

Downwind and Out: The Strategic Dispersion of Power Plants and Their Pollution

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- **Local** governments monitor air quality and participate in siting polluters/monitors

Problem: Air pollution can travel long distances and not all counties are monitored

- Regulation & enforcement are complicated!

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Why? Air-pollution regulation and monitoring is fraught with complexity.

We shed light on additional challenges regulators face under the current, federalist system.

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- Downwind siting for polluters as a strategy (*e.g.* Monogan III et. al (2017))
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Pervasiveness and problems with pollution transfer

- Sergi et. al (2020), Wang et. al (2020), Tessum et. al (2017)
 - Quantify extent of pollution transport in general + costs (health damages)

The Geography of US Power Plants

Data Sources

Generator Data: Emissions & Generation Integrated Database (eGRID) and EPAs EmPOWER Air Data Challenge.

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
Meteorology: NOAA's North American Regional Reanalysis (NARR) daily data

Historic wind patterns at various pressure levels. 32km × 32km grid cells across contiguous US

Distances to County Borders

Panel A: Distance to nearest **county** border


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
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Distances to State Borders

Panel B: Distance to nearest **state** border


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


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Water Borders: Example



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
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- Why would a smaller downwind area within a county be advantageous for a polluter? **Emissions will exit the jurisdiction faster.**

Main Idea: In the absence of regulatory avoidance, it should be a 50–50 flip whether the county's area downwind of the plant (in the EGU's county of residence) is larger or smaller than the area upwind.


- **Focus:** coal. Strongest incentive to avoid regulation.
- **Placebo:** natural gas. Less incentive to avoid regulation.

Downwind vs. Upwind Area

(a) Plant 628



(b) Plant 1378



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 - n_s : # plants for whom downwind area < upwind area
 - N_T : total # plants (within fuel type)
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 - Major drawback: cannot capture more nuanced strategy

Strategic Siting: Main Results

	Coal-fueled plants			Natural-gas-fueled plants		
	(1) All	(2) Post-CAA	(3) Pre-CAA	(4) All	(5) Post-CAA	(6) Pre-CAA
Panel a: Siting strategically within county						
Count	515	286	229	1,258	995	263
Count strategic	297	165	132	612	482	130
Percent strategic	57.67%	57.69%	57.64%	48.65%	48.44%	49.43%
Fisher's exact test of H_0 : In-county downwind area \geq upwind area						
<i>Under H_0: $E[\text{Percent strategic: County}] = 50\%$</i>						
P-value	0.0003	0.0054	0.0122	0.8381	0.8448	0.5974

Strategic Siting: Main Results

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	(1) All	(2) Post-CAA	(3) Pre-CAA	(4) All	(5) Post-CAA	(6) Pre-CAA
Panel b: Siting strategically within state						
Count	515	286	229	1,258	995	263
Count strategic	279	152	127	575	466	109
Percent strategic	54.17%	53.15%	55.46%	45.71%	46.83%	41.44%
Fisher's exact test of H_0 : In-county downwind area \geq upwind area						
<i>Under H_0: $E[\text{Percent strategic: State}] = 50\%$</i>						
P-value	0.0321	0.1574	0.0563	0.9989	0.9788	0.9978

The Geography of US Coal Emissions

Overview

We quantify the nature of the pollution transfer problem

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Model: HYbrid SIngle-Particle Lagrangian INtegrated TRAjectory (HYSPLIT)

- Atmospheric dispersion model. Heavily vetted by NOAA.
- Performs better than many other models (such as InMAP) for *long-distance* pollution transport modeling.

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Model: HYbrid SIngle-Particle Lagrangian INtegrated TRAjectory (HYSPLIT)

- Atmospheric dispersion model. Heavily vetted by NOAA.
- Performs better than many other models (such as InMAP) for *long-distance* pollution transport modeling.
- Coal-based particles will travel much further than other sources of PM.


Hysplit: Goals

We do the following:


- 1) Quantify how quickly coal-based particles leave their own county and state (it's fast).
- 2) Quantify the proportion of coal-based emissions that are from other counties/states in any given county/state.
- 3) Illustrate the implications of 1) and 2) with case studies.

Example Plants

(a) Plant 1378, January 2005



(b) Plant 1378, July 2005




Hours since release




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
(c) Plant 3470, January 2005



(d) Plant 3470, July 2005




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
Emissions Transport: Speed

Panel A: Percent of emissions outside of source's county—by hours since emission

Weighted across plants by mass of SO₂ emissions



Weighted across plants by mass of NO_x emissions





Month of operation —●— January —●— July

Emissions Transport: Speed

Panel B: Percent of emissions outside of source's state—by hours since emission

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


Month of operation —●— January —●— July

Emissions Transport: Shares

Panel A: Sources of local coal-based particles, weighted by mass of SO₂ emissions

Coal-fueled units in 2005 with capacity greater than 25 MW



Discussion

What did we do?

Main contributions:

- Descriptive results on the geography of physical power plants *and* their emissions.
 - Causal evidence of coal plants strategically locating to minimize downwind area.
- Clean Air Act did not seem to impact strategic siting.
- Descriptive results on pervasiveness of pollution transport problem from coal powered plants.

Thank you!

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