

EECS544
Analysis of Societal Networks

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Abstract

We'll use Easley, D. and Kleinberg, J. [\[EK10\]](#) as our main reference. We focus on mathematically rigorous approach to analyze social network and also game theory.

This course is taken in Fall 2021, and the date on the covering page is the last updated time.

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Chapter 1

Graph and Network

Lecture 1: Introduction to Graph Theory

1.1 Graph

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Let's start with some of the most fundamental definitions.

Definition 1.1.1 (Vertex set). A set is called a *vertex set* if we view its elements as vertices.^a

^aSometimes *nodes*.

Definition 1.1.2 (Graph). There are two kinds of *graph* we're interested in, **undirected graph** and **directed graph**.

Definition 1.1.3 (Undirected graph). An *undirected graph* is a pair $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, where \mathcal{V} is the **vertex set** and \mathcal{E} is the **edge set**.

Definition 1.1.4 (Edge set). An *edge set* \mathcal{E} of an **undirected graph** \mathcal{G} is a set of paired vertices, which we call edges.^a

^aSometimes *links*.

Definition 1.1.5 (Directed graph). A *directed graph* is a pair $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, where \mathcal{V} is the **vertex set** and \mathcal{E} is the **directed edge set**.

Definition 1.1.6 (Directed edge set). A *directed edge set* \mathcal{E} of a **directed graph** \mathcal{G} is a set of ordered-paired vertices, which we call directed edges.^a

^aSometimes *directed links*.

Example (Undirected and directed graph). Let $A = \{a, b, c, d, e\}$ be a **vertex set**, then an example of **edge sets** can be

$$B := \{\{a, b\}, \{b, e\}, \{c, d\}\},$$

and

$$B' := \{(a, b), (b, e), (c, d)\}$$

is an example of **directed edge set**. Together, (A, B) is a valid **undirected graph**, while (A, B') is a **directed graph**.

Notation. We some time will write an edge between a and b as (a, b) instead of $\{a, b\}$ and a directed edge from a to b as $a \rightarrow b$ if the content is clear.

Note. While the definition of a **vertex set** is purely abstract, we often just deal with concrete graph where the structure of the graph is clear (e.g., in social network, every people are vertices, and relationships between people are edges).

Definition. Given a **directed graph** \mathcal{G} , we can define the followings.

Definition 1.1.7 (In-degree). For a node $v \in \mathcal{V}$, the *in-degree* of v in a **directed graph** \mathcal{G} is defined as the number of directed edges pointing in to v .

Definition 1.1.8 (Out-degree). For a node $v \in \mathcal{V}$, the *out-degree* of v in a **directed graph** \mathcal{G} is defined as the number of directed edges pointing out from v .

Moreover, if we generalize above to an **undirected graph** we have the following.

Definition 1.1.9 (Degree). Given an **undirected graph**, for a node $v \in \mathcal{V}$, the *degree* of v in an **undirected graph** is defined as the number of edges link with v .

Definition 1.1.10 (Subgraph). A *subgraph*^a \mathcal{G}' is defined by a pair $(\mathcal{V}', \mathcal{E}')$ such that $\mathcal{V}' \subseteq \mathcal{V}$, $\mathcal{E}' \subseteq \mathcal{E}$.

^aSometimes *component*.

Note. Notice that the edges in \mathcal{E}' need to be well-defined. Namely, for every $e = (a, b) \in \mathcal{E}'$, a, b need to also be in \mathcal{V}' .

Finally, we introduce the following definition.

Definition 1.1.11 (Simple graph). A *simple graph* is a **graph** without loops and multiple edges.^a

^ai.e., no edges like $\{a, a\}$ and there is only one edge between any two nodes.

Lecture 2: Graph Theory

Definition 1.1.12 (Path). Given a list of vertices indexed in order as v_1, \dots, v_n where $v_i \in \mathcal{V}$,

- (a) A *path* P connecting v_i in an **undirected graph** is a **subgraph** $P = (V, E)$, where $V = \{v_i\}_{i=1}^n$, and $E = \{\{v_i, v_{i+1}\}\}_{i=1}^{n-1}$.
- (b) A *path* P connecting v_i in a **directed graph** is a **subgraph** $P = (V, E)$, where $V = \{v_i\}_{i=1}^n$, and $E = \{(v_i, v_{i+1})\}_{i=1}^{n-1}$.

Then, in the same spirit of **Definition 1.1.11**, we have a so-called **simple path**.

Definition 1.1.13 (Simple path). A **path** is a *simple path* if it does not have repeating vertices.

Intuition. Basically, it says that **simple paths** can't have loops.

With the definitions we introduced, we can now try to characterize a **graph**.

Definition. We can then define connectivity of a **graph** as follows.

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Definition 1.1.14 (Connected). An **undirected graph** is *connected* if for every two nodes, there exists at least one **path** connect them together.

Definition 1.1.15 (Strongly connected). A **directed graph** is *strongly connected* if for every two nodes, there exists at least one **path** connect them together.

Notation (Connected component). The above definitions can be generalized to a **subgraph** as well. In this case, we say that this **subgraph** is **connected**, or more often we'll say this **subgraph** is a *connected component*. Same for **strongly connected**.

Definition 1.1.16 (Giant component). A **subgraph** is called a *giant component* of a **graph** if it is a **connected** component and with a significant number of nodes of the original **graph**.

Finally, we introduce the first matrix associated with a **graph**.

Definition 1.1.17 (Adjacency matrix). For an **undirected graph** $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, the *adjacency matrix* of an **undirected graph** is a matrix A such that

$$A_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \{i, j\} \in \mathcal{E} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For a **directed graph** $\mathcal{G}' = (\mathcal{V}', \mathcal{E}')$, the *adjacency matrix* of a **directed graph** is a matrix A' such that

$$A'_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } (i, j) \in \mathcal{E}' \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Remark. The **adjacency matrix** of an **undirected graph** must be **symmetric** by definition.

Proof. Since if $\{i, j\} \in \mathcal{E}$, we know that $\{j, i\} \in \mathcal{E}$ as well since $\{j, i\} = \{i, j\}$, so $A_{ij} = A_{ji} = 1$.
On the other hand, if $\{i, j\} \notin \mathcal{E}$, then $\{j, i\} \notin \mathcal{E}$, hence in this case $A_{ij} = A_{ji} = 0$ clearly. \otimes

Lecture 3: Network Property

A network is essentially a **graph** with some interesting properties. We start with connectivity.

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1.2 Measuring Connectivity

Intuition. If there are more **paths** in the **graph** between different parts of the **graph**, then this **graph** is *more connected*.

To characterize **paths**, we have the following definitions.

Definition 1.2.1 (Edge independent). Two **paths** are said to be *edge independent* (EI) if they do not share a common edge.

Definition 1.2.2 (Vertex independent). Two **paths** are said to be *vertex independent* (VI) if they do not share a common vertex except the starting vertex and the ending vertex.

1.2.1 Cut Set

Before we formulate the definition of cut set, we'll need to define so-called **induced subgraph** since they're highly related.

Definition 1.2.3 (Induced subgraph). Given a graph $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, the *induced subgraph* with respect to

- $\mathcal{V}' \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ is defined as $\mathcal{G}[\mathcal{V}'] := (\mathcal{V}', \hat{\mathcal{E}})$, where $\hat{\mathcal{E}} := \{e \in \mathcal{E} : e = (i, j), i, j \in \mathcal{V}'\}$.^a
- $\mathcal{E}' \subseteq \mathcal{E}$ is defined as $\mathcal{G}[\mathcal{E}'] := (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}')$.

^aThis is for [directed graph](#), but the case for [undirected graph](#) is similar, just change (i, j) to $\{i, j\}$.

Intuition. This is just a convenient notion for [graph subtraction](#) which is essentially just the subtraction between the edge set and the vertex set. Notice that the case of edge-subtraction is trivial, while node-subtraction needs to be well-defined, e.g. it's nonsense to say (i, j) is still in the [induced subgraph](#) if one end of the edge is not in the [node set](#) anymore.

Definition 1.2.4 (Edge cut set). Given $u, v \in \mathcal{V}$, a set of edges $\mathcal{E}' \subseteq \mathcal{E}$ is called an *edge cut set* if u, v are in different [connected components](#) in the [subgraph induced from \$\mathcal{E}'\$](#) .

Definition 1.2.5 (Vertex cut set). Given $u, v \in \mathcal{V}$, a set of vertices $\mathcal{V}' \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ is called a *vertex cut set* if u, v are in different [connected components](#) in the [subgraph induced from \$\mathcal{V}'\$](#) .

Note. It's worth noting that in the case of [vertex cut set](#), if u or v is not in \mathcal{V}' , then we still say u and v are not in the same [connected component](#) (even if neither u nor v is in \mathcal{V}').

Remark. Note that the above definitions are for [undirected graph](#) since we only consider [connected](#) but not [strongly connected](#). But it's obvious that one can generalize the notion to [directed graph](#).

Theorem 1.2.1 (Menger's theorem). If for any pair of nodes (i, j) we have $|\text{ECS}(i, j)| > n$ where $\text{ECS}(i, j)$ denotes the collection of [edge cut set](#) respect to (i, j) , then for any pair of nodes (i, j) ,

$$\# \text{ edge independent paths between } i \text{ and } j > n.$$

Proof. A nice proof can be found [here](#). ■

Lecture 4: Network Properties


We now try to further characterize the connectedness of a network. We first give a common notion.

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Definition 1.2.6 (Complete graph). A graph $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ is *complete* if \mathcal{E} contains every possible edges.

Notation. We often denote a [complete graph](#) with n nodes as K_n .

Example (Triadic closure). The *triadic closure* says that if a network has this property, then given $a, b, c \in \mathcal{V}$, if $\{a, b\}, \{b, c\} \in \mathcal{E}$, it's very likely that $\{a, c\} \in \mathcal{E}$ as well.



This motivates us that the number of triangles maybe can be used to quantify the connectedness of a network.

Definition 1.2.7 (Clustering coefficient). For each node i , define the *clustering coefficient*

$$c_i = \frac{\# \text{ of triangles in the graph that include node } i}{d_i(d_i - 1)/2},$$

where d_i is the *degree*^a of i .

^aWe assume our network is an *undirected* for simplicity.

Remark. We have, for any node i , $c_i \in [0, 1]$. If $\forall i$ $c_i = 1$, then this *graph* is *complete*. If $\forall i$ $c_i = 0$, then this *graph* is a *tree*.

1.2.2 Bridges and Local Bridges

Definition 1.2.8 (Bridge). A *bridge* is the only edge that connects together two *subgraphs* that are themselves *connected*.

Remark. Deleting a bridge may change the distance between two nodes from some finite value to ∞ . (disconnects those two nodes)

Definition 1.2.9 (Local bridge). An edge (i, j) is said to be a *local bridge* if i, j have no neighbors in common.

Note. Equivalently, a *local bridge* is an edge that is not included in any triangles.

Remark. If (i, j) is a *local bridge*, then we have

$$d_G(i, j) \geq 3$$

after removing this *local bridge*. Furthermore, a *bridge* must also be a *local bridge* by definition.

Definition 1.2.10 (Span of a local bridge). The *span* of a *local bridge* b is defined as $d_{G[\mathcal{E} \setminus \{b\}]}$.

1.3 Triadic Closure

Intuition ([EK10] pp.62). If two people in a social network have a friend in common, then there is an increased likelihood that they will become friends themselves at some point in the future.

The above intuition suggests the following characteristics of a network.

Definition 1.3.1 (Strong triadic closure). If a is a node and there are two nodes b, c such that (a, b) and (a, c) are strong ties, then (b, c) will form an edge. If for any nodes a, b, c in this graph \mathcal{G} satisfy this property, then we say this graph has *strong triadic closure property* (STC).

Definition 1.3.2 (Embeddedness). The *embeddedness* of an edge is defined as the number of common neighbors shared by the end points.

Chapter 2

Network Partition

Lecture 5: Partition Networks Hierarchically

2.1 Girvan-Newman Algorithm

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Intuition. We want to partition a network in order to study its structure. We do this in the following ways

1. Remove **bridges** and **local bridge**
2. Assign importance for each node

Problem. In what order?

Answer. Assign importance to **local bridge**. ⊗

This idea is the backbone of the **Girvan-Newman algorithm**. We first see a simple algorithmic approach which utilize the intuition.

Remark. We propose the following procedure to partition a network.

1. Rank all **local bridges**.
2. Remove the highest ranked one, which yields a partition.
3. Re-calculate ranking.
4. Repeat from 2. until no edges remain.

Note. At the end all nodes become isolated.

Problem. How to rank order **local bridges**?

Intuition. An edge is more important if more **shortest paths** use it. Notice that a *normalization* is needed: Between pairs of nodes, there should be lots of variation in the number of the **shortest paths** and we want to balance these out.

2.1.1 Betweenness

Definition 2.1.1 (Betweenness). Imagine that there is a unit flow of water between each (distinct) pair of nodes. If the flow has k different ways to go to, ^a we divide this unit flow into $1/k$. We then

equally divide this flow amongst the **shortest paths** coming out of the starting node.

^aActually not only depends on where can the flow go, but also where were that node added into BFS in the first place

With the definition of **betweenness**, we give the pseudocode of **Girvan-Newman algorithm**.

Algorithm 1: Girvan-Newman Algorithm

Data: A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$

```

1 for  $e \in \mathcal{E}$  do
2    $\text{between}_e \leftarrow 0$  // Initialize betweenness variable for every edge
3
4 while  $\mathcal{E} \neq \emptyset$  do
5    $\text{Betweenness}(\mathcal{G}, \{\text{between}_e\}_{e \in \mathcal{E}})$  // Calculate betweenness of all remaining edges
6    $\text{between}_{\text{highest}} \leftarrow \max_{e \in \mathcal{E}} \text{between}_e$ 
7    $\mathcal{E}_{\text{highest}} \leftarrow \{e \in \mathcal{E} : \text{between}_e = \text{between}_{\text{highest}}\}$ 
8    $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E} \setminus \mathcal{E}_{\text{highest}}$ 
9    $\mathcal{G} \leftarrow \mathcal{G}[\mathcal{E}]$ 
10 return
```

Remark. Run time analysis: $O(\ln n)$.

Problem. But how do we calculate **betweenness** in reality?

2.1.2 Calculate Betweenness

Intuition. Use breadth-first search (BFS) in a slight different manner.

Remark. The key is that any sub-**path** to destination is also a **shortest path**.

With BFS exploration (i : starting point, m is the destination), we have

the **shortest path** from i to m = # the **shortest path** from i to j + # the **shortest path** from j to m

while j, k are at same level $n - 1$, and m at level n , with the fact that there are edges between j, k to m . This can be done by adding a *counter* when running BFS.

2.1.3 Counter

From the above equation, we will have

$$c_v^{n+1} = \sum_{v^n} c_{v^n}^n$$

where the subscript indicates the node belongs to the counter, and c_v^{n+1} maintains the number of **shortest path** to v , which is just $n + 1$.

The unit flow flows from nodes back from the **path** it is added into the BFS algorithm needs to keep its own 1, and then distribute.

Remark. An algorithm for calculating the importance of each **local bridge**, which turns out to be **betweenness**. And this is accomplished by BFS with a counter.

Lecture 6: Homophily

2.2 Shortest Path Algorithm

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We want to develop some algorithms similar to BFS to find the distance between nodes. We first make the notion of distance between nodes rigorous.

Definition 2.2.1 (Shortest path). Given a [graph](#), a *shortest path* between two nodes u, v is a [path](#) whose end nodes are u, v while the sum of the weights^a of its constituent edges is minimized.

^aWe only discuss unweighted [graph](#) so far, where we treat the weight as 1 for all edges.

Definition 2.2.2 (Distance between nodes). We usually let the length of the [shortest path](#) between two nodes in a [graph](#) \mathcal{G} be the *distance between these two nodes*, denoted as

$$d_{\mathcal{G}}(\cdot, \cdot),$$

which takes two input for two corresponding nodes.

Something like

$$d_{\mathcal{G}}(i, j) = 1 + \min_{k \in N_{\mathcal{G}}(j)} d_{\mathcal{G}}(i, k).$$

2.2.1 Dynamic programming

There are many approaches to calculate the distance between nodes, one way is *Dijkstra's algorithm*.

2.3 Homophily

Links in a (social) network are formed between people that are *similar*. This is an important feature that leads to the formation of communities.

2.3.1 Define *Like* and *Opposite*

Consider a network with two types of individuals:

Example (Middle school). Consider a school of boys and girls. Suppose the fraction of boy is p and the fraction of girls is $q = 1 - p$. We have

$$\frac{\binom{np}{2}}{\binom{n}{2}} \cong p^2$$

and also

$$1 - p^2 - q^2 = 2pq.$$

If the fraction of cross connection $\ll 2pq$, homophily is considered likely. Otherwise, if the fraction $\gg 2pq$, inverse-homophily is likely to occur.

We see that some social implications arise from this

1. schelling model
2. parameters
 - (a) satisfaction threshold
 - (b) population of each partition
 - (c) vacancy
3. a grid of X and O (denoting partition of agents).
 - Satisfied Agent: A satisfied agent is one that is surrounded by at least t percent of agents that are like itself.
 - Dynamics: When an agent is not satisfied, it can be moved to any vacant location in the grid.

Chapter 3

Diagonalization

Lecture 7: Spectral Theorem

Our goal is to do network partition, and to do so, we now develop a power tool to decompose a matrix. Later, we'll see that by decomposing a special matrix called **Laplacian** which characterize a network, we'll get a corresponding decomposition on the network in an insightful way. 22 Sep. 12:30

3.1 Eigenvalue and Eigenvector

We now want to study a very useful theorem called **spectral theorem**. Before this, we need to study **eigenvalue**.

Definition. For a matrix A , if v is a nonzero vector such that we can write

$$Av = \lambda v,$$

then we call v the **eigenvector** while λ the **eigenvalue**.

Definition 3.1.1 (Eigenvalue). The *eigenvalue* is the scalar multiple λ as described above.

Definition 3.1.2 (Eigenvector). The *eigenvector* is the nonzero vector v as described above.

Remark. Indeed, **eigenvector** and **eigenvalue** is defined in a more general sense, i.e., for linear transformation T such that

$$T(u) = \lambda u.$$

This is a generalization since a linear transformation can come from an infinite-dimensional vector space, which don't have a vector representation in this case.

Note (Left eigenvector). The notion of **eigenvector** is indeed also called a *right eigenvector*. As for the *left eigenvector*, it's the similar definition but with transpose. Rigorously, for a matrix A , the *left eigenvector* is the nonzero vector v which satisfies

$$v^T A = \lambda v^T.$$

But for simplicity, we do not make this into a definition.

Note (Characteristic equation). To find **eigenvalues** of a matrix A , this is equivalent to solve $Av = \lambda v$

where v is undetermined. We can indeed use the so-called *characteristic equation*

$$\det(\lambda I - A) = 0$$

to help us solve for λ .

3.2 Spectral Theorem

With some assumption on structural properties of a matrix, we can say something about its eigenvalue. Hence, we start with the so-called **symmetric matrices**.

Definition 3.2.1 (Symmetric matrix). A *symmetric matrix* is a square matrix such that

$$A = A^\top.$$

With this assumption, we have the following strong theorem which we'll heavily rely on.

Theorem 3.2.1 (Spectral Theorem). If A is a **symmetric matrix**, then all **eigenvalues** are real. Furthermore, the left and right **eigenvectors** are the same, and they construct an orthonormal basis.

Proof. We verify the second part of the theorem. If we have A is **symmetric**, then suppose \vec{x} is a right **eigenvectors**, we have

$$A\vec{x} = \lambda\vec{x} \Rightarrow (A\vec{x})^\top = \lambda\vec{x}^\top \Rightarrow \vec{x}^\top A^\top = \lambda\vec{x}^\top \Rightarrow \vec{x}^\top A = \lambda\vec{x}^\top,$$

where we see that \vec{x} is just left **eigenvector**, hence the left and right **eigenvectors** are the same. ■

Lecture 8: Diagonalization

3.3 Eigen Decomposition

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From **spectral theorem**, we can **diagonalize** a **symmetric matrix** A via so-called **eigen decomposition** as follows.

Theorem 3.3.1 (Eigen decomposition). For a **symmetric matrix** A , we can always write

$$A = UDU^\top,$$

where U is the **eigenvalues** matrix, and D is the diagonal matrix of **eigenvalues**. W

Proof. Firstly, from **Theorem 3.2.1**, denote n right **eigenvectors** of A by u_1, \dots, u_n where u_i corresponds to eigenvalue λ_i such that

$$\lambda_1 \leq \lambda_2 \leq \dots \leq \lambda_n.$$

Corresponding to this order, we define U as

$$U = \begin{pmatrix} | & | & \cdots & | \\ u_1 & u_2 & \cdots & u_n \\ | & | & \cdots & | \end{pmatrix},$$

then we have

- (a) u_i are linear independent, and they form a basis in \mathbb{R}^n .
- (b) $u_i^\top u_j (= \langle u_i, u_j \rangle) = 0$ for $i \neq j$.
- (c) $u_i^\top u_i = \sum_{j=1}^n u_{ij}^2 = 1$ (*length* = 1).

Remark (U is invertible). We see that U is invertible. Indeed, we have $U^{-1} = U^\top$ since

$$U^\top U = \begin{pmatrix} - & u_1^\top & - \\ - & u_2^\top & - \\ & \vdots & \\ - & v_n^\top & - \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} | & | & \cdots & | \\ u_1 & u_2 & \cdots & u_n \\ | & | & & | \end{pmatrix} = I.$$

Then, we claim that we can write A as $A = UDU^\top$ where

$$D = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 & & & \\ & \lambda_2 & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ & & & \lambda_n \end{pmatrix}.$$

To see this, from $U^\top = U^{-1}$, we have $AU = (UDU^\top)U = UD$ since

$$\begin{aligned} AU &= A \begin{pmatrix} | & \cdots & | \\ u_1 & \cdots & u_n \\ | & & | \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} | & \cdots & | \\ Au_1 & \cdots & Au_n \\ | & & | \end{pmatrix} \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} | & \cdots & | \\ \lambda_1 u_1 & \cdots & \lambda_n u_n \\ | & & | \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} | & \cdots & | \\ u_1 & \cdots & u_n \\ | & & | \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 & & \\ & \ddots & \\ & & \lambda_n \end{pmatrix} = UD \end{aligned}$$

Hence we're done. ■

Example. Find the **eigenvalue** of

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 2 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Proof. The **characteristic equation** of A is

$$\begin{aligned} \det(\lambda I - A) &= \det \left(\begin{pmatrix} \lambda - 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda - 2 & -1 \\ 0 & -1 & \lambda - 2 \end{pmatrix} \right) \\ &= (\lambda - 1)((\lambda - 2)^2 - 1) \\ &= (\lambda - 1)(\lambda - 2 - 1)(\lambda - 2 + 1) \\ &= (\lambda - 1)(\lambda - 3)(\lambda - 1) = 0. \end{aligned}$$

We see that the roots of the **characteristic equation** are 1, 1, 3 with 1 has **multiplicity** 2. ⊗

Example. Give an example of a where A defined as

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 & 1 \\ 0 & a & 2 \end{pmatrix}$$

has complex **eigenvalues**.

Proof. The characteristic equation of A is

$$\begin{aligned}\det(\lambda I - A) &= \det \begin{pmatrix} \lambda - 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda - 2 & -1 \\ 0 & -a & \lambda - 2 \end{pmatrix} \\ &= (\lambda - 1)((\lambda - 2)^2 - a) \\ &= (\lambda - 1)(\lambda^2 - 4\lambda + 4 - a) = 0\end{aligned}$$

Clearly, there is a root 1 for $\lambda - 1 = 0$, as for the quadratic $\lambda^2 - 4\lambda + (4 - a) = 0$, $\Delta = 16 - 4(4 - a) = 4a$. We see that for $a = -1$, $\Delta = -4 < 0 \Rightarrow$ the quadratic has complex roots. Hence,

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 & 2 \\ 0 & -1 & 2 \end{pmatrix}$$

has a complex eigenvalue. *

3.4 Network Decomposition

Now comes to our main goal, i.e., to do the network decomposition. First, let's define a matrix which capture the graph structure.

Definition 3.4.1 (Laplacian). For an undirected graph, the Laplacian is defined as $L := D - A$, where A is the adjacent matrix, D is diagonal degree matrix.

Remark. Since

$$L^\top = (D - A)^\top = D^\top - A^\top = D - A = L,$$

we see that L is symmetric, hence its eigenvalues are real by Theorem 3.2.1. Many incidence matrices $B_{|V| \times |E|}$ which encode the relation between edges and nodes satisfies

$$L = BB^\top.$$

We'll show that L has non-negative eigenvalues later.

3.4.1 Positive Definite and Positive Semi-Definite

Definition 3.4.2 (Positive definite). A is positive definite (PD) if and only if

$$\forall \vec{x} \neq \vec{0}, \quad \vec{x}^\top A \vec{x} > 0.$$

Definition 3.4.3 (Positive semi-definite). A is positive semi-definite (PSD) if and only if

$$\forall \vec{x} \neq \vec{0}, \quad \vec{x}^\top A \vec{x} \geq 0.$$

Lemma 3.4.1. If λ is a real eigenvalue, then $\lambda \geq 0 \Leftrightarrow A$ is positive semi-definite; also, $\lambda > 0 \Leftrightarrow A$ is positive-definite.

Proof. Suppose λ is a real eigenvalue, let \vec{u} be the eigenvector such that $A\vec{u} = \lambda\vec{u}$, and

$$\vec{u}^\top A \vec{u} = \vec{u}^\top (\lambda \vec{u}) = \lambda \underbrace{\vec{u}^\top \vec{u}}_{>0} \geq 0,$$

which implies A is positive semi-definite. Similarly, if $\lambda > 0 \Rightarrow \vec{u}^\top \vec{u} > 0$, A is positive definite. Lastly, the backward direction is obvious. ■

Lemma 3.4.2. A is **positive semi-definite** and **symmetric** $\Leftrightarrow \exists \tilde{B}$ such that $A = \tilde{B}\tilde{B}^\top$.

Proof. We see that if $A = \tilde{B}\tilde{B}^\top$, it's clearly **symmetric** and

$$x^\top Ax = x^\top \tilde{B}\tilde{B}^\top x = (\tilde{B}x)^\top \tilde{B}x = y^\top y \geq 0,$$

hence A is **positive semi-definite**.

For another direction, from **Theorem 3.2.1**, since A is **symmetric**, we know that $A = UDU^\top$ where all entries of D is ≥ 0 by **Lemma 3.4.1**. We see that we can decompose D into $D = CC^\top$ where

$$D = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 & & & \\ & \lambda_2 & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ & & & \lambda_n \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{\lambda_1} & & & \\ & \sqrt{\lambda_2} & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ & & & \sqrt{\lambda_n} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \sqrt{\lambda_1} & & & \\ & \sqrt{\lambda_2} & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ & & & \sqrt{\lambda_n} \end{pmatrix} =: CC^\top,$$

then by defining $\tilde{B} := UC$, we see that

$$A = UDU^\top = UCC^\top U^\top = (UC)(UC)^\top = \tilde{B}\tilde{B}^\top$$

as desired. ■

Remark (Properties of Laplacian). Given a Laplacian $L = BB^\top$, from **Lemma 3.4.2**, L is **positive semi-definite**, which further implies

$$0 \leq \lambda_1 \leq \lambda_2 \leq \dots \leq \lambda_n.$$

But $\lambda_1 = 0$ since we have $L = D - A$ where $\text{diag}(d_1, \dots, d_n)$ being the diagonal **degree** matrix, and furthermore,

$$L\vec{1} = (D - A)\vec{1} = \begin{pmatrix} d_1 \\ d_2 \\ \vdots \\ d_n \end{pmatrix} - A\vec{1} = \vec{0}$$

since $d_i = \sum_{j=1}^n A_{ij}$ from the **definition** of A , so

$$L\vec{1} = 0\vec{1}.$$

Hence, 0 is an **eigenvalue** with **eigenvector** $\vec{1}$, so $\lambda_1 = 0$.

We now study the **multiplicity** of an **eigenvalue** of L . We first introduce the following definition.

Definition 3.4.4 (Multiplicity). We say the **eigenvalue** λ^* of A has *multiplicity* k if

$$\det(\lambda I - A) = (\lambda - \lambda^*)^k g(\lambda)$$

where $g(\cdot)$ is a polynomial in λ with $g(\lambda^*) \neq 0$.

If the network has two **connected** components, we can then relabel the nodes and obtain a concatenation of two **adjacency matrices** that doesn't intersect

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 & 0 \\ 0 & A_2 \end{bmatrix}$$




Figure 3.1: Two connected components graph.

Then we see that we can also represent the Laplacian in block matrix form as

$$L = \begin{bmatrix} D_1 - A_1 & 0 \\ 0 & D_2 - A_2 \end{bmatrix} =: \begin{bmatrix} L_1 & 0 \\ 0 & L_2 \end{bmatrix}.$$

We then see that the characteristic equation of L is¹

$$\det(\lambda I - L) = \det(\lambda I_1 - L_1) \det(\lambda I_2 - L_2)$$

Then, as we just remarked, both L_1 and L_2 has an eigenvalue being 0, which implies that 0 is an eigenvalue of L with multiplicity 2.

We see that multiplicity of eigenvalue of Laplacian can help us find communities. This suggests the following definition.

Definition 3.4.5 (Fiedler eigenvalue). The *Fiedler eigenvalue* of a graph \mathcal{G} is the second-smallest eigenvalue (neglect multiplicity) of the Laplacian of \mathcal{G} .

We see that by first doing the eigen-decomposition on Laplacian and find all eigenvalues that are close to zero, which can be used to find communities, and nearly all community detection algorithms rely on this fact.

As previously seen. Turning back to Givran-Newman algorithm, though it works at social network, but what about other tasks like internet?

Problem. Hyperlinks (directed): How important is the edge?

Answer. Internet search seems to rank nodes, not edges. (the website itself is the point?) ⊗

An immediate question arises.

Problem. How does one rank nodes?

Answer. Network centrality. ⊗

Example (Network centrality). There are many examples of methods to quantify network centrality, e.g.,

- Degree. Ranks nodes by edges.
- Eigen-centrality. Adjacency matrix, finds an eigenvector and use its entries.

We now study this in depth.

¹Detailed derivation is omitted. It's essentially followed from the block structure.

Chapter 4

HITS

HITS is a hyperlinks-induced topic search algorithm proposed by [John Kleinberg](#), whose backbones are the idea of **hubs** and **authorities**.

- Hubs: nodes that *aggregate*.
- Authorities: nodes that are *important*.

The key idea is that

1. If many websites (nodes) point to it, then this website is important (authority property).
2. If a node points to many authority nodes, then it is important as well.

Then by iteratively identifying hubs and authorities, we can rank the nodes in the network. We now describe in detailed how this algorithm works.

4.1 HITS Algorithm

The pseudocode of the algorithm is as follows.

Algorithm 2: HITS Algorithm

Data: A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$

Result: hub, auth

```
1 for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                     // Initialize
2    $\text{auth}(v) \leftarrow 1$ 
3    $\text{hub}(v) \leftarrow 1$ 
4
5 while not converge do
6   for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                 // auth update
7      $\text{auth}(v) \leftarrow \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V}: u \rightarrow v \in \mathcal{E}} \text{hub}(u)$ 
8   for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                 // hub update
9      $\text{hub}(v) \leftarrow \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V}: v \rightarrow u \in \mathcal{E}} \text{auth}(u)$ 
10
11  for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                   // auth normalize
12     $\text{auth}(v) \leftarrow \text{auth}(v) / \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V}} \text{auth}(u)$ 
13  for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                   // hub normalize
14     $\text{hub}(v) \leftarrow \text{hub}(v) / \sum_{u \in \mathcal{V}} \text{hub}(u)$ 
15 return hub, auth
```

Note. There are two facts are worth noting.

1. $\text{hub}(v)$ and $\text{auth}(v)$ will converge as long as initial score are positive.

2. Final scores will be independent of the initial scores.

Lecture 9: Analysis of HITS

4.2 Analysis on HITS

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- Authority update:

$$\mathbf{a}_k(i) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}: j \rightarrow i \in \mathcal{E}} \mathbf{h}_{k-1}(j) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}: A_{ji}=1} \mathbf{h}_{k-1}(j) = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} A_{ji} \mathbf{h}_{k-1}(j) = (A^\top \mathbf{h}_{k-1})_i.$$

We see that

$$\mathbf{a}_k = A^\top \mathbf{h}_{k-1}.$$

- Hub update:

$$\mathbf{h}_k(j) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{V}: i \rightarrow j \in \mathcal{E}} \mathbf{a}_k(i) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{V}} A_{ij} \mathbf{a}_k(i) = (A \mathbf{a}_k)_j.$$

We see that

$$\mathbf{h}_k = A \mathbf{a}_k.$$

Furthermore,

$$\mathbf{h}_k = A \mathbf{a}_k \Rightarrow \mathbf{h}_k = A \mathbf{a}_k = A(A^\top \mathbf{h}_{k-1}) = AA^\top \mathbf{h}_{k-1}.$$

If we ignore the normalization for now, then

$$\mathbf{h}_k = AA^\top \mathbf{h}_{k-1} = (AA^\top)AA^\top \mathbf{h}_{k-2} = \dots = (AA^\top)^k \mathbf{h}_0.$$

Hence, we need to study AA^\top . Firstly, from [Lemma 3.4.2](#), we see that AA^\top is [positive semi-definite](#) and [symmetric](#). Furthermore, from [Theorem 3.2.1](#), since AA^\top is symmetric, all [eigenvalues](#) are real. Then from [Lemma 3.4.1](#), we see that all [eigenvalue](#) of AA^\top are positive, i.e.,

$$0 \leq \lambda_1 \leq \lambda_2 \leq \dots \leq \lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}.$$

From the [Theorem 3.2.1](#), let the [eigenvectors](#) of AA^\top be $u_1, \dots, u_{|\mathcal{V}|}$, then

$$\mathbf{h}_0 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|} \alpha_i u_i$$

where α_i are unique since $\{u_i\}$ form a basis, and

$$\alpha_i = u_i^\top \mathbf{h}_0 = \sum_{j=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|} \alpha_j u_i^\top u_j.$$

Moreover, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{h}_1 &= (AA^\top) \mathbf{h}_0 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|} \alpha_i \lambda_i u_i; \\ &\vdots \\ \mathbf{h}_k &= (AA^\top)^k \mathbf{h}_0 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|} \alpha_i \lambda_i^k u_i. \end{aligned}$$

With the above formula, we now consider

$$0 \leq \lambda_1 \leq \lambda_2 \leq \dots \leq \underbrace{\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}}_{\text{largest}}.$$

Case i. Unique largest **eigenvalue**: $\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|} > \lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|-1} \geq \dots \geq \lambda_1 \geq 0$, then the term λ^k will dominate, namely

$$\mathbf{h}_k = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|} \alpha_i \lambda_i^k u_i.$$

Dividing both sides by $\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}^k$, we have

$$\frac{\mathbf{h}_k}{\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}^k} = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|-1} \alpha_i \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}} \right)^k u_i + \alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|} u_{|\mathcal{V}|}.$$

Then since $\lambda_i/\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|} < 1$ for $1 \leq i \leq |\mathcal{V}| - 1$, hence when $k \rightarrow \infty$, all terms in the sum will converge to 0, leaving us with

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\mathbf{h}_k}{\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}^k} = \alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|} u_{|\mathcal{V}|}.$$

Since $u_{|\mathcal{V}|}$ is a non-zero vector, we consider the following two cases:

- (a) All terms are non-negative with one positive. Firstly, suppose $\mathbf{h}_0 = x > 0$ such that $u_{|\mathcal{V}|}^\top x = \alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|} > 0$. Then we have

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \frac{(AA^\top)^k x}{\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}^k} = \alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|} u_{|\mathcal{V}|}.$$

We see that the left-hand side is greater or equal to 0, and stays in positive for every $k \Rightarrow$ the limit is also positive. Now, since $\alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|} > 0$, we can conclude that $u_{|\mathcal{V}|} \geq 0$. In other words, \mathbf{h}_0 can be any vector with all coefficients positive and then $\alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|} = u_{|\mathcal{V}|}^\top \mathbf{h}_0 > 0$.

- (b) At least one term is positive. $\mathbf{h}_0 = x > 0$ such that $u_{|\mathcal{V}|}^\top x > 0$.

Remark. To rank nodes, all we need is the vector $u_{|\mathcal{V}|}$. And the limiting value of $u_{|\mathcal{V}|}$ is called the **hub score**.

Case ii. Non-unique largest **eigenvalues**: For discussion, we assume that the largest **eigenvalue** has algebraic multiplicity of 2. Namely

$$\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|} = \lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|-1} \geq \dots \geq \lambda_1 \geq 0.$$

Again, from the same discussion, we see that

$$\mathbf{h}_0 = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|} \alpha_i u_i.$$

Furthermore, we see that

$$\frac{(AA^\top)^k \mathbf{h}_0}{\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}^k} = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|-2} \alpha_i \left(\frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}} \right)^k u_i + \alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|-1} u_{|\mathcal{V}|-1} + \alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|} u_{|\mathcal{V}|}.$$

Since $\lambda_i/\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|} < 1$ for $1 \leq i \leq V - 2$, hence when $k \rightarrow \infty$, all terms in the sum will converge to 0, leaving us with

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \frac{(AA^\top)^k \mathbf{h}_0}{\lambda_{|\mathcal{V}|}^k} = \alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|-1} u_{|\mathcal{V}|-1} + \alpha_{|\mathcal{V}|} u_{|\mathcal{V}|}.$$

Remark. It still converges but it may not be $u_{|\mathcal{V}|}$.

Chapter 5

Page Rank

Lecture 10: Page Rank

5.1 Page Rank Algorithm

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As previously seen (Voting procedure). The hubs vote authorities, while authorities vote for hubs in [HITS algorithm](#).

But this is not always the case. Rankings that can be collaborated as the following new algorithm will show, which will determine the importance of a node we called *page rank*.

Algorithm 3: Basic Page Rank Algorithm

Data: A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, iteration L

Result: pageRank

```
1 for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                     // Initialize
2    $\text{pageRank}(v) \leftarrow 1/|\mathcal{V}|$ 
3
4 for  $i = 1, \dots, L$  do
5   for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                   // Send
6      $\text{neighborNum} \leftarrow |\{v \rightarrow u \in \mathcal{E}\}|$ 
7     if  $\text{neighborNum} \neq 0$  then                       // divides pageRank(v) to its (out)neighbor
8       for  $v \rightarrow u \in \mathcal{E}$  do
9          $\text{pageRankNew}(u) \leftarrow \text{pageRankNew}(u) + \text{pageRank}(v)/\text{neighborNum}$ 
10      else                                             // no outgoing links
11         $\text{pageRankNew}(v) \leftarrow \text{pageRankNew}(v) + \text{pageRank}(v)$ 
12
13   for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                   // Receive
14      $\text{pageRank}(v) \leftarrow \text{pageRankNew}(v)$            // Update the page rank
15      $\text{pageRankNew}(v) \leftarrow 0$                    // Clean up for the next iteration's updating
16
17 return pageRank
```

Remark (Algorithm explanation). The following is the detailed explanation of the [basic page rank algorithm](#).

- (a) Initialize: For all nodes in \mathcal{V} , set page rank to be $1/|\mathcal{V}|$.
- (b) Send: Basic page rank updates: each node divides of its current page rank equally across its outgoing links and sends the value to the node at the end. If there are no outgoing links, then the node retains its page rank.

- (c) **Receive:** Each node updates its page rank to be the sum of the values it receives on its incoming links. If a node has retained its page rank, then it adds it to this value.

Note (Conservation of the page rank). Page rank is never lost over gained in the network, it is just passed around. This means no normalization is required, the page ranks always sum to 1, with all terms non-negative.

But then there are some problems we care about.

Problem. Will it converge?

Answer. It will converge in most cases. *

Example. Consider a cycle graph, with different initial page rank. It will not converge! All values just cycling around.

Problem. To what if it does?

Answer. Eigenvector of some eigenvalues of some matrix associated with the network. *

Problem. Is the final state always interesting?

Answer. It may not always be interesting. *

Our goal is to have

1. convergence for all starting vectors;
2. the final vector to be relevant to the graph.

5.2 Analysis on Page Rank

Let's denote the page rank of node i as r_i throughout the following discussion.

- (a) **Initialize:** Denote r^{old} as the column vector of page ranks.
- (b) **Send:**
- If $d_i^{\text{out}} > 0$: then $\frac{r_i^{\text{old}}}{d_i^{\text{out}}}$ is sent to neighbor at the end of the outgoing links.
 - If $d_i^{\text{out}} = 0$: then r_i^{old} sent to itself.
- (c) **Receive:** Collect all the page rank values. Therefore,

$$r_i^{\text{new}} = \sum_{j:j \rightarrow i} \frac{r_j^{\text{old}}}{d_j^{\text{out}}} + \begin{cases} r_i^{\text{old}} & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} = 0; \\ 0 & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} > 0. \end{cases}$$

We can indeed write it in a more compact form as follows. We have $r^{\text{new}} = N^{\top} r^{\text{old}}$, where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{if } i \neq j, (N^{\top})_{ij} &= \begin{cases} \frac{1}{d_j^{\text{out}}} & , \text{ if } A_{ji} = 1; \\ 0 & , \text{ if } A_{ji} = 0, \end{cases} = \begin{cases} \frac{A_{ji}}{d_j^{\text{out}}} & , \text{ if } d_j^{\text{out}} > 0; \\ A_{ji} & , \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases} \\ \text{if } i = j, (N^{\top})_{ij} &= \begin{cases} 1 & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} = 0; \\ 0 & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} > 0, \end{cases} = \begin{cases} 1 & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} = 0; \\ A_{ii} & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} > 0. \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Hence,

$$N_{ij} = \begin{cases} \frac{A_{ij}}{d_i^{\text{out}}} & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} > 0; \\ A_{ij} & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} = 0 \wedge i \neq j; \\ 1 & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} = 0 \wedge i = j. \end{cases}$$

5.2.1 Eigenvalues of N

After L steps, we have

$$r(L) = (N^\top)^L r(0).$$

To study what happens as $L \rightarrow \infty$, we suppose there is a convergence vector r such that

$$r = (N^\top)r.$$

We see that r must be an **eigenvector** for N^\top for **eigenvalue** 1. Notice that u should be *non-negative* and sums to 1 over entries. Now we have

$$(N^\top)r = r \Rightarrow r^\top N = r^\top,$$

r is a left **eigenvector** of N with **eigenvalue** 1.

Note. N has an **eigenvalue** 1.

Proof. From what we have derived for N_{ij} , we have

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} N_{ij} = \begin{cases} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} \frac{A_{ij}}{d_i^{\text{out}}} = \frac{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{V}} A_{ij}}{d_i^{\text{out}}} = \frac{d_i^{\text{out}}}{d_i^{\text{out}}} = 1 & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} > 0; \\ \underbrace{1}_{j=i} + \underbrace{\sum_{j \neq i} A_{ij}}_{=d_i^{\text{out}}=0} = 1 + 0 = 1 & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} = 0. \end{cases}$$

Hence, we conclude that N is a matrix such that the row sums are always 1, so

$$N\vec{1} = \vec{1},$$

which shows that 1 is an **eigenvalue** of N , with $\vec{1}$ being a right **eigenvector**! *

We can ask about the left **eigenvector** — it exists. Corresponding to $\vec{1}$.

Problem. What do we know about the entries?

Answer. We have

1. row sums on 1
2. non-negative entries
3. row stochastic matrix (associated with Markov chains)

*

Remark. Each row vector is a probability mass function (PMF) on $\{1, 2, \dots, |\mathcal{V}|\}$.

5.3 Perron-Frobenius Theorem

5.3.1 Irreducible

In the following lectures, we will study so-called **Perron-Frobenius theorem**, which is a theorem about non-negative matrices. Before this, we need to study **irreducible** matrix.

Definition 5.3.1 (Irreducible). A non-negative matrix $A_{n \times n}$ is *irreducible* if for all $i, j = 1, \dots, n$, there exists $k(i, j) \in \mathbb{Z}$ depends on i, j such that $k(i, j) > 0$ and

$$(A^k)_{ij} > 0.$$

Remark. We can express the condition to be *irreducible* as there exists a $k > 0$ such that

$$\underbrace{A_{im_1} A_{m_1 m_2} \dots A_{m_{k-1} j}}_{k \text{ terms}} > 0.$$

Proof. We have

$$\begin{aligned} (A^2)_{ij} &= \sum_k A_{ik} A_{kj} \\ (A^3)_{ij} &= (AA^2)_{ij} = \sum_k A_{ik} (A^2)_{kj} = \sum_k \sum_l A_{ik} A_{kl} A_{lj} \\ &\vdots \\ (A^n)_{ij} &= \sum_{k_1} \sum_{k_2} \dots \sum_{k_n} A_{ik_1} A_{k_1 k_2} A_{k_2 k_3} \dots A_{k_n j} \end{aligned}$$

A is non-negative so $A_{ij}^{n+1} > 0 \Rightarrow$ at least one of the sums > 0 , by re-indexing we have the result. \circledast

We see that the above equivalent condition is still not easy to work with, hence we introduce the following definition.

Definition 5.3.2 (Adjacency matrix of a matrix). Given a matrix A , we define the *adjacency matrix* of A as \tilde{A} such that

$$\tilde{A}_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } A_{ij} > 0 \\ 0, & \text{if } A_{ij} = 0 \end{cases}.$$

Note. \tilde{A} is an *adjacency matrix* of some *directed graph* with n nodes.

We then see that

$$A_{im_1} A_{m_1 m_2} \dots A_{m_{k-1} j} > 0 \Leftrightarrow \tilde{A}_{im_1} = \tilde{A}_{m_1 m_2} = \dots = \tilde{A}_{m_{k-1} j} = 1.$$

This implies the *irreducibility* of $A \Leftrightarrow$ *irreducibility* of $\tilde{A} \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{G}$ corresponding to \tilde{A} is *strongly connected*, i.e., $\forall i, j$ we can find a path on \mathcal{G} .

Remark. This *graph* \mathcal{G} can be non-simple *graph*.

We see that to check for a non-negative matrix A , whether $(A^{n+1})_{ij} > 0$ or not, we first find the *graph* \mathcal{G} corresponding to \tilde{A} . If $(A^{n+1})_{ij}$ is positive \Leftrightarrow there is a *path* in \mathcal{G} from i to j .

Lecture 11: Scaled Page Rank

As previously seen. **Basic page rank algorithm:** If the page rank converges, then we must have

$$r^* = (N^\top) r^* \Leftrightarrow (r^*)^\top N = (r^*)^\top,$$

where r^* is a left *eigenvector* of N for *eigenvalue* 1.

Remark. Row stochastic property \Rightarrow 1 is *eigenvalue*.

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5.3.2 Periodicity

Definition 5.3.3 (Period). Given $A_{n \times n}$ and $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, find all $m > 0$ such that

$$(A^m)_{ii} > 0.$$

And the greatest common divisor of them is called the *period* of i .

Definition 5.3.4 (Aperiodic). Given $A_{n \times n}$ and $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, if the *period* is 1 for node i , then i is said to be *aperiodic*. And A is said to be *aperiodic* all i are *aperiodic*.

Remark. We see that

- A sufficient condition for *aperiodic* is $A_{ii} > 0$ since it implies the *period* is 1 for i .
- If A is a positive matrix^a, then we know that

$$\begin{aligned} A_{ij} > 0 \forall i, j &\Rightarrow \text{irreducible} \\ A_{ii} > 0 \forall i &\Rightarrow \text{aperiodic}. \end{aligned}$$

Notice that this is only a simple sufficient condition for a matrix to be *irreducible* and *aperiodic*.

^aAll entries are positive

5.3.3 Perron-Frobenius Theorem

We now start to study our main theorem, the *Perron-Frobenius theorem*. Before that, we introduce a useful definition.

Definition 5.3.5 (Spectral radius). The *eigenvalue* of A with the largest absolute value is called the *spectral radius* or the *Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue* of A , denoted as $\rho(A)$.

Theorem 5.3.1 (Perron-Frobenius theorem). Let A be an *irreducible* non-negative matrix, then the *spectral radius* is positive and has *multiplicity* 1.

Both the right *eigenvector* ($\vec{v}, A\vec{v} = \rho(A)\vec{v}$) and the left *eigenvector* ($\vec{w}, \vec{w}^\top A = \rho(A)\vec{w}^\top$) can be taken to be positive with

$$\vec{w}^\top \vec{v} = 1.$$

Furthermore, we have

- (a) The following holds

$$\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} \frac{A^k}{(\rho(A))^k} = \vec{v} \vec{w}^\top_{(n \times n)}.$$

- (b) The following holds

- Row sum bound:

$$\min_i \sum_j A_{ij} \leq \rho(A) \leq \max_i \sum_j A_{ij}.$$

- Column sum bound:

$$\min_j \sum_i A_{ij} \leq \rho(A) \leq \max_j \sum_i A_{ij}.$$

- (c) If A is also *aperiodic*, then

$$\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \frac{A^m}{(\rho(A))^m} = \vec{v} \vec{w}^\top.$$

Proof. We omit the proof, but it's worth checking out. See [here](#) for a short proof. ■

As previously seen. For the [basic page rank algorithm](#):

1. N is non-negative and row stochastic, so we know $\rho(N) \leq 1$. But since we already showed 1 is one of the [eigenvalues](#) of $N \Rightarrow \rho(N) = 1$.
2. $N \rightarrow \tilde{A}$: [Adjacency matrix](#) of original [graph](#) plus self-loops for any nodes with no outgoing links.


We can now say something about N .

Remark. We don't certainly have that N is [irreducible](#).

Proof. Since $\rho(N) = 1$ but the [multiplicity](#) can be > 1 or [eigenvectors](#) may not all be positive. From [Theorem 5.3.1](#), N cannot be [irreducible](#) in both cases. *

Remark. We don't certainly have that N is [aperiodic](#).

Proof. Consider the following network:



For this network, we have

$$N = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad N^2 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad N^3 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

and for higher power it just repeats. We see that the [period](#) for all three nodes are all 3, which means that N is not [aperiodic](#). *

This is problematic, since for [basic page rank algorithm](#), we have

$$r(k) = (N^\top)^k r(0),$$

hence we are interested in the case that $(N^\top)^k$ converges.

5.4 Scaled Page Rank Algorithm

Scaled page rank is a modification of page rank that gives a matrix $\tilde{N}(s)$ that is always [irreducible](#) and [aperiodic](#) with $s \in (0, 1)$. We first give the algorithm to calculate it.

Algorithm 4: Scaled Page Rank Algorithm**Data:** A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, scale factor $s \in (0, 1)$, iteration L **Result:** SPageRank

```

1 for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do // Initialize
2   SPageRank( $v$ )  $\leftarrow 1/|\mathcal{V}|$ 
3
4 for  $i = 1, \dots, L$  do
5   for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do // Send
6     neighborNum  $\leftarrow |\{v \rightarrow u \in \mathcal{E}\}|$ 
7     if neighborNum  $\neq 0$  then // divides SPageRank( $v$ ) to its (out)neighbor
8       for  $v \rightarrow u \in \mathcal{E}$  do
9         SPageRankNew( $u$ )  $\leftarrow$  SPageRankNew( $u$ ) + SPageRank( $v$ )/neighborNum
10      else // no outgoing links
11        SPageRankNew( $v$ )  $\leftarrow$  SPageRankNew( $v$ ) + SPageRank( $v$ )
12
13   for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do // Receive
14     SPageRank( $v$ )  $\leftarrow$  SPageRankNew( $v$ ) // Update the page rank
15     SPageRankNew( $v$ )  $\leftarrow 0$  // Clean up for the next iteration's updating
16   for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do // Scale
17     SPageRank( $v$ )  $\leftarrow s \times$  SPageRankNew( $v$ ) // Scaled down by  $s$ 
18     SPageRank( $v$ )  $\leftarrow \frac{1-s}{|\mathcal{V}|}$  // Re-distribute page rank
19
20 return SPageRank

```

Remark (Algorithm explanation). The following is the detailed explanation of the [scaled page rank algorithm](#).

- (a) Initialization: same as [basic page rank algorithm](#).
- (b) Send: same as [basic page rank algorithm](#).
- (c) Receive: same as [basic page rank algorithm](#).
- (d) Scale: Scale down all page ranks by s (multiply by s) and add $(1-s)/|\mathcal{V}|$ to the page ranks of all nodes.

5.5 Analysis on Scaled Page Rank

Again, let's denote the scaled page rank of node i as r_i throughout the following discussion.

$$r_i^{\text{new}} = s \left(\sum_{j: A_{ji}=1} \frac{u_j^{\text{old}}}{d_j^{\text{old}}} + \begin{cases} u_i^{\text{old}} & , \text{ if } d_i^{\text{out}} = 0; \\ 0 & , \text{ otherwise;} \end{cases} \right) + \frac{1-s}{|\mathcal{V}|}.$$

Then we have

$$r^{\text{new}} = s(N^\top r^{\text{old}}) + \frac{1-s}{|\mathcal{V}|} \mathbf{1} = s(N^\top u^{\text{old}}) + \underbrace{\frac{1-s}{|\mathcal{V}|} \mathbf{1} (\mathbf{1}^\top r^{\text{old}})}_{\text{add to 1}} = \underbrace{\left(sN + \frac{1-s}{|\mathcal{V}|} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1}^\top \right)^\top}_{\tilde{N}(s)^\top} r^{\text{old}}.$$

Finally, we have the rule of updating scaled page rank being $r^{\text{new}} = (\tilde{N}(s))^\top r^{\text{old}}$, hence

$$r(k) = \left(\tilde{N}(s)^\top \right)^k r(0).$$

Note. We see that $\tilde{N}(s)$ is

- non-negative
- row stochastic
- strictly positive with all entries at least $(1-s)/|\mathcal{V}|$

Firstly, since $\tilde{N}(s)$ is non-negative and is row-stochastic, we see that $\tilde{N}(s)\vec{1} = \vec{1}$, hence $\rho(\tilde{N}(s)) = 1$.

Moreover, since $\tilde{N}(s)$ is strictly positive, from the [remark](#), we have that $\tilde{N}(s)$ is both [irreducible](#) and [aperiodic](#). With the non-negativity, we can then apply [Theorem 5.3.1](#) (c) to get

$$\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \frac{(\tilde{N}(s))^m}{(\rho(\tilde{N}(s)))^m} = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} (\tilde{N}(s))^m = \vec{v}\vec{w}^\top,$$

where \vec{v} is the right [eigenvector](#) of $\tilde{N}(s)$ and \vec{w} is the left [eigenvector](#) of $\tilde{N}(s)$ with $\vec{w}^\top \vec{v} = 1$.

And since $\tilde{N}(s)$ is row stochastic, we have $\vec{v} = \vec{1}$, hence $\vec{w}^\top \vec{1} = 1$, which means the sum of all entries is 1 and \vec{w} has all positive entries.

If (\vec{v}, \vec{w}) are right and left [eigenvectors](#) of $\tilde{N}(s) \Leftrightarrow (\vec{w}, \vec{v})$ are the right and left [eigenvectors](#) of $\tilde{N}(s)^\top$.

Remark. Scaled page rank converges to r^* where

$$r^* = \tilde{N}(s)^\top r^*,$$

which is the right [eigenvector](#) of $\tilde{N}(s)^\top$. But it's the same as the left [eigenvector](#) of $\tilde{N}(s)$, which is just $\vec{w}(s)$.

Note. In practice, the scale factor is usually set as $s \cong 0.8 \sim 0.85$.

Lecture 12: Page Rank, Markov Chain and Randomness

Recall that we want to measure the centrality of a network. We did this by introducing [Theorem 3.2.1](#) 11 Oct. 12:30 and [Theorem 5.3.1](#).

We first look at following two problems.

Problem (Eigenvector centrality). For A be an [adjacency matrix](#), which is a non-negative matrix with $r(0) = \vec{1}$ and

$$r(k) = Ar(k-1), \quad \forall k = 1 \dots$$

Then if it is [irreducible](#) and [aperiodic](#), then

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \frac{r(k)}{(\rho(A))^k} = v(w^\top r(0))$$

where $\rho(A)$ is the unique [spectral radius](#), v is the right [eigenvector](#) of A and w is the left [eigenvector](#) of A , and $w^\top v = 1$ for $\rho(A)$.

We then have

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \frac{A^k}{(\rho(A))^k} = vw^\top.$$

Remark. Notice that

- v would be the **eigenvector** centrality measure.
- $r^* = Ar^*$ need not hold because 1 need not be an **eigenvalue**.
- Since

$$(r(k))_i = \sum_j A_{ij} r_j(k-1) = \sum_{j: i \rightarrow j} r_j(k-1),$$

so we see that nodes that either point to many nodes, or important nodes or both, will have higher value.

Problem (Katz centrality). Again, consider $r(k) = Ar(k-1)$, but this time we modify the equation to be

$$r(k) = \alpha Ar(k-1) + \beta \vec{1}$$

where α is aiming to dampen the degree, and β is aiming to add a constants weight for each node to increase the fairness. Similarly, any solution will satisfy

$$r^* = \alpha Ar^* + \beta \vec{1} \Leftrightarrow (I - \alpha A)r^* = \beta \vec{1}.$$

Definition 5.5.1 (Katz centrality). The solution r^* of $r^* = \alpha Ar^* + \beta \vec{1}$ is called the *Katz centrality* if it exists.

Now, if $I - \alpha A$ is invertible, then

$$r^* = \beta(I - \alpha A)^{-1} \vec{1}.$$

Noting that

$$\det(\lambda I - A) = 0 \Leftrightarrow \det(I - \lambda A) = 0,$$

which implies α should not be the inverse of an **eigenvalue** of A . Also, we need that r^* to be positive.




Figure 5.1: Katz Centrality

Then for all $1/\alpha > \rho(A) \Leftrightarrow \alpha\rho(A) < 1 \Leftrightarrow \rho(\alpha A) < 1$, α can't be the inverse of any **eigenvalues** of A since we see that αA is non-negative with **spectral radius** < 1 .

Now, if αA is non-negative with **spectral radius** strictly less than one, then we have

$$(I - \alpha A)^{-1} = I + (\alpha A) + (\alpha A)^2 + \dots$$

just like the geometry series of $\frac{1}{1-k}$ for $|k| < 1$. We then have

$$r^* = \beta \left(\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (\alpha A)^i \right) \vec{1}.$$

Remark. Since

$$\rho(A) \leq \text{the maximum of row sum of } A = \text{the highest out-degree},$$

we see that

$$\underline{\alpha \times \text{the highest out-degree} < 1}$$

is a sufficient condition for this to hold.

Note. [Katz centrality](#) is commonly used.

Chapter 6

Stochastic Process

The motivation is simple: we want to understand the scaled page rank via another viewpoint, i.e., via [Markov chain](#).

As previously seen. We have seen that $\tilde{N}(s)$ is formed in a way such that

$$\tilde{r}(k) = \tilde{N}(s)^\top \tilde{r}(k-1)$$

with $\tilde{r}(0) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}$, where $\tilde{r}(k)$ is the vector form of the scaled page rank. Then, we have

$$\tilde{r}(k) = \left(\tilde{N}(s)^\top \right)^k r(0),$$

which suggests that an **iterated algorithm** known as *power iteration* or *power method*. We see that this will provide a uniform decrease in the relative error of the entries. Specifically, let v be the left [eigenvalues](#), then we have

$$\max_{i \in \mathcal{V}} |(r(k))_i - v_i| \leq c_0 s^k$$

where s is the scaled page rank factor. Then, by using this, if we set the error tolerance as ϵ , i.e., we want the right-hand side to be less than ϵ , we have

$$\# \text{iteration} = \frac{\log(\epsilon)}{\log(s)} \times \text{nnz}(N),$$

where $\text{nnz}(N)$ is the number of non-zero elements in N .

Remark. A sparse [graph](#) like Internet will typically have

$$\text{nnz}(N) \sim \Theta(n^2),$$

where n is the number of the nodes.

6.1 Probability

To introduce [Markov chain](#), we start with probability.

As previously seen (Probability review). We let

- Σ being our sample space.
- \mathcal{F} being the σ -algebra (σ -field). This is essentially just a collection of events subsets of the sample space.

- $\mathbb{P}: \mathcal{F} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is the probability with values in $[0, 1]$ assigned to events.

For further and rigorous review, see [Real Analysis note \(MATH 597\)](#).

We first see some examples of discrete cases.

Example (Coin toss). Let $\Omega = \{H, T\}$ corresponding to coin toss, where H is head, T is tail. We see that

$$\mathcal{F} = \{\emptyset, \{H\}, \{T\}, \{H, T\}\}.$$

If we let the probability of event H as p , then we have

$$\mathbb{P}(\emptyset) = 0, \quad \mathbb{P}(\{H\}) = p, \quad \mathbb{P}(\{T\}) = 1 - p, \quad \mathbb{P}(\{H, T\}) = 1.$$

Example (Dice toss). Let $\Omega = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ corresponding to faces of a die. Then \mathcal{F} is the power set of Ω . If the die is fair, then \mathbb{P} is so-called uniform distribution, which assign a equal value to every event in Ω . For example,

$$\mathbb{P}(\{1, 2, 3\}) = \frac{|\{1, 2, 3\}|}{6} = \frac{3}{6} = \frac{1}{2}.$$

For continuous cases, we have the following examples.

Example (Uniform distribution). Let $\Omega = [0, 1]$, and \mathcal{F} is the Borel^a σ -algebra which includes all intervals in $[0, 1]$. If we let \mathbb{P} be the uniform distribution on $[0, 1]$, for every $x \in [0, 1]$, we have

$$\mathbb{P}([0, x]) = x.$$

If we define $F(x) := \mathbb{P}([0, x])$, this is known as the cumulative distribution function, of CDF in short.

^aBorel usually means usual topology on Euclidean space.

Example (Exponential distribution). Let $\Omega = [0, \infty)$, and let \mathcal{F} be the Borel σ -algebra with \mathbb{P} the exponential distribution with parameter $\lambda \in (0, \infty)$. Then for all $x \in [0, \infty)$, the CDF is defined as

$$F(x) = \mathbb{P}([0, x]) = 1 - e^{-\lambda x}.$$

Example (Normal distribution). Let $\Omega = \mathbb{R} = (-\infty, +\infty)$, and \mathcal{F} be the Borel σ -algebra with \mathbb{P} be the normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ^2 . Then for all $x \in (-\infty, +\infty)$, the CDF is defined as

$$F(x) = \mathbb{P}((-\infty, x]) = \int_{-\infty}^x \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} e^{-\frac{(x'-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}} dx'.$$

Since this is an important distribution, we denote the normal distribution with mean μ and variance σ^2 as $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$.

There are some important properties of probability. Firstly, for two mutually disjoint sets A and $B \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $A \cap B = \emptyset$, we have

$$\mathbb{P}(A \cup B) = \mathbb{P}(A) + \mathbb{P}(B).$$

This can be easily generalized to any finite collection of mutually disjoint subsets

$$A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n$$

such that

$$A_i \cap A_j = \begin{cases} A_i, & \text{if } i = j \\ \emptyset, & \text{if } i \neq j. \end{cases}$$

We then have

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^n A_i\right) = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{P}(A_i).$$

Remark. Axioms of probability says that this extends to countably infinity collections of mutually disjoint sets. Namely, consider mutually disjoint sets

$$A_1, A_2, \dots,$$

we have

$$\mathbb{P} \left(\bigcup_{i=1}^{\infty} A_i \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \mathbb{P}(A_i) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{P}(A_i).$$

Another important property is that \mathcal{F} is closed under (countably many) intersections.

Also, Let Ω be the sample space, then we have $\mathbb{P}(\Omega) = 1$. This implies

$$\mathbb{P}(\emptyset) = 0.$$

Further, if $A \in \mathcal{F}$, then $A^c \in \mathcal{F}$ and $A \cap A^c = \emptyset$. We then see

$$\mathbb{P}(\Omega) = 1 = \mathbb{P}(A \cup A^c) = \mathbb{P}(A) + \mathbb{P}(A^c) \Rightarrow \mathbb{P}(A^c) = 1 - \mathbb{P}(A).$$

Note. Notice that $\emptyset = \Omega^c$ in our convention.

Lastly, we have the following definition.

Definition 6.1.1 (Mutually independent). We say two sets A, B are *mutually independent* sets if

$$\mathbb{P}(A \cap B) = \mathbb{P}(A) \mathbb{P}(B).$$

Also, we have similar definition for countably infinite collections of sets. We say a countably infinite collection of sets is mutually independent if any finite sub-collection is independent. Namely, for any finite index set $K \subsetneq \mathbb{N}$ with $|K| < \infty$,

$$\mathbb{P} \left(\bigcap_{k \in K} A_k \right) = \prod_{k \in K} \mathbb{P}(A_k).$$

6.1.1 Random Variable

Let's start with a definition.

Definition 6.1.2 (Random variable). A *random variable* is just a mappings (functions) from the sample space to real number \mathbb{R} .

Typically, we let $X: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be measurable and denote the Borel σ -algebra on \mathbb{R} as $\mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R})$. In particular, we have $(-\infty, x] \in \mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R})$, or more generally, for all $x \in (-\infty, +\infty)$, $\{\omega: X(\omega) \leq x\} \in \mathcal{F}$. This allows us to define the cumulative density function of x . In particular,

$$\mathbb{P}_X((-\infty, x)) = \mathbb{P}(\{\omega: X(\omega) \leq x\}).$$

Same as probability, we can define **independence** of a collection of **random variables**.

Definition 6.1.3 (Independent). Let X and Y be two **random variables**. We say X, Y are *independent* if for all $A, B \in \mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R})$,

$$\mathbb{P}(\{x \in A\} \cap \{y \in B\}) = \mathbb{P}(\{x \in A\}) \mathbb{P}(\{y \in B\}).$$

Remark. Notice that we are abusing the notation here. In the definition, x is sampled from X and y is sampled from Y without explicitly mentioning. In reality, we have

$$\{x \in A\} \cup \{y \in B\} = \{\omega \in \Omega: X(\omega) \in A \wedge Y(\omega) \in B\},$$

we see that we need

$$\{\omega \in \Omega: X(\omega) \in A\} \in \mathcal{F} \text{ and } \{\omega \in \Omega: Y(\omega) \in B\} \in \mathcal{F}.$$

Note (Independence via expectation). We can also view **independence** from the probability density function $f_X(x)$. We have

$$\mathbb{E}[f(x)] := \begin{cases} \sum_{i=1}^n f_X(x_i) \mathbb{P}(x = x_i) \\ \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_X(x) \underbrace{dF_X(x)}_{\text{CDF}} \end{cases}$$

where $f_X(x)$ is probability density function. Then in this case, we say X and Y are **independent** if for any f and g ,

$$\mathbb{E}[f(x)g(y)] = \mathbb{E}[f(x)] \mathbb{E}[g(y)].$$

Example. Let $f_X(x) = x^2$ and $g_Y(y) = y^3$. Then if X and Y are **independent**, we will have

$$\mathbb{E}[x^2 y^3] = \mathbb{E}[x^2] \mathbb{E}[y^3].$$

Remark. Again, we have similar definition for countably infinite collection of **random variables** being **independent**. Let **random variables** being

$$X_1, X_2, \dots$$

associated with the probability density function f_1, f_2, \dots . Then, we say this collection of **random variables** is **independent** if for any finite sub-collection is **independent**. Namely, for any finite index set $K \subsetneq \mathbb{N}$ such that $|K| < \infty$,

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\prod_{k \in K} f_k(x_k)\right] = \prod_{k \in K} \mathbb{E}[f_k(x_k)].$$

6.2 Stochastic Process

We now define

Definition 6.2.1 (Stochastic process). *Stochastic process*^a, is a collection of **random variable** induced by a discrete (time) index

$$X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots$$

In a compact way, we can write $\{X_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$.

^aSometimes random process

Similarly to the **independent** in probability, there is an analogous definition.

Definition 6.2.2 (i.i.d.). A stochastic process is said to be *i.i.d.* if its collection of **random variable** are all **independent** and identically distributed.

Lecture 13: Stochastic Process and Markov Chain

Let's first see some examples of [i.i.d. stochastic process](#), where i is the time index unspecified.

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Example (Biased coin toss). For all i , let $X_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and

$$\mathbb{P}(X_i = 1) = p.$$

We denote this as $X_i \sim \text{Bernoulli}(p)$.

Example (Dice toss). For all i , let $X_i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ and

$$\mathbb{P}(X_i = j) = \frac{1}{6}.$$

We denote this as $X_i \sim \text{Uniform}(\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\})$.

Example (Uniform distribution). For all i , let $X_i \sim \text{Uniform}([0, 1])$, where $X_i \in [0, 1]$.

Example (Exponential distribution). For all i , let $X_i \sim \exp(\lambda)$, then

$$\mathbb{P}(X_i > u) = e^{-\lambda u} \quad \forall u \geq 0.$$

Example (Normal distribution). For all i , let $X_i \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$.

Remark. Notice that our discussion will focus on $\mathbb{E}[X_i] < +\infty$.

The main reason we study [i.i.d. stochastic process](#) is because of the following theorem.

Theorem 6.2.1 (Strong law of large numbers). For an [i.i.d.](#) sequence $\{X_i\}$, it follows that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n X_i = \mathbb{E}[X].$$

This is so-called the *strong law of large numbers* (SLLN).

Example (Coin toss). If an unfair coin will face up with probability p , then [strong law of large numbers](#) tells us that

$$\frac{\#H}{\#H + \#T} \cong p$$

with many enough tosses. Mathematically, we let $Y_i = \mathbb{1}_{\{X_i \in B\}}$, where

$$\mathbb{1}_{\{X_i \in B\}}(\omega) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } X_i(\omega) \in B; \\ 1, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

hence $y_i \sim \text{Bernoulli}(p = \mathbb{P}(X_i \in B))$. Then we can use the [i.i.d.](#) sequence Y_i to describe a series of coin tosses.

6.2.1 Conditional Property

As previously seen. We first note that if $\mathbb{P}(A \cap B) = \mathbb{P}(A)\mathbb{P}(B)$, then A and B are [independent](#).

Now, if A and B are dependent, then given B is happened, we should be able to say something about the probability under the current condition. This suggests the following definition.

Definition 6.2.3 (Conditional probability). Let $\mathbb{P}(B) > 0$, then the *conditional probability* of event A under condition B is defined as

$$\mathbb{P}(A | B) := \frac{\mathbb{P}(A \cap B)}{\mathbb{P}(B)}.$$

Similarly, we have the *conditional expectation*

Definition 6.2.4 (Conditional expectation). The *conditional expectation* is defined as

$$\mathbb{E}[X | X \in A] = \mathbb{E}[X | A].$$

Example. We look at an example for discrete *random variable* X . Let $X \in \Omega$, then

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[X | X \in A] &= \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \omega \mathbb{P}(X = \omega | X \in A) \\ &= \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \omega \frac{\mathbb{P}(\{X = \omega\} \cap \{x \in A\})}{\mathbb{P}(X \in A)} \\ &= \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \omega \frac{\mathbb{P}(X = \omega)}{\mathbb{P}(X \in A)} \\ &= \frac{\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \omega \mathbb{P}(X = \omega)}{\mathbb{P}(X \in A)} \end{aligned}$$

Now, consider three events A, B, C , then we have

$$\mathbb{P}(X \in A, X \in B, X \in C) := \mathbb{P}(X \in A \cap B \cap C).$$

Then if A, B, C are *independent*, then we further have

$$\mathbb{P}(X \in A \cap B \cap C) = \mathbb{P}(X \in A) \mathbb{P}(X \in B) \mathbb{P}(X \in C)$$

as we have seen. If they are dependent, given $\mathbb{P}(X \in C) > 0$, then

$$\mathbb{P}(X \in A, X \in B, X \in C) = \mathbb{P}(X \in A, X \in B | X \in C) \mathbb{P}(X \in C).$$

This suggests the notion of *conditional independence* as follows to help us further factorize the above equation.

Definition 6.2.5 (Conditionally independent). For events A, B, C , if

$$\mathbb{P}(X \in A, X \in B | X \in C) = \mathbb{P}(X \in A | X \in C) \mathbb{P}(X \in B | X \in C),$$

then A and B are *conditionally independent* given C .

6.3 Markov Chain

We now formally define *Markov chain*.

Definition 6.3.1 (Markov chain). A *Markov chain* is a dependent *stochastic process* with a specific form of *conditional independence* defined as follows. Consider a *random variables* sequence

$$X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots$$

with discrete time index $1, 2, 3, \dots$ ^a At time $n > 1$, we have $X_n = a_n$ where a_n takes values in a

discrete set. Then

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{P}(X_1 = a_1, X_2 = a_2, \dots, X_{n-1} = a_{n-1}, X_{n+1} = a_{n+1}, \dots, X_{n+m} = a_{n+m} \mid X_n = a_n) \\ &= \mathbb{P}(X_1 = a_1, X_2 = a_2, \dots, X_{n-1} = a_{n-1} \mid X_n = a_n) \\ & \quad \cdot \mathbb{P}(X_{n+1} = a_{n+1}, \dots, X_{n+m} = a_{n+m} \mid X_n = a_n). \end{aligned}$$

^aNoting that they lie on a discrete space, like real number, labels, etc.

Intuition (Conditional independence property of Markov chains). Knowing where we are, the progress in the future is **conditionally independent** of how we got to the present, i.e., knowing the present, the past and the future are **conditionally independent**.

Note. Markov chains will not be i.i.d. sequences of random variables since there will be dependence. But still, the strong law of large number will hold under conditions.

6.3.1 Time Homogeneous Markov Chain

We need to know two things:

- initial distribution $X_0 \sim \mu$ (or $X_1 \sim \mu$)
- one-step transition matrix

$$P_{ij} := \mathbb{P}(X_{n+1} = j \mid X_n = i) \quad \forall i, j.$$

Note. Note that

1. Notice that this is not a function of n .
2. The condition here is just for an example from the lecture.

Review the example in lecture

Then we see that the total probability of $\mathbb{P}(X_n = i)$ is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}(X_n = i) &= \sum_j \mathbb{P}(X_n = i, X_0 = j) \\ &= \sum_j \mathbb{P}(X_0 = j) \mathbb{P}(X_n = i \mid X_0 = j) \\ &= \sum_j \mu_j (P^n)_{ji} \\ &= (\mu^\top P^n)_i \end{aligned}$$

where the first step is from the definition of *total probability*. Recall that

$$P_{ij} = \mathbb{P}(X_{n+1} = j \mid X_n = i),$$

hence

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{j \in \Omega} P_{ij} &= \sum_{j \in \Omega} \mathbb{P}(X_{n+1} = j \mid X_n = i) \\ &= \mathbb{P}(X_{n+1} \in \Omega \mid X_n = i) \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{P}(X_{n+1} \in \Omega, X_n = i)}{\mathbb{P}(X_n = i)} = \frac{\mathbb{P}(X_n = i)}{\mathbb{P}(X_n = i)} = 1. \end{aligned}$$

We see that P is row stochastic and P_i is a probability distribution on Ω . So $\rho(P) = 1 \Rightarrow \exists \pi(\text{distribution})$ such that

$$\pi^\top P = \pi^\top.$$

We see that the left **eigenvector** is a distribution. We have P is irreducible and Ω is finite, then

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{m=1}^n \mathbb{1}_{\{X_m=i\}} = \pi_i$$

almost surely.

Refinement with aperiodic P ,

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{P}(X_n = i) = \pi_i$$

Chapter 7

Page Rank and Markov Chain

Lecture 14: Random Walker and Monte Carlo Estimator

7.1 Basic and Scaled Page Rank via Markov Chain

25 Oct. 12:30

Recall that the basic page rank $r(n)$ is updated by the equation $r(n+1) = N^\top r(n)$, i.e.,

$$r^\top(n+1) = r^\top(n)N$$

where N is a row stochastic matrix. On the other hand, compare to [Markov Chain](#),

$$\mathbb{P}(X_n = \cdot)^\top = \mu^\top P^n = \mu^\top P^{n-1}P = \mathbb{P}(X_{n-1} = \cdot)^\top P$$

with $\mu \sim \mathbb{P}(X_0 = \cdot)$. We see that the above two equations are the same with

$$r(0) := \begin{pmatrix} 1/V \\ \vdots \\ 1/V \end{pmatrix}.$$

Remark. It turns out that basic page rank is looking at a [Markov chain](#)! Recall that N_{ij} is defined as

$$N_{ij} = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{d_i^{\text{out}}}, & \text{if } A_{ij} = 1; \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$


We pick an outgoing neighbor uniformly at random, but no one else.

This is indeed the idea of a [random walker](#), and we formalize it as follows.

Definition 7.1.1 (Random walker). Given a [graph](#), a *random walker* will traverse the [graph](#) following some rule with randomness.

In this case, our [random walker](#) will follow the [simple random walk](#) rule defined as follows.

Definition 7.1.2 (Simple random walk). Suppose the [random walker](#) is now at location (node) i , then regardless of how he came to i , he'll pick the next destination uniformly at random from outgoing neighbors of i .



Note. If $d_i^{\text{out}} = 0$, then the **random walker** following **simple random walk** will get stuck.

Now, just like in the basic page rank cases, we have

$$\tilde{N}(s) = sN + \frac{1-s}{|\mathcal{V}|} \mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^\top$$

for scaled page rank update equation.

Intuition. Compare to basic page rank, scaled page rank can be thought as follows. When a **random walker** at location i , we toss a biased coin with $\mathbb{P}(\{H\}) = s$. If we get heads, then we follow the **simple random walk rule**. Otherwise, if we get tails, we pick any node on the network at random as the next destination.

7.2 Personalized Page Rank via Markov Chain

As previously seen. Recall that we want to associate page rank with **random walker**.

- Basic page rank: **random walker** on the **graph**.
- Scaled page rank: **random walker** with reset to a uniformly chosen node.

This is a good view point for the **population as a whole user** surfing the webs. Across population reset is to a randomly chosen webpage. We can rank webpages across the population.

Problem. Can we be more specific?

Answer. With the help of reset, yes.

Remark. Personalizing the restart distribution is what allows this.

⊛

Algorithmically, we have the following.

Algorithm 5: Personalized Page Rank Scheme

Data: A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, iteration T , $v^* \in \mathcal{V}$

```

1 for  $i = 1, \dots, T$  do
2   RandomWalk( $v$ ) // Perform a random walk starting at  $v$ 
3 return
```



Figure 7.1: Random Walk for personalized page rank

We denote the personalized page rank at v^* as $\pi_{v^*}(s)$. Collect $\pi_{v^*}(s)$ for all $v^* \in \mathcal{V}$, then if we reset uniformly,

$$\pi_{\mathcal{V}}(s) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \sum_{v^* \in \mathcal{V}} \pi_{v^*}(s).$$

Remark. Average of all the personalized page rank, one can get the scaled page rank since averaging with respect to any specific distribution μ distributed on \mathcal{V} , we have

$$\pi_{\mu}(s) = \sum_{v^* \in \mathcal{V}} \mu(v^*) \pi_{v^*}(s).$$

We see that if μ is uniformly distributed, we get scaled page rank.

7.3 Markov Chain via Monte Carlo Algorithm

In this section, we'll see some simulation-based algorithms which can help us estimate page rank empirically. This kind of simulation-based algorithm which estimate some kind of randomness is called *Monte Carlo algorithm*. We'll analyze the corresponding estimators' quality in terms of their bias, variance, and so on. Let's start with the first one.

7.3.1 First Page Rank Estimator

We now introduce the first simulation-based algorithm to estimate page rank. The very first one we should do is the [random walk](#) where we essentially implement [simple random walk](#).

Algorithm 6: Random Walk

Data: A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, steps T , s
Result: A list arrival, ending node $v \in \mathcal{V}$

```

1 for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do // Initialize
2    $\text{arrival}(v) \leftarrow 0$ 
3  $v \leftarrow \text{random}(\mathcal{V})$  // select a uniformly random node to start
4  $\text{arrival}(v) \leftarrow 1$ 
5
6 for  $i = 1, \dots, T$  do
7    $\text{result} \leftarrow \text{TossCoin}(s)$  // Toss a biased coin with  $\mathbb{P}(\{H\}) = s$ ,  $\mathbb{P}(\{T\}) = 1 - s$ 
8   if  $\text{result} = H$  then // If heads
9     if  $d_i^{\text{out}} \neq 0$  then  $v \leftarrow \text{random}(N_i^{\text{out}})$  // Go to  $v$ 's neighbor randomly
10  else // If tails
11     $v \leftarrow \text{random}(\mathcal{V})$  // reset to a uniformly random node
12   $\text{arrival}(v) \leftarrow \text{arrival}(v) + 1$  // Record arrival at  $v$ 
13 return arrival,  $v$ 

```

Note. The result of **random walk** records the time the **random walker** arrives v for all $v \in \mathcal{V}$ throughout the simulation.

We can describe **random walk** as a **Markov chain**. Consider $\{X_n\}_{n \geq 0}$ where X_n is the location of the **random walker** at time n . We see that

$$\begin{aligned} X_0 &\sim \text{uniform}(\{1, 2, \dots, |\mathcal{V}|\}) \\ X_1 &= \begin{cases} \text{uniform}(\{1, 2, \dots, |\mathcal{V}|\}), & \text{with probability } 1 - s; \\ \text{NextHop}(x_0), & \text{with probability } s, \end{cases} \\ &\vdots \\ X_t &= \begin{cases} \text{uniform}(\{1, 2, \dots, |\mathcal{V}|\}), & \text{with probability } 1 - s; \\ \text{NextHop}(x_{t-1}), & \text{with probability } s \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

with $\text{NextHop}(\cdot)$ being

$$\text{NextHop}(i) = \begin{cases} \text{uniform}(\{N_i^{\text{out}}\}), & \text{if } d_i^{\text{out}} > 0; \\ i, & \text{if } d_i^{\text{out}} = 0. \end{cases}$$

Note. This is **irreducible** and **aperiodic**.

Suppose we run the **random walk** for T iterations, we now analyze our first version of **random walk** by **Markov Chain** with the help of the **strong law of large numbers**. A naive estimation of π_v suggests by **random walk** is

$$\hat{\pi}_v^\top(s) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{n=0}^{T-1} \mathbb{1}_{\{X_n=v\}} \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}.$$

When $T \rightarrow \infty$, we have

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{n=0}^{T-1} \mathbb{1}_{\{X_n=v\}} = \pi_v(s) \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}$$

guaranteed by **SLLN** almost surely.




Figure 7.2: First Estimator with $\hat{\pi}_i(s) = 9/T$.

But this estimator has two main issues.

Problem (Speed of convergence). Not clear how long we should run this for. Namely, we need to be able to say something about

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\left| \hat{\pi}_v^\top(s) - \pi_v(s) \right|^2 \right]$$

in T to ensure the speed of convergence.

Problem (Biased). The estimator is a **biased** estimator. Recall that this estimator is unbiased if

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\hat{\pi}_v^\top(s) \right] = \pi_v(s);$$

and if it is biased,

$$\hat{\pi}_v^\top(s) - \pi_v(s) \neq 0.$$

We see that $\hat{\pi}_v^\top(s)$ is indeed biased since

$$\mathbb{E} [\hat{\pi}_v^\top(s)] = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{n=0}^{T-1} \mathbb{E} [\mathbb{1}_{\{X_n=v\}}] = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{n=0}^{T-1} \mathbb{P}(X_n = v) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{n=0}^{T-1} (\mu_0 P^n)_v \xrightarrow{T \rightarrow \infty} \pi_v(s),$$

where P is the one-step transformation matrix. This only converges when $T \rightarrow \infty$ by [Perron-Frobenius theorem](#) since the [aperiodicity](#).

7.3.2 Second Page Rank Estimator

We now try to improve [random walk](#) we just proposed. Recall that

$$\tilde{N}(s) = sN + (1-s) \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1} \vec{1}^\top.$$

Notice that $\pi(s)$ is the left [eigenvector](#) of $\tilde{N}(s)$ with [eigenvalue](#) 1, i.e.,

$$\pi^\top(s) \tilde{N}(s) = \pi^\top(s).$$

Therefore,

$$\pi^\top(s) = \pi^\top(s) sN + (1-s) \underbrace{\pi^\top(s) \vec{1}}_{=1} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}^\top = \pi^\top(s) sN + (1-s) \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}^\top,$$

where we group $\pi^\top(s) \vec{1} = 1$ because $\pi(s)$ is a probability vector, which sums to 1. Then

$$\pi^\top(s) (I - sN) = (1-s) \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}^\top.$$

Hence,

$$\pi^\top(s) = (1-s) \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}^\top (I - sN)^{-1} = (1-s) \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}^\top \left(\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} s^i N^i \right) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} s^i (1-s) \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}^\top N^i$$

where $N^0 := I$.

As previously seen. We have $(I - A)^{-1} = I + A + A^2 + \dots$

We now analysis the expression

$$\pi^\top(s) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \underbrace{s^i (1-s)}_{\tau} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}^\top N^i.$$

Firstly, the term $s^i (1-s) := \tau$ is the so-called geometric [random variable](#).

Intuition (Geometric random variable). We can think of τ as the probability of tossing a series of [independent](#) biased coins until first tail occurs, since we have

$$\mathbb{P}(\tau = 0) = 1 - s, \quad \mathbb{P}(\tau = 1) = s(1-s), \dots, \mathbb{P}(\tau = i) = s^i(1-s).$$

Remark. We see that reset happens at time N , hence we look at time $N - 1$.

Next, we analyze the term $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}^\top N^i$, where

- $u = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \vec{1}^\top$ is the uniform distribution on the nodes of the graph.
- N^i represents random walk repeated i times.

Intuition. In all, this term represents that we start at a uniformly random node and take i steps as per random walk. Namely, this term represents the distribution of locations of the random walk after i steps.

Now, the suggested algorithm becomes follows.

Algorithm 7: Estimate Page Rank ver.2

Data: A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, iteration K , s

Result: A list arrival

```

1 for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                     // Initialize
2    $\text{arrival}(v) \leftarrow 0$ 
3
4 for  $i = 1, \dots, K$  do
5    $\tau \leftarrow \text{GeoRandom}(s)$                      // Toss a geometric random variable
6    $v \leftarrow \text{random}(\mathcal{V})$                      // select a uniformly random node
7    $\_, v \leftarrow \text{RandomWalk}(v, \tau, s)$            // Random walk starting at  $v$  with  $\tau$  steps
8    $\text{arrival}(v) \leftarrow \text{arrival}(v) + 1$            // Record where the random walker ends up at
9 return arrival

```

Note. The result of the above algorithm records the time the random walker ends up at v for all $v \in \mathcal{V}$ in every random walk.

Denote those K random variables τ as $\tau_1, \tau_2, \dots, \tau_K$ and the associated X_τ as $X_{\tau_1}, X_{\tau_2}, \dots, X_{\tau_K}$. We see that

$$\hat{\pi}_v^K(s) = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{1}_{\{X_{\tau_k}=v\}}.$$

This is an unbiased estimator since

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{1}_{\{X_{\tau_k}=v\}} \right] = \mathbb{P}(X_{\tau_k} = v) = \pi_v(s).$$

Also, the variance can be derived as

$$\text{Var} [\hat{\pi}_v^K(s)] = \frac{\pi_v(s)(1 - \pi_v(s))}{K} \leq \frac{1}{4K}.$$

Remark. Since $n(1 - n) \leq 1/4$ for every $n \in [0, 1]$ with equality if $x = 1/2$.



Figure 7.3: Second Estimator with $X_{\tau-1} \sim \pi(s)$

Note. We note that the empirical mean is unbiased while the empirical variance is biased. Let X_1, X_2, \dots, X_N are i.i.d. with mean μ and variance σ^2 .

- $\hat{\mu}_N$ is the empirical mean which is defined as

$$\hat{\mu}_N := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N X_i$$

with

$$\mathbb{E} [\hat{\mu}_N] = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{E} [X_i] = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mu = \mu,$$

which implies this is an unbiased estimator.

- Denote $\hat{\text{Var}}(N)$ as the empirical variance estimator. It's defined as

$$\hat{\text{Var}}(N) := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (X_i - \hat{\mu}_N)^2.$$

This is indeed a biased estimator since

$$\mathbb{E} [\hat{\text{Var}}(N)] = \left(\frac{N-1}{N} \right) \sigma^2,$$

which is slightly less than the true variance. We then have an unbiased estimator defined as

$$\overline{\text{Var}}(N) := \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{i=1}^N (X_i - \hat{\mu}_N)^2$$

with $\mathbb{E} [\overline{\text{Var}}(N)] = \sigma^2$.

7.3.3 Third Page Rank Estimator

Recall that

$$\pi(s) = \frac{1-s}{|\mathcal{V}|} \mathbf{1}^\top (I - sN)^{-1}.$$

Now, we define

$$Z := (I - sN)^{-1} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} s^i N^i$$

with $s^0 := 1$ and $N^0 := I$. Z is a non-negative matrix since $Z_{ij} \geq 0$. We further define $\sigma_{ij} := (1-s)Z_{ij}$ with a matrix Σ whose entries are defined as $(\Sigma)_{ij} := \sigma_{ij}$ and σ_i is the row of Σ corresponding to node i .

Remark. We see that λ_i is the page rank corresponding to the reset distribution where we always reset to node i .

Then, we proposed the following algorithm.

Algorithm 8: Estimate Page Rank ver.3

Data: A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, iteration M , s

Result: A list arrival

```

1 for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                     // Initialize
2    $\text{arrival}(v) \leftarrow 0$ 
3
4 for  $i \in \mathcal{V}$  do
5   for  $j \in 1, \dots, M$  do
6      $\tau^i \leftarrow \text{GeoRandom}(s)$                 // Toss a geometric random variable
7      $\_, v \leftarrow \text{RandomWalk}(i, \tau^i)$           // random walk starting at  $i$  with steps  $\tau^i$ 
8      $\text{arrival}(v) \leftarrow \text{arrival}(v) + 1$           // Record where the random walker ends up at
9 return arrival
```

Note. The result of [the above algorithm](#) records the time the [random walker](#) **ends up** at v for all $v \in \mathcal{V}$ in every [random walk](#).

If we only take one walk, namely $M = 1$, then

$$\pi_v(s) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{V}} \sigma_{iv}(s).$$

Now, for every node i in the network, we run M times with $\tau_1^i, \tau_2^i, \dots, \tau_M^i$ and $X_{\tau_1}^i, X_{\tau_2}^i, \dots, X_{\tau_M}^i$ and count the number of arrivals in node v and find the average. Explicitly, we have

$$\hat{\pi}_v(s) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}|} \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|} \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^M \mathbb{1}_{\{X_{\tau_m^i}^i = v\}} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}| M} \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|} \sum_{m=1}^M \mathbb{1}_{\{X_{\tau_m^i}^i = v\}}.$$

This is another unbiased estimator for the same reason given in the [second estimator](#), but we see that this converges faster and with smaller variance. Specifically, we have

$$\text{Var} [\hat{\pi}_v(s)] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{V}| M} \left(\pi_j - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{V}|} \sigma_{ij}^2}{|\mathcal{V}|} \right)$$

for all $v \in \mathcal{V}$. Hence, this is a better estimator.




Figure 7.4: Third Page Rank Estimator with $X_{\tau_j-1}^i \sim \sigma_i(s)$

Problem. Although the estimator found by [this algorithm](#) is better than the other two, but it still has its flaws. The main thing is, it throws away so much data, which means, which means it will converge slower.

Lecture 15: Final Page Rank Estimator

As previously seen. Main idea is that to construct a [Markov chain](#) on nodes of the [graph](#). At none i , the [random walker](#) toss a biased coin and determine where to go.

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7.3.4 Forth Page Rank Estimator

We introduce the final estimator, which make the full use of the data given, which avoids the problem we faced when using [the third estimator](#).

Formally, to further utilize the data thrown away by [the previous algorithm](#), we just record more data as follows.

Algorithm 9: Estimate Page Rank ver.4**Data:** A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, iteration M , s **Result:** A list N_t

```

1 for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                     // Initialize
2   for  $t \in 1, \dots, M \times |\mathcal{V}|$  do
3      $N_t(v) \leftarrow 0$ 
4  $t \leftarrow 0$ 
5
6 for  $i \in \mathcal{V}$  do
7   for  $j \in 1, \dots, M$  do
8      $\tau^i \leftarrow \text{GeoRandom}(s)$                 // Toss a geometric random variable
9      $\text{arrival}, v \leftarrow \text{RandomWalk}(i, \tau^i)$     // random walk starting at  $i$  with steps  $\tau^i$ 
10    for  $k \in \mathcal{V}$  do                                // Record every node the random walker has been to
11       $N_t(k) \leftarrow N_t(k) + \text{arrival}(k)$ 
12     $t \leftarrow t + 1$ 
13 return  $N_t$ 

```

Intuition. We see that this algorithm just record every information about the random walker! We see that it utilize the data in the most efficient way.

In this case, we don't need to analyze this estimator, since there is an off-the-shell theorem we can use, **Renewal theorem**.

Theorem 7.3.1 (Renewal Theorem). We have

$$\pi_v(s) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[\# \text{ of visits to node } v \text{ in this reset}]}{\mathbb{E}[\text{Duration of reset}]}$$

for every v , where we have $\mathbb{E}[\text{Duration of reset}] = \frac{1}{1-s}$, which implies

$$\hat{\pi}_v(s) = \frac{\frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^T N_t(k)}{\frac{1}{1-s}} = \frac{1-s}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T N_t(v)$$

where $N_t(v)$ is the number of time we visited v in reset duration.

Note. Note that T is $M \times |\mathcal{V}|$ since there are these many reset duration in the algorithm. Also, we see that each reset duration is independent of the other T reset duration starting at uniformly chosen node.

We see that this is also a non-biased estimator, and also, the random variables sequence $\{N_t(v)\}_t$ is i.i.d.

Remark. This estimator does not throw out those useful data, hence the estimator computed by this algorithm converges faster.




Figure 7.5: Forth Page Rank Estimator which records $N(v)$ for every node.

Chapter 8

Random Graph

We are interested in some functions depend on the number of nodes n in the graph such that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} f(n)$ can be understood, namely we are interested in so-called *large graph property*.

8.1 Order Relationship of Functions

We first introduce some common notations for asymptomatic comparison.

Definition. Given $f(n)$ and $g(n)$, the following notion compare f and g *loosely*.

Definition 8.1.1 (Big- O). $f(n)$ is said to be $O(g(n))$ if there is a positive k such that

$$f(n) \leq k \cdot g(n)$$

for all large enough n .

Definition 8.1.2 (Big- Ω). $f(n)$ is said to be $\Omega(g(n))$ if there is a positive k such that

$$f(n) \geq k \cdot g(n)$$

for all large enough n .

Definition 8.1.3 (Big- Θ). $f(n)$ is said to be $\Theta(g(n))$ if there are positive $k_1 \leq k_2$ such that

$$k_1 \cdot g(n) \leq f(n) \leq k_2 \cdot g(n)$$

for all large enough n .

Definition. Given $f(n)$ and $g(n)$, the following notion compare f and g *strictly*.

Definition 8.1.4 (Small- o). $f(n)$ is said to be $o(g(n))$ if for every positive ϵ , there exists a N large enough such that

$$f(n) \geq \epsilon \cdot g(n)$$

for all $n \geq N$.

Definition 8.1.5 (Small- ω). $f(n)$ is said to be $\omega(g(n))$ if for every positive ϵ , there exists a N large enough such that

$$f(n) \leq \epsilon \cdot g(n)$$

for all $n \geq N$.

Definition 8.1.6 (Same order). $f(n)$ is said to be of the *same order* as $g(n)$ asymptotically if


$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{f(n)}{g(n)} = 1.$$

We can write $f(n) \sim g(n)$ for short in this case.


Remark. If $f(n)$ or $g(n)$ are not non-negative, we simply use $|f(n)|$ and $|g(n)|$ and apply the above definitions.

We first consider the size of the largest connected component, and see how does this relation behave as $n \rightarrow \infty$. Formally, for a function $f(n)$ which represent the size of a graph, where n is the number of nodes in the graph.


Example (Island). If $f(n) = \log n$, we'll see small islands with $\frac{n}{\log(n)}$ of them without big continent. This is because when $n \rightarrow \infty$, $\frac{n}{\log(n)} \rightarrow 0$.



Example. If $f(n) = n^c$ with $c < 1$, we'll see a continent but'll shrink as $n \rightarrow \infty$. This is because that $\frac{n^c}{n} \rightarrow 0$ for $c < 1$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$. Better than island but not that great.



Example (Giant component). If $f(n) = cn$, there will be a giant component roughly c percent of nodes in the graph. Since as $n \rightarrow \infty$, $\frac{cn}{n} \rightarrow c$.



Lecture 16: Random Graph

8.2 Erdős-Rényi Random Graphs Family

1 Nov. 12:30

We introduce two main models for generating random [graphs](#).

- Erdős-Rényi. The random [graph](#) is given by $G(n, M)$. A [graph](#) is chosen uniformly at random from the collection of all [graphs](#) with n nodes and M edges.
- Edward-Gilbert. The random [graph](#) is given by $G(n, p)$. The [graph](#) is constructed by connecting nodes randomly, with each edge is included in the [graph](#) with probability p [independently](#).

Remark. We compare these two models.

- The number of expected edges in $G(n, p)$ is $\binom{n}{2}p$. Hence, by [SLLN](#), nearly all [graphs](#) in $G(n, p)$ will have $\binom{n}{2}p$ edges. Then if $pn^2 \rightarrow \infty$ and $M = \binom{n}{2}p$, then as n grows, the behavior of $G(n, p)$ should be similar with $G(n, M)$.
- The most commonly used model is $G(n, p)$ since the [independent](#) property of edges simplifies lots of analysis.

We first focus on Erdős-Rényi random [graphs](#) family.

8.2.1 Uniform and Undirected Model

In this case, the [adjacency matrix](#) A is [symmetric](#). This can be seen from constructing the [adjacency matrix](#) A such that

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & & U \\ & \ddots & \\ L & & 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

where we need to specify the upper triangular part U , and the lower triangular part L can then be obtained by [symmetry](#).

Now, let V denotes the number of nodes of the [graph](#) we're going to generate, also let $p \in (0, 1)$, we have the following algorithm to generate a random [graph](#).

Algorithm 10: Uniform and Undirected Random Graph Generator

Data: $p \in (0, 1)$, V

Result: [Adjacency matrix](#) A

```

1  $A_{V \times V} = 0_{V \times V}$                                      // Initialize
2
3 for  $i = 1, \dots, V - 1$  do
4   for  $j = i + 1, \dots, V$  do
5      $A_{ij} \leftarrow \text{Bernoulli}(p)$                        //  $\mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = 1) = p, \mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = 0) = 1 - p$ 
6 return  $A$ 
```

Soon, we will study some properties as $V \rightarrow \infty$.

8.2.2 Non-Uniform and Undirected Model

Given a non-uniform distribution matrix P with $P = P^\top$, where P is the probability matrix with diagonal entries being 0. Then, we have the following algorithm to generate a random [graph](#).

Algorithm 11: Non-Uniform and Undirected Random Graph Generator

Data: P, V
Result: Adjacency matrix A

```

1  $A_{V \times V} = 0_{V \times V}$  // Initialize
2
3 for  $i = 1, \dots, V - 1$  do
4   for  $j = i + 1, \dots, V$  do
5      $A_{ij} \leftarrow \text{Bernoulli}(P_{ij})$  //  $\mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = 1) = P_{ij}, \mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = 0) = 1 - P_{ij}$ 
6 return  $A$ 

```

8.2.3 Uniform and Directed Model

Again, with $p \in (0, 1)$, we have the following algorithm to generate a random graph.

Algorithm 12: Uniform and Directed Random Graph Generator

Data: $p \in (0, 1), V$
Result: Adjacency matrix A

```

1  $A_{V \times V} = 0_{V \times V}$  // Initialize
2
3 for  $i = 1, \dots, V - 1$  do
4   for  $j = 1, \dots, V$  do
5      $A_{ij} \leftarrow \text{Bernoulli}(p)$  //  $\mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = 1) = p, \mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = 0) = 1 - p$ 
6 return  $A$ 

```

We see that for all $i \neq j$,

$$i \neq j \quad A_{ij} = \text{Bernoulli}(p)$$

chosen independently. And because of independence, $A_{ij} \neq A_{ji}$ can occur and

$$\mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = A_{ji} = 1) = \mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = 1) \mathbb{P}(A_{ji} = 1) = p^2.$$

Compared to undirected case, we see that

$$\mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = A_{ji} = 1) = p$$

in an undirected graph.

8.2.4 Non-Uniform and Directed Model

Denote P as the probability matrix with diagonal entries being 0. Then we have the following algorithm to generate a random graph.

Algorithm 13: Non-Uniform and Directed Random Graph Generator

Data: P, V
Result: Adjacency matrix A

```

1  $A_{V \times V} = 0_{V \times V}$  // Initialize
2
3 for  $i = 1, \dots, V - 1$  do
4   for  $j = 1, \dots, V$  do
5      $A_{ij} \leftarrow \text{Bernoulli}(P_{ij})$  //  $\mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = 1) = P_{ij}, \mathbb{P}(A_{ij} = 0) = 1 - P_{ij}$ 
6 return  $A$ 

```

We see that for all $i \neq j$,

$$A_{ij} = \text{Bernoulli}(P_{ij})$$

chosen independently.

Example (Stochastic block model). We consider a specific model called *stochastic block model* (SBM) with the probability matrix being:

$$P = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} V_1 & V_2 \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} V_1 \\ V_2 \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} P_{11} & P_{12} \\ P_{21} & P_{22} \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

with $P_{12} = P_{21}^\top$, $P_{11} = P_{11}^\top$ and $P_{22} = P_{22}^\top$. In particular,

$$\begin{aligned} P_{11} &= p_{11} \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}_{V_1 \times V_1}, & P_{22} &= p_{22} \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}_{V_2 \times V_2} \\ P_{12} &= p_{12} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}_{V_1 \times V_2}, & P_{21} &= p_{21} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}_{V_2 \times V_1}, \end{aligned}$$

where each block matrix is uniform within the block. In the typical set up, we will have $p_{11}, p_{22} \gg p_{12}$. This creates a community structure such that

- p_{11} governs connectivity in community 1.
- p_{22} governs connectivity in community 2.
- p_{12} governs the *cross* connectivity structure.

Remark (Bipartite graph generalization). If we instead set

$$p_{12} \gg p_{11}, p_{22},$$

The generated random [graph](#) generalizes to multiple communities by an appropriate block structure.




Figure 8.1: For $p_{12} = 0$ and $p_{12}, p_{22} > 0$

Also, this relates to the community detection algorithm. We look at the [Laplacian](#) $L = D - A$ and find [spectral decomposition](#) and find the smallest [eigenvalues](#) and [eigenvectors](#) to study community structure. See [Section 3.4](#) for detailed discussion.

8.3 Analysis of Erdős-Rényi Random Graphs Family

As previously seen. To summarize all cases we have seen, we have

- Uniform case. With $p \in (0, 1)$,

- $p = 0$ - V has isolated nodes.
- $p = 1$ - **Complete graph**.

- Non-uniform case. Some values can be 1 or 0, but not all.

Now, let's look at the properties follows the above discussion. In particular, we consider the **uniform directed** case with $p \in (0, 1)$. We then see that each **undirected** edge is chosen with probability p . For node i , we have

- The **degree** is associated with $\text{Binomial}(V - 1, p)$ such that

$$\mathbb{P}(\deg(i) = k) = \binom{V-1}{k} p^k (1-p)^{V-1-k}.$$

- The mean **degree** is just $(V - 1)p$.
- The total number of edges is associated with $\text{Binomial}\left(\frac{V(V-1)}{2}, p\right)$.
- The mean number of edges is $\frac{V(V-1)}{2}p$.

Now, we can discuss different regimes.

8.3.1 Extremely Sparse Regime

With $p = \min\{c/V, 1\}$ for some $c > 0$. Then for node i , we have

- The **degree** is associated with $\text{Binomial}(V - 1, \frac{c}{V}) \rightarrow \text{Poisson}(c)$ as $V \rightarrow \infty$.
- The mean **degree** is $c \frac{V-1}{V} \rightarrow c$ as $V \rightarrow \infty$.

Note (Poisson distribution). Recall the Poisson distribution is defined as

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{Poisson}(c) = k) = e^{-c} \frac{c^k}{k!}, \quad k = 0, 1, \dots$$

We see that for an isolated node i , $\mathbb{P}(\deg(i) = 0) = e^{-c} > 0$, hence as $V \rightarrow \infty$, e^{-c} fraction of nodes will be isolated since

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{isolated nodes}) = (1 - p)^{V-1} = \left(1 - \frac{c}{V}\right)^{V-1} \rightarrow e^{-c},$$

where $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)^n = e^{-1}$.

- The total number of edges is associated with $\text{Binomial}\left(\frac{V(V-1)}{2}, \frac{c}{V}\right)$.
- The mean number of edges is $\frac{V(V-1)}{2} \frac{c}{V} = \frac{c(V-1)}{2} \sim \Theta\left(\frac{c}{2}V\right)$, which is linear in V .

Remark. We can further divide this cases into following sub-cases:

1. Sub-critical regime with $0 < c < 1$. Essentially **isolated nodes**. The largest **connected** component will have size $O(\log V)$ as $V \rightarrow \infty$, and the number of **connected** components will be

$$\Omega\left(\frac{V}{\log V}\right)$$

as $V \rightarrow \infty$.

8.3.2 Sparse Regime

This is also known as connectivity regime. With $p = \frac{c \log V + a}{V}$ where $a \in \mathbb{R}$ and $c > 0$, more precisely, we have

$$p \sim \frac{c \log V + a}{V} \text{ as } V \rightarrow \infty.$$

Asymptotically, as $V \rightarrow \infty$, node **degrees** go to infinity (not necessarily for all nodes). Now, for node i , we have

- The mean **degree** is

$$(V-1)p = \frac{V-1}{V}(c \log V + a) \sim c \log V + a = \Theta(\log V).$$

- The number of edges is

$$\frac{V(V-1)}{2}p = (V-1)(c \log V + a) = \Theta(V \log V).$$

Remark. Now consider following sub-cases.

1. $0 < c < 1$: As $V \rightarrow \infty$, there will always be isolated nodes. There will be one **giant component** with almost all nodes.
2. $c > 1$: As $V \rightarrow \infty$, the **graph** is **always connected**.
3. $c = 1$:
 - With probability $e^{-e^{-a}}$, there are isolated nodes.
 - With probability $1 - e^{-e^{-a}}$, the **graph** is **connected**.

For these **graphs**, isolated nodes are the ones stopping, preventing **connectivity**. The moment you eliminate isolated nodes, connectivity emerges.

8.3.3 Extremely Dense Regime

Now, if $p \sim \Omega(\frac{\log V}{V})$, the **graph** is extremely dense with **connectivity**. In this case, the **degree** distributions as Poisson

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{Poisson}(c) > k) \sim e^{-g(c)k},$$

which drop exponentially or geometrically in k since its has geometric tail.

Remark. In practice, we have

$$\mathbb{P}(\deg(i) > k) \sim \frac{1}{k^\alpha}$$

for $\alpha > 1$, which has only power-law tail.

Lecture 17: Random Graph

8.4 Real World Graphs

3 Nov. 12:30

In this section, we compare the random **graph** models with the real-world **graphs**.

Remark (Dense and sparse). Generally, we say a **graph** is sparse when the number of edges is linear with respect to V , namely

$$E \sim \Theta(V).$$

And we say a [graph](#) is dense when the number of edges is quadratic with respect to V , namely

$$E \sim \Theta(V^2),$$

note that this case is not so common. We can also see this by considering the number of triangles. In the connectivity regime, the number of edges is

$$\Theta(V \log V),$$

which is small relative to what's observed in real-world [graphs](#).

In practice, a real-world graph will have the following properties:

1. The number of edges is linear in V .
2. [Giant component](#) usually entice graph(connectivity)
3. Lots of triangles

Compare to the real-world [graphs](#), the [Erdős-Rényi random graphs family](#) usually have the following properties, for each different settings:

- [Extremely sparse regime](#):
 - edges is linear in V
 - [giant component](#)
 - isolated nodes
 - no triangles as $V \rightarrow \infty$
- [Sparse regime](#):
 - edges is $\sim \Theta(V \log V)$
 - most nodes in the [giant component](#)
 - can have connectivity
 - Many triangles
- [Extremely dense regime](#):
 - edges is $\sim \Omega(V^{1+\epsilon})$ with $\epsilon > 0$
 - fully [connected](#)
 - lots of triangles

8.5 R-MAT Graphs

Besides [Erdős-Rényi random graph family](#), we can use different approaches to generate a random [graph](#). We now introduce so-called *R-MAT graphs*.

Intuition. The main idea is to recursively set an entry of the [adjacency matrix](#).

We assume that the number of nodes is $V = 2^k$ for some k . Now, given four numbers $a, b, c, d \geq 0$ with $a + b + c + d = 1$, we let

$$\begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{bmatrix}$$

be a distribution on $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. Further, we denote

- E : Target number of edges to be placed on a [directed graph](#). Furthermore, we add entries in the [adjacency matrix](#) one edge of a time.
- A : $2^k \times 2^k$ matrix such that

$$A = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} 2^{k-1} & 2^{k-1} \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} 2^{k-1} \\ 2^{k-1} \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} A_1 & A_2 \\ A_3 & A_4 \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix}_{2^k \times 2^k}$$

Then the algorithm to generate an R-MAT graph is as follows.

Algorithm 14: R-MAT Graph Generator

Data: (a, b, c, d) , $V = 2^k$
Result: Adjacency matrix A

```

1  $A_{V \times V} = 0_{V \times V}$  // Initialize
2
3 for  $e = 1, \dots, E$  do
4    $A' \leftarrow A$ 
5   for  $\ell = k, \dots, 2$  do // Iterated backwards, choose  $A_{2^{\ell} \times 2^{\ell}}$  with size  $2^{\ell-1} \times 2^{\ell-1}$ 
6      $r \leftarrow \text{rand}([0, 1])$ 
7     if  $r \leq a$  then //  $1 \sim a$ 
8       region  $\leftarrow 1$ 
9     else if  $a < r \leq a + b$  then //  $2 \sim b$ 
10      region  $\leftarrow 2$ 
11     else if  $a + b < r \leq a + b + c$  then //  $3 \sim c$ 
12      region  $\leftarrow 3$ 
13     else //  $4 \sim d$ 
14      region  $\leftarrow 4$ 
15      $A' \leftarrow A'_i$  // Choose the region  $i$ 
16   if  $A' = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \end{bmatrix}$  then
17      $A' = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \end{bmatrix}$  // Note that this also changes  $A$ 's corresponding entry
18
19 for  $i = 1, \dots, V$  do // Clean of to make  $A$  a simple directed graph
20    $A_{ii} = 0$ 
21 return  $A$ 
  
```

Example. In picture, R-MAT algorithm is doing the following:

$$M = \left(\begin{array}{c|c|c|c} & & & \\ \hline & & & \\ \hline & & & \\ \hline & & & \end{array} \right),$$

where we choose $k = 3$ with the sequence 2, 1, 3.

Note that in line 20, we delete any entries on the diagonal and produce the adjacency matrix A to produce a simple directed graph.

Example (Clean up). Let A be

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix},$$

which has self-loop hence not simple. After cleaning up, we have

$$A' = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Remark. We can do some comparison between what we have already seen.

- **Erdős-Rényi Random Graph**: Poisson **degree** distribution with $p = \frac{c}{V}$. Then the tail probability (CCDF) is

$$\mathbb{P}(\deg(i) \geq k) \cong ce^{-\alpha k},$$

which decreases exponentially.

- **Real-World graphs**. Tail probability is

$$\mathbb{P}(\deg(i) \geq k) = \frac{c}{k^{\alpha-1}},$$

which is polynomial decrease if $\alpha \in (2, 3)$. More specifically,

– $\alpha > 2$:

* mean **degree** exists, such that

$$\text{mean degree} \cong \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} k \frac{\tilde{c}}{k^{\alpha}} = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{\tilde{c}}{k^{\alpha-1}}.$$

We see that $\alpha - 1 > 1$ is needed for above to converge to a finite number.

* mean squared of **degree** exists, such that

$$\text{mean squared of degree} \cong \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} k^2 \frac{\tilde{c}}{k^{\alpha}} = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{\tilde{c}}{k^{\alpha-2}}.$$

– $\alpha < 3$: This implies $\alpha - 2 < 1$, hence above will just diverge to $+\infty$.

- In practice, the variance of **degrees** is exponentially high.

8.6 Preferential Attachment Directed Graph

Yet, we have another algorithm to produce a random **graph**. Let the (**undirected**) **degree** distribution on V being

$$d_1, d_2, \dots, d_V$$

with $\sum_{i=1}^V d_i$ being even. Then by considering a histogram, for $k = \{0, 1, \dots, V-1\}$, we have

$$P_k^{\alpha} = \frac{1}{V} \sum_{i=1}^V \mathbb{1}_{\{d_i=k\}} = \frac{\# \text{ of nodes with degree } k}{V}.$$

We make the following assumptions for constructing a preferential attachment **graph**.

- Nodes arrive in sequence $1, 2, \dots, V$
- Each node has an **out-degree**. Out going edges that need to be paired with nodes earlier in sequence such that

$$d_i^{\text{out}} \leq i - 1.$$

Now, with $p \in (0, 1)$, the following algorithm will generate a preferential attachment **graph**.

Algorithm 15: Preferential Attachment Graph Generator

Data: $p \in (0, 1)$, V , $\{d_i\}_{i=1}^V$
Result: \mathcal{G}

```

1  $\mathcal{V} \leftarrow \{1, 2, \dots, V\}$ 
2  $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
3  $\mathcal{G} \leftarrow (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$  // Initialize
4
5 for  $i = 1, \dots, V$  do // Assume nodes arrive in order
6    $\text{unpaired} \leftarrow \{1, 2, \dots, i-1\}$  // Unpaired nodes earlier to  $i$ 
7   for  $e = 1, \dots, d_i^{\text{out}}$  do
8      $\text{result} \leftarrow \text{TossCoin}(p)$  //  $\mathbb{P}(\{H\}) = p$ ,  $\mathbb{P}(\{T\}) =: q = 1 - p$ 
9     if  $\text{result} = H$  then // If heads
10       $j \leftarrow \text{rand}(\text{unpaired})$ 
11    else // If tails
12       $j \leftarrow \text{randWithWeight}(\text{unpaired}, \{d_k^{\text{in}}\}_{k \in \text{unpaired}})^a$ 
13
14     $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E} + \{i \rightarrow j\}$  // Add the edge  $i \rightarrow j$  to  $\mathcal{G}$ 
15     $\text{unpaired} \leftarrow \text{unpaired} \setminus \{j\}$  //  $j$  is now paired with  $i$ 
16 return  $\mathcal{G}$ 

```

^aIn this case, we choose one of the unpaired nodes in **proportion** to their incoming edges.

Remark. Node 1 always has **out-degree** 0.

8.7 Analysis of Preferential Attachment Directed Graph

Now, let us analyze the situation such that if $d_i^{\text{out}} = 1$ for all $i = 2, 3, \dots$ with $t = 2, 3, \dots, V$. Define

$X_i(t) := \#$ of incoming edges for node i after node t is added to the **graph**.

We then see

$$\sum_{i=1}^V X_i(t) = t - 1 = \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} X_i(t)$$

since $X_i(t) = 0$ for all i such that $t \leq i \leq V$. Look at the change of $X_i(t)$ with respect to $X_i(t-1)$, we further have

$$X_j(t) = \begin{cases} X_j(t-1) = 0, & \text{if } t \leq j \leq V; \\ X_j(t-1), & \text{w.p. } p \frac{t-2}{t-1} + q \frac{t-1-X_j(t-1)}{t-1}; \\ X_j(t-1) + 1 & \text{w.p. } p \frac{1}{t-1} + q \frac{X_j(t-1)}{t-1}. \end{cases}$$

Remark. This is a vector valued **random process**.

In order to simplify the analysis, we take a look at the expectation. We have $x_j(t) = \mathbb{E}[X_j(t)]$, which is just

$$x_j(t) = \begin{cases} x_j(t-1) = 0, & \text{if } t \leq j \leq V; \\ x_j(t-1) + p \frac{1}{t-1} + q \frac{x_j(t-1)}{t-1}, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Then, we have

$$\underbrace{x_j(t) - x_j(t-1)}_{\text{discrete derivative}} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } t \leq j \leq V; \\ \frac{p}{t-1} + q \frac{x_j(t-1)}{t-1}, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Let $V \rightarrow \infty$ and $\tilde{x}_i(t) = \frac{x_i(t)}{V} \cong \frac{X_i(t)}{V}$ will be well-approximated by a differential equation

$$\frac{d\tilde{x}_j(t)}{dt} = \frac{p}{t} + q \frac{\tilde{x}_j(t)}{t} = \frac{p + q\tilde{x}_j(t)}{t}.$$

Rearranging, we have

$$\frac{1}{p + q\tilde{x}_j(t)} \frac{d\tilde{x}_j(t)}{dt} = \frac{1}{t}.$$

Then since

$$\frac{d}{dt} (\ln(p + q\tilde{x}_j(t))) = \frac{1}{p + q\tilde{x}_j(t)} \cdot q \frac{d\tilde{x}_j(t)}{dt},$$

hence we have

$$\frac{d}{dt} (\ln(p + q\tilde{x}_j(t))) = \frac{q}{t},$$

In all, we have

$$\ln(p + q\tilde{x}_j(t)) = q \ln(t) + qc.$$

Take exponential on both sides, we have $p + q\tilde{x}_j(t) = t^q e^{cq}$. Solving for \tilde{x}_j , we see that

$$\tilde{x}_j(t) = \frac{t^q e^{cq} - p}{q}.$$

We now need the initial value. In this case, we have $x_j(t) = 0, \forall t \leq j \leq V$, which implies $\tilde{x}_j(j) = 0$, and hence

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{x}_j(j) = 0 &\Leftrightarrow j^q e^{cq} = p \\ &\Rightarrow e^{cq} = \frac{p}{j^q} \\ &\Rightarrow \tilde{x}_j(t) = \frac{p}{q} \left(\left(\frac{t}{j} \right)^q - 1 \right) \forall t \geq j. \end{aligned}$$

From this, we see that the fraction of nodes with **degree** greater than k is

$$\frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{q}{p} \frac{k}{V}\right)^{\frac{1}{q}}} \cong \frac{c}{k^\alpha}$$

where $\alpha = \frac{1}{q} = \frac{1}{1-p}$.

Note (Power-tail law). This is what we called *power law tail*.

Remark. This process is biasing towards incoming degrees.

Note (Formal Analysis). A more formal setup is the following. Let

$$[X_j(t)]_{j=1, \dots, V}$$

be a **Markov chain**. Considering two aggregations:

1. For $i = 0, 1, \dots$, we determine the fraction of nodes with **in-degree** at least i at time t . Then

$$y_i(t) = \frac{1}{V} \sum_{k=1}^V \sum_{j=1}^V \mathbb{1}_{\{X_j(t)=k\}} = \frac{1}{V} \sum_{j=1}^V \mathbb{1}_{\{X_j(t) \geq i\}}.$$

2. For $s \in [0, 1]$, define $t = \lfloor sV \rfloor$. Now, for $i = 0, 1, \dots$, set $\tilde{y}_i^V(s) = y_i(\lfloor sV \rfloor)$. Then the formal comparison of $\tilde{y}_i^V(s)$ can be made with an appropriate O.D.E. solution

$$\{y_i(s)\}_{i=0,1,\dots}$$

for $s \in [0, 1]$. This is the formal **mean-field** analysis that is not in the scope of the course. Hence, we give a flavor of the results using a hand-wavy argument.

Chapter 9

Game Theory

Lecture 18: Game Theory

We now turn to a new topic, game theory. The goal is to analyze situations with **rational agents** who want to maximize their won **rewards** under a particular structured **game**. 8 Nov. 12:30

9.1 Game

We restrict a **game** with the following structure.

Definition 9.1.1 (Game). A *game* has **players**, and each **player** has a set of **strategies** and a **reward** function.

Definition 9.1.2 (Player). *Players*, also called *agents*, are the participants of the **game**.

Definition 9.1.3 (Strategy). *Strategies*, also called *actions*, are a set of choices a **player** can perform in a **game**.

Definition 9.1.4 (Reward). *Rewards*, also called *utilities* or *payoffs*, is the return for each **player** based on the played **strategies** of all **players** (including self).

Note (Assumptions of a game). We make some assumptions of a **game**.

- There are (**finite**, infinite) number of **players**.
- Each player has a (**finite**, infinite) set of **strategies** to choose from, homogeneous or inhomogeneous

Besides the assumptions of **game** structure, we also have some assumptions for the **player**.

Note (Assumptions of players). We make some assumptions of **players**.

- Common knowledge: All **agents** know all other players' **strategy** set and **payoffs**. Basically means each **player** knows everything about the structure of the **game**.
- Rationality: All **agents** are fully *rational* and self utility maximizer.

Remark. As a result of **common knowledge**, everyone knows that all **agents** are **rational**.

By above two assumptions, **players** succeed in selecting optimal **strategies**, and our goal is to understand these optimal **strategies**.

9.2 Normal Form, One-Shot Games

For simplicity, we also assume the **payoffs** are finite, but this is nearly all the case, so we just assumed it.

Definition 9.2.1 (One-shot game). A **game** is a *one-shot Game* if **players** will simultaneously and **independently** choose their **actions**, and they do so only once in this game.

We note that contrarily, there are games called **dynamic game**.

Definition 9.2.2 (Dynamic game). A **game** is a *dynamic game* if **actions** can be played sequentially over time for **players** in the **game**.

Now, we see some examples which are all **one-shot game** and is in **normal form**, i.e., can be described in a matrix.

Definition 9.2.3 (Payoff matrix). If we tabulate all combinations of **players' strategies** and the corresponding **payoffs** in a form of matrix, then we call the matrix the *payoff matrix*. We'll soon see lots of examples.

Remark. A **game** is in **normal form** simply means if we can write out its corresponding **payoff matrix**. But we'll see that describing a **game** in such a way will lose some information.

Before we see the examples, we make the following notions about characterizing **strategy**.

Definition 9.2.4 (Dominant strategy). The *(strictly) dominant strategy* is the optimal response to every others' **strategy** of the other **players** in the sense that the **payoffs** of this **strategy** is strictly better in any cases.

Definition 9.2.5 (Weakly dominant strategy). The *weakly dominant strategy* is the optimal response to every others' **strategy** of the other **players** in the sense that the **payoffs** of this **strategy** is better in any cases.

Remark. Comparison between **strictly** and **weakly dominant strategy**:

- **Strictly dominant strategy**: The **payoff** is strictly higher in all cases.
- **Weakly dominant strategy**: This **strategy** is always in the best **action** set. but in some cases, some other **strategies** will give you the same **payoff**.

Example (Prisoner's dilemma). Assume that two people are taken for investigation of a crime. They're interrogated simultaneously and in different rooms, so they can't communicate. Each of them is offered the choice to confess or not.

- Two **players**.
- **Actions** set: {confess(C), not confess(NC)}.
- **Payoffs**: There are four possibilities:
 - If you confess and partner doesn't, then you are released and partner gets 10 years in jail.
 - If you don't confess and partner confess, then you'll get 10 years and partner released.
 - If both confess, both get 4 years.
 - If both do not confess, both get charges on minor crime, which will let them get 1 year.

We can then define so-called **payoff matrix**,

		Player 2	
		NC	C
Player 1	NC	$(-1, -1)$	$(-10, 0)$
	C	$(0, -10)$	$(-4, -4)$

Problem. How will you react?

Answer. We first see what **action** should suspect 1 plays based on **rational** analysis. Suspect 1's reasoning should be as follows:

- If suspect 2 confess \rightarrow since $-4 > -10 \Rightarrow$ the best **action** is to confess.
- If suspect 2 don't confess \rightarrow since $0 > -1 \Rightarrow$ the best **action** is to confess.

Since this problem is symmetric, namely the **strategy** for both suspects are the same, so both of them will confess, leading to an equilibrium. \otimes

Remark. We see that

- No hidden **payoffs** other than what we have in **payoff matrix**.
- Both not confessing is better as a pair (in the sense that if we sum the **payoffs**). We see that utilize sum is not maximized, which means this action is not *efficient*.
- Confessing is the best option of the other suspect's choice. In this case, confessing is a **dominant strategy**.

Example (Golden ball). Two **players** have two options, one is split, and another is steal. And there are x amounts of money in total. If both **players** choose split, then they can both get half of the money; if one chooses split and another chooses steal, the **player** chooses steal can get all the money while another **player** get nothing. If both choose steal, then they both get nothing.

- Two **players**.
- **Actions** set: {split, steal}.
- **Payoffs**: Assume the total **rewards** is x .
 1. (split, split): $\frac{x}{2}$ for both.
 2. (split, steal): **player** who plays steal gets x , steal gets 0.
 3. (steal, steal): 0 for both.

The **payoff matrix** is

		Player 2	
		split	steal
Player 1	split	$(x/2, x/2)$	$(0, x)$
	steal	$(x, 0)$	$(0, 0)$

The **player** 1's reasoning should be as follows:

- If **player** 2 chooses to split \rightarrow since $x > \frac{x}{2}$, the best **action** is to steal.
- If **player** 2 chooses to steal \rightarrow since $0 = 0$, the best **action** is *undetermined*.

We see that stealing is a **weakly dominant strategy** since it does not strictly outperform in every case.

Example (Prisoner's dilemma ver. 2). Consider again the [prisoner's dilemma](#), but with different [payoff](#) matrix.

		Player 2	
		NC	C
Player 1	NC	$(-1, -1)$	$(-3, -2)$
	C	$(-2, -3)$	$(-4, -4)$

With the same analysis, we see that the equilibrium is not confessing, namely (NC, NC) is a dominant strategy equilibrium, furthermore, it's a strictly dominant strategy.

Example (Two firms). There are two firms competing with each other. They both have options to produce lower-priced products or upscale product. And we simply assume that their goal is to maximize the market share. We further assume that in the whole market, there are 60% of population will only buy low-priced products, and other 40% of population will only buy upscale products.

- Two firms.
- [Actions](#) set: {low-priced(Lp), upscales} (Uc)
- [Payoffs](#):

		Firm 2	
		Lp	Uc
Firm 1	Lp	$(0.48, 0.12)$	$(0.6, 0.4)$
	Uc	$(0.4, 0.6)$	$(0.32, 0.08)$

We see that firm 1's reasoning should be as follows:

- Lp is a [strictly dominant strategy](#).

We also see that firm 2's reasoning should be as follows:

- If firm 2 choose Lp \rightarrow Uc
- If firm 2 choose Uc \rightarrow Lp

We see that with [common knowledge](#) and [rationality](#) assumptions, firm 2 will assume that firm 2 will play its [dominant strategy](#). As a result, firm 2 will play Uc, hence, (Lp, Uc) is the *equilibrium point*, and it's also *efficient*.

Example (Two firms ver. 2). Consider the [two firms game](#), but with three [actions](#). The [payoff](#) matrix now becomes

		Firm 2		
		A	B	C
Firm 1	A	$(4, 4)$	$(0, 2)$	$(0, 2)$
	B	$(0, 0)$	$(1, 1)$	$(0, 2)$
	C	$(0, 0)$	$(0, 2)$	$(1, 1)$

To see the best response, we see that

- For firm 1:
 - If firm 2 play A \rightarrow pick A.

- If firm 2 play $B \rightarrow$ pick B .
- If firm 2 play $C \rightarrow$ pick C .
- For firm 2:
 - If firm 1 play $A \rightarrow$ pick A .
 - If firm 1 play $B \rightarrow$ pick C .
 - If firm 1 play $C \rightarrow$ pick B .

We see that there are no **dominant strategy**. But (A, A) is the *equilibrium point*, which we will call it the *Nash equilibrium*.

Note. One may notice that we are using **normal form** to describe **one-shot games**. Contrarily, we will use so-called *extensive form* to describe a **dynamic game**.

9.3 Nash Equilibrium

We now have seen some examples of equilibrium, and we can now formalize it.

Definition 9.3.1 (Nash equilibrium). A set of players played **actions** is called a *Nash Equilibrium* when each **player** doesn't have an incitement to **unilaterally deviate**.

We further make two more useful definitions we'll later use. These notions generalize the notion of **strategy**.

Definition 9.3.2 (Pure strategy). We say a **strategy** is *pure* if the **player** will play exactly one **strategy** deterministically.

Definition 9.3.3 (Mixed strategy). We say a **strategy** is *mixed* if the **player** will play **strategies** with some probability.

Intuition. Basically **Definition 9.1.3** is the same as **Definition 9.3.2**, and **Definition 9.3.3** says that the **player** will play with some randomness.

We then define a **game** structure mathematically in the following way.

Definition 9.3.4 (Mathematical game). Denote the set of **player** as \mathcal{I} , with the number of the player being $I := |\mathcal{I}|$. Assume that each **player** i has a finite set \mathcal{S}_i of **actions** to choose from with size $|\mathcal{S}_i| < \infty$. Then, we can define a **strategy** vector s , which denotes the **action** chosen by all **players** such that

$$s := (s_1, \dots, s_I)$$

with dimension being I . We also define the vector of opponents' **strategy** s_{-i} such that

$$s_{-i} := (s_1, \dots, s_{i-1}, s_{i+1}, \dots, s_I)$$

with dimension being $I - 1$ for **player** i . Finally, the **utility** function for **player** i is

$$u_i := \prod_{j=1}^I \mathcal{S}_j \rightarrow \mathbb{R},$$

where $u_i(s) = u_i(s_1, \dots, s_I) = u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$.

Definition 9.3.5 (Best response). Given the **strategies** of all other **players**, the subset of s_i that

maximize the **payoff** of **player** i is called the *best response*, or *best response correspondence*, denotes as $BR_i(s_{-i})$.

Intuition. $BR_i(s_{-i})$ can be thought as follows: For **player** i , given every other **players'** **strategies** they will play, find the optimal response. And since there may be several **strategies** can achieve the optimal **reward**, so it's should be a set.

Remark. Note that mathematically, $BR_i(s_{-i}) \subseteq \mathcal{S}_i$ such that

$$BR_i(s_{-i}) = \arg \max_{s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i} u_i(s_i, s_{-i}).$$

Lecture 19: Nash Equilibrium

Besides the **rationality** assumptions, we also have the following.

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Note (Bounded rationality). The *bounded rationality* assumption says that **players** can only have some finite levels of **rationality**, i.e., not fully **rational**.

As previously seen. Let's review notions we introduced before.

- \mathcal{I} : the set of **players**.
- I : $|\mathcal{I}|$, the number of **players**.
- \mathcal{S}_i : **player** i choose **strategy** s_i from \mathcal{S}_i such that $s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i$ with $S_i = |\mathcal{S}_i|$.
- s : (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_I) , **strategy** chosen by all **players**.
- **Player** $i \in \mathcal{I}$, then $-i := \mathcal{I} \setminus \{i\}$: Everyone else but i .

Example.

$$\begin{aligned} i = 1: & \quad -1 = \{2, 3, \dots, I\}, \\ i = 2: & \quad -2 = \{1, 3, \dots, I\}, \\ & \quad \vdots \end{aligned}$$

since

$$s_{-i} = (s_1, \dots, s_{i-1}, s_{i+1}, \dots, s_I).$$

- **Best-response correspondence** (set): For **player** i , give the **strategies** of $-i$ (s_{-i} is given), find the subset of **strategies** in \mathcal{S}_i that give **player** i the highest **payoff**.
- **Utilities**: $\forall i \in \mathcal{I}$,

$$u_i: \prod_{j=1}^I \mathcal{S}_j \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

For every vector $s = (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_I) \in \prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} \mathcal{S}_j$, $u_i(s)$ is a real number.

Remark. We see that s_i, s_{-i} form the entire vector of strategies every player plays, so $u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$ is well-defined. Moreover,

$$\max_{s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i} u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$$

finds all strategies that attain the maximum rewards.

As previously seen. We now view the Golden Balls game with what we just defined. The payoff matrix is

		Player 2	
		split	steal
Player 1	split	$(x/2, x/2)$	$(0, x)$
	steal	$(x, 0)$	$(0, 0)$

For player 1, given

1. $s_{-1} = \text{steal}$:

- $u_1(\text{split}, \underbrace{\text{steal}}_{s_{-1}}) = 0$
- $u_1(\text{steal}, \underbrace{\text{steal}}_{s_{-1}}) = 0$

So

$$\arg \max_{s_1 \in \mathcal{S}_1} u_1(s_1, \text{steal}) = \{\text{split}, \text{steal}\},$$

which is our best response correspondence.

2. $s_{-1} = \text{split}$:

- $u_1(\text{split}, \underbrace{\text{split}}_{s_{-1}}) = \frac{x}{2}$
- $u_1(\text{steal}, \underbrace{\text{split}}_{s_{-1}}) = x$

So

$$\arg \max_{s_1 \in \mathcal{S}_1} u_1(s_1, \text{split}) = \{\text{steal}\},$$

which is our best response correspondence, and moreover, since it's unique and strictly greater than any other choices, so we call it the strict best response.

Definition 9.3.6 (Strict best response). \bar{s}_i is called a *strict best response* to s_{-i} if

$$u_i(\bar{s}_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$$

for every $s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i \setminus \{\bar{s}_i\}$.

Note. Obviously, a strict best response will be unique. Also, note that Definition 9.3.6 is just Definition 9.2.4.

Remark. With the introduced notations, we can reformulate Definition 9.2.4 and Definition 9.2.5 as follows. s_i is *strictly dominant* if it is the strict best response for all s_{-i} , while s_i is *weakly dominant* if it is one of the best response for all s_{-i} .

Remark. We see that

- In the **Golden balls** example, where steal is a **weakly dominant strategy**.
- **Rationality** plus **common knowledge** implies that if a **player** with **dominant strategies**, then the **player** will play them.

We can also reformulate **Nash equilibrium** with the introduced notions.

As previously seen (Nash equilibrium). Let $s^* = (s_1^*, s_2^*, \dots, s_I^*)$ be the **strategy profile**, which is a **pure strategy Nash equilibrium** if

$$s_i^* \in \text{BR}(s_{-i}^*)$$

for all $i \in \mathcal{I}$.

Note. We see that

- Every **agent** is playing a BR to the others.
- **Utility** is the incentive for **agents**. Setting everyone else at s_{-i}^* , there is no incentive for **player** i to deviate (not necessary to change **action**). This implies there are no *unilateral dominants* are possible.

$$\forall_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \forall_{s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i} u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*) \geq u_i(s_i, s_{-i}^*).$$

As previously seen. There are two different types of **strategies**:

- **Pure strategy**: Fixing an **action** for every **player**.
- **Mixed strategy**: A randomized **action** is played by every **player**.

Remark. We see that

1. **Pure strategy Nash equilibrium** needs not exist for every **game**.
2. Even if they exist, they need not be unique.
3. If there are multiple equilibrium, then which one gets played is a tough question and usually involves external quantities (outside information).

9.3.1 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

We first introduce the concept of **coordination games**.

Definition 9.3.7 (Coordination game). *Coordination games* are **games** such that **players** get a higher **payoff** by working together (taking the same **action**).

Example (Shaking hands). There are two men want to shake their hands. They can either position their hand up (U) or down (D). The **payoff matrix** is

		Player 2	
		U	D
Player 1	U	(1, 1)	(0, 0)
	D	(0, 0)	(1, 1)

We see that (U, U) and (D, D) are **pure strategy Nash equilibrium**.

Example (Battle of the sexes). A man and a woman are going to a date. The man prefer to see football (F) while the woman prefer to go to theater (T). If their opinion are not equal, then they can't go to anywhere, so their fulfillment (payoff) will both be 0. The payoff matrix is

		Woman	
		T	F
Man	T	(1, 2)	(0, 0)
	F	(0, 0)	(2, 1)

We see that (T, T) and (F, F) are pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Example (Stay hunt). The payoff matrix is

		Player 1	
		S	H
Player 2	S	(4, 4)	(0, 3)
	H	(3, 0)	(3, 3)

We see that (S, S) and (H, H) are pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

We also have so-called Anti-Coordination Games.

Definition 9.3.8 (Anti-coordination game). Anti-coordination games are games that one player prefers to coordinate, and the other does not.

And before we see examples about anti-coordination game, we introduce two types of games.

Definition 9.3.9 (Attack-defense game). An attack-defense game can be simply described as follows. There are two players, one is attacker and another is defender. Attacker has two actions, they are attack with strategy A or B, respectively. Correspondingly, defender also has two actions to choose from, namely defend against A or defend against B. Clearly, if defender correctly defend attacker's attack in terms of strategy attack chooses, then defender gets a higher payoff, otherwise the attacker gets a higher payoff.

Definition 9.3.10 (Zero-sum game). A zero-sum game is a game such that the sum of rewards in each outcome is always zero.

Example (Rock, paper, scissors). This is an example that a game without pure Nash equilibrium. The payoff matrix is

		Player 2		
		Rock	Paper	Scissors
Player 1	Rock	(0, 0)	(-1, <u>+1</u>)	(<u>+1</u> , -1)
	Paper	(<u>+1</u> , -1)	(0, 0)	(-1, <u>+1</u>)
	Scissors	(-1, <u>+1</u>)	(<u>+1</u> , -1)	(0, 0)

And it's clear that no matter what we fixed a strategy for one player first, another player will have incentive to deviate right after another player changes his strategy.

Example (Hawk-Dove). Two neighboring countries are likely going to fight. If one choose Hawk (H), then that country will fight; otherwise if choosing Dove (D), then that country will not going

to fight and will not going to fight back either.

		Country 2	
		H	D
Country 1	H	$(0, 0)$	$(5, 1)$
	D	$(1, 5)$	$(3, 3)$

Problem. Is (D, D) a Nash Equilibrium?

Answer. No. Since if player 2 is playing D , we see that $u_1(H, D) = 5$, $u_1(D, D) = 3$. Then player 1 has a deviation to get a higher payoff. \otimes

Problem. Is (H, D) a Nash Equilibrium?

Answer. True. Since

- Player 1: H is the best response.
- Player 2: Player 1 is H . Then $u_2(H, H) = 0$, and $u_2(H, D) = 1$.

We see that neither player 1 nor player 2 has an incentive to deviate. So (D, H) (also (H, D)) is a Nash Equilibrium. \otimes

Example (Matching Pennies). This is a simple example for attack-defense game and also a zero-sum game. Suppose there are two people each hold a penny and simultaneously choose whether to show heads (H) or tails (T) on their penny. player 1 loses his penny to player 2 if they match; player 1 wins player 2's penny if they don't match.

		Player 2	
		H	T
Player 1	H	$(-1, 1)$	$(1, -1)$
	T	$(1, -1)$	$(-1, 1)$

We see that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. So we have no idea what strategy each player will play.

Remark. This is also a zero-sum game.

Remark. From matching pennies games example, we see that there are no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. This is due to the fact that all player will play their strategy in a deterministic way, if the best response exists. And if not, then we have no idea what they will play in this case, which is hard to analyze. Now if we allow some randomness, then by John Nash, he proved that with such a setup, the Nash Equilibrium always exists (Theorem 9.3.1).

9.3.2 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Follows the intuition of matching pennies game, we now go in-depth and analyze mixed strategy. Essentially, we are just randomizing one's strategies such that the randomization is done independently. This will bring the game structure with much more interesting properties.

As previously seen. The reason why we call it mixed strategies is initially, we only have distinct strategy to choose from. But now, with probability, we have some kind of mixed strategy between

choices. In [matching pennies game](#) example, we have [strategies](#) which mixes between H and T .

Example. For [player](#) i , denote \vec{P}_i as a probability distribution on \mathcal{S}_i (PMF) such that

$$\{s_{i1}, s_{i2}, s_{i3}, s_{i4}\} = \mathcal{S}_i,$$

and $S_i = 4$. More specifically, \vec{P}_i looks like

$$(P_{i1}, P_{i2}, P_{i3}, P_{i4})$$



with all entries non-negative and their sum is 1. There are lots of examples for such P_i . For example,

- Uniformly [mixed](#): $(\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4})$.
- [Pure strategy](#): $(1, 0, 0, 0)$.

We can then consider so-called [probability simplex](#), defined as follows.

Definition 9.3.11 (Probability simplex). The *probability simplex*, denoted as $\Delta(\mathcal{S}_i)$, is equal to

$$\left\{ (P_{i1}, P_{i2}, \dots, P_{iS_i}) : P_{ij} \geq 0 \wedge \sum_{j=1}^{S_i} P_{ij} = 1 \quad \forall j = 1, \dots, S_i \right\}.$$



Intuition. This is just a set of probability distributions over \mathcal{S}_i , but with a good geometry representation.

[Players' actions](#) are enhanced to picking probability distribution (adding uncertainty to your choice).

Problem. How to evaluate [payoff](#)?

Answer. Let

$$u_i(\vec{P}_i, \vec{P}_{-i}) \mathbb{E}_{\vec{P}_1 \times \vec{P}_2 \times \dots \times \vec{P}_I} [u_i(\bar{S}_1, \bar{S}_2, \dots, \bar{S}_I)],$$

such that \bar{S}_i is a [random variable](#) that takes values in \mathcal{S}_i with distribution \vec{P}_i , and they are [mutually independent](#). This is further equal to

$$\sum_{j_1 \in \mathcal{S}_1} \sum_{j_2 \in \mathcal{S}_2} \dots \sum_{j_I \in \mathcal{S}_I} P_{1j_1} \times P_{2j_2} \times \dots \times P_{Ij_I} \times u_i(\bar{S}_{1j_1}, \bar{S}_{2j_2}, \dots, \bar{S}_{Ij_I}).$$

⊛

Example (Matching Pennies revisit). Recall the [matching pennies game](#).

		Player 2	
		H	T
Player 1	H	(1, -1)	(-1, 1)
	T	(-1, 1)	(1, -1)

with $P_1 = (\frac{3}{4}, \frac{1}{4})$ and $P_2 = (\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3})$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} u_1(P_1, P_2) &= \frac{3}{4} \times \frac{1}{3} u_1(H, H) + \frac{3}{4} \times \frac{2}{3} u_1(H, T) + \frac{1}{4} \times \frac{1}{3} u_1(T, H) + \frac{1}{4} \times \frac{2}{3} u_1(T, T) \\ &= \frac{3}{12} - \frac{6}{12} - \frac{1}{12} + \frac{2}{12} \\ &= -\frac{1}{6}. \end{aligned}$$

Also, $u_2(P_1, P_2)$ is $\frac{1}{6}$ from the [zero-sum setting](#).

We can now combine the probability set up with the definition of the [best response](#), which gives us

$$\text{BR}_i(\vec{P}_{-i}) = \left\{ \vec{P}_i \in \Delta(\mathcal{S}_i) : u_i(\vec{P}_i, \vec{P}_{-i}) = \max_{\hat{P}_i \in \Delta(\mathcal{S}_i)} u_i(\hat{P}_i, \vec{P}_{-i}) \right\}.$$

Also, for Nash Equilibrium, let P^* be the same probability distribution for all $i \in \mathcal{I}$, then

$$P_i^* \in \text{BR}_i(P_{-i}^*) \Leftrightarrow \forall_{P_i \in \Delta(\mathcal{S}_i)} u_i(P_i^*, P_{-i}^*) \geq u_i(P_i, P_{-i}^*).$$

Theorem 9.3.1 (Nash's existence theorem). Every finite [game](#) (finite number of [actions](#)) has at least one [mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium](#).

Proof. A nice short proof can be found [here](#). It's essentially proved by [Brouwer fixed-point theorem](#). ■

Lecture 20: Mixed strategy

As previously seen (Matching pennies revisit). Recall the [matching pennies game](#). Assume now that [player 2](#) plays $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$. Now, if [player 1](#) plays

- (1, 0): Utility for [player 1](#) is $u_1(H, P_2^*) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot -1 = 0$.
- (0, 1): Utility for [player 1](#) is $u_1(T, P_2^*) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot -1 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 = 0$.

Hence, the [utility](#) of [player 1](#) is just

$$u_1(P_1, P_2^*) = P_1(H)u_1(H, P_2^*) + P_1(T)u_1(T, P_2^*) = 0.$$

Therefore, any [mixed strategy](#) is the [best response](#), so we just use $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ for [player 1](#), and the same is true for [player 2](#). In all, we have

$$P_1^* := \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right), \quad P_2^* := \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)$$

as the [Nash Equilibrium](#).

Problem. What if [player 2](#) was laying $(\frac{2}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$?

Answer. The [best response](#) for [player 1](#) is to always play H . ⊗

Work this out

Problem. The **mixed strategies** are everywhere in real-life. But how can we understand **mixed strategies**?

Answer. We see that

- **Actions** are distributions or beliefs.
- In real life, people do randomize-serving in tennis, bluffing in cards game, openings in chess, etc.
- Variations in the population and lack of knowledge of how the other person will play.

⊛

Example (Football). Let **player 1** be offense-side, and **player 2** be defense-side. They both have two options, one is run (or to defense against run), denotes by R , another is pass (or defense against pass), denotes by P .

		Player 2	
		R	P
Player 1	R	$(0, 0)$	$(5, -5)$
	P	$(10, -10)$	$(0, 0)$

we then see that there is a **Nash Equilibrium** such that player 1 plays $(\frac{2}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$, while player 2 plays $(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3})$.

9.3.3 Principle of Indifference

For **player** i , let $P_i \in \Delta(\mathcal{S}_i)$. Now, let the support of P_i to be the **actions** with strictly positive probability, namely

$$\{s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i: P_i(s_i) > 0\} \subseteq \mathcal{S}_i.$$

Example. For example, let $\{a, b, c\} = \mathcal{S}_i$. Then

- $P_i = (1, 0, 0)$: the support is $\{a\}$
- $P_i = (\frac{1}{6}, \frac{5}{6} - \frac{1}{10^6}, \frac{1}{10^6})$: the support is $\{a, b, c\}$
- $P_i = (0, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$: the support is $\{b, c\}$

Note. In the second case, we call this a **fully mixed**.

Definition 9.3.12 (Fully mixed). A **mixed strategy** is called *fully mixed* if the support of the **strategy** vector is on the entire **actions** set.

Theorem 9.3.2 (Principle of indifference). For a **Nash Equilibrium** P^* , for every **player** i , if

$$\forall s_i^j, s_i^k \in \text{support}(P_i^*),$$

we have

$$u_i(s_i^j, P_{-i}^*) = u_i(s_i^k, P_{-i}^*) = u_i(P_i^*, P_{-i}^*).$$

Proof. Let $s_i^j, s_i^k \in \text{support}(P_i^*)$. Then $P_i^*(s_i^j) > 0$ and $P_i^*(s_i^k) > 0$. Now, denotes γ as $\gamma =$

$\min \left(P_i^*(s_i^j), P_i^*(s_i^k) \right) > 0$, and let $\epsilon := [-\gamma, \gamma]$. We can then construct a new **mixed strategy** \tilde{P}_i^ϵ for **player** i as follows. For s_i^j and s_i^k

$$\tilde{P}_i^\epsilon(s_i^j) = P_i^*(s_i^j) - \epsilon, \quad \tilde{P}_i^\epsilon(s_i^k) = P_i^*(s_i^k) + \epsilon,$$

with $\tilde{P}_i^\epsilon(s_i) = P_i^*(s_i)$ for all $s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i \setminus \{s_i^j, s_i^k\}$, which means that the other **actions** remain the same. Since P^* is a **Nash Equilibrium**, so we have

$$u_i(P_i^*, P_{-i}^*) = \max_{P_i \in \Delta(\mathcal{S}_i)} u_i(P_i, P_{-i}^*) \geq u_i(\tilde{P}_i^\epsilon, P_{-i}^*).$$

Furthermore, the left-hand side is

$$u_i(P_i^*, P_{-i}^*) = P_i^*(s_i^j)u_i(s_i^j, P_{-i}^*) + P_i^*(s_i^k)u_i(s_i^k, P_{-i}^*) + \sum_{s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i \setminus \{s_i^j, s_i^k\}} P_i^*(s_i)u_i(s_i, P_{-i}^*),$$

and the right-hand side is

$$u_i(\tilde{P}_i^\epsilon, P_{-i}^*) = \tilde{P}_i^\epsilon(s_i^j)u_i(s_i^j, P_{-i}^*) + \tilde{P}_i^\epsilon(s_i^k)u_i(s_i^k, P_{-i}^*) + \sum_{s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i \setminus \{s_i^j, s_i^k\}} P_i^*(s_i)u_i(s_i, P_{-i}^*).$$

Then we see that the inequality is

$$P_i^*(s_i^j)u_i(s_i^j, P_{-i}^*) + P_i^*(s_i^k)u_i(s_i^k, P_{-i}^*) \geq \tilde{P}_i^\epsilon(s_i^j)u_i(s_i^j, P_{-i}^*) + \tilde{P}_i^\epsilon(s_i^k)u_i(s_i^k, P_{-i}^*)$$

since the summation part is the same. Rearranging, we have

$$\epsilon u_i(s_i^j, P_{-i}^*) \geq \epsilon u_i(s_i^k, P_{-i}^*).$$

Since $\epsilon \in [-\gamma, \gamma]$, we further have

$$u_i(s_i^j, P_{-i}^*) = u_i(s_i^k, P_{-i}^*) = u.$$

Hence,

$$u_i(P_i^*, P_{-i}^*) = \sum_{s_i \in \text{support}(P_i^*)} P_i^*(s_i) \underbrace{u_i(s_i, P_{-i}^*)}_u = u.$$

The last equality follows since

$$\sum_{s_i \in \text{support}(P_i^*)} P_i^*(s_i) = 1.$$

■

Intuition. In other words, given the **strategies** of the opponents, **player** i is **indifferent** between the **strategies** in the $\text{support}(P_i^*)$ because they yield the same **payoff**.

Now, we show a general method to find all **Nash Equilibrium** in a 2 **players** and 2 **actions game**. Let the **payoff matrix** be like

		Player 2	
		L	R
Player 1	U	$(a_{U,L}, b_{U,L})$	$(a_{U,R}, b_{U,R})$
	D	$(a_{D,L}, b_{D,L})$	$(a_{D,R}, b_{D,R})$

Let

- **Player 1** plays **strategy** $(p, 1 - p)$ with $p \in [0, 1]$.
- **Player 2** plays **strategy** $(q, 1 - q)$ with $q \in [0, 1]$.

We then find all the **best response** of each **player** in a parametric form. Says **player** 1 with $p^*(q)$, while **player** 2 with $q^*(p)$, where they can be a set. We see that

$$p^*(q) = \arg \max_{\tilde{p} \in [0,1]} u_1((\tilde{p}, 1 - \tilde{p}), (q, 1 - q)).$$


Then

$$\begin{aligned} & u_1((\tilde{p}, 1 - \tilde{p}), (q, 1 - q)) \\ &= \tilde{p}(q \cdot a_{U,L} + (1 - q)a_{U,R}) + (1 - \tilde{p})(q \cdot a_{D,L} + (1 - q)a_{D,R}) \\ &= \tilde{p}([q \cdot a_{U,L} + (1 - q)a_{U,R}] - [q \cdot a_{D,L} + (1 - q)a_{D,R}]) + (q \cdot a_{D,L} + (1 - q)a_{D,R}) \end{aligned}$$

Now, denotes C as

$$C := [q \cdot a_{U,L} + (1 - q)a_{U,R}] - [q \cdot a_{D,L} + (1 - q)a_{D,R}],$$

there are three cases for C :



We see that

- $C > 0$: maximizes in $\tilde{p} = 1$
- $C < 0$: maximizes in $\tilde{p} = 0$
- $C = 0$: maximizes in $\tilde{p} = [0, 1]$


Then we denote

$$\arg \max_{\tilde{p} \in [0,1]} u_1((\tilde{p}, 1 - \tilde{p}), (q, 1 - q)) =: p^* := \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } C > 0; \\ 0, & \text{if } C < 0; \\ [0, 1], & \text{if } C = 0 (\text{Indifference}). \end{cases}$$

Use the similar calculations to find $q^*(p)$ using the **best response**. We conclude that

$$(\bar{p}, \bar{q}) \text{ is a Nash Equilibrium} \Leftrightarrow \bar{p} \in p^*(\bar{q}) \wedge \bar{q} \in q^*(\bar{p}),$$


namely they are the **best response** of each other.



Example (Matching pennies revisit). Coming back to the [matching pennies](#) games. We have

$$p^*(q) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } q > \frac{1}{2} \\ [0, 1], & \text{if } q = \frac{1}{2} \\ 0, & \text{if } q < \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}, \quad q^*(p) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } p > \frac{1}{2} \\ [0, 1], & \text{if } p = \frac{1}{2} \\ 0, & \text{if } p < \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}.$$

After plotting, we see that $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ is the only intersection, so it's the only [Nash equilibrium](#).



Example (Football revisit). We also look at the [football game](#) example. We see that for $p^*(q)$, we have

- R : [utility](#) is $q(0) + (1 - q)5 = 5 - 5q$.
- P : [utility](#) is $q(10) + (1 - q)0 = 10q$.

Hence, the difference is $5 - 5q - 10q = 5 - 15q$, so


$$5 - 15q \Rightarrow \begin{cases} \text{Difference} > 0, p^*(q) = 1, & 5 > 15q \Rightarrow q < \frac{1}{3}; \\ \text{Difference} < 0, p^*(q) = 0, & 5 < 15q \Rightarrow q > \frac{1}{3}; \\ \text{Difference} = 0, p^*(q) = [0, 1], & 5 = 15q \Rightarrow q = \frac{1}{3}. \end{cases}$$

As for $q^*(p)$, we have

- R : [utility](#) is $p(0) + (1 - p)(-10) = -10 + 10p$.
- P : [utility](#) is $p(-5) + (1 - p)0 = -5p$.

Hence, the difference is $-10 + 10p - (-5p) = -10 + 15p$, so

$$-10 + 15p \Rightarrow \begin{cases} \text{Difference} > 0, q^*(p) = 1, & -10 + 15p > 0 \Rightarrow p > \frac{2}{3}; \\ \text{Difference} < 0, q^*(p) = 0, & -10 + 15p < 0 \Rightarrow p < \frac{2}{3}; \\ \text{Difference} = 0, q^*(p) = [0, 1], & -10 + 15p = 0 \Rightarrow p = \frac{2}{3}. \end{cases}$$



Example (Market entering). We now look at a new game. Consider the Market entering game. Let the payoff matrix being

		Player 2	
		E	D
Player 1	E	$(-1, -1)$	$(3, 0)$
	D	$(0, 3)$	$(0, 0)$

We immediately see that (E, D) and (D, E) are pure Nash equilibrium. And since we always have odd number of Nash equilibrium, hence there are one more mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. By using the principle of indifference, we see that

$$\begin{cases} u_1(E, \bar{q}) &= \bar{q}(-1) + (1 - \bar{q})3 = 3 - 4\bar{q} \\ u_1(D, \bar{q}) &= \bar{q}(0) + (1 - \bar{q})0 = 0, \end{cases}$$

so we have

$$u_1(E, \bar{q}) = u_1(D, \bar{q})$$

by the principle of indifference. This implies $\bar{p} = \frac{3}{4}$.




Figure 9.1: There are 3 NE.

Lecture 21: Bayesian Game

We first introduce a new notion.

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Definition 9.3.13 (Social welfare). The social welfare is the sum of payoffs among all players.

As previously seen. We look back some games and introduce another measure of Nash equilibrium.

- Coordination game. The payoff matrix is defined as

		Player 2	
		S	H
Player 1	S	(5, 5)	(0, 3)
	H	(3, 0)	(3, 3)

As we can see, there are two **Nash equilibrium** (S, S) and (H, H) with **payoffs** $(5, 5)$ and $(3, 3)$ respectively. If we consider **social welfare**, one will choose to play (S, S) with **social welfare** as 10 rather than 6.

- **Prisoner's dilemma.**

		Player 2	
		NC	C
Player 1	NC	(-1, -1)	(-10, 0)
	C	(0, -10)	(-4, -4)

We see that (C, C) is the only **Nash equilibrium**, but (NC, NC) is the **social welfare** maximization, which is not in the **Nash equilibrium**.

Remark. We say that a **Nash equilibrium** *reaches social welfare* if it's a maximizer of the **social welfare**.


9.3.4 Operating Points


Let $i \in \mathcal{I}$ be the set of **players**, and P_i be the corresponding distribution of **strategy** on **player** i . Then we see the definition of the so-called **operating points**.

Definition 9.3.14 (Operating point). An *operating point* is a vector of **rewards** of **players** such that we cannot increase the **payoff** of one **agent** without decreasing the **payoff** of at least one other **agent**.

Let P denotes the set of operating points. From here, we have the following criteria for **Pareto Optimal**.

Definition 9.3.15 (Pareto optimal). A solution is called *Pareto optimal* if no individual or preference criterion can be better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion worse off or without any loss thereof.





Note. For either **social welfare** maximizing or **Pareto operating point**,

- **Nash equilibrium** needs not achieve either goal.
- **Social welfare** maximizing points are always **Pareto optimal**.

Remark. We can (re)design **games** such that some nice objective is additive, then **social welfare** maximization can be achieved, i.e., the goal is that any **Nash equilibrium** should maximize **social welfare**.

Until this point, we only study the **games** have complete and symmetric information, i.e., **common knowledge assumption**. Now, we can look at some more complicated cases such that we have an incomplete and/or asymmetric information setting.

9.4 Bayesian Game

We now introduce a new type of **game** called **Bayesian game**.

Definition 9.4.1 (Bayesian game). A *Bayesian game* is an asymmetric/incomplete **games**.

Intuition. Since we need to use **Bayesian Theorem** to analysis **Bayesian games**, so it gets its name.

Example (Auction). A typical example of a **Bayesian game** is **auctions**, which we'll study in depth later.

An important difference is that in **Bayesian games**, **nation** is also a **player**. Further, randomness decides the state of everyone and people may know their state but not of the others.

Note. Randomness here is different from **mixed strategies**. This happens **at the beginning**.

9.4.1 Basic Setup

We now try to mathematically model a **Bayesian game**.

Definition 9.4.2 (Mathematical Bayesian game). Let \mathcal{I} denotes the set of **players**, and $I = |\mathcal{I}|$. Let each **player** i has a **type** defined as follows.

Definition 9.4.3 (Type). The *type* of a **player** i , denoted as $\tau_i \in T_i$, is chosen with distribution π_i such that

$$\mathbb{P}(\tau_i = t_i) = \pi_i(t_i).$$

And also, we have the set of **actions** \mathcal{S}_i , and the set of feasible **actions**

$$c_i(t_i) \in \mathcal{S}_i.$$

Furthermore, the **utility** of **player** i is

$$u_i(t_1, s_1, t_2, s_2, \dots, t_I, s_I),$$

where we need **types** and **actions** of all **players** to determine this. Also, we have

$$\vec{t} := (t_1, \dots, t_I), \quad \vec{s} := (s_1, \dots, s_I),$$

with the common notation for $-i$, namely


$$\vec{t}_{-i} := (t_1, \dots, t_{i-1}, t_{i+1}, \dots, t_I), \quad \vec{s}_{-i} := (s_1, \dots, s_{i-1}, s_{i+1}, \dots, s_I).$$

We see that **player** i has to choose a **strategy** $\sigma_i: T_i \rightarrow \mathcal{S}_i$ such that

$$\forall t_i \in T_i, \text{ choose } \sigma_i(t_i) \in c_i(t_i) \subseteq \mathcal{S}_i.$$

Intuition. We are simply picking functions as **strategies**.

Example. Let $T_i = \mathbb{R}_+ = [0, +\infty)$ be non-negative real number. Let $\sigma_i(t_i) = \min(100, t_i)$ and $\mathcal{S}_i = \mathbb{R}_+$.



Then we can have so-called **independent types model**.

Definition 9.4.4 (Independent types model). An *independent types model* is a **Bayesian game** such that the **types** $\tau_i, i = 1, \dots, I$ are a set of **mutually independent variables**.

Remark. For an **independent types model**, we have

$$\mathbb{P}(\tau_1 = t_1, \dots, \tau_I = t_I) = \prod_{i=1}^I \pi_i(t_i).$$

We see that we can express all **games** we have previously seen like follows. Let $T_i = \{i\}$, and $c_i(i) = \mathcal{S}_i$ with **type** being $\pi_i(i) = 1$ such that

$$u_i(1, s_1, 2, s_2, \dots, I, s_I) = u_i(s_1, s_2, \dots, s_I).$$

Now we define the notions of incomplete information.

Definition 9.4.5 (Ex-ante). No **player** has information about anyone's **types** but only the distribution information where **strategy** is chosen. Since we don't know the exact **payoffs**, hence we simply take

the expected value for the **payoffs** based on the **strategy** functions:

$$u_i(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_I) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau_1, \dots, \tau_I} [u_i(\tau_1, \sigma_1(\tau_1), \dots, \tau_I, \sigma_I(\tau_I))].$$

Then the **Nash equilibrium** is $(\sigma_1^*, \dots, \sigma_I^*)$ such that

$$\forall_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \forall_{\sigma_i} u_i(\sigma_i^*, \sigma_{-i}^*) \geq u_i(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i}^*).$$

This kind of information mechanism is called *ex-ante*.

Note. The **ex-ante** information mechanism can be summarized as follows.

1. Given **player** i, \dots, I .
2. $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_I$ are chosen: Each **player** picks **strategy** σ_i .
3. τ_1, \dots, τ_I are realized: Nation chooses **types** for each **player**.
4. $\forall_i s_i = \sigma_i(\tau_i)$ is chosen: **Actions** produced, and the **game** is realized.
5. $u_i(\tau_1, s_1, \dots, \tau_I, s_I)$, namely the **payoff** is received.

Definition 9.4.6 (Interim). Players get to know their **types** since Nation play first, and they can reason based on that. So we see that **player** i knows τ_i but not τ_{-i} . Then $u_i(t_i, \sigma_i(t_i), \sigma_{-i})$ can be described as

$$\mathbb{E}_{\tau_{-i}} \left[u_i(\underline{t_i, \sigma_i(t_i)}, \tau_1, \sigma_1(\tau_1), \dots, \tau_{i-1}, \sigma_{i-1}(\tau_{i-1}), \right. \\ \left. \tau_{i+1}, \sigma_{i+1}(\tau_{i+1}), \dots, \tau_I, \sigma_I(\tau_I)) \right].$$

This kind of information mechanism is called *interim*.

Note. The **interim** information mechanism can be summarized as follows.

1. Given **player** i, \dots, I .
2. τ_1, \dots, τ_I are realized: Nation chooses **types** for each **player**.
3. $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_I$ are chosen: Each **player** picks **strategy** σ_i .
4. $\forall_i s_i = \sigma_i(\tau_i)$ is chosen: **Actions** produced, and the **game** is realized.
5. $u_i(\tau_1, s_1, \dots, \tau_I, s_I)$, namely the **payoff** is received.

Remark. Think about the **best response**. Suppose σ_{-i} is fixed. Then for all $s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i$, $u_i(t_i, s_i, \sigma_{-i})$ is defined.

$$\arg \max_{s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i} u_i(t_i, s_i, \sigma_{-i})$$

for every t_i , $\text{BR}_i(\sigma_{-i}) = \bar{\sigma}_i(\sigma_{-i})$. Then we call that $(\sigma_1^*, \dots, \sigma_I^*)$ is a **Bayes interim Nash equilibrium** if

$$\forall_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sigma_i^* \in \bar{\sigma}_i(\sigma_{-i}^*).$$

Definition 9.4.7 (Ex-post). Every **player** gets to know everyone's **type**.

$$u_i(t_1, \sigma_1(t_1), \dots, t_I, \sigma_I(t_I)).$$

This kind of information mechanism is called *ex-post*.

We will focus on **Interim** setting and study **auctions**, which model mechanism well.

Chapter 10

Auctions

Lecture 22: Auctions

We now introduce a specific kind of [game](#), auction. Rather than the simple set up we have seen, the auction is more complex and interesting. We'll see how can we extend what we have discussed in [game theory](#) into this set up. Firstly, we see some examples.

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Example (Auctions). There are mainly four types of auction:

1. First-price auction (Sealed bid): Each [player](#) bids an amount for the item (how much the [player](#) is willing to pay), and the sellers selects the highest bidder and charges him the price that was bid by him and give the item. Others pay nothing, receive nothing.
2. Dutch auction (Descending price auction): Seller announces a price (high price). If no [players](#) raise hands, seller drops price until the first time some [players](#) have their hand up. Item sold to the [player](#) at that price.
3. Second-price auction (Sealed bid):
 - (a) Sort the bids from the highest
 - (b) Find the highest bidder
 - (c) Give the good to this bidder but charge him/her the second-highest bid.
4. English auction (Ascending price auction):
 - (a) Start from price 0
 - (b) Keeping increasing price until only one left
 - (c) Sell the good to the person remaining and at the price at which everyone else drops out.

Remark. The first two auctions basically implement the same result.

Note (Tie breaking). Some form of auctions may encounter tie issues. Some common way to do ties breaking are

- Random order.
- Choose some fixed order (specified earlier).

Example (Second-price auction). For example, we have

	A	B	C	D
b_i	10	2	3	7

After sorted:

	A	D	C	B
b_i	10	7	3	2

We then sell the good to A with price 7.

Example (English auction). For example, we start with 0, and everyone wants the good. Then we slightly increase the price, until:

1. Price is 2 or $(2 + \epsilon)$: A, D and C want the good, B drops out.
2. Price is 3 or $(3 + \epsilon)$: A and D want the good, C drops out too.
3. Price is 7 or $(7 + \epsilon)$: A want the good, D drops out too.

Then A gets the good with price being 7.

We relate auctions with **game** as we discussed before. Given the **types** for **player** $i \in \mathcal{I}$ being **i.i.d.** such that

$$t_1, t_2, \dots, t_I,$$

and also for the valuations such that

$$v_1, v_2, \dots, v_I.$$

Note. We see that

- For simplicity, without specifying, we assume they are distributed in

$$\text{uniform}([0, 1]).$$

- The valuation v_i is taken as the satisfaction in dollar amount from buying the good.

Then, the **utility** function is determined based on specific forms of auction.

10.1 Order Statistics

For all kinds of auctions we mentioned, we see that to analyze auctions, it'll involve some kind of order of bidding. In the content of auctions, we often refer this as *order statistics*.

Let X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n be **i.i.d.** and non-negative, continuous valued **random variables**. Let $F_X(\cdot)$ be the CDF, and $f_X(\cdot)$ be the probability density function.

Example. Consider

1. $X = \text{uniform}([0, 1])$:

$$F_X(x) = \begin{cases} x, & \text{if } x \in [0, 1]; \\ \min(x, 1) & \text{if } x > 1, \end{cases}$$

with

$$f_X(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x \in [0, 1]; \\ 0, & \text{if } x > 1. \end{cases}$$

2. $\text{Exp}(\lambda)$:

$$F_X(x) = 1 - e^{-\lambda x}, \quad x \geq 0,$$

with

$$f_X(x) = \lambda e^{-\lambda x}, \quad x \geq 0.$$

The idea is simple, we first sort x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n in decreasing order and denotes

$$y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n$$

such that

$$\begin{aligned} y_1 &= \max\{x_1, \dots, x_n\} \\ y_2 &= \max\{x_1, \dots, x_n\} \setminus \{y_1\} \\ y_3 &= \max\{x_1, \dots, x_n\} \setminus \{y_2, y_3\} \\ &\vdots \end{aligned}$$

Then we have

$$\max\{x_1, \dots, x_n\} = y_1 \geq y_2 \geq \dots \geq y_n = \min\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}.$$

Now, we want to find out $\mathbb{E}[Y_1]$, which is just

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1] = \int_0^\infty y f_{Y_1}(y) dy$$

where f_{Y_1} is the probability density function of Y_1 . Since $f_{Y_1}(y) = \frac{d}{dy}(F_{Y_1}(y))$, where

$$\begin{aligned} F_{Y_1}(y) &= \mathbb{P}(Y_1 \leq y) = \mathbb{P}(\max\{X_1, \dots, X_n\} \leq y) \\ &= \mathbb{P}(X_1 \leq y, X_2 \leq y, \dots, X_n \leq y) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^n \mathbb{P}(X_i \leq y) = \prod_{i=1}^n F_{X_i}(y) = (F_X(y))^n, \end{aligned}$$

where we have used the properties of the [i.i.d. assumption](#).

Further, since we now know

$$f_{Y_1}(y) = \frac{d}{dy}((F_X(y))^n) = n(F_X(y))^{n-1} \frac{d}{dy}F_X(y) = n(F_X(y))^{n-1} f_X(y),$$

we have

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1] = \int_0^\infty ny(F_X(y))^{n-1} f_X(y) dy.$$

Example. Let $F_X(\cdot) \sim \text{uniform}([0, 1])$. Then

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1] = \int_0^1 nyy^{n-1} dy = n \int_0^1 y^n dy = \frac{ny^{n+1}}{n+1} \Big|_0^1 = \frac{n}{n+1}.$$

Hence, $\mathbb{E}[X_1] = \frac{1}{2}$.

Remark. The expected value of the k^{th} element is exactly

$$\frac{k}{n+1}$$

as one can check.

10.2 Second-Price Auction

We first analyze **second-price auction**, since it's easier to analyze. Recall the **interim** setting, namely each **agent** know its valuation but only the distribution of the valuation of others. Now, let

$$\sigma_i: [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1] \quad v_i \mapsto \sigma_i(v_i)$$

where σ_i is just the **strategy** of bidding. Then the **utility** is

$$\mathbb{E}_{-i} \left[u_i \left(\underbrace{v_i, \sigma_i(v_i)}_{\text{known for } i}, \underbrace{v_{-i}, \sigma_{-i}(v_{-i})}_{\text{random}} \right) \right].$$

The goal is to choose $\sigma_i(\cdot)$ such that expected **utility** is maximized for each v_i assuming σ_{-i} is fixed. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(v_i, \sigma_i(v_i), v_{-i}, \sigma_{-i}(v_{-i})) &= \left(v_i - \max_{j \in I \setminus \{i\}} \sigma_j(v_j) \right) \mathbb{1}_{\{i \text{ wins the auction}\}} \\ &= \left(v_i - \max_{j \in -i} \sigma_j(v_j) \right) \mathbb{1}_{\{\sigma_i(v_i) \geq \sigma_j(v_j) \forall j \in -i\}}. \end{aligned}$$

We now aim to maximize

$$\mathbb{E}_{-i} [u_i(v_i, \sigma_i(v_i), v_{-i}, \sigma_{-i}(v_{-i}))].$$

10.2.1 Reason of Response

We need to reason how **agents** will bid strategically.

- If $b_i = \sigma_i(v_i) > v_i$.
 - (a) $b_i < \tilde{P}_i = \max_{j \in -i} \sigma_j(v_j) = b_j$, then we see that $\max(b_i, \tilde{P}_i) = \tilde{P}_i$, so i never wins the auction. Continue to do so even if he reduces bid to v_i .
 - (b) $b_i = \tilde{P}_i$, then i can win the auction. Since $v_i - \tilde{P}_i < 0$, and the second-highest bid is \tilde{P}_i . So He better to bid v_i and lost the auction.
 - (c) $b_i > \tilde{P}_i$, then i definitely wins the auction.
 - $v_i < \tilde{P}_i$: **utility** is $v_i - \tilde{P}_i < 0$, not a viable option.
 - $v_i \geq \tilde{P}_i$: **utility** is $v_i - \tilde{P}_i \geq 0$, but same result would also hold if b_i is exactly v_i .
- If $b_i = \sigma_i(v_i) < v_i$.
 - (a) $\tilde{P}_i \leq b_i < v_i$. **Agent** i wins with **utility** being $v_i - \tilde{P}_i \geq 0$ and no lose in increasing bid to v_i .
 - (b) $b_i < v_i \leq \tilde{P}_i$. Don't win the auction. No lose in increasing bid to v_i .
 - (c) $b_i \leq \tilde{P}_i \leq v_i$. Lose the auction. However, bidding v_i the **agent** could have won the auction and gotten non-negative **utility**.

Remark (Incentive compatible). Bidding v_i is a (**weakly**) **dominant strategy** for **agent** i . This further implies that for **second-price auction**, **agents** bid their true value. This is essentially *incentive compatibility*, or *truth-telling desirable*.

Remark. We see that **second-price auction** is truth-telling in **dominant strategies**. Hence, irrespective of how the other players bid, truthfully bidding is optimal, namely

$$\sigma_i(v_i) = v_i.$$

10.2.2 Revenue of the Auctioneer

Given v_1, v_2, \dots, v_I , defined \tilde{v}_i as before, namely

$$\max\{v_1, \dots, v_I\} = \tilde{v}_I \geq \tilde{v}_{I-1} \geq \dots \geq \tilde{v}_1 = \min\{v_1, \dots, v_I\}.$$

And since it's a **second-price auction**, so the revenue is \tilde{v}_{I-1} .

Note. The expected revenue of \tilde{v}_{I-1} is

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{v}_{I-1}] = \frac{I-1}{I+1}$$

if we assume uniform valuation.

Hence, we see that the winner gets $\tilde{v}_I - \tilde{v}_{I-1}$, and the expected **utility** is

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{v}_I] - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{v}_{I-1}].$$

In the uniform case, the above further equals to

$$\frac{I}{I+1} - \frac{I-1}{I+1} = \frac{1}{I+1}.$$

With winner and auctioneer together, their **utility** is

$$\tilde{v}_I - \tilde{v}_{I-1} + \tilde{v}_{I-1} = \tilde{v}_I.$$

Remark. We see that the good always goes to the highest valuation.

Sums of **utilities** of all players in auctioneer is **social welfare** - max value possible of \tilde{v}_I .

Remark. **second-price auction** is **social welfare** maximizing.

Now, if **agent** i bids v_i and wins, then he gets

$$v_i = \max_{j \in -i} v_j \geq 0,$$

and if lose then get 0. Hence, the expected **utility** y is always non-negative if you attend the auction, while staying out will get you 0, hence we see that it's better to participate in the auction.

Remark (Voluntary participation). This phenomenon is called *voluntary participation*, or *individual rationality*.

And since the probability of winning is $\frac{1}{I}$, hence the expected **utility** is

$$\frac{1}{I} \times \frac{1}{I+1} = \frac{1}{I(I+1)}$$

for every **agent**.

Note. Even if we are using **ex-post** setting, it's still optimal to bid truthfully in a **second-price auction**.

10.3 First-Price Auction

We'll see that the **first price auction** is not as **simple**. There are no **dominant strategy equilibrium**, only so-called **Bayes-Nash equilibrium** in **interim**.

Consider $I = 2$, and v_i choose $b_i = \sigma_i(v_i)$. The **utility** is

$$u_i(v_i, b_i, v_{-i}, b_{-i}) = \left(v_i - \max_{j \in \mathcal{I}} b_j \right) \mathbb{1}_{\{i \text{ is the winner}\}} = (v_i - b_i) \mathbb{1}_{\{b_i \geq b_{-i}\}}$$

If $I > 2$, then the **utility** is now

$$(v_i - b_i) \mathbb{1}_{\{\sigma_i(v_i) \geq \sigma_j(v_j) \forall j \in -i\}} = (v_i - b_i) \prod_{j \in -i} \mathbb{1}_{\{\sigma_i(v_i) \geq \sigma_j(v_j)\}}$$

Then, since we're in the **interim** setup, the expected value of the **utility** is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{-i} [u_i(v_i, \sigma_i(v_i), v_{-i}, \sigma_{-i}(v_{-i}))] &= \mathbb{E}_{-i} \left[(v_i - \sigma_i(v_i)) \prod_{j \in -i} \mathbb{1}_{\{\sigma_i(v_i) \geq \sigma_j(v_j)\}} \right] \\ &= (v_i - \sigma_i(v_i)) \prod_{j \in -i} \mathbb{P}(\sigma_j(v_j) \leq \sigma_i(v_i)), \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality comes from **independence**.

Note. There are two facts to note.

- Identical valuation implies $\sigma_i \equiv \sigma$ for all $i \in \mathcal{I}$. Same bidding function so it's symmetric.
- $\sigma(\cdot)$ is monotonically increasing. Then

$$\mathbb{P}(\sigma_j(v_j) \leq \sigma_i(v_i)) = \mathbb{P}(\sigma(v_i) \leq \sigma(v_i)) = \mathbb{P}(v_j \leq v_i) = F(v_i) = v_i,$$

where F is the CDF, and the last equality comes from the fact that we assume the valuation is uniform($[0, 1]$).

This is a fairly reasonable assumption, since it'll rule out the situations like if two buyers' true value are different, but they somehow decide to bid the same value.

With the second fact of the note above, the expected **utility** is

$$(v_i - \sigma(v_i)) F^{I-1}(v_i).$$

If we assume that this is uniform valuation, then above further equals to

$$(v_i - \sigma(v_i)) v_i^{I-1}.$$

Lecture 23: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Now we look at the expected **utility** of **agent** i over other **agents'** valuation and bids. From the monotonically increasing property of $\sigma(\cdot)$, the expected **utility** of i is

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$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{-i} [u_i(v_i, \sigma_i(v_i), v_{-i}, \sigma_{-i}(v_{-i}))] &= \mathbb{E}_{-i} \left[(v_i - \sigma_i(v_i)) \prod_{j \in -i} \mathbb{1}_{\{\sigma_i(v_i) \geq \sigma_j(v_j)\}} \right] \\ &= (v_i - \sigma_i(v_i)) \prod_{j \in -i} \mathbb{P}(\sigma_j(v_j) \leq \sigma_i(v_i)) \\ &= (v_i - \sigma_i(v_i)) \prod_{j \in -i} \mathbb{P}(v_j \leq v_i) \\ &= (v_i - \sigma_i(v_i)) F^{I-1}(v_i) \\ &= (v_i - \sigma_i(v_i)) v_i^{I-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Now the question is how should an **agent** bid? Namely, how to find $\sigma_i(\cdot)$?

10.3.1 Reason of Response

To reason about the bidding strategy, we first see an important principle.

Theorem 10.3.1 (Revelation Principle). Let σ be the **equilibrium** bidding function. Then any deviation can be decomposed into two steps:

- (a) $v_i \rightarrow v$: Map value to same **false** value.
- (b) Apply σ to the **false** value, so that the bid is $\sigma(v)$.

Intuition. Theorem 10.3.1 simply tells us that we don't need to perturb σ itself to analyze incentive of deviation, we can simply perturb v to achieve the same result.

Remark (Equilibrium bidding). The **equilibrium bidding** is

- Step 1: $v_i \rightarrow v_i$: identical mapping.
- Step 2: The same, so bid is $\sigma(v_i)$.

Assume a deviation of $v_i \rightarrow v$ and the bid is $\sigma(v)$. Then the **utility** becomes

$$\begin{aligned} u_i &= (v_i - \sigma(v)) \mathbb{P}(\text{Winning with bid } \sigma(v)) \\ &= (v_i - \sigma(v)) \prod_{j \in -i} \mathbb{P}(\sigma(v_j) \leq \sigma(v)) \\ &= (v_i - \sigma(v)) F^{I-1}(v) \\ &= (v_i - \sigma(v)) v^{I-1} \\ &=: f_\sigma(v; v_i). \end{aligned}$$

Then the **best response** calculation for i is as follows. Given a σ , maximize **utility** by properly choosing v for each v_i . We simply differentiate the function and set the value be zero

$$\frac{d}{dv} f_\sigma(v; v_i) = v_i(I-1)v^{I-2} - (I-1)v^{I-2}\sigma(v) - \sigma^1(v)v^{I-1} := 0$$

for the **first order condition**. It's equivalent to solve the following O.D.E.:

$$v_i(I-1)v^{I-2} = \frac{d}{dv}(\sigma(v)v^{I-1}).$$

We see that $\sigma(v) \leq v_i$ is needed as you never bid higher than your valuation in a **first-price auction**.

For the **equilibrium bidding** $v_i \rightarrow v_i$, the maximizer should be v_i itself. For the **equilibrium bidding** function σ^* ,

$$\left. \frac{d}{dv} f_{\sigma^*}(v; v_i) \right|_{v=v_i} = 0.$$

Expand it out, we have

$$\frac{d}{dv} f_{\sigma^*}(v; v_i) = v_i(I-1)v^{I-2} - \left((I-1)v^{I-2}\sigma^*(v) + \frac{d\sigma^*(v)}{dv}v^{I-1} \right).$$

By setting $v = v_i$, we should get zero!

$$(I-1)v_i^{I-1} = (I-1)v_i^{I-2}\sigma^*(v_i) + \left. \frac{d\sigma^*(v)}{dv} \right|_{v=v_i} v_i^{I-1}.$$

This equation has to hold for every v_i in $[0, 1]$.

Now, for a \bar{v} , $\sigma^*(\bar{v})$ should be

$$(I-1)v_i^{I-1} = \frac{d}{dv_i} (v_i^{I-1}\sigma^*(v_i)).$$

Integrate on both sides, we have

$$\int_0^{\bar{v}} (I-1)v_i^{I-1} dv_i = v_i^{I-1}\sigma^*(v_i) \Big|_0^{\bar{v}}.$$

Solve for the left-hand side, we have

$$\frac{I-1}{I} \bar{v}^I = \bar{v}^{I-1} \sigma^*(\bar{v}).$$

Hence,

$$\sigma^*(\bar{v}) = \frac{I-1}{I} \bar{v} = (1 - \frac{1}{I}) \bar{v},$$

which means that **agent** bids $\frac{I-1}{I}$ times the value who estimate!

Note. We see that

- **Agents** will shade their bid, hence it's not truthful.
- The good goes to the **agent** with the highest valuation, hence it's a **social-welfare** maximizer.

Remark. If an **agent** whose valuation is zero, then from the function, we see that he would bid zero, hence the **utility** is zero as well.

10.3.2 Revenue of the Auctioneer

The expected revenue for the auctioneer is equal to

$$\frac{I-1}{I} \mathbb{E}[\tilde{v}_I] = \frac{I-1}{I} \frac{I}{I+1} = \frac{I-1}{I+1}.$$

Note. Recall that the expected revenue for **second-price auction** for the auctioneer is also

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{v}_{I-2}] = \frac{I-1}{I+1}.$$

We see that both auctions give the same expected revenue.

Remark (Revenue equivalence). If two auctions implement the same outcome in **Bayesian Nash equilibrium**, and **agents** with value 0 will bid 0, then the expected revenue will be the same. This is so-called *revenue equivalence*. And this equivalence relation holds for more general kinds of auctions, namely under some conditions of auctions, the revenue for auctioneer is always the same. We'll come back to this relation soon.

10.4 Mechanism Design of Auctions

After seeing two kinds of auctions, we now try to give a general framework of auctions and try to design a mechanism of such **games**. Assume that the auctioneer doesn't know values of **agents**.

Problem. How the auction will be conducted?

Answer. Given b_1, \dots, b_I , we need to answer the following two questions:

- Who wins the auction?
- What that person pays?

The mechanism design of auctions can be thought as answering these two questions.

Example (All-pay auction). We first see an example called *all-pay auction*. For bids b_1, \dots, b_I ,

- The highest bidder wins.
- Everyone pays their bid.

⊗

For a general auction, the bids are just messages. Auctioneer is specifying two things.

- Allocation rule: (x_1, \dots, x_I) , where x_i is the amount of good goes to **agent** i .
- Payment rule: (p_1, \dots, p_I) , where p_i to be paid by **agent** i .

This suggests the following definition.

Definition 10.4.1 (Direct mechanism). In the specification, if the messages are in the same space as values, then we call such a mechanism as a *direct mechanism*.

Remark. From **revelation principle**, **direct mechanisms** are sufficient. Since bids are messages, which can be anything, hence it suffices to consider messages to be in the same space as the values.

Hence, we assume that the message space is the same as value space, namely we are designing a **direct mechanism**. For every message vector, specifies the allocation rule and the payment rule. Furthermore, we let

$$\text{utility} = \text{Value} - \text{Payment},$$

which turns out to be so-called **quasilinear utility**.

Note. There are things that a mechanism designer may want.

- **Incentive compatible** (IC).
- **Individual rationality** (IR).

Also, a mechanism designer may have a goal in mind.

- **Social welfare** maximization (Efficiency).
- Revenue maximization.
- Budget-Balance: Payments should sum to 0.

Remark. All can't be met simultaneously.

Assume every **agent** i values v_1, \dots, v_I , and bids b_1, \dots, b_I respectively. With the specification being

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Allocations} &: x_1, \dots, x_I; \\ \text{Payments} &: p_1, \dots, p_I, \end{aligned}$$

where all are functions of b_i . Then the **utility** is

$$u_i(v_i, n_i(\vec{v})) - p_i(\vec{v}).$$

With **interim** setup, we average across all other **agents**. Now, assume that $x_i(\vec{v}) \in \{0, 1\}$ and will allow multiple **agents** to get

$$x_i(\vec{v}) = 1.$$

If $x_i(\vec{v}) = 1$, then **utility** is v_i , else 0. We then see that

$$u_i(v_i, x_i(\vec{v})) = v_i x_i(\vec{v}) - p_i(\vec{v}).$$

Then the expected value is

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}_{-i}[u_i(v_i, x_i(\vec{v}))] &= v_i \mathbb{E}_{-i}[x_i(\vec{v})] - \mathbb{E}_{-i}[p_i(\vec{v})] \\ &= v_i \mathbb{E}_{-i}[x_i(v_i, v_{-i})] - \mathbb{E}_{-i}[p_i(v_i, v_{-i})] \\ &= v_i \bar{x}_i(v_i) - \bar{p}_i(v_i).\end{aligned}$$

Now we see a theorem.

Theorem 10.4.1 (Bayesian Nash equilibrium characterization). When the types are drawn from a continuous joint distribution \vec{F} with independent types, strategies

$$\vec{\sigma}^* = (\sigma_1^*, \sigma_2^*, \dots, \sigma_I^*) \quad (b_i = \sigma_i^*(v_i))$$

are in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if

- Monotonicity. $\bar{x}_i(v_i)$ is monotonically non-decreasing.
- Payment identity.

$$\bar{p}_i(v_i) = v_i \bar{x}_i(v_i) - \int_0^{v_i} \bar{x}_i(z) dz + \bar{p}_i(0),$$

where often $\bar{p}_i(0) = 0$.

If the strategy profile is onto, the converse is true as well.

Lecture 24: Matching Market

10.5 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

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As previously seen. For a valuation \vec{v} , the bid $\sigma^*(\vec{v})$ is in the same space as \vec{v} by revelation principle. With allocation being specified as

$$\vec{x}_i(v_i)$$

which is monotonically increasing, and the payment being specified as

$$\bar{p}_i(v_i) = v_i \bar{x}_i(v_i) - \int_0^{v_i} \bar{x}_i(z) dz + \bar{p}_i(0),$$

then we can analyze a general auction with Theorem 10.4.1.

10.5.1 Revenue Equivalence

We start with the expected revenue. The expected revenue is

$$\mathbb{E}_v \left[\sum_i \bar{p}_i(v_i) \right] = \mathbb{E}_v [F(\vec{v})] + \sum_{i=1}^I \bar{p}_i(0).$$

(a) If two mechanisms have the same allocation rule in equilibrium, then

- $\bar{x}_i(v_i)$ will be the same
- $\bar{p}_i(v_i)$ will be the same except for the $\bar{p}_i(0)$ term.

(b) If agent with valuation zero, pay zero, then

$$\bar{p}_i(0) = 0$$

in both mechanisms. This implies that the revenue will be the same.

Note. Similar characterization holds for [dominant strategy equilibrium](#) but those [ex-post](#).

- Allocation rule property.
- Payment rule property.

If we now assume [independence](#) and identical valuation setting, together with the valuation being uniform($[0, 1]$). Then the [second-price auction](#) and [first-price auction](#) are [revenue equivalent](#).

By symmetry, the payment rules will be identical in each auction, hence the revenue is

$$I \times \text{payment rule for each agent.}$$

- For the [second price auction](#) (SP),

$$\bar{p}_1^{\text{SP}}(v_1) = \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\max_{j \in -1} v_j \right) \mathbb{1}_{\{\max_{j \in -1} v_j \leq v_1\}} \right].$$

Denote $\tilde{p}_1 = \max_{j \in -1} v_j$, then

$$F_{\tilde{p}_1^{\text{SP}}}(x) = \mathbb{P}(\tilde{p}_1 \leq x) = \mathbb{P}(v_2 \leq x, v_3 \leq x, \dots, v_I \leq x) = x^{I-1},$$

where $x \in [0, 1]$. Then,

$$f_{\tilde{p}^{\text{SP}}}(x) = (I-1)x^{I-2}.$$

We see that

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{p}_1^{\text{SP}} &= \mathbb{E} [\tilde{p}_1 \mathbb{1}_{\{\tilde{p}_1 \leq v_1\}}] = \int_0^{v_1} x f_{\tilde{p}_1}(x) dx \\ &= (I-1) \int_0^{v_1} x \cdot x^{I-2} dx = (I-1) \int_0^{v_1} x^{I-1} dx = \frac{I-1}{I} v_1^I. \end{aligned}$$

- For the [first price auction](#) (FP),

$$\bar{p}_1^{\text{FP}}(v_1) = \sigma^{\text{FP}}(v_1) \mathbb{P}(\text{Agent 1 has the highest value } v_1) = \sigma^{\text{FP}}(v_1) v_1^{I-1},$$

where every other [agent](#)'s value is less or equal to v_1 .

From [revenue equivalence](#),

$$\hat{p}^{\text{SP}}(v_1) = \hat{p}^{\text{FP}}(v_1),$$

which implies

$$\frac{I-1}{I} v_1^I = \sigma^{\text{FP}}(v_1) v_1^{I-1} \Rightarrow \sigma^{\text{FP}} = \frac{I-1}{I} v_1,$$

as we discussed before.

Chapter 11

Matching Market

Beyond the current setup of [auctions](#), we can see a more general setup. Specifically, we introduce so-called **Matching Market**.

Note. The comparison between auctions and matching market is as follows.

- One good to many buyers: Auctions.
- Many goods to many buyers: Matching Market.

11.1 Ads Auctions

We first see an example of matching market in terms of a general form of auction, namely *ad-auctions*. Specifically, consider a particular keyword searching result, the ads related to which may show up in the following order:

- AD1 with r_1
- AD2 with r_2
- AD3 with r_3
- AD4 with r_4
- \vdots

where r_i is so-called the [click-through rate](#) for ad location i . We see that the location of ads matter.

Note. We see that

- [Click-through rate](#) is location dependent. Person needs to click on ad and then buy the product the ad is about.
- Often, $r_i < r_j$ for $i > j$. (i.e., people prefer to click on ads on the top)

We see that there is a [bipartite structure](#). On the one side of the [graph](#) contains buyers, and the other side contains sellers (Ad positions). Now, assuming for each buyer's good i , the cost is b_i . Then the expected revenue to advertiser i is

$$b_i r_j$$

if one purchase the location j . Now, let $v_{ij} := b_i r_j$, where i denotes the buyers, and j denotes the sellers. Then we have the so-called [valuation matrix](#) V defined as follows.

Definition 11.1.1 (Valuation matrix). The *valuation matrix* V is matrix with element V_{ij} being the amount that bidder i values good j .

We see that in our case, i.e., ads-auctions, our **valuation matrix** can be defined as

$$V := \vec{r}^\top \vec{b}.$$

If $V_{ij} \geq 0$ and beyond rank-one imply good allocation here. Note that we allow the sellers to set prices to goods.

Remark. There are different types of prices.

- Posted. Item comes with price.
- Anonymous. The price is the same for any buyers.

Definition 11.1.2 (Balance). The market is called *balance* if the number of sellers and buyers are the same.

Without loss of generality, we assume that the market is **balanced** by letting

$$V \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N},$$

which implies there are a same number (N) of buyers and sellers.

Remark (Balance the market). This can be achieved by adding dummy buyers or sellers.

- Dummy buyers: Value every good as 0.
- Dummy sellers: Valued as 0 for every buyer.

Consider each seller/item coming with a **posted** and **anonymous** price, namely item j has price $p_j \geq 0$.

Problem. How does a buyer i react to this? Assuming i knows his valuation, and each buyer can only purchase one good.

Answer. Suppose the valuation for buyer i is $V_{i1}, V_{i2}, \dots, V_{iN}$, and the prices for each good is p_1, p_2, \dots, p_N . Then it's clear that buyer i will

- only consider item whose valuation exceeds the price,
- focus only on goods whose **payoff** is maximum (valuation – price).

Mathematically, we have

$$\arg \max_{j: V_{ij} \geq p_j} V_{ij} - p_j.$$

For convenience, we define a function $[\cdot]_+$ such that

$$[x]_+ := \max(x, 0) = \begin{cases} x, & \text{if } x \geq 0; \\ 0, & \text{if } x \leq 0. \end{cases}$$

Then the **utility** of buyer i at price vector \vec{p} is

$$u_i = \left[\max_{j \in \{1, \dots, N\}} V_{ij} - p_j \right]_+ = \max_{j \in \{1, \dots, N\}} [V_{ij} - p_j]_+.$$

We then defined so-called **preferred sellers list** $s(i)$ for buyer i as follows.

Definition 11.1.3 (Preferred sellers list). The *preferred sellers list*, denotes as $s(i)$ for buyer i , is defined as

$$s(i) := \begin{cases} \emptyset, & \text{if } \forall j \ V_{ij} < p_j; \\ \arg \max_j (V_{ij} - p_j), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Note that $s(i)$ contains goods that buyer i is interested in.

Remark. If $s(i) \neq \emptyset$, then there is at last one seller that buyer i is interested in.

We then use the preferred sellers lists to construct an undirected bipartite graph between buyers and sellers. *

Example. Let $N = 3$, and

$$V := \begin{pmatrix} 5 & 3 & 4 \\ 3 & 8 & 3 \\ 5 & 4 & 7 \end{pmatrix}, \quad p := \begin{pmatrix} 4 \\ 3 \\ 7 \end{pmatrix},$$

the goal is to fulfill the market as much as possible.

Proof. Then, we have

1. Buyer 1. $V_{11} - p_1 = 1$, $V_{12} - p_2 = 0$, $V_{13} - p_3 = -3$. Hence,

$$s(1) = \{1\}.$$


2. Buyer 2. $V_{21} - p_1 = -1$, $V_{22} - p_2 = 5$, $V_{23} - p_3 = -4$. Hence,

$$s(2) = \{2\}.$$

3. Buyer 3. $V_{31} - p_1 = 1$, $V_{32} - p_2 = 1$, $V_{33} - p_3 = 0$. Hence,

$$s(3) = \{1, 2\}.$$

We see that c is not desired by any buyers at current price.




*

Example. Consider the same valuation matrix V as above while change p into

$$p = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Proof. Then we see that satisfaction is possible.




⊛

Example. Consider the same valuation matrix V as above while change p into

$$p = \begin{pmatrix} 5 \\ 8 \\ 7 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Proof. Then we see that satisfaction is possible as well.



⊛

Remark. We see that the satisfaction match is not always possible.

11.2 Perfect Matching

We now discuss a general matching problem.

Remark. Note that the discussion about ad-auctions is indeed general enough to be considered as a general market matching problem since if we neglect the meaning of V under the content of ads-auctions, instead just interpret V_{ij} as in the original definition, then it's just a general matching problem.

The task is that for any given price and the valuation matrix V , find the preferred sellers bipartite graph and perform matching. Furthermore, we try to maximize the matching in terms of size. In other words, we are trying to satisfy as many buyers as possible. This suggests the following definition.

Definition 11.2.1 (Perfect matching). We call a matching is a *perfect matching* if the size of the maximum matching is N .

To discuss perfect matching, we first defined some notations. Let

$$S \subseteq \{1, \dots, N\}$$

be the subset of sellers, and

$$B \subseteq \{1, \dots, N\}$$

be the subset of buyers. We further denote $N(S)$ be the union of all buyers that like goods in S , and $N(B)$ be the union of preferred sellers of all the buyers in B .

Definition 11.2.2 (Constricted set). Given the definition of $N(S)$, we say S is a *constricted set* if $|S| > |N(S)|$.

Note. Similarly, if $|B| > |N(B)|$ then B is *constricted*.

Theorem 11.2.1 (König-Hall maximize theorem). A bipartite graph has a perfect matching if and only if there are no constricted sets.

Note. This is a necessary and sufficient conditions for a perfect matching to exist given a bipartite graph.

Remark. With naive approach, we need to check every non-empty subset of sellers. Hence, there are $2^N - 1$ checks, but polynomial time checks exists. Hence, We can also find a perfect matching in polynomial time.

Note (Market clearing prices). The prices for which a perfect matching exists are called *market clearing prices*.

Lecture 25: Perfect Matching

We now want to solve the following questions.

08 Dec. 12:30

Problem. Given a bipartite graph, can we check if there is a perfect matching?

Answer. Yes, by Hopcroft-Karp algorithm, which is an asymmetric BFS algorithm. *

Problem (Market clearing prices). Given a market, do the market clearing prices exist? If they do, can we find them?

Answer. Yes. We can find it in polynomial time by Hungarian algorithm. Also, by using VCG principle, we can obtain specific market clearing prices. *

Problem (Social welfare). What's the connection between market clearing prices and social welfare maximizing.

11.3 Hopcroft-Karp Algorithm

To answer the first question, since we already have the powerful Theorem 11.2.1 which characterize the existence of a perfect matching, a simple way to idea is to check whether a constricted set exists or not. But a brute-force approach will require we to check for all subsets of $\{1, 2, \dots, N\}$, which is exponential.

Hence, another simple idea is to find a maximum matching and check whether it's perfect, i.e., whether a maximum matching has size N . Note that we'll have to use Theorem 11.2.1. We first see some definitions which is important to understand the algorithm.

Definition 11.3.1 (Augmenting path). Let M be a bipartite matching in $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V} = L \sqcup R, \mathcal{E})$. Then we say that a simple path P in \mathcal{G} is an *augmenting path* w.r.t. M if it starts at an unmatched vertex in L , ends at an unmatched vertex in R with its edges belong alternately to M and $E - M$.

Note. Definition 11.3.1 s related to, but different from, an augmenting path in a flow network algorithm like Ford-Fulkerson algorithm.

Intuition. To find an augmenting path, we utilize the idea of breadth-first search since it'll build up a level graphs in its nature, and in the case of a bipartite graph, with some checking, we can build up a level graph which the end points of edges alternating between matched and unmatched vertices.

Then, we'll see that in the [algorithm](#) we're going to develop, we'll need to find the shortest [augmenting paths](#), and this is done by using depth-first search.

Algorithm 16: Hopcroft-Karp Algorithm

Data: A [bipartite graph](#) $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V} = L \sqcup R, \mathcal{E})$

Result: A maximum matching M

```

1  $M \leftarrow \emptyset$  // Initialize
2 do
3    $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \{P_i\}_{i=1}^k$  // Maximal set of disjoint shortest augmenting paths w.r.t.  $M$ 
4    $M = M \oplus (\bigcup_{i=1}^k P_i)$  //  $A \oplus B := (A - B) \cup (B - A)$ 
5 while  $\mathcal{P} \neq \emptyset$ 
6 return  $M$ 
  
```

Intuition. We see that

- If there is an [augmenting path](#), we can augment the total size of the matching by 1 by altering this [path](#). Specifically, if an [augmenting path](#) exists, then flip all the labels of the edges, and label the free buyers and sellers to matched. This will increase the size of the matching by 1.
- This is a polynomial time algorithm, since we will only explore every node once.

We now analyze the [Hopcroft-Karp algorithm](#) rigorously. We first prove that the correctness of [Hopcroft-Karp algorithm](#).

11.3.1 Correctness Analysis

We first see an important lemma which characterizes the behavior of [line 3](#) and [line 4](#).

Lemma 11.3.1. If M is a matching and P is an [augmenting path](#) w.r.t. M , then the symmetric difference $M \oplus P$ is a matching and $|M \oplus P| = |M| + 1$. Furthermore, if P_1, P_2, \dots, P_k are [vertex-disjoint augmenting paths](#) w.r.t. M , then the symmetric difference

$$M \oplus (P_1 \cup P_2 \cup \dots \cup P_k)$$

is a matching with cardinality $|M| + k$.

Proof. Suppose M is a matching and P is an [augmenting path](#) w.r.t. M , then P consists of k edges in M and $k + 1$ edges not in M by the [definition^a](#).

This implies that

$$|M \oplus P| = |M| + |P| - 2k = |M| + 2k + 1 - 2k = |M| + 1,$$

since we must remove each edge of M within is in P from both M and P . Now suppose P_1, P_2, \dots, P_k are [vertex-disjoint augmenting paths](#) w.r.t. M . Let k_i be the number of edges in P_i which are in M , so that $|P_i| = 2k_i + 1$. Then we have

$$M \oplus (P_1 \cup P_2 \cup \dots \cup P_k) = |M| + |P_1| + \dots + |P_k| - 2k_1 - 2k_2 - \dots - 2k_k = |M| + k.$$

To see that we in fact get a matching, suppose that there was some vertex v which had at least 2 incident edges e and e' . They cannot both come from M since M is a matching. They cannot both come from P since P is [simple](#) and every other edge of P is removed. Thus, $e \in M$ and $e' \in P \setminus M$. However, if $e \in M$, then $e \in P$, so $e \notin M \oplus P$, a contradiction. A similar argument gives the case of $M \oplus (P_1 \cup \dots \cup P_k)$. ■

^aSpecifically, the first edge of P touches an unmatched vertex in L , so it cannot be in M . Similarly, the last edge in P touches an unmatched vertex in R , so the last edge cannot be in M . Since the edges alternate being in or not in M , there must be exactly one more edge not in M than in M .

We see that [Lemma 11.3.1](#) ensures that M is always a matching, also, M will increase k at each

iteration. We now analyze why whenever there are no **augmenting paths**, i.e., $\mathcal{P} = \emptyset$, M is optimal¹.

Theorem 11.3.1. If a matching M is not optimal, then there exists at least one **augmenting path**.

Proof. Suppose that a matching M is not optimal, and let P be the symmetric difference $M \oplus M^*$ where M^* is an optimal matching. Since M and M^* are both matchings, every vertex has **degree** at most 2 in P . So P must form a collection of disjoint cycles, of **paths** with an equal number of matched and unmatched edges in M of **augmenting paths** for M , and of **augmenting paths** for M^* . But the latter is impossible because M^* is optimal.

Now, the cycles and the **paths** with equal numbers of matched and unmatched vertices do not contribute to the difference in size between M and M^* , so this difference is equal to the number of **augmenting paths** for M in P . Thus, whenever there exists a matching M^* larger than the current matching M , there must also exist an **augmenting path**. ■

Hence, with **Theorem 11.3.1**, we see that **Hopcroft-Karp algorithm** terminate with the desired result. We now want to know its time complexity.

Remark (Finite termination). Before doing a formal time complexity analysis, we note that just from **Lemma 11.3.1** and **Theorem 11.3.1**, we already have finite termination guarantee for **Hopcroft-Karp algorithm**. It's because that A maximum matching M^* is always finite since we only consider a finite **bipartite graph**, and from **Lemma 11.3.1**, at each iteration before termination, we must find at least one **augmenting path** P , and from **Lemma 11.3.1**, the corresponding new matching $M \oplus P$ has cardinality increased at least by 1, hence we see that we're guaranteed for a finite termination.

11.3.2 Time Complexity Analysis

11.3.3 An Alternated Approach

Another way to answer whether a given market has **perfect matching** is as follows. We first define a new label called **exhausted**², which means that for a free buyer node, no **augmenting paths** are found. Then, with the notion of **constricted set**, we state a fundamental theorem about the **only** constraint when constructing a **perfect matching**, without proving it.

Theorem 11.3.2. If there are no exhausted buyer nodes, then we have a **perfect matching**. Otherwise, if there are exhausted buyer nodes, then we can find some **constricted sets**.

Remark. **Theorem 11.3.2** essentially tells us that the only obstacle one will meet when constructing a **perfect matching** is the existence of **constricted set**. Compare to **Theorem 11.2.1**, this is an even stronger result in the sense that it gives us a useful characterization of **constricted set** when we want to actually check the condition given in **Theorem 11.2.1** algorithmically.

Now, we simply run a modified version of **Hopcroft-Karp algorithm** with the special label **exhausted** and utilizing **Theorem 11.3.2**. But it's essentially just the same thing, hence we omit it here.

11.4 Market Clearing Prices

We now come back to **market clearing prices** problem.

Problem. Given **valuation matrix** V and price vector p , is it always the case that a **market clearing price** exists?

Answer. Yes, and we can find it in polynomial time. (**Hungarian algorithm** do it in $O(n^3)$, which is strongly polynomial time) ⊛

Without loss of generality, as assume that $V_1 > V_2 > V_3 \geq \dots \geq V_N$. Then we easily see that if

¹Note that optimal doesn't mean **perfect**, just maximum.

²Note that we only have **matched** or **free** before.

- $p = (V_1, 0, \dots, 0)$, then a **perfect matching** exists.

Note. This is essentially a **first price auction**.

- $p = (V_2, 0, \dots, 0)$, then a **perfect matching** exists as well.

Note. This is essentially a **second price auction**.

Furthermore, if

- $p_1 > V_1$, then no **perfect matching** exists.
- $p_1 < V_2$, then no **perfect matching** exists as well.

We claim that **market clearing prices** always exists, and will follow so-called *Lattice structure*. Says if p^1 and p^2 are both market clearing prices, then

$$\begin{aligned} p^1 \vee p^2 &:= \text{element-wise max} \\ p^1 \wedge p^2 &:= \text{element-wise min} \end{aligned}$$

are also **market clearing prices**, where

- Max **market clearing price** is by taking the maximum in all components.
- Min **market clearing price** is by taking the minimum in all components.

Remark. There is a nice property for **market clearing prices**: It's always **social welfare** maximizing, respect to the **utility** of all buyers and the sum of prices (seller made).

We can actually formulate the above question as a linear programming. Define $x_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ as the part of good j in assigned to buyer i , namely we allow fractional assignment. Then we model the above question as

$$\begin{aligned} V^* &:= \max \sum_{i,j} V_{ij} x_{ij} \\ \sum_j x_{ij} &= 1 \quad \forall i \\ \sum_i x_{ij} &= 1 \quad \forall j \\ x_{ij} &\in [0, 1]. \end{aligned}$$

Intuition. We see that

- The first constraint says that buyer want one good.
- The second constraint says that seller has one good for **type** j .

If we further restrict the fractional assignment property, then we have the integer programming version of above, namely

$$\begin{aligned} V^* &:= \max \sum_{i,j} V_{ij} x_{ij} \\ \sum_j x_{ij} &= 1 \quad \forall i \\ \sum_i x_{ij} &= 1 \quad \forall j \\ x_{ij} &\in \{0, 1\}. \end{aligned}$$

Remark. We see that

- **Perfect matching** is the only possible solution.
- Solving the linear programming leads to an integer solution.
- The **market clearing price** induced by **perfect matching** will achieve V^* in the integer programming, which is **social welfare** maximizing.

11.5 Demange-Gale-Sotomayor Algorithm

Given an **English auction** for multiple goods, with valuations and prices being all in integers, we can run the so-called **Demange-Gale-Sotomayor (DGS) algorithm** and get a set of **market clearing prices**.

Algorithm 17: Demange-Gale-Sotomayor Algorithm

Data: valuation matrix $V_{N \times N}$
Result: A **perfect matching** M , Final price p

```

1 for  $j = 1, \dots, N$  do                                     // Initialize
2    $p_j \leftarrow 0$ 
3
4 do
5    $\mathcal{G} \leftarrow \text{PreferredSellerGraph}(p)$            // Get the preferred sellers bipartite graph
6    $M \leftarrow \text{Hopcroft-Karp}(\mathcal{G})$                      // Get a maximum matching of  $\mathcal{G}$ 
7   if  $|M| = N$  then                                         // If  $M$  is perfect
8     return  $M, p$ 
9   else
10     $N \leftarrow \text{FindConstrictedSet}(\mathcal{G}, M)$            // Find  $B' \subseteq B$  s.t.  $|N(B')| < |B'|$ 
11     $S \leftarrow \text{randSubset}(N)$                            // Pick any  $S \subseteq N(B)$  s.t.  $S \neq \emptyset$ 
12    for  $i = 1, \dots, N$  do
13       $p_i \leftarrow p_i + 1$ 
14 while True

```

Intuition. If there is more demand and less supply, then we increase the price.

Remark (Polynomial time). This algorithm will terminate in finite-time, further, it's actually a polynomial time algorithm since finding a **constricted set** in this case is not exponential anymore with a maximum matching M given, and the fact that **Hopcroft-Karp algorithm** is a polynomial time algorithm, we have the desired result.

If one carefully enough for choosing S , he will always terminate in the minimum **market clearing prices**.

Note. Note that it's easy to extend to the case that the market is not **balance**, since **Hopcroft-Karp algorithm** can deal with **unbalance** market.

11.6 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Principle

Consider a **second price auction**. There is only 1 item to be sold with N buyers with valuation V_1, V_2, \dots, V_N . We further let

$$V_1 > V_2 > V_3 \geq \dots V_N.$$

In this case, we see that **agent** 1 gets the good with price V_2 . We denote the **utility** as $\Delta := V_1 - V_2 > 0$.

Problem. What's the **utility** of other **players**?

Answer. 0. ⊗

We now conduct a thought experiment. If we remove **agent** 1 and replace him with a dummy **agent**, says $\tilde{1}$, then we see that **agent** 2 will get the good with price V_3 . Further, we see that the sum of the values obtained by **agents** other than $\tilde{1}$ is V_2 , since now **agent** 2 gets the good and his valuation is V_2 .

We see that by the appearance of **agent** 1, other **agents** collectively lost V_2 values. We call such collectively lost values as *externality* **agent** 1 imposes.

With this view point to view a second price auction, we see the following principle.

Theorem 11.6.1 (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves principle). Charge a price to an **agent** as the externality **agent** imposes on others.

Example. We see that for

- **Agent** 1 should be charged with price V_2
- **Agent** 2 should be charged with:

In the original auction, the value of all other **agents** are V_1 . Now, replace **agent** 2 by a dummy **agent** $\tilde{2}$, then the value of all **agents** other than $\tilde{2}$ is V_1 . Hence, the difference is

$$\Delta_2 = V_1 - V_1 = 0,$$

namely by **VCG principle**, we charge **agent** 2 with price 0.

To apply **VCG principle** in a matching market problem mathematically, we first denote the total set of sellers as S , and the total set of buyers as B . Recall the definition of V^* , we further specify it by adding the superscript and subscript as

$$V_B^{*,S}$$

for considering S and B in the programming. Then, for $i \in B$, denote $j^*(i)$ as the matched seller respect to i in a perfect matching that maximize social welfare. Now, consider the *reduced problem*, namely calculate

$$V_{B-i}^{*,S-j^*(i)},$$

which stands for the value of everyone else when **agent** i is not present.

Lastly, we consider the alternate problem, where we need to calculate the value that everyone else gets if i is not present, namely we calculate

$$V_{\tilde{B}}^{*,S}$$

where $\tilde{B} := B - i + \emptyset$, where \emptyset stands for a dummy **agent** \tilde{i} .

Combining the reduced problem and the alternate problem, together with the **VCG principle**, we see that the auctioneer should charge buyer i

$$p_i^{\text{VCG}} = V_{\tilde{B}}^{*,S} - V_{B-i}^{*,S-j^*(i)}.$$

We now simply let

$$p_{j^*(i)} = p_i^{\text{VCG}},$$

namely we make the price as **posted price**.

Remark. We finally note that

- It's a **market clearing price**, furthermore, it's actually the minimum **market clearing price**.
- There is a conceptual difference between the **VCG** approach and the **DGS algorithm** approach. One is **posted**, one is not. We see that in **VCG** approach, we determine the prices for each **agent** by their valuation, while this is not the case in **DGS algorithm** approach.

Appendix

This note is completed in \LaTeX with Inkscape, in case of anyone is interested, please check out this blog³ together with my configuration⁴.

³<https://castel.dev/>

⁴<https://github.com/sleepymalc/VSCoDe-LaTeX-Inkscape>

Bibliography

- [EK10] D. Easley and J. Kleinberg. *Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World*. Cambridge University Press, 2010. ISBN: 9781139490306. URL: <https://books.google.com/books?id=atfCl2agdi8C>.