

# QRSMS: A SMS client with end-to-end encryption via Quick Response (QR) code

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the emergence of instant messaging (IM) and Over-the-top (OTT) messaging applications, short message service (SMS) remains as a popular option for mobile communication. With the first text message sent in 1992 through the Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) network, the technology has seen a lot of growth and development [1]. While mostly used for person-to-person communication [2], the medium has seen other applications such as alert notification [3], [4], empowering businesses and online services [5]–[7], mobile health (m-health) interventions [8], [9], mobile government applications [10], [11], education [12], Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) [13] and more. During the year 2022, Globe Telecom gained Php 8.8 billion revenue from SMS with 86.7 million mobile customers. Furthermore, the company has invested Php 1.1 billion to improve spam and fraudulent SMS detection and prevention [14]. Unreliable internet service as well as the lack of Internet infrastructure in some area remains a challenge in the adoption of online services for communication such as Facebook Messenger, Viber, Telegram, etc. SMS on the other hand is ubiquitous. Anyone with a mobile device and a registered subscriber identity module (SIM) card can send and receive text messages regardless of their platform and cellular provider [15].

Regardless of its wide range of applications and sustained use, however, SMS is not ideal for private communication such as sending sensitive and confidential information as early specifications for SMS does not have security in mind [16]. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) specified the use of A5 algorithm for encryption over the GSM network together with the A3 and A8 algorithm for authentication and cipher key generation to provide security [17] but attacks on the A5/1 and the weaker A5/2 algorithms has been demonstrated even with minimal resources [18]–[20] and even the A5/3 used for Third Generation (3G) network has been compromised [21]. Mobile network operators may also opt not to use any encryption during the transit of message wirelessly [22]. This means that a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) can sit between the Mobile Equipment (ME) and Base Station Subsystem (BSS) using an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catcher to actively intercept traffic and even request the victim ME to use a weaker or no encryption at all [23]. Additionally, encryption is only performed between

the Mobile Equipment (ME) and the Base Station Subsystem (BSS) [17]. Once the message reaches the SMS Center (SMSC), messages are stored and kept in plain text for a while allowing malicious entities to target the SMSC to view the contents of these messages. This makes an end-to-end encryption a huge improvement over what is available in the GSM specifications.

To provide a better security system for SMS, independent researchers have proposed frameworks and protocols that offers end-to-end encryption. PK-SIM [24] provides end-to-end security between the mobile user and service provider through Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). SMSec [25] was developed using the Java Wireless Messaging API (WAP) and uses a combination of asymmetric and symmetric cryptography to provide security. EasySMS [26] and SecureSMS [7] are completely based on symmetric key cryptography. Similarly, SmartSMS [27] uses symmetric key encryption for m-health application. These protocols however, requires additional resources and infrastructure on the side of the service provider in order to be implemented.

This paper propose an SMS client that uses quick-response (QR) codes for key exchange. Initially developed by Toyota's subsidiary Denso Wave for inventory of vehicle parts manufacturing, QR code has seen many application in today's era [28]. Able to store up to a maximum of 7,089 characters in one code [29] it can be used to encode text, URL, and other data and can be decoded using a mobile device equipped with a camera and the appropriate software which can display a text, connect to a wireless network, open a webpage, or open a linked application [30]. The proposed client will encode the public key and parameters needed to generate a shared secret in a QR code. The code can be shared to the intended recipient through offline (in person) or other secure online platform that allows sending of images.

End-to-end security will be achieved through the combined use of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography as well a key-agreement protocol. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) will be used for encrypting the message as it provides the most security while being performant [31]. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) will be used for generating key pairs and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) for generating a shared secret. The use of ECC allows for a smaller key length while providing an comparable security as the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) public key cryptosystem [32].

The proposed method will use the android platform to develop an SMS client that can generate keypair, exchange public keys through QR code, and establish an end-to-end

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## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Regardless of the insecurity present in SMS, due to its wide spread application, it remains to be of use to many users around the world. To provide better end-to-end security, protocols/frameworks has been proposed.

PK-SIM [24] card is a framework developed based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) providing end-to-end encryption between the Service Provider (SP) and the mobile user which contains the PK-SIM card. Their framework is composed of the mobile client, a Certification Authority and Registration Authority (CA/RA), a Secure Access gateway (SAG) found in the service provider's infrastructure and the Mobile Operator (MO) that provides the network for SMS communication. Before the user can send secure messages, the SAG together, with the CA/RA must first validate the identity of the mobile client. A primary key shared between the client and the SAG is generated during the authentication phase. This key is used to establish a session key which is used to symmetrically encrypt/decrypt the message. However, in their approach, end-to-end security is only available between the mobile client and the SAG on the Service Provider's side. Additionally, it is stated that the generation of primary key in the authentication phase takes up to a day or longer. Every time this key expires, the protocol must be performed again from the beginning. Similarly, the SMSec [25] protocol is designed such that it uses a combination of asymmetric cryptography for authenticating the user and uses symmetric cryptography for the actual exchange of messages. It also falls short such that end-to-end encryption is between the mobile device and the authentication source. Unlike PK-SIM however, SMSec is a software solution built with the Java Wireless Messaging API (WAP).

In contrast, the EasySMS [26] protocol is designed to provide end-to-end encryption using only symmetric algorithm. In their approach, an Authentication Server (AS) is responsible for the storage of all secret key shared between the AS and the respective Mobile Station (MS) or the user. It is also assumed that there is a shared secret key between the AS and a CA/RA which contains information about every mobile subscriber. Before a SIM card could be used, a subscriber must first register within the CA/RA. With these requirements met, the AS, with the help of CA/RA can now authenticate any MS that wants to send an SMS securely. However, this approach falls under the same disadvantage as the previous protocols. When user A wants to send a message to user B, the AS validates the identity of both users and generate different key for each respective user. This means that the message from user A is encrypted with the key shared between the AS and user A, decrypted in the AS then re-encrypt the message for user B using the key shared between the AS and user B. This approach is also used for the development of SecueSMS [7] but is proposed to be specific for value added services (VAS) and commercial applications. SmartSMS [27] follows a similar concept but instead of the AS being connected to a CA/RA, a trusted third party hosted in a public cloud is responsible for the functions of CA/RA.

In these protocol, apart from being not truly end-to-end

encrypted (encryption only occurs between the mobile station and the service provider), they also require a third party for authenticating the user. This means that in order to achieve secure communication, changes within the service provider's and the network itself must be consider. This paper will introduce a different approach that does not require additional infrastructure by having the ciphertext sent through the SMS network while encryption and decryption is performed by the communicating devices.

## III. OBJECTIVES

To create a secure platform for the exchange of encrypted SMS, the main objective of this research is to develop an SMS client application that can encrypt and decrypt messages and utilize QR codes as means of exchanging keys for generating a shared secret. To be specific, this research aims to do the following:

1. Design and implement a key-agreement protocol using QR code as means for key exchange.
2. Design and implement an SMS client for mobile android device with end-to-end encryption.
3. Conduct a usability study of the SMS client application.

## IV. MATERIALS AND METHODS

Equipped with features and support for developing android applications, Android Studio will be used as the integrated development environment (IDE). The programming language Kotlin will also be used for the application as it fully supported for android development as well as it eliminates the verbosity of Java while also allowing the use of Java libraries [33]. The android platform comes with telephony and cryptographic libraries that will help achieve the goals of the application [34].

To achieve end-to-end encryption, both the sending and receiving party must have the application installed and have exchanged their QR code generated by the application through other means suggested below. In case only one party has the software installed, if they decide to send an encrypted message to a user without the application, the latter might receive the message in ciphertext. If the opposite were to occur, the application should be able to determine if the received text was encrypted or not. In general, for the software to perform its intended function, the following requirements must be considered. The application should be able to:

1. Send and receive encrypted SMS message.
2. Decrypt encrypted SMS message.
3. Generate a private and public key pair.
4. Encode the user's public key along with other parameters needed to perform a key exchange into a QR code.
5. Decode the QR code containing the other participant's public key and parameters to generate the shared secret.
6. Safely store secrets inside the device.
7. Associate the correct keys to the appropriate contact.
8. Allow users to manage saved keys.

It should be noted that in order to keep the integrity of the system, an assumption is made that the user will not feed a QR code whose origin is unknown. To ensure that the code




Fig. 1. Overview of key generation and key agreement in QRSMS




Fig. 2. Overview of sending and decryption of messages in QRSMS

being decoded is from the intended contact, the QR code should only come from the other party involved in the secure communication through other means such as offline (in-person exchange) or secure online application. That said, the method in which the QR codes are exchanged between users will not be included in the analysis of the security of the application. This eliminates the need for authentication methods as the users themselves are the one responsible for ensuring that the participant in the exchange is the intended recipient. This assumption sets the scope of the study such that the paper will focus on investigating the usability of the SMS client which uses QR code for key exchange.

Since there are no built-in libraries for encoding and decoding of QR code, ZXing [35] and Google's ML kit barcode scanning [36] will be bundled with the application to provide

the missing functionalities. The `javax.crypto` library contains the `KeyAgreement` class needed to establish a shared secret as well as the `Cipher` class that contains the functionalities for symmetric encryption. The `java.security` library will enable us to use the `KeyGenerator` class which allows the generation of public and private key pair using EC.

#### A. Key-Agreement Protocol

To achieve end-to-end security, participants in the exchange should be able to generate a shared key known only to them. This process can be further divided into two steps. Keypair generation and shared secret key generation. This two step process is shown in Figure 1.

1) *Keypair Generation*: Before enabling the exchange of encrypted messages, each party involved must first generate

their public and private key pair. For each contact the user wants to exchange keys with, a unique key pair will be generated using Elliptic Curve (EC) algorithm. The generated public key will be encoded to a QR code while the complementing private key will be kept securely in the system and will be used to finalize the key exchange.

2) *Shared Secret key Generation*: Once each party have their generated QR code, they will give their QR code to the other allowing them to scan and use the key. Using ECDH, their private key for that particular user will be fed along with the scanned public key to generate a shared secret. This process is illustrated in fig. 1. The shared secret will be stored inside Android's built in KeyStore to protect the keys from unauthorized use [37].

### B. Encrypted Messaging

With each of the user involved in the key-agreement now having generated a shared secret with their intended contact, the exchange of encrypted SMS can now begin. AES encryption algorithm can be used generate the ciphertext with the shared secret as the key for symmetric cryptography shown in fig. 2.

### C. User Testing

Throughout the duration of the development process, the features and interface of the system will be thoroughly tested to ensure that the program can perform its intended functions. However, upon the completion of a minimum viable product, usability test will be conducted to further inspect the working condition off the application as well as analyze users' thoughts with regards to the system. Users will be asked to perform various tasks that involves the following capabilities of the application:

1. Generation of QR code containing the public key to be used for a contact
2. Sending and Receiving of unencrypted and encrypted messages
3. Scanning and decoding of QR code received from a contact
4. Management of stored keys

Along with the given tasks are questionnaire that aims to understand users' perspective throughout their usage of the application. Single Ease Question (SEQ) will be asked after completing each task. With measures of central tendency, a general sentiment can be derived on how well the users performed in each of the tasks. This can provide an insight on the ease-of-use of the system. This is followed by a System Usability Scale (SUS) Questionnaire to assess the system's perceived usability.

### V. EXPECTED OUTCOME

Built for the Android Platform, QRSMS should be able to provide users the ability exchange end-to-end encrypted SMS to secure their conversations using QR code as means to exchange keys. Otherwise, the user should be able to send regular SMS if they choose to. To ensure smooth operation by




Fig. 3. QRSMS User Interface Prototype

the user, the system should be designed with a simple and user-friendly interface that user of any background can make use of the systems whole functionality. Figure 3 shows a prototype of the User Interface (UI) upon entering the application in which most of the significant functions of the system should be present and apparent.

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