

On Fairness Concerns in the Blockchain Ecosystem

Johnnatan Messias
@johnnatan_me



Thesis defense



MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE
FOR SOFTWARE SYSTEMS


April 25, 2024 – Saarbrücken, Germany



UNIVERSITÄT
DES
SAARLANDES


What's a Blockchain?

- ▶ Blockchain is a **decentralized ledger** to record **transactions** between any two or more users
 - ▶ An **append-only** list of **cryptographically linked records** of transactions called **blocks**
 - ▶ Tamper evident




What's a Blockchain?

- ▶ Blockchain is a **decentralized ledger** to record **transactions** between any two or more users
 - ▶ An **append-only** list of **cryptographically linked records** of transactions called **blocks**
 - ▶ Tamper evident




What's a Blockchain?

- ▶ Blockchain is a **decentralized ledger** to record **transactions** between any two or more users
 - ▶ An **append-only** list of **cryptographically linked records** of transactions called **blocks**
 - ▶ Tamper evident




What's a Blockchain?

- ▶ Blockchain is a **decentralized ledger** to record **transactions** between any two or more users
 - ▶ An **append-only** list of **cryptographically linked records** of transactions called **blocks**
 - ▶ Tamper evident




What's a Blockchain?

- ▶ Blockchain is a **decentralized ledger** to record **transactions** between any two or more users
 - ▶ An **append-only** list of **cryptographically linked records** of transactions called **blocks**
 - ▶ Tamper evident




What's a Blockchain?

- ▶ Blockchain is a **decentralized ledger** to record **transactions** between any two or more users
 - ▶ An **append-only** list of **cryptographically linked records** of transactions called **blocks**
 - ▶ Tamper **It's a chain of blocks!**




How Transactions Are Ordered?

Money transfer




Smart contract interaction




1 - Transactions **arrive through P2P**

Every transaction includes a fee





Mempool

2 - Transactions are **included in the Mempool**



3 - Miners **select them to include in a block**



4 - Miners/MPOs **mine a block**

5 - Miners **relay the blocks** to the P2P network


6 - Block and its transactions **become part of the blockchain**

Why This Is Good?

Centralized banking



John sends money to **Olivia** through his **bank** account




Olivia receives money in her account

The **banks** take full custody of the funds and transfer the money between them

Decentralized banking










John sends money to **Olivia** through the **blockchain**









Olivia receives money to her public address

The **blockchain** transfer money between accounts without a trusted party taking custody

50+ BLOCKCHAIN REAL WORLD USES CASES






THE INTERNET OF BLOCKCHAIN FOUNDATION






bitcoin



50+ BLOCKCHAIN REAL WORLD USES CASES




ethereum

What Can Go Wrong?

Anything that can go wrong will go wrong!


Fairness Concerns




IMC 2021

- ▶ How do miners select transactions for inclusion in a block once they enter the miners' Mempool?
- ▶ In what order do miners include transactions within a block?
- ▶ Has there been collusion among miners to prioritize transaction inclusion?
- ▶ How do we know that the ordering is fair?

Fairness Concerns




IMC 2021




FC 2023

- ▶ Which transactions are allowed or transmitted over the public P2P network?
- ▶ Does everyone have the same view of available transactions?
- ▶ Are private transactions preferentially treated by miners?
- ▶ To what extent do transaction bundling practices occur using private relays?


Fairness Concerns



IMC 2021



FC 2023




IMC 2024


Targeting

- What is the distribution of Compound tokens among its participants?
- How small or large is the set of voters who determine the outcomes for the amendments?
- What is the cost associated with casting a vote in the Compound protocol?


Fairness Concerns



IMC 2021



FC 2023



IMC 2024



Targeting

Data Set

Publicly available does not mean easily accessible!

Data Publicly Available, but Accessible?

- ▶ We deployed Archive nodes
 - ▶ Bitcoin and Ethereum
 - ▶ Entire copy of the ledger



Data Collection: Blockchain

Category	Bitcoin	Ethereum
Time period	Jan. 1st 2018 to Dec. 31st 2020	Sep. 8th 2021 to Jun. 30th 2022
# of blocks	161,954	1,867,000
Block number	501,951 to 663,904	13,183,000 to 15,049,999
# of transactions	313,575,387	347,629,393




Mempool data

17,300,576 transactions in 7639 blocks

2 months of data


Flashbots data set

6,937,292 transactions
in 3,284,886 bundles



Data Collection: Governance

Compound (COMP) token events



Event name	# of events	Description
Approval	213,220	Standard ERC-20 approval event.
DelegateChanged	12,095	Emitted when an account changes its delegate.
DelegateVotesChanged	75,820	Emitted when a delegate account's vote balance changes.
Transfer	1,886,618	Emitted when users/holders transfer their tokens to another address.


Compound Governor events




- ▶ Gathered all Compound data up to Nov. 7, 2022
- ▶ Inferred wallet addresses ownership

Event name	# of events	Description
ProposalCanceled	17	Emitted when a proposal is canceled.
ProposalCreated	133	Emitted when a new proposal is created.
ProposalExecuted	101	Emitted when a proposal is executed in the TimeLock.
ProposalQueued	105	Emitted when a proposal is added to the queue in the TimeLock.
VoteCast	9500	Emitted when a vote is cast on a proposal: 0 for against, 1 for in-favor, and 2 for abstain.


Fairness Concerns



IMC 2021



FC 2023



IMC 2024

- ▶ How do miners select transactions for inclusion in a block once they enter the miners' Mempool?
- ▶ In what order do miners include transactions within a block?
- ▶ Has there been collusion among miners to prioritize transaction inclusion?
- ▶ How do we know that the ordering is fair?

There Are Three Social Conventions Everyone Assumes Are Followed

- ▶ Which transactions are allowed or transmitted over the P2P network?
 - ▶ **Social Convention 1:** Fee-rate threshold for excluding transactions
- ▶ Once they get into the Mempool, how are miners selecting them?
 - ▶ **Social Convention 2:** Fee-rate based selection when mining new blocks
- ▶ Once miners selected these transactions, in what order do they get included within a block?
 - ▶ **Social Convention 3:** Fee-rate based ordering within blocks

Analyzing Social Conventions Adherence

Analyzing Social Conventions Adherence

- ▶ **Social Convention 1:** Fee-rate threshold for excluding transactions
 - ▶ Bitcoin nodes filter out transactions with a fee-rate of less than 1 sat/byte.
 - ▶ But our node received in total 1084 low fee-rate transactions
- ▶ **Social Convention 2:** Fee-rate based selection when mining new blocks.
 - ▶ A non-trivial fraction of transactions pairs **violates** the social convention across all snapshots, clearly indicating that **miners** do not adhere to the social convention
- ▶ **Social Convention 3:** Fee-rate based ordering within blocks
 - ▶ Position Prediction Error (**PPE**): The mean PPE is **2.65%**. **20%** of all blocks have PPE higher than **4%**
 - ▶ Signed Position Prediction Error (**SPPE**) to measure acceleration and deceleration

Lower
is better

Analyzing Social Conventions Adherence

- ▶ **Social Convention 1:** Fee-rate threshold for excluding transactions
 - ▶ Bitcoin nodes filter out transactions with a fee-rate of less than 1 sat/byte.
 - ▶ But our node received in total 1084 low fee-rate transactions
- ▶ **Social Convention 2:** Fee-rate based ordering within blocks.
 - ▶ A non-trivial fraction of all blocks violate this convention across all snapshots
- ▶ **Social Convention 3:** Fee-rate based ordering within blocks
 - ▶ Position Prediction Error (**PPE**): The mean PPE is **2.65%**. **20%** of all blocks have PPE higher than **4%**
 - ▶ Signed Position Prediction Error (**SPPE**) to measure acceleration and deceleration

Lower
is better

Investigating Social Convention Violations

Investigating Social Conventions Violations: Results

- ▶ Self-interest transactions
 - ▶ Identified MPOs wallets
 - ▶ MPOs prioritize their own transactions and other MPOs transactions

- ▶ Dark-fees transactions
 - ▶ We confirm that a large fraction have been accelerated via side-channel payments

BTC.com | ACTIVE EXPERIMENT

$SPPE \geq$	# transactions	# acc. transactions	% acc. transactions
100 %	628	464	73.89
99 %	1108	720	64.98
90 %	5365	972	18.12
50 %	95,282	1007	1.06
1 %	657,423	1029	0.16

Investigating Social Conventions Violations: Results

- ▶ Self-interest transactions
 - ▶ Identified MPOs wallets
 - ▶ MPOs prioritize their own transactions and other MPOs transactions
- ▶ Dark-fees transactions
 - ▶ We confirm that a large fraction have been accelerated via side-channel payments
- ▶ Scam payment transactions
 - ▶ We did not observe any acceleration or deceleration

$SPPE \geq$	# transactions	# acc. transactions	% acc. transactions
100 %	628	464	73.89
99 %	1108	720	64.98
90 %	5365	972	18.12
50 %	95,282	1007	1.06
1 %	657,423	1029	0.16

BTC.com

Active Dark-Fee Experiment

- ▶ We took 10 snapshots of our Mempool during periods of high congestion
- ▶ We randomly selected only low-fee rate transactions with a size of 101 bytes for accelerating using ViaBTC transactions accelerator services
 - ▶ 212 in total transactions
- ▶ We paid ViaBTC 205 € to accelerate the 10 low fee rate transactions




Metrics	Delay in # of blocks		Perc. Position in a block	
	Acc.	Non-acc.	Acc.	Non-acc.
Minimum	1	9	0.07	17.47
25-perc	1	148	0.08	75.88
Median	2	191	0.09	87.92
75-perc	2	247	0.20	95.00
Maximum	3	326	4.39	99.95
Average	1.8	198.5	0.79	84.46

Bitcoin Dark-Fees Transactions

- These transactions were accelerated by 5 MPOs




Mining Pool	Hash-rate		
	Last 24h	Last week	Last month
F2Pool	19.9 %	18.7 %	19.9 %
AntPool	12.5 %	10.6 %	10.2 %
Binance	9.6 %	10.3 %	10.0 %
Huobi	8.1 %	9.3 %	9.8 %
ViaBTC	5.1 %	7.1 %	7.7 %
Total	55.2 %	56 %	57.6 %




Mining pools with combined hash rates of over 50% were colluding to include these transactions!


Fairness Concerns



IMC 2021



FC 2023



IMC 2024


- ▶ What is the **distribution of Compound tokens** among its participants?
- ▶ How small or large is the set of voters who determine the outcomes for the amendments?
- ▶ What is the **cost associated with casting a vote** in the Compound protocol?

Decentralized Governance Compound

- ▶ It is a smart contract that defines how to amend applications on the blockchain
- ▶ The security of the code is absolute paramount!
- ▶ What does a governance protocol do?
 - ▶ Defines a set of rules to amend smart contracts
 - ▶ Periodically people need to change these smart contracts
- ▶ Voting power is distributed to participants through tokens
 - ▶ Typically, one token equals one vote!
- ▶ On-chain voting mechanism!
 - ▶ You pay transaction fees to vote!


Compound Protocol

- ▶ Decentralized lending platform
- ▶ It uses the Compound Governor Bravo as their governance protocol
- ▶ Proposals lifecycle typically lasts for 7 days




How Frequently Are Amendments Proposed and Voted?

- Compound contract is being actively amended. 1 proposal every 7 days on average





How Frequently Are Amendments Proposed and Voted?

- Compound contract is being actively amended. 1 proposal every 7 days on average
- Most of the proposals are successfully **executed**




How Frequently Are Amendments Proposed and Voted?

- ▶ Compound contract is being actively amended. 1 proposal every 7 days on average
- ▶ Most of the proposals are successfully **executed**
- ▶ The majority of the proposals receive significant support
 - ▶ 89.39% of votes are in favor on average



What Is the Distribution of Voting Power?


- ▶ The voting power is **highly concentrated** with 10 out of 4186 accounts **controlling 57.86% of all voting power**
- ▶ On average **2.84 voters were needed to obtain at least 50% of the votes**



**Top 15 accounts
control 63.56% of
the total voting
power**

Voting Participation & Cost

- ▶ Voter turnout is, on average, 33.25%
- ▶ On average, proposals were voted by 71 voters




Voting Participation & Cost

- ▶ Voter turnout is, on average, 33.25%
- ▶ On average, proposals were voted by 71 voters
- ▶ Casting a vote can be highly costly! \$0.03 to \$294.02, with an average of \$7.88
 - ▶ Cost per vote unit is on average \$358.54



Conclusion


Conclusion



IMC 2021

- ▶ **Transaction ordering is an important** topic to be considered!
- ▶ There are three social conventions that everyone assumes are followed
 - ▶ Our study shows **there are violations on all three**
- ▶ We expose some possible reasons behind them:
 - ▶ **Selfish prioritization**
 - ▶ **Non-transparent dark-fees payments**
- ▶ Through active experiments
 - ▶ **MPOs with over 50% of the hash rate collude** when accelerating transactions

Conclusion



- ▶ **Users actively vote on proposals:** 89.39% in favor, on average
- ▶ **Voting costs vary significantly:** from \$0.03 to \$294.02, disadvantaging small token holders with an average cost of \$7.88 per vote
 - ▶ Normalized costs per vote unit reveal an average of \$358.54, posing fairness concerns
- ▶ **Voting power is concentrated**
 - ▶ 10 voters holding 57.86% and 44.72% of all tokens for Compound and Uniswap, respectively.
 - ▶ On average, proposals only required 2.84 voters to pass.
- ▶ **Powerful voters potentially form coalitions**
 - ▶ It raises concerns about voting concentration.

Papers

Publications Used in This Thesis



- ▶ [ArXiv \(targeting IMC 2024\)](#) — Understanding Blockchain Governance: Analyzing Decentralized Voting to Amend DeFi Smart Contracts. **J. Messias**, V. Pahari, B. Chandrasekaran, K. P. Gummadi, and P. Loiseau.
- ▶ [FC 2023](#) — Dissecting Bitcoin and Ethereum Transactions: On the Lack of Transaction Contention and Prioritization Transparency in Blockchains. **J. Messias**, V. Pahari, B. Chandrasekaran, K. P. Gummadi, and P. Loiseau.
- ▶ [IMC 2021](#) — Selfish & Opaque Transaction Ordering in the Bitcoin Blockchain: The Case for Chain Neutrality. **J. Messias**, M. Alzayat, B. Chandrasekaran, K. P. Gummadi, P. Loiseau, and A. Mislove.
- ▶ [Workshop \(KDD-SDBD 2020\)](#) — On Blockchain Commit Times: An analysis of how miners choose Bitcoin transactions. **J. Messias**, M. Alzayat, B. Chandrasekaran, and K. P. Gummadi.

Ongoing Works on Blockchains

- ▶ ArXiv 2024 (targeting AFT 2024): Airdrops: Giving money away is harder than it seems. **J. Messias**, A. Yaish, B. Livshits.
- ▶ ArXiv 2024 (targeting AFT 2024): The Writing is on the Wall: Analyzing the Boom of Inscriptions and its Impact on Rollup Performance and Cost Efficiency. K. Gogol, **J. Messias**, M.I. Silva, and B. Livshits.
- ▶ ArXiv 2024 (targeting FC 2025) – Quantifying Arbitrage in Automated Market Makers: An Empirical Study of Ethereum ZK Rollups. K. Gogol, **J. Messias**, D. Miori, C. Tessone, and B. Livshits.
- ▶ Marble 2024 – Liquid Staking Tokens in Automated Market Makers. K. Gogol, R. Fritsch, **J. Messias**, M. Malte, B. Kraner, and C. Tessone.
- ▶ Marble 2024 – On the Determinants of Price Convergence between CEXs and Layer-2 Blockchain AMMs. K. Gogol, **J. Messias**, D. Miori, B. Livshits, and C. Tessone.
- ▶ CfC St. Moritz 2024 – Cross-border Exchange of CBDCs using Layer-2 Blockchain. K. Gogol, **J. Messias**, M. Schlosser, B. Kraner, and C. Tessone.

Additional Publications While at MPI-SWS

- ▶ [ArXiv 2021](#) — Modeling Coordinated vs. P2P Mining: An Analysis of Inefficiency and Inequality in Proof-of-Work Blockchains. M. Alzayat, **J. Messias**, B. Chandrasekaran, K. P. Gummadi, and P. Loiseau.
- ▶ [WWW 2019](#) —(Mis)Information Dissemination in WhatsApp: Gathering, Analyzing and Countermeasures. G. Resende, P. Melo, H. Sousa, **J. Messias**, M. Vasconcelos, J. Almeida, and F. Benevenuto.
- ▶ [Workshop ICWSM 2019](#) — WhatsApp Monitor: A Fact-Checking System for WhatsApp. P. Melo, **J. Messias**, G. Resende, K. Garimella, J. Almeida, and F. Benevenuto.
- ▶ [Information Retrieval Journal 2019](#) — Search Bias Quantification: Investigating Political Bias in Social Media and Web Search. J. Kulshrestha, M. Eslami, **J. Messias**, M. B. Zafar, S. Ghosh, K. P. Gummadi, and K. Karahalios.
- ▶ [FAT* 2019](#) — On Microtargeting Socially Divisive Ads: A Case Study of Russia-Linked Ad Campaigns on Facebook. F. N. Ribeiro, K. Saha, M. Babaei, L. Henrique, **J. Messias**, F. Benevenuto, O. Goga, K. P. Gummadi, and E. M. Redmiles.

Main Collaborators



Krishna P. Gummadi



Balakrishnan
Chandrasekaran



Patrick Loiseau



Vabuk Pahari



Alan Mislove



Mohamed Alzayat



Fabrício Benevenuto



Jussara M. Almeida



Ben Livshits



Aviv Yashi



Krzysztof Gogol

Among others...



MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE
FOR SOFTWARE SYSTEMS



UNIVERSITÄT
DES
SAARLANDES



VU
VRIJE
UNIVERSITEIT
AMSTERDAM



UGA
Université
Grenoble Alpes

N
Northeastern
University



University of
Zurich^{UZH}

U F *m* G

Matter
Labs

האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM

Imperial College
London

thank you!



On Fairness Concerns in the Blockchain Ecosystem

Johnnatan Messias

@johnnatan_me



Thesis defense



MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE
FOR SOFTWARE SYSTEMS

April 25, 2024 – Saarbrücken, Germany



UNIVERSITÄT
DES
SAARLANDES