

Do External Threats Reduce Affective Polarization? An Experiment on Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Jonas Pilgaard Kaiser*

Aarhus University

Markus Seier*

Aarhus University

January 4, 2023

Preliminary – see latest version [here](#)

Abstract

In many countries, citizens have become increasingly biased in how they evaluate others based on political affiliation. We argue that this increase in affective polarization may in part be caused by changes in global power structures, which caused many countries to experience a long period without external (military) threats. To study the importance of external threats, we conduct a priming experiment to examine how making Russia's invasion of Ukraine salient causally influences affective polarization and collaboration in the U.S. We find that priming Americans with Russia's military aggression leads to a modest reduction in affective polarization as well as an increase in cooperativeness as measured by people's behavior in an incentivized coordination game. Surprisingly, the effect of making Russia's invasion salient does not depend on perceived cross-party disagreement about the conflict. These results suggest that one must also look to global changes in international relations to understand within-country developments in polarization and willingness to collaborate.

Keywords: Affective polarization, partisanship, social identity, common enemy effect, external threat, 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

* Contact: Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Fuglesangsallé 4, 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark. Email: jkaiser@econ.au.dk and mseier@econ.au.dk.

† The study is pre-registered on OSF (<https://osf.io/u82kq>). The project was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Aarhus University (20.04.2022, BSS-2022-036). We especially thank Alexander Koch, Daniele Nosenzo, and Rasmus Skytte for valuable feedback and discussions. Also, we thank Hallgeir Sjåstad, Julia Nafziger, Nicola Maaser, Alexander Sebald, and seminar participants at the departments for Economics and Political Science at Aarhus University, the Copenhagen Network of Experimental Economists, DGPE, and the Fairness and the moral mind workshop at FAIR, NHH, for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of William Demant Fonden and Knud Højgaards Fond.

1 Introduction

In many countries, political preferences have become increasingly important for people's social identity (Mason, 2013, 2018a). This has led to a polarization that is not merely ideological but also affective as people increasingly dislike members of opposing parties (Iyengar et al., 2019).¹ Such affective polarization can decrease social cohesion, and it is often argued that affective polarization greatly reduces the scope for cross-party collaboration (Layman et al., 2006; MacKuen et al., 2010; Hetherington, 2015). Prior research on the causes of increased polarization has mostly focused on factors that occur within countries, including social sorting (Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2015; Huber and Malhotra, 2017; Mason, 2018b; Mason and Wronski, 2018; Robison and Moskowitz, 2019; Harteveld, 2021), partisan media (Lau et al., 2017), campaign messages (Hansen and Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017), and moralization of politics (Garrett and Bankert, 2020). Far less attention has been paid to external factors such as global changes in international relations. This is surprising as the increase in affective polarization – especially in the U.S. – coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union, which fundamentally changed the global power distribution and the nature of conflicts. A common dictum is that external threats to a group strengthen group cohesion and collaboration (Sumner, 1906; De Jaegher, 2021) – at least when there is cross-party agreement regarding the threat (John and Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015; Orian Harel et al., 2020).² The aim of the present paper is to study the influence of external threats on affective polarization and collaboration by using the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Specifically, we address the following research questions: How did Russia's invasion of Ukraine influence affective polarization in the U.S.? How did this effect depend on perceived political agreement about how to handle the conflict? And to what extent did Russia's invasion influence the willingness and ability of U.S. citizens to collaborate with supporters of the opposing party?

To answer these questions, we conduct an online experiment with 1,403 U.S. citizens and make either the threat of Russia's invasion or political disagreement about how to handle the

¹In the U.S., surveys provide evidence that from the mid-1980s, Democrats and Republicans have increasingly disliked members of the opposing party (Iyengar et al., 2012; Hetherington et al., 2016; Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018). Recent experimental evidence even suggests that partisan favoritism is stronger than bias related to race and religion in the U.S. (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Westwood et al., 2018). Affective polarization is, however, also present in other countries, including European countries with multiparty systems (Marchal and Watson, 2019; Tworzecki, 2019; Gidron et al., 2020; Reiljan, 2020; Knudsen, 2021; Harteveld, 2021; Wagner, 2021; Flores et al., 2022).

²We use the term ‘threat’ in the broad sense that encompasses both existential and symbolic threats as both types have been found to increase group cohesion (Riek et al., 2006). Moreover, this effect may occur regardless of whether the threat originates from opposing groups or from natural phenomena (Maki et al., 2019).

threat salient. Specifically, we prime the participants by exposing them to one of three news articles. In the *Invasion* treatment, participants read about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and how this poses a threat to the interests of the U.S. In the *Disagreement* treatment, participants also read about Russia’s invasion, but the article focuses on the disagreement between some Republicans and Democrats about how well President Biden is handling the crisis. Finally, participants in *Control* read an apolitical and emotionally neutral news article about how raindrops move on car windshields. After the news prime, we measure affective polarization by eliciting participants’ ratings of the Democratic and Republican Party on feeling thermometers. We also elicit participants’ stereotypes about members of both parties on the following traits: Patriotism, selfishness, intelligence, open-mindedness, and honesty. Finally, we measure participants’ willingness to compromise in an incentivized coordination game, in which participants make decisions in two conditions that vary the partisan identity of the other player.

Testing pre-registered hypotheses, we find that priming participants with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine leads to a modest reduction in affective polarization as measured by feeling thermometers. The difference between own- and opposite-party feeling thermometer rating (henceforth ‘FT difference’) is 2.9 degrees lower in the *Invasion* treatment than in *Control* (from a baseline of an FT difference of 51.4 in *Control*). Looking at political disagreement, we expected that it would mitigate or even reverse the effect of the external threat. Yet, we find that no statistically significant differences between affective polarization in *Invasion* and *Disagreement*.

We then examine how making the external threat salient influences participants’ behavior in a coordination game with real monetary stakes. We first demonstrate that greater affective polarization as measured by feeling thermometers predicts a greater tendency to discriminate based on the party affiliation of the opposing player. Then, we show that priming participants with Russia’s invasion increases their willingness to compromise. Specifically, the *Invasion* treatment increases participants’ probability of cooperating by approximately 6.5 percentage points regardless of the partisan affiliation of the other player (from a baseline probability of 40.3 percent in *Control*). Again, we find no significant differences between *Invasion* and *Disagreement*.

We make two substantial contributions to the literature on affective polarization. First, we examine how perceived external threats causally influence affective polarization, and we examine how this effect depends on perceived cross-party (dis)agreement about how to handle the threat. In doing so, we build on previous research that relates group identities to external threats. Related to our study, [Gehring \(2021\)](#) uses observational data to show that the Russian

invasion of Ukraine in 2014 made citizens in Eastern Europe identify more strongly with the EU and support common EU policies to a greater extent (see also Chueri and Törnberg, 2022). Bafumi and Parent (2012) examine how political polarization between Republican and Democratic House Members (so-called “elite polarization”) was associated with the relative military capabilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They find that elite polarization was higher when the U.S. was relatively more powerful. Our study differs from these in both method and focus. We use experimental methods rather than observational data to obtain the causal impact of making an external threat salient as well as the effect of (dis)agreement about how to handle the threat. And we study the effect of an external threat on attitudes and cooperative behavior among citizens within a country rather than examining attitudes towards an intergovernmental organization (Gehring, 2021) or the political preferences of politicians (Bafumi and Parent, 2012).

Second, we provide evidence of how affective polarization matters for incentivized behavior in a coordination game that measures people’s ability to cooperate and their willingness to compromise when they interact with supporters of their own and the opposite party (Attanasi et al., 2016). Previous studies have shown that individuals behave more selfishly in the dictator game when they face a recipient from the opposite party (Fowler and Kam, 2007; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Whitt et al., 2021), and they are less trusting towards an opposite-party member in the trust game (Carlin and Love, 2013; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Carlin and Love, 2018; Whitt et al., 2021). The novel feature of our study is that we use a coordination game in which two players must agree on an action in order to earn money. It is particularly suited for measuring the ability to coordinate and (as players earn different amounts) willingness to compromise for achieving the most efficient outcome. Thus, the game captures essential aspects of how members of opposing political parties need to compromise in order to further the common good.

Finally, our study has implications for politicians in times of crises. Affective polarization matters for many decisions that people make (Gift and Gift, 2015; McConnell et al., 2018; Ruch et al., 2022), and it greatly influences how well governments function and respond to critical challenges like the COVID-19 outbreak (Binder, 2003; Hetherington, 2015; Flores et al., 2022). It is therefore a crucial insight that external threats reduce affective polarization as it can be vital for the immediate policy response – even if the effect is only transient (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Myrick, 2021). A key finding in this paper is that this effect is not significantly different when people perceive greater political disagreement regarding the crisis. This suggests that as long as people agree that there is an external threat, politicians should not fear a backlash from open discussions about how to best handle the threat.

This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we provide background information on the development of external threats to the U.S. We describe the relevant theoretical framework in Section 3. In Section 4, we detail the experimental design. Sections 5 and 6 report results relating to affective polarization and cooperation, respectively. We discuss further results in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes. The Appendix includes background on Russia’s invasion at the time of our experiment, experimental instructions, a power analysis, and further results, tables, and figures.

2 Background: External Threats to the U.S.

For most of the 20th century, the U.S. faced critical external threats, and many argue that such threats have helped unite the American people and increase social cohesion (e.g., [Desch, 1996](#)). The most prominent threats were World Wars I and II and the Cold War. The latter was marked by a bipolar global power distribution ([Waltz, 1979](#)), which lasted for more than 40 years. In this period, the threat of the communist Soviet Union provided a common enemy that could unite Republicans and Democrats ([Huntington, 1997](#); [Bafumi and Parent, 2012](#)). The Cold War defined the key priorities of U.S. politics – both foreign and domestic – and the focus on the Soviet Union often distracted from internal issues in the U.S. ([Nivola, 2003](#); [Bafumi and Parent, 2012](#); [Myrick, 2021](#)).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which brought an end to the Cold War, the U.S. lost its counterpart, and the global power balance shifted towards unipolarity. There was no longer an empire fighting for principles that opposed the cornerstones to the American society, including liberty, democracy, and individualism ([Desch, 1996](#); [Huntington, 1997](#)). And some even argued that humanity had progressed to the endpoint of its ideological evolution: Western liberal democracy ([Fukuyama, 1992](#)). Since then, a major task for the U.S. has been to adjust to its role as the world’s sole military superpower, and the U.S. has had to redefine its interests in international relations. And while the 9/11 attacks made salient the threat of terrorism, the increased bipartisan support of President George W. Bush was short-lived and faltered with the 2003 invasion of Iraq ([Khazatsky, 2021](#)). Thus, the U.S. has been without a critical military threat for many years, and it is likely that this has increased the scope for internal divisions ([Bafumi and Parent, 2012](#)).

We argue that to understand the rise of affective polarization in the U.S., one must consider the development in external threats to the U.S. As we cannot manipulate the presence of an external threat, we use a priming approach to obtain the causal impact of making an external threat salient on affective polarization in the U.S. To this end, we exploit Russia’s full-scale

invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.³ Though the U.S. did not involve its military in the conflict, it took a definite stand in support of Ukraine and imposed economic sanctions on Russia. In addition, it increased the number of troops stationed in NATO countries near Ukraine. The American public found Russia’s invasion alarming: In a survey of U.S. adults conducted April 25 – May 1, 2022, by [Pew Research Center](#), 50 percent responded that they were “extremely” or “very” concerned that the support for Ukraine might lead to a U.S. war with Russia. Democrats and Republicans both approved of placing strict economic sanctions on Russia (80 and 73 percent, respectively). Yet, there was also some cross-party disagreement regarding the conflict: 55 percent of Republicans “somewhat” or “strongly” disapproved of the Biden administration’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, whereas 63 percent of Democrats “somewhat” or “strongly” approved of the Biden administration’s response.

In the next section, we explain theoretical frameworks from the social identity approach that are useful for understanding how an external threat such as the one posed by Russia’s military aggression may influence polarization in the U.S.

3 Theory

Affective polarization is rooted in people’s social identities ([Iyengar et al., 2019](#)), and we therefore draw on theories from the social identity approach to inform our study ([Tajfel et al., 1971](#); [Tajfel and Turner, 1979](#); [Tajfel, 1986](#)).⁴ Self-categorization theory describes how group biases arise as individuals distinguish between those who belong to the same group as themselves (ingroup) and those who do not (outgroup, [Turner et al., 1987](#); [Turner and Reynolds, 2012](#)). In our context, the social categorizations follow from individuals’ affiliation to either the Democratic or the Republican Party. This group identification is emotionally significant, and it leads to social comparisons ([Turner, 1975](#)). Thus, individuals are motivated to think highly of their own party (“ingroup love”) and to focus on the negative characteristics of the other party (“outgroup hate”, [Weisel and Böhm, 2015](#)).⁵ This gives rise to affective polarization, whereby voters are more likely to distrust and dislike those affiliated to the other party. Yet, the presence of an external threat may reduce affective polarization in the two ways we describe in the following.

³In Appendix A.1, we describe the historical background for the Russian invasion, and we describe its development up until the time of our experiment.

⁴Following [Tajfel \(1978](#), p. 63), we define social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value or emotional significance attached to that membership”.

⁵This tendency is further strengthened by people’s tendency to like those who share their attitudes (cf. the similarity-liking effect, [Byrne, 1961](#); [Bruchmann et al., 2018](#); [Zorn et al., 2022](#)).

The Feeling of a Common Ingroup. An external threat may influence what individuals perceive to be their ingroup and outgroup. Most Democrats and Republicans think of themselves both as being affiliated with a political party and as an American (cf. the common ingroup identity model, [Gaertner et al., 1989, 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000](#)).⁶ This American identity is likely to become more salient in the presence of international conflicts such as the war between Russia and Ukraine. When individuals think of themselves not as partisans but rather as belonging to a nation, members of the opposing party are seen as fellow Americans and become part of the ingroup rather than the outgroup. Then, the motivated reasoning that leads people to think highly of their ingroup also encompasses the political opposition. Consequently, as shown by [Levendusky \(2018\)](#), increasing the salience of national identity reduces affective polarization.

Intergroup Conflict Theory. An external threat may also function as a rallying cry for individuals to overcome their differences and unite against the threat, a phenomenon known as the common enemy effect ([Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Giles and Evans, 1985; De Jaegher, 2021](#)). Previous research has demonstrated that perceived threats may reduce gaps between groups ([Dovidio et al., 2004; Moskalenko et al., 2006; Stollberg et al., 2017; Dehdari and Gehring, 2022](#)), and this occurs through both attitudes ([Bonanno and Jost, 2006; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Gude, 2006](#)), emotions ([Porat et al., 2019](#)), and a general sense of group cohesiveness ([Wilder, 1984; Rothgerber, 1997; Mackie et al., 2000; Karasawa et al., 2004](#)).⁷ Similarly, a perceived threat from Russia may therefore decrease perceived differences between Republicans and Democrats and instead enhance the distinction between Americans and Russians (cf. intergroup conflict theory, [Stephan and Stephan, 1996, 2000; Stephan et al.,](#)

⁶As noted by [Turner et al. \(1994\)](#), the context dependence of identity does not imply that the “true” identity is being distorted; rather, it is a feature of a person’s identity that it is adaptive as it makes identity more accurate and more useful.

⁷While this literature goes back to [Sumner \(1906\)](#), more recent research emphasizes that it is the perceived threat rather than the actual threat that matters for people’s threat response ([Merolla et al., 2007; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009; Vail et al., 2012](#)). How people respond to a specific perceived threat depends on a wide range of factors, including the nature of the intergroup relation, situational factors, and the cultural dimensions on which the groups differ (see [Stephan et al., 2009](#), for a review). Most important for the present experiment, a group is more prone to perceive a threat from another group if the two have a history of conflict ([Stephan et al., 2002; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter, 2006](#)) and if their cultural values differ (cf. the concordance model of acculturation, [Piontkowski et al., 2002; Zárate et al., 2004; Rohmann et al., 2006, 2008](#)). Regarding the individuals within the group, the theory predicts that the response to a perceived threat is especially strong for people who more closely identify with the ingroup ([Riek et al., 2006](#)).

2009, 2015).⁸

The effect of international conflict may, however, be *reversed* if individuals perceive an intense cross-party polarization related to the conflict. First, cross-party polarization may increase the salience of people’s political identity, which in turn may increase affective polarization (West and Iyengar, 2020). Second, cross-party polarization could lead individuals to perceive their political opposition to be a hindrance for dealing with the threat, which could also reinforce the polarization (John and Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015; Orian Harel et al., 2020). An interesting question is therefore whether the effect of Russia’s military aggression changes when the perceived cross-party disagreement is high. We examine this in our experiment, which we describe in the following section.

4 Experimental Design


Our experiment consists of five parts (see Figure 1), and these are completed in a single session using the online research platform Prolific. First, participants answer questions about their demographics, which we use as controls in the analysis. Second, participants are randomly assigned to one of three treatments, which vary in the content of a news prime. Participants either read about the threat of Russia’s invasion, the political disagreement regarding Biden’s response to the invasion, or an apolitical topic. Third, participants rate the Democratic and Republican parties on feeling thermometers and answer questions that reveal possible stereotypes regarding members of the two parties. Fourth, participants play an asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game; a coordination game in which one player can increase the total payoff by foregoing some personal earnings. Finally, participants answer questions about their political attitudes. The full set of instructions are available in Appendix A.2.1.

4.1 Demographic Survey

Participants first answer demographic questions about their age, gender, ethnicity, education, and employment. This information provides us with details about the background of our sample, which we use as controls in testing our hypotheses because individuals’ demographics to some extent predict affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2019).

⁸One way a common enemy influences politics within a country is to increase cross-political support for the incumbent leader (“rally around the flag”, Mueller, 1970; Baker and Oneal, 2001). Yet, our interest here is in how threats influence sentiments and cooperativeness within the general population rather than how citizens feel about the people in power.

Figure 1: Timeline of the experiment



4.2 Treatments: News Primes

In the second part of the experiment, participants read a brief news article, and they are asked to answer in 1-2 sentences a question about the content of the news article (the full articles are included in Appendix A.2.1).⁹ We vary the topic and framing of the news article in a between-subjects design; in Section 7.4, we provide suggestive evidence that the effect of the news articles stems from subtle cues (priming) rather than from providing new information that changes participants' attitudes. We stratify participants based on their stated party affiliation on Prolific such that there is an equal number of Republicans and Democrats in each treatment.

In the *Invasion* treatment, participants first read an introduction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This describes how the fate of Ukraine "has huge implications for the rest of Europe, the health of the global economy and America's place in the world". The introduction also describes "Putin's attempt to redraw the map of Europe" and how "the United States and its allies in Europe have imposed the toughest financial sanctions ever on Russia". After this introduction, the article takes a threat perspective and describes that "economic pressure can lead states at war to adopt riskier strategies, and this often leads to an escalation of the conflict". Supporting the threat narrative, the article is accompanied by a picture of Russian tanks.

In the *Disagreement* treatment, participants read the same introduction to the Russian invasion as in *Invasion*. But the article continues to describe the disagreement between Republicans and Democrats about how well President Biden is handling the crisis. Specifically, it mentions how "some Republicans in Congress have blamed Biden for failing to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin from sending forces into Ukraine", quoting Representative Brian

⁹The news articles draw heavily on the formulations by Kingsley (2022), Morgan (2022), and Morales (2022).

Mast saying that “there’s no doubt that weakness leads to war.” Participants then read how “some Democrats [...] have argued that the Republican critique is misguided”. To emphasize the role of politics, the article is accompanied by a picture of President Joe Biden.

In *Control*, participants read an apolitical and emotionally neutral news article about how raindrops move on car windshields, illustrated with a picture. By making the content emotionally neutral, we avoid potential confounds with e.g. individuals in a good mood perceiving the world in a more inclusive and integrative way (e.g., [Bless and Fiedler, 2006](#)).

Upon reading the news article and writing 1-2 sentences about its content, participants in *Invasion* and *Disagreement* answer three questions about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: How much they have followed the development of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, how big a threat they consider Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to be for the U.S. and its interest, and to what extent they consider Democrats and Republicans to disagree/agree on how to handle Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These question serve as a manipulation check as the *Invasion* treatment should increase perceived threat, and the *Disagreement* treatment should increase perceived disagreement compared to *Control*. We return to this in Section 5.2.

4.3 Affective Polarization

In the third part of the experiment, participants answer standard questions used to elicit affective polarization. Participants start by rating the Democratic and Republican parties on feeling thermometers ([American National Election Studies, 1968](#)), and we randomize the order of the parties to preclude order effects. A feeling thermometer is a scale from 0 to 100, where ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that one feels cold and unfavorable towards the party (with 0 being the coldest), and ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that one feels warm and favorable (with 100 being the warmest). A rating of 50 means that one neither feels warmly nor coldly towards the party.¹⁰

We additionally elicit the participants’ stereotypes by asking them to rate the Democratic and Republican parties on five traits: Patriotism, selfishness, intelligence, open-mindedness, and honesty ([Iyengar et al., 2012](#); [Garrett et al., 2014](#); [Levendusky, 2018](#); [Druckman and Levendusky, 2019](#); [Hobolt et al., 2021](#); [Renström et al., 2021](#)). To avoid order effects, we randomize both the order of the party and the order of the traits.

¹⁰Note the key difference between affective polarization and ideological polarization: Whereas ideological polarization suggests that people disagree on political topics, the emotional attachment to one’s party leads to a dislike for the members of the opposing party *on a personal level*. [Mason \(2015\)](#) and [Marchal and Watson \(2019\)](#) have even demonstrated that it is possible for ideological disagreement to play a negligible role to the extent that voters “disrespectfully agree”.

4.4 Asymmetric Battle of the Sexes Game

To obtain an incentivized, behavioral measure of participants’ ability and willingness to collaborate across party lines, the fourth part of the experiment consists of an asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game (Attanasi et al., 2016). Similar to the traditional Battle of the Sexes game, the asymmetric version is a one-shot coordination game in which two players (Player 1 and 2) must choose the same action of two (A and B) to earn money. For the asymmetric game, however, the total payoffs are different depending on what action the two players coordinate on (summarized in Table 1). Specifically, if both players choose A, Player 1 earns 35 cents, and Player 2 earns 5 cents. If both players choose B, Player 1 earns 15 cents, and Player 2 earns 35 cents. If the players choose differently, both Player 1 and Player 2 earn zero cents.

Table 1: Payoff matrix for the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game

$1 \setminus 2$	A	B
A	35,5	0,0
B	0,0	15,35

There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria to the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game: Both play A and both play B.¹¹ Yet, in this game, both players choosing B yields a greater total payoff. Importantly, this outcome does not Pareto dominate the other equilibrium; rather, Player 1 must forego some earnings to achieve the “greater good”, and she must agree to earn less than Player 2 to do so. Thus, analyzing participants’ decisions in the role of Player 1 informs about their willingness and ability to coordinate and compromise for the “greater good”.

Using the strategy elicitation method (Selten, 1967), participants make four potentially payoff-relevant decisions in this game. They decide both as Player 1 and as Player 2, and they play the game together with a Republican and a Democrat in random order. Participants are informed that we randomly match them with a supporter of the Republican or Democratic party after the survey is completed, and that one of their four decisions will be payoff relevant (randomly drawn and paid as a bonus via Prolific).¹² Participants answer three control ques-

¹¹There is also a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, where Player 1 plays A with 87.5 percent probability and Player 2 plays B with 70 percent probability.

¹²A potential concern with using a within-subject design is that asking participants to play the game with persons from both parties could induce experimenter demand effects if participants e.g. feel that they ought (not) to change their decisions. We nevertheless opted for a within-subject design to achieve sufficient power for our budget. Due to the random order of decisions, we are able to test for order effects (between-subjects). As described in Section A.3.5, we find no order effects, suggesting that the within-subject nature of our design

tions before making their decisions. Following Arechar et al. (2018), participants are allowed to continue only when they answer all three control questions correctly. If participants answer incorrectly, they are informed about this and are asked to try again.

4.5 Political Attitudes

In the final part of the survey, the participants answer general questions about their political preferences. Specifically, they indicate on a 5-point Likert scale how interested they are in politics, and they answer what party they support and how strongly they do so. For people indicating that they are Independent, we ask whether they consider themselves as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party.¹³ In our main analysis, we use political affiliation (and strength of this affiliation) as well as interest in politics as control variables because we expect these to predict some variation in affective polarization. Specifically, previous studies show that affective polarization is larger among Democrats than Republicans (West and Iyengar, 2020; Renström et al., 2021), and strength of party support should correlate positively with affective polarization because the partisan identity is more emotionally significant for individuals who more strongly identify with either of the parties (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1986).

After answering questions about their political attitudes, participants in *Control* answer the three questions about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which we use for our manipulation check in Section 5.2.¹⁴

4.6 Procedure

We recruited 1425 participants on Prolific between May 7 and 24, 2022, and the experiment was implemented in Qualtrics.¹⁵ Online samples tend to be politically left-leaning and women

does not introduce a bias into our analysis.

¹³Note that we ask about political preferences after eliciting affective polarization because making participants think about their political identity could influence our measurement of affective polarization and thereby distort our treatment effects. One concern is that the treatments could influence participants’ responses to the questions about political attitudes (cf. post-treatment bias, Montgomery et al., 2018). Yet, this is unlikely to be a concern in our case as we find no differences across treatments in party affiliation, strength of party support, or interest in politics (all p ’s > 0.2, Kruskal-Wallis test). Moreover, our results are qualitatively robust to using the participants’ party affiliation as recorded on Prolific rather than their stated affiliation at the end of our experiment. In our main analysis, we follow our pre-registration and use party affiliation as reported in the experiment because this is the most recent information provided by the participants.

¹⁴We placed these questions at the very end of the survey for the participants in *Control* to avoid any priming effects of having the participants consider the invasion.

¹⁵As online experiments attract most respondents around the time when they are published, we started collecting data on a Saturday to ensure that we did not bias our sample against employed individuals (Casey

are often over-represented (Paolacci et al., 2010; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014; Casey et al., 2017); therefore, we stratified the sample on Prolific to recruit an equal number of Democrats and Republicans as well as an equal number of men and women.¹⁶

We limited the sample to Americans who had completed 10 previous studies on Prolific with an approval rating of at least 98 percent (Matherly, 2019). We applied several pre-registered screeners to ensure high-quality data (Thomas and Clifford, 2017; Zhang et al., 2022), and we provide details for this in Appendix A.2.2. In total, we screened out 13 responses (0.9 percent). Furthermore, as our study concerns polarization between Democrats and Republicans, we excluded nine participants who identified as “true Independents”, leading to a main sample of 1403.¹⁷ With this sample size, we expected based on power simulations to have a power of 0.8 to detect a treatment effect on feeling thermometer differences of approximately 5.4, equivalent to a standardized effect size of Hedge’s $g_p = 0.15$ (Goulet-Pelletier and Cousineau, 2018, see Appendix A.3.1 for details).

In our final sample, the mean age was 40 years, 49.9 percent were men, 82.3 percent were white or Caucasian, 62.2 percent were employed (part or full time), 10.2 percent were self-employed, 39.8 percent had obtained a Bachelor’s degree, and 13.6 percent had obtained a Master’s degree. The full set of sample characteristics is provided in Appendix A.3.2.

For completing the study, respondents earned on average USD 1.2 (min: 1.07, max: 1.41), and the median completion time was approximately 8 minutes (which is an upper bound as it relies on Qualtrics timing data that also counts time spent off task with the survey running in the background).

et al., 2017).

¹⁶As we are interested in affective polarization, our main sample comprises only people who affiliate themselves with the Republican or the Democratic Party. To maximize the relevant sample given our budget, we therefore used the pre-recorded questions on Prolific in recruiting the most relevant participants. One might be concerned that we by doing so bias our sample towards the most politically interested sample. But the vast majority of participants on Prolific provide information about their political affiliation because doing so maximizes their chances of getting invited for studies. As of May 3, 2022, there were 37,916 active American participants on Prolific, of which 27,293 (72 percent) had reported their political affiliation. Of these, 17,821 (65 percent) declared support for either the Democratic or the Republican Party (Prolific, 2022).

¹⁷Our results are robust to including all participants in the analysis. Furthermore, our results are robust to using RelevantID as a screener (Imperium, 2022). RelevantID is an online fraud and duplicates detection service offered by Imperium, and it is embedded in Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2022). Note that we only use this for robustness as Zhang et al. (2022) demonstrate that combining individual screeners provides a similar fraud detection performance while making it more transparent why responses are flagged.

4.7 Hypotheses

As described in Section 3, we rely on the social identity approach to form our (pre-registered) hypotheses. First, consider the *Invasion* treatment. In this treatment, we make it salient that there is a threat and that the conflict is international. We posit that this makes participants think of their American identity as well as think of Russia as their common enemy, both factors contributing to a reduction in affective polarization. Thereby, we reach our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 *Affective polarization is lower in Invasion than in Control.*

Second, consider the *Disagreement* treatment. We expect that an emphasis on cross-party disagreement about President Biden will counteract the two effects mentioned above. Specifically, the treatment increases the salience of political rather than national identities, and if individuals perceive an intense cross-party polarization related to the conflict, it is likely that they do not view their political opposition as a potential ally in dealing with the threat. We thereby reach our second hypothesis:¹⁸

Hypothesis 2 *Affective polarization is greater in Disagreement than in Invasion.*

5 Results: How Do Threats Influence Affective Polarization?

In this section, we present the results on how the treatments influence affective polarization as measured by the feeling thermometers. We first present descriptive statistics that document the existence of affective polarization in our sample. We then show that the *Invasion* and *Disagreement* treatments succeed in manipulating the participants' threat and disagreement perceptions, respectively. Finally, we test our pre-registered hypotheses.

As pre-registered, our primary outcome measure is the difference in feeling thermometer ratings between own party and opposing party (henceforth FT difference). We planned to use stereotypes as secondary measures to provide more details on affective polarization. But in contrast to previous research (e.g., [Garrett et al., 2014](#)), we do not find affective polarization in stereotypes and refer instead the results of our pre-registered analyses to Appendix A.3.8.

¹⁸We pre-registered to compare (i) *Invasion* with *Control*, (ii) *Disagreement* with *Control*, and (iii) *Invasion* with *Disagreement* if (i) and (ii) did not both show significant differences. In Appendix A.3.4, we report the results from (ii), which show that we fail to detect any difference between *Disagreement* and *Control* for the full sample. This led us to test (iii), and we report (i) and (iii) in the main text for expositional purposes.

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

In line with previous research, we find affective polarization in the feeling thermometer questions. Across all participants, the average FT difference is 49.6 degrees. Participants on average rate their own party at 70.4 degrees and the opposite party at 20.8 degrees.¹⁹ Figure 2 shows the distribution of answers to the feeling thermometer questions for Democrats and Republicans separately. As seen in the figure, we find a larger FT difference among Democrats than Republicans (in line with [West and Iyengar, 2020](#), and [Renström et al., 2021](#)): Both Democrats and Republicans rate their own party at around 70 degrees, but Democrats rate the Republican Party at 15.9 degrees while Republicans rate the Democratic Party at 25.8 degrees on average.

5.2 Manipulation Check


Before turning to our main hypotheses, we first show that the experimental manipulations work as intended. That is, we first test whether participants in the *Invasion* treatment perceive Russia to be a greater threat to the U.S. and its interests relative to participants in *Control*. Second, we test whether participants in the *Disagreement* treatment perceive the same level of threat but more political disagreement about how to handle Russia’s invasion of Ukraine relative to participants in *Invasion*. Figure A.2 shows the average threat perception and disagreement perception in the three treatments.

Invasion. Participants in the *Invasion* treatment perceive Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a greater threat to the U.S. and its interests relative to participants in *Control* (3.52 vs. 3.33, $p = .006$, *t*-test). Instead of relying on the numerical rating, we can also see that participants in *Invasion* are more likely to rate the threat of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as “somewhat severe” or “severe” relative to participants in *Control* (53.1 vs. 44.3 percent, $p = .009$, Fisher’s exact test). We find no difference in the perception of disagreement between *Invasion* and *Control* (2.91 vs. 2.89, $p = .703$, *t*-test).

Disagreement. Participants in *Disagreement* perceive the same level of threat as in *Invasion* (3.42 vs. 3.52, $p = .117$, *t*-test). Yet, participants in *Disagreement* perceive more political disagreement about how to handle Russia’s invasion of Ukraine relative to participants in *Invasion* (3.29 vs. 2.91, $p < .001$, *t*-test). Similarly, participants in *Disagreement* are more

¹⁹Compared to the existing literature, we find a similar own-party feeling thermometer rating and around 5 degrees lower opposite-party rating. (e.g., [Iyengar et al., 2012](#); [Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018](#); [Levendusky, 2018](#)).

Figure 2: Affective polarization in Feeling Thermometer ratings



Note: This figure shows violin plots for how participants rate each party on the feeling thermometer. The plots show (epanechnikov) kernel density estimates, which depict the probability density of the data at different values. Within these estimates are standard box plots, which show the quartiles of the distributions (with the red dot as the median). The x-axis labels refer to partisan affiliation of the participants. For example, the left-most plot is the distribution of Republican participants rating their own party.

likely to answer that Democrats and Republicans “strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” on how to handle Russia’s invasion of Ukraine relative to participants in *Invasion* (52.6 vs. 35.5 percent, $p < .001$, Fisher’s exact test).²⁰

We conclude that our news primes succeeded in generating (i) a greater average threat perception in *Invasion* and (ii) a greater average disagreement perception in *Disagreement*. We continue to examine how the treatments influence affective polarization.

5.3 H1: Invasion Prime Reduces Affective Polarization

We now report the results related to our first hypothesis, which states that affective polarization should be lower in *Invasion* than in *Control*. When conducting tests on FT difference, we follow the pre-analysis plan exactly and estimate OLS regressions “with (i) no controls, (ii) demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, education, and employment), and (iii) controls also for attitudes (party affiliation and interest in politics).” Our preferred specification is (iii) as we expect this to be the most efficient (as explained in Section 4). We also use non-parametric tests of treatment differences for robustness. Throughout and in line with our pre-registration, we rely on one-sided tests for the main tests as we have directional hypotheses, and we use two-sided tests otherwise.

We find that affective polarization is lower in *Invasion* than *Control* as measured by FT difference, and the difference becomes statistically significant when we include all control variables ($t = -1.86, p = .034$, one-sided test, cf. Table 2).²¹

The size of the coefficient suggests that participants in *Invasion* on average rate a 2.86 degrees smaller FT difference relative to participants in *Control* (Hedge’s $g_p = .088$). Arguably, this is a modest effect compared to the average FT difference of 51.4 in *Control*. It is somewhat smaller than the 5.6 degrees reduction that Levendusky (2018) finds from priming Americans with their national identity, but it is similar to the effect of 2.5 degrees that Boxell et al. (2020) find from priming individuals with the COVID-19 pandemic. It is, however, worth noting that we find this effect during the first months of the war when people were already influenced by the conflict, implying that this is the least likely time to find an effect. This is also evident

²⁰The *Disagreement* treatment also successfully increases perceived disagreement compared to participants in *Control* (3.29 vs. 2.89, $p < .001$, *t*-test). Similarly, participants in *Disagreement* are more likely to answer that Democrats and Republicans “strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” on how to handle Russia’s invasion of Ukraine relative to participants in *Control* (52.6 vs. 33.4 percent, $p < .001$, Fisher’s exact test).

²¹The treatment effect remains marginally significant when controlling for both the family-wise error rate and the false discovery rate (both p ’s $< .094$), cf. Appendix A.3.7). Yet, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test just fails to reach marginal significance due to the increased noise from not including control variables ($p = .104$, one-sided test).

by our manipulation check which only changes threat perceptions by .19 on a 5-point Likert scale (Hedge's $g_p = .180$).

In sum, our analysis of H1 leads us to conclude the following:

Result 1 *Priming participants with Russia's invasion of Ukraine leads to a modest reduction in affective polarization as measured by differences in feeling thermometer ratings.*

5.4 H2: The Effect of Invasion Primes Is Unaffected by Disagreement

Next, we report the results related to our second hypothesis, which states that affective polarization should be greater in *Disagreement* than in *Invasion*.

We find no difference in affective polarization between *Invasion* and *Disagreement* as measured by the FT difference (OLS: $p = .779$, cf. Table 2; MWU: $p = .843$), and this result holds regardless of the level of controls. We discuss these results in Section 7.1; for now, we simply conclude the following:

Result 2 *When participants are primed with the threat of Russia's military aggression, we fail to detect any effect on affective polarization of also priming participants with political disagreement about the conflict.*

Table 2: Treatment effects on affective polarization

	Invasion vs. Control			Invasion vs. Disagreement		
Invasion	-2.504*	-2.476*	-2.859**	0.456	0.839	-0.444
	(1.860)	(1.855)	(1.563)	(1.850)	(1.852)	(1.581)
Constant	51.434***	46.806***	21.598***	48.474***	35.787***	14.960***
	(1.300)	(3.828)	(3.825)	(1.285)	(3.748)	(3.727)
N	926	926	926	933	933	933
Adj. R2	0.00	0.02	0.31	-0.00	0.03	0.29
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

6 Results: How Do Threats Influence Cooperation?

In this section, we examine participants' behavior in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game to uncover how the salience of external threats influences people's willingness to cooperate. We are particularly interested in the two decisions participants make in the role of Player 1 when facing either a Player 2 affiliated with their own or the opposite party. We first provide evidence that affective polarization as measured by the FT difference predicts participants' behavior in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game. Then, we examine how the *Invasion* and *Disagreement* treatments influence cooperative behavior.

We use McNemar's test to investigate within-subject changes in the proportions of participants who choose selfish/cooperative strategies. To investigate between-subjects treatment effects on behavior in the game, we use logit and multinomial logit as well as Fisher's exact tests for robustness. We do not observe any order effects on Player 1 behavior (see Appendix A.3.5), and we therefore pool the data.

6.1 Affective Polarization and Cooperation

Our main interest in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game is participants' behavior in the role of Player 1. Participants display affective polarization in the sense that they choose differently depending on the partisan affiliation of the other participant: Pooling all treatments, participants are more likely to choose the cooperative action B if Player 2 is an own-party member (47.1 percent) rather than an opposite-party member (39.3 percent). This difference is statistically significant ($p < .001$, McNemar's test), and it is consistent with previous studies that show how partisans tend to behave more prosocially towards people from their own party in the Dictator Game and the Trust Game (Fowler and Kam, 2007; Carlin and Love, 2013; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Carlin and Love, 2018; Whitt et al., 2021).²² The effects of ingroup-outgroup discrimination in our setting are large: If participants were as cooperative in the opposite-party condition as in the own-party condition, the total surplus would increase by 16.4 percent.²³

We proceed to generate four "Player 1 types" that characterize how participants choose when facing an own- and opposite party members, respectively. We find that 49.2 (35.5) percent choose A (B) irrespective of the partisan identity of Player 2 (henceforth types *AA* and *BB*). Further, 11.6 percent of participants display affective polarization by playing the cooperative strategy B when Player 2 is from their own party, but the selfish strategy A when Player 2 is from the opposite party (*BA*). Only 3.7 percent display the opposite pattern of playing A when Player 2 is from their own party and B otherwise (*AB*).²⁴

Based on these Player 1 types, we observe that affective polarization as measured by feeling thermometers is informative for the participants' incentivized behavior: A greater FT difference is associated with a higher probability of being type *BA* and thus displaying affective polarization in the game (see Figure 3). Multinomial logistic regressions confirm this tendency as a greater FT difference predicts a greater probability of being type *BA* ($p < .001$, cf. Table A.8). The marginal effect implies that a 10 degrees greater FT difference predicts a 2 percentage points greater probability of being of type *BA* in the asymmetric Battle of the

²²In the decisions in the role of Player 2, there is not much indication of behavioral difference in own/opposite-party condition. Only around 8 percent of participants change their decision from own- to opposite-party condition in the role of Player 2 and a change in either direction is equally likely (McNemar's $\chi^2 = .08, p = .850$).


²³To obtain this result, we use the frequencies from Player 2 behavior when facing a Player 1 affiliated with the opposite party. We then compute the expected total surplus given the average Player 1 behavior in the own-party and other-party conditions.

²⁴Player 1 cooperation with own-party members is similar in our experiment to the level that Attanasi et al. (2016) find in their *University* treatment (47.1 vs. 49 percent), in which participants also share a generalized sense of belonging to an extended ingroup (students at the same university). Compared to Attanasi et al. (2016), we generally find a higher willingness to choose B in the role of Player 2.

Sexes game. This is a considerable effect considering that the baseline frequency of type *BA* is only 11.6 percent. In addition, a greater FT difference correlates significantly with a lower probability of being of type *BB* and a greater probability of being of type *AA*. As this relation holds across all treatments, we view this behavioral validation of feeling thermometers as an important, general result, and we summarize it as follows:

Result 3 *Affective polarization as measured by feeling thermometers is behaviorally relevant: A greater difference in thermometer ratings predicts a greater tendency to discriminate based on party affiliation in an incentivized asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game.*

Figure 3: Share of types BA split by FT difference



Note: This figure divides participants into quartiles based on the size of the FT differences such that participants in the first quartile exhibit the smallest FT difference and participants in the fourth quartile exhibit the greatest FT difference. For each quartile, the bars indicate the share of participants who as Player 1 choose B when facing a person affiliated with own party and choose A when facing a person affiliated with the opposing party. Whiskers denote 95 percent confidence intervals.

6.2 The Invasion Prime Increases General Willingness to Compromise

We now compare behavior in *Invasion* and *Control*. Cf. our pre-registration, we expected that a reduction in affective polarization would manifest in participants' willingness to compromise in the decision of Player 1. Accordingly, we find that participants in *Invasion* are more likely

to choose the cooperative option B in the role of Player 1 compared to participants in *Control* (see Figure 4). Logistic regressions show that participants in *Invasion* are more likely to choose B both when facing a Player 2 who is affiliated with their own party (6.4 percentage points, $p = .029$, one-sided test) and the opposite party (6.7 percentage points, $p = .021$, one-sided test) compared to participants in *Control* (see Table A.6).²⁵

In addition, we expected that a reduction in affective polarization would cause participants to be less likely to discriminate based on the party affiliation of Player 2 (i.e., choose B in the own-party condition and A in the opposite-party condition). To test this, we perform multinomial logistic regression with “Player 1 type” as the dependent variable (see Table 1). Contrary to our expectations, we find no difference between *Invasion* and *Control* in the likelihood of being of type *BA* ($p = .612$). Rather, participants in *Invasion* are 7.7 percentage points less likely to be of type *AA* ($p = .026$) and 6.1 percentage points more likely to be of type *BB* ($p = .063$) relative to participants in *Control* (see Table A.7). This supports the notion that salient threats increase general willingness to compromise. We discuss this result in Section 7.2 and here conclude as follows:

Result 4 *The invasion prime makes participants more willing to compromise and choose B in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game irrespective of the partisan identity of the other player.*


6.3 The Effect of Invasion Primes Is Unaffected by Priming Disagreement

We now examine whether there are differences in the treatment effects in *Disagreement* as compared to *Invasion*. Logistic regressions reveal no statistically significant difference in the probability that participants play the cooperative option B in the role of Player 1 – regardless of whether Player 2 is affiliated with the same party ($p = .544$, cf. Table A.6) or the opposite party ($p = .393$, cf. Table A.6). We also find no statistically significant effects on Player 1 types in multinomial regressions (cf. Table A.7). Thus, reflecting the results in Section 5.4, we find that although perceived political disagreement is larger in *Disagreement*, this does not influence the effect of the *Invasion* prime.

Result 5 *When participants are primed with the threat of Russia’s military aggression, we fail to detect any effect on cooperative behavior of also priming participants with political disagreement about the conflict.*

²⁵Fisher’s exact tests yield the same conclusion: Participants in *Invasion* are more likely to choose B when Player 2 is affiliated with their own party (49.6 vs. 44.3 percent, $p = .060$, Fisher’s exact one-sided test) and with the opposite party (42.1 vs. 36.2 percent, $p = .037$, Fisher’s exact one-sided test) compared to participants in *Control*.

Figure 4: Decision of Player 1 across treatments



Note: This figure shows for each treatment the share of participants who choose B as Player 1 in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game when facing either a player affiliated with one's own party or the opposite party. Whiskers denote 95 percent confidence intervals.

7 Discussion

In the preceding analyses, we have demonstrated that priming Americans with an external threat in the form of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine reduces affective polarization. This lends support to the notion that the presence of outside threats and international conflicts influence divisions within a country. We also showed that affective polarization predicts people’s behavior in an incentivized coordination game and that the presence of an external threat increases overall willingness to compromise. In contrast to our expectations, however, the effect of the external threat was not changed by making internal disagreements about the threat salient.

In the following section, we further discuss the effect of political disagreement and the effect of threats on cooperation. We then extend our analysis to show that there are large differences in treatment effects between Democrats and Republicans. Finally, we broaden the discussion to what can be learned from the priming method that we apply in this study. In Appendix A.3.9, we provide evidence that neither strength of partisan support, extent of political interest, nor the participants’ gender or age moderate our treatment effects.

7.1 The Effect of Political Disagreement

As explained in Section 5.4, we find that when participants are primed with the threat of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is no additional effect of priming participants with political disagreement about how to handle the conflict. These results seem to be at odds with previous research that shows how making politics salient tends to increase affective polarization (e.g., [West and Iyengar, 2020](#); [Huddy and Yair, 2021](#); [Skytte, 2021](#)). In addition, they go against what one would expect from the importance of party cues for voter attitudes and behavior ([Baum and Groeling, 2009](#); [Bullock, 2019](#); [Telhami and Rouse, 2022](#)): When voters are reminded that their own party has criticized the opposing party, the cue received from one’s party is to feel animosity towards the opposing party.

One explanation for the absence of treatment differences between *Invasion* and *Disagreement* could be that the effect of Russia’s military aggression dominates the effect of disagreement about how well President Biden is handling the crisis. As such, our study provides evidence that points in a different direction than the recent studies that explain how conflicts can make disagreements become even more pronounced and increase national divisions ([John and Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015](#); [Orian Harel et al., 2020](#)). One possible reason for the mixed findings could be the type of threat that is being studied. From the perspective of the U.S., Russia’s invasion of Ukraine primarily posed a threat to American interests in Europe and to the geopol-

litical stability, with a widespread fear of the war escalating beyond the borders of Ukraine (cf. Section 2). In contrast, [John and Dvir-Gvirsman \(2015\)](#) study Israeli responses to the 2014 Gaza War, which led to thousands of casualties and thus posed a much more existential threat. We view it as an interesting point for future research to explore what conditions determine if conflicts work to unite or divide a nation.

7.2 The Effect of Threats on Cooperation

In Section 6, we showed that the *Invasion* treatment makes participants more willing to compromise, and this result was not significantly different in *Disagreement*. In contrast to our expectations, willingness to compromise increased regardless of the partisan identity of Player 2. Thus, one cannot interpret the increase in cooperation as a result of reducing affective polarization. One can, however, understand this effect through the lens of the Perceived Target of Threat principle ([Weisel and Zultan, 2016, 2021b,a](#)). According to this principle, individuals tend to help the group if they perceive the group to be under threat, but they help themselves if they perceive themselves to be under threat. At the time of the present study, Americans arguably perceived the target of threat to be “the U.S.” rather than themselves as “individuals”. Hence, the *Invasion* treatment might make participants more cooperative in general, increasing their willingness to cooperate as Player 1 even when they are facing a Player 2 affiliated with their own party (whom group biases support also in *Control*).

7.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Partisan Affiliation

An exploratory analysis reveals substantial differences in how Democrats and Republicans respond to the invasion prime: As we detail below, both the *Invasion* and *Disagreement* treatments reduce affective polarization among Republicans, but Democrats display the same level of affective polarization across all three treatments. Notably, this occurs even though both groups pass the manipulation checks.²⁶ In the following, we test for treatment effects for the two parties separately, and we then discuss possible reasons for why only Republicans are responsive to making the Russian invasion salient.

Looking first at feeling thermometers, we find a statistically significant 6.2 degrees reduction in the FT difference in *Invasion* among Republicans (OLS: $p = .008$, cf. Table 3). In contrast, we find no treatment effect among Democrats ($p = .984$). For neither the Republicans

²⁶Specifically, we find that perceived threat is significantly greater in *Invasion* than *Control* for Democrats (3.73 vs. 3.53, $p = .024$) and marginally so for Republicans (3.31 vs. 3.14, $p = .099$). Moreover, perceived disagreement is significantly greater in *Disagreement* than *Invasion* for both Democrats (3.37 vs. 2.90, $p < .001$) and Republicans (3.21 vs. 2.94, $p = .010$).

nor the Democrats is there any difference between the *Invasion* and *Disagreement* treatments ($p = .749$ and $p = .722$, cf. Table 3).²⁷

Likewise for the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game, only Republicans are influenced by the *Invasion* treatment (see Figure 5). Compared to Republicans in *Control*, Republicans in *Invasion* are more likely to choose B both when Player 2 is affiliated with the participant's own party (logit: 10.6 percentage points, $p = .031$, cf. Table A.9) and the opposite party (10.4 percentage points, $p = .027$). In contrast, Democrats are not influenced by the *Invasion* treatment (all p 's $> .322$). Again, there is no difference between *Invasion* and *Disagreement* for any of the parties. As for Player 1 types, the *Invasion* treatment makes Republicans 13.5 percentage points less likely to be of the selfish type *AA* (multinomial logistic regression: $p = .004$, cf. Table A.10) and 7.3 percentage points more likely to be of the cooperative type *BB* ($p = .081$). In contrast, there is no effect among Democrats (all p 's $> .291$). The effects of *Disagreement* are again not significantly different from those in *Invasion* for either party.

In sum, both treatments effectively reduce affective polarization among Republicans, and they increase Republican's willingness to compromise in the coordination game. None of the treatments have any effect on Democrats. First, one might speculate that this result is due to the characteristics of our sample. In our sample Republican participants are on average older, less educated, and more likely to be White/Caucasian compared to Democratic participants. But these sample differences reflect differences between Republicans and Democrats in the general population (Pew Research Center, 2018), and we control for these characteristics throughout the analysis.

Second, one might speculate that our sampling procedure led to differences between Republicans and Democrats. Specifically, because there are more Democrats than Republicans on Prolific,²⁸ more Democrats were recruited early in the data collection. Thus, almost all Democratic participants were recruited on the first day of data collection, but it took longer to recruit the Republican participants (96 vs. 34.6 percent of responses collected on the first day). If something happened after we started the data collection on May 7, 2022, this would have disproportionately large effects on the Republican sample. Ex ante, we accounted for this by making sure that equal shares were randomized into each treatment on every day, implying that any developments in the conflict would influence participants across all treatments. Ex post, we find no evidence of any systematic change in the estimated treatment effect among

²⁷Consequently, Republicans exhibit a 5.0 degrees reduction in FT difference in *Disagreement* compared to *Control* ($p = .023$, OLS), but there is no effect among Democrats ($p = .387$).

²⁸As of August 16, 2022, 80 percent of the participant pool on Prolific who had stated their support for one of the two parties supported the Democratic Party.

Republicans over the course of the data collection.²⁹

Third, it is possible that citizens respond differently to the conflict depending on what party the President represents. Studies of previous conflicts have found that the rally-around-the-flag effect, in which the President's popularity increases as a response to a threat, is more pronounced among the opposition. This may occur because people affiliated with the President and his party are “at the flag” already before the threat. For instance, [Fox \(2009\)](#) finds that the popularity of President Bush increased more for Democrats than Republicans in response to both the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq War. Similarly, [Callaghan and Virtanen \(1993\)](#) show that in response to the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, support for President Carter increased more among Republicans than Democrats (see also [Lebo and Cassino, 2007](#)). In this way, it is possible that those who are not in power and thus dislike the (party of the) President the most at the outset respond more strongly to a threat. This would make Republicans more responsive to our treatments.

Fourth, it is possible that the threat of Russia has different effects for Republicans and Democrats if Democrats associate the Republican Party with Russia, e.g. due to Russia’s interference in the 2016 election in favor of Donald Trump. In this election, Russia i.a. waged social media campaigns to favor Donald Trump, fabricated articles and disinformation, and conducted cyberattacks on the Clinton campaign ([Mueller, 2019](#)). As demonstrated by [Darr et al. \(2019\)](#), this scandal caused Democrats to evaluate the Trump administration less favorably, and it is possible that the controversial relation between the Republican Party and Russia lead Democrats to not think of Republicans as an ally for the present conflict.³⁰

²⁹Specifically, we looked at the estimated treatment effect on each day of the data collection and fail to find any pattern in the changes.

³⁰Indeed, as formulated by [Jahani et al. \(2020\)](#), p. 4): “People will only consider the enemy of their enemy to be a friend if they can see one of the enemies as a potential ally” (cf. social balance theory).


Table 3: Treatment effects by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	-0.387 (2.395)	0.303 (2.387)	-0.041 (2.096)	-4.798* (2.833)	-5.505* (2.853)	-6.222*** (2.345)
Constant	53.618*** (1.783)	46.079*** (4.819)	22.577*** (4.712)	49.194*** (1.888)	45.177*** (5.787)	22.451*** (5.742)
N	472	472	472	454	454	454
Adj. R2	-0.00	0.03	0.27	0.00	0.03	0.35
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	-1.072 (2.298)	0.092 (2.306)	-0.736 (2.066)	1.875 (2.843)	1.343 (2.838)	-0.776 (2.427)
Constant	54.303*** (1.651)	38.683*** (4.743)	23.007*** (4.911)	42.521*** (1.904)	29.970*** (5.577)	14.473*** (5.283)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Adj. R2	-0.00	0.07	0.24	-0.00	0.03	0.30
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 5: Player 1 decisions in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes Game



Note: This figure shows for each treatment the share of participants who choose B as Player 1 in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game when facing either a player affiliated with one's own party or the opposite party. The left diagram shows the behavior of Republicans, the right diagram shows the behavior of Democrats. Whiskers denote 95 percent confidence intervals.

7.4 Validity of Priming in Experiments

As the priming method has become increasingly popular (Cohn and Maréchal, 2016), researchers have become more aware of potential caveats with the method. One critique of priming is that effects tend to be short-lived. Indeed, the fact that we find an effect of priming participants with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine during the armed conflict suggests that the effect of the conflict is only present for individuals for whom the conflict is highly salient. It has long been known that while incumbent leaders become more popular following conflicts, this effect decays over time (Mueller, 1973; Kernell, 1978; Norpoth, 1984). Although we find causal evidence of the effect of priming individuals with the conflict, our study provides no information about the long-run effects of the conflict or how this effect may change as the nature of the conflict changes.³¹

A related concern is whether our primes work as “subtle situational cues” as intended or whether the primes include new information that may change participants’ attitudes (Cohn and Maréchal, 2016). We address this in Appendix A.3.9.6 by investigating whether the observed treatment effects are moderated by the extent to which participants have been following the development of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. If the effect of the news articles was to provide new information, those who do not follow the invasion should respond more strongly as they know less about the conflict. Yet, we find no statistically significant differences in treatment effects based on how much participants follow the war; if anything, participants who have been following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine actually reduce FT difference *more* in both the *Invasion* and *Disagreement* treatments. This suggests that the treatment effects in our study indeed follow from priming and not from new information.

8 Conclusion

In this study, we have shown that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to a modest reduction in affective polarization in the U.S. and that this effect did not depend on cross-party political disagreement. In addition, we have demonstrated that making Russia’s military aggression salient increases general cooperativeness among Americans in an incentivized coordination game. Thus, we have shown that the presence of an external threat can reduce polarization and increase cooperation within a country. This suggests that global changes in international relations matter for within-country developments in polarization. As such, our study extends

³¹As for short-run effects, we can exploit the fact that all participants completed our experiment in one sitting but that some participants took longer than others to complete the experiment. As we describe in Appendix A.3.9.5, we find that the treatment effects do not depend on the time between the news prime and answering the feeling thermometer questions (also when controlling for participants’ speed).

the literature that discusses why polarization has been on the rise in many countries (Iyengar et al., 2019) and how polarization may be detrimental to collaboration (Hetherington, 2015).

Yet, some factors challenge the external validity of our results. First, our sample differs from the American voting population on a number of observable characteristics. Specifically, our sample is younger, more educated, more likely to be unemployed, and Whites/Caucasians are over-represented. However, we control for all these background characteristics throughout the analyses.

Second, we measure the causal effect of one incident of military aggression for one specific war at one point in time. Our study provides no evidence for the generalizability of our effects across any of these dimensions. An avenue for future research is thus to investigate whether the effect persists for different types of crises and whether the effect of Russia's invasion changes as the conflict develops over time.

Another interesting avenue for future research is to elaborate on our surprising finding that priming participants with cross-party disagreement about how well President Biden is handling Russia's invasion does not change the effect of the invasion prime. To us, this suggests that as long as people agree that there is an external threat, it can be possible to have open discussions about how to best handle the threat without harming the unifying effect of the threat. Future studies should explore how general this result is and shed light on what characteristics of a group determine if crises lead to less or more polarization.

References

- AL-FANNAH, N. M. (2017): “Making Defeating CAPTCHAs Harder for Bots,” in *2017 Computing Conference*, London: IEEE, 775–782.
- AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES (1968): “ANES 1968 Time Series Study,” <https://electionstudies.org/data-center/1968-time-series-study/>.
- ARECHAR, A. A., S. GÄCHTER, AND L. MOLLEMAN (2018): “Conducting Interactive Experiments Online,” *Experimental Economics*, 21, 99–131.
- ÅS, B. (1982): “A Materialistic View of Men’s and Women’s Attitudes towards War,” *Women’s Studies International Forum*, 5, 355–364.
- ATTANASI, G., A. HOPFENSITZ, E. LORINI, AND F. MOISAN (2016): “Social Connectedness Improves Co-Ordination on Individually Costly, Efficient Outcomes,” *European Economic Review*, 90, 86–106.
- BAFUMI, J. AND J. M. PARENT (2012): “International Polarity and America’s Polarization,” *International Politics*, 49, 1–35.
- BAKER, W. D. AND J. R. ONEAL (2001): “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the ‘Rally ’Round the Flag’ Effect,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45, 661–687.
- BAUM, M. A. AND T. GROELING (2009): “Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding National Security and War,” *Political Behavior*, 31, 157–186.
- BBC (2022): “How Many Ukrainian Refugees Are There and Where Have They Gone?” *BBC*.
- BEBLER, A. (2015): “Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict,” *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 15, 35–54.
- BENDER, R. AND S. LANGE (2001): “Adjusting for Multiple Testing—When and How?” *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology*, 54, 343–349.
- BINDER, S. A. (2003): *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- BLESS, H. AND K. FIEDLER (2006): “Mood and the Regulation of Information Processing and Behavior,” in *Affect in Social Thinking and Behavior*, New York, NY, US: Psychology Press, 65–84.
- BONANNO, G. A. AND J. T. JOST (2006): “Conservative Shift Among High-Exposure Survivors of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks,” *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 28, 311–323.
- BOXELL, L., J. CONWAY, J. N. DRUCKMAN, AND M. GENTZKOW (2020): “Affective Polarization Did Not Increase During the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Working Paper 28036, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- BRUCHMANN, K., B. KOOPMANN-HOLM, AND A. SCHERER (2018): “Seeing beyond Political Affiliations: The Mediating Role of Perceived Moral Foundations on the Partisan Similarity-Liking Effect,” *PLOS ONE*, 13, e0202101.

- BULLOCK, J. G. (2019): “Party Cues,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion*, Oxford Handbooks, online edition.
- BURSZTEIN, E., S. BETHARD, C. FABRY, J. C. MITCHELL, AND D. JURAFSKY (2010): “How Good Are Humans at Solving CAPTCHAs? A Large Scale Evaluation,” in *2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, Oakland, CA, USA: IEEE, 399–413.
- BYRNE, D. (1961): “Interpersonal Attraction as a Function of Affiliation Need and Attitude Similarity,” *Human Relations*, 14, 283–289.
- CALLAGHAN, K. J. AND S. VIRTANEN (1993): “Revised Models of the ”Rally Phenomenon”: The Case of the Carter Presidency,” *The Journal of Politics*, 55, 756–764.
- CAO, J. AND S. ZHANG (2014): “Multiple Comparison Procedures,” *JAMA Guide to Statistics and Methods*, 312, 543–544.
- CARLIN, R. E. AND G. J. LOVE (2013): “The Politics of Interpersonal Trust and Reciprocity: An Experimental Approach,” *Political Behavior*, 35, 43–63.
- (2018): “Political Competition, Partisanship and Interpersonal Trust in Electoral Democracies,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 48, 115–139.
- CASEY, L. S., J. CHANDLER, A. S. LEVINE, A. PROCTOR, AND D. Z. STROLOVITCH (2017): “Intertemporal Differences among MTurk Workers: Time-based Sample Variations and Implications for Online Data Collection,” *SAGE Open*, 7, 2158244017712774.
- CHMIELEWSKI, M. AND S. C. KUCKER (2020): “An MTurk Crisis? Shifts in Data Quality and the Impact on Study Results,” *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 11, 464–473.
- CHONG, D. AND J. N. DRUCKMAN (2007): “Framing Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 103–126.
- CHUERI, J. AND P. TÖRNBERG (2022): “Did Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Unite Europe? Cohesion and Division in the Twitter Endorsement Networks of the European Parliament,” .
- CLARKE, D., J. P. ROMANO, AND M. WOLF (2020): “The Romano–Wolf Multiple-Hypothesis Correction in Stata,” *The Stata Journal*, 20, 812–843.
- COHN, A. AND M. A. MARÉCHAL (2016): “Priming in Economics,” *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 12, 17–21.
- COVELL, K. (1996): “National and Gender Differences in Adolescents’ War Attitudes,” *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, 19, 871–883.
- CRAMER, A. O. J., D. VAN RAVENZWAAIJ, D. MATZKE, H. STEINGROEVER, R. WETZELS, R. P. P. P. GRASMAN, L. J. WALDORP, AND E.-J. WAGENMAKERS (2016): “Hidden Multiplicity in Exploratory Multiway ANOVA: Prevalence and Remedies,” *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, 23, 640–647.
- DARR, J. P., N. P. KALMOE, K. SEARLES, M. SUI, R. J. PINGREE, B. K. WATSON, K. BRYANOV, AND M. SANTIA (2019): “Collision with Collusion: Partisan Reaction to the Trump–Russia Scandal,” *Perspectives on Politics*, 17, 772–787.

- DE JAEGHER, K. (2021): "Common-Enemy Effects: Multidisciplinary Antecedents and Economic Perspectives," *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 35, 3–33.
- DEHDARI, S. H. AND K. GEHRING (2022): "The Origins of Common Identity: Evidence from Alsace-Lorraine," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 14, 261–292.
- DENNIS, S. A., B. M. GOODSON, AND C. A. PEARSON (2020): "Online Worker Fraud and Evolving Threats to the Integrity of MTurk Data: A Discussion of Virtual Private Servers and the Limitations of IP-Based Screening Procedures," *Behavioral Research in Accounting*, 32, 119–134.
- DESCH, M. C. (1996): "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" *International Organization*, 50, 237–268.
- DOVIDIO, J. F., M. TEN VERGERT, T. L. STEWART, S. L. GAERTNER, J. D. JOHNSON, V. M. ESSES, B. M. RIEK, AND A. R. PEARSON (2004): "Perspective and Prejudice: Antecedents and Mediating Mechanisms," *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30, 1537–1549.
- DRUCKMAN, J. N. AND M. S. LEVENDUSKY (2019): "What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Polarization?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 83, 114–122.
- DUPUIS, E. C. AND E. S. COHN (2011): "A New Scale to Measure War Attitudes: Construction and Predictors," *Journal of Psychological Arts and Sciences*, 14.
- ECHEBARRIA-ECHABE, A. AND E. FERNÁNDEZ-GUDE (2006): "Effects of Terrorism on Attitudes and Ideological Orientation," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 36, 259–265.
- ECONOMIST, T. (2022): "Americans' Views on the War Reveal a Striking Generational Divide," *The Economist*.
- FARCOMENI, A. (2008): "A Review of Modern Multiple Hypothesis Testing, with Particular Attention to the False Discovery Proportion," *Statistical Methods in Medical Research*, 17, 347–388.
- FLORES, A., J. C. COLE, S. DICKERT, K. EOM, G. M. JIGA-BOY, T. KOGUT, R. LORIA, M. MAYORGA, E. J. PEDERSEN, B. PEREIRA, E. RUBALTELLI, D. K. SHERMAN, P. SLOVIC, D. VÄSTFJÄLL, AND L. VAN BOVEN (2022): "Politicians Polarize and Experts Depolarize Public Support for COVID-19 Management Policies across Countries," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 119, e2117543119.
- FOWLER, J. H. AND C. D. KAM (2007): "Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation," *The Journal of Politics*, 69, 813–827.
- FOX, G. T. (2009): "Partisan Divide on War and the Economy: Presidential Approval of G. W. Bush," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53, 905–933.
- FUKUYAMA, F. (1992): *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, Toronto, New York: Free Press ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International.
- GAERTNER, S. AND J. DOVIDIO (2000): *Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model*, Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

- GAERTNER, S. L., J. F. DOVIDIO, P. A. ANASTASIO, B. A. BACHMAN, AND M. C. RUST (1993): “The Common Ingroup Identity Model: Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias,” *European Review of Social Psychology*, 4, 1–26.
- GAERTNER, S. L., J. MANN, A. MURRELL, AND J. F. DOVIDIO (1989): “Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Benefits of Recategorization,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57, 239–249.
- GARRETT, K. N. AND A. BANKERT (2020): “The Moral Roots of Partisan Division: How Moral Conviction Heightens Affective Polarization,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 50, 621–640.
- GARRETT, R. K., S. D. GVIKSMAN, B. K. JOHNSON, Y. TSFATI, R. NEO, AND A. DAL (2014): “Implications of Pro- and Counterattitudinal Information Exposure for Affective Polarization: Partisan Media Exposure and Affective Polarization,” *Human Communication Research*, 40, 309–332.
- GEHRING, K. (2021): “Can External Threats Foster a European Union Identity? Evidence from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” *The Economic Journal*, ueab088.
- GIDRON, N., J. ADAMS, AND W. HORNE (2020): “American Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective,” *Elements in American Politics*.
- GIFT, K. AND T. GIFT (2015): “Does Politics Influence Hiring? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment,” *Political Behavior*, 37, 653–675.
- GILES, M. W. AND A. S. EVANS (1985): “External Threat, Perceived Threat and Group Identity,” *Social Science Quarterly*, 66, 50–67.
- GOULET-PELLETIER, J.-C. AND D. COUSINEAU (2018): “A Review of Effect Sizes and Their Confidence Intervals, Part I: The Cohen’s d Family,” *The Quantitative Methods for Psychology*, 14, 242–265.
- HANSEN, K. M. AND K. KOSIARA-PEDERSEN (2017): “How Campaigns Polarize the Electorate: Political Polarization as an Effect of the Minimal Effect Theory within a Multi-Party System,” *Party Politics*, 23, 181–192.
- HARTEVELD, E. (2021): “Fragmented Foes: Affective Polarization in the Multiparty Context of the Netherlands,” *Electoral Studies*, 71, 102332.
- HAUSER, D. J., P. C. ELLSWORTH, AND R. GONZALEZ (2018): “Are Manipulation Checks Necessary?” *Frontiers in Psychology*, 9.
- HAUSER, D. J. AND N. SCHWARZ (2015): “It’s a Trap! Instructional Manipulation Checks Prompt Systematic Thinking on “Tricky” Tasks,” *SAGE Open*, 5, 2158244015584617.
- (2016): “Attentive Turkers: MTurk Participants Perform Better on Online Attention Checks than Do Subject Pool Participants,” *Behavior Research Methods*, 48, 400–407.
- HETHERINGTON, M. (2015): ““Why Polarized Trust Matters”,” *The Forum*, 13, 445–458.
- HETHERINGTON, M. J., M. T. LONG, AND T. J. RUDOLPH (2016): “Revisiting the Myth: New Evidence of a Polarized Electorate,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 80, 321–350.

- HISTORY EXTRA, B. (2022): “Russia-Ukraine Crisis: 9 Milestone Moments in History That Explain Today’s Invasion,” *BBC*.
- HOBOLT, S. B., T. J. LEEPER, AND J. TILLEY (2021): “Divided by the Vote: Affective Polarization in the Wake of the Brexit Referendum,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 51, 1476–1493.
- HOENIG, J. M. AND D. M. HEISEY (2001): “The Abuse of Power,” *The American Statistician*, 55, 19–24.
- HUBER, G. A. AND N. MALHOTRA (2017): “Political Homophily in Social Relationships: Evidence from Online Dating Behavior,” *The Journal of Politics*, 79, 269–283.
- HUDDY, L. AND O. YAIR (2021): “Reducing Affective Polarization: Warm Group Relations or Policy Compromise?” *Political Psychology*, 42, 291–309.
- HUNTINGTON, S. P. (1997): “The Erosion of American National Interests,” *PALM COAST DATA*, 76, 28–49.
- IMPERIUM (2022): “RelevantID® – Imperium,” <https://www.imperium.com/relevantid/>.
- IYENGAR, S. AND M. KRUPENKIN (2018): “The Strengthening of Partisan Affect: Strengthening of Partisan Affect,” *Political Psychology*, 39, 201–218.
- IYENGAR, S., Y. LELKES, M. LEVENDUSKY, N. MALHOTRA, AND S. J. WESTWOOD (2019): “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22, 129–146.
- IYENGAR, S., G. SOOD, AND L. YPHTACH (2012): “AFFECT, NOT IDEOLOGY: A SOCIAL IDENTITY PERSPECTIVE ON POLARIZATION,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 76, 405–431.
- IYENGAR, S. AND S. J. WESTWOOD (2015): “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 59, 690–707.
- JAHANI, E., N. M. GALLAGHER, F. MERHOUT, N. CAVALLI, D. GUILBEAULT, Y. LENG, AND C. A. BAIL (2020): “Exposure to Common Enemies Can Increase Political Polarization: Evidence from a Cooperation Experiment with Automated Partisans” .
- JOHN, N. A. AND S. DVIR-GVRSMAN (2015): “‘I Don’t like You Any More’: Facebook Unfriending by Israelis during the Israel–Gaza Conflict of 2014,” *Journal of Communication*, 65, 953–974.
- KAISER, J. (2022): “Growth and Inequality: Experimental Evidence on How Misperceptions Affect Redistribution,” *Unpublished manuscript*.
- KARASAWA, M., K. KARASAWA, AND Y. HIROSE (2004): “Homogeneity Perception as a Reaction to Identity Threat: Effects of Status Difference in a Simulated Society Game,” *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 34, 613–625.
- KENNEDY, R., S. CLIFFORD, T. BURLEIGH, P. D. WAGGONER, R. JEWELL, AND N. J. G. WINTER (2020): “The Shape of and Solutions to the MTurk Quality Crisis,” *Political Science Research and Methods*, 8, 614–629.

- KERNELL, S. (1978): "Explaining Presidential Popularity: How Ad Hoc Theorizing, Misplaced Emphasis, and Insufficient Care in Measuring One's Variables Refuted Common Sense and Led Conventional Wisdom Down the Path of Anomalies," *American Political Science Review*, 72, 506–522.
- KHAZATSKY, A. (2021): "The Rise of Political Polarization in the U.S." *The Unisverse*.
- KINGSLEY, P. (2022): "The Roots of the Ukraine War: How the Crisis Developed," *New York Times*.
- KNUDSEN, E. (2021): "Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems? Comparing Affective Polarization Towards Voters and Parties in Norway and the United States," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 44, 34–44.
- LAU, R. R., D. J. ANDERSEN, T. M. DITONTO, M. S. KLEINBERG, AND D. P. REDLAWSK (2017): "Effect of Media Environment Diversity and Advertising Tone on Information Search, Selective Exposure, and Affective Polarization," *Political Behavior*, 39, 231–255.
- LAYMAN, G. C., T. M. CARSEY, AND J. M. HOROWITZ (2006): "PARTY POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9, 83–110.
- LEBO, M. J. AND D. CASSINO (2007): "The Aggregated Consequences of Motivated Reasoning and the Dynamics of Partisan Presidential Approval," *Political Psychology*, 28, 719–746.
- LESTER, D. (1994): "Factors Affecting Student Attitudes toward War," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 134, 541–543.
- LEVENDUSKY, M. (2009): *The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- LEVENDUSKY, M. S. (2018): "Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?" *The Journal of Politics*, 80, 59–70.
- LIST, J. A., A. M. SHAIKH, AND Y. XU (2019): "Multiple Hypothesis Testing in Experimental Economics," *Experimental Economics*, 22, 773–793.
- MACKIE, D. M., T. DEVOS, AND E. R. SMITH (2000): "Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79, 602–616.
- MACKINTOSH, E. (2022): "What Does Putin Want in Ukraine? The Conflict Explained," *CNN*.
- MACKUEN, M., J. WOLAK, L. KEELE, AND G. E. MARCUS (2010): "Civic Engagements: Resolute Partisanship or Reflective Deliberation," *American Journal of Political Science*, 54, 440–458.
- MAKI, A., P. C. DWYER, S. BLAZEK, M. SNYDER, R. GONZÁLEZ, AND S. LAY (2019): "Responding to Natural Disasters: Examining Identity and Prosociality in the Context of a Major Earthquake," *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 58, 66–87.
- MARCHAL, N. AND D. WATSON (2019): "The Rise of Partisan Affective Polarization in the British Public," *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
- MASON, L. (2013): "The Rise of Uncivil Agreement: Issue Versus Behavioral Polarization in the American Electorate," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57, 140–159.

- (2015): ““I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 59, 128–145.
- (2018a): “Ideologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 82, 866–887.
- (2018b): “Losing Common Ground: Social Sorting and Polarization,” *The Forum*, 16, 47–66.
- MASON, L. AND J. WRONSKI (2018): “One Tribe to Bind Them All: How Our Social Group Attachments Strengthen Partisanship,” *Political Psychology*, 39, 257–277.
- MATHERLY, T. (2019): “A Panel for Lemons? Positivity Bias, Reputation Systems and Data Quality on MTurk,” *European Journal of Marketing*, 53, 195–223.
- MCCONNELL, C., Y. MARGALIT, N. MALHOTRA, AND M. LEVENDUSKY (2018): “The Economic Consequences of Partisanship in a Polarized Era,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 62, 5–18.
- MEROLLA, J. L., J. M. RAMOS, AND E. J. ZECHMEISTER (2007): “Crisis, Charisma, and Consequences: Evidence from the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election,” *The Journal of Politics*, 69, 30–42.
- MEROLLA, J. L. AND E. J. ZECHMEISTER (2009): *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- MONTGOMERY, J. M., B. NYHAN, AND M. TORRES (2018): “How Conditioning on Posttreatment Variables Can Ruin Your Experiment and What to Do about It,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 62, 760–775.
- MORALES, M. (2022): “Movement of Raindrops on Car Windshield Has Scientific Explanation As Gravity Forces Cause Them to Move,” *The Science Times*.
- MORGAN, D. (2022): “Republicans Target Biden for Blame over Putin’s Ukraine Invasion,” *Reuters*.
- MOSKALENKO, S., C. McCUALEY, AND P. ROZIN (2006): “Group Identification under Conditions of Threat: College Students’ Attachment to Country, Family, Ethnicity, Religion, and University before and after September 11, 2001,” *Political Psychology*, 27, 77–97.
- MOSS, A. AND L. LITMAN (2018a): “After the Bot Scare: Understanding What’s Been Happening with Data Collection on MTurk and How to Stop It,” .
- (2018b): “Concerns about Bots on Mechanical Turk: Problems and Solutions,” .
- MUELLER, J. (1973): *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*, New York: John Wiley.
- MUELLER, J. E. (1970): “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson,” *The American Political Science Review*, 64, 18–34.
- MUELLER, R. S. (2019): “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election,” Tech. rep., U.S. Department of Justice.
- MYRICK, R. (2021): “Do External Threats Unite or Divide? Security Crises, Rivalries, and Polarization in American Foreign Policy,” *International Organization*, 75, 921–958.

- NIVOLA, P. S. (2003): “Can the Government Be Serious?” *The Brookings Review*, 21.
- NORPOTH, H. (1984): “Economics, Politics, and the Cycle of Presidential Popularity,” *Political Behavior*, 6, 253–273.
- OPPENHEIMER, D. M., T. MEYVIS, AND N. DAVIDENKO (2009): “Instructional Manipulation Checks: Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45, 867–872.
- ORIAN HAREL, T., I. MAOZ, AND E. HALPERIN (2020): “A Conflict within a Conflict: Intragroup Ideological Polarization and Intergroup Intractable Conflict,” *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, 34, 52–57.
- PAOLACCI, G. AND J. CHANDLER (2014): “Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool,” *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 23, 184–188.
- PAOLACCI, G., J. CHANDLER, AND P. G. IPEIROTIS (2010): “Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk,” *Judgment and Decision Making*, 5, 411–419.
- PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2018): “Trends in Party Affiliation among Demographic Groups,” *Pew Research Center*.
- (2022): “Americans’ Concerns About War in Ukraine: Wider Conflict, Possible U.S.-Russia Clash,” *Pew Research Center*.
- PIONTKOWSKI, U., A. ROHMANN, AND A. FLORACK (2002): “Concordance of Acculturation Attitudes and Perceived Threat,” *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 5, 221–232.
- PORAT, R., M. TAMIR, M. J. A. WOHL, T. GUR, AND E. HALPERIN (2019): “Motivated Emotion and the Rally around the Flag Effect: Liberals Are Motivated to Feel Collective Angst (like Conservatives) When Faced with Existential Threat,” *Cognition and Emotion*, 33, 480–491.
- PROLIFIC (2021): “Why Participants Get Banned,” <https://blog.prolific.co/why-participants-get-banned/>.
- (2022): “Prolific . Quickly Find Research Participants You Can Trust.” <https://www.prolific.co/#audience>.
- PUTNEY, S. AND R. MIDDLETON (1962): “Some Factors Associated with Student Acceptance or Rejection of War,” *American Sociological Review*, 27, 655–667.
- QUALTRICS (2022): “Fraud Detection,” <https://www.qualtrics.com/support/survey-platform/survey-module/survey-checker/fraud-detection/>.
- REILJAN, A. (2020): “‘Fear and Loathing across Party Lines’ (Also) in Europe: Affective Polarisation in European Party Systems,” *European Journal of Political Research*, 59, 376–396.
- RENSTRÖM, E. A., H. BÄCK, AND R. CARROLL (2021): “Intergroup Threat and Affective Polarization in a Multi-Party System,” *The Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 9, 553–576.
- RIEK, B. M., E. W. MANIA, AND S. L. GAERTNER (2006): “Intergroup Threat and Outgroup Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10, 336–353.

- ROBISON, J. AND R. L. MOSKOWITZ (2019): “The Group Basis of Partisan Affective Polarization,” *The Journal of Politics*, 81, 1075–1079.
- ROHMANN, A., A. FLORACK, AND U. PIONTKOWSKI (2006): “The Role of Discordant Acculturation Attitudes in Perceived Threat: An Analysis of Host and Immigrant Attitudes in Germany,” *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 30, 683–702.
- ROHMANN, A., U. PIONTKOWSKI, AND A. VAN RANDENBORGH (2008): “When Attitudes Do Not Fit: Discordanace of Acculturation Attitudes as an Antecedent of Intergroup Threat,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 34, 337–352.
- ROMAN, N., W. WANTA, AND I. BUNIAK (2017): “Information Wars: Eastern Ukraine Military Conflict Coverage in the Russian, Ukrainian and U.S. Newscasts,” *International Communication Gazette*, 79, 357–378.
- ROMANO, J. P. AND M. WOLF (2005a): “Exact and Approximate Stepdown Methods for Multiple Hypothesis Testing,” *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 100, 94–108.
- (2005b): “Stepwise Multiple Testing as Formalized Data Snooping,” *Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society*, 73, 1237–1282.
- (2016): “Efficient Computation of Adjusted P-Values for Resampling-Based Stepdown Multiple Testing,” *Statistics & Probability Letters*, 113, 38–40.
- ROTHGERBER, H. (1997): “External Intergroup Threat as an Antecedent to Perceptions in In-Group and out-Group Homogeneity,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73, 1206–1212.
- RUCH, A., A. DECTER-FRAIN, AND R. BATRA (2022): “Millions of Co-purchases and Reviews Reveal the Spread of Polarization and Lifestyle Politics across Online Markets,” *arXiv:2201.06556 [physics]*.
- SCHROEDER, D. F., E. L. GAIER, AND J. A. HOLDNACK (1993): “Middle Adolescents’ Views of War and American Military Involvement in the Persian Gulf,” *Adolescence*, 28, 951–963.
- SELTEN, R. (1967): “Die Strategiemethode Zur Erforschung Des Eingeschränkt Rationalen Verhaltens Im Rahmen Eines Oligopolexperimentes,” in *Beiträge Zur Experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung*, ed. by H. Sauer- man, J. C. B. Mohr: Tübingen, book section 5, pp. 136–168.
- SHAMIR, M. AND T. SAGIV-SCHIFTER (2006): “Conflict, Identity, and Tolerance: Israel in the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” *Political Psychology*, 27, 569–595.
- SHYROKYKH, K. (2018): “The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine: External Actors and Domestic Factors,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 70, 832–850.
- SIVAKORN, S., I. POLAKIS, AND A. D. KEROMYTIS (2016): “I Am Robot: (Deep) Learning to Break Semantic Image CAPTCHAs,” in *2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)*, Saarbrucken: IEEE, 388–403.
- SKYTTE, R. (2021): “Dimensions of Elite Partisan Polarization: Disentangling the Effects of Incivility and Issue Polarization,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 51, 1457–1475.

- STAGNER, R. (1938): "Some Factors Related to Attitude toward War," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 16, 131–142.
- STEPHAN, W. G., K. A. BONIECKI, O. YBARRA, A. BETTENCOURT, K. S. ERVIN, L. A. JACKSON, P. S. McNATT, AND C. L. RENFRO (2002): "The Role of Threats in the Racial Attitudes of Blacks and Whites," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 1242–1254.
- STEPHAN, W. G. AND C. W. STEPHAN (1996): "Predicting Prejudice," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 20, 409–426.
- (2000): "An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice," in *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination*, Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, "The Claremont Symposium on Applied Social Psychology", 23–45.
- STEPHAN, W. G., O. YBARRA, AND K. R. MORRISON (2009): "Intergroup Threat Theory," in *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- STEPHAN, W. G., O. YBARRA, AND K. RIOS (2015): "Intergroup Threat Theory," in *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- STOHLBERG, J., I. FRITSCH, AND E. JONAS (2017): "The Groupy Shift: Conformity to Liberal in-Group Norms as a Group-Based Response to Threatened Personal Control," *Social Cognition*, 35, 374–394.
- SUMNER, W. G. (1906): *Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals*, Boston, MA: Ginn.
- TAJFEL, H. (1978): "Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Comparisons," in *Differentiation between Social Groups*, London, UK: Academic Press, 61–76.
- (1986): "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Monterey, CA, USA: Brooks/Cole, 33–37.
- TAJFEL, H., M. G. BILLIG, R. P. BUNDY, AND C. FLAMENT (1971): "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 149–178.
- TAJFEL, H. AND J. C. TURNER (1979): "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- TELHAMI, S. AND S. M. ROUSE (2022): "Measuring the Impact of Partisanship on Attitudes toward the US Response to the Russia-Ukraine War," *Brookings*.
- THOMAS, K. A. AND S. CLIFFORD (2017): "Validity and Mechanical Turk: An Assessment of Exclusion Methods and Interactive Experiments," *Computers in Human Behavior*, 77, 184–197.
- TURNER, J. C. (1975): "Social Comparison and Social Identity: Some Prospects for Intergroup Behaviour," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 5, 1–34.
- TURNER, J. C., M. A. HOGG, P. J. OAKES, S. D. REICHER, AND M. S. WETHERELL (1987): *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*, Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory, Cambridge, MA, US: Basil Blackwell.

- TURNER, J. C., P. J. OAKES, S. A. HASLAM, AND C. McGARTY (1994): “Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20, 454–463.
- TURNER, J. C. AND K. J. REYNOLDS (2012): “Self-Categorization Theory,” in *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology*, Vol. 2, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd, 399–417.
- TWORZECKI, H. (2019): “Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681, 97–119.
- UN (2022): “Ukraine: UN Rights Office Probe Spotlights Harrowing Plight of Civilians,” *UN*.
- VAIL, K. E., J. ARNDT, M. MOTYL, AND T. PYSCZYZNSKI (2012): “The Aftermath of Destruction: Images of Destroyed Buildings Increase Support for War, Dogmatism, and Death Thought Accessibility,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48, 1069–1081.
- VANNETTE, D. (2017): “Using Attention Checks in Your Surveys May Harm Data Quality,” .
- WAGNER, M. (2021): “Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems,” *Electoral Studies*, 69, 102199.
- WALTZ, K. (1979): *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw-Hill.
- WEISEL, O. AND R. BÖHM (2015): ““Ingroup Love” and “Outgroup Hate” in Intergroup Conflict between Natural Groups,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 60, 110–120.
- WEISEL, O. AND R. ZULTAN (2016): “Social Motives in Intergroup Conflict: Group Identity and Perceived Target of Threat,” *European Economic Review*, 90, 122–133.
- (2021a): “Perceived Level of Threat and Cooperation,” *Frontiers in Psychology*, 12.
- (2021b): “Perceptions of Conflict: Parochial Cooperation and Outgroup Spite Revisited,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 167, 57–71.
- WEST, E. A. AND S. IYENGAR (2020): “Partisanship as a Social Identity: Implications for Polarization,” *Political Behavior*.
- WESTWOOD, S. J., S. IYENGAR, S. WALGRAVE, R. LEONISIO, L. MILLER, AND O. STRIBIS (2018): “The Tie That Divides: Cross-national Evidence of the Primacy of Partyism,” *European Journal of Political Research*, 57, 333–354.
- WHITT, S., A. B. YANUS, B. McDONALD, J. GRAEBER, M. SETZLER, G. BALLINGRUD, AND M. KIFER (2021): “Tribalism in America: Behavioral Experiments on Affective Polarization in the Trump Era,” *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 8, 247–259.
- WILDER, D. A. (1984): “Predictions of Belief Homogeneity and Similarity Following Social Categorization,” *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 23, 323–333.
- ZÁRATE, M. A., B. GARCIA, A. A. GARZA, AND R. T. HITLAN (2004): “Cultural Threat and Perceived Realistic Group Conflict as Dual Predictors of Prejudice,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 40, 99–105.

ZHANG, Z., S. ZHU, J. MINK, A. XIONG, L. SONG, AND G. WANG (2022): “Beyond Bot Detection: Combating Fraudulent Online Survey Takers,” *Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022 (WWW ’22), April 25–29, 2022, Lyon, France*, 1–11.

ZORN, T. J., A. MATA, AND H. ALVES (2022): “Attitude Similarity and Interpersonal Liking: A Dominance of Positive over Negative Attitudes,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 100, 104281.

Online Supplement

Did Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Reduce Affective Polarization in the U.S.? Experimental Evidence

Jonas Pilgaard Kaiser & Markus Seier

January 4, 2023

A.1 Background: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine


In the following section, we give a brief account of important developments for Ukraine's recent history, and we describe how Americans viewed the Russian invasion at the time of our experiment. Our aim is not to provide full details of Ukraine's complex history but rather to provide background information necessary for understanding the scope of the current conflict.

After Ukraine left the Soviet Union in 1991 ([Mackintosh, 2022](#)), Ukraine's main political goals have been to ensure independence and sovereignty while simultaneously balancing co-operation with the European Union and Russia ([Shyrokykh, 2018](#)). This balance has been increasingly difficult to maintain as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have expanded eastward. Specifically, the European Union enrolled 12 new states between 2004 and 2007 and initiated negotiations about an Association Agreement with Ukraine in 2008 ([Gehring, 2021](#)). Further, NATO announced at the Bucharest summit in 2008 plans of some day enrolling Ukraine and Georgia in the organization ([Bebler, 2015](#)). This eastward expansion has been viewed critically by Russia and President Vladimir Putin, who on several occasions has expressed his views of Ukraine being a part of Russia ([Mackintosh, 2022](#)).

The tensions between Russia and Ukraine increased drastically after the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution. The revolution followed the Russian-friendly President Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, and it ended with Yanukovych being forced to flee the country ([Gehring, 2021](#)). Afterwards, a separatist rebellion broke out in the east of Ukraine, and this gained support from Russia. In March 2014, Russia deployed

military to Crimea and took over government buildings. Russian-backed authorities held a referendum shortly after this invasion, and Crimean voters overwhelmingly chose to join Russia. While Ukraine and Western countries called this referendum illegitimate, President Vladimir Putin finalized the absorption of the peninsula into Russia. The conflict then shifted to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine. The pro-Russian separatists held a self-rule referendum claiming independence of the regions, but the Ukrainian government responded with a so-called “anti-terrorist operation” against the separatists. Throughout this operation, President Vladimir Putin denied Russian military involvement (Roman et al., 2017). The Ukrainian government and the separatists agreed on cease fire with the Minsk peace agreement in 2015, but there has not been stable peace in the regions since. By 2021, more than 13,000 people had been killed in this conflict and Western countries have responded with sanctions on Russia (History Extra, 2022).

Figure A.1: Timeline of the Russian/Ukrainian conflict



A dramatic escalation of the conflict occurred on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of the Ukrainian mainland. The immediate response from the U.S. and European countries was to impose economic sanctions targeting Russian banks and Russia’s oil and gas industry. The U.S. did not employ any military in Ukraine, but they increased the number of troops in NATO countries near Ukraine. As of May 17 (around the time of our experiment), more than 3,380 civilians were confirmed to have been killed (UN, 2022), and 12 million refugees were believed to have fled Ukraine (BBC, 2022).

A.2 Experimental Design

A.2.1 Instructions

On the next page, we include the instructions for participants who are randomly assigned to the *Invasion* treatment. Afterwards, we include the news articles used in *Disagreement* and *Control*. There are a few things to note for these screenshots:

- On the first page (Prolific post), we include the information that participants see before deciding whether to participate in the study or not. That is, this page is not strictly speaking a part of the experiment, but it is added here for completeness as it is the first information that participants receive about the present experiment.
- On the second and third pages (consent form and demographics), we include honeypots. These are simple hidden questions that asks “Do you see this question” with responses “Yes”, “No”, and “Don’t know” (coded in JavaScript). These questions can only be read by bots; thus, any participant who answers one of these questions is confirmed to use a bot.
- On the seventh page (asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game), a dropdown menu presents the participants with three choices for the control questions: “Person 1 and Person 2 choose A”, “Person 1 and Person 2 choose B”, and “Person 1 and Person 2 choose differently”. All three answers must be correct before the participant is allowed to continue. If at least one answer is incorrect, the participants receive a prompt that this is the case, and they are told to try again.
- As explained in Section 4, the order in which people are shown the different parties as well as the order in which the traits appear are randomized between participants.

Consent Form

You are being invited to take part in the research study 'Study on Attitudes'. We would like to ask you for your consent to participate in the study and for us to treat your data in agreement with data protection legislation. Before you decide to participate in this study, it is important that you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. Please ask the researcher if there is anything that is not clear or if you need more information. You may print this consent form for your records.

The **purpose** of this study is to learn about people's attitudes. **Your task** will be to answer questions about your attitudes and your background (e.g., gender, age, and ethnicity) as well as to read a short news article.

Your participation should take about **10 minutes**, and you must complete the study in one sitting. If you complete the study, you will receive **USD 1.3 and up to 35 cents in bonus payment**. This study is funded by Knud Højgaards Fond and William Demant Fonden, and you will be paid via Prolific's payment system.

By participating, you will contribute to research and be paid as stated above. There are no risks for participating in this study beyond those encountered in normal everyday life. Please understand that your **participation is voluntary**, and you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time without penalty. To stop, simply close your browser window.

Your responses will be **confidential**. Your Prolific ID number will be kept confidential and will be deleted 6 months after the payment process is completed. Normal personal information such as your gender, age, and ethnicity is collected for the scientific analysis. When we publish the results from this study in a scientific journal, the anonymized data will also be made publicly available to comply with open science standards.

If you have questions about this research study or your participation, please contact the researcher Markus Seier from Aarhus University, Denmark, through the Prolific messaging system or by email at mseier@econ.au.dk.

Thank you very much for your participation!

By clicking the button below, you acknowledge:

- Your participation in the study is voluntary, and you may withdraw your consent and discontinue participation at any time without penalty.
- You do not waive any legal rights or release Aarhus University and The Norwegian School of Economics or its agents from liability for negligence.
- You give consent to treating your personal data and to participate as a subject in the study as described above.



I consent, begin the study



I do not consent, I do not wish to participate

What is your Prolific ID?

Please note that this response should auto-fill with the correct ID

What is your **age** (in years)?

What is your **gender**?

- Male
- Female

What best describes your **ethnicity**?

- White or Caucasian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Asian American
- Other

What is the highest **degree** or level of school that you have completed?

- Less than a high school diploma
- High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
- Some college, no degree
- Associate degree (e.g., AA, AS)
- Bachelor's degree (e.g., BA, BS)
- Master's degree (e.g., MA, MS, MEd)
- Doctorate or professional degree (e.g., MD, DDS, PhD)

What best describes your current **employment status**?

- Employed (part or full time)
- Self-employed
- Unemployed
- Student
- Retired
- Other

What is your **year of birth**?

Now, we would like you to read a brief article about Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Please read it carefully.

Based on the article, we will ask you to write 1-2 sentences about how Russia may respond to the financial sanctions that the U.S. and its allies have imposed.

"The Russian invasion will upend the lives of 44 million Ukrainians. But the relevance of Ukraine extends far beyond its borders. Its fate has huge implications for the rest of Europe, the health of the global economy and America's place in the world.

Putin's attempt to redraw the map of Europe risks becoming the most devastating conflict on the continent since World War II. As a response to the invasion, the United States and its allies in Europe have imposed the toughest financial sanctions ever on Russia, and they have only built on these penalties since.

However, this sustained international pressure and Ukraine's resistance may still not be enough to force Russia to end its military campaign. That leaves Ukraine – and the world – in a perilous and unpredictable moment.

Scholars who study the effect of economic isolation on states – whether through sanctions, wartime blockades, or other mechanisms – find that economic isolation rarely causes its targets to capitulate outright. Rather, economic pressure can lead states at war to adopt riskier strategies, and this often leads to an escalation of the conflict."



According to the article, how might Russia respond to the imposed financial sanctions? Write 1-2 sentences in your own words.

On a scale from 1 to 5, how much have you been following the development of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

Not at all	To a lesser extent	To some extent	To a large extent	To the fullest extent
<input type="radio"/>				

On a scale from 1 to 5, how big a threat do you consider Russia's invasion of Ukraine to be for the United States and its interest?

Very small	Small	Moderate	Somewhat severe	Severe
<input type="radio"/>				

On a scale from 1 to 5, to what extent do you consider Democrats and Republicans to disagree/agree on how to handle Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

We would like you to rate how you feel towards the Democratic and Republican parties on a scale of 0 to 100, which we call a "feeling thermometer". On this feeling thermometer scale, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel cold and unfavorable towards the party (with 0 being the coldest). Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel warm and favorable (with 100 being the warmest). A rating of 50 means you have no feeling one way or the other.

How would you rate your feeling towards the **Republican Party**? Write a number between 0 (cold) and 100 (warm).

How would you rate your feeling towards the **Democratic Party**? Write a number between 0 (cold) and 100 (warm).

Now we would like know more about what you think about the Democratic Party. Below, we have given a list of words that some people might use to describe them. For each item, please indicate **how well you think it applies to the Democratic Party.**

	Not at all well	Not too well	Somewhat well	Very well	Extremely well
Honest	<input type="radio"/>				
Open-minded	<input type="radio"/>				
Intelligent	<input type="radio"/>				
Selfish	<input type="radio"/>				
Patriotic	<input type="radio"/>				

Now we would like know more about what you think about the Republican Party. Below, we have given a list of words that some people might use to describe them. For each item, please indicate **how well you think it applies to the Republican Party.**

	Not at all well	Not too well	Somewhat well	Very well	Extremely well
Honest	<input type="radio"/>				
Open-minded	<input type="radio"/>				
Intelligent	<input type="radio"/>				
Selfish	<input type="radio"/>				
Patriotic	<input type="radio"/>				

For your next task, **you will be matched with a respondent who supports the Democratic Party**. One of you will be Person 1, the other will be Person 2. You will be asked to make a decision both as Person 1 and Person 2. The actual roles will be drawn at random after your response.

Your task is to choose either **A** or **B**. Your payment will depend on what you and the Democrat choose:

- If both you and the Democrat choose **A**, then **Person 1 will earn 35 cents, and Person 2 earns 5 cents**.
- If both you and the Democrat choose **B**, then **Person 1 will earn 15 cents, and Person 2 earns 35 cents**.
- If you and the Democrat choose **differently**, then both **Person 1 and Person 2 earn nothing (0 cents)**.

The following table summarizes the different choices and their corresponding payments:

	A	B
A	Person 1: 35 Person 2: 5	Person 1: 0 Person 2: 0
B	Person 1: 0 Person 2: 35	Person 1: 15 Person 2: 0

Before you continue to your decisions, we would like to ensure that you understand the task. Please answer the following questions.

If you are selected to be **Person 1**, what will maximize your earnings?

If you are selected to be **Person 2**, what will maximize your earnings?

What decisions will maximize the total earnings?

If you are selected to be **Person 1** and the Democrat is Person 2, will you choose **A** or **B**?

A
 B

If you are selected to be **Person 2** and the Democrat is Person 1, will you choose **A** or **B**?

A
 B

Now, **you will be matched with a respondent who supports the Republican Party**. The situation is the same as before. That is, your task is to choose either **A** or **B**. Your payment will depend on what you and the Republican choose:

- If both you and the Republican choose **A**, then **Person 1 will earn 35 cents, and Person 2 earns 5 cents**.
- If both you and the Republican choose **B**, then **Person 1 will earn 15 cents, and Person 2 earns 35 cents**.
- If you and the Republican choose **differently**, then both **Person 1 and Person 2 earn nothing (0 cents)**.

The following table summarizes the different choices and their corresponding payments:

	A	B
A	Person 1: 35 Person 2: 5	Person 1: 0 Person 2: 0
B	Person 1: 0 Person 2: 0	Person 1: 15 Person 2: 35

Note that we randomize whether your bonus payment comes from this interaction or your previous interaction with the Democrat.

If you are selected to be **Person 1** and the Republican is Person 2, will you choose **A** or **B**?

A
 B

If you are selected to be **Person 2** and the Republican is Person 1, will you choose **A** or **B**?

A
 B

In general, how interested are you in politics?

Not at all interested	Not too interested	Somewhat interested	Very interested	Extremely interested
<input type="radio"/>				

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat?

- Strong Democrat
- Not very strong Democrat

Your response has been recorded. Thank you for completing this study and thereby helping us with our research!

We will now examine your responses and match you with another participant to determine potential bonuses from your participation in our study. You will receive your payment via Prolific's payment system in the next 5 days.

Please click the button below to be redirected back to Prolific and register your submission.

Now, we would like you to read a brief article about how raindrops move on car windshields. Please read it carefully.

Based on the article, we will ask you to list some of the factors that influence raindrop's movement.

"As a car speeds along in the rain, some water droplets slide up the windshield, others slide down, and some seem stuck in place. Sungyon Lee and Alireza Hooshanginejad, fluid mechanics researchers at Cornell University, used mathematical equations to describe the forces on the raindrops. That work revealed several factors that determine a droplet's behavior, the pair reports March 4 in *Physical Review Fluids*.

Raindrops on a moving car's angled windshield simultaneously experience forces from gravity and from the wind that speeds over the car. The direction that a raindrop moves depends on its size, Lee and Hooshanginejad say. For larger raindrops, gravity wins, pulling the droplets down. For smaller raindrops, wind prevails, pushing them up the slope. For medium-sized raindrops, the forces balance out and the droplets sit still. The tiniest raindrops also stay put, because the wind doesn't provide enough oomph to overcome water's tendency to adhere to the glass.



Other factors affect the raindrops' behavior, too. As the car's speed, and therefore wind speed, increases, larger raindrops get pushed up the windshield. Decreasing the car's speed has the opposite effect. And if the car moves slowly enough, there won't be enough wind to coax any raindrops to move upward."

According to the article, what are some of the factors that influence raindrops' direction of movement on car windshields? Write 1-2 sentences in your own words.

Now, we would like you to read a brief article about Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Please read it carefully.

Based on the article, we will ask you to write 1-2 sentences about how (some) Democrats and Republicans view the response by President Joe Biden to Russia's invasion.

"The Russian invasion will upend the lives of 44 million Ukrainians. But the relevance of Ukraine extends far beyond its borders. Its fate has huge implications for the rest of Europe, the health of the global economy and America's place in the world.

Putin's attempt to redraw the map of Europe risks becoming the most devastating conflict on the continent since World War II. As a response to the invasion, the United States and its allies in Europe have imposed the toughest financial sanctions ever on Russia, and they have only built on these penalties since.



Some Republicans in Congress have blamed Biden for failing to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin from sending forces into Ukraine. They have called on the U.S. president to take a stronger position on the largest conflict in Europe since World War II. "There's no doubt that weakness leads to war," Representative Brian Mast, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a Thursday (February 24th) morning tweet. Opposingly, some Democrats like Senator Mark Warner, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, have argued that the Republican critique is misguided and that pre-emptive sanctions may have been of little benefit."

According to the article, how do (some) Democrats and Republicans view the response by President Joe Biden to Russia's invasion? Write 1-2 sentences in your own words.

On a scale from 1 to 5, how much have you been following the development of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

Not at all	To a lesser extent	To some extent	To a large extent	To the fullest extent
<input type="radio"/>				

On a scale from 1 to 5, how big a threat do you consider Russia's invasion of Ukraine to be for the United States and its interest?

Very small	Small	Moderate	Somewhat severe	Severe
<input type="radio"/>				

On a scale from 1 to 5, to what extent do you consider Democrats and Republicans to disagree/agree on how to handle Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

A.2.2 Screeners

In the following, we describe the pre-registered screeners that we applied to ensure high-quality data in our sample. As mentioned in Section 4, these screeners led to the exclusion of in total 13 of 1425 responses (0.9 percent).

First, we used two ‘honeypots’ (coded in JavaScript) to detect bots. Honeypots are traps set up to engage and detect bad actors in a computer system. We followed [Moss and Litman \(2018a\)](#) and used survey items that were hidden from humans but would be read by a bot. Thus, only bots would be able to answer these questions. If any response was provided to one of these questions, the respondent was confirmed to be a bot, and we dropped it from the experiment.¹ We detected no bots in our sample.

Second, we followed [Kennedy et al. \(2020\)](#) and included a consistency check in the demographic questions. The first item asked participants about their age, and the last item asked about their year of birth (see also [Zhang et al., 2022](#)). This resulted in the exclusion of 9 participants who answered these questions inconsistently.

Third, we followed [Chmielewski and Kucker \(2020\)](#) and used the text prime as an additional screener for farmers (see also [Dennis et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2022](#)). Farmers are respondents who manage to access the study despite not being in the U.S. (e.g., via server farms) and not being proficient in English ([Moss and Litman, 2018b](#)). We did not identify any responses that misused the English language, used nonsense phrases, or answered in single words unrelated to the question (e.g., “nice” and “good”). Neither did we find any responses that copied entire paragraphs from the news prime.

Finally, two respondents somehow managed to answer the survey twice. We exclude these four responses from our sample.

Note that we do not test for Virtual Private Servers (VPS) or Virtual Private Networks (VPN) although recommended by [Kennedy et al. \(2020\)](#) as Prolific regularly test for this to ban respondents ([Prolific, 2021](#)). Also, our study did not use attention checks such as Instructional Manipulation Checks ([Oppenheimer et al., 2009](#)). These have been found to have limited diagnostic value as many participants in online samples are familiar with this type of question ([Hauser and Schwarz, 2016; Thomas and Clifford, 2017](#)), and they may change people’s behavior ([Hauser and Schwarz, 2015; Hauser et al., 2018](#)), resulting in recommendations from Qualtrics that researchers stop using them ([Vannette, 2017](#)).

¹We prefer this honeypot to (re)CAPTCHAs because some bots are able to pass CAPTCHAs ([Sivakorn et al., 2016; Al-Fannah, 2017](#)), and the honeypot is unobtrusive, saving time and making it easier for people with vision impairment to complete the study ([Bursztein et al., 2010](#)). We applied the honeypots to both the consent form and the demographic survey as [Kaiser \(2022\)](#) demonstrates that bots and humans may work in hybrid, using bots to complete only some parts of a survey.

A.3 Analysis

A.3.1 Power Analysis

The following section presents the a priori power analysis that informed our study and which we used in the pre-registration. With the available funding, we planned to recruit a sample of 1425 participants, which we planned to randomize equally to each of the three treatments. Our primary comparison is the difference in ratings on the feeling thermometer between participants' own party and the opposing party. Based on [Boxell et al. \(2020\)](#), we expected that the participants rate their own party at a mean of 62 with a standard deviation of 24, and we expected that the participants rate the opposing party with a mean of 40 and a standard deviation of 26. Regarding the within-subject correlation between the two parties, one could a priori imagine two effects that work in opposite directions: On the one hand, when individuals strongly identify with one party, this may create a larger discrepancy between the two ratings, resulting in a negative within-subject correlation. On the other hand, if participants differ in their interpretation of the scale and the notions of "warm" and "cold", this will create a positive within-subject correlation. As we do not know which of these effect will be stronger, we assumed for the power analysis that there would be no correlation between ratings.

Based on the above assumptions, we ran power simulations in Stata (version 17) that showed us to expect a power of 0.8 to detect a treatment effect on FT difference of approximately 5.4, equivalent to a standardized effect size of Hedge's $g_p = 0.15$ ([Goulet-Pelletier and Cousineau, 2018](#)). For comparison, [Boxell et al. \(2020\)](#) find that the party difference is 22 points. Also, [Levendusky \(2018\)](#) uses a national news prime to find an effect of 5.6 on an out-party feeling thermometer.

As explained in Section 4.6, our final sample size was slightly below our target sample size (1,403 vs. 1,425). But such a small difference does not change the conclusions from our power simulations.²

A.3.2 Sample Characteristics Table

The full set of sample characteristics are provided in Table A.1.


²We refrain from changing any other inputs for the power analysis to avoid the problems of ex-post power calculations, ([Hoenig and Heisey, 2001](#)).

Table A.1: Sample Characteristics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Age	40.00	14.38	18	80
Male	0.50	0.50	0	1
Ethnicity				
White	0.82	0.38	0	1
Asian American	0.07	0.25	0	1
Hispanic	0.05	0.22	0	1
Black	0.04	0.21	0	1
Other Ethnicity	0.01	0.12	0	1
Employment Status				
Employed	0.72	0.45	0	1
Self Employed	0.10	0.30	0	1
Student	0.08	0.27	0	1
Retired	0.07	0.25	0	1
Other Employment	0.03	0.16	0	1
Education Level				
Less Than High School	0.01	0.09	0	1
High School	0.12	0.33	0	1
Some College	0.20	0.40	0	1
Associate Degree	0.10	0.30	0	1
Bachelors Degree	0.40	0.49	0	1
Masters Degree	0.14	0.34	0	1
Doctorate Degree	0.04	0.20	0	1
Political Attitudes				
Democrat	0.51	0.50	0	1
Strong Supporter	0.48	0.50	0	1
Political Interest	3.34	0.98	1	5
Experimental Characteristics				
Duration in Seconds	569.15	353.65	134	4,050
Fraud Score	0.86	5.08	0	75
Prolific Score	99.83	0.39	98	100

A.3.3 Manipulation Check

Figure A.2: Manipulation check



Note: This figure shows for each treatment the average perceived threat and the average perceived political disagreement between the two parties. Whiskers denote 95 percent confidence intervals.

A.3.4 Affective Polarization in *Disagreement* and *Control*

In this section, we report the results from the pre-registered comparison between *Disagreement* and *Control*. We first report the results from the feeling thermometer and then turn to behavior in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game.

Feeling Thermometers We expected that making political disagreement salient would increase affective polarization compared to *Control* (cf. Section 3). Yet, contrary to our expectations participants report a 1.8 degrees greater FT difference in *Control* than in *Disagreement*. This indicates that affective polarization is reduced in *Disagreement*, but the difference is only marginally statistically significant in the specification with demographic controls ($p = .093$, cf. Table A.2). The nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-test fails to reach statistical significance

($p = .152$, which is expected as this test does not incorporate control variables). Thus, we cannot confirm our pre-registered hypothesis and the effect even seems to move in the opposite direction.

Asymmetric Battle of the Sexes. In the coordination game, we expected to find that more people would compromise and choose B in *Control* than in *Disagreement*. But reflecting the results of the feeling thermometer, we find that the effect moves in the opposite direction as participants in *Disagreement* are 3 (3.2) percentage points more likely to choose B when Player 2 is affiliated with their own (the opposite) party. None of these effects reach statistical significance ($p = .384$ and $p = .332$, cf. Table A.3).³ Looking at “Player 1 types”, the marginal effects suggest that participants in *Disagreement* are more likely to be type *BB* and less likely to be type *AA* relative to participants in *Control*. However, the effects are not statistically significant (all p' s $> .217$, cf. Table A.4).

Table A.2: Treatment effects on affective polarization

	Disagreement vs. Control		
Disagreement	-2.960 (1.828)	-3.048* (1.811)	-1.769 (1.522)
Constant	51.434*** (1.300)	40.400*** (3.936)	16.545*** (3.961)
N	947	947	947
Adj. R2	0.00	0.04	0.32
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

³Fisher’s exact tests yield the same conclusion: The difference is statistically insignificant both when Player 2 is affiliated with the participants’ own party (47.6 vs. 44.3 percent, $p = .328$, Fisher’s exact test) and the opposite party (39.6 vs. 36.2 percent, $p = .284$, Fisher’s exact test).

Table A.3: Treatment effects on Player 1 probability of choosing B

	Disagreement vs. Control					
	Own-Party Condition			Opposite-Party Condition		
Disagreement	0.033 (0.032)	0.028 (0.033)	0.030 (0.034)	0.035 (0.032)	0.033 (0.032)	0.032 (0.033)
N	947	943	943	947	943	943
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table shows marginal effects (average partial effects) from logistic regressions with Player 1 probability of choosing B as the dependent variable. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors calculated using Delta method in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

Table A.4: Treatment effects on Player 1 type in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes Game

Disagreement vs. Control			
Disagreement			
(AA)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.020 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.034)
(AB)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)
(BA)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.019)
(BB)	0.043 (0.031)	0.041 (0.031)	0.039 (0.032)
N	947	947	947
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table shows marginal effects (average partial effects) from multinomial logistic regressions with Player 1 type as the dependent variable. For Player types, the first letter refers to participants' Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with own party, second letter refers to their Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with the opposite party. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors calculated using Delta method in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

A.3.5 Test for Order Effects in Asymmetric Battle of the Sexes

In the Asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game, we are interested in participants' decisions in the role of Player 1. One concern when asking participants to play the game with a persons from both parties is that participants might feel that they ought (not) to change their decisions. As we randomized the order of the party affiliation of the first person the participants played the game with, we are able to test for order effects.

We test for the existence of order effects in participants' decisions in the role of Player 1. Participants make their first decision in the role of Player 1 either facing a person from their own party or from the opposite party. For both the own- and opposite-party condition, we test whether there are significant differences in Player 1's decision depending on which condition the participants is randomized into.

First, we investigate the own-party condition. 694 participants are randomized into the own-party condition first and 709 participants are randomized into the own-party condition last. The frequency of choosing B is very similar across these two game orders (47.4 percent vs. 46.8 percent) and a Fisher's exact test cannot reject that the decision in the role of Player 1 when the other person is from the same party is independent of game order ($p = .831$, Fisher' exact test).

Secondly, we investigate the opposite-party condition. Mirroring the above, 709 participants are randomized into the opposite-party condition first and 694 are randomized into the opposite-party condition last. Again, the frequency of choosing B is very similar across these two game orders (39.9 percent vs. 38.6 percent) and a Fisher's exact test cannot reject that the decision in the role of Player 1 when the other person is from the opposite party is independent of game order ($p = .623$, Fisher's exact test).

Thus, we conclude that the within-subject design does not introduce a bias into our analysis and we pool the data in the analysis.⁴

A.3.6 Tables for Asymmetric Battle of the Sexes

⁴We actually find some evidence of order effects in the role of Player 2. Specifically, in the role of Player 2 in the own-party condition, a greater share of subjects choose A when the play the own-party condition last. However, we participants' decisions in the role of Player 2 is not the focus of our analysis.

Table A.5: Player 1 types in the Battle of the Sexes game by party affiliation

Player 1 Type	Republicans	Democrats	Total
(AA)	55.2%	43.3%	49.2%
(AB)	4.6%	2.8%	3.7%
(BA)	9.6%	13.5%	11.6%
(BB)	30.6%	40.4%	35.6%

Notes: First letter refers to participants' Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with own party, second letter refers to their Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with the opposite party.

Table A.6: Treatment effects on Player 1 probability of choosing B

Invasion vs. Control						
	Own-Party Condition			Opposite-Party Condition		
Invasion	0.053*	0.062**	0.064**	0.059**	0.065**	0.067**
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
N	926	926	926	926	926	926
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement						
	Own-Party Condition			Opposite-Party Condition		
Invasion	0.020	0.021	0.021	0.025	0.026	0.028
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
N	933	933	933	933	933	933
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table shows marginal effects (average partial effects) from logistic regressions with Player 1 probability of choosing B as the dependent variable. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors calculated using Delta method in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

Table A.7: Treatment effects on Player 1 type in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes Game

Invasion vs. Control			
Invasion			
(AA)	-0.065** (0.033)	-0.074** (0.034)	-0.077** (0.034)
(AB)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)
(BA)	0.006 (0.021)	0.009 (0.020)	0.010 (0.019)
(BB)	0.047 (0.031)	0.058* (0.033)	0.061* (0.033)
N	926	926	926
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement			
Invasion			
(AA)	-0.041 (0.033)	-0.043 (0.034)	-0.041 (0.034)
(AB)	0.021* (0.013)	0.020* (0.012)	0.019* (0.011)
(BA)	0.016 (0.021)	0.017 (0.019)	0.013 (0.018)
(BB)	0.004 (0.032)	0.006 (0.033)	0.009 (0.033)
N	933	933	933
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table shows marginal effects (average partial effects) from multinomial logistic regressions with Player 1 type as the dependent variable. For Player types, the first letter refers to participants' Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with own party, second letter refers to their Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with the opposite party. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors calculated using Delta method in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.8: Relation between FT difference and Player 1 type in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes Game

FT difference			
(AA)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.002*** (0.001)
(AB)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
(BA)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
(BB)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.001)
N	1403	1403	1403
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table shows the marginal effects (average partial effects) from FT difference in multinomial logistic regressions with Player 1 type as the dependent variable. For Player types, the first letter refers to participants' Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with own party, second letter refers to their Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with the opposite party. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors calculated using Delta method in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table A.9: Treatment effects on Player 1 probability of choosing B by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control: Own-Party Condition						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	0.026 (0.046)	0.038 (0.047)	0.036 (0.048)	0.079* (0.046)	0.100** (0.049)	0.106** (0.049)
N	472	472	472	454	448	448
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Control: Opposite-Party Condition						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	0.041 (0.046)	0.048 (0.047)	0.047 (0.047)	0.077* (0.045)	0.095** (0.047)	0.104** (0.047)
N	472	472	472	454	446	446
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement: Own-Party Condition						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	0.024 (0.046)	0.035 (0.048)	0.034 (0.049)	0.013 (0.046)	0.011 (0.048)	0.017 (0.048)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement: Opposite-Party Condition						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	0.034 (0.046)	0.039 (0.048)	0.037 (0.048)	0.014 (0.045)	0.014 (0.048)	0.026 (0.048)
N	475	475	475	458	449	449
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table shows for each party marginal effects (average partial effects) from logistic regressions with probability of choosing B as the dependent variable. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors calculated using Delta method in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.10: Treatment effects on Player 1 type in the asymmetric Battle of the Sexes Game by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion						
(AA)	-0.018 (0.046)	-0.037 (0.048)	-0.034 (0.049)	-0.112** (0.046)	-0.130*** (0.047)	-0.135*** (0.047)
(AB)	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.033 (0.022)	0.029* (0.016)	0.029* (0.017)
(BA)	-0.023 (0.032)	-0.015 (0.028)	-0.016 (0.028)	0.035 (0.029)	0.036 (0.024)	0.034 (0.022)
(BB)	0.049 (0.045)	0.052 (0.048)	0.051 (0.048)	0.044 (0.043)	0.065 (0.041)	0.073* (0.042)
N	472	472	472	454	454	454
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion						
(AA)	-0.025 (0.045)	-0.044 (0.053)	-0.040 (0.051)	-0.055 (0.047)	-0.051 (0.047)	-0.059 (0.048)
(AB)	0.001 (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.042** (0.021)	0.024* (0.013)	0.024* (0.013)
(BA)	-0.009 (0.031)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.041 (0.028)	0.045* (0.027)	0.041 (0.026)
(BB)	0.033 (0.045)	0.044 (0.053)	0.042 (0.051)	-0.028 (0.044)	-0.017 (0.043)	-0.007 (0.043)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table shows for each party marginal effects (average partial effects) from multinomial logistic regressions with Player 1 type as the dependent variable. For Player types, the first letter refers to participants' Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with own party, second letter refers to their Player 1 decision when Player 2 is affiliated with the opposite party. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors calculated using Delta method in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

A.3.7 Multiple Hypothesis Testing

In accordance with our pre-registration, we control for multiple hypothesis testing to investigate the robustness of our findings (Cao and Zhang, 2014; Cramer et al., 2016; List et al., 2019). We report here the results when we control for the family-wise error rate (FWER). Note that controlling for FWER also implies controlling for the false discovery rate (FDR). For this exercise, we consider as our ‘family’ the three main hypotheses with the test for our primary measure (Farcomeni, 2008), which is FT difference and we do not control for multiple hypothesis testing in exploratory analysis (Bender and Lange, 2001). In controlling for the FWER, we adjust the p-values from the regression with all control variables as this is our preferred specification (cf. Section 5).

We use the Romano-Wolf resampling procedure to control for FWER (Romano and Wolf, 2005a,b, 2016), and we implement this in Stata using the package developed by Clarke et al. (2020). The advantage of this approach is that it is a resampling procedure and thus takes the dependency between tests into account. We conduct this adjustment using 1000 resamples, which gives a Romano-Wolf adjusted p -value of .094 (unadjusted $p = .040$) in the *Invasion vs. Control* comparison. The adjustment does not change the conclusion in the *Invasion vs. Disagreement* comparison ($p = .758$). Thus, when controlling for FWER and FDR, we conclude that the treatment effect in the *Invasion vs. Control* comparison remains marginally significant while the effect in the *Invasion vs. Disagreement* comparison remains insignificant.


A.3.8 Stereotypes Analysis

We present in this section the analyses related to the stereotypes that we elicited in the experiment (see Section 4.3). We present descriptive statistics that document very little existence of affective polarization in trait ratings. Further, we present analyses in accordance to our pre-registration, which shows that the treatments had little impact on trait ratings.

A.3.8.1 Descriptives: Baseline Affective Polarization

Participants rate both parties on a 5-point Likert scale on the following traits: Patriotism, selfishness, intelligence, open-mindedness, and honesty. Participants on average rate their own and the opposite party similar on all traits (see Figure A.3). Further, there is little difference between Republicans and Democrats with the exception that Republicans rate the Republican Party as significantly more open-minded than the Democratic Party (2.63 vs. 2.47, $t = -2.4, p < .02$).

Figure A.3: Affective polarization in Stereotypes



Notes: This figure shows for each party how participants rate their own party and the opposite party on the following traits (from left to right): Patriotism, selfishness, intelligence, open-mindedness, and honesty. Whiskers denote 95 percent confidence intervals.

A.3.8.2 Treatment Effects

In the following, we present regression outputs related to our three pre-registered hypotheses with net trait rating of each of the traits as the dependent variable. We include only the outputs from the regressions with the maximum number of controls. The treatment effects remain insignificant in specifications with fewer controls and the conclusion is the same in Mann-Whitney U-tests.

H1: Affective Polarization in *Invasion* and *Control*. Table A.11 reports the regression outputs. We do not find any statistically significant treatment effect for any of the traits.

Table A.11: *Invasion vs. Control* treatment effect on stereotypes

	Patriotism	Selfishness	Intelligence	Open-mindedness	Honesty
Invasion	-0.093 (0.143)	-0.018 (0.140)	0.007 (0.113)	0.049 (0.147)	-0.017 (0.116)
Constant	0.173 (0.398)	0.338 (0.368)	-0.111 (0.295)	-0.135 (0.380)	-0.160 (0.308)
N	926	926	926	926	926
Adj. R2	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.00
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with the following traits (left to right) as the dependent variables: Patriotism, selfishness, intelligence, open-mindedness, and honesty. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 $* p < 0.10$, $** p < 0.05$, $*** p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

H2: Affective Polarization in *Disagreement* and *Control*. Table A.12 reports the regression outputs. We find a marginally significant treatment effect on *Honesty*. The coefficient estimate is negative and suggests that participants in the *Disagreement* treatment rate a .2 smaller difference in how well their own- and the opposite-party is described by honesty. This should, however, be interpreted in the context that there is no affective polarization in honesty in the first place as participants on average rate the other party as more honest than their own party.

Table A.12: *Disagreement vs. Control* treatment effect on stereotypes

	Patriotism	Selfishness	Intelligence	Open-mindedness	Honesty
Disagreement	-0.186 (0.141)	0.152 (0.136)	-0.194* (0.111)	-0.145 (0.145)	-0.216* (0.112)
Constant	0.131 (0.383)	0.347 (0.363)	0.039 (0.299)	-0.257 (0.381)	-0.185 (0.307)
N	947	947	947	947	947
Adj. R2	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with the following traits (left to right) as the dependent variables: Patriotism, selfishness, intelligence, open-mindedness, and honesty. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

H3: Affective Polarization in *Invasion* and *Disagreement*. Table A.13 reports the regression outputs. We find a statistically significant treatment effect at the 10 percent level on *Honesty* as in the *Disagreement vs. Control* comparison and note the same caveat with there not being affective polarization on this trait in the first place.

Table A.13: *Invasion vs. Disagreement* treatment effect on stereotypes

	Patriotism	Selfishness	Intelligence	Open-mindedness	Honesty
Invasion	0.079 (0.144)	-0.192* (0.138)	0.185 (0.113)	0.229 (0.146)	0.211* (0.113)
Constant	-0.293 (0.373)	0.489 (0.330)	-0.308 (0.282)	-0.010 (0.347)	-0.339 (0.280)
N	933	933	933	933	933
Adj. R2	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.00
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with the following traits (left to right) as the dependent variables: Patriotism, selfishness, intelligence, open-mindedness, and honesty. The baseline is a participant in the *Invasion* treatment. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

A.3.9 Moderation Effects

We present in the following tests on whether some of our control variables moderates the effects of our treatments. We investigate the role of strength of partisan identity, political interest, age, gender, education level, fade-out of treatment primes, and the extent to which the participants have been following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

A.3.9.1 Strength of Partisan Identity and Political Interest

Drawing on the social identity approach (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1986), we expect that the partisan identity is more emotionally significant for the individuals who more strongly identifies with either of the parties relative to people who merely lean towards a party. We therefore expect that affective polarization is more pronounced for the former. We test this and possible moderating effects of strength of party support in the following.

Almost half (48 percent) of our sample identifies as “strong supporters” of either of the parties. These participants display both more “ingroup love” and “outgroup hate”: They rate their own party significantly better (78.5 vs. 62.9, $p < .001$) and the opposite party

significantly worse (13.8 vs. 27.3, $p < .001$). In investigating whether the strength of partisan affiliation moderates the treatment effects, one could imagine an effect in either direction: On the one hand, the lower opposite-party and higher own-party feeling thermometer rating leaves more room for reducing the FT difference. On the other hand, if individuals' partisan identity is sufficiently strong, their attitudes might be rather immovable. We test this by including an interaction between our treatment indicator and our strong supporter indicator in an OLS regression (see Table A.14). The coefficient estimates suggest that strong supporters reduce their FT difference by 2.65 degrees more in *Invasion* ($p = .395$) relative to *Control*.⁵ These effects are statistically insignificant, but we also note that our sample size is chosen to ensure power for the main comparisons and not moderation effects of these.

We next examine the moderating effect of being interested in politics. In our sample, 42.3 percent rate themselves “very” or “extremely” interested in politics. Similar to “strong supporters”, we find suggestive evidence that the politically interested participants reduce their FT difference relatively more following the primes (4.7 degrees more in *Invasion* *vs.* *Control*, see Table A.16). These interactions are, however, also statistically insignificant (all p 's $> .137$).⁶

⁵We perform this test of moderation effects for Democrats and Republicans separately as well (see Table A.15). The interactions are statistically insignificant (all p 's $> .460$), but the signs suggest that following the *Invasion* prime, strong supporters of both the Democratic and Republican Party reduces FT difference relative to partisan “leaners”.

⁶Looking at Democrats and Republicans separately (see Table A.17), we do not find any statistically significant moderation effect.

Table A.14: Moderating effect of strength of party support on treatment effect

	Invasion vs. Control			Invasion vs. Disagreement		
Invasion	-1.411 (2.268)	-1.970 (2.276)	-1.666 (2.245)	-0.992 (2.303)	-0.853 (2.302)	-0.946 (2.224)
Treatment×Strong Supporter	-3.502 (3.167)	-2.586 (3.148)	-2.422 (3.104)	0.143 (3.213)	0.896 (3.206)	1.048 (3.168)
Strong Supporter	31.462*** (2.158)	30.690*** (2.184)	26.542*** (2.279)	27.817*** (2.225)	26.942*** (2.213)	23.499*** (2.303)
Constant	36.239*** (1.534)	34.657*** (3.344)	21.080*** (3.900)	35.819*** (1.586)	26.146*** (3.255)	15.195*** (3.791)
N	926	926	926	933	933	933
Adj. R2	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.24	0.26	0.28
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Strong Supporter, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for strongly supporting one's party. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

Table A.15: Moderating effect of strength of party support on treatment effect by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	1.798 (3.103)	0.938 (3.134)	1.696 (3.107)	-4.198 (3.211)	-5.466* (3.178)	-5.361* (3.157)
Treatment×Strong Supporter	-3.926 (4.207)	-1.951 (4.211)	-3.110 (4.159)	-4.667 (4.738)	-3.073 (4.700)	-2.045 (4.621)
Strong Supporter	27.363*** (3.137)	25.390*** (3.226)	21.588*** (3.354)	36.001*** (2.978)	34.861*** (3.056)	31.362*** (3.107)
Constant	38.212*** (2.368)	36.747*** (4.410)	21.790*** (4.875)	34.763*** (2.013)	32.310*** (4.932)	22.077*** (5.804)
N	472	472	472	454	454	454
Adj. R2	0.23	0.23	0.27	0.31	0.33	0.34
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	-2.917 (3.070)	-2.164 (3.024)	-2.084 (3.020)	-0.124 (3.243)	-0.853 (3.166)	-0.848 (3.111)
Treatment×Strong Supporter	2.667 (4.148)	3.102 (4.075)	2.440 (4.059)	-1.519 (4.926)	-0.359 (4.925)	0.182 (4.892)
Strong Supporter	20.770*** (3.058)	19.268*** (2.977)	18.022*** (3.106)	32.852*** (3.269)	31.769*** (3.332)	28.851*** (3.460)
Constant	42.927*** (2.325)	29.426*** (4.434)	23.817*** (5.154)	30.689*** (2.063)	23.527*** (4.653)	14.497*** (5.324)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Adj. R2	0.19	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.29	0.30
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable, estimated separately for each party. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Strong Supporter, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for strongly supporting one's party. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.16: Moderating effect of political interest on treatment effect

	Invasion vs. Control			Invasion vs. Disagreement		
Invasion	0.090 (2.372)	-0.034 (2.372)	-1.100 (2.105)	-0.775 (2.417)	-0.423 (2.432)	-0.142 (2.105)
Treatment×Political Interested	-5.767 (3.511)	-5.574 (3.519)	-4.661 (3.126)	1.614 (3.559)	1.648 (3.553)	-0.833 (3.169)
Political Interested	22.155*** (2.413)	21.305*** (2.445)	10.392*** (2.317)	14.774*** (2.483)	13.578*** (2.519)	5.709** (2.315)
Constant	41.723*** (1.605)	42.100*** (3.695)	32.432*** (3.439)	42.589*** (1.670)	35.124*** (3.652)	22.249*** (3.360)
N	926	926	926	933	933	933
Adj. R2	0.12	0.12	0.30	0.07	0.08	0.28
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Political Interest, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for being politically interested. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

Table A.17: Moderating effect of strength of party support on treatment effect by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	2.415 (3.229)	2.786 (3.213)	2.891 (2.984)	-1.955 (3.388)	-2.471 (3.408)	-5.016* (2.942)
Treatment×Political Interested	-5.334 (4.563)	-4.939 (4.543)	-5.963 (4.135)	-7.604 (5.452)	-7.784 (5.533)	-4.200 (4.773)
Political Interested	18.655*** (3.363)	17.504*** (3.374)	10.426*** (3.285)	25.578*** (3.576)	24.601*** (3.714)	10.907*** (3.308)
Constant	44.212*** (2.446)	41.125*** (4.720)	34.689*** (4.256)	39.712*** (2.119)	41.643*** (5.538)	32.570*** (4.972)
N	472	472	472	454	454	454
Adj. R2	0.09	0.11	0.25	0.13	0.14	0.35
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	-3.612 (3.076)	-3.042 (3.141)	-1.770 (2.833)	1.868 (3.517)	1.332 (3.425)	-0.107 (2.961)
Treatment×Political Interested	4.167 (4.483)	5.364 (4.468)	2.563 (4.040)	-0.884 (5.539)	-0.499 (5.714)	-2.269 (5.129)
Political Interested	9.154*** (3.253)	5.680* (3.254)	0.703 (3.054)	18.858*** (3.706)	18.050*** (3.854)	10.072*** (3.509)
Constant	50.239*** (2.241)	38.927*** (4.785)	29.234*** (4.330)	35.889*** (2.318)	29.609*** (5.286)	23.583*** (4.652)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Adj. R2	0.05	0.09	0.23	0.08	0.10	0.30
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable, estimated separately for each party. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Political Interest, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for being politically interested. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include a dummy for being politically interested, and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.3.9.2 Age

In the following, we test whether different age cutoffs has a moderating effect on the influence of our treatments. Surveys have demonstrated that age matters for people's attitudes towards the war ([Economist, 2022](#)). This is understandable from the intergroup conflict theory, which suggests that individuals are more likely to perceive a threat between two groups if these have a history of conflict, and the older generation has first-hand experience of living during the Cold War.

As expected, we find that threat perception is positively correlated with age (Spearman's $\rho = .19$, $p < .001$). To test for the moderating effect of age, we report two sets of regressions that use indicator variables for either (i) the participant being older than 30 (69.1 percent of the sample) or (ii) the participant being older than 40 (42.0 percent of the sample). We interact this with our treatment indicators to investigate whether age moderates the effect of the treatment primes. We find no evidence that participants' age moderates our treatment effect in either the *Invasion vs. Control* or *Invasion vs. Disagreement* comparison (see Table A.18).⁷

⁷We tested this for Democrats and Republicans separately as well. We did not observe any significant moderating effect of age (see Table A.19 and Table A.20)

Table A.18: Moderating effect of age on treatment effect

	Participants >30 years old cutoff					
	Invasion vs. Control			Invasion vs. Disagreement		
Invasion	0.398 (3.096)	-0.148 (3.107)	-2.893 (2.605)	4.808 (2.944)	5.500* (3.027)	1.742 (2.605)
Treatment×Older than 30	-3.850 (3.861)	-3.467 (3.875)	-0.009 (3.258)	-6.514* (3.754)	-6.803* (3.801)	-3.343 (3.315)
Older than 30	6.417** (2.789)	4.594 (2.918)	1.595 (2.306)	9.080*** (2.639)	8.097*** (2.742)	4.701** (2.313)
Constant	46.792*** (2.315)	52.590*** (3.255)	24.777*** (3.681)	42.382*** (2.107)	43.751*** (3.232)	22.355*** (3.550)
N	926	926	926	933	933	933
Adj. R2	0.00	0.01	0.30	0.01	0.01	0.26
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
	Participants >40 years old cutoff					
	Invasion vs. Control			Invasion vs. Disagreement		
Invasion	-2.320 (2.367)	-2.777 (2.394)	-4.137** (2.001)	2.568 (2.302)	3.234 (2.372)	0.358 (2.024)
Treatment×Older than 40	-0.073 (3.798)	0.476 (3.817)	2.917 (3.243)	-5.130 (3.781)	-5.535 (3.827)	-2.001 (3.298)
Older than 40	5.458** (2.626)	4.072 (2.675)	0.935 (2.211)	10.515*** (2.601)	10.025*** (2.685)	5.504** (2.346)
Constant	49.042*** (1.694)	53.773*** (2.895)	25.475*** (3.460)	44.153*** (1.602)	44.536*** (2.905)	23.538*** (3.364)
N	926	926	926	933	933	933
Adj. R2	0.01	0.01	0.31	0.02	0.02	0.27
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. The main independent variables of interest are Treatment×Older than 30 (40), which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for the participant being older than 30 (40) years. Demographics include, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

Table A.19: Moderating effect of age on treatment effect by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control: Participants >30 years old cutoff						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	0.830 (3.819)	0.905 (3.932)	-1.726 (3.315)	-0.490 (5.161)	-2.394 (5.202)	-4.028 (4.350)
Treatment×Older than 30	-1.149 (4.879)	-1.356 (4.943)	2.386 (4.237)	-5.707 (6.168)	-4.118 (6.230)	-2.850 (5.161)
Older than 30	7.609** (3.713)	5.869 (3.938)	1.265 (3.223)	5.816 (4.235)	3.619 (4.399)	3.237 (3.354)
Constant	48.342*** (3.003)	55.026*** (4.206)	26.514*** (4.951)	44.807*** (3.616)	48.698*** (5.083)	24.121*** (5.394)
N	472	472	472	454	454	454
Adj. R2	0.01	0.01	0.26	0.00	0.03	0.34
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement: Participants >30 years old cutoff						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	5.207 (3.587)	5.732 (3.727)	3.910 (3.226)	3.852 (4.955)	4.014 (5.177)	-2.541 (4.416)
Treatment×Older than 30	-9.613** (4.591)	-9.606** (4.651)	-8.025* (4.167)	-2.832 (6.041)	-3.209 (6.263)	2.738 (5.365)
Older than 30	16.074*** (3.327)	14.794*** (3.591)	12.464*** (3.207)	2.941 (4.048)	2.601 (4.196)	-2.784 (3.410)
Constant	43.965*** (2.702)	49.362*** (4.051)	28.953*** (4.745)	40.465*** (3.315)	36.967*** (5.113)	18.697*** (5.239)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Adj. R2	0.05	0.04	0.23	-0.00	0.02	0.30
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. The main independent variables of interest are Treatment×Older than 30, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for the participant being older than 30 years. Demographics include, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.20: Moderating effect of age on treatment effect by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control: Participants >40 years old cutoff						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	0.815 (2.920)	0.628 (2.968)	-1.653 (2.490)	-6.939* (3.892)	-7.950** (3.965)	-6.521** (3.297)
Treatment×Older than 40	-1.068 (4.973)	-0.910 (4.934)	4.437 (4.392)	4.172 (5.667)	4.924 (5.716)	0.560 (4.733)
Older than 40	9.827*** (3.627)	8.300** (3.699)	1.398 (3.204)	1.612 (3.787)	-0.531 (3.784)	1.217 (2.988)
Constant	49.571*** (2.212)	55.060*** (3.676)	26.947*** (4.490)	48.444*** (2.613)	51.992*** (4.470)	25.957*** (5.241)
N	472	472	472	454	454	454
Adj. R2	0.02	0.02	0.27	0.00	0.03	0.34
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement: Participants >40 years old cutoff						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	2.853 (2.770)	3.465 (2.898)	1.795 (2.520)	1.334 (3.836)	2.112 (3.974)	-1.976 (3.361)
Treatment×Older than 40	-9.574** (4.636)	-9.705** (4.621)	-7.211* (4.233)	0.599 (5.695)	-1.165 (5.889)	2.822 (4.878)
Older than 40	18.332*** (3.150)	17.394*** (3.205)	14.174*** (3.042)	5.185 (3.830)	5.316 (3.963)	-1.232 (3.281)
Constant	47.533*** (2.009)	51.634*** (3.603)	33.013*** (4.476)	40.171*** (2.529)	36.270*** (4.524)	17.772*** (4.929)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Adj. R2	0.07	0.07	0.24	0.00	0.02	0.30
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. The main independent variables of interest are Treatment×Older than 40, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for the participant being older than 40 years. Demographics include, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.3.9.3 Gender

It has long been well-known that there are large gender differences in attitudes towards war and that men tend to be more favorable towards war than women (Stagner, 1938; Putney and Middleton, 1962; Ås, 1982; Schroeder et al., 1993; Lester, 1994; Covell, 1996; Dupuis and Cohn, 2011). As our primary treatment involves priming participants with an armed conflict, we therefore test for a possible moderating role of gender in the following. We stratified our sample to include an equal number of men and women. Men and women rate the average level of threat perception similarly (3.38 vs. 3.46, $p = .169$) and they show similar levels of affective polarization in FT difference (49.8 vs. 49.4, $p = .811$). We test whether gender moderates the effect of the treatments by including an interaction between our treatment indicator and the male indicator in an OLS regression (see Table A.21). The coefficient estimates suggest that men reduce their FT difference 1.9 degrees less than women in *Invasion* relative to *Control* ($p = .549$). Further, we find a statistically insignificant difference between men and women in the *Invasion* vs. *Disagreement* comparison.⁸

⁸We perform this test of gender moderation effects for Democrats and Republicans separately as well (see Table A.22). The interactions are statistically insignificant ($p's > .663$).

Table A.21: Moderating effect of gender on treatment effect

	Invasion vs. Control			Invasion vs. Disagreement		
Invasion	-3.978*	-3.432	-3.455*	-0.897	0.210	-1.199
	(2.679)	(2.683)	(2.261)	(2.702)	(2.719)	(2.324)
Treatment×Male	2.975	1.935	1.202	2.707	1.246	1.495
	(3.721)	(3.733)	(3.136)	(3.703)	(3.680)	(3.145)
Male	-0.651	-0.522	-0.454	-0.383	-0.185	-0.580
	(2.602)	(2.590)	(2.132)	(2.576)	(2.518)	(2.231)
Constant	51.751***	47.391***	22.023***	48.670***	36.144***	15.363***
	(1.847)	(3.956)	(3.969)	(1.880)	(3.950)	(3.846)
N	926	926	926	933	933	933
Adj. R2	-0.00	0.02	0.31	-0.00	0.03	0.28
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Male, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for being male. Demographics include age, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

Table A.22: Moderating effect of gender on treatment effect by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	-1.461 (3.379)	-1.050 (3.360)	-1.761 (3.002)	-6.513 (4.122)	-6.252 (4.132)	-5.521 (3.392)
Treatment×Male	2.256 (4.800)	2.766 (4.721)	3.511 (4.095)	3.472 (5.668)	1.498 (5.736)	-1.399 (4.711)
Male	-2.153 (3.575)	-3.219 (3.520)	-3.456 (3.013)	1.112 (3.784)	3.155 (3.689)	3.053 (2.935)
Constant	54.640*** (2.472)	46.867*** (4.890)	23.653*** (4.846)	48.638*** (2.745)	45.664*** (6.085)	21.895*** (5.987)
N	472	472	472	454	454	454
Adj. R2	-0.01	0.03	0.27	0.00	0.03	0.34
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	-1.592 (3.385)	-0.311 (3.376)	-1.295 (3.092)	-0.699 (4.102)	-0.507 (4.096)	-2.151 (3.372)
Treatment×Male	0.993 (4.616)	0.782 (4.493)	1.401 (4.044)	5.194 (5.688)	3.786 (5.776)	2.546 (4.830)
Male	-0.890 (3.323)	-1.905 (3.169)	-0.817 (3.030)	-0.610 (3.815)	1.246 (3.855)	0.430 (3.232)
Constant	54.772*** (2.480)	38.927*** (5.000)	29.113*** (4.452)	42.824*** (2.716)	31.001*** (5.933)	24.637*** (4.866)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Adj. R2	-0.01	0.07	0.23	-0.00	0.03	0.30
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable, estimated separately for each party. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Male, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for being male. Demographics include age, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat, and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.3.9.4 Education Level

In the following, we test whether participants' educational attainment moderates the effects of our treatments. Compared to the American voting population, a large share of our sample has obtained at least a Bachelor's degree (54.7 %). We generate an High-education indicator taking the value one for participants who have obtained at least a Bachelor's degree. We test whether education level moderates the effect of the treatments by including an interaction between our treatment indicator and the Higher-education indicator in an OLS regression (see Table A.23). The coefficient estimates suggest that highly educated participants reduce their FT difference 3.4 degrees less than lower educated in *Invasion* relative to *Control* ($p = .273$). In the *Invasion vs. Disagreement* comparison, the coefficient estimate suggests that highly educated reduce their FT difference 7 degrees less than lower educated ($p = ..027$).⁹

⁹We perform this test of education-level moderation effects for Democrats and Republicans separately as well (see Table A.24). The interactions in the *Invasion vs. Disagreement* comparison is statistically significant for Democrats and suggest that highly-educated Democrats reduce their FT difference around 7 degrees less.

Table A.23: Moderating effect of education on treatment effect

	Invasion vs. Control			Invasion vs. Disagreement		
Invasion	-2.777 (2.750)	-2.577 (2.779)	-4.684** (2.378)	-3.035 (2.766)	-2.674 (2.767)	-5.037** (2.435)
Treatment×Higher-education	0.229 (3.731)	0.305 (3.755)	3.490 (3.148)	5.972 (3.711)	5.785 (3.680)	7.420** (3.193)
Higher-education	4.074 (2.591)	3.652 (2.638)	0.873 (2.157)	-1.669 (2.563)	-2.309 (2.513)	-3.488 (2.185)
Constant	49.207*** (1.853)	42.026*** (3.561)	18.645*** (3.550)	49.464*** (1.877)	36.819*** (3.551)	19.684*** (3.506)
N	926	926	926	933	933	933
Adj. R2	0.00	0.02	0.30	0.00	0.03	0.28
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable, estimated separately for each party. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Higher-education, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for having obtained at least a Bachelor's degree. Demographics include age, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat, and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

Table A.24: Moderating effect of education on treatment effect by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	-1.850 (3.653)	-0.876 (3.716)	-3.999 (3.222)	-3.491 (4.033)	-3.661 (4.046)	-5.745* (3.480)
Treatment×Higher-education	1.974 (4.826)	2.040 (4.839)	6.531 (4.172)	-2.538 (5.674)	-3.629 (5.685)	-0.690 (4.687)
Higher-education	4.788 (3.567)	3.509 (3.654)	1.148 (3.037)	2.861 (3.773)	3.065 (3.773)	1.323 (2.971)
Constant	50.861*** (2.629)	40.993*** (4.514)	18.267*** (4.438)	47.714*** (2.610)	41.310*** (5.425)	19.766*** (5.360)
N	472	472	472	454	454	454
Adj. R2	0.01	0.03	0.27	0.00	0.03	0.34
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	-3.545 (3.719)	-3.048 (3.715)	-5.495 (3.392)	-2.673 (4.009)	-2.898 (4.017)	-4.763 (3.461)
Treatment×Higher-education	4.012 (4.721)	4.875 (4.615)	7.351* (4.175)	8.265 (5.653)	7.243 (5.662)	6.834 (4.777)
Higher-education	2.750 (3.423)	0.388 (3.324)	-1.284 (3.083)	-7.942** (3.741)	-8.275** (3.747)	-6.923** (3.108)
Constant	52.557*** (2.719)	36.592*** (4.242)	21.442*** (4.567)	46.896*** (2.574)	36.636*** (5.437)	19.584*** (5.117)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Adj. R2	0.00	0.07	0.25	0.00	0.03	0.30
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes


Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable, estimated separately for each party. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Higher-education, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for having obtained at least a Bachelor's degree. Demographics include age, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.3.9.5 Fade-out of Treatment Primes

In this section, we investigate whether the treatment effects depend on the time between participants receive the news prime and answer the feeling thermometer questions. One critique of the priming method is that it only uncovers effects that do not last long. Since our study runs online, it is possible that some respondents take breaks and therefore spend more time than required to complete the study (see times in Figure A.4). Although these breaks do not occur at random, we test whether the treatment effects correlate with the time respondents take from receiving their prime to answering the questions related to affective polarization as any correlation will indicate a rapid fade-out of the treatment effect. In conducting this test, we are aware that some participants may be faster than others; so, we use participants' response times for the demographic questions as a control for speed. We find no significant interaction effect between time spent and the treatment indicator, suggesting no immediate fade-out in the treatment effect (see Table A.25).

Figure A.4: Time between news prime and affective polarization questions



Notes: This figure shows the distribution of time taken between receiving the news prime and answering the feeling thermometer question.

Table A.25: Fade-out of the effect of primes on FT difference

	Invasion vs. Control			Invasion vs. Disagreement		
Invasion	-3.244*	-3.131*	-3.162**	-0.558	-0.198	-0.704
	(2.178)	(2.149)	(1.775)	(1.987)	(1.977)	(1.701)
Time before first FT answer	-0.036	-0.028	0.006	-0.065	-0.070	0.006
	(0.084)	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.044)
Treatment×Time	0.058	0.051	0.023	0.086	0.089	0.019
	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.051)
Time spent on demograph.	0.050	0.046	0.056	0.054	0.045	0.023
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.060)
Constant	51.107***	46.459***	20.727***	48.357***	35.823***	14.586***
	(1.908)	(3.925)	(3.940)	(1.769)	(3.890)	(3.841)
N	926	926	926	933	933	933
Adj. R2	-0.00	0.02	0.31	-0.00	0.03	0.28
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Time, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and the time between receiving the prime and answering feeling thermometer questions. Time spent on demograph. is the time a participant uses to answer demographic questions (in seconds). Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat, and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

A.3.9.6 Followers and Non-Followers

We now test whether the extent to which participants have been following the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderating effect on the influence of our treatments. In designing the experiment, our intention was not to provide participants with any new information, but rather to only provide subtle situation cues by drawing participants' attention towards threat or political disagreement. As we provide basic information from mainstream media, this informational effect is especially plausible for the participants who have not been very attentive to the development during the first month of the invasion. We therefore test for informational effects by comparing treatment effects among followers and non-followers.

Fewer than half of the participants (39.8 percent) rate that they have been following the invasion “to a large extent” or “to the fullest extent”. We find no statistically significant difference in the treatment effects between these participants and the participants who have paid less attention to the conflict in neither the *Invasion vs. Control* or the *Invasion vs. Disagreement* comparison (see Table A.26).¹⁰ However, the signs on the coefficient estimates suggest that participants who have been following the invasion a lot respond to the *Invasion* treatment by decreasing their FT difference more relative to participants who have paid less attention to the conflict.¹¹

¹⁰A similar result is found when we test this separately for Democrats and Republicans (see Table A.27).

¹¹Note that this effect is not causal as individuals decide by themselves how closely they wish to follow the invasion. For instance, it is likely that people who care more about the development in Ukraine pay more attention to it. Their responsiveness to the prime may thus be a result of the fact that they care more about the development rather than the fact that they have been following the war more closely.

Table A.26: Moderating effect of following the invasion on treatment effect

	Invasion vs. Control			Invasion vs. Disagreement		
Invasion	-0.414 (2.362)	-0.201 (2.376)	-1.503 (2.025)	0.847 (2.375)	1.552 (2.394)	-0.292 (2.062)
Treatment×Following	-6.314* (3.743)	-6.637* (3.784)	-3.015 (3.251)	-1.199 (3.746)	-1.925 (3.777)	-0.549 (3.290)
Following	12.804*** (2.590)	11.105*** (2.630)	-1.172 (2.310)	7.689*** (2.596)	5.367** (2.668)	-3.372 (2.479)
Constant	46.639*** (1.636)	44.690*** (3.913)	19.316*** (4.005)	45.379*** (1.655)	35.812*** (3.847)	15.680*** (3.844)
N	926	926	926	933	933	933
Adj. R2	0.03	0.04	0.31	0.01	0.03	0.27
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Following, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for the participant responding that she follows the invasion “to a large extent” or “to the fullest extent”. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant identifies as a Democrat, and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-sided tests when in accordance with pre-registered hypotheses, two-sided otherwise)

Table A.27: Moderating effect of following the invasion on treatment effect by party affiliation

Invasion vs. Control						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	2.253 (3.124)	2.307 (3.138)	1.270 (2.779)	-3.248 (3.559)	-3.285 (3.601)	-4.816 (2.978)
Treatment×Following	-4.911 (4.723)	-4.148 (4.788)	-2.990 (4.298)	-6.801 (5.928)	-7.534 (5.887)	-3.589 (4.884)
Following	14.386*** (3.444)	11.604*** (3.552)	3.398 (3.268)	9.872** (4.101)	7.966* (4.171)	-2.695 (3.390)
Constant	46.969*** (2.418)	45.018*** (4.868)	35.631*** (4.262)	46.386*** (2.226)	43.487*** (5.936)	33.022*** (4.845)
N	472	472	472	454	454	454
Adj. R2	0.05	0.06	0.25	0.01	0.04	0.35
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Invasion vs. Disagreement						
	Democrats			Republicans		
Invasion	-0.823 (2.961)	0.722 (3.037)	0.255 (2.710)	1.899 (3.667)	1.382 (3.573)	-1.379 (3.035)
Treatment×Following	-0.116 (4.592)	-1.440 (4.586)	-1.888 (4.165)	-0.490 (5.824)	-0.185 (5.910)	1.907 (5.020)
Following	9.591*** (3.262)	5.915* (3.321)	0.742 (3.216)	3.562 (3.949)	0.893 (4.194)	-8.019** (3.638)
Constant	50.045*** (2.203)	39.240*** (4.983)	28.154*** (4.383)	41.238*** (2.395)	29.962*** (5.650)	24.012*** (4.551)
N	475	475	475	458	458	458
Adj. R2	0.03	0.07	0.23	-0.00	0.02	0.31
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Attitudes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: OLS regressions with FT difference as the dependent variable. The main independent variable of interest is Treatment×Following, which is an interaction between the treatment dummy and a dummy for the participant responding that she follows the invasion “to a large extent” or “to the fullest extent”. Demographics include age, gender, dummies for ethnicity and dummies for level of schooling. Attitudes include political interest (5-point Likert scale), and strength of partisan affiliation (dummy with value 1 if participant is a strong supporter). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$