

Lab 1: Analysis of Sample1

Jonathan Harijanto

January 16, 2017

CS 373: Defense Against the Dark Arts - Winter 2017

Abstract

The purpose of this blog is to describe the observation from an unknown malware called `evil.exe`. This blog will cover the testing methodology for the malware and the knowledge that was gained from completing this lab.

I. BLOG

A. What I looked at:

In this first lab, I had to investigate an unknown malware called `evil.exe`. The only available information for me was the current version of the file and the size of it. I was able to retrieve these data from Right Click - Properties (Windows Operating System). Therefore, I need additional tools to study the malware's behavior further. The list of tools that I used are FakeNet, ProcessMonitor, ProcessExplorer and Flypaper.

B. How I looked at it:

To study the behavior of the malware accurately, I had to run all the tools before I executed (double-click) the malware. First, I ran both FakeNet and Flypaper to stop the real network connection and simulate a 'fake' ones. I did this because I wanted `evil.exe` to assume that a network connection still exists and try to contact the remote host. When this happen, I could observe its network activity with the host. Next, I ran ProcessMonitor to watch the malware's activity towards the file system, registry, and process in real-time. Finally, I executed ProcessExplorer to look up the malware process details when it is running.

The way I analyzed the malware was I played with each tool individually and noted all the information provided in a text editor. The first tool I focused on was ProcessMonitor because it gave me an overall idea what the malware was doing. After that, I closed ProcessMonitor and moved on to ProcessExplorer. Similarly, I continued with FakeNet because I needed to look at the network traffic. Lastly, I applied some manual testing using Windows search tools and command prompt's command.

C. What I found:

When I studied the malware using Process Monitor, I found out that the first thing it did was call different registry functions in the Windows registry. I noticed that `evil.exe` called `RegOpenKey` function to open a registry key, `RegQueryValue` to retrieve data in a registry key and `RegEnumValue` to enumerate the value of a registry key in both `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE` (HKLM) and `HKEY_CURRENT_USER` (HKCU). It is interesting to know that most `RegQueryValue` results are NAME NOT FOUND instead of SUCCESS.

Furthermore, I noticed that the malware started to create multiple files with DLL extensions (.dll) in the system32 directory. One of the examples is `imm32.dll`. This `evil.exe` also read multiple files and created some file mapping objects in the system32 directory too.

Further down the list in Process Monitor, I observed that the malware started to call different registry functions which are `RegDeleteValue` to remove a registry key and `RegEnumKey` to retrieve a sub-key from the registry key. However, these function calls only occurred in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE` (HKLM). The last two things that the malware did were launched a new command prompt process and made a new directory called `ntldr`. Inside this directory, the malware created four different files: `svchest.exe`, `funbots.bat`, `lsinter.gif`, `system.yf`. Then, it used the open command prompt to hide these files, using `attrib` command, except `svchest.exe`.

Moving on to a different tool called FakeNet. With this program, I discovered that the malware made several HTTP requests using the GET method. The first request was to a host named `hisunpharm.com`, where `evil.exe` asked for an application file called `pao.exe`. Next, it inquired an HTML file, and a text file from a host called `timeless888.com`. Furthermore, all these files were downloaded in gzip format.

The last tool that I used was Process Explorer. I saw that `evil.exe` consumed 75 MB of memory for itself (Private Byte). Also, I found various strings dumped in the Properties - Scan section. Some of these strings were related to command prompt instruction (`attrib`), and some of them are related to specific directories in Windows. In addition, some strings printed as the Registry function like `RegOpenKey`. Last but not least, I discovered some random words like `FsEjGsZJFs` and random phrases like `WHAT A FFFING DAY`.

After I had finished using all the tools, I decided to perform some manual tests. From this tests, I learned that, first, the malware hid the `ntldr` directory from Windows Search. Second, the access

to `C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\`, where `pao.exe` is found, was blocked by the malware. Furthermore, the three files: `Isinter.gif`, `funbots.bat`, `system.yf` in `ntldr` directory were set as hidden, unless I executed the `svchest.exe` (an executable file created by `evil.exe`). Finally, I tried to use the `attrib -s -h -r /s /d` command on the malware folder and nothing showed up.

II. CONCLUSION

From this lab experiment, I learned that `evil.exe` was able to exploit the Windows security by adding, retrieving, and deleting various registry keys. It also able to attack the `system32` directory by adding and deleting several DLL extension files without permission. Furthermore, it could create its own network communication that able to download unknown files automatically. Thus, there is a high chance that `evil.exe` is a Trojan.