SOVIET LANGUAGE POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE

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A. General Background.

The past few years have witnessed an unprecedented interest in the language problems of multilingual states. Language riots on the Indian subcontinent and the preoccupation of the Peking Communist regime with linguistic issues highlight the importance of language in the dynamics of twentieth century politics. As for the Soviet Union, both linguists and social scientists have tended to shun this aspect of Russian affairs, or to dwell upon its more theoretical and polemical aspects. Selig S. Harrison has this to say: "While the importance of the multilingual nature of the Soviet State has long been recognized, the study of this aspect of the Soviet Union gained momentum only from the interdisciplinary approach in recent Soviet area studies. This absence of unified study confronting the social and political impact of language now looms as a serious limitation in the understanding of a changing world."[1] Likewise Uriel Weinreich, in his classic work Languages in Contact, stresses the need of approaching the phenomenon of multilingualism from both the linguistic and the socio-cultural viewpoints.[2]

In approaching Soviet language policy, it is sufficient to cast only a fleeting glance backward at practices in pre-Revolutionary Russia. Most of the Czars entertained little sympathy for the languages and cultures of the non-Russian subject peoples, and followed a policy of Russification, of varying intensity.

The Soviet regime came to power with the help of important segments of the national groups which hoped, by aiding the revolution, to achieve independence or at least

autonomy. The record shows, however, that after a ten-year period of relative linguistic liberalism, the Soviets in the early 1930's embarked upon their own type of linguistic Russification.

The scope of this paper does not permit a detailed description of the historical genesis of Soviet language policy. The most complete treatment of the subject in English is the recent dissertation of Henry Kučera, which unfortunately still remains unpublished.[3] However, in very broad strokes something of the background will be noted.

In the period of liberalism marking the 1920's an attempt was made to apply the Leninist slogan, "national in form, socialist in content." The ethnic groups of the Soviet Union were to be given full opportunity to develop their own languages so as to equip them to express the concepts of a modern, industrialized society. As Weinreich points out, this was done in two ways. One was to borrow from a "culture language," which had traditionally served as a source of enrichment (as Persian for Tadzhik). Another and more popular method was to dispatch linguistic commissions to remote areas, where the dialects had supposedly been preserved in a more "pristine" form. Semi-illiterate peasants thus become the sources for the new dictionaries and linguistic treatises which linguists of the many nationalities hastened to prepare. Thus was the new Soviet science of lingvotexnika created and ardently pursued.[4] The Latin alphabet was declared a fine weapon in the struggle to achieve an international socialist society and adapted for use by one language after another. In addition to these linguistic measures, the process of what has been termed functional korenizacija was begun in the early 1920's. This meant the appointment of officials fluent in native languages to administrative positions in the non-Russian areas.

Frightened by the possibility of creating a linguistic Frankenstein by encouraging this type of self-determination, the regime in the early 1930's renounced the principle of linguistic parity. Alarums were raised against the sin of "bourgeois nationalism," and it was officially demanded that dictionaries and other language treatises be purged of "archaisms," "dialectal forms," and terms derived from the languages of "feudal oppressors." The Latin alphabet, adopted by all non-Slavic tongues except Armenian, Georgian, Abxaz, and Yiddish, was declared anti-proletarian

and abandoned in favor of Cyrillic. From then on, for almost 30 years a policy of Soviet Russification has been pursued, in which the regime, although allowing the national languages more importance than did the Czars, nevertheless has systematically circumscribed their role for communication in the Soviet Union.

At this point, it is necessary to note how this policy actually squares with the linguistic theories of the Soviet founding fathers. Lenin, like Kautsky, envisioned the eventual use of a single language as a means for achieving solidarity under socialism. At the same time, he opposed the idea of forcible coercion to impose Russian upon the peoples of the Soviet Union. In 1914 he stated: "We do not want to drive them [the non-Russian peoples] into paradise with a stick."[6] In practice, however, references to any single language were avoided as expressions of chauvinism.

As for Stalin, he affirmed in 1925, in the much-quoted talk before the University of the Peoples of the East: "I have very little faith in this creation of a single universal language and the dying away of all other tongues in the period of socialism. I have very little faith in this theory of a single, all-embracing language. Experience in every case speaks not for, but against this theory."[7] Stalin, however, was to reverse his position when, speaking before the Central Committee of the Sixteenth Party Congress, he predicted that when world socialism would be achieved, national cultures and languages would die away and merge into one common socialist culture and one common tongue, which would be neither Russian, German, nor English, but a new language which would have assimilated the best elements of these national and zonal languages.

To these conflicting theories, one must add those of N. Ja. Marr, until his death in 1934 the high priest of Soviet linguistics. In his dotage Marr had evolved his Japhetic theory, a weird mixture of fact and fantasy. According to it, all languages were derived from a common source and were divided into four types, corresponding to their relative stages of development. Only those in the fourth stage, including Russian and all the Indo-European tongues, had any future; they would provide the material for a future world language, which would evolve when socialism was achieved. Seeking to reconcile his theory with Marxism, he also declared that human language was part of the superstructure

resting upon the economic base of society, and therefore a class manifestation.[9]

In 1950 the world was treated to the spectacle of a powerful dictator intervening in a linguistic controversy. Exhuming the ghost of Marr, then dead almost 20 years, Joseph Stalin declared the Japhetic theory false, particularly in its assertion that language is a class manifestation. When world socialism would be attained, he argued, and the mistrust of nations eliminated, the national languages would cross-fertilize one another. Then hundreds of national languages would fuse into zonal languages, and these would merge into one tongue—the international medium of socialism.[10] Stalin also paid his respects to the national languages, asserting that their enrichment by Russian was a natural process, thus reaffirming a theoretical justification for continued Russification.

During the controversy and afterwards the "new doctrine" of Marr and his followers was blamed for everything that ailed Soviet linguistics and language teaching.[11] In a programmatic statement, Mordinov charged Marr with attempting to Russify the non-Russian languages through a "mechanical hybridization." He stated, "This harmful approach, involving a break with the existing laws of the national languages, led to anarchy in orthography, to innumerable difficulties in the mastery of the grammar of the national languages, and to hardships in the work of local newspapers and magazines."[12] Despite all these theoretical statements, and the high-sounding verbiage attending the Marrist controversy, however, no fundamental change has taken place in the policy of Russification initiated in the early 1930's.

B. Soviet Patterns of Russification.

Although Russification had been relaxed for strategic reasons during World War II, barely had the conflict ended when the policy was resumed with renewed vigor. The clarion call was sounded by V. V. Vinogradov, now director of the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences, in his Velikij russkij jazyk, a book going far beyond the bounds of linguistics in its mystic glorification of the Russian language and the qualities which uniquely qualify it to

serve as the medium of communication of the Soviet peoples and the ideas of Communism. He wrote: "The Russian language as a language of high culture is the ideal and pattern for the languages of the other nationalities. From it they derive the vocabulary and phraseology relating to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and to the process of Socialist construction.... The Russian language has become for the languages of the other nations within the borders of the U.S.S.R. a source, a rich reservoir of new concepts, of a new system of visualizing reality."[13]

The Marr controversy provided an excellent psychological moment to reaffirm the official principles of linguistic Russification. In an important article, A. Mordinov and G. Sanžeev stated: "The enrichment of the lexical stock of the languages of the U.S.S.R. through borrowing from Russian is a natural, logical, and necessary process.... The struggle for the purity of the national languages means above all to guard them from corruption by the jargon of exploiting circles, archaic terms, religious lexicon, and from every type of alien word."[14]

At the same time it was demanded the linguists should no longer, like the Marrists, violate the "internal laws" of the national languages. According to this concept, hinted at by Stalin during the controversy and elaborated by Vinogradov in 1952, languages change not by "leaps and bounds," as Marr had held, but gradually. Moreover, while a language may change as a result of contact with another, thanks to the "internal laws" its lexical and grammatical basis displays remarkable stability.[15] The theory, highly abstract and contradictory, appears to be poorly understood by Soviet linguists, who mention it repeatedly in discussions of the national languages, but it seems to make little or no difference on the practical level.

Turning to linguistic Russification itself, one may note that discussions of this process have greatly oversimplified it. Numerous factors, such as the number of speakers of a given language, its prestige and continuity of literary and cultural tradition, location and mode of living of the speech community, their Soviet acculturation, strength of ethnic pride, and what Heinz Kloss terms "sociological completeness,"[16] or its ability to express the concepts of a modern, industrialized society, all combine to determine the extent to which Russian leaves its linguistic imprint. Accordingly,

a pyramid might be constructed, with positions assigned to the national languages according to their degree of Russification.

At the top of the "Russification pyramid" belong the languages of very small ethnic groups, "sociologically incomplete" and with little linguistic resistance. Fully qualifying in this category would be, for instance, the Paleo-Siberian Kamchadal language spoken by less than 1,000 persons on the West coast of Kamchatka, and which is a deeply Russianized and rapidly vanishing remnant of the former western dialect. Most of the speakers have by now replaced it by a Russian imbued with native habits.[17] The obsolescence and dying of tongues is, of course, a normal process not restricted to the Soviet Union. An interesting problem frequently connected with it is the persistence for a time of features of the old language in the adopted tongue.

This type of linguistic shift is taking place among various speech communities in the USSR. Felix Oinas, in a study of Russian calques in the Balto-Finnic tongues, gives numerous examples of the heavy penetration of both Russian loan words and loan translations. For instance, Olonetsian siätoi (bad weather) is patterned after bespogodica, the Votic selle takaz (ago) after tomu nazad, the Ludic panna strok (to fix a term) after the Russian položit' srok, and so on. He concludes that "the bulk of eastern Balto-Finnic peoples are now giving up their own languages for Russian."[18]

At the bottom of the "Russification pyramid" one would place the languages of large ethnic groups, such as Georgian and Armenian, possessed of a high degree of national consciousness and a well-developed cultural tradition, hence able to resist better the impact of the Russian language. Even so, these tongues have not been exempt from the process of "enrichment" through Great Russian.

The first line of attack in Soviet linguistic Russification has been the lexicon of a given language, with attention paid mostly to nouns and to a lesser extent to adjectives and verbs, with little attention to the remaining parts of speech.[19] The best sources for tracing the official changes in vocabulary are the successive editions of the Academy dictionaries issued during Soviet times. In Ukrainian, for example, a concerted effort has been made to eliminate all items thought to be of "Polish-Galician," or "dialectal" origin in favor of Great Russian. Shevelov has pointed out, by

way of illustration, that adresa (address), felt to be too close to the Polish equivalent, has been replaced by the Russian adres, oseredok (center) by centr, gudzik (knob) by knopka, perven' (element) by element.[20] In the case of both Ukrainian and Belorussian, every attempt is made to relate them as closely as possible to Great Russian.

The Turkic languages—spoken by the largest single ethnic groups after the Ukrainians—have been a special target for Russification. In the first place, everything possible has been done to differentiate from one another what are essentially dialects of something which might be called Turki. Obviously this is aimed against Pan-Turkism, or similar sentiments encouraged by linguistic unity. In the second place, an unceasing war has been waged against Arabic, Persian, and Turkic elements in these tongues, particularly in the abstract vocabularies. Ščerbak reports studies made by Rešetov and Borovkov, demonstrating that during the period 1923-40 the number of "Soviet international" words in periodical literature increased from 5 to 15 percent, while the percentage of Arabic-Persian vocabulary decreased from 37.4 to 25 percent.[21]

Even a random examination of the dictionaries of contemporary newspapers of, let us say, Kazakh, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Uzbek, reveals how far advanced is the process of replacing words of other origins by Russian equivalents in the economic, political, sociological, scientific, and technological fields—which might well be called the "obligatory lexical categories" of Russification. For example, in all these tongues the word inqilab (revolution) has been replaced by revolucija, firqa (party) by partija, džumhurija (republic) by respublika, and so on. A spot heading of the January 14, 1958, issue of Kizil Uzbekiston, published in Tashkent, yielded a number of words not in the "obligatory categories," such as rol' (role), park (park), stakan (glass), ataka (attack), kino (movie), and numerous others. The writer's study of Russian influence on the Uzbek lexicon is, however, not far enough advanced to permit further refinement of this point.

All efforts have been made to set off Tadzhik, an Iranian language, from the closely related Persian. According to a contributor to the Central Asian Review, more than 10 percent of the lexical items in the 1954 Tadzhik-Russian dictionary printed in Moscow in 1954 are loans or

Russo-Tadzhik hybrids. In technical dictionaries the proportion was even more striking. In the Dictionary of Chemistry published in Stalinabad in 1954, of the 3,200 items, 2,040 are direct Russian loans, 640 hybrids, and only 550 Tadzhik items.[22]

That Soviet linguists are by no means satisfied with the status and progress of Russification has been made painfully clear ever since the Marr controversy. Constant criticism is leveled in linguistics literature against the failure to make sufficient use of Russian loan words on one hand, and the raznoboj, or the lack of uniformity in their use, on the other. Typical of such statements is an article on Uzbek scientific-technological terminology by I. Rasulev, who writes, "Various linguists, writers, and translators do not yet appreciate the role and significance of Russian as a course, nor have they overcome their urge to corrupt the Uzbek language through Arabic-Persian terms so alien and incomprehensible to the people."[23] This, he remarks, results in raznoboj, of which he furnishes abundant examples. For instance, in Uzbek technical literature, "frequency of oscillation" is rendered arbitrarily either as tebranish chastotasi or tebranish takrorligi, while "critical temperature" appears either as kritik temperatura or tankidii temperatura.[24]

Writing in similar vein regarding the Dagestan languages of the Caucasus, Š. I. Mixajlov complains of the rampant raznoboj and gives examples. For instance, he notes that in the October 21, 1952, edition of the multilingual Dagestanskaja Pravda the term dvorec kul'tury appeared as dvorec kul'tury in Russian, Darghinian, Lezghian, and Kumyk, although the Avar translator resolved the problem by resuscitating the archaism kLagLa, a term which had "outlived its usefulness ... and all but forgotten, communicates nothing to the reader."[25]

For the present, at least, linguistic Russification appears to be mainly concerned with standardizing the "obligatory categories" of the lexicons of the national languages. As for phonology and grammar, these are much less objects of official concern. Nevertheless, Soviet linguists do not fail to applaud all cases of Russian influence. A. S. Sidorov points out that, as a result of contact with Russian, prepalatal affricates have lost their affrication, and remarks that this, together with other features, "brings the phonological

systems of the Komi and Russian languages closer together."[26] N. A. Baskakov has provided extensive data on Russian influence on the Turkic tongues. For example, he notes that in this group, vowel harmony is breaking down and new consonant clusters have now been integrated into the various Turkic sound systems; e.g., initial syllables of the type bra, brar, brabr, are now admissible in the various languages.[27]

As regards grammar, Soviet linguists have pointed out the increasing influence of Russian on the morphological structure of the national languages. For example, Sidorov has indicated the development of verbal aspects in Komi.[28] Ščerbak has pointed out the borrowing of Russian morphemes in Uzbek.[29]

Such Soviet linguistic writings provide a corpus of materials upon which Western scholars might draw to study the role which extensive and enforced lexical borrowing has played in modifying the phonology and morphology of the languages of the U.S.S.R. In this connection Jakobson remarks: "Nous voyons que les emprunts par eux-mêmes ne modifient pas la phonologie propre de la langue: ce n'est que leur assimilation qui est capable d'y introduire des éléments nouveaux. Or, même dans ce dernier cas, la langue ne s'approprie pas nécessairement des éléments insolites."[30] Whether one accepts this view or not, the Jakobsonian concept of the necessity of examining linguistic processes from both the diachronic and synchronic viewpoints has serious implications for the study of Russian influence upon the national languages.

The entire question of the integration of Russian lexical items in the native languages is an intriguing one. For years the insistence that these must be accepted in their Russian spelling created enormous orthographic and phonological confusion.[31] So great has been the chaos that cases have been cited of brilliant non-Russian students failing examinations in their mother tongue because of the contradictory norms of usage. At any rate, the battle over the orthography of loan words has waxed furious over the years. A favorite argument of one school of thought was that to keep spellings in their Russian form is useful as a bridge to non-Russians faced with the necessity of learning this language. Bitter criticism of this situation in 1950 brought promises of a policy in which the sound patterns of the national

languages would be taken more into consideration in the loan process. At the present writing, however, debate still continues and a uniform policy has not been adopted.[32]

The Marr controversy, which provided an opportunity for a general washing of the Soviet linguistic linen, also witnessed especially bitter criticism of orthographic practices, and the arbitrary decrees handed down by linguistic authorities. An editorial in a 1952 issue of the Voprosy Jazykoznanija commented: "Many contemporary national languages of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. need review and a standardization of their writing systems. The alphabets and spelling rules adopted in the late 1930's have in practice revealed a number of weaknesses. These weaknesses can be eliminated without serious damage or breakup of the writing systems."[33] All signs thus point to an increase in the extent of Russification of the "obligatory categories," accompanied by a drive to eliminate still existing items of non-Russian origin in these categories.[34] This signifies an end to even the present degree of lexical free variation. A by-product of this will probably be a re-examination and adjustment of the writing systems. Thus a type of Soviet standardization of the national languages along the lines discussed appears to be on the agenda of Soviet linguistic policy makers.

C. Teaching of the Russian Language.

One of the most effective instruments of Russification is the teaching of the Russian language itself, which, like the linguistic aspects of the policy, has been progressively intensified since the 1920's. At present, primary instruction is conducted in 59 of the national languages, while the study of Russian is introduced in the second or third year and taught each year. As a result, at least in the ten-year schools in non-Russian areas, the student is exposed to about as much, if not more, Russian than his native language.

Higher education, with notable exceptions in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Armenia and Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Moldavia, is carried on almost exclusively in Russian. Since most vuz'es require non-Russians to pass an entrance examination in Russian language and literature, the incentive for learning Russian is great, while no such

compelling stimulus exists for the native languages beyond the primary grades.[35]

Apparently the regime is greatly dissatisfied with the degree of bilingualism achieved by the younger generation and has begun a drive to step up the tempo of Russian teaching. The R.S.F.S.R. Ministry of Education, during August 21-25, 1956, sponsored an Interrepublic Conference on the Improvement of Teaching of Russian in Non-Russian Areas, in Tashkent. N. A. Muxtidinov, then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party and now member of the Presidium of the All-Union Communist Party, in opening the conference shed important light on the linguistic situation in non-Russian areas: "We cannot fail to be distressed by the fact that the students in many Uzbek and other non-Russian general schools do not have a sufficient command of the spoken [Russian] language, cannot easily make use of literature in the Russian language, are not able to express their thoughts in a correct Russian sentence. For this reason many graduates of our schools experience great difficulty in going on to advanced studies in the field of Soviet technology and in taking their place in industrial and agricultural production."[36]

As a result of the conference and of a mounting volume of complaints in such journals as Russkij jazyk v škole and Inostrannye jazyki v škole, educational organs called for the improvement of standards, and an intensification of the Russian teaching program.[37] Attempts are being made to rewrite the Russian language texts, which have been bitterly criticized for failing to take the learner's native language into consideration. Little can probably be done about the frequently decried ignorance by Russian-language teachers of the mother tongue of the students. One concrete result of the Tashkent conference has been the founding of a new journal entitled Russkij jazyk v ne-russkoj škole, which began publication in mid-1957.

Another measure intended to improve the level of Russian knowledge in Soviet bilinguals is that of introducing the language earlier in the primary school. The Ministry of Education of the Armenian S.S.R. has announced that beginning in 1957-58, Russian will be introduced in the first grade.[38] The trend is obvious when it is noted that Armenian schools had in 1948 moved Russian instruction down from the third to the second grade.

Little more need be said other than that the equation of a knowledge of Russian with vocational opportunity, and its progressive significance as the student climbs the educational ladder, puts the national languages at a disadvantage which is certain to minimize their role.

D. Bilingualism, Mass Media, and the Soviet System.

Although there is a massive literature on bilingualism,[39] Western scholars have thus far undertaken no synthetic studies on the relative roles of Russian and the national languages in the Soviet net of oral and written communication, against which one might better view the total impact of Russification. Obviously, bilingualism in a rigidly controlled multilingual state has its special features.

New approaches to bilingualism may yield important results both for the linguist and the social scientists. Joseph Greenberg has shown how statistical method can be employed to attain a rating for the "linguistic diversity" of an area.[40] Weinreich, in a recent article, has demonstrated how one may arrive at the index of the "rate of flow of communication" in terms of its efficiency for the speech community, "as one measurable aspect of communication that the quantitatively minded political scientist can utilize in analyzing the formation of nations and other power groupings."[41] Karl Deutsch applies communication-theory principles in exploring communication barriers as causes of social and other differentiations.[42] Einar Haugen has also furnished fresh insights into other aspects of bilingualism.[43]

The task of analyzing Sovite bilingualism is admittedly a formidable one. A large number of factors, both linguistic and extra-linguistic, would have to be considered in studying each speech community, including: age, sex, ethnic origin, education, urban or rural residence, occupation, speakers' attitudes toward mother tongue versus Russian, and the like. It would be important to establish the "dominance configuration"[44] to determine what is the "dominant" or the "upper" versus the "lower" language.[45] For example, although Russian can undoubtedly be established as the "dominant" language for a great deal of the U.S.S.R. it is doubtful that this would be valid for the Georgian speech community.

The question of demography also needs careful consideration. The increasing emphasis on decentralization of

industry and the development of the virgin lands in Asia is even now bringing large influxes of Russian and Ukrainian speakers to the non-Russian areas. In Siberia and the Soviet Far East, of a population of almost 40 million, only about 7 million are non-Russians. Richard Pipes, an authority on Soviet nationalities, points out that in Kazakhstan, the largest non-Russian area after Siberia, the Great Russians and the Ukrainians already outnumber the Kazakhs by 4.6 to 3.4 million.[46]

Of particular relevance is the question of the extent to which the special features of the Soviet system, such as its collectivistic tendencies and its domination by the Great Russian group, have produced linguistic shifts. What is the language of, let us say, a kolkhoz or industrial combine in the Urals, where large contingents of Russian administrators and specialists are assigned? What about the development of lingua francas or hybrid speech in such contact situations? The role of the Soviet Army, as a Russifying agent also needs to be considered. Bilinsky cites an interview with an ex-Soviet colonel who affirmed that the years of military service in the Army represent for many rural youths their heaviest exposure to the Russian language.[47]

An excellent source of information on the relative roles of Russian and the national languages is the testimony of refugees. The recent Harvard University Project on the Soviet Social System, based on interviews with Soviet defectors, included a "nationality questionnaire," with queries on ethnic identification, group attitudes, and language usage. On the basis of these, Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn concluded that: "... the Russian language is making massive inroads among Ukrainians ... 75 per cent could read and write Russian in addition to Ukrainian, almost 60 per cent read a Russian-language newspaper while in the Soviet Union, and almost 20 per cent spoke Russian at home ..."[48] Of another Slavic group they remarked: "Defectors report that city people often avoid using the Byelorussian language in the street lest they be suspected of 'bourgeois nationalism.'"[49]

Extensive data on Ukrainian bilingualism is offered by Yaroslav Bilinsky in his study, based to a large extent on interviews with former Soviet citizens. His evidence reveals a great deal of pressure, subtle and otherwise, in favor of Russian.[50] According to defector testimony, on the eve of

World War II, and undoubtedly at present, "if an educated Ukrainian in one of the large cities, who was fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian, chose to speak his native language, this was regarded not only as a sign of mauvais ton, but as Ukrainian nationalism, an act of political insubordination."[51] Yet he notes: "Haggling over the price of eggs and cabbages in the native peasant market is in Ukrainian as it used to be even in Tsarist times."[52] The overwhelming use of Russian in the cities, and Ukrainian in the countryside, presents a pattern paralleled in many if not most non-Russian areas.

Richard Pipes, in a study utilizing data gained from defectors, furnishes insight into the situation in Central Asia. He notes of the rural population that they "seem to be as ignorant of Russian as their ancestors had been."[53] According to him, bilingualism is to be found mostly among the city intelligentsia, who in part identify their interests with those of the regime. Of the Russian influx he remarks that "this has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, 'Soviet' in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups."[54]

Studies of the type just mentioned ought to be reinforced by a much-needed analysis of the comparative role of Russian and the national languages in the government-controlled mass media. The presentation of some crude data from Soviet sources may serve to point up the implications of such investigation. The recent appearance of a series of statistical handbooks, published by the U.S.S.R. with official figures of the 40 years of Soviet accomplishment, makes this an opportune moment for an undertaking of this nature.

A great deal of information on the languages of publication is provided in Pečat' SSR za sorok let 1917-1957.[55] In it one learns that in 1956 a total of 58,034 titles were printed in the U.S.S.R., of which 43,730 or almost 80 percent appeared in Russian. Of these Russian titles, a total of 917,014 volumes were produced, while only 162,882 volumes, or considerably smaller editions, were made of the 14,304 non-Russian books.[56] It has, indeed, been suggested that a tacit policy of limiting the editions of non-Russian books is followed.

It is also interesting to look at the relative proportions of book titles which appear in Russian and the national

language of a given area. According to the same source, in 1956 a total of 5,982 titles were printed in the Ukraine, of which 2,673, or less than half, appeared in Ukrainian. In Belorussia, of the 742 titles in 1956 only 285, or less than a third, were printed in Belorussian. Although these proportions vary, and are heavily in favor of the national languages in such areas as Armenia and Georgia, the proportion of Russian books rarely falls below 25 percent.[57] No breakdown is given for the smaller areas, but one may safely assume an overwhelming proportion of Russian-language books in such regions.

No figures are given for the number of Russian books which in any given area are distributed by Glavizdat and Glaviztorg from Moscow, which would also affect the balance.

As for periodicals, the same handbook indicates a heavy representation of Russian-language newspapers and journals. The proportion is most striking in Kazakhstan, where of 380 newspapers, only 145 are in Kazakh, the remainder in Russian.[58] No breakdown is offered for the smaller ethnic groups.

Another problem needing elaboration is the type of materials printed in Russian and national languages, respectively. Here again one could construct a sliding scale or pyramid for diversity of function, at the bottom of which would be such a language as Tat,[59] used only for primary school texts, plus a few works on folk literature and on Marxism-Leninism, and having at its peak such tongues as Ukrainian, in which appear treatises on medicine, engineering, and other highly specialized subjects.

There appears to be a growing trend toward bilingual publications. The Vestnik's of the Academies of Sciences of a number of Central Asian republics appear mostly in Russian, with summaries in the native language and sometimes even in English! Announcements appear quite frequently of new periodicals launched in several tongues. For example, recently the Riga city party organization launched a bilingual weekly entitled Golos Rigi—Rigas Balsas, in both Russian and Latvian.[60]

Information is needed on the language of radio broadcasting. As is the case with primary school instruction, domestic broadcasting is conducted in about 60 languages. What are the relative proportions of Russian and the mother

tongues in a given area? Here note must be taken of the ubiquitous loudspeaker system, which ensures that in public places and conveyances citizens will listen to the spoken Soviet word—in Russian and the native languages—whether they wish to or not. Likewise, in which languages do public and shop signs, tickets, railway schedules, and the like appear?

Another question is that of the languages of the theater. In Belorussia, of the 8 permanent theaters, only three present performances in Belorussian. In the Udmurt A.S.S.R., only one theater of the four performs in the native language. By contrast, in the Georgian S.S.R., 17 of the 20 theaters perform in Georgian, and in the Mari A.S.S.R. two of the three theaters give plays in the native Cheremis.[61] Data on movies would also be revealing.

The relative roles of Russian and the national languages for both written and spoken communication in Soviet administration is another pertinent question. Judging from comments in the provincial press, the regime is somewhat embarrassed about the disproportion between the use of Russian and the national tongues. In an article in the Kazaxstanskaja Pravda, one reads:

> In this connection there are serious defects. In many offices they have ceased to conduct legal affairs in the Kazakh tongue. Glaring abuses are to be observed in the ministries of agriculture, of the sovkhozes, of commerce, culture, and in the organs of justice. These organs are closely bound with the broad masses of the population, but they carry on legal proceedings only in one language—Russian. Even letters and complaints which are received in Kazakh are answered in Russian ... An end must be put to this inadmissible state of affairs. In this matter the example ought to be set by all soviets, beginning right with the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh S.S.R. All our laws, all decisions of the local Soviets and their legal processes ought to be transmitted to the masses in two languages.[62]

Complaints of this sort, particularly those concerning political work, appear particularly in the Baltic press. In January 1958, reporting on the 15th Latvian Communist Party Congress, Sovetskaja Latvija wrote: "In examining the problems of mass political work of party organizations

the delegates observed that this work often suffers because certain decisions concerning the use of the Latvian and Russian languages by our cadres are still poorly carried out."[63] And again, "It is necessary to eradicate such cases in which mass political work among the population is not conducted in the native language."[64]

Persistent statements of this sort tend to indicate that Russification is, if anything, too thorough-going precisely in a sphere where the regime would prefer, for the time being, not to witness it. The concept of korenizacija, or the insistence that the representatives of Soviet power should deal with the masses in the vernacular, is, after all, motivated by a practical regard for the efficiency of communication.

It is easy to see that, particularly in areas where the knowledge of Russian tends to be poor, the failure to use the national languages might be regarded as a cause of alienation, and an all too obvious confirmation that Soviet control is largely a Great Russian affair.

There is little need to continue to suggest more problems than the writer can answer at this point. Nevertheless, it is impossible to dismiss Soviet bilingualism without touching upon one of the most complex and elusive issues in Soviet studies—the question of the role of the non-Russian languages in keeping alive national sentiments. In this regard one comes face to face with a seeming dilemma. On one hand, the regime, through even its limited encouragement of the native languages, undoubtedly has reduced ethnic resentments and provided excellent propaganda capital for display to such emergent multilingual states as India. On the other hand, by this very act of fostering the use of the languages, it may have perpetuated the foci of nationalism and separatism. As both linguists and political scientists have never tired of repeating, history shows that when a people is deprived of all else, language remains as a symbol of solidarity—the ultima Thule of ethnic aspirations.[65]

That the regime is fully aware of this is evidenced by the unrelenting campaign waged in the provincial press against the bogey of "bourgeois nationalism." This Damocles sword must act as a powerful inhibiting force to the intelligentsia of non-Russian areas, who because of the risks involved shun the native language and elect to express themselves in the safer medium of Great Russian.

Everything considered, despite certain advantages derived from it, the continued functioning of such a large number of national tongues, the pressures created by mounting Russification, and the harrassment of the nationalities with the sinister threat of "bourgeois nationalism" all combine to create yet another divisive force—a vulnerability in the "monolithic" fabric of the Soviet system. However, as long as languages are less easily disposed of than rival political parties, the regime can do little more than continue to weight the balance of Soviet bilingualism in favor of Russian.

Postscript on Future Prospects

There is little reason for expecting any radical change in language policy in the predictable future. Minor oscillations and temporary signs of liberalism—often prompted by reasons of grand strategy—will doubtless continue to be noted. For example, since Stalin's death, five of the seven nationalities "liquidated" during World War II and banished to other parts of the Soviet Union have been "rehabilitated." These are the Balkars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmucks, and the Karačaj, whose languages will, of course, now be restored to official grace. Walter Kolarz sees in this, among other things, a move pro foro externo intended to ingratiate the Soviets with the nations of the East, four of the groups being Islamic and the fifth, the Kalmucks, being Buddhists.[66]

Perhaps as an overture to East and West Germany, the Soviets recently announced the resumption of instruction in German for children of ethnic Germans.[67] Despite the abuse heaped upon Arabic as a lexical source, the Soviet radio and press recently have announced the introduction of Arabic teaching in ten-year schools in Uzbekistan, and have invited the older generation familiar with Arabic to help youngsters learn this tongue.

No change appears in the offing for Yiddish language and culture, completely liquidated except for its use in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast' of Birobidzhan.

At the same time, the Soviets will undoubtedly continue to promote the languages or dialects of selected small nationalities to the status of literary languages. The latest group to be thus benefited have been the Gagauzy, a Turkic people numbering well below 100,000 and inhabiting the

southern part of the Moldavian S. S. R.[69] A Cyrillic alphabet has been devised, and Gagauz will be the language of instruction in the first four years of primary school.[70] Measures like this, while posing no threat to Soviet power, still serve as pro forma evidence of the continuity of "linguistic self-determination and equality."

Of Soviet language policy since 1930, one may well remark: Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. Nevertheless, the subject of language practices in the multilingual Soviet Union deserves far more attention than it has received both from linguists and social scientists.

Notes

1. Selig S. Harrison, The Most Dangerous Decades: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Language Policy in Multi-Lingual States (New York: Columbia University Language and Communication Center, 1957), p. i.

2. Uriel Weinreich, Languages in Contact (New York: Linguistic Circle, 1953), p. 3 et passim.

3. Henry Kučera, "Soviet Language Policy," unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1952; see also George Springer, "Soviet Linguistic Theory," unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1954; Henry Kučera, "Soviet Language Policy," Problems of Communism, III (March-April, 1954), 24-29; Uriel Weinreich, "The Russification of Soviet Minority Languages," Problems of Communism, II (1953), 46-57; Alo Raun, "National in Form, Socialist in Content," Ukrainian Quarterly, VI (Spring, 1950).

4. Weinreich, "Russification," pp. 51-52.

5. See Thomas G. Winner, "Problems of Alphabet Reform Among the Turkic Peoples of Soviet Central Asia, 1920-1941," Slavonic and East European Review, XXXVI (1952), 137-147.

6. V. I. Lenin, Izbrannye stat'i po nacional'nomu voprosu (Moskva, 1925), p. 39.

7. I. V. Stalin, "O političeskix zadačax Universiteta narodov vostoka," May 18, 1925, Sočinenija (2nd ed., Moskva, 1925), VII, 38-39. For a detailed discussion of the views of Soviet leaders on universal language, see Elliott R. Goodman, "The Soviet Design for a World Language," Russian Review, XV (April 1956), 85-99.

8. I. V. Stalin, "Političeskij otčet Central'nogo komiteta XVI s'ezda VKP(b)," June 27, 1930, Sočinenija, XII, 370.

9. There is an extensive literature on Marr's theories. The most comprehensive single source in a Western language appears to be: L. N. Thomas, The Linguistic Theories of N. Ja. Marr (Berkeley: University of California, 1957), 176 pp.

10. I. V. Stalin, "Otvet Tovarišču A. Xolopovu," July 28, 1950. In Marksizm i voprosy jazykoznanija (Moskva, 1950), pp. 45-47.

11. See John V. Murra et al., The Soviet Linguistic Controversy (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951), 98 pp.

12. A. E. Mordinov, "O razvitii jazykov socialističeskix nacij v SSSR," Voprosy filosofii (No. 3, 1950), pp. 75-93.

13. V. V. Vinogradov, Veliki russkij jazyk (Moskva, 1945), p. 158.

14. A. Mordinov and G. Sanžeev, "Nekotorye voprosy razvitija mladopis'mennyx jazykov SSSR," Bol'ševik, VII (April 1951), 41. Other important statements of this type: A. Mordinov, "O razvitii jazykov socialisticeskix narodov," Voprosy filosofii (No. 3, 1950), pp. 77-95; D. Zaslavskij, "Velikij jazyk našej èpoxi," Literaturnaja gazeta, Jan. 1, 1949.

15. V. V. Vinogradov, "Ponjatie vnutrennix zakonov razvitija jazyka," Voprosy jazykoznanija (No. 2, 1952), pp. 3 ff.; R. L'Hermite, "Lois Internes et linguistique soviétique," Linguistics Today, eds. A. Martinet and U. Weinreich (New York: Linguistic Circle, 1954), pp. 69-76.

16. Heinz Kloss, Die Entwickelung neuer germanischer Kultursprachen von 1800 bis 1950 (Munich, 1952).

17. See V. I. Ioxel'son, Kamchadal Studies (in English) (New York Public Library, Manuscript Division, 1910-11); V. I. Ioxel'son, Kamchadal-Russian and Russian-Kamchadal Dictionary (New York Public Library, Manuscript Division, 1910-11); Roman Jakobson, Gerta Hüttl-Worth, and J. F. Beebe, Paleo-Siberian Peoples and Languages, A Bibliographic Guide (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1957), p. 200.

18. Felix Oinas, "Russian Calques in the Balto-Finnic Languages," Indiana Slavic Studies (ed. M. Ginsburg and J. T. Shaw), I (Bloomington, 1956), 225-237.

19. It is realized that this conventional terminology of the traditional "parts of speech" is not well suited for discussions of the numerous non-Indo-European languages of the U.S.S.R. Further refinement is, however, not possible here. Also, as Weinreich was the first to point out, studies of bilingualism should not be done merely against the

perspective of static lists of semantemes but should take into consideration the continuum of flowing, connected spoken and written utterances. See Weinreich, Languages in Contact, p. 33.

20. George Shevelov, "Principi i etapi bol'ševikskoj movnoj politiki na Ukraini," Sučasna Ukraina (Munich), June 29, July 13, July 27, 1952. Regarding Russification of Ukrainian, see also: Jaroslav Rudnyćkyj, "Die Lage der Ukrainischen Sprache in der Sowjetunion," Wörter und Sachen, Vol. XIX (1938), No. 4, pp. 284-297; Roman Smal-Stocki, Ukrains'ka mova v sovets'kij Ukraini (Praci Ukrajins'kaho Naukovoho Institutu, XXXIV, Warsaw, 1936); The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishers, 1952), pp. 92-141; Roman Jakobson, "Slavische Sprachfragen in der Sowjetunion," Slavische Rundschau, Vol. VI (1934), No. 5, pp. 324-343; Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationality Policy After World War II," unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1958, chapter 6, pp. 251-309.

21. Cited by Ščerbak, "K istorii obrazovanija uzbekskogo nacional'nogo jazyka," Voprosy jazykoznanija (No. 6, 1954), p. 114.

22. "A Correspondent," "Russification of the Tadžik Language," Central Asian Review, VI (1958), 25-33.

23. I. Rasulev, "Nekotorye voprosy uzbekskoj naučno-texničeskoj terminologii, Voprosy Uzbekskogo jazykoznanija (Tashkent: Ak. Nauk UzSSR, 1954), p. 84.

24. Rasulev, p. 86.

25. Š. I. Mikailov, "Literaturnye jazyki Dagestana," Voprosy jazykoznanija (No. 6, 1955), p. 98.

26. A. S. Sidorov, "Soveščanie po voprosam izučenija Komi jazyka," Voprosy jazykoznanija (No. 4, 1953), pp. 144-148.

27. N. A. Baskakov, "Razvitie jazykov i pis'mennosti narodov SSSR," Voprosy jazykoznanija (No. 3, 1925), p. 35. Professor Charles A. Ferguson, in a conversation with the writer, pointed out that the influence of Persian on such a language as Uzbek has also contributed to the breakdown of vowel harmony.

28. Sidorov, "Soveščanie."

29. A. Ščerbak, "K istorii obrazovanija uzbekskogo nacional'nogo jazyka," Voprosy jazykoznanija (No. 6, 1954), p. 114.

30. Roman Jakobson, "Sur la théorie des affinités phonologiques entre les langues," in N. S. Troubetzkoy,

Principes de Phonologie (Paris: Klincksieck, 1949), pp. 351-365, esp. 358.

31. Speakers of languages which have no close equivalents for certain Russian phonemes are confronted by an obvious enigma in coping with loan words in their Russian form. Few are the languages, like Mordvinian, in which the Cyrillic alphabet represents the sound system with almost perfect fidelity.

32. H. Kučera, "Soviet Nationality Policy: The Linguistic Controversy," Problems of Communism, II (March-April 1953), pp. 28-29.

33. "Zadači sovetskogo jazykoznanija v svete trudov I. V. Stalina," Voprosy jazykoznanija (No. 1, 1952), p. 31.

34. It is typical of enforced programs of language reform that they tend to concentrate on the vocabulary, often to the exclusion of other aspects of a language. Cf., for example, the Turkish experience, as discussed by Uriel Heyd, Language Reform in Turkey (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1954), p. 45, et passim.

35. See Alexander Korol, Soviet Education for Science and Technology (Cambridge and New York: Technology Press and John Wiley, 1957), p. 179. See also Vsevelod Holub, "The Language of Instruction: An Aspect of the Problem of Nationalities in the Soviet Union," Horizons (Ukrainian Students' Review) (New York), II (Fall-Spring 1957), 26-37.

36. Pravda Vostoka, Aug. 25, 1956.

37. See "The Teaching of Russian in Central Asian Schools," Central Asian Review, V (1957), 37-41.

38. Kommunist (Erevan), Aug. 21, 1957.

39. Throughout this paper, "bilingualism" is employed in its broadest sense, and is intended to include "multilingualism," which is well represented in the U.S.S.R., particularly in such areas as Dagestan in the Caucasus, or the Xorezm in Uzbekistan.

40. Joseph H. Greenberg, "The Measurement of Linguistic Diversity," Language, XXXII (Jan.-Mar. 1956), 109-115.

41. Uriel Weinreich, "Functional Aspects of Indian Bilingualism," Word, XIII (Aug. 1957), 203-233; 228-229.

42. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York, 1953).

43. Einar Huagen, Bilingualism in the Americas (University of Alabama Press, 1956).

44. The term is Weinreich's; see Languages in Contact, p. 98.

45. Bloomfield's use of the terms "dominant" or "upper" and "lower" (Language, [New York, 1933], p. 46) has often been challenged. Weinreich suggests "prestige" language, but points out the contradictions to which all such definitions lead.

46. Richard E. Pipes, "The Nationalities," New Leader, April 14, 1958, p. 17.

47. Bilinsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism," pp. 301-302.

48. Raymond Bauer, Alex Inkeles, Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 202-203. The only large sampling of any one ethnic group in the Harvard study was, however, provided by the Ukrainians, with 458 respondents. A forthcoming report by Yaroslav Bilinsky will analyze more fully the data in these questionnaires.

49. Bauer, Inkeles, p. 202.

50. See Bilinsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism," pp. 251-307, which covers linguistic policy.

51. Bilinsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism," p. 270.

52. Bilinsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism," p. 268a. Bilinsky does not fail to give instances of the operation of the "prestige" factor, He cites an interviewee who informed him that while courting a young Ukrainian lady in Kiev he felt obliged to employ Russian rather than Ukrainian, which would have marked him as a country bumpkin (p. 269).

53. Richard E. Pipes, "Muslims of Central Asia: Trends and Prospects," Middle East Journal, IX, Nos. 2 and and 3 (Spring, Summer 1955), pp. 147-162, 295-308; see p. 160 et passim. While Pipes tends to minimize the extent of Russification in Central Asia, these articles contain valuable data on language and nationality problems.

54. Pipes, "Muslims" (Summer, 1955), p. 308.

55. Ministerstvo kul'tury SSSR, Pečat' SSSR za sorok let 1917-1957 (Moskva: Glavizdat, 1957).

56. Pečat', p. 50.

57. Pečat', pp. 50, 72.

58. Pečat', pp. 131-132.

59. An Indo-Iranian language used by a speech community of about 100,000 in the Caucasus. See W. K, Matthews, Languages of the USSR (Cambridge University Press, 1951), p. 127.

60. Pravda, Oct. 20, 1957.

61. Central'noe statističeskoe upravlenie, Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo SSSR, (Moskva, 1956), pp. 298-299.

62. Kazaxstanskaja Pravda, Jan. 31, 1957.

63. Sovetskaja Latvija, Jan. 24, 1957.

64. Sovetskaja Latvija, Jan. 23, 1957.

65. No attempt can be made here to discuss the voluminous literature on nationalism which pays attention to the matter of language. Let it be said, en passant, that Boyd Shafer's recent work Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York, 1955) warns against over-emphasis on this phase of the problem: "While language could perhaps be the chief distinguishing mark of nationality, language cannot alone explain the emergence of nationalism" (p. 81 et passim).

66. Walter Kolarz, "Die Rehabilitierung der liquidierten Sowjetvölker," Osteuropa, VI (June 1957).

67. Načalnaja škola, No. 7 (July 1957), p. 79.

68. The Jewish element, numbering about 25,000, appears to constitute only about one-quarter of the population of Birobidžan. No special importance seems to attend the news, printed by the May 28, 1958, Jewish Advocate (Boston) that Radio Moscow's shortwave service had late in May transmitted a broadcast describing life in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast' to North America.

69. P. Jyrkänkallio, "A Survey of the Turkic Peoples of Our Time," Studia Orientalia 14 (Helsinki, 1950), translated from the German and reproduced by the Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C. (1953), p. 34.

70. Sovetskaja Moldavija, Sept. 26, 1957.

71. Appreciation is expressed for the assistance received in the preparation of this study from the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Moreover the author is indebted for valuable suggestions to the following: Charles A. Ferguson, Department of Linguistics; Richard E. Pipes, Department of History; Morris Watnick, Russian Research Center, all of Harvard University, and Uriel Weinreich, Department of Linguistics, Columbia University.