

## *The President's Daily Brief*

1 July 1971

46

~~Top Secret~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

1 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

In Laos, Vang Pao's forces continue to cut deeply into Communist territory on and near the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 1)

The immediate Communist threat has eased in South Vietnam's central highlands. (Page 2) 50X1


Peking has increased its forces in western China since early this year. (Page 3)

Communist logistic forces in the Laotian panhandle are continuing a low level of transportation activity despite unusually heavy rains. (Page 4)



**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA



50X1

551607 7-71 CIA

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**

On Tuesday, forward elements of Vang Pao's irregulars reached Xieng Khouang airfield in the north central portion of the Plaine des Jarres and established a landing zone nearby. They found no evidence of recent enemy activity. At the same time, other patrols moved into the northeastern part of the Plaine, locating and destroying many small supply caches.

*Government forces have not been present in this area of the Plaine since February 1970, when a North Vietnamese counteroffensive drove the irregulars from Xieng Khouangville and swiftly rolled back the gains of the rainy season campaign in 1969.*


Other significant government advances were scored west of the Plaine. Irregular units have captured the entire Phou Seu ridge--the scene of clashes for several days--and other irregulars have moved back into Ban Na, an important government artillery base that had been abandoned in April.

*Vang Pao was not able to take Ban Na until mid-October last year, and his efforts to secure strong points north of Ban Na then had proved only temporarily successful.*

*The North Vietnamese clearly have been caught off balance by Vang Pao's offensive. They had been pulling back some of their units from forward positions west of the Plaine, which in part accounts for Vang Pao's relatively easy progress to date. Recent intercepts from the two Communist regiments near Phou Seu and Phou Theung indicate that they have suffered casualties and have supply problems, largely resulting from government tactical air and artillery attacks. The North Vietnamese, however, still have six regiments, with artillery and armor support, in the general vicinity of the Plaine.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

Enemy Forces Return to Base Areas



551610 7-71 CIA

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


**SOUTH VIETNAM**

Two North Vietnamese infantry regiments and part of an artillery regiment have moved away from the Ben Het battlefield in western Kontum Province to sanctuary in Laos. Two other North Vietnamese infantry regiments, which had been attacking allied targets in Pleiku Province, have pulled back into a Cambodian base camp. Elements of these units, however, no doubt remain behind to harass allied positions in conjunction with local forces.

*These regiments apparently have pulled back for a period of rest and retraining. They are likely also to absorb many of the new personnel and much of the equipment--including long-range artillery and possibly antiaircraft weapons--which were moving south during May and June from North Vietnam.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**Peking Increases Forces in Western China**



50X1

551609 7 71 CIA

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA**

The latest satellite photography shows more than 100 artillery pieces in revetted positions, about 50 tanks and assault guns, and over 300 trucks in the hills just south of Urumchi in Sinkiang. The equipment would be enough for an artillery division and an armor unit of undetermined size.

Chinese forces in Sinkiang had been expanded from about 40,000 in 1965 to 80,000 at the end of 1970. Much of this gradual increase resulted from the addition of an infantry division and border defense forces. Identification of the equipment for new units is the first evidence of a reinforcement of this nature in western China. The artillery and armor will considerably enhance the capability of the Chinese to defend the flat plain between the Soviet border and Urumchi.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

Indochina: Communist supply forces in the Laotian panhandle are continuing a low level of transportation activity despite unusually heavy rains. Occasional breaks in the weather have permitted the repair and use of rain- and bomb-damaged main roads, and supplies have been free-floated on waterways. Although truck movements increased during the past week, the flow of supplies during June remained below last June's level when weather was better. Some AAA units and logistic personnel are returning to North Vietnam for the duration of the rainy season, but there have been no indications of a large-scale withdrawal; most of the Communists' logistic forces are likely to remain in the panhandle.

USSR-Egypt: [redacted]

50X1  
50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

2 July 1971

47

~~Top Secret~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

2 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**


On *Page 1* we comment on the Viet Cong's latest proposal in Paris.

Inflation has sharply accelerated in Phnom Penh in the past week, with prices of some key items doubling. (*Page 3*)

Eight new heroin refineries have gone into production in the Thailand-Burma-Laos border region since the beginning of the year. (*Page 4*)



50X1



50X1

50X1

50X1

On *Page 7* we discuss Peking's commentary on the Chinese Communist Party's 50th anniversary yesterday.

MIG-19s are accumulating at China's Shen-yang plant. (*Page 8*)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**VIETNAM**

The Viet Cong's new seven-point proposal softens the Communist position on POW release but retains and amplifies a very tough line on US disengagement from the war. In addition, it repackages Hanoi's demands for a political settlement in South Vietnam in a superficially more attractive form.

Madame Binh stated in Paris yesterday that if the US sets "a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1971 of the totality of US forces" and those of its allies, the Communists and the allies will immediately work out arrangements to ensure the safety of the withdrawing troops and to release the soldiers and civilians "of all parties" who are held as prisoners. Prisoner release, the statement added, will be timed to end when withdrawals are completed.

The formulation on the prisoner-release question is new; up to now the Communists have said only that the POW issue would be "discussed" when the US set a withdrawal date. The deadline for withdrawal is even shorter this time than it was in the Viet Cong's eight points last September, however. More important, the demand that the military disengagement be total, including noncombatants, equipment, and bases, is as adamant as ever. The inclusion of civilian as well as military prisoners in the release also opens up a thorny problem of the Communist cadre held by Saigon.

There are two eye-catching changes in the new Communist position on a political settlement in South Vietnam. Last September's proposal contained an elaborate scenario involving the formation of a new non-Communist "administration" in Saigon excluding President Thieu, Vice-President Ky, and Prime Minister Khiem, and the establishment of a temporary coalition government on the basis of negotiations between this "administration" and the Communists. The new statement retains the same scenario, but Ky's and Khiem's names are not mentioned, and Hanoi demands only that Thieu and unnamed men in his "bellicose group" must go.

Second, the Communists have replaced their insistence on a coalition government with something less precise. They now say only that a broad "government of national concord" will be the outcome of the talks between the post-Thieu "administration" and the Communists. By implication the Communists are leaving the specific form of this government open to negotiation. Moreover, the language of this section--and indeed much of the statement--is cast to convey an image of conciliation and reasonableness, without committing Hanoi to anything specific.

(continued)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

The Communists doubtless hope that their initiative on the prisoners--coupled as it is with a restatement of their basic position on US withdrawals--will make things awkward for the US Government both at home and overseas. They may believe that their political proposals will appeal to many in the US who are looking for a face-saving way out of the war. They probably also hope to fuel worries in Saigon about Washington's longer-term support. The new formula for a political settlement in South Vietnam, by its fuzziness and air of reasonableness, is designed both to encourage individuals in South Vietnam whose support of the war is wavering and to give some ammunition to those--possibly even including Ky--who are already working to build an anti-Thieu, antiwar constituency.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CAMBODIA**

Inflation has sharply accelerated in Phnom Penh during the past week. Prices of beef and pork, as well as of rice on the open market, have doubled. In addition, the black market value of the Cambodian riel depreciated drastically in the past few days.

*The skyrocketing prices result from increased military spending, depleted stocks of important items, reduced food shipments into the capital, and early indications of a poor rice crop next season. The accompanying loss of confidence in the currency has led the Chinese community to send more capital abroad.*

*Only last week, Cambodia's leadership agreed in principle to all of the fairly sweeping fiscal and monetary reforms recommended last March by the International Monetary Fund. Reforms, if carried through, could eventually help in restoring public confidence.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Eight new refineries exclusively producing pure white heroin have gone into operation in the Thailand-Burma-Laos border region since the beginning of this year, [redacted] Their production had reached at least 7.5 metric tons by the end of May. This does not include production from the several refineries that were operating prior to 1971.

50X1

The flurry of refinery construction apparently reflects the increased demand generated by US servicemen in South Vietnam. Accelerated shipments of raw opium out of northeast Burma into the triborder refining area also reflect the responsiveness of local narcotics traffickers to the increasing demand for heroin. The shipments are partly an effort, too, to build up stocks in anticipation of US pressure to suppress the trade. By the end of June, about 300 tons of opium had been delivered to the triborder area this year compared with a known total of 123 tons for all of 1970.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**ISRAEL-USSR**



50X1  
50X1

50X1  
50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**INDIA**



50X1  
50X1

50X1  
50X1

50X1  
50X1

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA**

The authoritative editorial commemorating the Chinese Communist Party's 50th anniversary yesterday was largely a panegyric to the correctness of Mao Tse-tung's "line," together with a recounting of the political sins of many of his earlier party opponents. The article was remarkable for its cursory treatment of the achievements of the Cultural Revolution, which brought the most momentous purge in the history of the Chinese party. Although it did severely castigate deposed state chairman Liu Shao-chi, the editorial pointedly ignored numerous other opponents uncovered by Mao and his radical lieutenants during the 1966-1968 period, declaring flatly that "we will not go into detail about this revolution."

This gingerly approach reflects the intensity of the factional and personal conflicts within China's ruling politburo. Mounting political pressure over the past year on the politburo's radical ideologues has cast considerable doubt on the ultimate outcome of the Cultural Revolution, and much of its history may even be in the process of being rewritten. The editorial's condemnation of counterrevolutionaries who created chaos and sought personal power in the "revolution," its call for exposing conspirators and renegades still in the party, its praise for the army's role in restoring order, and its emphasis on inner party struggle are all apparently allusions to a recent sharpening of battle lines in the politburo between the militants who were in Mao's inner circle and the less tightly knit proponents of relative moderation.

The editorial also failed to indulge in self-congratulation over the progress achieved since last year's anniversary in rebuilding the post-Cultural Revolution party apparatus. This reticence with regard to the regime's first order of domestic business is almost certainly because some key central departments such as the party secretariat have yet to be formally reconstituted, and because four provinces still lack party committees. Moreover, the mere establishment of leading party organs in most of China's 29 provinces and special municipalities has proved no panacea for overcoming the political divisions engendered among the local leadership by the Cultural Revolution.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA**

The latest satellite photography showed 423 MIG-19s at two airfields associated with the aircraft production facility at Shen-yang. This is the highest number yet observed in the Shen-yang area.

*The accumulation of MIG-19s at Shen-yang has been evident for more than six months. The fact that so many have not yet been flown to Chinese Air Force units suggests that the air force simply cannot absorb the new aircraft at the current rate of production--as many as 50 a month. It may be, however, that the Shen-yang MIGs are yet to be equipped with some vital components. China has been producing MIG-19 aircraft since late 1964 or early 1965. At least 1,100 of the aircraft are already assigned to tactical units.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



50X1



50X1



50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

Communist China:

50X1  
50X1

50X1

USSR: The latest satellite photography shows five "Backfire" swing-wing bombers at the Ramenskoye test center near Moscow, the highest number observed to date. The new Soviet bomber--formerly designated KAZ-A--is now engaged in flight testing and aerial refueling trials. This Mach 2 aircraft probably will carry one air-to-surface missile. If the "Backfire" test program continues to run smoothly, we estimate that the aircraft could enter production this year and operational service by late 1973.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*3 July 1971*

48

~~Top Secret~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

3 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

On *Page 1*, we discuss the number of new Soviet missile silos identified in a preliminary analysis of photography from the current KH-9 mission.

The deaths of the Soviet cosmonauts apparently were due to a lack of oxygen resulting from loss of pressure in their descent capsule during re-entry.  
*(Page 2)*

50X1

Chile's Central Bank is recommending an austerity program in place of the expansionary policies being pursued by Allende. *(Page 4)*

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR**

Preliminary analysis of photography obtained from the second portion of the current KH-9 mission shows six additional new missile silos of the smaller type and one additional silo of the larger type. Forty nine of the smaller type and 18 of the larger type silos have now been identified. Several others have been tentatively identified.

Reconstruction of one of the two launch pads at the Tyuratam missile test center where SS-9s have been tested appears to be nearly complete. Testing of a missile for the larger silo could begin from this pad at any time.

Analysis of this photography is continuing, and the number of both silo types may change.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

USSR

The Soyuz 11 cosmonauts apparently died of asphyxiation resulting from a loss of pressure in their descent capsule during re-entry.

A report yesterday by Victor Louis, the Soviet-born Moscow correspondent for a London newspaper, indicates that the cosmonauts died from a lack of oxygen because they had not properly sealed the hatch on the capsule. Louis has provided accurate information in the past on some Soviet events and is used in various unofficial ways by the Soviet Government. The amount of technical detail in his report suggests that his information came from knowledgeable Soviet officials.

The report supports other evidence that the deaths were caused by a mechanical failure in the space-craft and by human error rather than by the physiological effects of prolonged weightlessness or by the residual effects of the fire which earlier had been extinguished aboard Salyut.

50X1

What effect the accident will have on the Soviet manned space program is not yet clear. If the problems are minor, future manned space flights are not likely to be significantly delayed.


50X1

Most of the ships which supported the Soyuz 11 mission have departed their stations, indicating that another manned launch is not imminent. The Soviets evidently plan to use Salyut again because they have raised its orbit since the cosmonauts' return, thereby extending its life.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


**INDIA-USSR**



50X1



50X1



50X1

50X1  
50X1



50X1

50X1



50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CHILE**

The Central Bank has warned that foreign exchange reserves may be exhausted by the end of the year. The bank recommends that the regime stop deficit spending, raise prices charged by nationalized enterprises, reassure private investors, devalue the escudo, and let prices for luxury goods rise.

50X1


*Industrial production is reported to be approaching capacity levels and will be hard pressed to meet heavy consumer demand, which continues unabated. As a result, prices are beginning to rise more rapidly despite price controls and increased imports. The administration apparently intends for the present to continue its expansionary policies even though Allende has said privately that Chile will soon be undergoing a "dollar crisis" and be forced to devalue.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

[ ] Chinese [ ]

50X1

50X1




*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**COMMUNIST CHINA**



50X1



50X1  
50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTE**

Communist China:


50X1  
50X1X1  
50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*5 July 1971*

*46*



~~Top Secret~~ 50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

5 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**


Irregular forces in Laos continued their advance across the Plaine des Jarres over the weekend.  
*(Page 1)*

The French say they will not join in any bloc-to-bloc talks on mutual and balanced force reductions.  
*(Page 2)*

South Africa and France have reached an agreement that will permit the South Africans to manufacture Mirage aircraft. *(Page 3)*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA



50X1

551619 7-71 CIA

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**

Irregular forces continued their advance across the Plaine des Jarres over the weekend. One battalion moved from the hills to the west on 2 July and secured five positions on the high ground dominating the northwest portion of the Plaine without meeting any opposition. South of this area, a 450-man irregular battalion was airlifted on the same day from Long Tieng to reinforce other units holding the Phou Seu ridge. Additional reinforcements have also been moved to Ban Na.

In the past few days, there has been little Communist opposition to irregular search and destroy operations on and around the Plaine. The irregulars now control almost all of the Plaine, with enemy forces holding only the northeast fringe in the Khang Khay region.

Action has also been light north of the Plaine. Irregular units conducting clearing operations in the vicinity of Bouam Long have made no contact with enemy elements for three days, and commanders at Bouam Long believe that the Communists have withdrawn from their earlier siege positions around that base.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FRANCE-NATO**

France intends to tell its NATO allies this week that it will not join in any bloc-to-bloc negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, according to a French embassy official in Washington. Paris will add, however, that its position is still open on discussions of military questions in a more general forum such as a Conference on European Security.

*Paris is concerned about the potential military consequences of force reductions in addition to being opposed to bloc-to-bloc negotiations. The French will nevertheless continue their own bilateral explorations, and will still participate in NATO discussions of MBFR.*

*France also will be among several allies which plan to meet and discuss the effect of the SALT talks on their own interests following the regular US briefing of NATO on Tuesday. Many Europeans who have long been uneasy about Soviet demands for including forward based nuclear systems in SALT now anticipate that these systems might be included in MBFR talks, and wish to consult among themselves on the interrelationships.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH AFRICA - FRANCE**


The two countries have signed an agreement that will permit South Africa to produce basic elements of Mirage III fighters and Mirage F-1 interceptors, according to press reports. Aircraft engines and various sophisticated components, however, will have to be imported from France for several years. Initial production of the Mirage IIIs is not expected until 1973, and F-1 production presumably will not take place until the mid-Seventies.

*South Africa has long sought self-sufficiency in arms production, particularly after the UN arms embargo was imposed in 1963. The country has since produced small arms, light infantry weapons, armored cars, and jet trainers. It will also participate in the production of a surface-to-air missile system developed by France.*

*A French Defense Ministry official recently stated that France will sell a "complement" of Mirages to South Africa. Earlier there were reports that the proposed deal involved 36 aircraft, an order that would about double the number of South Africa's Mirages.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*6 July 1971*

*14*

~~Top Secret~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

6 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**


North Vietnam's major dry season infiltration effort appears to be winding down; only 5,400 new infiltrators were detected in June. (Page 1)

Peking has dramatized its support of Hanoi's latest peace initiative with an exceptionally prompt endorsement of the seven-point proposal. (Page 2)

Peking has defined its terms for diplomatic relations with Japan, stressing the Taiwan issue. (Page 3)

Yesterday's Japanese cabinet changes strengthen the position of Sato's heir-apparent, Takeo Fukuda. (Page 4)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**Infiltration Starts from North Vietnam**

	1968 SVN	1969 SVN	1970 SVN, Cambodia, and Southern Laos	1971 SVN, Cambodia, and Southern Laos	Southern Laos	Southern Laos
JAN	21,000	19,200	13,700	100	8,200	1,700
FEB	18,900	25,000	11,700	....	7,800	3,400
MAR	32,600	17,100	10,600	....	2,900	—
APR	38,900	2,300	3,600	700	2,700	800
MAY	32,800	1,100	4,900	700	13,800	1,300
JUN	23,500	100	2,100	900	5,400	—
JUL	21,800	100	4,100	700	—	—
AUG	11,000	600	4,400	3,300	—	—
SEP	2,200	600	13,800	10,200	—	—
OCT	2,800	4,500	17,100	3,700	—	—
NOV	5,200	7,800	18,400	2,600	—	—
DEC	30,100	6,200	11,400	2,800	—	—

551622 7-71 CIA

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**INDOCHINA**

Only 5,400 new North Vietnamese infiltrators were detected moving through southern Laos in June.

50X1

[redacted] nearly 5,000 of these are headed for the northern half of South Vietnam, with the remainder going to the southern half or to Cambodia.

The June pattern suggests that this year's major dry season infiltration effort is winding down. It is fairly typical for Hanoi to get the majority of the troops destined for the southern regions started early, so that most of those who are moving at the end of the dry season and into the rainy season are going to areas closer to the North.

50X1

[redacted] the processing of stragglers from earlier groups is also characteristic of a concluding phase of infiltration.

Hanoi may try to keep infiltration moving at least sporadically during the rainy season, particularly if it hopes to prolong the current offensive in northern South Vietnam. Moreover, some 20 gaps in the numbering series of recent infiltration groups--possibly representing some 11,400 troops--could mean that the missing groups will turn up on the trails later in the summer.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA - NORTH VIETNAM**

Dramatizing Peking's close support of Hanoi's new peace initiative, the authoritative People's Daily carried an editorial on 3 July endorsing the Vietnamese Communists' seven-point proposal as the "correct way for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question." This exceptionally prompt reaction suggests that Hanoi coordinated its new move with Peking in advance. The Chinese waited five months before acknowledging the ten-point plan proposed by the Vietnamese in May 1969 and delayed for three months their endorsement of the Communists' eight-point plan of last September.

Also over the weekend, the Chinese signed their second supplemental military aid agreement of the year with the Vietnamese, under which Peking will supply unspecified equipment and materials on a grant basis. The normal military aid pact for 1971 was signed last October, and the first supplementary agreement was reached in February.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA - JAPAN**

A joint communiqué concluding the Peking visit of a delegation of the Buddhist-based Kōmeito party spelled out five conditions for establishing Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations: Japanese recognition that China is one and the People's Republic its sole legitimate government, that Taiwan is a province of China, that the Japanese - Nationalist Chinese treaty of 1951 is invalid, that US military forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and that Peking must be seated in all UN organs and Chiang Kai-shek's representatives expelled. If these conditions were met, the Chinese held out the prospect of a peace treaty and even the possibility of a non-aggression pact.

*By defining its terms for recognition, Peking hopes to capitalize on widespread sentiment in Japan for closer ties with the mainland and make it more difficult for the Sato government to follow a "two Chinas" course, especially in the UN General Assembly voting this autumn. The stress on the Taiwan issue in the communiqué suggests that the Chinese consider that other Sino-Japanese irritants, such as the US-Japan Security Treaty and Japanese "remilitarization," are not major obstacles to restoring diplomatic relations.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**JAPAN**

The sweeping cabinet changes announced yesterday further strengthen the position of Sato's heir-apparent, Takeo Fukuda, who was moved from the Finance to the Foreign Ministry. At the same time one of Fukuda's main backers was named secretary general of the governing Liberal Democratic Party, a post vacated last week by Fukuda's chief rival following the party's poor showing in the Upper House elections of 27 June. Another shift moved defense chief Nakasone to a party job where he can broaden his base of support for a future bid for the prime ministership.

*The government's weak election performance almost certainly precipitated more extensive changes than were planned a few weeks ago. It had been expected, for example, that Foreign Minister Aichi would be retained in order to present the Okinawa reversion agreement to the Diet this fall.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

South Vietnam: Vice President Ky announced yesterday that Truong Vinh Le, a prominent southern Catholic politician, will be his running mate in the presidential election on 3 October. Le, who was chairman of the National Assembly in the last four years of the Diem government, narrowly missed election to the Senate last August when he headed a Thieu-backed list of Catholic moderates. Le's selection will probably bring Ky support from some southerners, Catholics, and splinter groups that would otherwise vote for Thieu, and indicates that Ky will continue to try to weaken Thieu's bid for re-election by raiding his former supporters.

Pakistan: [redacted]

50X1  
5UAI

Indonesia: Initial returns from Saturday's parliamentary elections show the government party, Sekber Golkar, running well ahead. The Suharto government's apparent victory will put it in a stronger position to press forward with its priority programs--economic improvement and a political restructuring aimed at forging a single mass party and bridging the social and religious cleavages that have marked the traditional parties.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*7 July 1971*

*48*

~~*Top Secret*~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

7 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

[redacted] Soviet [redacted]

50X1  
50X1

(Page 1)

In South Vietnam, [redacted] Thieu is doing everything possible to keep Vice President Ky from qualifying for the presidential race this fall. (Page 2)

50X1  
50X1

Recent movements by North Vietnamese units in northern Laos seem designed to prevent Vang Pao's irregulars from driving eastward from the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 3)

South Korea [redacted] has urged President Pak to make a gesture toward the concept of unification with North Korea. (Page 4)

50X1


[redacted]

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


USSR




50X1



50X1



50X1



50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

[redacted] Thieu is doing everything possible to prevent Ky from obtaining from provincial councilors the 100 signatures he needs to qualify as a presidential candidate. Government officials are said to be using both intimidation and bribery to persuade councilors not to sign for Ky.

50X1

50X1

50X1

Ky himself apparently remains optimistic that he will be on the ballot, probably because of an agreement with Big Minh that provincial councilors sympathetic to Minh would endorse Ky.


50X1

[redacted] plans to have An Quang councilors nominate Ky are running into trouble because Ky's unpopularity among the Buddhists makes it difficult to ask them to feign support for him.

The prospect that Ky may not qualify is said to be causing Minh to have second thoughts about his candidacy. Minh's resolve to run has wavered in the past because of his concern over the fairness of the election; some of his supporters believe that if the government's tactics succeed in keeping Ky off the ballot, Minh will conclude that he has no chance to win and will withdraw.

Thieu apparently is aware of the possibility that both Minh and Ky will drop out. Thieu is reported to have ordered province chiefs to solicit blank endorsements from councilors which could be used to nominate some other candidate if necessary to give the appearance of a fair election.

LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA



**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**

Major North Vietnamese units near the Plaine des Jarres appear to be relocating in order to block any effort by Vang Pao's irregulars to move eastward from the Plaine. According to both intercepts and direction finding, "large formations" of the 148th Regiment of the 316th NVA Division are pulling back from the Phou Seu area southwest of the Plaine, where they have been active in much of the recent fighting. The division's 174th Regiment, which has been laying siege to Bouam Long north of the Plaine, is suspected to be moving southward, possibly to secure high ground east of the Plaine. This regiment has not been heard in communications since 3 July, and there has been no contact reported by commanders of irregular forces at Bouam Long.

The NVA 866th Independent Regiment also appears to have moved recently to new positions southeast of the Plaine. Elements of two regiments of the 312th Division--the 165th and 209th--are located in the same general area.

*It may take the North Vietnamese some time to refit and regroup their units before they are able to mount any major counter-offensive. Their intercepts indicate, for example, that they are continuing to have supply difficulties and that they have many sick and wounded troops.*

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## SOUTH KOREA

50X1

[redacted] is urging Pak to take a new initiative on unification with North Korea, [redacted]. As a first step in Yi's plan, Pak would propose that the North and South Korean Red Cross societies arrange for an exchange of names and addresses of refugees and families divided by the war. If all went well, [redacted] this would be followed by an exchange of mail, athletes, artists, and news publications. Eventually, there could be economic and political contacts between the North and South.

50X1


50X1

50X1

Last year Pak rejected recommendations for similar exchanges and is not likely to accept such a far-reaching proposal now. Pak, however, is said to favor a gradual relaxation of Seoul's rigid prohibition against all contact with the North in order to bring South Korean policy more into line with the worldwide easing of East-West tensions.

Last summer Pak, in a clear attempt to seize the propaganda initiative from Pyongyang, called for a lifting of the barriers dividing Korea and promised, subject to conditions unacceptable to the North, to drop South Korea's opposition to North Korean participation in the UN debate of the Korean question. Thus, he may be willing to make some public gesture on the unification issue--such as the exchange of names--prior to the UN debate later this year.


Although all Koreans favor reunification in principle, public fear and resentment among Southerners against the North is strong. Pak will move cautiously in order not to alarm the many South Koreans who oppose any form of compromise with the Communists.




50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**USSR - NORTH KOREA**



50X1  
50X1



50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*8 July 1971*

*46*



*Top Secret*

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

8 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Sirik Matak's thoughts on developments in Cambodia  
are presented on *Page 1*.



50X1

The prospects of a serious famine in East Pakistan  
are increasing. (*Page 3*)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CAMBODIA**

During a wide-ranging conversation with Ambassador Swank on 6 July, Sirik Matak made the following comments and observations:

--He intends to maintain the Cambodian Army at its current 220,000-man ceiling. He believes that Lon Nol's plans to enlarge the army are too ambitious and cannot be realized.

--His relations with Lon Nol remain good, and he consults the prime minister regularly on important policy decisions. He added, however, that Lon Nol's efforts to assert his authority on military matters on which he is inadequately briefed causes some "inconvenience."

--He credits First Deputy Prime Minister In Tam with undisguised political ambitions, and feels that he is out of tune with the rest of the cabinet. Matak is worried that if In Tam resigns, he will join the opposition in the assembly.

--He does not believe that the time is ripe for general negotiations with the Communists, and even less for separate negotiations affecting Cambodia. He attached no particular importance to former prime minister Son Sann's expected return from Paris this week.

*Since last August Son Sann has been in Paris, where he has made efforts to establish unofficial contacts with some of Sihanouk's supporters.*


50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

Egyptian


50X1

50X1



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**EGYPT**

	50X1
	50X1
	50X1
	50X1
	50X1 50X1
	50X1
	50X1
	50X1
	50X1 50X1
	50X1
	50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**EAST PAKISTAN**

Estimates of rice production in East Pakistan during the crop year that ended last month have been revised downward to about 11 million tons, compared with 12 million tons in the previous year. Projections for the crop year now beginning are for only 9.5 million tons, leaving a food deficit of about 3.4 million tons.

*Even if imports of this magnitude could be arranged, it would be virtually impossible to get them to the food deficit areas of East Pakistan. Port storage facilities are already full because continuing disruptions of the internal transport system have hampered movement of food grains to the interior. The ports themselves are operating far below capacity.*

*Much of the food grain would have to be distributed free rather than through regular commercial channels because of the limited purchasing power in the countryside. Most factories and commercial establishments are still shut down, and the rural works program, which normally employs several million landless laborers, has been interrupted.*

The chairman of the government's food relief committee has privately admitted "there will be a famine," although the government officially discounts this possibility. East Pakistani civil officials are too cowed by the army to differ publicly with the military governor and, as a consequence, little is being done to avert the famine.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*9 July 1971*

50

50X1

~~Top Secret~~

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

9 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**


Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna has adopted a flexible tone in responding to the most recent Pathet Lao proposals. (Page 1)

There are further indications that Communist Chinese leader Kang Sheng has lost all political power. (Page 2)

At Annex we comment on some of the probable motives underlying Madame Binh's seven-point proposals.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA



50X1

551640 7-71 CIA

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has accepted the Communist proposal that negotiations be held alternately in Vientiane and on the Plaine des Jarres. He sidestepped the Communist demand that negotiations be preceded by a country-wide cease-fire, and proposed instead a limited standdown in and around the Plaine. The talks themselves would presumably take up the larger question of a country-wide cease-fire and bombing halt, as well as other outstanding issues.

50X1

*Souvanna's show of flexibility is ostensibly an effort to get the negotiations onto the same track as last year when the two sides came close to agreeing to a limited cease-fire on the Plaine. As the government itself recognizes, however, the Communists are not likely to buy the scenario this year, particularly now that much of the Plaine is in government hands.*

On the Plaine, Vang Pao's irregulars continue to press forward and are now moving northward toward Phou Keng, the dominant high ground north of the Plaine. Other irregulars are conducting clearing operations in the Muong Pot Valley some four miles east of Ban Na; the valley is thought to be a major North Vietnamese supply and logistic center. There have been Communist probes and harassing attacks against irregular outposts on the Plaine, but no major North Vietnamese assault yet appears to be developing.

Vang Pao has told the US chargé that he plans further moves to the east if enemy resistance continues to be light. He is considering moves across Route 4 into the mountainous area east of the Plaine and sending raiding parties into the Nong Pet area in an effort to interdict the Route 7/71 road junction. He stated that he was sensitive to the dangers of overextending his forces but again reiterated the line that he has authorization from Souvanna and the King to retake as much territory as possible.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA**

Kang Sheng, who appeared on 3 June at a reception for visiting Romanian party chief Ceausescu after being politically sidelined for over six months, "no longer occupies a post," according to Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu. In a conversation with the US ambassador, the Romanian described Kang as a sick man who had left the hospital only to greet the delegation as a courtesy.

Kang's principal "illness" is almost certainly political. Removal of a leader of his stature--he ranked fifth on the elite politburo standing committee--for health reasons does not accord with past Chinese Communist practice.


Kang's brief reappearance indicates that the influence of leftist forces with which he has been associated has not waned completely. The continued fluidity in Peking's leadership was further underscored last week by the extraordinary fact that none of China's top officials put in a public appearance during the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Communist Party.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTE

Saudi Arabia:



50X1  
50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

A  
N  
N  
E  
X

## VIETNAM

The Vietnamese Communists are assiduously touting both the "reasonableness" and the "flexibility" of their position as embodied in Madame Binh's seven points. This is good propaganda, of course, but there may be something besides rhetoric in what they say. Hanoi, in fact, seems to have floated a set of proposals that are as tough as ever in their basic elements, but that are meant to leave some room for negotiation.

Hanoi's two central demands are unchanged in the seven points: it still insists both on complete American military disengagement over a clearly specified period and on a new political regime in South Vietnam. Indeed, the first of these demands--and more specifically the sweeping nature of the withdrawal Hanoi is calling for--has been defined more clearly, not so much by the seven points themselves as by such spokesmen as Madame Binh herself. In her talk on 2 July with Foreign Minister Schumann she made clear that by "withdrawal" the Communists mean the removal of noncombatants, equipment, and bases as well as combatants. Moreover, the seven points attach a rider to this demand in the form of a new call for the release of "civilians" (presumably including Viet Cong cadre) captured during the war.

The statement and accompanying commentary do, however, loosen up both the second demand and the relationship between the two. By explicitly separating the first and second points, Hanoi makes it clearer than before that the US can if it wants negotiate solely on the question of its own withdrawal, leaving a political solution (points two through seven) to the Vietnamese. The Communists of course are not blind to the fact that a precipitate US withdrawal would probably cause the collapse of the Thieu government, thus rendering the six political points largely irrelevant; they probably calculate that this alone makes Washington's acceptance of point one unlikely. They may figure there is an outside chance that public opinion in the US will add impetus to reaching agreement. At a minimum, they hope they can generate fresh pressures on Washington to explore the possibilities of a negotiated settlement at the Paris talks.

(continued)

A-1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

If Washington does reject point one, the Communist statement still seems to contain some negotiating latitude. We see in the last six points some effort to make more attractive the long-standing Communist demand that the US involve itself in the question of a political settlement in South Vietnam. The Communists seem to have gone out of their way to leave their latest political proposals as vague as possible, and we are left with the impression that Hanoi is saying that it will listen to alternatives concerning the nature of the political settlement and the course of events leading to it.

The Communists do insist, however, that as long as Washington plays the decisive role in supporting and protecting Saigon, it must take a leading role in the country's political reordering if the war is to end. Le Duc Tho told Anthony Lewis of The New York Times that there are many ways the Americans can do this without direct negotiations with the Communists, including manipulating the elections this fall. Implicit in his statement (and indeed in his very presence in Paris) is the notion that Washington can also negotiate with Hanoi.

Our interpretation of the seven points is conditioned by our assumptions about the way the Communists view the current US position on the war. Hanoi has acknowledged President Nixon's statements that American involvement in the war is to be ended, but the Communists want to prove that Vietnamization is not a viable route to that goal. American disengagement, they say, can come only through a negotiated alteration of the political structure in South Vietnam or through a unilateral US withdrawal regardless of the consequences to South Vietnam.

The latest flurry of activity, we believe, is designed to see if the US can be pried loose from the Vietnamization policy, either by a more explicit offer of POWs in exchange for withdrawal or by a more attractive prospect for a negotiated political settlement in South Vietnam--i.e. the first two of the seven points. The Communists say explicitly--and not surprisingly--that they would be forthcoming on the "modalities" of US withdrawal if Washington agreed to point one; they seem to hint that they would also be flexible if they found a willingness in Washington to talk about South Vietnamese politics. If they find no change in the US position on either issue, they probably will devote more energy to the attempt to prove militarily that Vietnamization is not a feasible alternative to withdrawal or political negotiation.

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*10 July 1971*

*47*

50X1

~~Top Secret~~

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

10 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Peking is showing no flexibility on the UN representation issue, and backers of the Albanian resolution are planning to inscribe it on the UN agenda [redacted]. (Page 1)

50X1  
50X1

Photography shows many permanent facilities on the Chinese side of the border near disputed Chen-pao Island. (Page 2)

Cambodia is seeking rice from the US and elsewhere in response to public pressure. (Page 3)

A Romanian party directive calling for intensified orthodoxy seems linked to uncertainties over relations with Moscow (Page 4), while the Yugoslavs are making some overtures to the West in view of similar concerns. (Page 5)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CHINA-UN**

[redacted] cosponsors of the Albanian resolution calling for the seating of Peking and the expulsion of Taipei indicate there will be no flexibility in Peking's position. The group decided in addition to seek more cosponsors and to inscribe the resolution on the UN agenda [redacted]. The Albanian chairman, apparently relaying Peking's instructions, rejected a proposal to conduct an intense lobbying effort against the Important Question resolution, presumably on the grounds that this stands little chance of passage in the coming session.

50X1

50X1


[redacted] a Japanese UN representative told US officers there that Tokyo's soundings on various "dual representation" resolutions had shown that such a motion is unlikely to pass. There are indications that several other countries interested in preserving Taipei's seat in the General Assembly are equally gloomy.

50X1

*The inflexibility of Peking and its supporters has clearly reinforced the initial pessimism of many countries over the chances of an alternative to the traditional Chinese representation motions. In any event, support for Taipei has steadily eroded since last year's vote, and further slippage prior to next autumn's vote is a virtual certainty.*

1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR**

A large number of permanent military facilities on the Chinese side of the border near disputed Chen-pao (Damanskiy) Island have been seen in recent satellite photography. There are as many as 400 small buildings, numerous bunkers, vehicle revetments, and antiaircraft and artillery positions within 11 miles of the island, in addition to five helicopter pads.

Most of these facilities were built during 1968 and 1969 but could not be clearly identified in photography of that time. Chinese forces near the border were reinforced following armed conflict over boundary delineation in March 1969. They now maintain a permanent presence in support of their claim to Chen-pao. Photography since the clash showed that the Chinese had established defensive positions on the island; whether these facilities are currently occupied cannot be determined in the recent film.

The Soviets maintain well-equipped border guard units close to Chen-pao, and have at least four divisions within 100 miles of the island.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CAMBODIA**

The government is under considerable public pressure to ease the country's serious shortage of rice and has formally requested the immediate shipment of 32,000 tons of US rice under the PL-480 program and the shipment of 150,000 tons after June 1972. Phnom Penh is also trying to buy rice from Tokyo and Taipei.

*The US Embassy believes that at present consumption levels current stocks will be exhausted by mid-November. Merchants, however, tend to conceal the size of their rice holdings, and official figures on the amounts in private hands are likely to be underestimated. The removal of price ceilings in Phnom Penh, which the government is considering, might shake loose enough privately held rice to carry Cambodia through into the next harvest beginning in January. In addition, armed convoys are making a major effort to transport large amounts of rice on a daily basis from Battambang Province.*

*With regard to next year's needs, the size of plantings in Battambang is said to be well behind schedule because of early flooding, labor shortages, and lack of incentives stemming from relatively low prices for paddy rice.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**ROMANIA-USSR**

*The Communist Party's call on Wednesday for intensification of ideological and cultural orthodoxy appears to stem from uncertainty over relations with Moscow following Ceausescu's recent Asian tour. The new directive comes down particularly hard on Romanian youth, some of whom are termed "parasites." The statement is more dogmatic and regressive than a similar directive issued last February, when on the surface at least Bucharest's relations with Moscow appeared to be moving toward an acceptable modus vivendi.*

*Since neither youth nor intellectuals represent a threat to Romania's internal stability, the new directive seems designed to remove grounds for any Soviet questioning of Ceausescu's commitment to Communism. The Bucharest press continues to publish endorsements of the tour in a manner intended to demonstrate firm Romanian popular support of Ceausescu. More expressions of solidarity can be expected as Bucharest holds out against participation in Warsaw Pact exercises in Bulgaria later this summer.*

*A desire to avoid saying anything that might even indirectly further disturb Moscow may account also for the reluctance of Romanian officials to discuss details of Ceausescu's travels with Western diplomats.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**YUGOSLAVIA**

Belgrade has recently been mounting a low-keyed effort both at home and abroad to deal with the possibility of an increase in Soviet pressure. Always suspicious of Moscow, Tito is concerned over his repeated failure to reach a post-Czechoslovakia understanding that would defuse the threat of the Brezhnev doctrine. Plans for Warsaw Pact military exercises in Bulgaria have further stirred Yugoslavia's long-range suspicions of Soviet intentions.

50X1  
50X1

50X1

In the past few weeks, along with cultivating warmer state relations toward Peking, Belgrade has made several bids for military cooperation with NATO members. In late June a deputy defense minister broached the possibility of expanded military ties with the US, including arms purchases.

50X1

The Yugoslavs have also suggested the possibility of a joint defense of the Adriatic.

50X1

Tito realizes that such overtures risk further antagonizing Moscow, but evidently feels that a package of real and symbolic deterrents will have some value.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTE**

East-West Germany: The Honecker regime, in a concrete move to underline its contention that West Germany is a foreign country, has abolished its State Secretariat for West German Affairs.

50X1  
50X1

[redacted] questions regarding West Germany are now to be handled by the Foreign Ministry. It is unclear whether the Foreign Ministry will assume responsibility for West German affairs immediately or after the current series of East-West German talks has concluded.

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

Sunday, Easter - "Jesus is risen!"  
~~Jesus is risen!~~

45

~~Top Secret~~  
50X1



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SUNDAY CABLE  
11 July 1971

VIETNAM

Saigon's negotiating team in Paris is taking a fairly hard-headed view of the new Communist peace initiative.

50X1  
5U1

[redacted] although the delegation had received no instructions from Saigon, it had on its own assessed the new seven points as a "skillful" and "timely" package that presents real difficulties for the Allies without sacrificing any basic Communist objectives. There was general agreement that Madame Binh and Le Duc Tho had managed to generate a new impression of Communist reasonableness that would be difficult to counter, and that the Communists had indeed made a "genuine positive attempt" to meet some US objections to previous proposals, particularly on the POW issue.

*This lack of panic, coupled with a fairly realistic view of the problems created for the US by the new Communist formulation should ease the difficulties in developing a coordinated Allied response, at least at the working level in Paris. Although there was some delegation apprehension that President Nixon would yield to US political pressure and compromise President Thieu's position, delegation chief Pham Dang Lam was more sanguine.*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

11 July 1971

CYPRUS

The Turkish Cypriot negotiator in the stalemated intercommunal talks has publicly, albeit unofficially, reiterated the standard hard-line Turkish position that the ideal solution to the intercommunal problem would be one based on "complete geographic separation" of the two communities.

*The Turkish statement in rejecting the latest Greek Cypriot proposals leaves little room for further progress in the intercommunal meeting next month. It also would appear to bear out the Greek Cypriots' view that the Turks would not long continue to support the talks. Nevertheless, one Turkish Cypriot official recently insisted that the official response would still leave the door open for further negotiations. There has been considerable concern by all parties that a breakdown in the talks could lead to new outbreaks of intercommunal violence.*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

11 July 1971

INDIA

Foreign aid commitments for the East Pakistani refugees in India are mounting very slowly. Only \$120 million in assistance had been pledged for refugee relief as of early this month. This sum is far short of the estimated \$400 million required to cover only six months of adequate care for the approximately 6.5 million refugees now in India. Prime Minister Gandhi has characterized the aid as "practically next to nothing." The US has been by far the biggest contributor with a commitment of \$70.5 million. Most of the relief contributions to date have been channeled through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who is coordinating the international relief program. The presence of five million refugees in West Bengal alone has produced a sharp increase in food prices and a substantial drop in wages.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

12 July 1971

27

~~Top Secret~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

12 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The attempt to overthrow the monarchy in Morocco failed, but the imposition of military rule is likely to compound the discontent that pervades the country. (Page 1)

50X1

[redacted] the Soviets [redacted] have intensified efforts to prevent the outbreak of war between the two countries such as occurred in 1965. (Page 2)

50X1

50X1

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has characterized foreign aid to 6.5 million refugees from East Pakistan as next to nothing. Only \$120 million has been pledged so far. (Page 4)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**MOROCCO**

The ill-managed attempt to overthrow the monarchy on Saturday has failed. King Hassan, who escaped unscathed from a three and a half-hour siege at his summer palace near Rabat, the capital, quickly transferred all civil and military power to General Oufkir, his ruthless minister of interior, who now has a free hand to round up the rebels and clean out the army. The King has pointed to the director of his military cabinet, Brigadier General Medbouh, as the instigator of the coup attempt.

*Medbouh, who was killed in the fray, has long been cited for his loyalty to the King*

50X1

*It seems likely that the naming of Oufkir will only compound the discontent that pervades the country.*

The rebel force consisted mostly of some 1,400 young enlisted men, led by a handful of officers. They attacked the palace during the King's birthday celebration attended by the diplomatic corps and top Moroccan officials and businessmen. Subsequently they seized key points in Rabat and broadcast over the radio that the King was dead and a republic under a revolutionary command council had been established. In all about 200 persons were killed, including 158 of the attackers, several top leaders, and the Belgian ambassador.

50X1


50X1

In an emotional press conference on Sunday, the King derided the amateurishness of the plot and also claimed that a foreign hand was behind it; he described the coup as being like the Libyan one.

*Whether or not Libya had foreknowledge of the coup attempt, the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council quickly broadcast on Saturday its support for the rebels and for what it viewed as "Arab revolution" against a monarchy.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-INDIA-PAKISTAN**



50X1

*The Soviets, however, appear in fact to be troubled by India's dark hints of military intervention, and have intensified their efforts to prevent another war between India and Pakistan like the one in 1965.*

On 9 July an authoritative commentary in Izvestiya provided a pointed reminder to India and Pakistan of Moscow's desire that war be avoided on the subcontinent. The article noted that local clashes have in the past frequently led to broad military conflicts, and urged that India and Pakistan find a peaceful solution to their problems over East Pakistan. It specifically endorsed Mrs. Gandhi's rebuff to those in India who advocate war with Pakistan.

Soviet officials in India are voicing similar concern. In recent remarks by the Soviet consul general in Madras to a group of Indian politicians, for example, the Soviet diplomat seemed preoccupied with the need to avoid a military conflict between India and Pakistan.

the consul general assured the group that the USSR is "standing by" India--he cited Moscow's help with the refugee problem and its remonstrances to the Pakistanis--but he stressed with much conviction that it would be very bad if India should drift into war and urged that every effort be made to prevent this.

50X1  
50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

China:

50X1


50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


COMMUNIST CHINA



50X1



50X1



50X1



50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTE**

India: Foreign aid commitments for the East Pakistani refugees in India are mounting very slowly. Only \$120 million in assistance had been pledged for refugee relief as of early this month. This sum is far short of the estimated \$400 million required to cover only six months of adequate care for the approximately 6.5 million refugees now in India. Prime Minister Gandhi has characterized the aid as "practically next to nothing." The US commitment of \$70.5 million has been by far the largest. Most of the relief contributions to date have been channeled through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who is coordinating the international relief program. The presence of 5 million refugees in West Bengal alone has produced a sharp increase in food prices and a substantial drop in wages.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

13 July 1971

46



~~Top Secret~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

13 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**



50X1

50X1

On *Page 2* we comment on the official Soviet statement on the cause of the Soyuz 11 tragedy.

Moroccan King Hassan seems to have the situation firmly under control in the aftermath of Saturday's coup attempt. (*Page 3*)



50X1

50X1

In Iceland, the three parties that have agreed to form a government are reported to have adopted a policy statement calling for the departure of US military forces over the next four years. (*Page 5*)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NATIONALIST CHINA




50X1

50X1



50X1

50X1



50X1



50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR**

The official Soviet statement on the cause of the Soyuz 11 tragedy attributes the deaths to "loss of the ship's sealing" during the descent trajectory about 30 minutes before landing, but denies that any structural failure in the Soyuz 11 vehicle caused the rapid drop in pressure that killed the cosmonauts. The report asserts that the flight prior to the beginning of the descent trajectory proceeded normally.

50X1



*The Soviet statement did not specify what seal had failed, but said that studies were continuing to determine the specific cause of the depressurization. It is likely, however, that human error in the sealing of the hatch or a mechanical malfunction in its operation caused the death of the cosmonauts.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**MOROCCO**

Saturday's coup attempt has been repressed with great severity, and the country remains calm. Reserves have been called up for 30 days and the port of Casablanca has been placed under military control, but King Hassan seems confident of his position and has not proclaimed martial law. In his public statements Hassan has left an impression of radical Arab involvement, and he has also blasted the Moroccan opposition for creating an atmosphere conducive to coup plotting.

*These elements did not actually have much to do with the abortive coup. Hassan's remarks are probably designed to divert attention from the fact that the plotters were moved by basic dissatisfaction with conditions in Morocco, and that they included officers who had been presumed to be staunchly loyal to the monarchy.*

The Libyan press has continued to urge support for the Moroccan "revolutionaries," long after the rebellion was effectively quashed. Egyptian President Sadat has sent envoys to both countries, apparently to try to head off further friction. In a gesture of solidarity, Jordan's King Husayn flew to Rabat yesterday to congratulate Hassan on his escape from assassination.


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**JORDAN**




50X1X1  
50X1  
50X1

50X1



50X1

50X1



50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## ICELAND


Four weeks after national elections, three opposition parties have agreed to form a government and are reported to have adopted a policy statement that sets a goal of securing the withdrawal of US military forces over the four-year term of office. The coalition government will be headed by Olafur Johannesson of the agrarian Progressive Party, and also includes the Communist-dominated Labor Alliance and the splinter Liberal Left.

*The three parties represent constituencies most opposed to the presence of US forces, which have been stationed in Iceland since 1951. In 1956, a center-left coalition government called for American withdrawal but reaffirmed the arrangement in return for \$9 million in loans.*

*The partners in the new coalition are unnatural allies. There are stresses and strains involved in various "agreements" made to form the coalition. The chances of the coalition's holding together for a full term appear slim.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*14 July 1971*

48



~~Top Secret~~ 50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

14 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

British negotiations with Malta seem to be near an impasse, while Mintoff has stressed his intent to end any NATO role on the island. (Page 1)

On Page 2 we note several Arab states' reactions to the coup attempt in Morocco.

[Redacted]

50X1

[Redacted]

50X1

50X1

On Page 5 we comment on Chile's copper nationalization amendment, which Allende is about to sign.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**MALTA**

A British Foreign Office official has informed the US Embassy in London that negotiations with Malta "may be on the point of breakdown." He said that the receipt of another caustic letter from Mintoff has caused London to "urgently reconsider" the planned departure of Defense Secretary Lord Carrington for Valletta. The contents of this letter are not available.

50X1  
50X1

50X1

London believes that its present aid to Malta is worth more than the facilities and rights it is receiving in return. At least some British officials contend that British interests alone would probably not justify meeting Valletta's price--more money for fewer facilities under more restrictions--and that London should turn to its NATO partners to cover the costs of any new arrangements.

Mintoff, for his part, still appears optimistic over the chances of reaching an agreement.

50X1  
50X1

50X1

Mintoff's attitude toward NATO is quite another matter. His private secretary declared to US Chargé Tucker last evening that "NATO is finished in Malta."

50X1  
50X1

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**MOROCCO**

A break in diplomatic relations with Libya appears imminent as Libyan news services continue to express support for the Moroccan "revolutionaries" despite the success of Rabat in restoring calm and rounding up the remnants of the rebels. The Libyan Embassy in Rabat is closely guarded and diplomatic personnel restricted. The small turnout for an officially organized demonstration in Tripoli

50X1

suggests that the government's precipitate support for the rebels has not proved popular, however.

Among Morocco's closer Arab neighbors, Algiers remains cautious and essentially noncommittal, and Tunis is reported as shocked, indignant, and relieved at the failure of the coup. The US Embassy reports that the Tunisian Government's main concerns appear to be whether the crisis will reinforce King Hassan's position and what its long-term effect may be for the cause of Maghreb unity.

50X1  
50X1

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

50X1

Soviets


50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

USSR-CHINA

50X1



50X1

50X1



50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

PANAMA

50X1

50X1

50X1

50X1

50X1

50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CHILE**

President Allende has decided to sign the copper nationalization legislation even though he has criticized it as weaker than he had wanted. The constitutional amendment authorizing total nationalization of Chilean copper resources, which Congress unanimously approved on Sunday, enables his government to take full control of the large mines as soon as he signs it.

A long negotiating process is still in prospect, however, over the transfer and compensation of the companies' remaining interests. There are also indications that an agreement reached with the Cerro Corporation in late May still faces major hurdles before it is signed. The US companies, if they object to the government's terms, can appeal only the amount of compensation offered, and the Allende forces are making every effort to ensure a majority on the appeal tribunal.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTE**

South Vietnam: A new flurry of Communist shellings and ground probes is likely to begin soon, despite recent heavy rains in the north of the country and seasonal flooding in the Mekong delta. Intercepts and captured documents, as well as agent reports, talk of increased activity from mid-July through August; the most frequently mentioned period is the latter part of July. In most of the country, the actions are likely to be conducted by local forces and guerrillas. Regular North Vietnamese units still pose a formidable threat near the DMZ, however, and elements of three regiments--more than 2,500 men--have been assembling in the delta close to a government artillery base in the northern U Minh Forest.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

15 July 1971

48

~~Top Secret~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

15 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

We now have good evidence that the Chinese Communists rejected as inadequate a Soviet proposal in March for a pact renouncing use of force in the border area pending a final frontier settlement. (Page 1)

In Laos, the Communists have sharply rejected Prime Minister Souvanna's proposal of 5 July for a cease-fire on the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 2)

North Vietnam apparently has received pledges of increased military aid from various Communist capitals. (Page 3)

The Jordanian Army drive against fedayeen strongholds in the north has entered its third day. (Page 4)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR**

Chou En-lai told [redacted]

[redacted] that China had rejected a Moscow proposal, made just before the Soviet party congress in March, for a pact renouncing the use of force in the border dispute for a three-year period during which a frontier settlement would be negotiated. The premier stated that Peking considered the offer a plot and that Moscow's real intention was to create an impression of Communist unity in its dealings with the US while in fact putting off the entry into force of such an agreement.

50X1

50X1

50X1

*The Chinese demand, as a precondition for discussion of border demarcation, that there be a preliminary protocol regarding conduct along the border, and that the protocol include a nonaggression clause.*

*Moscow's position had been that a nonaggression pact is best concluded simultaneously with a boundary agreement. The new Soviet "flexibility" presumably is designed to blunt charges by China that it is being forced to negotiate under military pressure. Although Moscow has no illusions about the likelihood of reaching a border settlement, it may hope that satisfaction of China's demand for a "preliminary protocol" can be used to obscure continuing Sino-Soviet difficulties. Peking, however, seems to feel that border tension has lessened and state relations have improved so that there is no need to reach agreement in the near future.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

In a tough and unyielding letter to Souvanna on 11 July, Lao Communist leader Souphanouvong stated that Souvanna's proposal of 5 July for a cease-fire on the Plaine des Jarres was in effect a rejection of the Communist proposal for a countrywide cease-fire. Souphanouvong argued that imposing a countrywide cease-fire was within the power of the Laotian parties, and that in rejecting it Souvanna was serving US interests. This is an allusion to the fact that a countrywide cease-fire would affect the US bombing program in the infiltration corridor.

The letter comes down hard on Vang Pao's current offensive on the Plaine, which it describes as an "extremely serious" act. It ties Souvanna's proposal of 5 July to the offensive and implies that it is evidence that Vientiane is not genuinely interested in reaching a settlement. The letter makes no reference to withdrawing the "special emissary" who is in Vientiane or to breaking contacts with the government. The Communists may still hope that they can convince Souvanna that it is in the government's interest to be more accommodating to their demands for talks.

The tone of the letter, however, suggests that the Communists doubt there will be progress toward negotiations until the military situation on the Plaine turns again to their advantage.

The Souphanouvong letter may take the edge off the high spirits now enjoyed by the leaders in Vientiane, but it is not likely to change orders to Vang Pao to take as much territory as he can. It would be both politically and psychologically difficult for Souvanna to rein in his troops when they have the upper hand; furthermore, he believes that gains on the ground will strengthen his future bargaining position. Souvanna evidently has little expectation that the Communists are interested in a partial stand-down in north Laos, and the chances for early meaningful negotiations are therefore slim. In its insistence on a nationwide cease-fire, the latest Souphanouvong letter will only reinforce the view that there is nothing to negotiate about at this juncture.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NORTH VIETNAM**


A military delegation headed by a North Vietnamese vice minister of defense returned to Hanoi early this month after a month-long trip to Peking and undisclosed European Communist capitals. The delegation apparently sought and received commitments for increased military aid.

The North Vietnamese press--which has been reticent about the trip--has noted only that a new supplementary military aid agreement has been concluded with the Chinese. [REDACTED]

50X1  
50X1

50X1

50X1



50X1

50X1



50X1



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**JORDAN**

The army's drive against fedayeen strongholds in northern Jordan is now in its third day. King Husayn has committed a significant force, including tanks and infantry, to the fight, and the tide apparently is going against the fedayeen. Government troops appear to be in control of the Gaza refugee camp and surrounding areas but are still trying to dislodge fedayeen who are dug into the neighboring heights.

Arab reaction to the government's latest offensive against the fedayeen has been relatively muted. Egypt felt it necessary to postpone King Husayn's visit scheduled for 23 July but ascribed the delay to pre-occupation with a political conference. An official spokesman expressed hope that Amman would respond to Egyptian-Saudi efforts to mediate the conflict with the fedayeen. Syrian statements perfunctorily deplored the fighting. The Syrians, who are worried about fedayeen on their own soil, are said to have promised the Jordanians to prevent any commandos from firing across the border into Jordan.  

50X1  
50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

Malta: Mintoff's action yesterday in terminating current arrangements for NATO facilities and forces in Malta makes the uncertain UK-Malta negotiations even more important if the West is to retain a base on the island. Although Mintoff wants to retain a British presence there, he obviously wants to get as good a deal as he can. He continues to play it tough with London. Yesterday afternoon he said he did not want the British negotiating mission under present circumstances, and this caused London to recall Defense Secretary Lord Carrington's plane from the runway as it was about to leave for Malta. The British representative to NATO, on instructions from London, has asked the other Allies if they would be willing to help pay the amount required to come to terms with Mintoff on the base issue.

Morocco: Security officials claim that, of the 1,500 insurgents involved in Saturday's coup attempt, 168 were killed, 650 have been captured, and 500 or so have fled; about 100 apparently rallied to the King, but their fate remains uncertain. [redacted]

50X1  
50X1

Bolivia: [redacted]

50X1  
50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*16 July 1971*

48

50X1

~~Top Secret~~

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

16 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The Kremlin apparently decided with some difficulty to pursue seriously an arms control agreement with the US, and there are still some who are unhappy over this course of action. (Page 1)

50X1

[Redacted]  
The Chinese Communists have let it be known they will welcome an expansion of indirect trade with the US.  
(Page 3)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SALT

Recent evidence suggests that Moscow's decision to pursue seriously an arms control agreement with the US was reached only with some difficulty in the Kremlin, and that there are still those who are unhappy with Moscow's course of action as advanced in the US-Soviet announcement of 20 May.

The Soviet official line on SALT since 20 May has been moderate and optimistic. Brezhnev's speech of 11 June, which stressed the "increasing significance" of the talks, is now being cited as a basic text by Soviet officials and media. The opening of SALT V in Helsinki was greeted with an uncharacteristically moderate and balanced Pravda editorial which announced that there were signs of a positive shift toward accommodation on both sides. This was followed by an Izvestiya article stressing the optimism accompanying the current round.

On 13 July, however, the military newspaper Red Star presented an article--said to be the first of a series--which adopted a more strident tone, casting doubt on US motives and intentions. Red Star's approach suggests a lack of enthusiasm on the part of some in the Soviet defense establishment for Moscow's present course.

Moreover, an article in the current edition of the Soviet Communist Party theoretical journal Kommunist painstakingly and defensively justifies Moscow's current policy on SALT. It quotes Lenin on the wisdom of dealing with the US and criticizes leftist elements whom Lenin called "masters of the revolutionary screech" for not understanding the current Soviet approach. The article's defensive tone and the attack on those criticizing from the left add to the conjecture that Moscow's current disarmament policy was not arrived at easily. Indeed, Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin told an American counterpart that there had been a high degree of nervous strain in the work of preparing for SALT V "because of tense disagreements within the Soviet Government."

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


COMMUNIST CHINA - PAKISTAN



50X1  
50X1



50X1  
50X1



50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**COMMUNIST CHINA - US**

Since the US relaxation of restrictions on trade with Communist China last month, the Chinese have told [redacted] that they will welcome an expansion of indirect Sino-US trade. Although Peking has made it clear that because of US relations with Taiwan direct trade with US-owned firms is impossible, the Chinese recently have increased their imports of US goods through foreign firms and have approached foreign exporters with the US market in mind. In both instances China has maintained that such trade is desirable as long as Peking is not officially informed of the US origin or destination.

50X1

Peking's commercial representatives in Hong Kong have been advised to establish companies to trade with the US on an unofficial basis. It is not clear, however, whether Peking has finally approved the start of this type of activity. China is also said to be considering allowing a small number of American company officials to attend the Canton trade fair this fall; however, they may not be permitted to engage directly in trade.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES


Jordan:

50X1

Laos: North Vietnamese resistance to the actions of Vang Pao's irregular forces on the eastern portion of the Plaine des Jarres is beginning to increase somewhat. The North Vietnamese are regrouping their forces to try to block any further advances by Vang Pao's forces into the high ground east of the Plaine. Four, or possibly five, North Vietnamese regiments are taking up essentially defensive positions in an arc around the eastern edge of the Plaine, an area they presumably want to protect not only for its tactical significance but also because it contains numerous storage facilities. Because many of these enemy units appear to be understrength and short of supplies and ammunition, their ability to launch a sustained counterattack at this time is open to question. For the present, they probably will continue their harassing and shelling attacks.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

17 July 1971

48

Top Secret

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

17 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Viet Cong cadres in Cambodia are selling opium and heroin to smugglers across the South Vietnamese border.  
*(Page 1)*

Lao officials say they have suggested to the Communist Chinese raising diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level. *(Page 2)*

Mack Trucks wants to renegotiate the terms of its participation in the Soviet Kama River truck project.  
*(Page 3)*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

Viet Cong cadres based in the southern Cambodian province of Takeo are selling opium and heroin as well as marijuana to smugglers from across the South Vietnamese border.

50X1  
50X1

The opium and heroin are brought into Cambodia by the North Vietnamese; the drugs are already processed and refined, but where this occurred was not specified. Any profits the Viet Cong make from the smuggling operations are used to purchase supplies and equipment for their local units, but they are said to be willing to sell the drugs at or below cost in order to ensure a steady flow into South Vietnam for government civil servants and US servicemen.

Earlier reports had indicated that the Viet Cong obtain marijuana locally and even encourage its production; this is the first report implicating the Communists in the hard drug traffic. Viet Cong personnel are said to be strictly forbidden to use the hard drugs themselves and any caught smoking opium risk the death penalty.

50X1

at least one Cambodian smuggler was reported to move about 10 to 20 pounds of opium and heroin into South Vietnam each month for resale via middlemen to American servicemen in the delta city of Can Tho.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS - COMMUNIST CHINA**

Lao officials say they have proposed to the Chinese that Vientiane and Peking raise their diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level.

*Souvanna has recently made several other moves to improve relations with Peking.*



50X1

*Souvanna has also reiterated publicly that Communist China should participate in any Indochina settlement.*

*These steps reflect Souvanna's efforts to strengthen his hand in relation to Hanoi in the event that Indochina negotiations come to pass. They also reflect his disenchantment over Moscow's apparent lack of interest or leverage in Indochina.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

USSR-US

Mack Trucks wants to renegotiate the contract terms which call for Mack to act as the major engineering and management consultant in the Kama River truck project. Mack says it cannot meet some of the conditions specified in the protocol signed in May, particularly the rigid completion date set by Moscow and the Soviet insistence on having the final say on equipment suppliers. Mack argues that US suppliers are reluctant to prepare detailed engineering designs unless practically assured of a contract.

*Mack's decision to reopen negotiations, together with Moscow's protracted difficulties in obtaining Western technical and financial assistance from other sources, almost certainly means a delay in the 1974 completion date. The Soviets cannot themselves supply the formidable management and engineering services Mack could provide, and in the end the Soviets may have to come to terms with Mack. Even so, we do not see the project coming to fruition before 1976.*


The Soviets view the truck project as the key to modernizing their freight transportation system. They hope to reduce their dependence on railroads for inter-city and short hauls; this would be economically feasible with the large trucks they plan to produce at Kama. The 20-ton capacity of the largest of these three-axle trucks will be five times the average capacity of the lighter common carrier trucks the Soviets now use. Kama trucks will be light enough for much of the existing Soviet road network, however, unlike the few large three-axle trucks now available. The Kama trucks could be used by the military to transport heavy equipment, but they are not specifically designed for this purpose and probably will be used primarily in industry and agriculture.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTE**

Panama:




50X1  
50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

19 July 1971

48



50X1

~~Top Secret~~

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

19 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The Jordanian Army's drive against the fedayeen has virtually ended except for mopping-up operations, and has drawn minimal reactions so far from most Arab states other than Iraq. (Page 1)

The new government in Iceland plans to go slowly in approaching the US about renegotiation of its defense agreement. (Page 2)

The Cambodian Government intends to present its economic reform program to the National Assembly today. (Page 3)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**JORDAN**

Serious fighting between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Army ceased on the morning of 16 July. Some groups of fedayeen have surrendered; the rest are pinned down on the western slopes of the mountains overlooking the Jordan River valley. A number are trying to make their way north to the Syrian border, but others--presumably aware that their chances of making it to Syria were slim--have fled across the river into Israeli-occupied territory and are surrendering to the Israeli authorities.

50X1



Radio Baghdad announced yesterday that Iraq had requested the recall of the Jordanian ambassador and was closing its border with Jordan, but no other Arab country has responded to fedayeen calls for drastic sanctions against Jordan. Representatives of Egypt, Libya, Syria, and the Sudan meeting in Egypt routinely expressed concern over the fighting and urged Jordan to cooperate with the Syrian delegation. A two-man Egyptian-Saudi team is flying to Damascus within a few days to discuss the issue, and President Bourguiba of Tunisia has decided to send an official delegation to Amman.

*By and large Jordan has been able to carry out its operation against the fedayeen with only minimal reactions from the rest of the Arab world. The most serious consequences are likely to be a delay in the renewal of Kuwait's subsidy payments to Jordan, and a chill in Jordan's improving relations with Egypt.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**ICELAND**

The new center-left government apparently does not plan to approach the US about renegotiation of the defense agreement until after the first of the year. Prime Minister Johannesson and Foreign Minister Agustsson, both from the Progressive Party--the senior member of the new coalition--told Ambassador Replogle on 16 July that they wished first to study the role of the US-manned Icelandic Defense Force in close consultation with NATO. They also pledged that future talks would result in arrangements satisfactory to both sides. Agustsson stated in a press interview the same day that further announcements on defense matters should not be expected in the near future, and that extending Iceland's fishing limits would instead "occupy most of our time."

*It is still questionable whether all elements of the Progressive Party as well as more radical members of the coalition will go along with this moderate approach. The defense issue adds one more to the list of disagreements that seem likely to make the government's life stormy and perhaps limited.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

• FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Cambodia: The government's economic reform program, which incorporates anti-inflation recommendations made by the International Monetary Fund, is scheduled to be presented to the National Assembly today. There has been considerable apprehension in Phnom Penh that the reform package would run into rough sledding in the legislature from deputies unhappy over the poor state of the country's economy. However, after several weeks of steady deterioration, the economy is taking an upward turn, with first-quality rice once again available on the open market and a definite improvement in the black market rate of the riel. Sirik Matak now is voicing optimism that the economic program will pass the assembly without serious opposition.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*20 July 1971*

*14*

~~Top Secret~~

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

20 July 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Hanoi has expressed deep misgivings over the implications for Vietnam of recent developments in Sino-US relations. A hard-hitting editorial by the party daily Nhan Dan serves notice on Peking and Washington that the North Vietnamese are prepared to go it alone if necessary and that relaxed tensions between the two powers will not influence Hanoi to compromise its position. (Page 1)

Initial Soviet comments on President Nixon's planned trip to China indicate Moscow's concern that Peking and Washington are seeking to gain leverage in their dealings with the USSR. (Page 2)

50X6

50X6

The military coup in Sudan appears to signal another turn to the left in that country's volatile political scene. (Page 4)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NORTH VIETNAM**

Breaking a three-day silence on last week's developments in Sino-US relations, the North Vietnamese party daily Nhan Dan yesterday published an unusually hard-hitting editorial which sharply criticized "socialist" nations that respond to Washington overtures and fall in with the Nixon doctrine. Although it did not directly mention China or President Nixon's coming visit, the editorial inveighed against big powers that gang up to make small countries do their bidding.

Hanoi's statement asserted that the Vietnamese Communists would hold to their present course and would not be bound by pacts or arrangements concluded behind their backs. The editorial reiterated that the US could disengage from Vietnam only by coming to terms with the Vietnamese and no one else: "Nixon has been running...in search of a way out. But he has gone to the wrong place. The exit door has been opened (i.e., the seven-point proposal), yet he has tumbled into an impasse."

The statement implied that the Vietnamese are prepared to go it alone if necessary. It recalled that through history the Vietnamese by themselves have defeated successive foreign "imperialists," leaving unsaid that the Chinese have been prominent among them.

*North Vietnam's strong reaction and blunt language probably reflect a reawakening in Hanoi of latent fears that Vietnamese Communist interests in Indochina could become enmeshed in big-power politics, as they were under less favorable circumstances for the Viet Minh in 1954. Hanoi may think that by forcefully and quickly weighing in, it can deflect any notions the Chinese have that Vietnamese Communist interests can be sacrificed to their own. Perhaps more importantly, Hanoi may also hope to make it clear that Washington cannot count on relaxed tensions with Peking to lead Hanoi into compromises it would otherwise not make. Moreover, Hanoi probably views last week's announcements in Washington and Peking as taking the play away from its own seven points and removing a good deal of the pressure it felt the Viet Cong proposal had generated on Washington.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-CHINA-US**

*Initial Soviet comment on President Nixon's planned visit to China has been sparse, reflecting Moscow's stunned surprise at a move which it presumably views as an attempt by both countries to gain leverage in their dealings with the USSR. The Soviets have not taken public note of the President's statement that the development is not directed against any other nation. We expect soon to see comments along lines already taken by some of Moscow's East European allies--that the planned visit has "anti-Soviet" overtones.*

*Some Soviet propaganda comments have sought to fan apprehensions in Hanoi that Washington and Peking are dealing at North Vietnamese expense. Moscow has suggested that Washington will use the development to avoid replying to the new Vietnamese Communist negotiating proposal, and has implied that a sellout of Hanoi's interests is in prospect.*

*Such attempts to score propaganda points at Peking's expense, however, cannot obscure a more fundamental apprehension about the trend of Sino-US relations. The visit to China this spring of the US table tennis team made a strong impression on the Kremlin, but Moscow apparently concluded that development of political contacts would be slow in coming. Moscow must now be concerned that the new Sino-US move portends an eventual US-Chinese collaboration detrimental to Moscow's interests.*

*The projected visit is unlikely to have any immediate dramatic impact on Moscow's position on such issues as arms limitations, Berlin, and the Sino-Soviet border dispute, which have a logic and history of their own. The Soviets may, however, feel a need to adopt a firmer stand on contentious issues in order to demonstrate that Sino-US tactics cannot force concessions from the USSR. Over the longer run, Moscow may begin to feel under increased pressure to be somewhat more forthcoming in its dealings with either or both of its rivals in order to forestall a US-Chinese accommodation.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


JAPAN



50X6  
50X6




50X6  
50X6



50X6  
50X6

50X6

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


**SUDAN**

A group of military officers led by a former member of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), Major Hashim al-Atta, has overthrown the government. Atta as president of a new ruling council announced over the Sudanese radio yesterday that the former regime had been ousted because it was dictatorial. He said that the coup leaders would cooperate with all democratic and nationalist elements and create a new government that would "liberate Sudan from an alliance between foreign and local capitalism." He spoke favorably of continued relations with the Soviet Union and indicated Sudan would strongly oppose Israel and support the cause of the Palestinian resistance.

*The ousted regime of RCC Chairman Numayri had been in difficulty almost from the moment it took over in a May 1969 coup. Frictions between conservative military officers and left-leaning nationalists led to periodic purges of Communists. Atta himself, at one time an organizer for the Sudanese Communist Party, was purged from the government in late 1970, despite his record as a brilliant officer and talented technician.*

In a bid to gain strong support for the new government, Atta promised to tackle some of Sudan's more plaguing problems. For example, he proposed eventual home rule for southern Sudan, thus holding out hope for an end to the costly military campaign to maintain Arab hegemony over the Negro tribes in that area.

Following Atta's radio address, the Sudan radio broadcast messages of support from political, social, and military groups in northern Sudan, and Radio Baghdad announced Iraqi recognition of the new government.



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTES**

Lebanon-Fedayeen: The mauling taken by fedayeen units in Jordan last week should also make it easier to keep them in line in Lebanon. Early last week, the Lebanese Government--which presumably knew of the imminent Jordanian drive--warned that henceforth the army would fire on any local fedayeen who failed to obey regulations.


50X1  
50X1

[redacted] Beirut has ordered the guerrillas to stop at checkpoints, turn over their weapons upon demand, follow the orders of the southern military commander, and do nothing that would provoke the army. With their movement in disarray and with support waning elsewhere in the Arab world, the guerrillas have little choice but to comply.

Communist China - Somalia: Peking will provide substantial new economic aid to Somalia, perhaps amounting to as much as \$110 million, under an agreement reached in Peking early last month. As much as half of the new credit may be devoted to building a 600-mile road between Mogadiscio and northern Somalia. The rest is to be used for agricultural and light industrial projects. Other Communist countries have given little economic aid to Mogadiscio since the leftist military coup of October 1969, and this latest deal would make China the most active Communist aid donor in Somalia.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

21 July 1971

46



50X1

~~Top Secret~~

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

21 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

A Chinese Communist editorial marking the 17th anniversary of the Geneva accords has praised the Vietnamese Communists' seven-point proposals. (Page 1)

"Big" Minh says there is a "90-percent chance" he will not run for the South Vietnamese presidency. (Page 2)

	50X1
	50X1
	50X1
	50X1

The new Sudanese junta is moving to consolidate its control. (Page 5)

Sabotage continues to cause major disruptions in East Pakistan's transportation network. (Page 6)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA - VIETNAM**

In an authoritative editorial yesterday commemorating the 17th anniversary of the Geneva accords, the Chinese praised the Vietnamese Communists' seven points as the "correct course" and criticized the US for making no positive response to the proposal. The editorial underlined Peking's long-held position that a settlement of the Indochina question must meet the desires of the Indochinese peoples. It claimed that the Geneva agreements were "a great achievement" for the Vietnamese, which was only later undermined by US actions.

*The Chinese statement marks the first time Peking has commemorated the Geneva anniversary in several years and is its most complimentary public pronouncement on the agreements since the start of the Paris peace negotiations in 1968. Peking almost certainly intended that its statement would at least partially assuage Hanoi's concern over recent developments in Sino-US relations. It is not evident from the text of the editorial whether or not the unusual attention was designed as anything more than an affirmation of Peking's continuing support for Hanoi's approach to negotiations. It could, however, be related to recent suggestions that China is willing to participate in an international conference on Indochina.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

"Big" Minh has told US officials there is a "90-percent chance" he will not run for president because Thieu is rigging the election. Minh cited the seizure of opposition newspapers and charged that government agents have threatened both his and Vice President Ky's campaign workers. Asserting that a "hands-off" policy will not be sufficient, Minh asked that the US prevent provincial and district officials from giving Thieu any unfair advantage.

Minh said he doubted whether Ky will be able to obtain the necessary endorsements in the face of government pressure on provincial councilors, and for the first time stated that if he does not run himself, he is thinking of throwing his support to Ky.

*Such a move before the 4 August filing deadline would likely enable Ky to qualify and thus alleviate some of the criticism of Thieu that a Minh withdrawal would touch off. Minh is still keeping his options open, however; he is continuing to prepare for the campaign, and only last week he sounded out a respected Catholic opposition deputy on becoming his running mate.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**USSR-ROMANIA**

50X1

top Soviet leaders criticized Ceausescu for the "anti-Soviet" tone of his Peking visit when the Romanian leader stopped over in Moscow on 24 June [redacted]. The Soviets feel that the Chinese-Romanian final communiqué accepted the Chinese thesis that the socialist bloc is divided into large and small states with conflicting interests. That communiqué was also a major matter of controversy during Ceausescu's later stop in Mongolia.

50X1  
50X1

50X1

Ceausescu, while in Mongolia, questioned the rationale for participation in the Warsaw Pact because "there is no threat from imperialism."

Ceausescu's remark reflects both his general disapproval of all military blocs and Romanian reluctance to join Pact exercises. Other reports confirm that Ceausescu's visit to Mongolia, which always echoes Moscow, was marked by ideological disputes that prevented agreement on more than an innocuous communiqué and bland speeches.


*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

JORDAN-FEDAYEEN




50X1  
50X1



50X1  
50X1



50X1  
50X1



50X1  
50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## SUDAN

Large and occasionally disorderly street demonstrations occurred both for and against the new regime yesterday in Khartoum and other cities.

50X1

[redacted] 5,000 supporters of deposed president Numayri demonstrated southeast of the capital in Wad Medani. There are, however, no indications of widespread organized resistance to the coup.

The new seven-man Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), installed yesterday as Sudan's new government, includes four men who have been affiliated with the Communist Party in the past. Unconfirmed reports reaching the US Interests Section in Khartoum characterize them as members of the party's doctrinaire wing. Three RCC members, including its chairman, Lieutenant Colonel Babakr al-Nur Uthman, and his deputy, Major Hashim al-Atta--the regime's main spokesman to date--had been dismissed from the previous government last November for leaking secrets to the Communists.

In moves designed to consolidate its position, early yesterday the RCC dissolved a number of organizations that had supported Numayri, rescinded the previous government's ban on four organizations that had formed the power base of the Communist Party, announced the release of approximately 47 jailed Communist Party members, and suspended all newspapers and magazines except for the army's journal.

[redacted] the coup's participants had been plotting against Numayri for a number of months.

50X1

[redacted] although all the new rulers opposed Numayri's policies, they are not necessarily agreed upon what course of action they should follow and may soon fall to arguing among themselves.

50X1

The Communist Party in the Sudan has been largely oriented toward local nationalism. Therefore the characterization of Sudan's new military leaders as either Communists or sympathizers should not be interpreted as meaning that the Sudan will now become a puppet of Moscow.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTE**

East Pakistan: The transportation system is more disorganized now than at any time since April, according to the top civilian official in Dacca. Sabotage operations by Bengali guerrillas, some probably acting under Indian sponsorship, apparently have produced major dislocations.

[redacted] the guerrillas will continue to attack the transport and communications network despite the adverse impact on the food crisis facing the Bengali population. Islamabad's military overseers in the East, who do not seem to have grasped the seriousness of the situation, have done little to correct it. The army is still using for its own purposes some of the boats provided by the US for cyclone relief in late 1970.

50X1  
50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

22 July 1971

48



50X1

~~Top Secret~~

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

22 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Our preliminary analysis of the latest satellite photography of the USSR shows 14 additional new missile silos of the smaller type and two of the larger type. (Page 1)


On Page 2 we comment on the rapidly growing guerrilla movement in East Pakistan.

Jordanian Government leaders claim that Damascus will permit Syria-based troops of the Palestine Liberation Army to invade Jordan. (Page 3)

The Cambodian Government has made its first serious effort in months to consult with the National Assembly. (Page 4)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

50X1



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

USSR

Preliminary analysis of photography obtained from the final portion of the most recent satellite mission shows 14 additional new missile silos of the smaller type and two of the larger type. There are now 64 of the smaller type and 20 of the larger type under construction in the USSR. In addition, several other sites have been tentatively identified. No new details concerning construction of the silos have been obtained thus far.

The smaller type silos are under construction at Derazhnya where the SS-11 is located together with the SS-4 MRBM, and at Pervomaysk where the SS-11 is located together with the SS-5 IRBM. The larger type silos have been identified at five of the six SS-9 complexes.

The mission which was launched in mid-June at least partially covered 22 of 24 Soviet ICBM complexes as well as Derazhnya and Pervomaysk.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**PAKISTAN-INDIA**

*Since early May, when open Bengali resistance was suppressed, a guerrilla movement has grown rapidly in East Pakistan. US officials in Dacca now conclude that prospects for eventual success of the Bengali insurgency movement are steadily improving.*

*Insurgents have been able to disrupt the transportation system in the eastern part of the province, and communications are far from normal elsewhere. Sabotage of the electric power system and the tea industry is continuing.*

50X1

\* \* \*

In India, Finance Minister Chavan intends to ask Parliament for an additional \$130-\$160 million for refugee relief; \$80 million has already been allocated. With the approval of the request, total funds available--both domestic and foreign--would amount to about \$350 million, roughly the cost of six months' care for those refugees now in Indian camps. The approximately \$125 million in foreign aid to date has come mainly from the US.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**JORDAN-SYRIA**

Prime Minister Tal notified the US Embassy in Amman late Tuesday that he has information--its source unspecified--that Syrian President Assad will bow to Yasir Arafat's demands to permit Syria-based troops of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) to invade Jordan. King Husayn believes Damascus might be tempted by the opportunity to demonstrate support for the Palestinian cause while at the same time disposing of some of the troublesome PLA troops under the guns of the Jordanian Army. Husayn does not think that Syrian troops would become involved in any offensive. The King says Jordanian troops have taken defensive positions along the Syrian border, and he will not hesitate to order aircraft into action against invading PLA units.

*Although unleashing the PLA would run counter to the Asad government's policy of covert cooperation with Jordan in handling the fedayeen, it would refurbish Syria's pro-fedayeen credentials in the eyes of the Arab public. PLA strength in Syria is about 10,000--a number which the Jordanian Army could easily handle provided no regular Syrian troops were involved. An offensive generating renewed fighting with fedayeen forces, however, would have political consequences; Arab propaganda attacks are already mounting now that the full extent of the commando defeat is becoming known.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CAMBODIA**

Sirik Matak recently met with leaders of the National Assembly to seek their support for the government's economic stabilization program. Matak, who was accompanied by his three deputy prime ministers, stressed the need to combat inflation by raising taxes and by working with Saigon and Bangkok to curb smuggling and thereby cut revenue losses. He indicated he would need the assembly's help in obtaining another advance from the National Bank to cover anticipated budget deficits. He also used the occasion to quiet fears among the deputies that Washington and Peking might reach an Indochina settlement that would be detrimental to Cambodia's interests.

*The meeting was the government's first serious effort in many months to consult with the assembly and should be helpful in getting the new economic reforms through the assembly. It should also aid in dispelling the notion that the government holds the assembly in low esteem.*

Matak's considerable skill in handling the regime's critics and his ability to get things done are putting Prime Minister Lon Nol in a less favorable light. [redacted]

50X1  
50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

Malta: According to the British deputy high commissioner in Valletta, Mintoff presented UK Defense Secretary Carrington with a selection of various formulas offering certain rights and facilities in return for specific sums of money that could total in excess of \$35 million annually--more than double the current level. A price was even set on the UK's retaining veto power over third-country use of Malta's airfields and harbors. Carrington's statement on his return to London yesterday that the British have alternatives to Maltese bases and facilities underlines the UK's position that there is no urgent need for higher British payments. No date has been set for a resumption of talks.

Panama:

50X1

The government is seeking both to divert attention from the recent disappearance of a liberal priest in circumstances suggesting National Guard involvement and to build up support on the overriding issue of canal negotiations. The press has already exploited two incidents involving Panamanian secondary schools and students with trumped-up charges of provocation by "imperialists."

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*23 July 1971*

*47*

50X1

~~Top Secret~~

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

23 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

In the Sudan, General Numayri's coup against the forces that ousted him earlier this week appears to be successful. (Page 1)

Growing dissatisfaction in Japan with Sato's handling of China policy and economic relations with the US is causing speculation that the prime minister may resign later this year. (Page 2)

In South Vietnam, Thieu is widely reported to be applying pressure on provincial officials to endorse his own candidacy for re-election and to prevent Ky from qualifying (Page 3); signs persist that the Communists plan another round of heightened military activity which could begin any time. (Page 4)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SUDAN**

Forces loyal to General Numayri were successful yesterday in a move to topple the Communist-affiliated junta that had ousted Numayri on 19 July. After his supporters regained control of the radio and television stations, Numayri took to the air to announce that his government had been restored and to call on the armed forces and citizenry to begin an all-out search for Communists. Khartoum, which had been the scene of tank and small-arms fire during the day, was quiet by nightfall except for scattered shooting.

The coup got under way in Khartoum shortly after the Libyan Government's action early yesterday to force a BOAC airliner carrying two members of the just-installed anti-Numayri government to land at Benghazi. Libyan authorities removed the two men--Babakr al-Nur Uthman, the designated chairman of the new junta, and Faruq Hamdallah--from the aircraft, and presumably have them in custody. Middle East news sources report that Major Hashim al-Atta, who led the coup and acted as the junta's chief spokesman, has now been arrested and that the "traitors" will soon be brought before military courts.

*Numayri's chances of making his counter-coup stick will be improved by the fact that his opponents had so little time to consolidate their power. In pleading for a round-up of Communists, Numayri is proceeding with a course he has followed since last fall when he began dismissing party members and supporters--including the leaders of this week's coup--from the cabinet and other government posts.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**JAPAN**

Former foreign minister Ohira, leader of one of the factions in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and one of the principal aspirants to succeed Sato, told Ambassador Meyer on 20 July that the prime minister would probably step down following Diet ratification of the Okinawan reversion agreement late this fall. Other party leaders are also weakening in their support for the prime minister, whose unprecedented fourth consecutive term does not actually end until November 1972.

*Criticism of Sato's rule has stemmed from his cautious China policy and from growing economic frictions with the US. The dissatisfaction was sharply intensified by the loss of face Sato suffered when President Nixon announced his coming trip to China. Sato had been claiming that he was in close consultation with Washington on the China issue.*

*The prime minister now faces a dilemma: on the one hand his flexibility on China is limited by the close political and economic ties his right-wing supporters have with Taiwan; on the other, party rivals are prepared to abandon his ship if it appears to be foundering over the China issue.*

Ohira speculated that whoever succeeds Sato would have to call general elections promptly to seek a popular mandate. He claimed that the Liberal Democrats would suffer a "substantial" loss of strength in the Diet. Ohira maintained that a basic change in the party's political practices in such elections was required, with a shift from "bribing" special interest groups to winning over the electorate with popular, well-defined programs.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

Reports [redacted]

50X1  
50X1

[redacted] support opposition claims that President Thieu's campaign organization has already collected over 400 signed endorsements from the 550 provincial councilors, often with the help of the powerful province chiefs. In Military Region 3, surrounding the capital, all but one of the 93 provincial councilors have endorsed Thieu.


Many provincial councilors who have not signed for Thieu are reluctant to endorse Ky, according to the reports; this is especially true of supporters of the militant An Quang Buddhists. Contrary to the claim of a Ky organizer that the vice president now has the necessary 100 endorsements to file for the presidential contest, [redacted] asserts that Ky had only 24 two days ago, and that some of these still need validation by province chiefs.

50X1

*Thieu appears to have authorized the application of pressures at the local level by the province chiefs, although he may not always be aware of the tactics used. Since the chiefs have the authority to fire provincial councilors, their powers of persuasion are strong. The reports also indicate that Saigon has made it clear to some province chiefs that their futures depend on getting the endorsements.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

Southeast Asia Opium Production



551688 7-71 CIA

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

South Vietnam: There continue to be indications that the current lull in military activity will soon be broken by another of the Communists' periodic surges of activity.

50X1

Communist initiatives in the southern provinces are likely to be more limited than in the north--as they have been in the summer campaign thus far--but a few selected targets there may come under attack or harassment.

Southeast Asia: [redacted] opium refineries in the main producing area of northeast Burma near Tachilek had ceased production of heroin and morphine as of late June, after being ordered to do so by the government under pressure from the US and UN. There are indications, however, that some refineries are moving to more inaccessible sectors in the Burma-Laos-Thai border region, and it seems unlikely that the government's orders will be enforced for any extended period or will result in any significant reduction in heroin exports from the tri-border area.

50X1

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

24 July 1971

47

~~Top Secret~~


50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

24 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**



50X1

50X1

Egyptian President Sadat's lengthy speech last evening reflects Cairo's growing frustration and deepening resignation over domestic affairs, the state of affairs in the Arab world, and the continuing stalemate with Israel. (Page 3)

There is additional strong evidence that Hanoi anticipates higher levels of fighting during the next dry season. (Page 4)

The demotion of Soviet Politburo member Voronov from his job as premier of the Russian Federation is likely the first of a series of moves foreshadowed by the expansion of the Politburo at the party congress in April. (Page 5)


In Sudan, General Numayri's forces are mopping up remnants of the leftist coup group. (Page 6)

Vice President William Tolbert has been quickly sworn in as President following the death yesterday of Liberian President Tubman. (Page 7)


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

***FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY***

**CHINA**




50X1




50X1

50X1



50X1

50X1




50X1


50X1

***FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY***

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



50X1



50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**EGYPT**

*Cairo's growing sense of frustration and resignation was evident in President Sadat's lengthy speech last night.*

Frequently invoking the memory of Nasir, Sadat began his address to the opening session of Egypt's sole legal political organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), with a review of the domestic situation. He dwelt on the need to create a strong, modern state and harkened back to the recent purge of the ASU by stating that it is "there to serve and not to rule." He admitted that "the people abhorred" the old ASU and called for "open dialogue and democracy" within the newly restructured body. Sadat also stated that he intended to reform the office of the presidency and ordered the study of further ministerial improvements.

In discussing inter-Arab affairs, Sadat expressed his sadness at the present disarray in the Arab world, particularly on the moribund "Eastern Front." Adding to what will almost certainly be a new period of strained relations between Egypt and Jordan, Sadat launched a bitter attack on King Husayn for his recent actions against the Palestinian guerrillas. Sadat employed the harshest language used in public by any Egyptian in recent years, accusing Husayn of "prevaricating" and adding that Husayn must bear the responsibility for the "crimes which have taken place in Jordan."

*Sadat's bitterness probably stems in part from his view of the fedayeen as a useful element of pressure on Israel, and also from the amount of attention the events in Jordan have diverted from what he views as the primary problem of getting Israel to withdraw from Arab territory.*

With regard to the prolonged impasse with Israel, Sadat restated his earlier vow that 1971 was a decisive year, but went further and pledged that he would "not allow 1971 to pass without this battle being decided," adding that "we will not accept this state of no war and no peace." Despite these gloomy words, however, Sadat declared that his previously announced terms for an interim Suez Canal settlement still stood and that he would "never stop looking for any road leading to peace if there is a chance for peace."

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**VIETNAM**

*An authoritative North Vietnamese Army newspaper has provided another sign that Hanoi anticipates higher levels of fighting during the coming dry season.*

A recent editorial in Quan Doi Nhan Dan claimed the Communists had been highly successful in providing logistic support to front-line forces during the first half of 1971. The article asserted that even greater efforts would be required in the second half of 1971 in view of the "new and increasingly high requirements of the battlefield."

[redacted] the Communists did in fact improve their support operations during this period. During the past dry season, for example, the Communists greatly improved their command and control over the transportation net and established a number of new rear service units in southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia. Logistics operations were at a high level in several parts of Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos last winter and spring.

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

USSR

On Thursday Politburo member Gennady Voronov relinquished the premiership of the Russian Federation to assume the inconsequential post of chairman of the People's Control Committee.

The 60-year-old Voronov is an independent who has long been out of favor with Brezhnev and his allies. The sharp decline in his status follows a series of other reversals. In February his chief deputy for seven years was replaced by an official with career ties to Brezhnev. Brezhnev's ranking of the Politburo at the party congress this spring showed a steep slide for Voronov in the five years since the 1966 congress.



Voronov's independent and outspoken views have clearly antagonized other leaders. His rivalry with Brezhnev's unofficial deputy, Kirilenko, goes back to the early 1960s. His persistent advocacy of more agricultural reform at a lower cost contradicted the wishes of First

Deputy Premier Polyansky and conflicted with the agricultural program announced by Brezhnev last summer.

By precedent, Voronov's new post does not entitle him to membership on the Politburo. He replaces a protege of trade union chief Shelepin, another Politburo member in decline and the only incumbent ranked below Voronov at the congress. Voronov's demotion may be the start of a series of changes foreshadowed by the expansion of the Politburo from 11 to 15 members at the party congress in April.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SUDAN**

Scattered fighting continues as Numayri's forces mop up partisans of the leftist coup group. The fighting centered in south Khartoum yesterday as the armored units that spearheaded Numayri's counter coup searched for rebels. Heavy shelling by tanks in the area of the Presidential Palace resulted in some damage to the British Embassy and the US mission building, where a Marine guard was wounded.

Four special military tribunals were formed by General Numayri to try members of the junta. Late yesterday Major Hashim al-Atta, who led the anti-Numayri putsch on 19 July, was sentenced to be executed by a firing squad along with a member of his junta and the two army commanders who had helped him seize power, but there are conflicting reports as to whether the sentences have been carried out.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



**William V. S. Tubman**



**William R. Tolbert**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTES**

Liberia: Following the death of President Tubman yesterday, Vice President William Tolbert was sworn in as his successor in ceremonies that same evening in Monrovia. The initial transfer of power should be relatively smooth, although some behind-the-scenes maneuvering by ambitious politicians is inevitable. Tolbert, like the late president, is committed to a pro-Western foreign policy and the continuation of Liberia's historically close ties with the US.


Egypt-Israel: [Redacted]

50X1  
SUA

[Redacted]  
50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

26 July 1971

27

~~Top Secret~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

26 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Moscow's first authoritative commentary on President Nixon's planned visit to Peking has expressed some alarm that improved Sino-US relations might produce an anti-Soviet combination. (Page 1)

Numayri's forces appear to have consolidated their control in the Sudan, and bloody reprisals against the Communists may be in prospect. (Page 2)

The British have provided details of two alternative proposals Mintoff has offered for a new defense arrangement, and want NATO to make up most of the costs. (Page 3)



50X1

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-CHINA-US**

In Moscow's first authoritative comment on President Nixon's planned visit to Peking, a Pravda article yesterday expressed some of the Kremlin's fears concerning improved Chinese-US relations. The article was attributed to "I. Alexandrov"--a pseudonym employed to indicate high-level endorsement, but Moscow softened its impact by attributing many of the views to foreign sources.

The article sought to indicate that both Washington and Peking are trying to bring pressure on the USSR. It stressed, however, that the Kremlin still hopes to improve relations with Washington and Peking, implying that Moscow would not let the Sino-US dialogue interfere with its own current negotiations with either party.

Although Moscow said it was reserving judgment on future developments, a key passage added that it must take its worst suspicions into account in determining future policy. In particular, fear was expressed that the US-Chinese move might lead to a "political combination" directed against the USSR. Moscow did not suggest what counteractions it might take.

This temporizing on a future course suggests that the Soviet leadership is uncertain over just how far and fast Sino-US relations will develop. One official has said the Soviets will want to take a "long, cool look" at the visit's ramifications. Some are hoping that Taipei will remain a major obstacle to Sino-US ties. Ambassador Abrasimov in Berlin, for example, pressed US Ambassador Rush last week to acknowledge that there is an "obvious conflict" between the US defense commitment to Nationalist China and the preconditions for normalization of Sino-US relations set forth in Chou En-lai's recent public comments.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SUDAN**

Numayri's forces appear to have consolidated their control, although the country remains under a state of emergency and a dusk-to-dawn curfew. Minor gun battles were reported over the weekend as the government continued to round up the rebels.

50X1

The semiofficial Cairo daily al-Ahram has cited Sudanese sources in stating that the secretary general of the Sudan Communist Party masterminded the coup against Numayri from the safety of the Bulgarian Embassy in Khartoum, where he had fled after escaping from Sudanese authorities last month. Al-Ahram claimed that the party planned to get rid of most of the actual leaders of the coup once it had gained control.

50X1

Bloody reprisals against the Communists may well be in prospect. During the countercoup the junta machine-gunned some 30 soldiers, including a number of senior officers. One of the two coup leaders removed from the BOAC plane in Libya and seven others have since been executed. Numayri told a reporter Saturday night that 400 persons, including 100 army officers, were involved in the abortive coup, and that six military tribunals had been set up to try them.

On the international scene, Sudan has broken off diplomatic relations with Iraq, which had hastily recognized the rebel government, and Numayri has charged the ruling Iraqi Baath Party with participating in the plot. Numayri has also announced that Sudan will join the planned Federation of Arab States next January.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**MALTA**

The British have informed the North Atlantic Council that Mintoff has offered them two alternative proposals for a new UK-Malta defense arrangement. One, a "wholly exclusive arrangement," would continue the present British veto power over third country use of Maltese facilities in exchange for an annual payment of \$72 million. The other, costing \$48 million, would be a "less exclusive arrangement" under which Valletta could grant non-Warsaw Pact countries use of its harbors and airfields. Mintoff told the British that other NATO countries could contribute to London's payment even though NATO must leave the island; he stipulated, however, that bilateral development aid from NATO members could not be counted as part of the payment.


The British have in mind a payment of \$24 million annually, of which they would pay less than half, and are pressing NATO to make up the rest. Up to now, UK aid has amounted to about \$12 million a year. London has asked its allies for a firm response by 5 August so that negotiations with Valletta can resume. NATO Secretary General Brosio, however, is dubious about the prospects for a special financial contribution.

*Mintoff, in rejecting the UK's initial offer last week of \$12 million annually, told the British that their forces would have to be withdrawn if his demands were not met quickly, and that he would turn elsewhere for aid. One obvious direction would be toward Libya, whose deputy prime minister is reported to have told Foreign Secretary Home during a recent visit to London that Tripoli would be willing to help Malta with up to \$60 million annually if the UK would not do so.*


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

CHILE



50X1  
50X1



50X1  
50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTE**

South Vietnam: Ky admitted to Deputy Ambassador Berger Friday that he still lacked about two thirds of the endorsements needed to qualify for the presidential election in October and said that Thieu's obstructionist tactics would probably prevent him from picking them up by the filing deadline of 4 August. Ky claimed that if he failed to make the list of candidates, "Big" Minh would also pull out of the race, leaving Thieu without credible opposition. Minh has been saying the same thing, although a politician Minh has considered as a running mate expects Minh to postpone a final decision until he can judge the fairness of the lower house elections next month.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

27 July 1971

22

50X1

~~Top Secret~~

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

27 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

A number of Japanese companies are reconsidering their commercial relationships with Nationalist China and South Korea. (Page 1)

On Page 2, we discuss Romanian leader Ceausescu's attitude toward the meeting of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance that opens today in Bucharest.

The US Consulate in Dacca has concluded that famine is likely in East Pakistan before the end of the year. (Page 3)

A major opium refinery in northwest Laos has been deliberately burned in response to US pressures for curbing the narcotics trade. (Page 4)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**JAPAN**

Several major Japanese corporations have now decided not to attend an annual meeting of a Nationalist Chinese - Japanese committee established a number of years ago to further trade. New Japan Steel and Japan Airlines were the first to cancel out, causing Taipei to revoke its invitations to other firms in order to save face. Moreover, five of the six Japanese shipping firms serving Taiwan plan to terminate their service.

Meanwhile, Toyota Motors is seeking to liquidate its substantial involvement in South Korea, according to sources of the US Embassy in Seoul.

Japanese firms are increasingly sensitive about the wisdom of their involvement in Taiwan and South Korea in view of what they believe is an improving atmosphere for commerce with Communist China. This reaction stems in part from the fact that one of the "Four Principles" governing trade, set forth by Chou En-lai to Japanese businessmen in April 1970, is a ban on business with Japanese firms trading with South Korea or Taiwan. For the near term, Japanese firms are likely to be more interested in reducing the visibility rather than the substance of their trade relationships with Taiwan and South Korea, but over time a growing number of companies will have to choose between the immediate economic benefits of these relationships and the prospect of a more lucrative mainland market.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**ROMANIA-CEMA**

Romanian leader Ceausescu will continue to oppose Moscow's version of economic integration at the annual session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) that opens today in Bucharest. Divergent interests at the three-day meeting are likely to generate some low-caliber fireworks, especially between Romania and the Soviet Union, over the draft program for developing socialist economic integration.

Ceausescu has reaffirmed his opposition to economic integration in several recent speeches. Last Friday, for example, he stated that "interdependence in production must in no way infringe on national sovereignty." He added that "the times of the policy of domination and diktat are gone forever." Nevertheless, he may be forced to give a little at the meeting and agree to some limited aspects of integration, perhaps as a sop to the Soviets.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**EAST PAKISTAN**

According to the US Consulate in Dacca, chances of famine are increasing. The most critical food period will be the last two months of 1971 before the large rice crop is harvested. A smaller crop, due for harvesting in September, will provide some temporary relief, but transport bottlenecks will prevent much of this crop from reaching those areas that need it most.

The government has so far taken no significant steps to speed the movement of foodgrains, and deliveries from the ports to the interior were at a lower level in July than in June. In this situation, the consulate concludes that the government will not be able to move into the deficit areas all of the estimated 1.4 million tons of foodgrain imports needed through December and that starvation is likely to begin in November.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTE**

Laos: A major opium refinery and transshipment center in northwest Laos has been deliberately destroyed by fire as a response to US agitation for curbing the traffic in narcotics. The fire apparently was ordered by recently retired Lao Armed Forces commander General Ouan Rathikoun in the hope of conveying the impression that he has severed connections with the opium trade. Destruction of the facility will not significantly reduce the narcotics output from the Thailand-Laos-Burma border area. Some 26 other refineries are currently operating there and more can be set up within a short period of time.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*28 July 1971*

*48*



*Top Secret*

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

28 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Ceylonese Government officials are concerned that last spring's insurgency may soon be renewed.  
*(Page 1)*

The party splintering evident in the Japanese Diet session that just ended will intensify as speculation grows that "lame duck" Prime Minister Sato will step down early. *(Page 2)*

Moscow's criticism of the campaign of "bloody terror" against the Sudanese Communist Party may be only the first step in efforts to pressure General Numayri to call off his reprisals.

50X1

50X1

*(Page 3)*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


**CEYLON**

Government officials are increasingly concerned over the possibility that this spring's insurgency will soon be renewed.

--On 26 July, Home Minister Felix Bandaranaike told the Australian High Commissioner that an attack might take place within a day or two, possibly against selected targets in Colombo. He thought the group that attacked the US Embassy last March would be responsible, estimating the group's strength at 2,500.

--The army commander, who also has reports of imminent trouble, says that the government has stopped releasing persons detained during the earlier disorders. Many of the 1,200 already set free are said to have returned to their villages, threatened local head men for having supported the government, and then disappeared into the countryside.

--Other officials foresee a new wave of violence beginning in August, with the People's Liberation Front, which was primarily responsible for the spring disorders, directing the effort. In north Colombo and outlying areas, posters have begun to appear containing, in addition to standard Front slogans, passages in what seems to be a code. Security officials fear these may contain instructions for future attacks.



50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**JAPAN**

Only strenuous, last-minute efforts by the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party succeeded last week in blocking the introduction of a resolution in the Diet calling for the immediate normalization of relations with Peking. The resolution was supported by dissident elements in the ruling party as well as by the opposition parties.

50X1

similar joint effort by dissidents and the opposition two weeks ago resulted in the defeat of the Liberal Democrats' official candidate for speaker of the Upper House.

*The breakdown in Sato's party discipline results in part from the growing view of party members that Sato is a "lame duck," and that the succession struggle is under way. Party splintering will intensify in the next few months with growth of speculation that Sato's accumulating troubles will cause him to step down early.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-SUDAN**

TASS criticism of the campaign of "bloody terror" against the Communists may be only the first step in a Soviet effort to instigate a public outcry against further persecution of the Sudanese Communist Party. The toughest statement to date was issued by the USSR Central Trade Unions Council on 27 July which "condemned" the execution of the head of the Sudanese Workers' Union and demanded an end to the persecution of trade unionists. The Soviet press has not been friendly to Numayri's sudden return to power, and Moscow--the predominant source of Sudanese military assistance--has some leverage to use in trying to press the General to call off his reprisals. Inasmuch as the Secretary General of the Sudanese Communist Party was executed last night, we think Numayri is unlikely to discontinue his purge, which he doubtless regards as an internal matter.


\* \* \*

50X1



50X1


50X1



3

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



[redacted]  
**China's**  
[redacted]

50X1

50X1  
50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

Communist China:

50X1  
50X1

50X1

South Vietnam: As part of a special antinarcotics program launched last month National Police carried out a series of raids last weekend in Saigon and the delta. Police confiscated about 345 pounds of opium and 80 pounds of heroin, while arresting 19 suspected drug smugglers.


50X1

The antinarcotic program, scheduled to last until mid-September, will be an interesting test of the government's willingness to take measures against large drug traders.

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

29 July 1971

47

50X1

~~Top Secret~~

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

29 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Pakistan

50X1

(Page 1)

50X1

50X1

Government irregulars have launched a major new campaign in south Laos. (Page 3)

50X1

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**PAKISTAN-INDIA**

The Pakistani [redacted]

50X1

50X1

50X1

50X1

[redacted] a senior Foreign Ministry official in Islamabad told the US chargé that his government no longer opposes a UN Security Council meeting on South Asian matters. He said Pakistani envoys in various capitals have been advised that such a meeting might prove useful even though there are disadvantages involved. The US Embassy in Islamabad thinks this change might be the result of growing awareness that resistance elements in East Pakistan will be hard to contain. The embassy does not rule out, however, the possibility that Pakistan fears direct Indian military action.

50X1

50X1

50X1

50X1

50X1

50X1

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NORTH VIETNAM - USSR**



50X1  
50X1




50X1

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

### LAOS: Bolovens Plateau Area



50X1

551709 7-71 CIA

- Communist-held location
- Government-held location

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**


Four battalions of government irregulars, numbering 1,300 men, were airlifted yesterday to an area north of Saravane and subsequently took the town without resistance. The move into Saravane is the beginning of a major new campaign in south Laos, during which the government will try to recapture Paksong in the central portion of the Bolovens Plateau. Intercepts indicate that the Communists have been expecting a "sweep" operation but evidently are not yet certain where the main government attack will come.

Saravane has been in enemy hands since last year. Although it is a secondary target to Paksong, its capture should give a psychological boost to the government in Vientiane. Instead of trying to hold Saravane for long, however, the irregulars will try to move against Communist installations and supply caches to the west.


The Communists have between six and eight battalions in the Bolovens area with armor and artillery support. They hold most of the key high ground positions on the plateau and have had some time to preposition ammunition caches.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


JAPAN-US



50X1  
50X1



50X1  
50X1  
50X1



50X1  
50X1

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*30 July 1971*

47

50X1

~~Top Secret~~

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

30 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Indian authorities are ordering all foreign nationals in the Pakistani refugee areas in West Bengal to leave as soon as possible. (Page 1)

In South Vietnam, the Communists appear to be increasing their combat strength around the northern coastal provinces (Page 2), and have extended the new road through the western end of the DMZ another two miles toward Route 9. (Page 3)

Lon Nol has established a new central economic committee to help counter criticism of the government's performance, and has named a potential rival to head it. (Page 4)

Soviet experts in the Sudan are about to leave as relations between Moscow and Khartoum show severe strain following last week's coup. (Page 5)

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**INDIA**


The West Bengal state government has notified British and West German relief organizations that foreign nationals serving in the Pakistani refugee areas in the state must leave as soon as possible-- preferably "within two days." Similar messages are said to be going out to all foreign organizations working in the camp areas. The ban applies even to missionaries who were working in the area well before the outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan. Foreign "administrative" personnel allowed to remain in Calcutta will need special permission to visit the refugee camps.

*Taken in conjunction with India's refusal to permit the stationing of UN personnel along the border with East Pakistan, the ban may reflect New Delhi's extreme sensitivity to the presence of foreign observers in an area where sizable numbers of troops are stationed and where future military operations might be mounted.*

50X1

*/ Any actual eviction of personnel from the refugee camps would increase international support for a Security Council meeting on the South Asian crisis.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

The Communists appear to be increasing their combat strength around the northern coastal provinces. The 3rd Regiment of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division returned to southeastern Quang Nam Province this month from Laos, where it has operated for the past year. Intercepted radio signals indicate that other components of the 2nd Division involved in the fighting in Lam Son 719 earlier this year are also on the move, possibly to the same general area. Farther south, the headquarters of the North Vietnamese 3rd Division is on the way to rejoin two subordinate infantry regiments near the densely populated coast in northern Binh Dinh Province.


*The 3rd Division headquarters had been located some 35 miles away in a remote part of southwestern Quang Ngai Province. Early this year, a nearly identical move by this headquarters was followed by a sharp increase in Communist military activity in upper Binh Dinh.*

In the central highlands, the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment and some elements of the 95B Regiment have moved out of border redoubts and are heading toward the Ben Het and Pleiku areas, respectively. The Communists also seem to be sending more firepower through the infiltration system toward the central highlands. [redacted] a large enemy convoy with 36 pieces of artillery was en route to that area.

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## New Communist Road Construction



50X1

551718 7-71 CIA

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**INDOCHINA**

Recent photography indicates that during the past month the new road through the western end of the DMZ has been extended southward two more miles. Another two miles remain to be completed to connect with Route 9, the main east-west road into Quang Tri Province.

*The road improves access to Quang Tri and will provide an alternate supply route in an area that is less affected by the rainy season that inundates the main supply routes in Laos. We have observed additional construction extending northeast from the new road and believe this is probably intended to link with Route 102 in North Vietnam.*

Farther south, work is continuing at a considerably slower pace on a road north from the A Shau Valley toward Route 9. Gaps totaling some seven miles remain to be completed to link the DMZ road to the valley.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## CAMBODIA

Lon Nol on 28 July announced the creation of a "Central Committee for Economic Warfare" to help put the country's economic house in order. He named as head of the committee Son Ngoc Thanh, the ambitious former political exile. There has been no reference to Sirik Matak's role in the economic shake-up, and he was not present at the meeting in which Lon Nol announced the changes.

*Lon Nol's move is intended to help counter recently increased criticism of the government's performance. In giving Thanh the most prominent position the latter has yet held in the government, Lon Nol not only hopes to trade on Thanh's reputation for incorruptibility and high standing with the assembly, but to saddle a potential rival with responsibility for one of the government's thorniest problems, the unsatisfactory economic situation.*

*Recently Thanh attempted to sound out Chargé Enders about the possible US reaction to his assuming leadership of the government in the near future. When he received a negative response, Thanh backed off and said he would help the government with its economic reform program.*

*Although there is little evidence that discontent with the government has crystallized to the point that a direct challenge is likely, Thanh's approach may be symptomatic of the uneasiness in Phnom Penh about the future. The upcoming National Assembly interpellation of the government on its economic program and the impending absence of Sirik Matak on a visit to the US next month will provide tests of the strength of anti-government sentiment.*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SUDAN-USSR**

President Numayri announced yesterday that Soviet experts in the Sudan had completed their mission and were about to leave. Several of them, he said, had left before last week's coup. Numayri affirmed that he had no evidence of Soviet involvement in the coup and had no desire to have relations with Moscow deteriorate.

*None of the military or economic projects undertaken by an estimated 500 or more Soviet experts appears to be near enough to completion to warrant such an exodus.*

50X1

*The bitter tone of an authoritative Izvestiya article yesterday condemning the "mass terror" against Sudanese Communists nevertheless suggests that Moscow will take some concrete steps to demonstrate its dismay at developments in Khartoum. We do not believe the Soviets will completely write off their investment in the Sudan because of the execution of local party members, however; Moscow has often sacrificed local Communist parties for the sake of the USSR's national interests.*


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



50X1


*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

USSR



50X1  
50X1

50X1



50X1




50X1


50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**ISRAEL-EGYPT**




50X1



50X1

***FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY***



551719 7-71

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## CYPRUS

A  
N  
N  
E  
X

The Cyprus problem is once again threatening to boil over. The intercommunal talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriot elements on the island are stalemated, and there is growing tension between the communities. A dialogue between Greek and Turkish representatives at the UN is scheduled for early September. Should this meeting fail to produce a formula which would reinvigorate the intercommunal talks, Ankara probably will press for an alternative solution which could result in a new crisis situation. Convinced that the Greek and Greek Cypriot long-range goal is enosis--union of Cyprus with Greece--the Erim government, under strong military influence, has now adopted a long-range goal of partition to be sought through protracted negotiations with Athens. The going is likely to become rough over the next few months and may call for US or UN involvement to head off a recurrence of the crisis of November 1967.

The intercommunal talks, now entering their fourth year, are hung up on the question of degree of local autonomy to be granted the Turkish Cypriot community. Athens and Ankara are hoping to keep the talks alive at least until the bilateral talks at the UN in September. Makarios has little interest in this coming dialogue, regarding it as potentially leading to some kind of separate Turkish status on Cyprus--anathema to him. He is playing on Greek Cypriot emotions as well as threatening to seek Moscow's support if "outside" powers move to intervene.

Last spring Makarios rejected a Turkish Cypriot proposal for a Turkish Cypriot Affairs Ministry in the government. He viewed the proposal as merely another ploy to obtain a separate entity at the top level of government. Greece, on the other hand, regarded this as a reasonable request and tried unsuccessfully to convince Makarios to accept it. The resulting strains in Greece-Cyprus relations were aggravated by the Archbishop's visit to Moscow at the beginning of June. Moscow successfully avoided taking a strong stand on the Cyprus issue during the visit, but Athens and Ankara regarded Makarios' trip as a threatening development.

With the advent of the Erim government last March, Ankara took a firmer line and now insists that if the talks do not show progress soon, other alternatives must be sought. Erim has been involved in the Cyprus problem for at least a decade and, on occasion, has seemed to associate himself with the concept of communal partitioning of the island. The Turkish military now has a greater voice in the government and,

(continued)

A1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

having put Erim in power, intends to keep the Cypriot problem under active discussion. The military regards Cyprus as strategically important to Turkey--a potential "Mediterranean Cuba"--and is determined to maintain a Turkish presence there.

Athens is hesitant to face the Cypriot problem squarely but does not believe that Turkey fully appreciates the limits of Greek influence on Makarios. Even though Greece has made it clear to him that it has no intention of being provoked into a war with Turkey, Greek leaders remain fearful of his ability to dig in and cause a complete breakdown between Athens and Ankara. The Greeks probably are hopeful that if the Turks decide to move additional troops to Cyprus, they will first consult Athens. If they do consult, some arrangement may be worked out. If not, Athens probably would also have to make some military move, however reluctantly, as a demonstration of solidarity with the Greek Cypriots. Should the Cypriot problem come to this, Athens and Ankara each would almost certainly turn to the US and the UN for diplomatic pressure on the other.

At present, Ankara and Athens agree that it is in their mutual interest to allow the communal talks to continue. Turkey believes the Greeks should take a more active part in settling the problem, but the Turks will probably take no military action as long as there is no real danger of enosis or a major outbreak on the island. Athens' major concern is to avoid a confrontation with Turkey. If the Greek-Turkish meetings in New York in September do not fit with Makarios' ideas, however, the Cypriot President remains capable of creating a new crisis on the island--one which in turn could easily spill over to embroil Athens and Ankara directly.

Even before September, local incidents or maneuverings could set back the efforts of Greek and Turkish leaders to keep the problem manageable. Tensions on the island have in fact been rising in recent weeks. Makarios remains openly critical of Turkish Cypriot elements and has publicly encouraged Greek Cypriots to protect their "rights." In these circumstances, any incident could easily erupt in significant fighting. Aware of this danger, Ankara has informed the Turkish Cypriot community not to react too strongly to any Greek Cypriot provocation. Early this week the 3,100-man UN force went on an increased readiness alert; it is trying to prevent local incidents to the extent that it can without itself getting involved in military clashes.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*31 July 1971*

*47*

~~Top Secret~~

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

31 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

In southern Laos, the government drive to retake Pak-song is making headway despite some stiff Communist resistance. (Page 1)

50X1


South Vietnam

50X1

(Page 2)

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**

The three battalions that make up the government's 1,250-man main task force in the drive to retake Paksong were airlifted yesterday to positions north of Route 23 on the western edge of the Bolovens Plateau. This force has begun to push east, paralleling the road, and plans to attack Paksong from the north. Two other regular army battalions in the eastward drive on Route 23 have captured the village of Ban Gnik where they had been temporarily stalled by heavy rocket and mortar fire from elements of a North Vietnamese battalion entrenched in bunkers nearby. US air observers report that Communist troops are constructing bunkers and gun pits farther east along Route 23, as well as on high ground just west of Paksong.


*Communist actions suggest they intend to put up a spirited defense of the central Bolovens. Intercepts indicate that elements of the North Vietnamese 9th Regiment are defending Paksong and the approach along Route 23.*

To the north of the plateau, government units are still holding Saravane. Several small clashes have occurred in this area.


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

SOUTH VIETNAM



50X1



50X1




50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


CONGO (KINSHASA)




50X1



50X1



50X1



50X1



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


50X1

EGYPT-USSR

50X1



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

50X1

NOTE

50X1

USSR - East Germany:

50X1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*