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Technical Specification

3rd Generation Partnership Project;

Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects;

5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for

the Network Repository Function (NRF)

network product class

(Release 16)

** 

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# Foreword

This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

Version x.y.z

where:

x the first digit:

1 presented to TSG for information;

2 presented to TSG for approval;

3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.

y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.

z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings:

**shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something

**shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something

The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports.

The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document.

**should** indicates a recommendation to do something

**should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something

**may** indicates permission to do something

**need not** indicates permission not to do something

The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended.

**can** indicates that something is possible

**cannot** indicates that something is impossible

The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not".

**will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

In addition:

**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements.

# 1 Scope

The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the NRF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the NRF network product class.

# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".

[2] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".

[3] 3GPP TS 33.501 v15: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".

[4] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System".

[5] 3GPP TS 29.510: "5G System; Network function repository services; Stage 3".

[6] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".

# 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations

## 3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

## 3.2 Symbols

Void.

## 3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

NF Network Function

NRF Network Repository Function

# 4 NRF-specific security requirements and related test cases

## 4.1 Introduction

NRF specific security requirements include both requirements derived from NRF-specific security functional requirements in relevant specifications as well as the security requirements introduced in the present document derived from the threats specific to NRF as described in TR 33.926 [6].

## 4.2 NRF-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases

### 4.2.1 Introduction

The present clause describes the security functional requirements and the corresponding test cases for NRF network product class. The proposed security requirements are classified in two groups:

- Security functional requirements derived from TS 33.501 [3] and detailed in clause 4.2.2.

- General security functional requirements which include requirements not already addressed in TS 33.501 [3] but whose support is also important to ensure that NRF conforms to a common security baseline detailed in clause 4.2.3.

### 4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the NRF deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases

#### 4.2.2.1 Security functional requirements on the NRF deriving from 3GPP specifications – general approach

In addition to the requirements and test cases in TS 33.117 [2], clause 4.2.2, a NRF shall satisfy the following:

It is assumed for the purpose of the present SCAS that a NRF conforms to all mandatory security-related provisions pertaining to a NRF in:

- 3GPP TS 33.501 [3]: "Security architecture procedures for 5G system";

- other 3GPP specifications that make reference to TS 33.501 [3] or are referred to from TS 33.501 [3].

Security procedures pertaining to a NRF are typically embedded in NF discovery/registration/access token request procedures and are hence assumed to be tested together with them.

#### 4.2.2.2 NF discovery procedure

##### 4.2.2.2.1 NF discovery authorization for specific slice

*Requirement Name*: NF discovery authorization for specific slice

*Requirement Reference:* TS 33.501 [3], clause 5.9.2.1, TS 23.502 [4], clause 4.17.4, and TS 29.510 [5], clause 6.2.3.2.3.1.

*Requirement Description*:

"NRF shall be able to ensure that NF Discovery and registration requests are authorized" as specified in TS 33.501 [3], clause 5.9.2.1.

"The NRF authorizes the Nnrf\_NFDiscovery\_Request. Based on the profile of the expected NF/NF service and the type of the NF service consumer, the NRF determines whether the NF service consumer is allowed to discover the expected NF instance(s). If the expected NF instance(s) or NF service instance(s) are deployed in a certain network slice, NRF authorizes the discovery request according to the discovery configuration of the Network Slice, e.g. the expected NF instance(s) are only discoverable by the NF in the same network slice".

as specified in TS 23.502 [4], clause 4.17.4.

"If included, the requester-snssais IE shall contain the list of S-NSSAI of the requester NF. The NRF shall use this to return only those NF profiles of NF Instances allowing to be discovered from the slice(s) identified by this IE, according to the "allowedNssais" list in the NF Profile and NF Service" as specified in TS 29.510 [5], clause 6.2.3.2.3.1.

*Threat References*: TR 33.926 [6], clause H.2.2.1, No slice specific authorization for NF discovery

*Test Case*:

**Test Name:** TC\_DISC\_AUTHORIZATION\_SLICE\_NRF

**Purpose:**

Verify that the NRF under test does not authorize slice specific discovery request for the NF instance which is not part of the requested slice, according to the slice specific discovery configuration of the requested NF instance.

**Procedure and execution steps:**

**Pre-Conditions:**

- Test environment with the NF1 and NF2, which may be simulated.

- The NF2 is configured with a list of S-NSSAI, which contains slice A but not slice B.

- The NF1 is configured as a NF instance belonging to slice B and is connected in emulated/real network environment.

- The NF1 and NF2 is successfully authenticated with the NRF under test.

**Execution Steps**

1. The NF2 registers at the NRF under test with a list of S-NSSAI.

2. The NF1 sends an Nnrf\_NFDiscovery\_Request to the NRF under test with the expected service name of NF2, NF type of the expected NF2.

3. The NRF under test determines that NF2 instance only allows discovery from NFs belonging to slice A, according to the "allowedNssais" list stored in NF2 Profile.

**Expected Results:**

The NRF under test returns a response with "403 Forbidden" status code, as specified in clause 5.3.2.2.2 of TS 29.510 [5].

**Expected format of evidence:**

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., evidence can be presented in the form of screenshot/screen-capture.

### 4.2.3 Technical Baseline

#### 4.2.3.1 Introduction

The present clause provides baseline technical requirements.

#### 4.2.3.2 Protecting data and information

##### 4.2.3.2.1 Protecting data and information – general

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.1 of TS 33.117 [2].

##### 4.2.3.2.2 Protecting data and information – unauthorized viewing

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.2 of TS 33.117 [2].

##### 4.2.3.2.3 Protecting data and information in storage

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.3 of TS 33.117 [2].

##### 4.2.3.2.4 Protecting data and information in transfer

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.4 of TS 33.117 [2].

##### 4.2.3.2.5 Logging access to personal data

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.2.5 of TS 33.117 [2].

#### 4.2.3.3 Protecting availability and integrity

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.3 of TS 33.117 [2].

#### 4.2.3.4 Authentication and authorization

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.4 of TS 33.117 [2].

#### 4.2.3.5 Protecting sessions

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.5 of TS 33.117 [2].

#### 4.2.3.6 Logging

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.3.6 of TS 33.117 [2].

### 4.2.4 Operating Systems

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.4 of TS 33.117 [2].

### 4.2.5 Web Servers

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.5 of TS 33.117 [2].

### 4.2.6 Network Devices

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.2.6 of TS 33.117 [2].

## 4.3 NRF-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases

### 4.3.1 Introduction

The requirements proposed hereafter (with the relative test cases) aim to securing NRF by reducing its surface of vulnerability. In particular, the identified requirements aim to ensure that all the default configurations of NRF (including operating system software, firmware and applications) are appropriately set.

### 4.3.2 Technical baseline

All text from TS 33.117, clause 4.3.2 also applies to NRFs. There are no NRF-specific adaptations or additions to clause 4.3.2 of TS 33.117 [2].

### 4.3.3 Operating systems

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.3.3 of TS 33.117 [2].

### 4.3.4 Web servers

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.3.4 of TS 33.117 [2].

### 4.3.5 Network devices

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.3.5 of TS 33.117 [2].

### 4.3.6 Network functions in service-based architecture

There are no NRF-specific additions to clause 4.3.6 in TS 33.117 [2].

## 4.4 NRF-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases

All text from TS 33.117, clause 4.4 also applies to NRFs. There are no NRF-specific adaptations or additions to clause 4.4 of TS 33.117 [2].

Annex A (informative):  
Change history

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Change history** | | | | | | | |
| **date** | **Meeting** | **TDoc** | **CR** | **Rev** | **Cat** | **Subject/Comment** | **New version** |
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| 2019-10 |  |  |  |  |  | EditHelp review | 16.0.1 |
| 2019-12 | SA#86 | SP-191138 | 0001 | - | F | Adding abbreviations and corrections for alignment | 16.1.0 |
| 2020-07 | SA#88E | SP-200358 | 0002 | 1 | F | Update to the test case of NF discovery authorization for specific slice | 16.2.0 |