

# The Efficacy of Hiring Credits in Distressed Areas

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The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Board or Banco de México.

# Research Summary

## ► **What we do**

- Estimate the effect of place-based hiring tax credits on employment and unemployment

## ► **How we do it**

- Exploit unique institutional setting in North Carolina
  - Counties assigned different credit amounts based on an economic distress ranking
- Compare counties that received different tax credits
  - Across tiers that determine credit amounts
  - Across distress rank cutoffs that determine tiers

## ► **What we find**

- For a \$9,000 per hire credit:
  - Decreases in unemployment rates of around 0.5 percentage points
  - Increases in employment levels of around 3%

# Effectiveness of Hiring Tax Credits

- ▶ Demand side intervention
- ▶ Effectiveness may vary across areas and over the economic cycle
  - ▶ Limited effectiveness in average times and areas: Bartik (2001), Neumark and Grijalva (2015)
  - ▶ More effective during recessions under rigid wages: Neumark (2013)
  - ▶ More effective in permanently depressed areas: Kline and Moretti (2013), Amior and Manning (2015)
- ▶ Place-based policy: May only induce labor reallocation
- ▶ May result in wastage / churning

# Difficulties in Evaluating Hiring Tax Credits

- ▶ Program assignment endogenous by design: Credits given to distressed areas
- ▶ Mean reversion may bias estimates (Ashenfelter's Dip)
- ▶ Mixed evidence in previous studies: Freedman (2013) Neumark and Grijalva (2015), Chirinko and Wilson (2016), Cahuc et al. (2018)

# North Carolina's Hiring Tax Credits

- ▶ Rank 100 counties according to economic distress
  - Ranking components: Unemployment rate, income per capita, population growth
- ▶ Assign different credit amounts based on ranking. Firms must keep payroll numbers up
- ▶ Focus on 1996 wave of the program, first two tiers

Credit size by distress rank (Dollars per year)

| Years     | Distress |             |    |    |       |           |    |    |     |     |
|-----------|----------|-------------|----|----|-------|-----------|----|----|-----|-----|
|           | 10       | 20          | 30 | 40 | 50    | 60        | 70 | 80 | 90  | 100 |
| 1988-1995 | 2,800    |             |    |    |       |           |    |    |     |     |
| 1996-2006 | 12,500   | 3,000-4,000 |    |    |       | 500-1,000 |    |    |     |     |
| 2007-2013 | 12,500   |             |    |    | 5,000 |           |    |    | 750 |     |

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
# Unemployment Rate Distribution and Persistence across NC Counties



# William S. Lee Act 1996-2006

- ▶ \$12,500 dollars for 10 most distressed counties
- ▶ Industry targeting: Manufacturing, wholesale trade, warehousing, data processing

## Counties by Tier






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
- ▶ Overrides for distress ranking based assignment
  - ▶ Low population or high poverty
  - ▶ Keep the program for at least two years
- ▶ 28 counties receive largest subsidy by 2006

## Counties by Tier

2006





# Outcome Measures Pre-program by Ranking





# RD: Graphical Results - Log Employment

## 3 Year Difference in Log Employment Residuals




# RD: Graphical Results - Employment/Population

## 3 Year Difference in Employment / Population Residuals



## RD: Graphical results - Unemployment

### 3 Year Difference in Unemployment Rate Residuals



Local mean fit



Linear fit

## RD Estimation

$$Y_{ctk} = \gamma_c + \gamma_t + \gamma_k + \theta_k \text{tier1}_{c,t-k} + \nu_k f(\text{rank}_{c,t-k}) + \beta_k X_{c,t-k} + \varepsilon_{ctk}$$

- ▶ County  $c$  at time  $t$  measured  $k$  years after treatment designation
- ▶ Assume constant treatment effects: Effect size only depends on years since program starts
- ▶ Measure outcomes stretching from two years before to three years after each treatment designation
- ▶ Pool spans of observations: Cluster standard errors by county

## RD Estimation - Further Assumptions

$$Y_{ctk} = \gamma_c + \gamma_t + \gamma_k + \theta_k tier1_{c,t-k} + \nu_k f(rank_{c,t-k}) + \beta_k X_{c,t-k} + \varepsilon_{ctk}$$

- ▶ Control function estimates: Keep  $f()$  linear due to limited sample size
- ▶ Local estimates: Small neighbourhood around threshold (Cattaneo et al. 2015)
- ▶ Multiple thresholds: Focus on main treatment threshold of distress rank and exclude “defiers” from overrides due to low population, etc. (Wong et al. 2013)
- ▶ Dynamics: Disentangle indirect effects from changes in likelihood of receiving credits in the future (Cellini et al. 2010)
  - ▶ Intent-to-treat estimates and treatment-on-the-treated estimates

## RD: Intent-to-treat Estimates

| Dependent variable    | 1 yr later       | 2 yrs later       | 3 yrs later         |
|-----------------------|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Log employment        | 0.006<br>(0.013) | 0.016<br>(0.015)  | 0.036**<br>(0.017)  |
| Employment/Population | 0.002<br>(0.004) | 0.005<br>(0.005)  | 0.012**<br>(0.005)  |
| Unemployment rate     | 0.188<br>(0.319) | -0.319<br>(0.261) | -0.507**<br>(0.228) |

N = 2,779

Standard errors clustered by county in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



## RD: Treatment-on-the-treated Estimates

| Dependent variable         | 1 yr later         | 2 yrs later         | 3 yrs later        |
|----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Log employment - IV        | -0.065*<br>(0.038) | 0.038<br>(0.031)    | 0.072**<br>(0.031) |
| Employment/Population - IV | -0.016<br>(0.011)  | 0.010<br>(0.008)    | 0.023**<br>(0.009) |
| Unemployment rate - IV     | -0.130<br>(0.622)  | -1.030**<br>(0.496) | -1.177*<br>(0.610) |

N = 770

Standard errors clustered by county in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$


## Local Estimates: 3 Years Later

| Time Range | Window   | Dependent Variable |          |                       |          |                   |          |
|------------|----------|--------------------|----------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|
|            |          | Log Employment     |          | Employment Population |          | Unemployment Rate |          |
| 1996-2006  | 6 ranks  | 0.053**            | [ 0.018] | 0.014**               | [ 0.013] | -0.050            | [ 0.884] |
| 1996-2006  | 10 ranks | 0.028*             | [ 0.089] | 0.010**               | [ 0.022] | -0.508            | [ 0.128] |
| 1996-2006  | 20 ranks | 0.025**            | [ 0.042] | 0.010***              | [ 0.002] | -0.908***         | [ 0.000] |

P-values from randomization inference with 1000 replications in brackets.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

# Results across Industries: Employment/Population






# Summary of Results

- ▶ For a credit difference of \$9,000 per hire:
  - ▶ Around 3% higher employment
  - ▶ Around 0.5 p.p. lower unemployment rate
- ▶ Suggests hiring credits more effective in distressed areas


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# Distress Indicators by Ranking



# RD with multiple thresholds

Wong, Steiner, and Cook (2013) univariate approach:



- ▶ Focus on main treatment threshold of distress rank: exclude “defiers” from overrides due to low population, etc.
- ▶ Yields sharp RD:  $T_1$  vs  $C$ . Alternatively, use fuzzy RD including the defiers

## RD estimates: Other outcomes

|                       | ITT - 3 years later | TOT - 3 years later |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Log Employment        | 0.066               | 0.081               |
| Target Industries     | (0.043)             | ( 0.073)            |
| Log Employment        | 0.004               | -0.007              |
| Non-Target Industries | (0.025)             | ( 0.034)            |
| Employment/Population | 0.014***            | 0.017**             |
| Target Industries     | (0.005)             | ( 0.008)            |
| Employment/Population | 0.000               | -0.000              |
| Non-Target Industries | (0.004)             | ( 0.007)            |
| Log Hires             | 0.058               | 0.179**             |
| Annual Total          | (0.039)             | ( 0.087)            |
| Log Separations       | 0.037               | 0.134*              |
| Annual Total          | (0.038)             | ( 0.070)            |

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$