

## NOTES AND COMMENTS

### OBSERVING UNOBSERVABLES: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES WITH A CONSUMER CREDIT FIELD EXPERIMENT

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Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of hidden information and hidden action problems in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers to former clients of a major South African lender along three dimensions: (i) an initial “offer interest rate” featured on a direct mail solicitation; (ii) a “contract interest rate” that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate; and (iii) a dynamic repayment incentive that was also a surprise and extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing. These three randomizations, combined with complete knowledge of the lender’s information set, permit identification of specific types of private information problems. Our setup distinguishes hidden information effects from selection on the offer rate (via unobservable risk and anticipated effort), from hidden action effects (via moral hazard in effort) induced by actual contract terms. We find strong evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence of hidden information problems. A rough estimate suggests that perhaps 13% to 21% of default is due to moral hazard. Asymmetric information thus may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high-risk borrowers.

**KEYWORDS:** Advanced selection, credit markets, development finance, information asymmetries microfinance, moral hazard.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES are important in theory. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) sparked a large theoretical literature on the role of asymmetric information in credit markets that has influenced economic policy and lending practice worldwide (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), Bebczuk (2003)). Theories show that information frictions and ensuing credit market failures can create inefficiency at both the micro and the macro level via underinvestment (Mankiw (1986), Gale (1990), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Hubbard (1998)), overinvestment (De Meza and Webb (1987), Bernanke and Gertler (1990)), or poverty traps (Mookherjee and Ray (2002)). Many policies

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have been put forth to address information asymmetry problems. A better understanding of which information asymmetries are empirically salient is critical for determining optimal remedies, if any.

Information asymmetries are difficult to identify in practice. Empirical evidence on the existence and importance of specific information frictions is relatively thin, in general, and particularly so for credit markets ([Chiappori and Salanie \(2000\)](#)). Distinguishing between hidden information and hidden action is difficult even when precise data on underwriting criteria and clean variation in contract terms are available, as a single interest rate may produce independent, conflated selection and incentive effects. For example, a positive correlation between loan default and a randomly assigned interest rate, conditional on observable risk, could be due to adverse selection *ex ante* (those with relatively high probabilities of default will be more likely to accept a high rate) or moral hazard *ex post* (because those given high rates have greater incentive to default).<sup>2</sup>

We test for the presence of distinct types of asymmetric information problems using a new field experiment methodology that was implemented by a South African finance company that typically lends at 200% APR. Our design randomizes interest rates independently along three dimensions: (i) the interest rate offered in a direct-mail solicitation; (ii) the actual interest rate on the loan contract; (iii) the interest rate offered on future loans. The design produces borrowers who select in at identical rates and then face different repayment incentives going forward, and borrowers who select in at different rates and then face identical repayment incentives.

The ability to disentangle hidden information (defined here as *ex-ante* selection effects, which includes both selection on unobserved risk type, i.e., classic adverse selection, and selection on unobserved anticipated effort) from hidden action (defined here as *ex-post* incentive effects) is critical from a policy and practical perspective. For instance, hidden information problems should motivate policymakers and lenders to consider subsidies, loan guarantees, information coordination, and enhanced screening strategies. Hidden action problems should motivate policymakers and lenders to consider legal reforms in the areas of liability and garnishment, and enhanced dynamic contracting schemes.

Our theoretical model formalizes how our experimental design can disentangle hidden information from hidden action effects. The model also highlights an interesting limitation of the design for testing theory: it can only isolate the effect of classic adverse selection (on risk type alone) if there is no hidden

<sup>2</sup>See [Ausubel \(1999\)](#) for a related discussion of the problem of disentangling adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market. See [Chiappori and Salanie \(2000\)](#) on the analogous problem in insurance markets. Insurance markets have been the subject of relatively active interplay between theoretical and empirical contributions, but recent papers on other markets have also made important strides toward identifying the independent effects of adverse selection and/or moral hazard; see, for example, [Cardon and Hendel \(2001\)](#) on health insurance, and [Shearer \(2004\)](#) on labor contracts.

action effect (i.e., no moral hazard in effort). The limitation comes from the fact that, in a world with both hidden information and hidden action problems, there can be selection on two distinct forms of hidden information: selection on unobserved risk type (classic adverse selection) and selection on unobserved anticipated effort. In that case our design identifies effects of the reduced-form combination of both forms of hidden information; i.e., of selection on the two different forms of ex-ante unobservables.

Our empirical results indicate weak evidence of hidden information and strong evidence of economically significant moral hazard. A rough estimate suggests that moral hazard explains perhaps 13% to 21% of default in our sample. Information asymmetries thus may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high-risk borrowers at very high rates.

## 2. MARKET AND LENDER OVERVIEW

Our cooperating lender operated for over 20 years as one of the largest, most profitable micro-lenders in South Africa. It competed in a “cash loan” industry segment that offers small, high interest, short-term, uncollateralized credit with fixed monthly repayment schedules to a “working poor” population.<sup>3</sup>

Cash loan borrowers generally lack access to traditional institutional sources such as commercial banks. Cash loan sizes tend to be small relative to the fixed costs of underwriting and monitoring them, but substantial relative to a typical borrower’s income. For example, the lender’s median loan size of R1000 (\$150) was 32% of its median borrower’s gross monthly income.

Cash lenders arose to substitute for traditional “informal sector” moneylenders following deregulation of the usury ceiling in 1992, and they are regulated by the Micro Finance Regulatory Council (MFRC). Cash lenders focusing on the observably highest-risk market segment typically make 1-month maturity loans at 30% interest per month. Informal sector moneylenders charge 30%–100% per month. Lenders targeting observably lower-risk segments charge as little as 3% per month.<sup>4</sup>

Our cooperating lender’s product offerings were somewhat differentiated from competitors. It did not pursue collection or collateralization strategies such as direct debit from paychecks or physically keeping bank books and ATM

<sup>3</sup>Aggregate outstanding loans in this market segment equal 38% of non-mortgage consumer credit [Department of Trade and Industry South Africa \(2003\)](#).

<sup>4</sup>The cash loan market has important differences and similarities with “traditional” microcredit (e.g., the Grameen Bank, or government or non-profit lending programs). In contrast to our setting, most microcredit has been delivered by lenders with explicit social missions that target groups of female entrepreneurs, sometimes in group settings. On the other hand, the industrial organization of microcredit is trending steadily in the direction of the for-profit, more competitive delivery of individual, untargeted credit that characterizes the cash loan market ([Robinson \(2001\)](#), [Porteous \(2003\)](#)). This push is happening both from the bottom-up (non-profits converting to for-profits) as well as from the top-down (for-profits expanding into microcredit segments).

cards of clients. Its pricing was transparent and linear, with no surcharges, application fees, or insurance premiums added to the cost of the loan. The lender also had a “medium-maturity” product niche, with a 90% concentration of 4-month loans (Web Appendix Table I.A). Most other cash lenders focus on 1-month or 12+-month loans. The lender’s normal 4-month rates, absent this experiment, ranged from 7.75% to 11.75% per month depending on observable risk, with 75% of clients in the high-risk (11.75%) category.

Per standard practice in the cash loan market, essentially all of the lender’s underwriting and transactions were conducted face to face in its network of over 100 branches. Its risk assessment technology combined centralized credit scoring with decentralized loan officer discretion. Rejection was prevalent even with a modal rate of 200% annual percentage rate (APR); the lender denied 50% of new loan applicants. Reasons for rejection included unconfirmed employment, suspicion of fraud, poor credit rating, and excessive debt burden.

Applicants who were approved often defaulted on their loan obligation, despite facing several incentives to repay. Carrots included decreasing prices and increasing future loan sizes following good repayment behavior. Sticks included reporting to credit bureaus, frequent phone calls from collection agents, court summons, and wage garnishments. Repeat borrowers had default rates of about 15%; first-time borrowers defaulted twice as often.

### 3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

The sample frame consisted of 57,533 former clients<sup>5</sup> with good repayment histories from 86 predominantly urban branches. Everyone in the sample frame had borrowed from the lender within the past 24 months, and did not have a loan outstanding in the 30 days prior to the mailer. Web Appendix Tables I.A and I.B present summary statistics on the sample frame and the subsample of clients who obtained a loan in this study (Karlan and Zinman (2009)). The lender assigns prior borrowers into low-, medium-, and high-risk categories, and this determines the borrower’s loan pricing and maturity options under normal operations.

<sup>5</sup>Information asymmetries may be less prevalent among former clients than new clients if hidden type is revealed through the lending relationship (Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004)). Hence there is reason to expect that a lender faces more adverse selection among new clients (those who have not previously done business with the firm). The lender tried addressing this possibility by sending solicitations to 3000 individuals from a mailing list purchased from a consumer database. Only one person from this list borrowed. Another list was purchased from a different vendor, and 5000 letters were sent without randomized interest rates. Only two people responded. The lender had no previous experience with direct mail solicitation to new clients, and concluded that the lack of response was due to low-quality (fraudulent or untargeted) lists from the consumer database firms, or to consumer unfamiliarity with receiving a solicitation from a firm they have not done business with in the past. In general, unsolicited direct mail is not common in South Africa, but individuals are accustomed to receiving mail from firms with which they do business (e.g., the lender mails solicitations and monthly statements to prior and existing clients).

### 3.1. *Experimental Design and Integrity*

The experiment was conducted in three waves: July, September, and October 2003. In each wave clients were randomly assigned three interest rates conditional on their observable risk category. Rate ranged from an upper bound of the prior interest rate for each individual to a lower bound of 3.25% per month (see Web Appendix Tables VIII and IX for details on the rate distributions). The offer rate  $r^o$  was featured on the direct mailer. The contract and future rates  $r^c$  and  $r^f$  were only revealed to clients and loan officers if the client tookup the offer (i.e., applied), and after the loan officer completed her initial underwriting (Web Appendix Figure 1 shows the experimental operations, step-by-step).<sup>6</sup>

Our design contains built-in integrity checks for whether  $r^c$  and  $r^f$  were indeed surprises: both client takeup and loan officer approve/reject decisions were uncorrelated with the surprise rates (Web Appendix Table II, columns 4 and 5). Nor were there any instances of clients applying for the loan, being approved, and then not taking out the loan. This fact further corroborates that the contract rate and dynamic repayment incentive were surprises; i.e., that borrowers made takeup decisions with reference to  $r^o$  only.

5028 (8.7%) clients tookup the offer by applying for a loan. Clients applied by entering a branch office and filling out an application in person with a loan officer. Loan applications were taken and assessed as per the lender's normal underwriting procedures. The loan application process took at most one hour, typically less. Loan officers first updated observable information (current debt load, external credit report, and employment information) and decide whether to offer any loan based on their updated risk assessment. 4348 (86.5%) of applicants were approved. Next loan officers decided the maximum loan size and maturity for which applicants qualified. Each loan supply decision was made "blind" to the experimental rates; i.e., the credit, loan amount, and maturity length decisions were made as if the individual were applying to borrow at the normal rate dictated by her observable risk class.<sup>7</sup>

After clients choose an allowable loan size and maturity, special software revealed  $r^c$  in the 41% cases that it was lower than  $r^o$  (otherwise no mention was made of a potentially lower rate). Loan officers were instructed to present the lower contract rate as simply what the computer dictated, not as part of a special promotion or anything particular to the client. Due to operational constraints, clients were then permitted to adjust their desired loan size following

<sup>6</sup>Web Appendix Table II, columns 1–3 shows that, as one would expect, the randomly assigned rates were essentially uncorrelated with baseline client characteristics, conditional on observable risk. The prevalence of significant correlations (3 out of 45 cases) is what one would expect to occur by chance.

<sup>7</sup>A lower interest rate normally would allow for a larger loan. This would work against identifying moral hazard on the interest rate, so we constrained the maximum allowable loan size to be calculated based on the normal, not experimental, interest rate.

the revelation of  $r^c$ . In theory, endogenizing loan size in this fashion can work against identifying moral hazard on the contract rate (since a lower  $r^c$  strengthens repayment incentives *ceteris paribus*, but might induce choice of a higher loan size that weakens repayment incentives). In practice, however, only about 3% of borrowers who received  $r^c < r^o$  changed their loan demand after  $r^c$  was revealed.

Last, 47% of clients were randomly assigned and informed of a dynamic incentive  $r^f$  in which clients received the same low contract interest rate on all future loans for one year as long as they remained in good standing with the lender.<sup>8</sup> This explicitly raised the benefits of repaying the initial loan on time (or equivalently the cost of defaulting) in the 98% of cases where the contract rate was less than the lender's normal rate. The average discount embodied in  $r^c$ , and hence  $r^f$ , was substantial: an average of 350 basis points off the monthly rate. Moreover, the lender's prior data suggested that, conditional on borrowing once, a client would borrow again within a year more than half the time. Clients not receiving the dynamic incentive obtained  $r^c$  for just the first loan (which had only a 4-month maturity in 80% of the cases). Clients were informed of  $r^f$  by the branch manager only after all paperwork had been completed and all other terms of the loan were finalized.

### 3.2. *Default Outcomes*

Following the execution of the loan contract we tracked repayment behavior using the lender's administrative data.

In principle, a measure of default should summarize the true economic cost of lending. In practice the true cost is very difficult to measure because of uncertainty and fixed costs in originating, monitoring, and collections. Given these difficulties, the lender lacked a summary statistic for default, and instead relied on a range of proxies for true costs (this is common practice). Consultation with the lender suggested focusing on three measures: (i) monthly average proportion past due (the average default amount in each month divided by the total debt burden); (ii) proportion of months in arrears (the number of months with positive arrearage divided by the number of months in which the loan was outstanding); and (iii) account in collection status (typically, the lender considered a loan in collection status if there are three or more months of payments in arrears). Web Appendix Table I.A presents summary statistics on these default measures. We also create a summary index that aggregates across these three measures of default to allow us to address the problem of multiple inference [Kling, Liebman, and Katz \(2007\)](#).

<sup>8</sup>For operational reasons, the dynamic repayment incentive was randomized at the branch level during the first and second wave of the experiment, and at the individual level for the third wave.

### 3.3. Identification Strategy: Intuition

A stylized example, illustrated in Figure 1, captures the heart of our identification strategy. Individuals decide whether to takeup at the solicitation's offer rate  $r^o$ , which can be "high" or "low." Of those that takeup at the high  $r^o$ , some are randomly surprised with a new lower contract interest rate  $r^c$ , while the remainder continue to receive the high rate (i.e.,  $r^c = r^o$ ). We identify any hidden information effect (the combination of selection on risk and on anticipated effort induced through selection on the offer rate) by considering the sample that received the low  $r^c$ , and comparing the repayment behavior of those who tookup at the high  $r^o$  (cells 2 and 3 in the figure) with those who tookup at the low  $r^o$  (cells 4 and 5). Because everyone in this sample was randomly assigned identical contracts (i.e., low  $r^c$ ), but selected in at varying, randomly assigned rates, any difference in repayment comes from hidden information: from selection on unobservables, including both type and anticipated effort, induced by  $r^o$ .

Similarly, we identify any effect of hidden action (moral hazard) by considering the sample that tookup at the high  $r^o$ , and comparing the repayment behavior of those who received the high  $r^c$  (cell 1) with those who received the low  $r^c$  (cells 2 and 3). These borrowers selected in identically, but ultimately received randomly different  $r^c$ . Any difference in default comes from the resulting moral hazard. We also identify moral hazard by comparing the repayment behavior of borrowers who both selected in and contracted at identical rates, but face different dynamic repayment incentives from randomly assigned future interest rates  $r^f$  that are conditional on repayment of the initial loan (cell 2 v. cell 3; cell 4 v. cell 5).




FIGURE 1.—Some basic intuition for our identification strategy.



## 4. THEORETICAL MODEL AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY

We now formalize what can be learned about the presence or absence of different types of asymmetric information problems from empirical tests based on our design. To do this, we provide a model of loan takeup and repayment in the presence of hidden information (in the form of risky prospects and anticipated effort) and hidden actions (in the form of realized effort). Our goal is not to put forward new theory that incorporates both adverse selection and moral hazard and discusses their interplay (e.g., Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997)), but rather to detail precisely what is meant by each in this context. Models with similar features can be found in many sources (e.g., Bardhan and Udry (1999)). Because the lender decisions included in the model are randomized, we only need to model borrower decisions. We do this in three stages, following the experimental design:

1. The individual decides whether or not to borrow at an exogenously set offer rate  $r^o$ . In making this decision, the individual believes that any repeat loans will be provided at the lender's normal interest rate  $r$ .

2. The lender randomly lowers the interest rate for some borrowers to  $r^c < r^o$ . With an independent randomization the lender also lowers the repeat borrowing rate to  $r^f = r^c < r$  for some borrowers. Given  $r^c$  and  $r^f$  the borrower decides how much effort,  $e \in [\underline{e}, \bar{e}]$ , to put into generating cash flows to repay the loan.

3. Cash flows (i.e., project returns) are realized and the borrower decides whether or not to repay the loan.

We define the borrower's decision process as follows. Each individual has the opportunity to invest in a project but is liquidity constrained and requires financing of 1 from a single lender to do so. We refer to "project" here in a broad sense that includes household as well as entrepreneurial activities. Individuals are indexed by a risk type  $\theta_i \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ . The project either succeeds ( $g$ ) and returns  $Y(\theta_i)$  or fails ( $b$ ) and returns 0. The probability of project success  $\pi(\theta_i, e)$  is a function of the project risk type,  $\theta_i$ , and the effort put forth by the borrower,  $e \in [\underline{e}, \bar{e}]$ . Both risk type and effort are observable to the borrower but incompletely observable to the lender. The borrower is subject to a state specific cost of default,  $C_i(r^f)$ ,  $i = g, b$ , which is a decreasing function of the future lending rate. Under limited liability  $C_b(r^f) < C_g(r^f)$ , but we will explore the implications of relaxing this assumption below.

We assume that the borrower is risk neutral and we make the following assumptions regarding returns and repayment:

**ASSUMPTION 1:**  $Y(\theta_i) > 1 + r^o$  for all  $\theta_i$ : if the project succeeds, the loan can be repaid at the offer interest rate. If the project fails the loan cannot be repaid (this follows from the borrower's liquidity constraint).

**ASSUMPTION 2:**  $\frac{\partial \pi(\theta_i, e)}{\partial e} > 0$ ;  $\frac{\partial^2 \pi}{\partial e^2} < 0$ : the likelihood of project success is increasing and concave in effort.



ASSUMPTION 3:  $\frac{\partial \pi(\theta_i, e)}{\partial \theta_i} < 0$ : the likelihood of project success is decreasing in risk type.

ASSUMPTION 4:  $\pi(\theta_i, e)Y(\theta_i) = \bar{Y}(e)$  for all  $\theta_i$ : all risk types have the same expected project return. This follows Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and implies that projects with a higher  $\theta_i$  are “riskier” in terms of second order stochastic dominance. It also implies, as we show below, that borrowers with higher  $\theta$  choose a lower effort level.

ASSUMPTION 5:  $C_g(r^f) \geq 1 + r^o$  for all relevant  $r^f$ : there is no strategic default. We make this assumption because we do not observe empirically why the borrower repays or not (e.g., whether the project succeeds or fails) and hence cannot test separately for each of the possible channels through which hidden actions affect repayment. So we use the model to focus on what can be learned about moral hazard in effort under the assumption that borrowers repay if they are able. An alternative interpretation (given our broad definition of “project”) is that “effort” is a tractable way to model all borrower activities that impact repayment.

We now turn to solving the three stages of the model. Consider a borrower using backwards induction:

### Stage 3

By Assumptions 1 and 5 the borrower repays if and only if the project succeeds.

### Stage 2

Knowing that she will repay if and only if the project succeeds, the borrower chooses effort to solve:

$$\max_{e \in [e_L, e_H]} \pi(\theta_i, e)((Y(\theta_i) - 1 - r^c + C_b(r^f)) - e - C_b(r^f)).$$

Effort is decreasing in  $r^c$  given Assumption 2. This implies:

HIDDEN ACTION EFFECT 1: Effort is decreasing in  $r^c$  given Assumption 2. A given set of borrowers exerts less effort at higher contract interest rates than at lower contract interest rates, holding constant offer and future interest rates. Thus repayment is decreasing in  $r^c$ .

Effort is also decreasing in  $r^f$  given Assumptions 1, 2, and 5. This implies:

HIDDEN ACTION EFFECT 2: A given set of borrowers exerts less effort as the cost of default decreases, holding constant offer and contract interest rates. Thus repayment is decreasing in  $r^f$ .

Risk type,  $\theta_i$ , also affects effort, which then affects repayment. To see this note the borrower's first order condition for optimal effort:

$$\frac{\partial \pi(\theta_i, e)}{\partial e} (Y(\theta_i) - 1 - r^c + C_b(r^f)) = 1$$

Given Assumption 4, we can implicitly define optimal effort  $\hat{e}$  as a function of  $r^c$ ,  $C_b(r^f)$ , and  $\theta_i$ .

$$(1) \quad \frac{(1 - \bar{Y}'(\hat{e}(r^c, C_b(r^f), \theta_i))Y(\theta_i))}{\bar{Y}'(\hat{e}(r^c, C_b(r^f), \theta_i))} = C_b(r^f) - 1 - r^c.$$

Equation (1) implies that  $\hat{e}(r^c, C_b(r^f), \theta_i)$  must be a decreasing function of  $\theta_i$ , i.e., *ceteris paribus*, higher risk borrowers put in less effort.<sup>9</sup> We use this finding below to help interpret our third effect, the effect of the offer rate on repayment.

### Stage 1

An individual decides to take up the offer if the expected return from her project, given expected optimized effort at the offer interest rate,  $\hat{e}(r^o, C_b(r), \theta_i)$ ,<sup>10</sup> is greater than her next-best option (set to zero for simplicity). That is, an individual borrows from the lender if and only if

$$(2) \quad \pi(\theta_i, \hat{e}(r^o, C_b(r), \theta_i))(Y(\theta_i) - 1 - r^o + C_b(r)) - \hat{e}(r^o, C_b(r), \theta_i) - C_b(r) \geq 0,$$

where  $\hat{e}(r^o, C_b(r), \theta_i)$  is the optimal level of effort for an individual with project type  $\theta_i$  that borrows and expects to pay the offer interest rate,  $r^o$ .

If we assume that  $C_b(r) < 1 + r^o$  then the left-hand side of (2) is increasing in riskiness,  $\theta_i$ . To see this, note that the envelope theorem implies that the increase in  $\theta_i$  has no indirect effect through effort. The only effect of increasing  $\theta_i$  comes through the term  $\pi(\theta_i, \hat{e})$ , which has a negative first derivative by Assumption 3. Consequently, for a given  $r^o$ , either all borrowers will take out a loan, or there will be a separation with those with a higher  $\theta_i$  taking a loan. We define the implicit function  $\underline{\theta}(r^o)$  as the  $\theta_i$  below which individuals, offered interest rate  $r^o$ , do not borrow, i.e. the  $\theta_i$  at which equation (2) equals zero. The implicit function theorem implies that:

$$(3) \quad \frac{d\underline{\theta}(r^o)}{dr^o} > 0.$$

<sup>9</sup>This follows from the concavity of  $\pi$  in effort.

<sup>10</sup>In stage one the borrower evaluates optimal effort at the offer rate and standard future borrowing rate because any surprise rates have not yet been revealed (see Web Appendix Table II, column 4 for corroborating evidence that takeup is uncorrelated with surprise rates).

This partial derivative implies that higher offer interest rates lead to a riskier pool of clients. Coupled with Assumption 4, this produces the classic Stiglitz–Weiss adverse selection effect: a higher offer interest rate leads to a lower repayment rate.

If  $C_b(r) > 1 + r^o$ , which is implied by  $C_b(r) \geq C_g(r)$ , we would get the opposite result. That is, increasing the interest rate would lead to less risk in the borrower pool—advantageous selection. The classic adverse selection result relies heavily on the asymmetry of borrower default costs across states. While the empirical prevalence of limited liability gives the asymmetry assumption some appeal, there may be cases in which it does not hold. Our empirical results, will shed light on the plausibility of the asymmetry assumption.

Note also that Equation (3) is only true for a marginal change in  $r^o$ . If we consider a discrete change in  $r^o$  the risk pool will change through two channels. One is the classic Stiglitz–Weiss adverse selection effect. Two is an anticipated effort effect that cannot be signed theoretically without an additional assumption: although we know from (1) that riskier clients exert less effort, we can only assert that the anticipated effort effect here actually draws in riskier clients (and thereby reinforces the classic adverse selection effect) by assuming that the cost of additional effort at the discretely higher rate is greater than the benefit. So without that additional assumption the net effect of  $r^o$  on the risk pool and hence on repayment is ambiguous in theory. Of course we will test the net effect empirically.

**HIDDEN INFORMATION EFFECT:** We label the net effect of  $r^o$  on repayment “Hidden Information” because it only exists if there is selection on unobservables prior to actual effort choice.

It is important to note that what we learn about the nature of asymmetric information from the empirical test of how  $r^o$  affects repayment depends on whether we find either of the hidden action effects (i.e., on whether there is moral hazard in effort). If there is no hidden action effect then the test identifies any effect of classic adverse selection (or of advantageous selection) on risk. If there is a hidden action effect then our test identifies the reduced-form combination of any classic adverse selection effect and an effect of selection on anticipated effort that may either reinforce or offset any classic adverse selection. In this case the offer rate provides a one-sided test for hidden information: if we find that  $r^o$  affects repayment this is evidence of a hidden information problem that works through either or both channels (classic adverse selection and/or selection on anticipated effort). But if we find that  $r^o$  does not affect repayment we might be failing to identify offsetting effects of classic adverse selection and advantageous selection on anticipated effort that can still have negative welfare consequences.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup>See Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) for evidence and discussion on the effects of offsetting selection on risk exposure and other decision inputs.

In sum, our experimental design allow us, under the assumptions detailed above, to differentiate between hidden information and hidden action effects that have theoretical and policy relevance. Below we present the empirical results and then discuss implications in the [Conclusion](#).

## 5. RESULTS

Table [I](#) presents estimates from an empirical model of default that tests for the three asymmetric information effects derived above:

$$(4) \quad Y_i = \alpha + \beta_o r^o + \beta_c r^c + \beta_b C + X_i + \varepsilon_o,$$

where  $Y_i$  is one of the measures of default described in Section [3.2](#), and  $X_i$  is a vector of the randomization conditions: observable risk, mailer wave, and branch.<sup>12</sup> Adding controls for loan size and maturity does not change the results. We estimate equation (4) on the entire sample of 4348 individuals who obtained a loan. The specifications in Table [I](#) vary only in how they measure default, and in whether the dynamic repayment incentive  $C$  is measured as a binary variable ( $= 1$  if  $r^f = r^c$  on future loans conditional on good repayment of initial loan) or with binary and continuous ( $r - r^f$ ) variables. Columns 1–6 estimate the effects of the randomly assigned interest rates on default using individual default measures. Columns 7 and 8 use a summary index of the three default measures; these results are interpreted as the average effect of the interest rate on default, in standard deviation units.

The first row of Table [I](#) presents estimates of  $\beta_c$ , the effect of the contract rate on default. This coefficient identifies any Hidden Action Effect [1](#), with  $\beta_c > 0$  indicating moral hazard in effort on the contract rate. Seven out of the eight coefficients are positive; the one marginally significant result (column 3) implies that a 100 basis point cut would reduce the average number of months in arrears by 3%.

The next row presents estimates of  $\beta_b$ , the effect of the dynamic repayment incentive on default. Every specification points to economically and statistically significant moral hazard. Columns 1, 3, and 5 imply that clients assigned any dynamic incentive defaulted an estimated 13 to 21 percent less than the mean. The summary index test also finds a large and significant effect. Columns 2, 4, and 6 show that the effect is increasing in and driven by the size of the discount on future loans, as each 100 basis point decrease in  $r^f$  reduces default by about 4% in the full sample. The second-to-last row of the table shows that binary incentive and the size of the discount are jointly significant in all specifications.

<sup>12</sup>The dynamic incentive was randomized at the branch office level in waves 1 and 2 and hence the error term allows for clustering at the branch level. This is done to allow for the possibility that borrowers in the same branch are subject to similar shocks. Thus following [Bloom \(2005\)](#) and [Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer \(2006\)](#) we cluster the standard errors at the unit of randomization.

TABLE I  
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF HIDDEN INFORMATION AND HIDDEN ACTION: FULL SAMPLE

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	OLS							
	<i>Monthly Average Proportion Past Due</i>		<i>Proportion of Months in Arrears</i>		<i>Account in Collection Status</i>		<i>Standardized Index of Three Default Measures</i>	
Mean of Dependent Variable:	0.09	0.09	0.22	0.22	0.12	0.12	0	0
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Contract rate (Hidden Action Effect 1)	0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.006* (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.014 (0.011)	0.004 (0.013)
Dynamic repayment incentive dummy (Hidden Action Effect 2)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.000 (0.017)	-0.028** (0.011)	0.004 (0.021)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.020)	-0.080** (0.032)	-0.000 (0.057)
Dynamic repayment incentive size		-0.005 (0.004)		-0.009** (0.004)		-0.006 (0.005)		-0.023* (0.013)
Offer rate (Hidden Information Effect)	0.005 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.015 (0.011)	0.015 (0.012)
Observations	4348	4348	4348	4348	4348	4348	4348	4348
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.15	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.11
Probability(both dynamic incentive variables = 0)		0.06		0.00		0.06		0.01
Probability(all 3 or 4 interest rate variables = 0)	0.0004	0.0005	0.0003	0.0012	0.0006	0.0016	0.0000	0.0001

\*significant at 10%; \*\*significant at 5%; \*\*\*significant at 1%. Each column presents results from a single OLS model with the RHS variables shown and controls for the randomization conditions: observable risk, month of offer letter, and branch. Adding loan size and maturity as additional controls does not change the results. Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the branch level. "Offer rate" and "Contract rate" are in monthly percentage point units (7.00% interest per month is coded as 7.00). "Dynamic repayment incentive" is an indicator variable equal to one if the contract interest rate is valid for one year (rather than just one loan) before reverting back to the normal (higher) interest rates. "Dynamic repayment incentive size" interacts the above indicator variable with the difference between the lender's normal rate for that individual's risk category and the experimentally assigned contract interest rate. A positive coefficient on the Offer Rate variable indicates hidden information, a positive coefficient on the Contract Rate or Dynamic Repayment Incentive variables indicates hidden action (moral hazard).

The dependent variable in columns (7) and (8) is a summary index of the three dependent variables used in columns (1)–(6). The summary index is the mean of the standardized value for each of the three measures of default.

The next row presents estimates of  $\beta_o$ , the effect of the offer rate on default. Given the presence of moral hazard this coefficient identifies a net Hidden Information Effect that is the combination of any classic adverse selection, and selection on anticipated effort that may either reinforce or offset any classic adverse selection. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates net adverse (advantageous) selection on hidden information. The point estimates are positive in all eight specifications but never significant.

The bottom row shows the  $F$ -test  $p$ -value for the null hypothesis of no asymmetric information effects on default (i.e., that all of the interest rate coefficients = 0). This hypothesis is rejected with >99% confidence in each of the 8 specifications.

Web Appendix Table III shows that we find similar results if we bin clients along the lines of Web Appendix Figure 1 and compare means. The Web Appendix also contains additional results (in Tables IV–VIII) on heterogeneity in hidden information and hidden action effects by gender and borrowing history, and on the efficiency of the lender's underwriting process.

## 6. CONCLUSION

We develop a new market field experiment methodology that disentangles hidden information from hidden action effects. The experiment was implemented on a sample of successful prior borrowers by a for-profit lender in a high-risk South African consumer loan market. The results indicate significant moral hazard, with weaker evidence for adverse selection on hidden information.

Practically, identifying the existence and prevalence of any specific information asymmetries is important because of the preponderance of credit market interventions that presuppose credit rationing arising from these asymmetric information problems. But theory and practice are far ahead of the empirical evidence. To craft optimal policies and business strategies, we need answers to at least three key questions:

- Which models of information asymmetries (if any) accurately describe existing markets?
- What lending practices are effective at mitigating information asymmetries?
- What are the welfare implications of resolving information asymmetry problems in credit markets?

Our paper makes inroads to the first question only in one particular market and, hence, does not lead directly to a policy prescription.

There are many promising directions for future research and we mention a few. One is replicating our experimental design in different markets. There is particularly strong motivation for studying more marginal (e.g., first-time) borrowers, since these borrowers are the focus of many interventions and may pose relatively severe hidden information problems. Our design can also be

adapted to other product and service markets in which it is useful to separate selection effects from ex-post incentive effects.

Another direction is to design tests that address the key confound discussed in the theoretical section: selection processes can attract types who exert less unobserved effort as well as types who are the innately more risky. Collecting supplemental data on margins of effort and riskiness that are not typically observed by the principal can help isolate these different selection channels (Finkelstein and McGarry (2006); Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008)). Another approach to isolating adverse selection on risk would be to study contexts where effort can be observed (e.g., settings where firms can closely monitor employee actions and productivity).

Uncovering the actual nature and practical implications (if any) of asymmetric information problems in credit markets will require theoretical as well as empirical progress. We highlight a fundamental entangling of selection and effort, specifically that selection processes may draw in individuals with different anticipated effort as well as with different project risks. Thus the clean theoretical distinction between adverse selection and moral hazard may not be identifiable empirically in many contexts. Salanie (2005) lauds the “constant interaction between theory and empirical studies” (p. 221) that has characterized the closely related literature on insurance markets. Comparably intense interactions would deepen our understanding of credit markets, and field experiments can be a useful tool for testing and refining theories as well as practice.

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