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Demo Pratikum Security Assessment Findings Report

Business Confidential

Date: May 08th, 2024 Project: 897-19

Version 1.0



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Confidentiality Statement

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TCMS may share this document with auditors under non-disclosure agreements to demonstrate penetration test requirement compliance.

Disclaimer

A penetration test is considered a snapshot in time. The findings and recommendations reflect the information gathered during the assessment and not any changes or modifications made outside of that period.

Time-limited engagements do not allow for a full evaluation of all security controls. TCMS prioritized the assessment to identify the weakest security controls an attacker would exploit. TCMS recommends conducting similar assessments on an annual basis by internal or third-party assessors to ensure the continued success of the controls.

Contact Information

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


Assessment Overview

From May 07th, 2024 to May 08th, 2024, DC engaged JS to evaluate the security posture of its infrastructure compared to current industry best practices that included an external penetration test. All testing performed is based on the Modul Pratikum

Phases of penetration testing activities include the following:

- Planning Customer goals are gathered and rules of engagement obtained.
- Discovery Perform scanning and enumeration to identify potential vulnerabilities, weak areas, and exploits.
- Attack Confirm potential vulnerabilities through exploitation and perform additional discovery upon new access.
- Reporting Document all found vulnerabilities and exploits, failed attempts, and company strengths and weaknesses.



Assessment Components

External Penetration Test

A JS engineer attempts to recon information using Nmap. The engineer also performs scanning and enumeration to identify potential vulnerabilities in hopes of exploitation.



Finding Risk Ratings

The following table defines levels of severity and corresponding CVSS score range that are used throughout the document to assess vulnerability and risk impact.

Severity	CVSS V3 Score Range	Definition
Critical/High	9.0-10.0	Exploitation is straightforward and usually results in system-level compromise. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch immediately.
High	7.0-8.9	Exploitation is more difficult but could cause elevated privileges and potentially a loss of data or downtime. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch as soon as possible.
Moderate	4.0-6.9	Vulnerabilities exist but are not exploitable or require extra steps such as social engineering. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch after high-priority issues have been resolved.
Low	0.1-3.9	Vulnerabilities are non-exploitable but would reduce an organization's attack surface. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch during the next maintenance window.
Informational	N/A	No vulnerability exists. Additional information is provided regarding items noticed during testing, strong controls, and additional documentation.



Scope

Assessment	Details
Penetration Test	 IP Address Aplikasi: 167.172.75.216 Semua fungsi aplikasi. Mekanisme akun pengguna dan autentikasi. Antarmuka web dan API. Interaksi database dan proses penanganan data.

Scope Exclusions

- 1. Tidak diperbolehkan untuk melakukan serangan yang dapat merusak data atau infrastruktur aplikasi.
- 2. Tidak diperbolehkan untuk mengeksploitasi kerentanan yang dapat memberikan akses ke server (contoh: RCE, privilege escalation).
- 3. Hindari serangan DoS/DDoS yang dapat mengganggu ketersediaan layanan aplikasi.



Summary Vulnerability Report

Alert counts by risk and confidence

This table shows the number of alerts for each level of risk and confidence included in the report.

(The percentages in brackets represent the count as a percentage of the total number of alerts included in the report, rounded to one decimal place.)

			C	onfidence		
		User Confirmed	High	Medium	Low	Total
	High	0	0	0	0	0
		(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)
	Medium	0	1	1	1	3
		(0.0%)	(12.5%)	(12.5%)	(12.5%)	(37.5%)
	Low	0	0	2	0	2
Risk		(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(25.0%)	(0.0%)	(25.0%)
	Informational	0	1	1	1	3
		(0.0%)	(12.5%)	(12.5%)	(12.5%)	(37.5%)
	Total	0	2	4	2	8
		(0.0%)	(25.0%)	(50.0%)	(25.0%)	(100%)

Alert counts by site and risk

This table shows, for each site for which one or more alerts were raised, the number of alerts raised at each risk level.

Alerts with a confidence level of "False Positive" have been excluded from these counts.

(The numbers in brackets are the number of alerts raised for the site at or above that risk level.)



	Risk			
			Info	ormational
	High (= High)	Medium (>= Medium)	Low (>= Informat:	
			(>= Low)	onal)
http://167.172.75.216	0	3	2	3
ite	(0)	(3)	(5)	(8)

1. GET http://167.172.75.216/register

Alert tags

- OWASP 2021 A01
- WSTG-v42-SESS-05
- OWASP 2017 A05
- CWE-352

Alert description

No Anti-CSRF tokens were found in a HTML submission form.

A cross-site request forgery is an attack that involves forcing a victim to send an HTTP request to a target destination without their knowledge or intent in order to perform an action as the victim. The underlying cause is application functionality using predictable URL/form actions in a repeatable way. The nature of the attack is that CSRF exploits the trust that a web site has for a user. By contrast, cross-site scripting (XSS) exploits the trust that a user has for a web site. Like XSS, CSRF attacks are not necessarily cross-site, but they can be. Cross-site request forgery is also known as CSRF, XSRF, one-click attack, session riding, confused deputy, and sea surf.

CSRF attacks are effective in a number of situations, including:

- * The victim has an active session on the target site.
- * The victim is authenticated via HTTP auth on the target site.
- * The victim is on the same local network as the target site.

CSRF has primarily been used to perform an action against a target site using the victim's privileges, but recent techniques have been discovered to disclose information by gaining access to the response. The risk of information disclosure is dramatically increased when the target site is vulnerable to XSS, because XSS can be used as a platform for CSRF, allowing the attack to operate within the bounds of the same-origin



```
policy.
Other info No known Anti-CSRF token [anticsrf, CSRFToken, RequestVerificationToken,
        csrfmiddlewaretoken, authenticity token, OWASP CSRFTOKEN, anoncsrf,
        csrf token, csrf, csrfSecret, csrf magic, CSRF, token, csrf token] was found in
        the following HTML form: [Form 1: "password" "username" ].
Request line and header section (238 bytes)
        GET http://167.172.75.216/register HTTP/1.1
        host: 167.172.75.216
        user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64;
        rv:125.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/125.0
        pragma: no-cache
        cache-control: no-cache
        referer: http://167.172.75.216
        Request body (0 bytes)
Response Status line and header section (231 bytes)
        HTTP/1.1 200 OK
        X-Powered-By: Express
        Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
        Content-Length: 1399
        ETag: W/"577-4i6dgKF7oXX4Gzdkc6Ly4etamd0"
        Date: Sat, 01 Jun 2024 10:20:03 GMT
        Connection: keep-alive
        Keep-Alive: timeout=5
        Response body (1399 bytes)
         <!DOCTYPE html>
         <html>
         <head>
             <title>Register - Jay's Bank</title>
             <link rel="stylesheet" href="/css/register.css">
         </head>
         <body>
             <div class="container">
                 <h1>Register</h1>
                 <div id="messageBox" class="message-box"
        style="display:none;"></div>
                 <form id="registerForm">
                      <div class="form-group">
                          <label for="username">Username:</label>
                          <input type="text" id="username"</pre>
        name="username" required minlength="10">
                          <small style="color:grey;">Username must
        be at least 10 characters long.</small>
                      </div>
                      <div class="form-group">
```



```
<label for="password">Password:</label>
                <input type="password" id="password"</pre>
name="password" required pattern="^(?=.*\d)(?=.*[a-
z]) (?=.*[A-Z]) (?=.*\W) .{10,}$">
                <small style="color:grey;">Password must
be at least 10 characters long and include at least one
digit, one special character, one uppercase letter, and
one lowercase letter.</small>
                <small id="passwordError"</pre>
style="color:red; display:none;">Invalid password
format.</small>
            </div>
            <button type="submit">Register</button>
        </form>
        Already have an account? <a href="/login">Login</a>
here</a>.
    </div>
    <script src="/js/register.js"></script>
</body>
</html>
```

Evidence <form id="registerForm">

Solution Phase: Architecture and Design

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard.

Phase: Implementation

Ensure that your application is free of cross-site scripting issues, because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330).

Note that this can be bypassed using XSS.

Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to



perform that operation.

Note that this can be bypassed using XSS.

Use the ESAPI Session Management control.

This control includes a component for CSRF.

Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.

Phase: Implementation


Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

Methodology:


- 1. Pembuatan akun
- 2. Mengubah password akun
- 3. Simpan auth-tokennya nya lalu kita gunakan burpsuit untuk masuk dengan menggunakan akun admin dengan cara mengubah password admin menjadi password akun kita menggunakan auth token yang tadi sudah kita simpan

Screen shot Langkah pengerjaan:





















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