



## 03 Block Cipher

2021 Spring

Information Security

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
March 9, 2021

Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering,  
National Taiwan Normal University

# What is Block Cipher?

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# Stream Cipher




**Encryption** and **Decryption** are the same algorithm.

### Block Cipher

A block cipher is one in which a **block** of plaintext is treated as a whole and used to produce a ciphertext block of **equal length**.

# Block Cipher



**Encryption** and **Decryption** are normally two different algorithms.

# Definition

## Pseudo Random Function

$F: K \times X \rightarrow Y$  such that exists an **efficient** algorithm to evaluate  $F(k, x)$ .

## Pseudo Random Permutation

$E: K \times X \rightarrow X$  such that

1. Exists an **efficient deterministic** algorithm to evaluate  $E(k, x)$ .
2.  $E$  is an **one-to-one** function.
3. Exists an efficient **inversion** algorithm.

# Definition

## Pseudo Random Function

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1. Exists an **efficient deterministic** algorithm to evaluate  $E(k, x)$ .
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3. Exists an efficient **inversion** algorithm.

Actually, a block cipher is a Pseudo Random Permutation function.

# What can PRF Do?

- Undoubtedly, you can use PRF to create a PRG.
  - How?
- This also implies that PRF can be used to construct a stream cipher.
- We will discuss PRF later.



# What can PRF Do?

- Undoubtedly, you can use PRF to create a PRG.
  - How?
  - $G(k) = F(k, 0) || F(k, 1) || \dots || F(k, t - 1)$ .
- This also implies that PRF can be used to construct a stream cipher.
- We will discuss PRF later.

# What can PRP Do?

- PRPs are **block ciphers**.
- Functionally speaking, a PRP is also a PRF.
  - A PRP is a PRF where  $X = Y$  and is **efficiently invertible**.

Is it possible to use a block cipher to construct a stream cipher?


Is it possible to use a block cipher to construct a stream cipher?

YES.

## Feistel Cipher

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# Feistel Network



$f_1, f_2, \dots, f_d : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  are PRF.

$$\begin{cases} R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f_i(R_{i-1}) \\ L_i = R_{i-1} \end{cases}$$


How to invert Feistel Networks?

How to invert Feistel Networks?

$$\begin{cases} R_{i-1} = L_i \\ L_{i-1} = R_i \oplus f_i(L_i) \end{cases}$$



# Feistel Network



- For all function  $f$ , the Feistel network is invertible.
  - Even  $f$  is not invertible.
- The encryption circuit and the decryption circuit are the **same**.


# Feistel Network is a Secure Cipher

What is a secure cipher??

Conditions:


1.  $f: K \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$  is a **secure PRF**.
2. **3-round** and above.
3. Keys are **independent**.

## Why 3-round Above?



Can you generate  $m_0, m_1$  and determine which one is encrypted when receiving  $c$ ?


## Why 3-round Above?



Can you generate  $m_0, m_1$  and determine which one is encrypted when receiving  $c$ ?


- Just choose two messages with different  $R_0$ .

## Why 3-round Above?



Can you generate  $m_0, m_1$  and determine which one is encrypted when receiving  $c$ ?

## Why 3-round Above?




Can you generate  $m_0, m_1$  and determine which one is encrypted when receiving  $c$ ?

If  $E(L, R) = (L', R')$ , then  $E(L \oplus T, R) = (L' \oplus T, R')$ .

## Why Keys must be Independent?

Slide attack.




Do you know what this means? **This is your homework.**

**DES**

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


# Data Encryption Standard




The block size is 64 bits.

# The Feistel Function



# DES Key Schedule



共8组

- DES actually has a key length of 64 bits, however 8 bits are used for parity, therefore the effective key length is 56 bits.

# S-Boxes

S <sub>1</sub>																
	x0000x	x0001x	x0010x	x0011x	x0100x	x0101x	x0110x	x0111x	x1000x	x1001x	x1010x	x1011x	x1100x	x1101x	x1110x	x1111x
0yyyy0	14	4	13	1	2	15	11	8	3	10	6	12	5	9	0	7
0yyyy1	0	15	7	4	14	2	13	1	10	6	12	11	9	5	3	8
lyyyy0	4	1	14	8	13	6	2	11	15	12	9	7	3	10	5	0
lyyyy1	15	12	8	2	4	9	1	7	5	11	3	14	10	0	6	13
S <sub>2</sub>																
	x0000x	x0001x	x0010x	x0011x	x0100x	x0101x	x0110x	x0111x	x1000x	x1001x	x1010x	x1011x	x1100x	x1101x	x1110x	x1111x
0yyyy0	15	1	8	14	6	11	3	4	9	7	2	13	12	0	5	10
0yyyy1	3	13	4	7	15	2	8	14	12	0	1	10	6	9	11	5
lyyyy0	0	14	7	11	10	4	13	1	5	8	12	6	9	3	2	15
lyyyy1	13	8	10	1	3	15	4	2	11	6	7	12	0	5	14	9

## What if S-Box is Bad ...

- What is a bad S-Box?

## What if S-Box is Bad ...

- What is a bad S-Box?
- Suppose S-Box is

$$S(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) = (x_2 \oplus x_3, x_1 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5, x_1 \oplus x_6, x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_6)$$

$$S(\vec{x}) = B \cdot \vec{x}$$

The output will be also linear combination.

# Brute Force Attack

- Exhaustive Search Attack.
- How long do you need to search all  $2^{56}$  possible keys?
- Quiz:  
Do you think it is very easy to get the plaintext and ciphertext pair??

- Jun. 1997. The DESCHALL Project breaks a message encrypted with DES for the first time in public.
- Jul. 1998. The EFF's DES cracker (Deep Crack) breaks a DES key in 56 hours.
- Jan. 1999. Together, Deep Crack and distributed.net break a DES key in 22 hours and 15 minutes.
- Apr. 2006. The Universities of Bochum and Kiel, breaks DES in 9 days at a \$10,000 hardware cost.



Is DES secure enough? **No**.

Is DES cracked? **No**.


DES is not safe because the computation power is over its design instead of DES has been cracked.

## Triple DES

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
## Increase DES Keys

- DES is not secure enough because of short keys.
- How about double the key size? Like the figure below so that key size will be 112 bits.




Unfortunately, it does not work. Why?

# Trivial Thinking



Possible keys are  $2^{56} \times 2^{56} = 2^{112}$ .


# Meet in the Middle Attack



Only  $2 \times 2^{56} = 2^{57}$ .

# Triple DES

- Meet in the middle attack still works.
- So the effective key size is **112 bits** instead of 168 bits.



Why not three encryption blocks?

**AES**

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## DES is Not Secure Anymore ...

- 1997: NIST publishes request for proposal.
- 1998: 15 submissions.
- 1999: NIST chooses 5 finalists.
- 2000: NIST chooses Rijndael as AES.


Key Size: 128, 192, 256 bits.

Block Size: 128 bits.

# Candidates

- CAST-256 Entrust (CA)
- Crypton Future Systems (KR)
- E2 NTT (JP)
- Frog TecApro (CR)
- Magenta Deutsche Telekom (DE)
- **Mars IBM (USA)**
- **RC6 RSA (USA)**
- SAFER+ Cylink (USA)
- **Twofish Counterpane (USA)**
- DEAL Outerbridge, Knudsen (USA-DK)
- DFC ENS-CNRS (FR)
- HPC Schroeppel (USA)
- LOKI97 Brown et al. (AU)
- **Rijndael Daemen and Rijmen (BE)**
- **Serpent Anderson, Biham, Knudsen (UK)**

# Advanced Encryption Standard



# I will Not Talk Too Much in Detail

- **Uniform** and **parallel** round transformation, composed of:
  - Byte substitution.
  - Shift rows.
  - Mix columns.
  - Round key addition.
- **Sequential and lightweight key schedule.**
- Mathematically quite **sophisticated**.
- **No arithmetic operations.**

All you need to know is **AES is a secure PRP**.

## Before We End Up This Topic

- This course is called **Information Security** instead of **Cryptography**.
- You can skip some details about how PRP works, but you need to know how to use these PRPs, like **3DES** and **AES**.
- I hope one day I can open a course called Applied Cryptography ...

# How to Use Block Ciphers

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# Now We Have a Block Cipher

## 1. 3DES

- Block Size: 64 bits.
- Key Size: 168 bits. (only 112 bits effective)


## 2. AES

- Block Size: 128 bits.
- Key Size: 128, 192, 256 bits.

However, a file size is often larger than a block size.

## Trivial Solution: ECB

Electronic Code Book (ECB)




This mode has a big problem. Why?




# AES with ECB



Original image



Encrypted using ECB mode



Modes other than ECB result in pseudo-randomness


## ECB is Not Semantically Secure

ECB is not semantically secure if the message has multiple blocks.

Can you show how to break ECB?

## ECB is Not Semantically Secure


ECB is not semantically secure if the message has multiple blocks.



The probability that the attacker wins this game is?

## Solution: Add Counters

Suppose there is a PRP function  $F$ .




Look, you can build a stream cipher from a block cipher (PRP).

### Theorem

If  $F$  is a secure PRF, then  $E_{\text{DETCtr}}$  is semantic secure. For any efficient adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  attacking  $E_{\text{DETCtr}}$ , there exists an efficient PRF adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  such that:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SS}}[\mathcal{A}, E_{\text{DETCtr}}] = 2 \times \text{Adv}_{\text{PRF}}[\mathcal{B}, F]$$

# Proof



When using one key many times, counter mode does not work.

Why?

When using one key many times, counter mode does not work.

Why?


Because each counter start from 0 for many files.




## Chosen Plaintext Attack

- Adversary can obtain the encryption of **arbitrary** messages of his choice.
- Actually, it is semantic security for **many-times** key.

# CPA Game Model 1/2



## CPA Game Model 2/2



- To achieve CPA-security, the encryption method must generate different outputs for a given message multiple times.
- This implies we need to **randomize** the encryption.

## How to Use Block Ciphers: Many-Times Key

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## How to Randomize the Ciphertext?

Your idea?

## How to Randomize the Ciphertext?

Your idea?


Add a random number in the content.

## Other Operation Modes


1. CBC: Cipher Block Chaining.
2. CTR: Counter.



## CBC Mode 1/2



## CBC Mode 2/2



### Theorem

For any  $L > 0$ , if  $E$  is a secure PRP over  $(K, X)$ ,  $E_{\text{CBC}}$  is CPA-secure over  $(K, X_L, X_{L+1})$ .

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{CPA}}[\mathcal{A}, E_{\text{CBC}}] \leq 2 \times \text{Adv}_{\text{PRP}}[\mathcal{B}, E] + \frac{2q^2L^2}{|X|}.$$

- $q$ : # messages encrypted with  $k$ .
- $L$ : length of max message.

## Example

Suppose we want  $\text{Adv}_{\text{CBC}}$  to be less than  $\frac{1}{2^{32}}$ .

- 3-DES:
  - $|X| = 2^{64}$ .
  - $ql < 2^{16}$ .
- AES:
  - $|X| = 2^{128}$ .
  - $ql < 2^{48}$ .

## Quiz

Suppose IV is **predictable**, what will happen?


# Quiz

Suppose IV is **predictable**, what will happen?

Challenger



Attacker



```
void AES_cbc_encrypt (
    const unsigned char *    in,
    unsigned char *    out,
    size_t    length,
    const AES_KEY *    key,
    unsigned char *    ivec,
    const int    enc
)
```

How about the last block??



How about the last block??


Padding issue. Pad all zeros in the last block.

How about the last block??

Padding issue. Pad all zeros in the last block.

How to distinguish 0 between real message and padding?

## CTR Mode



# CTR Mode is Secure

## Theorem

For any  $L > 0$ , if  $E$  is a secure PRP over  $(K, X)$ ,  $E_{\text{CTR}}$  is CPA-secure over  $(K, X_L, X_{L+1})$ .

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{CPA}}[\mathcal{A}, E_{\text{CTR}}] \leq 2 \times \text{Adv}_{\text{PRP}}[\mathcal{B}, E] + \frac{2q^2L}{|X|}.$$

- $q$ : # messages encrypted with  $k$ .
- $L$ : length of max message.

So, CTR mode is better than CBC.

## **Appendix: Reminder**

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# Never Implement Crypto Cipher

- In this class, I have introduced some block ciphers.
- I know you are good at programming ...but please do not implement them yourselves.
  - If you want to practice or for fun, that is OK. But do not use them in the serious scenario.
  - **Why?**