

# The President's Daily Brief

*March 1, 1976*

2

*Top Secret*

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 14176  
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March 1, 1976

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[redacted] (Page 1)

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Portugal: The agreement signed by political and military leaders last week is designed in part to prevent a return to a leftist-dominated administration. (Page 3)

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

ANGOLA-ZAIRE

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

RHODESIA-MOZAMBIQUE

*Mozambique apparently has decided to impose sanctions against Rhodesia by closing the border, cutting off Rhodesian trade through Mozambique.*

President Machel took a tough public stand on Rhodesia following Mozambique's independence last June. Economic problems and internal dissensions, however, have prevented him from disrupting the lucrative economic ties between the two countries. Machel's change of mind now almost certainly is designed to pressure Smith into a settlement with Joshua Nkomo.

No public announcement of the sanctions has been made, but the arrest last week of some Rhodesian railroad workers just inside Mozambique may have been a signal to Smith that a new get-tough policy was under way.

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Machel, Tanzanian President Nyerere, and Zambian President Kaunda still seem willing to use political pressure on Smith even though they recognize the inevitability of insurgency against the Rhodesian government. [redacted]

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[redacted]

The insurgents still are not a unified or effective force. Nevertheless, insurgent activity in northeastern Rhodesia is growing and gaining momentum. In addition, there have been Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique and some minor clashes between Rhodesian and regular Mozambican forces.

PORUGAL

*Analysis of the agreement signed by political and military leaders last Thursday indicates that it is not so much a call for a return to civilian rule as it is a document that sets up obstacles to prevent a return to a leftist-dominated administration.*

Civilian political leaders will be more involved in the day-to-day running of the government and will be in control of the legislature once it is elected on April 25.

The military retains considerable clout, however. The all-military Revolutionary Council, chaired by the President, has been given veto power over all legislation. The veto can be overturned only by a two-thirds vote of the legislature. The Council also retains certain other functions that can only be regarded as a license to intervene if the military decides that the civilians are incapable of governing.

The signing of the pact is the culmination of a series of measures that have substantially toned down leftist government programs and have steadily eliminated Communist influence in the country. The shift to the right in government policies reflects the mood of the country as a whole.

In recent weeks, there has been an upsurge of anti-Communist activity in the north, and the Communists are complaining that there are many areas where they will be unable to campaign effectively for the April election.

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
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# The President's Daily Brief

March 2, 1976

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

*The impact of last year's harvest failure is being increasingly felt by Soviet consumers.*

Our embassy in Moscow reports that food shortages in rural areas are a main topic of conversation in the Soviet capital. Residents of the city are being appealed to by friends and acquaintances to "bring or send bread, meat, and milk." The Moscow "man on the street" has been irritated further because food shortages are not receiving attention at the party congress.


Other recent reports indicate that food supplies in rural areas are continuing to deteriorate, while supplies in urban areas still appear adequate. Despite massive imports of grain, feed shortages are still causing slaughtering of livestock.




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MEXICO

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
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Turkey is planning another air and naval exercise next week in the vicinity of the Greek island of Lesbos. An exercise held last week ended without incident.

Turkey has requested that air and sea travel be prohibited in the area for four hours on each of the two days the exercise is in progress. This would have the effect of temporarily shutting off Lesbos from the Greek mainland. Athens sees the exercise as a Turkish plan to isolate part of Greece; the defense minister stated last week that the area will not be closed.

The Turks may regard the exercise as a means of re-emphasizing the international character of the air and sea space that separates mainland Greece from the Aegean islands.

(continued)

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*Another breakdown in military discipline in eastern Bangladesh underscores the tenuous control exercised by the Sayem government.*

Some troops at a base in Chittagong mutinied last Friday; by yesterday the government claimed it had regained control. It is unclear what provoked the mutinous troops, but there are indications that some of them may have been supporters of the late president Mujib.

The army base in Dacca and other major bases are quiet, but unrest could spread as it did last November. Troops are disenchanted over several issues, including the government's failure to fulfill demands for more pay.

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# The President's Daily Brief

*March 3, 1976*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

USSR

Some prominent Soviets have recently implied that Moscow is tailoring its public statements on the US with an eye to influencing the US election.

A senior member of the USA Institute in Moscow recently told a US embassy officer that his institute had drafted its contribution to Brezhnev's report to the 25th party congress with US domestic politics in mind. He said that the institute was pleased that the resulting speech was optimistic about the future of bilateral relations.

In yet another conversation with a US official, Anatoly Gromyko, son of the Soviet foreign minister, noted the careful preparation which had gone into Brezhnev's report to the congress, calling attention to the "friendly and non-polemical" treatment of the US.

The younger Gromyko said he was confused about the results of the New Hampshire primary and its implications for the "spirit of Vladivostok," which he strongly endorsed. The Soviet central press seems similarly perplexed by the results.

In an effort to shed more light on US political affairs, the USA Institute, according to one of its senior members, is engaged in a thorough study of each major presidential candidate. He professed confidence in the future of Soviet-US relations regardless of the outcome of the presidential contest, but conceded that the USSR would prefer to see you returned to office "because we know him personally."

At the same time, the institute's study of Governor Reagan, whom the Soviet media have taken to task for his views on Soviet-US relations, had concluded that there is "a great difference between his words and his deeds."

USSR-EGYPT

*Soviet diplomats in Cairo reportedly believe that increasing popular discontent with President Sadat may force Egypt to take some sort of initiative to improve relations with Moscow this year.*

The Soviets think that Egypt's failure to attract sufficient Arab or Western capital has led to a deteriorating economic situation. They also believe that Sadat's inability to score additional diplomatic successes has led to popular frustration and growing disillusionment with Egypt's connection with Washington.



There is no indication that the Soviets think a coup against Sadat is likely in the near future. Their assessment of Sadat's political trouble--which is very similar to our own impressions--is a significant change in the thinking of the same Soviet officials who a few months ago said that Sadat was firmly entrenched.


[redacted] the Soviets perceive a change in the Egyptian mood. Moscow undoubtedly will keep up military and economic pressure on Sadat to make some favorable gesture.

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During the past few months, in fact, there have been signs--such as decreased criticism of the Kremlin--which suggest that Cairo is signaling a somewhat more accommodating attitude toward Moscow. These signs, however, have only seemed to encourage the USSR to maintain the pressure--by refusing, for example, to sell spare parts for and overhaul the engines of Egypt's MIG-21s.

JORDAN - SAUDI ARABIA - SYRIA

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*The Moroccans may soon begin further military operations in Sahara against the Polisario guerrillas, according to the US defense attaché in Rabat.*

The purpose would be to eliminate Polisario forces Rabat believes are located in the Zemmour mountains around Guelta in Sahara and in the area north of Bir Moghrein in Mauritania. The sweep would also be directed at guerrilla pockets in southern Morocco near the Algerian border. A reliable Moroccan source told US officials last week that Rabat believes Polisario forces are poised for operations in these areas.

\* \* \*

*The Soviets appear determined to do what they can to minimize differences between Moscow and the West European Communist parties and to avoid any sense of irreversible estrangement.*

The Soviets have not tried to conceal the existence of dispute. At the same time--beginning with Brezhnev's opening speech at the party congress--they have not hesitated to make their own views clear.

The Soviets have reported the speeches of both sycophants and independents, and Brezhnev has met with both Cunhal of Portugal and Berlinguer of Italy--representatives of the two groupings. Pravda even put a photo of the Brezhnev-Berlinguer meeting on its front page. The Soviets can thus make a plausible case that they have treated everyone with relative even-handedness.

\* \* \*

*For the first time, the South Africans are preparing contingency plans in the event of an insurgent threat from Mozambique and Angola.*

South African defense forces have begun to identify targets in the neighboring countries. Defense officials apparently have concluded that expanded assistance from Mozambique to Rhodesian guerrillas and the potential for trouble in Namibia present a significant security threat to South Africa.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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A bitter disagreement that emerged yesterday among Portugal's top military officers could foreshadow an open split between left- and right-wing factions in the Revolutionary Council.

Conservative newspapers have published a strong attack by air force Chief of Staff Morais da Silva on President Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Melo Antunes, both left-leaning members of the Council. Up to now, Council members have successfully papered over their differences in order to present a united front against the Communists and the far left. Morais da Silva's attack may mean that Council unity has been ended and rightist officers have decided to press for the removal of Costa Gomes and Melo Antunes now, even though the coming elections probably will sweep both of them from power.

\* \* \*

Icelandic Prime Minister Hallgrimsson has agreed to explore means to reduce tension in the cod war with the UK and to get the talks started again.

Hallgrimsson's proposal calls for the UK to pull out all warships and all but 15 trawlers from the 200-mile zone around Iceland. In return, Iceland will promise not to harass the remaining British trawlers. The Prime Minister apparently visualizes an agreement of about six months' duration. By the end of this time, he presumably expects a favorable UN Law of the Sea Conference ruling on 200-mile economic zones. The Icelandic cabinet, by Hallgrimsson's own admission, is still divided on whether to negotiate with the British.

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*The Italian Socialist Party's national congress, which opens today, and that of the Christian Democrats, which will convene later this month, will determine whether the two parties can settle on a formula for a new coalition and avoid an early election.*

Only the Socialist Party, Italy's third largest, can guarantee the Christian Democrats a non-Communist majority in parliament. For the short term, the Socialists appear willing to collaborate with the Christian Democrats, provided the latter give the Socialists more influence over policy in a new government and agree to consult the Communists openly, rather than behind-the-scenes, in order to make the Communist Party more responsible for government actions. The Socialist congress is likely to reiterate that the party's long-term goal is a grouping of leftist forces, including the Communists, that would replace the Christian Democrats as the nation's dominant political force.

The Christian Democrats have so far been unable to reconcile internal differences over how to respond to the Socialist Party's conditions. Most party members favor giving the Socialists more influence in the government but oppose actions that would publicly modify the Christian Democrats' traditional opposition to the Communists.

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# The President's Daily Brief

*March 4, 1976*


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ILLEGIB



ILLEGIB

March 4, 1976

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Mozambique-Rhodesia: President Machel's decision yesterday to close his country's borders with Rhodesia will have serious economic consequences for both countries. (Page 4)

Note: USSR (Page 5)

~~FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY~~

## EGYPT - SAUDI ARABIA

President Sadat obtained \$725 million in cash aid pledges during his trip last week around the Persian Gulf. This assistance will keep Egypt financially afloat until June, but Sadat still must get \$1 billion in balance-of-payments support for the second half of the year.

According to our embassy in Cairo, the new Arab aid includes \$300 million from Saudi Arabia, \$200 million from Kuwait, \$150 million from the United Arab Emirates, and \$75 million from Qatar. Sadat also may have signed an agreement with the Saudis which formally acknowledges a previous Riyadh pledge of \$700 million in arms aid.

Sadat apparently is going to try to muddle through the second half of 1976 without a return to Saudi Arabia for more funds. Many Egyptian officials were distressed at the size of the Saudi contribution, having hoped for several times the amount they received.

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The impasse with Saudi Arabia has already inspired Cairo to patch up its relations with the International Monetary Fund. Last year, Egypt's refusal to devalue the pound as recommended by the IMF caused deferment of some \$300 million in loans. Cairo is now prepared to try a substantial devaluation and to consider other economic and financial reforms in the hope of reaching a compromise with the IMF.

Egypt also is seeking Chase Manhattan Bank sponsorship of a \$250 to \$500 million medium-term bank loan. Cairo is offering to reserve a portion of Suez Canal revenues for repayment to facilitate the loan. Cairo may also be able to draw on the Saudi-sponsored Arab aid fund before the end of 1976. It is still unclear, however, whether firm commitments for the \$2 billion fund have been obtained from all prospective participants.

PLO-SYRIA

*Relations between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Syria are strained because of Damascus' continuing close control of events in Lebanon.*

The presence in Lebanon of at least 3,000 troops of the Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army has raised fears among independent Palestinian leaders that Damascus will attempt to impose on the fedayeen in Lebanon the same strict regulations that govern Palestinian activities in Syria. Syrian President Asad has pledged publicly, in fact, that Damascus will guarantee Palestinian respect for past agreements restricting fedayeen freedoms in Lebanon.

Syria has not yet taken systematic or forceful steps to fulfill this promise [redacted]

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[redacted]  
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Syria is unlikely to use its increased influence to attempt to place permanent restrictions on fedayeen activity in Lebanon or to wrest control of the PLO from Arafat and other independent Palestinians. Asad would not want to face the Palestinian and Arab criticisms that would follow an attempt to unseat the PLO leader.

Palestinian leaders have turned to Egypt to help offset Syrian influence, but Syrian views on issues related to Middle East peace negotiations will still dominate Palestinian councils.

CHINA

*The latest round of domestic political ferment has not altered the main lines of Chinese foreign policy.*

Acting Premier Hua Kuo-feng indicated in his remarks at the welcoming banquet for former president Nixon last week that Peking's anti-Soviet orientation and its desire for working relationships with the US and other Western powers remain intact. There is no evidence at this juncture that China's relationship with the USSR is likely to become central to the current domestic political debate.

The anti-Soviet strains of Chinese policy remain in evidence. A brief lull in Chinese press attacks against Moscow coincided with the initial attack on "capitalist roaders" in the People's Daily and the announcement of Hua's temporary appointment. Within days, however, the Chinese press launched one of its harshest anti-Soviet propaganda campaigns. Peking has attacked Soviet domestic policies of special sensitivity to Moscow and Soviet foreign policy across-the-board.

Many Chinese spokesmen interpret the visit of former president Nixon as a sign of Peking's continued interest in developing relations with Washington. [redacted]

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[redacted] Peking had not fully anticipated the controversy the trip caused in the US.

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MOZAMBIQUE-RHODESIA

*President Machel's decision yesterday to close Mozambique's borders with Rhodesia will have serious economic consequences for both countries.*

Since up to half of Rhodesia's foreign trade passed through Mozambique, Prime Minister Ian Smith will now be under intense pressure to negotiate a settlement with his country's black nationalists.

The Rhodesians will try to make up as much of the economic loss as possible by increasing traffic through South Africa's transport links with Salisbury. The South Africans are not likely to disrupt their own commerce significantly to accommodate the Smith government, however.

Closing the border will mean a loss of revenue and increased unemployment in Mozambique. Food shortages will also pose a serious problem, since Mozambique has been dependent on Rhodesian wheat, corn, and meat shipments.

The Machel government probably is counting on British Commonwealth leaders to make good their pledge of last year to make up the revenue that would be lost by imposing sanctions.

NOTE

*A study of the full text of Soviet Premier Kosygin's speech on Monday to the 25th party congress shows that he added no new details to economic plans for 1976 through 1980.*

Kosygin described the basic achievements of the previous five-year plan as stable growth and improved welfare for the Soviet people. He did not dwell on agricultural disappointments but did concede that the overall growth in the agricultural sector was low and had had an impact on light industry and food processing. He criticized investment waste and lagging technology.

Kosygin said the main task of the new plan would be consumer welfare. He stated that industrial goals are realistic and that, with the application of skilled management, they could even be surpassed.

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# The President's Daily Brief

March 5, 1976

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March 5, 1976

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China: The attacks on Teng Hsiao-ping continue to escalate, but the campaign thus far has stopped short of its final step--a call for and subsequent announcement of his ouster. (Page 4)


Morocco-Algeria: Satellite photography shows that Morocco is constructing one, possibly two, new runways at an airfield some 100 miles west of the Algerian border. (Page 5)

South Africa: Prime Minister Vorster's bland public comments yesterday on Mozambican President Machel's announcement of a total boycott against Rhodesia seem intended to keep Pretoria's options open. (Page 6)

Notes: Yugoslavia; Greece-Turkey; Argentina  
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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR





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Krivak-class Guided Missile Destroyer

USSR

*The Soviets have moved four naval ships south in the Indian Ocean, possibly in reaction to the increasing tension in southeastern Africa.*

A Krivak-class guided missile destroyer, an Alligator-class landing ship, and a support ship have been at an anchorage near Coetivy Island in the Seychelles since February 28, and an oiler joined the group yesterday.

During the later stages of the fighting in Angola, the Soviet navy maintained a constant patrol in neighboring waters, usually with the same combination of types of ships as are now at Coetivy Island. With some eight warships, an attack submarine, and numerous support ships in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets could quickly reinforce the contingency group. The Soviet squadron normally remains in the northwestern sector of the Indian Ocean, near support facilities in Somalia.

\* \* \*

*Soviet arms offloaded in Mozambique last month reportedly included three tanks and three or four truck-mounted 122-mm. rocket launchers.*

This would be the first delivery of such equipment to Mozambique. We do not know whether the arms are destined for Rhodesian guerrillas or Mozambique forces. We also cannot substantiate reports that either the USSR or Cuba is shifting arms and materiel directly from Angola to Mozambique, nor can we confirm any arms deliveries directly from the USSR this year. Last year, seven Soviet arms carriers offloaded an estimated \$12 million of equipment in Mozambique including 122-mm. rockets, anti-aircraft guns, and small arms.


## CHINA

*The attacks on Teng Hsiao-ping continue to escalate, but the campaign thus far has stopped short of its final step--a call for and subsequent announcement of his ouster.*

This situation suggests that Teng's removal is at least as divisive an issue as was his return from political disgrace nearly three years ago. Nevertheless, more moderate elements in the leadership have not been able to slow the attacks or mount a public defense of Teng and his policies.

Teng is the only member of the Politburo's elite Standing Committee who has not appeared in public since Chou En-lai's funeral in mid-January. No one in the leadership has appeared regularly, but the party's left wing, which is leading the attack on Teng, has monopolized the public limelight. Those leaders who are most likely to support Teng and his policies have made few or no public appearances.

Chinese officials have made conflicting statements as to whether Teng still holds his important party, government and military positions. A Chinese official responded on March 3 with a "no comment" when asked to confirm rumors that Teng had resigned. If the moderates fail to defend Teng publicly in the face of the strong leftist attack, he probably ultimately will have to give up his highest ranking positions as party vice chairman and member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Should his opposition fall short of purging him, it is probable at best Teng could hang on as an ordinary member of the Politburo. Teng's position as People's Liberation Army chief of staff is also in doubt.



MOROCCO-ALGERIA

*Satellite photography of mid-February shows that Morocco is constructing one, possibly two, new runways at Goulimime airfield, some 100 miles west of the Algerian border in southern Morocco. The new strips will be capable of handling jet aircraft.*

The improvements at this airfield will give the Moroccans a large forward base from which they can better conduct operations throughout southern Morocco and the northeastern part of Western Sahara. The Moroccans now have all 14 of their usable F-5 fighters, some 13 French-built jet trainers and light attack aircraft, plus 7 older piston driven trainer aircraft in southern Morocco and the Sahara, leaving northern Moroccan air space virtually defenseless. All of the jet aircraft are operating either out of Agadir or El Aaiun.

Algeria, since late last year, has kept at least 20 MIG-15s or MIG-17s at Bechar and Tindouf. Construction of new runways at Bou Ladhah and Tindouf, as well as the building of aircraft revetments at Tinfouchy airfield in southwestern Algeria indicates that Algiers plans to improve facilities in that part of the country, should it be necessary to build up airpower there. Algiers has around 20 Soviet-built light bombers and about 190 fighters, fighter-bombers, and jet trainers based elsewhere in Algeria.

SOUTH AFRICA

Prime Minister Vorster's bland public comments yesterday on Mozambican President Machel's announcement of a total boycott against Rhodesia seem intended to keep Pretoria's options open.

Vorster probably hopes that South Africa's capabilities for softening the impact of the boycott can be used as bargaining chips for dealing with Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith and possibly the black African leaders with whom Vorster worked last year to get Rhodesian settlement talks started.

The South African transportation network is physically capable of handling a significant portion of the Rhodesian traffic--roughly half of Rhodesia's overseas trade--that has been going through seaports in Mozambique. An emergency rerouting of Rhodesian trade, however, would involve some costly disruptions in South Africa's normal traffic patterns.

Although the Mozambican boycott makes the Rhodesian settlers more dependent than ever on South African economic support, Vorster's reinforced leverage over Smith must be exerted discreetly. The Mozambican boycott represents the application of the UN sanctions against the Smith regime that are anathema to white South Africans, and Vorster will avoid any statements that could be construed as support for international sanctions. Nevertheless, he will probably make economic aid to Rhodesia contingent, at least in part, on Smith's cooperation with Vorster's efforts to resolve the Rhodesian conflict.

Vorster no doubt fears that the insurgents, who are concentrated in Mozambique, may soon be supported by Cuban troops. An escalation of guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia would put Vorster under intense domestic political pressures to resume open military aid for Smith, a move that would cancel his efforts toward peaceful coexistence with Mozambique and other black African states.

NOTES

Yugoslav President Tito is preparing to resume an active schedule after nearly two months of recuperation from his latest illness.

Over the weekend he will preside at party meetings to hear reports from the delegation to the Soviet party congress. Tito also is expected to see Cuban Prime Minister Castro, who will spend the weekend in Belgrade. The Yugoslav leadership is completing preparations for Tito's Latin American tour, which is expected to begin Wednesday. On the return leg of his trip, Tito may stop in the Azores for talks with Portuguese President Costa Gomes.

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Greece and Turkey apparently have reached a compromise agreement on the proposed Turkish military exercise in the Aegean on March 9-10, thereby defusing a situation that could have raised tensions and led to an incident.

According to senior Greek Foreign Ministry officials, the agreement will permit the Turkish exercise west of the Greek island of Lesbos to take place while ensuring, at the same time, that air and sea traffic to and from the island will not be interrupted.

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[redacted] Argentine [redacted]

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*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

March 6, 1976

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Exempt from general  
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exemption category 5B(1)/(2)(3)  
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March 6, 1976

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
**OPEC:** A decline in OPEC import prices should give Saudi Arabia and some other OPEC members grounds--if they choose to use them--to resist or curb the decision for a midyear oil price rise when the oil ministers meet in May. (Page 4)

**Notes:** USSR; Zaire-Angola; Rhodesia; China-USSR  
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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
EGYPT-ISRAEL-SYRIA



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

CUBA - SOUTHERN AFRICA



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
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THAILAND



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OPEC

*OPEC import prices, on which the oil producers have focused as justification for oil price hikes, have declined at an annual rate of 8 percent since March 1975. This should give Saudi Arabia and some other OPEC members grounds--if they choose to use them--to resist or curb the decision for a midyear oil price rise when the oil ministers meet in Jakarta in late May.*

Three factors have contributed to the recent downward trend in OPEC import prices:

- Sluggish domestic demand and substantial unused capacity apparently induced industrial suppliers to cut prices to foreign markets.
- Wholesale price inflation fell to about half the 1974 rate in most industrial countries.
- The dollar appreciated in 1975, making imports from non-US suppliers less expensive in dollar terms.

## *Changes in the Soviet Leadership*

### Dropped

#### **Minister of Agriculture Polyansky**, no longer in the Politburo.

His position there has been tenuous since February 1973, when he was demoted from first deputy premier. His loss of Politburo status removes him from the long-term succession race, but does not help to clarify the positions of other contenders. The move has no very clear implications for foreign policy, and only some murky hints for the problem of reorganization of management of industry and agriculture.

### Promoted

#### **Party Secretary Ustinov**, from candidate to full member of the Politburo.

Ustinov is responsible for the defense industry and Soviet space efforts. He is primarily a manager, not a policy maker, despite his Politburo status. He has made his career in the government apparatus, worked closely with Premier Kosygin, and transferred to party work only in 1965. The promotion from candidate to full Politburo member will not significantly affect the political balance in the Kremlin and casts no light on succession. Ustinov is 67.

#### **Leningrad party boss Romanov**, from candidate to full member of the Politburo.

Romanov has been regarded as a comer, and his promotion is no great surprise. He has acquired national prominence as an innovative industrial manager—by Soviet standards. His long-term prospects for succession have been improved, but he must still get an assignment in Moscow to be a credible contender.

#### **Azerbaydzhani party boss Aliyev**, to candidate member of the Politburo.

Aliyev's promotion is essentially to provide Kremlin representation for the Caucasus region. That has been the only major geographic area without someone in the leadership since Georgian party boss Mzhavanadze's retirement under fire in 1972. Aliyev is a relatively young and quite vigorous leader. As a member of a minority nationality, however, he cannot be expected to move very fast or very far in the Kremlin hierarchy.

#### **Chief of the Central Committee's General Department Chernenko**, to party secretary.

Chernenko's promotion was foreshadowed by a series of awards he received on Tuesday. His career association with Brezhnev covers two decades. Their paths first crossed when Brezhnev was party boss of Moldavia in the early 1950s and Chernenko was engaged in propaganda and agitation work there. His more recent career specialization has been general administration, handling the leadership's paper work. He accompanied Brezhnev to Helsinki in 1975. Chernenko's promotion to the Secretariat, however, does little more than formalize an existing arrangement and strengthen Brezhnev's hand in that body.

#### **Pravda chief editor Zimyanin**, to party secretary.

Zimyanin is a Belorussian, with presumed links to first deputy premier Mazurov and Belorussian party boss Masherov. As *Pravda*'s chief editor he has played an even-handed role on policy questions and avoided divisive issues. Zimyanin will probably pick up the slot for culture and the intelligentsia, vacant since Demichev's demotion to minister of culture in 1974.

## NOTES

*The few changes in the Soviet leadership made at the party congress yesterday indicate continuity in national policy and style of leadership.*

General Secretary Brezhnev's public stature has reached a new high, but he evidently will continue a consensus type of leadership. There is still no sign that preparations are being made for succession.

Agricultural Minister Polyansky, dropped from the Politburo, was the leadership's scapegoat for the harvest failures. The elevation of party secretary Ustinov, who maintains overall supervision of defense industry and space, completes the appointment to the Politburo of officials responsible for foreign policy and defense. Ustinov joins Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko, and KGB chairman Andropov, all of whom have been added to the Politburo in the past few years.

\* \* \*

*Zaire yesterday closed down the Kinshasa headquarters of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola* [redacted]

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[redacted] Mobutu, who apparently avoided making specific aid commitments, is not likely to support a National Front insurgency as long as his prospects for cooperation with Angolan President Neto appear good. For the time being, however, Mobutu will want to keep the Front alive to use against Neto in the event the Angolan leader does not live up to the agreement reached a week ago.

(continued)

\* \* \*

Rhodesian nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo reportedly told London that, during their negotiating session last Monday, Prime Minister Smith offered immediate parity for blacks in the Rhodesian government and majority rule in five years.

Nkomo may be grasping at straws. Both Nkomo and Smith have a high stake in keeping the talks going to forestall a renewal of all-out guerrilla warfare. Smith's proposal was oral only, and the transcript of the meeting reportedly makes no mention of it.

Insisting that he has "an understanding" with Smith, Nkomo wants the British to call a constitutional conference in Salisbury before the end of March. The British are unlikely to take any such action unless they get an unequivocal commitment from Smith that he will move toward majority rule. London's special envoy who visited Salisbury last week saw no sign that the Prime Minister was relaxing his position.

\* \* \*

The Chinese rejected a Soviet proposal last week that the joint committee on Sino-Soviet river navigation meet this month in the Soviet far east.

Peking instead renewed its proposal of last year--which Moscow rejected then--that the committee take up territorial issues.

From 1956 through 1974, the committee met annually, alternately in China and the USSR, to discuss routine navigational matters along the rivers that form the de facto Sino-Soviet border. China's attempts to broaden the agenda of the talks and the Soviet refusal resulted in a postponement of last year's session. Riverine traffic was normal last year, and it is likely to be normal again this summer even in the absence of talks.

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# The President's Daily Brief

*March 8, 1976*

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Western Sahara: Morocco and Mauritania severed diplomatic relations with Algeria yesterday after Algiers announced its recognition of the Saharan Democratic Republic. (Page 1)

Western Europe - Cuba: Some West European governments are under growing domestic pressure to reduce their modest development aid programs to the Castro regime. (Page 2)

Spain: This is likely to be a turbulent week in Spain. (Page 3)

Notes: USSR; Japan-Australia; Cuba-Yugoslavia  
(Pages 4 and 5)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

WESTERN SAHARA

*Morocco and Mauritania severed diplomatic relations with Algeria yesterday after Algiers announced its recognition of the Saharan Democratic Republic, proclaimed on February 27 by the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. Rabat has condemned the so-called republic as an Algerian creation.*

In announcing its recognition of the Saharan "state," Algiers again pledged to give the Polisario Front full political, moral, and material support in the struggle for self-determination. Only Algeria, the Malagasy Republic, and Burundi have so far recognized the new "state," which is, in effect, a government in exile.

Egyptian President Sadat, in a statement released yesterday, urged restraint on both Morocco and Algeria and cautioned against taking steps that would "complicate the situation." Sadat's remarks suggest Cairo is prepared to resume its mediatory role if the parties are receptive.

WESTERN EUROPE - CUBA

*The relations of West European nations with Cuba have not been particularly affected by Havana's involvement in Angola. Some governments, however, are under growing domestic pressure to reduce their modest development aid programs to the Castro regime.*

The largest West European countries, with the exception of West Germany, have had diplomatic relations with Havana for a decade or more. None of them wants to take action that might affect adversely its share of the Cuban market.

West Germany, which resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba only last year, has announced the cancellation of a planned aid program. This decision resulted partly from criticism by opposition parties.

Other governments will honor existing commitments. The Social Democratic government in Sweden, the largest donor in Western Europe, is under pressure to reduce its assistance but will make every effort to continue aid. Prime Minister Palme is sufficiently concerned about political backlash, however, that he has asked Castro to postpone his trip to Sweden until after the national election there in September.

SPAIN

*This is likely to be a turbulent week in Spain. Leftists have called a general strike in the Basque region, and a politically sensitive court-martial opens in Madrid today.*

The general strike in the four Basque provinces has been called by various clandestine labor organizations, including the Communist-dominated workers' commissions, to protest the deaths of four workers killed by police during the demonstrations last week. Organizers of the strike predicted yesterday that it will be the biggest since the Civil War and that economic activity in many parts of the industrialized north will be at a standstill all week.


The strikes may provoke more violence. Small extremist groups have infiltrated some Basque labor groups. These extremists were probably the main instigators of the violence last week.

Interior Minister Fraga, who toured the Basque region yesterday, warned that the government will not tolerate "anarchistic attempts" to derail its reform program.

In Madrid, ten officers go on trial today. They were arrested last summer for membership in a clandestine group called the Democratic Military Union. The group, which is reported to have between 300 and 400 members and some 1,000 sympathizers, advocates political reforms and reorganization of the armed forces.

A harsh verdict against the ten could further politicize younger officers who favor some degree of democratization in Spain, while a lenient sentence would outrage hard-line Francoist officers.

The government has tried to discourage reporting about the court-martial, claiming that it is strictly a military matter. Oppositionists have vowed to publicize the affair and, over the weekend, the clandestine Communist radio has been broadcasting declarations of solidarity with the ten officers.



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NOTES

*The Soviets are replacing some of their naval ships off West Africa, but are not reducing the size of the force.*

The Soviet naval force in the area has stabilized at a level higher than that maintained prior to the war in Angola, and the operating area has been extended to include the Gulf of Guinea as well as the waters off Conakry. When the rotation is complete, the Soviets will have a cruiser, a destroyer, a landing ship, and an oiler operating in West African waters.

Off the east coast, the Soviets have four ships at anchor near Coetivy Island in the Indian Ocean--a destroyer, a landing ship, an oiler, and a support ship.

\* \* \*

*Japanese-Australian relations seem likely to improve following a relatively abrasive period caused by the economic recession and the policies of the former Whitlam government.*

Although Tokyo is still somewhat cautious, the recent visit by Australian Deputy Prime Minister Anthony clearly indicated to Japanese leaders that the Fraser government wishes to encourage a Japanese economic role in Australia, particularly in the development of natural resources. Trade problems will remain but should diminish in intensity. Japan is Australia's largest trading partner.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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Cuban Prime Minister Castro and Yugoslav President Tito met at Tito's Adriatic island retreat over the weekend. The Yugoslav leader, in his public toast at a dinner honoring Castro on Saturday night, lauded "the army and the people of Angola" for defeating "imperialist and racist forces."

Tito said Angola must be able to determine its domestic policies and to pursue "an independent and nonaligned foreign policy." Contrary to some Western press reports, he made only a parenthetical reference to Cuba's "rich contribution" to the People's Republic of Angola. Castro is expected to move on to Bulgaria today en route home from the Soviet party congress. Tito leaves Yugoslavia on Wednesday for a tour of Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela.

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# The President's Daily Brief

March 9, 1976

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Italy: The decisions taken by the Socialist Party at its national congress will present the Christian Democrats with difficult political choices at their congress next week. (Page 4)

Zaire: President Mobutu is now trying to improve relations with the USSR and Cuba. (Page 5)

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

EGYPT




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
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
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
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
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LEBANON

A wave of cease-fire violations over the last several days by Muslim deserters from the Lebanese army has again heightened tension throughout the country. Syrian-controlled Palestinian troops have been able to contain most of the trouble, but Lebanese leaders are divided over how to deal with it.

Late last week, a robbery committed by a small group of deserters was mistakenly blamed on Christians from a small village in northern Lebanon. Muslim militiamen, reportedly aided by a few fedayeen commandos, attacked the village. The incident prompted Christian communities in Beirut to set up blockades.

The situation was relatively quiet yesterday, but Palestinian forces and Lebanese army troops had to separate Christian and Muslim militiamen.

The largest band of Muslim deserters, headed by Lieutenant Khatib, took over several abandoned military facilities yesterday. The Lebanese cabinet met yesterday to discuss the seizure, but is unlikely to provide any immediate solution.

Although Khatib has until now generally adhered to the cease-fire, his ability to roam freely throughout the eastern portion of the country has undermined Christian confidence in the truce. It has embittered both Christian and Muslim military officers, many of whom oppose the government's offer of a general amnesty to all deserters.

Khatib's espousal of political demands favoring Muslim leftists has won him support from Kamal Jumblatt and other influential leftist leaders and a growing popular following among disadvantaged Muslims. Khatib reportedly has refused amnesty from the government and has turned down a Syrian offer of political asylum. The Syrians apparently now favor inducing him and presumably other renegade officers to join fedayeen commando groups.

Damascus appears confident that it can contain the disturbances caused by the deserters and at this point seems anxious to avoid interfering too directly in the controversy.

## ITALY

*The decisions taken by the Socialist Party at its national congress will present the Christian Democrats with difficult political choices at their congress next week and possibly increase the pressures for an early parliamentary election.*

The Socialists closed their congress on Sunday with a unanimous resolution stressing the party's long-range goal of creating a leftist coalition, including the Communists, that would replace the Christian Democrats as the country's dominant political force. Socialist leader De Martino emphasized, as he has in the past, that such a government would not be feasible until the Socialists have increased their strength with respect to the Communists, and until the latter have put more distance between themselves and Moscow.

The Socialists softened somewhat their long-standing demand for closer relations between a future Christian Democratic - Socialist government and the Communist opposition. The Socialists now say merely that they will not join any government "prejudicially closed to or conceived as an antithesis to" the Communists; they are no longer calling for a formalized relationship between the government and the Communists.

While the Socialists' new formulation offers more room for compromise with the Christian Democrats, its effect will be diminished by the tendency at the Socialist congress to portray a future coalition with the Christian Democrats as a mere stepping stone to an eventual leftist coalition.

The Socialists have compounded the Christian Democrats' troubles by ruling out another coalition with them before the next election. The Socialist decision means that the Christian Democrats will go into the next election bearing the major responsibility for government and subject to criticism from all sides. That prospect is likely to lead many Christian Democrats to argue at their congress next week that the party would fare better in an election held this summer or fall than in one held after more than a year at the head of another weak and ineffective government.

ZAIRE

*Having established the basis for a political accommodation with the Popular Movement regime in Angola late last month, President Mobutu is now trying to improve relations with Moscow and Havana.*

Mobutu's intentions were conveyed by Foreign Minister Nguza to the Soviet, Cuban, and East European ambassadors late last week. Nguza told the ambassadors that Zaire would welcome better relations but would expect a withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

Nguza later remarked to Ambassador Cutler that President Mobutu was not encouraged by the meeting and that he expects Cuban forces to assist liberation groups in Rhodesia and Namibia. Nguza pointed out that President Mobutu cannot argue against nationalist movements in southern Africa.

Mobutu is feeling particularly vulnerable just now. The heavy role played by Havana and Moscow in Angola has served to remind him that both countries contributed to the instability in Zaire in the early days of its independence and worked to keep him from assuming power. Cubans, in particular, have vowed revenge against him because of his role in the death of Patrice Lumumba.

Zaire is in the grip of a serious economic slump. Its army has been demoralized by the poor showing it made in Angola. Mobutu has managed to obtain Western support to help his country out of its economic slump but has been less successful in strengthening his military forces.

NOTES

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Australia

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The Italian EC delegation in Brussels has informed Rome that the EC at a meeting this Friday will consider sending a note to Washington protesting recommended US protectionist measures on shoe imports.

The Italians, who would be most affected by the proposal, are willing to approve an EC protest note as an initial step--if it is followed by some further expression of Community disapproval.

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# The President's Daily Brief

*March 10, 1976*

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Lebanon: Emergency sessions of the cabinet and parliament were called yesterday to discuss ways to end the occupation by Muslim army deserters of two military installations close to the Israeli border. (Page 1)

USSR: Moscow is playing down your decision to avoid the word "detente" and is focusing instead on statements supporting "relaxed international tension." (Page 2)

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Southern Africa:

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(Page 3)

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USSR-Algeria-Morocco: Moscow reportedly continues to support self-determination for Western Sahara but wants Algeria to find a peaceful settlement to the dispute. (Page 5)

Notes: USSR; Somalia-FTAI; Mexico (Pages 6 and 7)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

LEBANON

*The cabinet and parliament were called into emergency sessions yesterday to discuss ways to end the occupation by Muslim army deserters of two military installations close to the Israeli border.*

Christian and Muslim leaders are united in their concern that the deserters may spark an incident with Israel, but seem hopelessly divided over how to deal with the mutiny. If it continues for any length of time, it could trigger similar uprisings by Christian soldiers and ultimately draw Syrian-controlled Palestinian troops into direct clashes with Christian forces.

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Damascus is worried that the mutineers' action will encourage further defections, but is still reluctant to face the problem. Both Syria and the Palestinians see certain advantages in the mutineers' challenge to Christian control of the Lebanese army, but have been unable to control the leader of the revolt. Ultimately, the Syrians hope to reorganize the Lebanese army in a way that will diminish Christian control.

Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam returned to Beirut yesterday, but he will have little chance to resume negotiations on the formation of a new cabinet until the issue of the mutineers is resolved.

USSR

*Moscow is playing down your decision to avoid the word "detente" and is focusing instead on administration statements that support "relaxed international tension."*

Moscow's initial reaction to your statement on "detente" was in a broadcast to North America on March 2 in which the commentator mused that the "unfamiliar" word "detente" had been abused and finally "turned inside out."


Most recently, Soviet commentators have noted that "some" Americans hold that "detente" is an ambiguous term and were moving to strike it from the political dictionary. You and Secretary Kissinger were not linked with this development, but were praised for testifying to the "immutable" course of improving US-Soviet relations.

Soviet listeners were informed that you were avoiding the term "detente" when Moscow yesterday broadcast an account of Secretary Kissinger's interview with US News and World Report.

The Soviets noted the Secretary's assurances that no policy change is involved, and his remark that the administration sees no sensible alternative to building more stable relations with the USSR. They also reported his stress on the need for a new SALT agreement (a theme the Soviets themselves are emphasizing) and his assessment that US policy toward the USSR since 1969 has been successful.

Soviet commentaries do contain some somber overtones. For example, Moscow quoted Secretary Kissinger's statement that the US is dealing with an "irreconcilable ideology" and that the Soviet Union will not abandon support for national liberation movements in the name of friendly relations.


An earlier Soviet commentary also referred to "certain US circles" which were bent on replacing "detente" with "power politics."



SOUTHERN AFRICA



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
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
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Zaire and Zambia



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## USSR-ALGERIA-MOROCCO

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Moscow

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continues to support self-determination for Western Sahara but wants Algeria to find a peaceful settlement to the dispute.


In line with this advice, Moscow has handled cautiously the proclamation of the "Saharan Democratic Arab Republic" by the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas. The Soviets have publicly noted the declaration, but their media have also reported Moroccan opposition to the move.

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[redacted]  
Perhaps in pique, Algeria summoned home its ambassador to the USSR before the Soviet party congress. In addition, its delegate to the congress returned to Algiers to consult Boumediene before conferring with Soviet leaders.

Moroccan Prime Minister Osman, on the other hand, has told US officials that he was pleased by his discussions with Kosygin last month in Moscow. Kosygin evidently told Osman that Boumediene is out on a limb and that a way should be found to take him off it without embarrassment.

Moscow would probably like to continue to avoid choosing sides in the conflict. The USSR might support the Algerian position more strongly, however, if--despite Soviet desires--the Western Sahara situation deteriorates into a shooting war.



NOTES

The Soviet naval group in the Indian Ocean--composed of a destroyer, a landing ship, a support ship, and an oiler--is moving south from its anchorage near Coetivy Island.

The contingent may be planning a port call at Port Louis in Mauritius, which will celebrate its independence day on Friday.

On the other side of Africa, a Soviet F-class torpedo attack submarine--probably from the Mediterranean--has entered the port at Conakry. This is the second time this year that a Soviet submarine has visited Conakry; a J-class submarine was there briefly at the end of February. A Soviet Kresta-class cruiser and a landing ship are now there, too, and a destroyer and a merchant oiler are in the Gulf of Guinea.

\* \* \*

Somali President Siad reiterated his commitment to self-determination for the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas in the course of his speech earlier this month at the 25th Soviet party congress in Moscow.

We believe that Siad's goal is the complete and immediate withdrawal of French forces and the replacement of the present head of the territorial council, who is Paris' choice for future leadership, by a pro-Somali official. The incorporation of the territory into Somalia also is a near-term objective of Siad's.

Siad most likely used his trip to the congress to solicit Moscow's support for his policies in the Horn of Africa and to convince the Soviets of his need for military hardware. In the past, Moscow reportedly has cautioned Siad to do nothing rash, but rather to rely on political pressure and subversion to achieve his ends.

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[redacted] Mexican [redacted]

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seizure of illicit drugs.

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# The President's Daily Brief

*March 11, 1976*

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China: Peking's most authoritative statement to date on the campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-ping has linked Mao Tse-tung directly to this effort. (Page 1) 25X1

Japan: [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1

Lebanon: Rebellious Muslim soldiers in southern Lebanon reportedly were ordered late yesterday by their leader to stop all military action. (Page 4)

Notes: USSR; Saudi Arabia - South Yemen; Peru (Pages 6 and 7)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

CHINA

*Peking's most authoritative statement to date on the campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-ping has linked Mao Tse-tung directly to this effort.*

The statement was contained in a People's Daily editorial, which comes closer to establishing an official position on the campaign than previous, less official pronouncements. The editorial quotes Mao on the need to "narrow the target" of the attack, implying that Teng alone should be criticized, but leaves the door open for criticism of other officials who are associated with Teng and who, like him, were returned to public office after being ousted a decade ago.

While the editorial stops short of calling for Teng to be overthrown, stating only that he should be criticized, Teng is separated from other officials who, the editorial notes, should be "helped" to correct their past mistakes.

The party's left wing undoubtedly will use the editorial's statement, which is linked directly to Mao, that it is unpopular to "reverse previous verdicts"--a reference to the rehabilitation of officials overthrown during the Cultural Revolution--to broaden the attack on Teng to include many of the rehabilitees who once again hold important party, military, and government positions. The editorial nevertheless calls for people to remain "coolheaded" and strictly prohibits the kind of disruptive political activity that characterized the Cultural Revolution.

These prohibitions, which are at the operative heart of the editorial, strongly suggest that more moderate-leaning members of the leadership still retain a major voice in defining the scope of the campaign. These leaders almost certainly prefer at the least to limit the attacks to Teng himself and to keep the campaign from gaining enough momentum to encompass large numbers of rehabilitated officials and to undercut major domestic and foreign policies.

(continued)

In a briefing for foreign diplomats in Peking on March 6, a university official stated that Teng is the only target of the current attack and implied that he could remain in power if he agreed to admit his mistakes. He added, however, that Teng had not yet done so. The general low-key tenor of his comments suggests that Peking is making a concerted effort to play down the campaign for foreign audiences--and that important elements in the leadership are concerned about the possible impact that indications of political instability may have abroad.

In the meantime, the party's left wing continues its active pursuit of Teng. The Ministry of Culture, which is closely associated with leftist political leaders, has withdrawn from circulation all films in which Teng appears. Posters have been sighted in Shanghai and in Kwangtung Province calling for Teng's ouster.

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
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Equally important, there are signs that civilian leftists are courting the military as allies in the current campaign. The military was conspicuously absent during the campaign's initial stages, but some units are now beginning to participate in the criticism of Teng.

Military support would give a boost to those who are most actively pursuing the current campaign because at present they do not appear to have the muscle to enforce their demands. The support of the military is equally important to those who would like to keep the current campaign from getting out of hand. Thus far, the military has not decisively tilted toward either side.

JAPAN



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LEBANON

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The Israelis are closely monitoring the situation, but top government leaders have so far refrained from any comment that would inflame the situation. Israeli press articles suggest that the leadership is unsure of the implications for Israel of recent developments in Lebanon, and has not decided on what, if any, action it should take.

Successes already achieved by the rebel Muslim forces have sparked concern among Lebanese Christians that the rebels intend to form a renegade Muslim army encircling the core Christian area of the country.

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(continued)

Prime Minister Karami yesterday tried to gloss over the deepening controversy between Christian and Muslim leaders over the Muslim mutineers. Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt--an outspoken supporter of the Muslim rebels--apparently has so alienated Christian leaders on the mutiny issue, however, that they have refused to participate in further political talks until the problem is solved.

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## NOTES

*The Soviets have begun construction of a new class of small, surface warship.*

The boat is some 145 feet long and is armed with launchers for surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship missiles. The sizes of these launchers do not equate to known Soviet systems, suggesting that they may be for new or modified weapons. The size of the new boat suggests that it is a follow-on to the Osa-class coastal defense patrol boat. The array of armaments on the new boat, however, offers significant improvement over the Osa.

\* \* \*

*Saudi Arabia and South Yemen announced in a joint statement yesterday their intention to normalize relations, capping a reconciliation process initiated by Cairo in 1974.*

The communiqué said the two countries would refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. It also expressed both countries' opposition to "foreign interference" in the Arabian Peninsula. This reference is broad enough to encompass both the Saudi objection to the Soviet presence in South Yemen and Aden's opposition to Iran's military role in Oman.

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
  South  
Yemen's willingness to negotiate probably was dictated by economic necessity. The prospects for making South Yemen into a moderate state, however, are not very promising.

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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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# The President's Daily Brief

March 12, 1976

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exemption category, 5B(1), (2), (3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

March 12, 1976

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At <u>Annex</u> we present conclusions from an estimate on the likelihood and consequences of further conflicts in southern Africa over the next six months.	

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LEBANON

*The leader of the coup attempt yesterday, Sunni Muslim General Ahdab, claims to have the backing of the Christian army commander and all important army units. In fact, however, many high-ranking officers have not declared for either Ahdab or President Franjiyah.*

Private Lebanese militias and Palestinian forces yesterday seized most areas of Beirut with almost no fighting. These groups so far have simply reestablished control where they have traditionally dominated, giving no clue as to whether Franjiyah or Ahdab will emerge on top.

We do not know for sure whether Damascus played a role in the coup attempt, but tend to believe that the Syrians were surprised by the move and were uncertain how to respond. The Syrians--and the Palestinians--will be tempted to back Ahdab if he shows signs of succeeding.

Israeli forces along the Lebanese border went on alert yesterday because of the increasing numbers of Lebanese army bases occupied in the southern part of the country this week by rebel Muslim forces. We doubt that the Israelis will intervene directly even if the government in Beirut is seized by Ahdab--a conservative Muslim.

The potential for armed clashes involving Israeli troops in Lebanon remains high if Tel Aviv's troops continue to patrol as aggressively as they have over the past two weeks. They have carried out three cross-border raids since February 26.


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
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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The Soviets are giving selective coverage to the US election campaign. In contrast to their modest treatment of the New Hampshire primary and their total blackout on Massachusetts, the media have provided a detailed rundown on Florida.


Pravda yesterday carried a fairly straightforward report of Florida's primary results and added that former governor Reagan "practically lost the possibility of advancing his candidacy to the post of president." Red Star printed a harsh political biography of Senator Jackson, describing his career as having rested on the pillars of "oil, aviation, and Zionism." It alleged he lack public support and contrasted his policies with those pursued by the administration.

SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA


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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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NOTES

Fighting has broken out for the third time in two weeks between Polisario guerrillas and Moroccan forces in Western Sahara.

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[redacted] elements of a Moroccan infantry battalion in southern Morocco and a battalion in Western Sahara clashed with guerrilla forces on Wednesday. Rabat expects more of such attacks and has ordered additional security measures. Polisario guerrillas [redacted]

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[redacted] need a military success to prove the Polisario Front and the newly created Saharan Democratic Arab Republic are entities worthy of international recognition.

\* \* \*

Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith is expected to send a high-level delegation shortly to Zambia for talks with President Kaunda.

The delegation [redacted]

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[redacted] wants to explain Smith's "new terms" for a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problem. We have no information on these terms, but there is no evidence suggesting that the talks are intended to be anything other than another play for time. Smith met again yesterday with black nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo.

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Soviets


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Turkey has postponed indefinitely the Aegean air defense exercise that was to have been held in the vicinity of the Greek island of Lesbos.

Originally scheduled for March 9 and 10, the exercise had been twice delayed because of weather. Ankara apparently believes it has accomplished one of its purposes in scheduling the exercise--that of re-emphasizing the international character of the waters and air space that separate mainland Greece from the Aegean islands and hence Turkey's right to use these areas.

## Southern Africa



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## SOUTHERN AFRICA

We present below conclusions from an estimate on the likelihood and consequences of further conflicts in southern Africa over the next six months. The estimate was approved yesterday by the US intelligence board.

Likelihood of Expanded Conflicts in Southern AfricaIn Rhodesia:

- An expansion of insurgent activity against the white Rhodesian government will be avoided only if a political settlement is reached in the next six to eight weeks. This is unlikely to happen, and the momentum of preparations for an expansion of guerrilla warfare will probably become irreversible.
- The USSR will probably concentrate in coming months on developing closer ties with Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania and strengthening both materially and politically those insurgent elements that are amenable to its support and direction. It will also support a more aggressive African policy vis-a-vis Rhodesia, calculating that this would allow for an expanded Soviet (and Cuban) role in supporting the insurgents.
- China will provide additional training and advisory personnel and materiel support to the insurgents, but because of its limited resources, Peking may have to resign itself to some loss of influence to Moscow and Havana.
- Until near the end of the six-month period covered by this estimate, the increase in guerrilla warfare will probably be fairly modest. Once the rainy season--which favors the insurgents--begins in October, however, an appreciably larger increase in the insurgency is likely, and the insurgents will be able to operate more freely in Rhodesia.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

--The chances are better than even that by the end of the six months covered by this estimate some Cuban military personnel will be in combat with the insurgents inside Rhodesia. It is unlikely, however, that the Cubans in this period will have initiated large-scale conventional operations using heavy equipment.

--Throughout the period, Rhodesian security forces should be able generally to contain the insurgency to border areas but will have some difficulty in maintaining order in urban areas and in insulating the rural populace from guerrilla influence.

--By the end of the six months, the insurgents will have extended their areas of operation to cover most of the Mozambique-Rhodesia border, and they will be in a substantially stronger position, both relatively and absolutely, than they are now. The increased insurgency and the effects of Mozambique's imposition of sanctions will place severe strains on the Smith regime and probably lead it to offer token negotiating concessions, but will not cause its collapse or compel it to sue for peace.

--Beyond six months, the Cuban presence is likely to increase, with the magnitude and nature of the increase depending on Havana's and Moscow's assessment of developments within Rhodesia and on the attitudes of Mozambique and other insurgent supporters toward an expanded Cuban involvement.

In the Namibia/Southern Angola Region:

--The odds are that Angola and South Africa will reach a political understanding resulting in the withdrawal of South African military forces from Angolan territory.

--Given the constraints on both sides, we do not believe that the likelihood of a major confrontation between South African military units and Cuban forces is very high. Neither Luanda nor Pretoria appears to be seeking a confrontation.

--If no agreement is reached, the MPLA and the Cubans might launch a military probe against South African forces in southern Angola to determine whether they would quickly withdraw. The Soviets probably would not urge this course on Neto over the next six months, but they also probably would not withhold support if it were requested. They would advise, however, that if a military effort were undertaken, it be a cautious one.

--In any case, the Soviets would probably argue vigorously against pushing on into Namibia. The Cubans undoubtedly know that they could not achieve a military victory there even with forces substantially larger than those now in Angola.

--Guerrilla activity by the South-West Africa Peoples Organization will increase, and the Soviets, Cubans, and MPLA will provide assistance to SWAPO. Nevertheless, even with substantial outside assistance, SWAPO insurgents will be unable to expand their capabilities in the next six months to the point where they cannot be easily contained by South African security forces.

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
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# The President's Daily Brief

*March 13, 1976*

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March 13, 1976

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France-Somalia-Ethiopia: President Giscard has decided to move more quickly than had been anticipated to grant independence to the French Territory of the Afars and Issas. (Page 2)

Egypt-USSR: President Sadat has told our ambassador that Secretary Brezhnev has flatly refused a new request to replace Egyptian equipment lost during the 1973 war. (Page 4)

Notes: Thailand; Nigeria (Page 5)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

LEBANON

*Most military, political, and religious leaders have tentatively agreed that President Franjiyah must step down. Parliament is scheduled to meet today to approve a formula for a "legal" resignation.*

Brigadier Ahdab apparently has decided to allow the politicians time to work out some face-saving procedure in order to win the all-important support of the right-wing Christian Phalanges Party.


The President apparently recognizes that his support is eroding. At the same time, Christian political leaders are recognizing that Ahdab has the cooperation of most Christian officers in the army high command and is not proposing a revolutionary program that would threaten Christian interests.

If parliament proves unable to agree on a political solution to the crisis, however, or if Franjiyah balks, Ahdab will be likely to go ahead with his announced plan to establish a "military command council."

Israeli leaders met yesterday to evaluate the situation. We believe they will remain passive unless a change in Lebanon appears to affect the security of Israel's border or the safety of Israeli settlements.

For its part, Syria is likely to try to facilitate resolution of the political crisis in Beirut and to keep order in southern Lebanon to deny Israel an excuse to intervene. Damascus has adopted a publicly neutral position in the Ahdab-Franjiyah dispute, although Syrian officials hope to see Ahdab succeed.

## The Horn of Africa



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FRANCE-SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA

*President Giscard has decided to move more quickly than had been anticipated to grant independence to the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (FTAI). He appears prepared to relinquish French base rights there rather than become involved in a potential military conflict.*

When the French announced their decision late last year to grant independence to the territory, they specified no timetable but implied the process could take up to two years. Paris had hoped to transfer power to a government led by the pro-French leader of the territorial council and to retain some forces and air and port facilities at Djibouti after independence.

According to several French diplomats stationed in east Africa, Paris now plans to:

--Call a meeting of the two domestic political parties and rival liberation movements--one backed by Ethiopia and the other by Somalia--to plan for independence.

--Hold a referendum in the territory, possibly supervised by observers from the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League, as early as June to elect a new government.

--Make clear to local leaders that France does not insist on retaining its forces and facilities in the area after independence.

A personal representative of the French President will visit Somalia, Ethiopia, and apparently some Arab capitals in the next few weeks to discuss the composition of a local government and problems relating to the territory's security after independence.

We believe the negotiations are unlikely to result in a compromise settlement that would be acceptable to all parties for any length of time.

(continued)

President Siad has reacted favorably to the French initiative because he views the withdrawal of French troops as enhancing Somalia's ability to gain control of the territory.

[redacted] 25X1

Ethiopia, on the other hand, will see the French plans as favorable to Somalia, and will almost certainly consider moves to forestall a Somali takeover.

The French ambassador in Mogadiscio informed a US embassy officer that France has "told" Moscow to "respect the wishes of the territory's people." He implied that Paris had suggested that Franco-Soviet relations could suffer if Somalia does not cooperate with French efforts to withdraw gracefully from the territory and to guarantee its security for at least a brief period after independence.

\* \* \*

France would prefer to remain in Djibouti because of its relative closeness both to the Middle East and France's home waters.

Djibouti is France's only major naval base remaining in the Indian Ocean. Its strategic location near the entrance to the Red Sea enables the French to protect key oil supply routes to the West and monitor Soviet naval activity in the Gulf of Aden. Operating out of Djibouti, the French Indian Ocean flotilla is the largest Western naval force in the ocean and is nearly the same size as the Soviet contingent.

If the French are forced to relinquish the base, they almost certainly will have to increase the number of supply and support craft assigned to the area--at least for the near term. They also will be forced to rely more heavily on their limited support facilities at Reunion, an island east of the Malagasy Republic.

EGYPT-USSR

*Egyptian President Sadat has told our ambassador in Cairo that General Secretary Brezhnev has flatly refused a new request that the Soviets honor their commitment to replace Egyptian equipment lost during the October 1973 war. The Soviets also did not agree to reschedule Cairo's debt.*

According to Sadat, Brezhnev asserted that Soviet assistance cannot be separated from political realities. Since Egypt is taking itself out of the socialist camp, there is no reason for continued assistance. Sadat now professes to be convinced that the Soviets are determined to bring him down.

There is little independent evidence that the Soviets are ready to push their tenuous relationship with Sadat to the breaking point. Moscow is anticipating another period of polemical exchange with Egypt, however, and expects Sadat to comment on the state of the relationship in his speech on Sunday.

NOTES

Thai military leaders are strongly critical of the Foreign Ministry's handling of negotiations on a residual US military presence.

The military is upset that Prime Minister Khukrit and Foreign Minister Chatchai "railroaded" through the cabinet meeting on March 9 a policy position to the effect that the US must accept Thai sovereignty and jurisdiction over the residual US military facilities and personnel by March 20 or withdraw them. The Prime Minister's hard line apparently stems from his concern over having to defend in the April 4 general election any new agreement. He promised last March to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Thailand within a year.

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The public executions this week of 30 Nigerian military officers for their alleged roles in the coup attempt and the assassination last month of the country's chief of state are likely to heighten ethnic and religious suspicions.

The executions obviously are intended as a warning to other would-be coup makers. They also may be designed to placate the Muslim Hausas of the north because many of those executed apparently were members of the predominately Christian minority tribes of central Nigeria.

The secrecy of the trials and hasty executions this week will not sit well with many Nigerians, especially the minorities.

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# The President's Daily Brief

March 15, 1976

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
SYRIA-LEBANON: Syrian Chief of Staff Shihabi told Ambassador Murphy yesterday that he sees no way to control the situation in Lebanon other than to intervene with regular Syrian forces.  
(Page 1)

LEBANON: President Franjiyah has refused to resign unless impeached by parliament and convicted by a high court. (Page 4)

EGYPT-USSR: President Sadat's call for the abrogation of the Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty indicates that he no longer expects to be able to improve relations with Moscow.  
(Page 6)

NOTES: France; Italy-Spain (Page 8)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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## SYRIA-LEBANON

During a scheduled talk with Ambassador Murphy yesterday, Syrian Chief of Staff Shihabi responded to the ambassador's query about Syria's options in Lebanon by asserting that he now sees no way to control the situation other than to intervene with regular Syrian forces. Shihabi said that he was not recommending that Syrian regulars be sent in, but that he could see no alternative given the current drift of events.

The US defense attaché in Damascus believes that at least one Syrian division--the 3rd Armored at Al Qutayfah--has increased its state of readiness. He also believes that the 3rd division would be the division to be used if the Syrians intervene in Lebanon. A tour of the Damascus - Al Qutayfah area by the attaché yesterday, however, failed to provide any positive indications that any Syrian forces were being readied for intervention, although he did observe some minor military activity that could be considered unusual.

Ambassador Murphy describes his conversation with Shihabi as one of unrelieved gloom, punctuated by Shihabi's repeated frustration over what he termed are Syria's "limited possibilities" to do anything about the situation. Shihabi did not rule out further Syrian mediation, but he expressed doubt that Syria would be able "to play that game any longer." Shihabi stressed that the Lebanese cannot manage their own affairs and said that the only solution is to get rid of the entire Lebanese leadership. At one point, he mused that annexation may be the only answer because the Lebanese are fast becoming a threat to area stability.

Shihabi repeatedly stressed that the Lebanese army no longer exists and that there is no prospect of putting it back together as an effective force. He added that the some 5,000 Syrian-backed Palestine Liberation Army forces already in Lebanon are inadequate to maintain security. Shihabi dismissed the notion that some sort of Arab League force could be used.

(continued)

In response to the ambassador's concern about the security situation in southern Lebanon, Shihabi suggested that only Syrian regulars could effectively police the area. He speculated that Israel might understand that the Syrians were only acting as a peacekeeping force and were not a potential threat.

Shihabi's pessimistic mood almost certainly accurately mirrors the frustration that Syrian leaders are experiencing and their feeling that they are running out of options. President Asad's indefinite postponement of his visit to Paris, scheduled to begin today, underscores the seriousness with which Damascus views the situation.

Asad, however, is not likely to be stampeded into a high risk action, and Shihabi made it clear to Ambassador Murphy that he was only confiding his own disgust with the situation and was not suggesting what course of action Asad would finally take. Asad almost certainly prefers to continue his efforts to press the Lebanese to reach a political accommodation themselves [redacted]

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Asad also has some military options open to him short of military intervention. [redacted]

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[redacted] Asad could also position regular Syrian forces closer to the Lebanese border. Even if Asad decides to introduce Syrian regulars, he is likely first to authorize a limited move into northern Lebanon in hopes that this would provide a sufficient political shock effect.

The dilemma for Asad now is that he has staked considerable personal prestige on achieving a successful Syrian mediation. He is concerned to preserve the enhanced stature as an Arab leader that he has gained through his efforts to date, and he wants to avoid giving further ammunition to his critics, such as President Sadat. Thus, the danger in the present situation is that Asad, despite his caution and his desire not to provoke an Israeli counterreaction, could decide that some form of intervention by Syrian regulars is necessary to protect his heavy political investment in Lebanon and to preserve his Arab leadership credentials.

(continued)

The dilemma the Israelis face in assessing the current situation is that they recognize that Syrian leverage is crucial to resolving the crisis but are uncertain as to the ultimate consequences of a Syrian intervention. The Israelis are concerned about the security vacuum created in the sensitive southern border area by the collapse of the Lebanese army, and they could persuade themselves that the introduction of Syrian regulars would add enough uncertainty to the situation to justify some Israeli intervention into southern Lebanon.

Nevertheless, the Israelis will weigh Syria's moves carefully and although they are likely to respond to a substantial Syrian intervention, they may stay their hand if the Syrians confine themselves to northern Lebanon and the Beirut area. Even a limited Syrian move, however, is likely to trigger an increased Israeli alert and some mobilization.

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## LEBANON

President Franjiyah announced yesterday that he will not resign unless impeached by parliament and convicted by a high court, as provided in the Lebanese constitution. He clearly hopes that Brigadier Ahdab will in the end allow him to stay on rather than risk the new round of heavy fighting that probably would result from an extended political impasse or from a military move against the presidential palace.

The President, who had earlier said he would step down if asked by parliament, is in effect saying that he will not resign under any circumstances. The high court required to try impeachment cases has never been created and could not be established without new legislation signed by the president.

Ahdab is increasing the pressure on Franjiyah to resign, and on the politicians to force him to do so. He threatened yesterday to use force against the President.

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[Redacted] The chances for a military showdown increased last night, when the pro-Franjiyah radio station broadcast apparently authentic statements by Phalangist leader Jumayyil and National Liberal leader Shamun declaring that the President's resignation would not "constitute a solution" to the crisis.

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(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Egypt has remained unusually silent on the recent turn of events in Lebanon. Cairo was reported late last year to have readied a contingency plan for military intervention in Lebanon in the event of further deterioration, and it is possible that the Egyptians will again dust it off. They would await further developments before taking precipitate action, however, and it is unlikely that they would move against Lebanon in the midst of current problems with Libya and the diplomatic tangle with the USSR. For the moment, the Egyptians appear to be avoiding public comment that could stir up further trouble or provoke Syrian anger.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EGYPT-USSR

*President Sadat's call last night for the abrogation of the 1971 Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty indicates that he has finally written off any expectation of putting his relations with Moscow on an even keel and will no longer make even a pretense of maintaining a civil relationship.*

The 15-year treaty itself is essentially a meaningless document, but it has served as a symbol of continued amity between the two states through the many upheavals in their relations over the last five years.

Sadat did not specifically mention other agreements with the Soviets, such as the accord, scheduled to run through March 1978, that permits them the use of naval repair facilities at Alexandria, but it seems entirely possible that abrogation of this accord will follow. The Alexandria shipyard is the only major repair facility available to the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet.

Sadat recently received a letter from General Secretary Brezhnev flatly refusing further arms aid. The Egyptian President told Ambassador Eilts last week that the tone of the letter had convinced him of the accuracy of other information he had received that the Soviets are attempting to foment unrest in Egypt in an effort to overturn his government.

For the Soviets, Sadat's abrogation of the treaty will have important symbolic, and perhaps practical, consequences. Moscow places more stock in such treaties than their substance warrants; it regards a friendship treaty as a tangible expression of the desire for, if not necessarily the fact of, a close and congenial relationship. Egypt's abrogation will be seen not only as a declaration of present antipathy but also as an expression about future bilateral relations.

(continued)

The Soviets will be discomfited by the fact that it was Sadat, not they, who took the initiative, and the abrogation will revive memories of the ignominious expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972.

The Soviet leadership is almost certainly divided over how best to handle the Egyptian situation. The hard-liners may argue that Sadat is in serious political trouble and that, if Moscow remains unyielding, he will either come around or be replaced. Moscow's perception of Sadat's political trouble may have prompted Soviet rejection of his recent overtures. Those Soviet officials who have favored a more flexible policy will probably argue that thus far the inflexible policy has widened the breach with Cairo without impairing Sadat or strengthening the USSR's putative friends in Egypt.

## NOTES

*The French decided yesterday at a meeting of joint float finance ministers to withdraw the franc from the European joint float.*

The immediate cause of Paris' decision was the heavy cost of supporting the franc within the float's narrow limits--roughly \$4 billion since mid-January. The underlying causes of the franc's weakness are Paris' inability to bring inflation down to a rate close to those of its major trading partners in the float and prospects for a substantial deficit in the French current account this year. Paris left open whether it would rejoin the float in the future. The French are likely to try to negotiate changes in the joint float's structure and will probably seek to have the joint float's margins widened substantially from the present limits of 2.25 percent.

\* \* \*

*Spanish and Italian officials now stress possible political repercussions as well as familiar economic arguments in their attempts to head off a US decision to curtail shoe imports.*

Italian officials suggest that such a US move would hurt the ruling Christian Democratic Party in the event of a national election this year and would add to public criticism of the US resulting from the Lockheed and CIA controversies. The Spanish minister of industry has linked the shoe import issue to ratification of the recently negotiated US-Spanish treaty of friendship and cooperation. US import restrictions would inject nationalist sentiment into the treaty issue and would intensify economic concerns.

*Top Secret*

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# The President's Daily Brief

*March 16, 1976*

2

~~Top Secret~~<sup>25X1</sup>

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25X1

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25X1

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(Pages 6 and 7)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

LEBANON

*Brigadier Ahdab's backers are divided about what to do next now that their effort to oust President Franjiyah has bogged down. Syria is reportedly trying to put together another political solution.*

Some of Ahdab's supporters want to try to dislodge Franjiyah by force, but others, including the mainline fedayeen and Palestine Liberation Army forces, fear this would lead to a new round of heavy fighting. Ahdab's followers also cannot agree on whether to establish a new governing body, such as the military command council promised last week.

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According to a Beirut newspaper with good contacts in Syria, Asad is attempting to put together a package agreement that would provide for a general amnesty, reconstruction of the Lebanese army under the high command, and a new civilian government without Franjiyah. If no political solution is found, it is likely that the situation will deteriorate steadily toward civil war again. This almost certainly would lead to an attempt by the Christians to partition the country and possibly to direct military intervention by Syria.


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[redacted] Israeli aircraft were active on reconnaissance missions in the area yesterday.

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## The Horn of Africa



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HORN OF AFRICA

We present below conclusions from a Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Prospects for and Implications of Conflict in the Horn of Africa Over the Next Year or So." The estimate was issued yesterday after telephonic approval by the members of the US Intelligence Board.

The odds are at least even that France will decide within the next year or so to withdraw its military forces from the French Territory of Afars and Issas (FTAI). If that happens, open military conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia is likely to erupt soon thereafter.\*

--Somalia alleges that it supports independence for the FTAI, but in reality it is determined to pursue its historical aim of annexing the territory. (The Issas, who constitute about half of the population, are ethnic Somalis.)

--Ethiopia is equally determined to prevent Somalia from dominating the FTAI and its main port of Djibouti, the terminus of Ethiopia's only important rail link to the sea.

There is only a slender chance that war could be avoided through a diplomatic solution that included: external restraints (from other Africans, Arabs, and the superpowers); French revamping of the FTAI government to make it acceptable to both the Issas and Afars and to regional states with an interest in the problem; and a continuing French military presence.

\*The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that this judgment is too weak and that if the French withdraw within the next year or so, open military conflict will almost certainly erupt soon thereafter.

(continued)

The Somalis in coming months will probably instigate an expanded campaign of subversion and political violence in the FTAI designed to weaken France's will to keep a pro-French regime in power or to guarantee an independent state's territorial integrity.

--Rather than commit its troops against a sustained insurgency, France is likely to accelerate its withdrawal after attempting to devise a face-saving arrangement.

--A French withdrawal, in turn, would encourage Somalia to seize the territory by open force.

The USSR would like to avoid a war in the Horn. It is probably counseling Somali President Siad against precipitous military action, urging him instead to rely on a combination of political pressure and subversion to achieve Somali objectives. Nevertheless, we believe that Siad himself will favor a more aggressive policy and that Moscow will feel compelled to support him.

Ethiopia would undoubtedly go to war to block Somalia's territorial ambitions. Such a war would probably unfold as follows:

--A Somali attack would result in the capture of Djibouti and some other parts of the FTAI in the initial days of fighting.

--Ethiopian forces, though larger than those of Somalia, are already stretched thin combating domestic insurgencies and would have no more than an even chance of dislodging the Somalis.

--Neither side would be able to end the war decisively, and a military stalemate would result after several weeks of fighting. There would be pressure from the conservative Arabs and the OAU for a cease-fire.

The Soviet Union (and Cuba) would probably provide new aid to Somalia in this situation, although the decision to do so would not be an easy one. Moscow would probably simultaneously seek to limit the conflict and try to find a political solution that would satisfy minimum Somali and Ethiopian requirements.

(continued)

The US would be faced with the problem of how to respond to the Soviet move without appearing to abandon a friendly country and to allow Moscow to achieve a significant military and diplomatic advantage in yet another part of Africa.

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NOTES

*The Soviet Union's initial response to Egypt's abrogation of their friendship treaty, issued yesterday by Tass, appeared to be a holding statement until Moscow has studied the situation more fully.*

The Tass release described President Sadat's action as a new manifestation of an "unfriendly" policy toward the USSR that the Egyptian leader has been pursuing. Implying that Moscow may play down the Egyptian move, Tass stated that the treaty had not been functioning for some time and reiterated that the USSR will continue to work for friendly relations with Cairo and the Egyptian people.

An earlier Arabic broadcast from Moscow seemed to appeal to the Egyptian military, asserting that domestic forces were responsible for weaknesses in Egypt's current military capability.

\* \* \*


*India and Canada initialed a nuclear aid agreement on March 6, which will commit India not to test within 15 months of the date of the treaty's ratification.*

The agreement calls for resumption of Canadian assistance for the Rajasthan Nuclear Power Project. The Indians have accepted Canada's safeguards requirements and have given an oral assurance that India does not intend to export explosive material or technology.

India has been conducting site surveys in preparation for a second nuclear test. New Delhi apparently intends to test again and may well be in a position to do so after the 15 months have elapsed, or even earlier if the agreement should not be ratified.

(continued)

**French South Pacific Test Center**



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*Niger President Kountche and his supporters apparently remain concerned about the extent of military support for dissidents following yesterday's coup attempt.*

Our embassy in Niamey reports that fighting yesterday morning was heavy, suggesting that the coup attempt had significant backing. President Kountche said in a radio broadcast yesterday that the coup leaders are under arrest.

*Top Secret*



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# The President's Daily Brief

*March 17, 1976*

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*Top Secret* 25X1

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Egypt-USSR: Initial reaction in Egypt to President Sadat's abrogation of the Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty is generally favorable.  
(Page 3)


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Notes: OPEC; USSR; UN-Indonesia (Pages 5 and 6)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## **Beirut and Vicinity**

**MILES**



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LEBANON

Damascus has apparently moved between 800 and 1,000 regular Syrian troops into central Lebanon this week. They are to help Palestinian forces ensure that Lebanese Muslim and leftist troops do not attack the presidential palace at Babda while political negotiations continue in Damascus.


The Syrian troops reportedly are encamped near the village of Ayn Sawfar, along the Beirut-Damascus road. This would put them between rebel Muslim leader Ahmad Khatib's headquarters in eastern Lebanon and his forward positions around Alayh.

It is likely that the Syrian regulars now in Lebanon are wearing uniforms of the Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army or the Saqiya fedayeen group. Almost all forces from those groups remaining in Syria were preparing to move into Lebanon over the past several days; they may have provided cover for Syrian regulars.

[redacted] The  
Israelis are likely to remain content with issuing warnings against outside intervention even though they may suspect that some Syrian forces are in Lebanon.

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Syria, the Lebanese army high command, and the Christian Phalanges Party apparently are in general agreement that Ilyas Sarkis, governor of the central bank, should succeed President Franjiyah. Brigadier Ahdab so far has found it politically impossible to back Sarkis publicly, however, because Sarkis is unacceptable to Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt and to other Muslim and leftist leaders who have supported Ahdab.



EGYPT-USSR

Egypt reportedly is determined to end the Soviet naval presence in Alexandria.

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Alexandria is the largest and best-equipped naval facility used by the Soviets in the Middle East, and its loss will be a severe blow to the Soviet naval squadron--particularly to submarine operations--in the Mediterranean. The Soviets have access to other port facilities in the Mediterranean, but these merely have supplemented Alexandria.

In Syria, the Soviets gained limited use of facilities at Latakia and Tartus after the 1973 Middle East war. Both ports are used to replenish Soviet minesweepers. Neither port has major repair facilities, and it is unlikely that the Soviets will gain greater access to Syrian ports in the immediate future.

25X1

Since April 1974, the Soviets have had limited access to repair facilities in Tivat, Yugoslavia, but these facilities are not as extensive as those in Alexandria. The Soviets probably will not be able to expand their naval access there significantly because Belgrade would be loath to allow a greater Soviet naval presence in the country.

In Libya, the Soviets reportedly gained permission in 1974 to visit the ports of Tobruk and Zuwarah, but only for emergencies. Libya apparently does not have major ship repair facilities, and none is under construction at the two ports.

The Soviets almost certainly will seek to expand their access to other naval facilities in the Mediterranean. They probably will apply some pressure on countries where they already have some access--such as Syria and perhaps Yugoslavia--and turn to others, possibly Algeria, Tunisia, and Malta.

The Soviet submarine force in the Mediterranean will be particularly affected by the loss of the facilities in Alexandria. Diesel-powered submarines will probably have to be rotated in order to be repaired and overhauled.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY  
EGYPT-USSR

*Initial reaction in Egypt to President Sadat's abrogation of the Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty is generally favorable, according to a sampling taken by the US embassy.*

The abrogation of the treaty came as a complete surprise to most Egyptians, who had noted the recent lull in Egyptian-Soviet polemics. The embassy's impression is that large numbers of Egyptians welcome the step as "long overdue."

[redacted]

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
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[redacted] there is no evidence to suggest that Sadat does not have the support of his government. Fahmi, in fact, added his support in a speech to the People's Assembly on Monday in which he catalogued a long list of Egypt's grievances with Moscow as just grounds for the move.


Reaction throughout the rest of the Arab world has been chilly. Most Arabs have ignored Sadat's announcement; some have reported it factually, but no one has supported it. Two Jordanian newspapers, in fact, implied that the Soviet refusal to supply Egypt with arms was Sadat's fault entirely.

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EGYPT-ISRAEL-SYRIA



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


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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## NOTES

The move by three OPEC members--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran--into long-term lending last year reflects the growing sophistication of their financial institutions and the relative increase in long-term interest rates in 1975.

Long-term debt holdings by the three countries totaled \$19 billion last year, tripling over 1974, and constituting over 20 percent of their total assets. Initial holdings in 1974 were limited to a few large transactions with industrialized nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Activity broadened in 1975 to include lending to third world and communist countries and to private Western firms. Saudi and Kuwaiti long-term lending apparently continues to accelerate; the decline in Iran's investable surplus is forcing Tehran to cut back.

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
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*The report on the UN investigation of the situation in Timor should cause Indonesia few problems.*

It states that an accurate assessment of the situation as a whole "remains elusive," but makes no judgments on Fretolin accusations of intervention by Indonesian armed forces. No date has been set for Security Council consideration of the report, and there appears to be little sentiment to renew debate on Timor.

Indonesian forces now control all the major population centers and military installations in the Portuguese half of the island, and Fretolin forces appear incapable of seriously disrupting Jakarta's plans for eastern Timor.

*Top Secret*



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# The President's Daily Brief

March 18, 1976

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<u>Notes:</u> Yugoslavia-Panama; Thailand (Page 5)	

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LEBANON

*Brigadier Ahdab yesterday publicly withdrew his threat to force President Franjiyah's resignation.*

25X1

*Ahdab announced that his National Reformist Movement will await the outcome of the Syrian-sponsored political negotiations.*

Most of the Lebanese and Palestinian leaders who went to Damascus early this week returned to Beirut yesterday cautiously optimistic that a political settlement can be worked out. Only Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt, who condemned Syria's military and political intervention and refused to join the talks in Damascus, continues to call for a military showdown.

All parties to the Damascus negotiations apparently agreed that President Franjiyah must resign. They reportedly are now considering a proposal that the President be replaced by a caretaker government that would oversee the election of a new civilian president. Franjiyah might agree to such an arrangement; a precedent was set in 1952.

Damascus radio last night broadcast a statement by Asad affirming that the Syrian mediation effort will continue. Asad called on all sides "to maintain their self-control" during the negotiations. This close and public identification of Asad with the negotiations suggests that Damascus sees some signs of progress in the talks.

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CHINA



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
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
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
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USSR-SOMALIA

Somali President Siad, who has been in Moscow since the Soviet party congress, appears to be lobbying hard for increased Soviet diplomatic, military, and economic support for his policies in the Horn of Africa. He may be encountering difficulty, however, in gaining Moscow's open backing for his ultimate goal--annexation of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.

*Pravda*'s bland account of Siad's meeting with President Podgorny last week suggested that Moscow's commitment to Mogadiscio continues, but that the two leaders differ on the specifics of support. No mention was made of the FTAI dispute, suggesting that Moscow is reluctant to identify itself with Siad's position. The Soviet armed forces newspaper *Red Star* also failed to mention the FTAI in its front-page coverage of Siad's discussions with Defense Minister Grechko.

Moscow has said little publicly on the FTAI problem and privately has cautioned Siad to rely on political pressure and subversion to achieve his ends in the territory. The Soviets evidently do not want Siad to precipitate a war with Ethiopia that would compel them to come to his assistance to the detriment of their relations with Addis Ababa.

Moscow would also like the French to bow out of the situation with a minimum of disruption to Franco-Soviet relations. Tass, for example, applauded French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues' recent statement that Paris intends to grant independence to the FTAI after "broad consultations" with all political parties and a referendum attended by "international observers."

## NOTES

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Yugoslav President Tito [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] on the canal issue during his talks in  
Panama earlier this week [redacted]  
[redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1  
The Yugoslav President balanced his "full support" for Panama on the canal question with the observation that successful negotiations are in the interest of both states. Panamanian news coverage avoided anti-US themes during the visit, presumably on orders from the Torrijos government.

\* \* \*

Thai security forces are preparing for the possibility of leftist-inspired anti-US demonstrations in Bangkok this Saturday--the deadline imposed by the government last year for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Thailand.

The size and nature of the demonstrations will depend in part on the outcome of current Thai-US negotiations over a residual US military presence. There is also a danger that groups in the military may try to exploit the situation this weekend. If student and labor groups stage violent demonstrations, the army might declare martial law. All combat forces in the Bangkok area were put on full alert early today.

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

March 19, 1976

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South Africa - Angola: [redacted]

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
Cuba-Africa: Fidel Castro, in his speech in Conakry on Monday, directed his harshest comments at the remaining South African presence in Angola.  
(Page 2)

Notes: Egypt; Peru; Rhodesia; USSR-Egypt (Pages 3 and 4)


At Annex we examine Syrian Intervention in Lebanon.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA



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CUBA-AFRICA

*Fidel Castro, in his speech in Conakry on Monday, touched only briefly on the situations in Rhodesia and Namibia and directed his harshest comments at the remaining South African presence in Angola.*

While this criticism was couched in belligerent language, he appeared to be giving assurances that the South African interests in the Cunene dam would be protected if their troops were withdrawn.

Castro's aggressive posture in Conakry was probably due in part to his desire to maintain his reputation as one of the world's leading revolutionaries. His de-emphasis of Rhodesia and Namibia suggests he is wary of overplaying Cuba's military role in Africa and sparking local concern over the presence of Cuban troops.

NOTES

The Egyptian cabinet resigned yesterday and President Sadat has asked Prime Minister Salim to form a new government, which may be named today.

The reorganization is aimed chiefly at the economic ministries and will essentially be a palliative aimed at giving the appearance of progress toward resolving economic grievances. Some of those to be replaced are under attack for inefficiency; others, ironically, for trying to press programs too vigorously. Salim is an able administrator and has been largely responsible for the recent modest acceleration in the government's economic program.

President Sadat is being criticized by labor leaders for stating in his speech last Sunday that Egyptians will have to face five more years of austerity. A labor union official has told the US embassy that workers had expected some commitment from Sadat on price stabilization and wage increases.

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
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
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
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
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## SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON

*The limited intervention of regular Syrian military forces in central Lebanon this week is a measure of President Asad's determination to arrest the deterioration in the security situation and to force a political solution on the Lebanese.*

The introduction of some 1,000 Syrian regulars, thinly disguised as additional elements of the Palestine Liberation Army and reportedly supported by some tanks, appears to have been a calculated gamble with three immediate objectives:

- to help fill the military vacuum created by the rapid collapse of the Lebanese army;
- to prevent the Muslim forces under Lieutenant Khatib from attacking the Christian forces defending President Franjiyah;
- to speed Franjiyah's resignation and control the selection of his successor.

Since Syria's leverage in Lebanon hinges on its potential to bring overwhelming military pressure to bear, President Asad apparently concluded that the presence of at least some Syrian regulars was necessary to reassert Syrian control. He probably felt this was the only way to prevent a slide back into civil war and to get implementation of the reform package that was achieved through Syrian mediation last month back on track.

We believe that Asad is prepared to augment, in a controlled manner, the number of Syrian regulars in central and northern Lebanon if that is required to break the political impasse in Beirut.

The Syrian Rationale

The principal Syrian aim in Lebanon is to restore stability and achieve a political accommodation acceptable to both Lebanese Christians and Muslims. The Syrians believe that Franjiyah's resignation is necessary, and they want to control

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

the choice of his successor; but they are not attempting to deprive the Christians of the presidency nor are they prepared now to impose a Muslim-dominated government on Lebanon.

In our view, Syria does not intend to try to annex Lebanon. On the other hand, the Syrians probably do not believe they can abandon their mediation efforts and allow the resumption of a full-scale civil war. They have said repeatedly that they will not allow the partition of Lebanon, which almost certainly would be the result of a civil war.

The Syrian decision to inject regular forces was stimulated by the rapid disintegration of the Lebanese army. The army's collapse, the revolt of Muslim army elements led by Lieutenant Khatib, and the attempted coup by Brigadier Ahdab underscored the fact that there was no Lebanese force capable of providing nationwide security and enforcing the provisions of the political reform package worked out in February.

Syrian Chief of Staff Shihabi told Ambassador Murphy last week that the Palestine Liberation Army was inadequate to provide security throughout the country. Moreover, the main Palestinian groups in Lebanon--Fatah and Saqiya--are not capable of maintaining security outside areas under their immediate control. They are often at loggerheads, and are themselves a central issue in the Lebanese dispute.

The introduction of Syrian forces was designed in part to reinforce President Asad's mediation effort. Asad apparently calculated that he could make no further progress through political suasion without applying some military pressure. He probably calculated that the Israelis would accept that his only goal was to stabilize the situation and achieve a political breakthrough.

Asad would have preferred, we believe, not to risk a hostile Israeli reaction by using Syrian regulars. He has staked considerable prestige in the achievement of a successful Syrian mediation. He hopes to preserve the enhanced stature he has gained throughout the Arab world because of his mediation efforts to date and wants to avoid criticism, especially from President Sadat. Asad also wants to

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

avoid giving an opening to those in Syria who have been urging him to side more forcefully with Lebanese Muslims and leftists.

Nevertheless, Asad concluded that some form of intervention by regular forces was necessary to protect his heavy political investment in Lebanon.

#### Syria's Next Step

The immediate consequence of Syria's action has been to stabilize the security situation--at least temporarily. Syria probably will have to keep some regular forces in Lebanon, at least until President Franjiyah resigns. It is also unlikely that Syrian forces will be withdrawn entirely until there is discernible progress in reconstituting the Lebanese army. The Syrians apparently took their action with the aim of forcing a quick breakthrough. They would not hesitate to apply additional pressure, probably in the form of more troops, if it appeared the the Lebanese were attempting to drag their feet again.

In the event of a renewed civil war, we believe the Syrians would feel compelled to intervene on a still larger scale to impose a truce.

In the absence of a renewed civil war, we do not believe the Syrians are likely to send division-size units into Lebanon or to deploy sizable Syrian units in the sensitive southern Lebanese-Israeli border area. The Syrians would, however, take such action in the event Israel attempted to occupy southern Lebanon.

We do not believe the Syrians want to become bogged down in a sustained police action in Lebanon. They probably would leave a substantial PLA contingent in place, however, until a reconstituted Lebanese army proved it was capable of maintaining adequate security. Eventually, we think Syria would withdraw the bulk of the PLA.

#### Israel's Reaction

Although the Israelis are showing signs of increasing nervousness over developments in Lebanon, they continue to react with restraint and appear hopeful of being able to avoid being drawn into the

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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[redacted] Israel also continues to conduct reconnaissance flights over Lebanon and off the Lebanese coast. The Lebanese-Israeli border is relatively quiet, with only a few minor shooting incidents. The Israelis continue to occupy several positions during daylight hours just inside Lebanon astride major fedayeen infiltration routes into Israel.

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Any decision to intervene is likely to depend largely on Israel's perception of the situation there as it might affect Israel's security. Defense Minister Peres told reporters in January that if the Syrians invaded Lebanon, Israel's reaction would depend on the security situation "along the northern border with Lebanon," suggesting that Israel would not intervene if the Syrians sent some troops in as long as they stayed out of southern Lebanon and that area remained calm.

We believe the Israelis would send their forces across the border if the Syrians intervened in Lebanon with large armored units, if the Palestine Liberation Army concentrated large numbers of troops in southern Lebanon close to the Israeli border, or if fedayeen or leftist Muslim units began shelling Israeli settlements or stepped up cross-border operations.


Any Israeli military intervention is likely to be confined to southern Lebanon. The size of Israeli forces involved, as well as the duration and depth of the intervention, would depend largely on the nature of the threat perceived by the Israelis. Thus, if the Syrians intervened on a massive scale, the Israelis would be likely to respond in kind, sending their forces as far as the Litani River and remaining as long as the Syrians.

If the objective were to counter a terrorist threat, the Israelis would limit the size of the intervention force, the depth of its penetration, and the length of its stay.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

March 20, 1976

~~Top Secret~~

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Exempt from general  
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March 20, 1976

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USSR-Egypt: Egypt notified the USSR on March 17 that the Soviet navy must withdraw from the port of Alexandria within a month. (Page 3)

Portugal: Some 500,000 civil construction workers are scheduled to begin a nationwide strike on Monday. (Page 4)

Notes: Saudi Arabia; France; Egypt (Pages 5 and 6)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



LEBANON

*Fighting increased throughout Lebanon this week as it became apparent that it could take some time to negotiate the replacement of President Franjiyah.*

The most serious clashes have occurred just east of the presidential palace at Babda. Pro-Franjiyah forces holding the Christian village of Al Kahhalah have for two days exchanged fire with followers of Socialist Kamal Jumblatt, who hold the Druze village of Alayh.

The US embassy reports that continued fighting in this area could lead to a flight of Christians to the secure Christian enclave to the north. This would mean the extension of de facto partition to an important rural area of mixed population so far exempt from serious fighting.

Jumblatt is primarily responsible for the continued clashes near the presidential palace. He is the only significant politician not yet reconciled to the latest Syrian peace initiative, and appears determined to force all parties to accept a weak Maronite successor to Franjiyah.

Brigadier Ahdab's political and military influence has been reduced almost to zero in the week since he announced his coup. The US defense attaché in Beirut reports, in fact, that Ahdab has virtually no forces under his direct command.

Both Jumblatt and Fatah leader Yasir Arafat remain sympathetic to Ahdab's cause, however, if not to Ahdab. The three share a desire to minimize Syria's influence in Lebanon.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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USSR-EGYPT

Egypt notified the USSR on March 17 that the Soviet navy must withdraw from the port of Alexandria within a month. A high-level Egyptian official informed the US ambassador of Cairo's action. Soviet naval units in Alexandria--about 12 in all--should have little trouble leaving the port within the time allowed.

Moscow may have already begun preparations for evacuating the port. A Soviet naval transport and a cargo ship arrived in Alexandria yesterday. A Polnocny-class landing ship, now moving south through the Turkish straits, may be en route to Alexandria.

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Some Soviet tugs are in or near Egyptian waters. Several ships and submarines at Alexandria are either undergoing overhaul or have no propulsion systems and must be towed.


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PORUGAL

*Some 500,000 pro-Communist civil construction workers are scheduled to begin a nationwide strike on Monday.*

In the recent wave of walkouts, workers have focused on demands for increased wages and improved work conditions and have largely avoided the type of political confrontation that brought the Portuguese government to a halt last fall. Nonetheless, some members of the Revolutionary Council see the strikes as a Communist plan to force the government to declare a state of siege and postpone the legislative elections scheduled for April 25.

The Communists have maintained a low profile in the last few months, and in at least one instance recently warned that an unpopular strike could be used by the government to justify repression. The walkout of the pro-Communist construction workers on Monday may indicate whether the Communists are indeed behind the strikes.



NOTES

*Saudi Arabia's King Khalid begins a ten-day tour of the small states of the Persian Gulf tomorrow.*

This is the first such trip by a Saudi ruler, and it underscores Riyadh's intention to give greater attention to developments in the area. Khalid's tour will include visits to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.

The Saudis' regional policy involves:

--Maintaining the best possible relations with Iran and Iraq while quietly opposing any effort by either to increase its influence with the Gulf Arabs.

--Persuading the small Gulf states to follow Saudi leadership in order to give Riyadh added weight in dealing with Iran and Iraq.

--Giving lip-service to the idea of regional security but postponing any formal agreement or any other move that might give Iran or Baghdad a pretext to intervene in the area.

--Endorsing the departure of all outside powers from the area.

\* \* \*

*President Giscard of France is facing increasing criticism in the wake of the leftist opposition's major gains in the recent local elections and the withdrawal of the franc from the joint European float.*

Giscard's decision on the franc is being cited by the leftist opposition parties and the French press as an indication of his general failure to deal decisively with the nation's economic problems.

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*The ministers named yesterday to Egypt's new cabinet are mostly holdovers from the one that resigned the day before.*

All key ministers retained their previous portfolios. The only significant change was the creation of a new post, deputy prime minister for production. This is in line with President Sadat's attempt to represent the appointment of a new cabinet as a major effort toward resolving economic difficulties. The reshuffle is unlikely, however, to result in much real improvement.

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

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*March 22, 1976*

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*Top Secret*

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exemption category, 5(R)(1)(2)(3)  
Declassified upon approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

March 22, 1976

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UK-Iceland: The Icelandic proposal conveyed to the UK over the weekend offers a good chance for settlement of the two nations' fishing dispute.  
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Lebanon: Discussions continued over the weekend on how to replace President Franjiyah and form a new Lebanese government. Fighting in Beirut threatens to grow more intense. *(Page 2)*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


UK-ICELAND

*The Icelandic proposal conveyed to the UK over the weekend--through the Norwegian Foreign Minister--offers a good chance for settlement of the two nations' fishing dispute.*

The proposal would permit an average of 20 British trawlers--but no more than 25 at any time--to fish inside the 200-mile limit and would reduce the fishing area allowed to British vessels. The offer contains no reference to catch limitations. Iceland is prepared to conclude an agreement along these lines for an initial period of three to six months, an indication that Reykjavik might later consider an extension.

The proposal is predicated on the British withdrawing their warships. London has stated its willingness to do this but has insisted that a minimum of 25 trawlers be allowed to continue fishing.

In this move toward ending the dispute, Iceland may have been influenced by concern that domestic anti-NATO sentiment might get out of hand if incidents at sea continue. It may also foresee a possibility that the UN Law of the Sea Conference in New York will recommend specific arbitration methods for phasing out foreign fishing.



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LEBANON

*Discussions continued over the weekend in both Damascus and Beirut on how to replace President Franjiyah and form a new Lebanese government. Fighting in Beirut threatens to grow more intense.*

Leftist Muslim forces yesterday forced Phalangist militiamen from Beirut's gutted Holiday Inn, the last major Phalangist holdout in the hotel district. Phalangists have told US embassy officials they plan to bring heavier weapons into the area. The sea-front area--where the US embassy is located--reportedly came under Phalangist artillery fire this morning.

Fighting also continued in the mountains east of Beirut. It is centered in the Christian village of Al Kahhalah and the Druze village of Alayh.

According to unconfirmed press reports, Syrian forces--disguised as elements of the Palestine Liberation Army and equipped with artillery--arrived Saturday at Marj Uyun village in southern Lebanon. Eighteen of their 50 trucks reportedly continued east toward Sidon on the coast. If the report is true, these would be the first Syrian troops this close to the Israeli-Lebanese border.

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NOTES

*The last Soviet naval aircraft in West Africa--two AN-12s--have returned to the USSR.*

*The Soviets have kept naval aircraft in Guinea continuously since early January, largely to support reconnaissance aircraft and warships in the area.*

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*The Soviets have three warships--a guided missile cruiser, a destroyer, and a landing ship--and two tankers at Conakry and an intelligence ship in the Gulf of Guinea. At least one of the two attack submarines that have visited Conakry in the past month may still be in the area.*

\* \* \*

*Thai military combat units in Bangkok remain on full alert in the wake of clashes yesterday between left- and right-wing student groups over the timing for the withdrawal of US forces. The government, however, has decided the situation does not warrant the declaration of a state of emergency.*

At a press conference Saturday, Prime Minister Khukrit did not appear to rule out the possibility that a new government due to be formed after the April election will reverse the decision against allowing a residual military presence to stay in Thailand. Student groups have already indicated that they would renew their protests if a new government should modify Khukrit's action.

Broadcasts from Peking and Hanoi have reported the Thai decision without comment.

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# The President's Daily Brief

March 23, 1976

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~~Top Secret~~ 25X1

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declassification schedule of E.O. 14176  
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)  
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the Director of Central Intelligence

March 23, 1976

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Lebanon: The cabinet has approved a constitutional amendment that could clear the way for the replacement of President Franjiyah within a few days. (Page 1)


Notes: Egypt-Libya; USSR; USSR-Cuba (Page 3)

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



LEBANON

*The Lebanese cabinet yesterday approved a constitutional amendment that could clear the way for parliament to elect a replacement for President Franjiyah within a few days.*

The amendment provides for election of a new president any time within six months of the expiration of a six-year presidential term. Franjiyah's term expires in September.

The proposed amendment must be approved by parliament and signed by the president. Legislative approval seems certain, as a large majority of parliament last week signed a petition calling on Franjiyah to resign. Franjiyah presumably will sign the measure, since he proposed it himself. He could change his mind, however, if fighting intensifies or if leaders of the large Christian political parties raise new objections.

The cabinet reportedly expects Franjiyah to resign by May 9, but he has commented publicly that a newly elected president would need a long period to prepare himself "before he assumes his office."

Publicly, the Syrians are refusing to take sides in the presidential selection and are concentrating instead on restoring civil order in Lebanon. Damascus shows every sign of determination to use its influence to ensure that whoever is chosen as the new president is installed with at least a facade of legality.

Fighting was heavy in the Beirut area yesterday, as Phalangist and leftist militias battled for control of the hotel district. The Christians seized almost the entire area early in the day, aided by unprecedented heavy shelling of western Beirut with 155-mm. howitzers located in Bayt Miri. They were later pushed back in several locations.

Christian army units loyal to Franjiyah apparently are also in the Bayt Miri area from which they are shelling the Druze village of Alayh.

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
Alayh is held by followers of Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt who have been threatening to attack the nearby presidential palace.

Jumblatt still refuses to cooperate with the Syrian peace initiative. Yesterday he again appealed to Syria to back his call for Franjiyah's immediate and unconditional resignation on grounds that it reflected the "true interests of Syria and Arabs."

The US defense attaché in Damascus believes that Syrian forces are now in a very high state of alert because of events in Lebanon. He observed Syrian surface-to-air missile units and conventional antiaircraft artillery units along the front with Israel in a high state of readiness.

The attaché also saw unusual armor movements near Al Kiswah--the home garrison of the 1st Armored Division--as well as some unusual activity by Syrian military personnel in other areas. Other US personnel reported unusual Syrian military activity along the Golan Heights over the weekend. This activity may be related to Syrian maneuvers reportedly being held in the area.

The heightened alert by Syrian air defense units along the Golan may indicate that the Syrians plan to take additional measures in Lebanon and that they are concerned about how Israel might react.




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NOTES

Egypt is increasing its military readiness along its border with Libya presumably as the result of a further deterioration in relations between presidents Sadat and Qadhafi.


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Egyptian authorities have arrested 27 Libyans, supposedly members of sabotage teams, following an attempt early this month to kill or kidnap two former Libyan officials living in Cairo. Libya has retaliated by expelling some 26,000 Egyptians working in Libya.

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
  


. It is highly unlikely, however, that Cuba's first nuclear power station can become operational before 1981. Moreover, there are no indications that Havana has plans for a nuclear weapons program.

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TURKEY




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
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
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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

March 24, 1976

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exemption category, 5B(1),(2),(3)  
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the Director of Central Intelligence

March 24, 1976

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Argentina: The long-expected armed forces coup against President Peron took place early this morning. (Page 1)

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USSR: The Soviets are telling their domestic audience of Washington's dissatisfaction with some of Moscow's foreign policy moves and the adverse effect on Soviet-US relations. (Page 4)

Portugal: The Revolutionary Council met yesterday to discuss postponing legislative elections, now scheduled for April 25. (Page 5)

USSR: The Soviet Union continues to grapple with the problems posed by the independent-minded Western Communist parties. (Page 6)

Notes: China-Laos; Egypt; Rhodesia (Pages 7 and 8)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


ARGENTINA

*The armed forces early this morning put the finishing touches on their long-expected coup against President Maria Estela Peron, who is now under detention. A junta composed of the three service chiefs and probably led by army commander in chief General Jorge Rafael Videla is to assume executive authority.*

The armed forces moved methodically to establish their control, deploying troops along major roads and occupying provincial cities. Late last night troops were patrolling the streets of Buenos Aires. Most Argentines had long since come to regard Peron's ouster as inevitable, and the US embassy reported last night that civilian activity in the capital was normal, indicating no great concern over the coup.

The new government inherits a deteriorated economy, widespread terrorist violence, and monumental political divisions. There are significant differences within the military over how to solve these problems.

The bulk of the officers seem to favor a market economy that can attract foreign investment, but some apparently advocate more nationalist economic policies. Videla and those close to him are thought to favor relatively limited restrictions on political activity. The very magnitude of the nation's problems, however, could strengthen the arguments of those officers who believe that far stricter controls on national life are needed.



## LEBANON

*Syrian mediators reportedly persuaded the Christian Phalangists and leaders of some Muslim forces to agree to a cease-fire late yesterday, but leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt apparently has not accepted the agreement. The Syrians suspect that Jumblatt is trying to undermine their peace effort, and Damascus may decide it must send more Syrian troops into Lebanon.*

The US defense attaché in Damascus believes the Syrians may be making contingency preparations to intervene in Lebanon on a large scale. He feels that an intervention force might involve any one of Syria's five regular divisions or a task force of units from several divisions. Damascus also might use "defense" companies that are organized and equipped along regular military lines, but the attaché considers this less likely.

Some 2,000-3,000 Syrian regulars are already in Lebanon, integrated into units of the Palestine Liberation Army and the Saiga fedayeen. These forces are restraining rebel Muslim army troops led by Lieutenant Khatib at Khaldah, south of Beirut, and forces headed by Jumblatt in the Alayh area east of the capital.

We have no indication of unusual Israeli military activity. Tel Aviv continues to monitor the situation in Lebanon closely, and we believe that any large-scale Syrian move into Lebanon could cause an Israeli reaction.

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The proposed constitutional amendment providing for the election of a new president--the key proposal in the Syrian peace plan--was sent to the Lebanese parliament yesterday. Ambiguity in the bill over the timing of the transfer of power from

(continued)

President Franjiyah to a newly elected president has prompted calls for a revision of the amendment. According to press reports, the parliament will try to convene tomorrow for final deliberation on the bill.

Leftist forces regained most of the hotel district yesterday, but fighting elsewhere in the capital appears to have subsided. The presidential palace at Babda came under artillery fire briefly.

USSR

The Soviets are telling their domestic audience of Washington's dissatisfaction with some of Moscow's foreign policy moves and the adverse effect on Soviet-US relations. At the same time, Moscow continues to profess faith in the health and prospects of "detente."

Pravda carried a story on March 19 on US postponement of several meetings related to cooperative endeavors; Washington's displeasure over events in Angola was given as the reason. By way of response, the Soviets have quoted Senator Mansfield's statement that "threats" will not advance US interests, and they have reiterated their position that "detente" does not inhibit Soviet support of "progressive" forces in the world.

The Soviets have now altered their initial line on your decision not to use the word "detente." Although Moscow at first assured the Soviet public that this change was not important, it is now criticizing the concept of "peace through strength." A lead editorial in last week's New Times asked whether the phrase is not a throwback to cold war policies.

Moscow continues to publicize "evidence" that the majority in the US favor improved relations with the USSR. It portrays "anti-Soviet" sentiment in the US as a temporary election phenomenon which is proving unpopular with the voters and is destined to subside.

PORUGAL

Portugal's Revolutionary Council met yesterday to discuss postponing legislative elections, now scheduled for April 25. Most Council members were said to believe that at least a brief delay is justified.

The inability of the constituent assembly to complete the draft constitution on time and administrative difficulties have been cited as reasons for postponement. The election of the constituent assembly last year was delayed for two weeks, allegedly for technical reasons.



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
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Less politically minded officers--the so-called "operationalists"--are willing to accept a delay of only about two weeks and reportedly have convinced nearly half of the Council members to support their position. The "operationalists" believe a long delay would bring protests from moderate political parties and would call into question the military's real intentions as to its political role.

USSR

*The Soviet Union continues to grapple with the problems posed by the independent-minded Western Communist parties.*

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


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Publicly, the Soviets and their East European allies are continuing to stress ideological orthodoxy, particularly the concept of proletarian internationalism which has become a catchword for Soviet primacy in the world movement and a barometer of pro-Sovietism among foreign parties.

By stating their positions sternly, the Soviets may hope to draw the reins somewhat tighter on the foreign parties, making them think twice before undertaking further acts of defiance and perhaps reminding their leaders that the USSR still has some supporters within the ranks of their parties. More important, the Soviets are determined to stifle any expectations among their own people or in Eastern Europe that the restlessness of some Western parties will lead to liberalization in the East.



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY  
NOTES

China's red carpet treatment of a top-level Lao delegation to Peking was probably more important than substantive exchanges during the visit.

Chinese concern over Vientiane's friendly relationship with the Soviet Union and Vietnam as well as Lao sensitivity on this subject limited the likelihood of any significant accomplishment.

The visit did produce a new economic cooperation agreement providing for an "interest free" Chinese loan to Laos. This agreement presumably does not affect the status of the 18,000-man Chinese road building and security force that remains in northwestern Laos. Part of this force is constructing a road linking Luang Prabang with the road net built during the past eight years by the Chinese in northwest Laos.

\* \* \*

*President Sadat apparently is trying to reassure the Egyptian military and to head off any efforts by Soviet or Arab propagandists to stir up unrest over the country's military and economic problems.*

Sadat has been touring cities in the canal area since March 16--two days after he announced abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty--reviewing the progress of reconstruction and talking to military groups. In the course of his talks, he has charged that the price for Soviet arms has been a restriction on Egyptian political independence. He said his move toward economic liberalization and his efforts to diversify the sources of Egypt's arms will permit Cairo to secure "the most sophisticated weapons in the world." He implied that the task of rebuilding the military will be a lengthy process.

(continued)

\* \* \*

The four African presidents who have been backing the black nationalists in Rhodesia are meeting today to consider the consequences of the breakdown in negotiations between Prime Minister Ian Smith and nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo.

Zambian President Kaunda is hosting a conference in Lusaka with presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, Machel of Mozambique, and Khamza of Botswana to which rival Rhodesian nationalists have also been invited. The four presidents will again attempt to bring about a reconciliation between Nkomo, who gained control of the nationalist organizational structure inside Rhodesia last September, and the exiled nationalists who have been preparing an all-out military effort against Smith. The presidents may hope that a reunification of the rival nationalist groups will lend impetus to their efforts to build a unified liberation army.

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

*March 25, 1976*

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*Top Secret* 25X1

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March 25, 1976

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Lebanon-Syria: Syrian mediators are still trying to gain agreement to a cease-fire from Lebanese leftist leader Jumblatt. Syrian military commanders are showing signs of dissatisfaction with President Asad for his handling of the crisis. (Page 1)

China: The campaign criticizing Teng Hsiao-ping continues to leave open the possibility that he can redeem himself if he admits his mistakes. (Page 2)

Zambia-Rhodesia: Prime Minister Mudenda recently described the ground rules Lusaka will impose on Rhodesian insurgents if and when they are allowed to conduct guerrilla campaigns from Zambia. (Page 4)

USSR: The Soviets have made significant gains in their program to develop a nuclear-fusion reactor. (Page 5)

Notes: Argentina; Portugal; Thailand (Pages 6 and 7)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

LEBANON-SYRIA

Syrian mediators are still trying to gain agreement from leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt to Damascus' peace proposal; Jumblatt is scheduled to meet with President Asad today. Asad's handling of the current crisis is apparently creating dissatisfaction within the Syrian military, which may further complicate his efforts to obtain a cease-fire.

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Syrian officers may also be worried that Damascus will become bogged down militarily in Lebanon or, even worse, become involved in an unwanted conflict with the Israelis.

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The continued defiance of Jumblatt and other leftist leaders creates a dilemma for Asad. Faced with the prospect of the collapse of his mediation efforts, he probably feels under strong pressure to use more Syrian regulars to restore order. If he cracks down too heavily on recalcitrant leftists, however, he may provoke further discord within his own military. Asad's enemies hope he will make a serious miscalculation on Lebanon, but Asad is adept at outmaneuvering his opponents and thus far military dissension does not appear to have reached the stage where it threatens his position.

There are no indications that Syria has moved additional forces into Lebanon in the past few days. Israel has [redacted]

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[redacted] apparently taken no action beyond sending reconnaissance missions over southern and central Lebanon.

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## CHINA

The campaign criticizing Teng Hsiao-ping, now nearly two months old, continues to leave open the possibility that Teng can redeem himself if he admits his mistakes. This formulation leaves Teng a way out of his difficulties; it also serves a similar purpose for his opponents should their efforts to remove him fall short. Recent articles in the media indicate, in fact, that Teng's opponents recognize they have chosen a formidable adversary.

Chinese officials have frequently used the theme of Teng's possible redemption in discussions with foreigners, presumably to give the outside world an impression of patience and reasonableness. The same theme has surfaced from time to time within China. An article in the March 21 issue of *People's Daily*, although no less critical of Teng than earlier material, ends with the statement that "people are watching" Teng to see whether he will change his ways and "truly repent."

[redacted]

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The PRC-controlled press in Hong Kong reportedly has been told by Peking to refer to Teng as "comrade," indicating that he remains a member in good standing of the party.


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The article in the *People's Daily* stated that Teng "holds a high position and certain power" and expressed concern that he could use this power in his own interest and that of his supporters. The party theoretical journal *Red Flag* has indicated that Teng and his followers are putting up a struggle, noting that after their first major setback--presumably when Teng was blocked from the premiership--they have fought back "ten times as hard."

(continued)

Response to the campaign against Teng remains mixed. Some areas are pursuing it with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm, while others seem to be promoting it more vigorously. The recent public appearance of some provincial officials who, like Teng, were stripped of power during the Cultural Revolution and subsequently reinstated, indicates the campaign has not "broadened" in the way its originators may have hoped.

## Southern Africa



559512 3-76

ZAMBIA-RHODESIA

Zambian Prime Minister Mudenda recently described the ground rules Lusaka will impose on Rhodesian insurgents if and when they are allowed to conduct guerrilla campaigns from Zambia.

[redacted] Mudenda has stated that the insurgents would be provided safe haven, tactical information on Rhodesian border posts, small boats for river crossing, and possibly transportation for arms and equipment. Training will not be allowed in Zambia, and Lusaka will not act as an intermediary for procurement or shipment of arms to the insurgents.

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Cuban and non-African forces will not be allowed to transit Zambia or participate with the guerrillas in military operations from there. Neither will direct involvement be permitted in Zambia by non-African governments in the form of military aid, financing, or other types of support to the liberation movements. All non-African support must move through Tanzania and Mozambique.

The Zambian government has long maintained tight control over the activities of liberation movements within Zambia. The new restrictions clearly reflect Lusaka's concern over the Soviet and Cuban role in Angola, and are intended to prevent any such involvement with Rhodesian insurgents inside Zambia.

USSR

*The Soviets have recently made significant gains in their program to develop a nuclear-fusion reactor, also a major goal of US nuclear research.*

A fusion reaction will produce energy by the same process as a hydrogen bomb, but the energy will be released slowly and in a controlled manner. The fuel is deuterium, a form of hydrogen available in virtually unlimited quantities in water. The problem is to raise the temperature of the deuterium to about that of the sun to ignite the fusion reaction and then to continue the reaction at that temperature while extracting usable energy.

Soviet scientists have achieved impressive results with a fusion research device. Based on these results, they now plan to build a much larger device to demonstrate conclusively that energy can be produced in this way.

The US program, which is smaller in both funding and manpower, is expected to match the recent Soviet achievements later this year. However, the Soviet fusion program probably will demonstrate the feasibility of producing fusion energy before the US does. Many formidable engineering problems will remain before an electric power plant based on fusion energy can be built.

NOTES

Argentina's new military junta is firmly in place and shows every sign that it intends to retain power for some time.

There has been little violence so far, but stiff penalties have been decreed for anyone who assists the terrorist cause. The government has banned political and labor union activity, closed congress, suspended the supreme court, and is appointing military governors for the provinces. The new leadership is friendly to the US and will strive to improve Argentina's ties with this country which they hope will provide investment and new capital to cover Buenos Aires' huge debt payments and current-account deficit.

\* \* \*

Portugal's Revolutionary Council, after an all-night session, reaffirmed April 25 as the date for legislative assembly elections.

The so-called "operational" faction within the Council presumably mustered the strength to overrule arguments by those, including President Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Antunes [redacted]

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[redacted] The "operationalists" have been reluctant to risk public disapproval by going back on assurances that the vote would be held as scheduled.

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Thai

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*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

*March 26, 1976*

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March 26, 1976

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
Lebanon: Syria yesterday withdrew its mediators from Lebanon, leaving Muslim and leftist forces free to pursue their offensive against the Christians. (Page 1)

OPEC: The OPEC oil ministers will meet in Jakarta in late May to decide whether to increase oil prices. (Page 3)

Egypt-USSR: Sadat ignored a letter he received from Brezhnev in early March that allegedly promised discussions for new arms agreements and the reopening of debt negotiations. (Page 4)

Notes: Iceland-UK; Panama; West Germany - Egypt; Peru (Pages 5 and 6)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



559523 3-76

## LEBANON

Damascus yesterday withdrew its mediators from Lebanon, leaving the way open for Muslim and leftist forces to pursue unhindered their offensive against the Christians. Syrian-controlled Palestinian units and Syrian regular forces have been ordered to remain in place, but not to interfere with Muslim and leftist military operations.

President Asad apparently concluded that only large-scale Syrian intervention could stop the fighting. This would have risked Israeli counter-action and would quite likely have been politically unacceptable to the Syrian military and the Baath Party. Both strongly sympathize with the Lebanese leftists.

Withdrawal of the Syrian mediation team has set off a wave of panic among the Christians, and Christian fighters in Beirut are now clearly on the defensive. Leftist and rebel Muslim army troops have advanced into the mountains east of the capital and reportedly are moving steadily on the Christian strongholds of Brummana and Bayt Miri.

President Franjiyah, who was forced to flee the presidential palace at Babda yesterday, has set up temporary headquarters at Zug Mikhail. He met there yesterday with Christian leaders. [redacted]

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If the Christians do declare for partition, the greatest immediate danger would come from any response to a call they might make for outside help to protect their truncated state. Concern would be high throughout the Arab world that Israel might respond to a Christian call for help.


Leftist military successes have resulted in part from the increasingly active support leftists are receiving from the independent fedayeen groups, particularly Yasir Arafat's Fatah. Arafat recently formed a loose alliance with Lebanese leftist leaders to refurbish his revolutionary credentials and to protect Palestinian interests against the rapidly growing Syrian influence in Lebanon.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Israeli officials have not reacted publicly to the latest developments in Lebanon, but Chief of Staff Gur told an interviewer only a few days ago that his forces are following developments across the border very closely, "so as not to act too soon or too late." Yesterday, Israeli aircraft flew reconnaissance missions over Lebanon for the second day in a row.

Israelis supporting intervention argue that Israel should move quickly to fill the power vacuum in southern Lebanon before radical Arab forces do, and that pre-emptive action now would be easier than dislodging such forces later. They also maintain that failure to act would be read as a sign of Israeli weakness and that Israel must help Lebanon's Christians survive.



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OPEC

The OPEC oil ministers will meet in Jakarta in late May to decide whether to increase oil prices. Chances are good for a continuation of the current price freeze until the end of the year or, at worst, an increase smaller than last October's rise of 10 percent. Saudi Arabia, which wants no price increase, again holds the key.

Events in the oil market in recent weeks have strengthened the Saudis in dealing with both the companies and other members of OPEC. The competitive position of Saudi oil has improved, and Saudi oil is now underpriced with respect to both lighter and heavier crudes. Their strengthened position and the preoccupation of the price hawks with other issues may mean that the Saudis can have their way without having to expend much political capital.

Riyadh seems to be taking a harder line than in the past in favor of extending the freeze on oil prices. Since the last OPEC meeting in September, Oil Minister Yamani has repeatedly stated that the Saudis will insist on continuing the price freeze until the end of the year.

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It also appears that Saudi Arabia has managed again to win Algeria's support.

The Shah of Iran is trying to increase Iranian oil output and guarantee that it will stay high. He no doubt will push hard at Jakarta for the highest possible price rise.

At previous meetings of oil ministers over the past two years, the Iranian delegation has cited the rise in import costs as one of the main justifications for pushing up oil prices. The fact that the price of OPEC imports from the industrialized countries has fallen should strengthen the position of those opposed to a major price increase.

## EGYPT-USSR

A senior Egyptian official alleges that Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev sent President Sadat a letter promising to discuss new arms agreements and to reopen debt negotiations. Sadat received this letter a few days before he made his speech recommending abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty. Sadat had told Ambassador Eilts that the letter refused any further Soviet military or economic assistance.

Sadat proceeded with the treaty abrogation despite the communication from Brezhnev, according to the official, because he regarded the promised aid as merely a manipulative effort to keep him from announcing any anti-Soviet moves in his scheduled speech on March 14.

Sadat probably remembered past instances in which Moscow failed to follow through on concessions promised just before he was to make a major speech. This occurred last July when the Egyptian minister of finance was hastily summoned to Moscow on a promise of progress toward debt renegotiation a few days before Sadat was to speak publicly. The minister was kept cooling his heels until after the address and was then sent home empty-handed.



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If the Soviet letter was as conciliatory as reported, Sadat could be embarrassed if word of the letter should leak or if the Soviets should choose to publish it. Publicity would not help Sadat's efforts to convince the Egyptian military that all attempts to secure more arms from Moscow have been fruitless.

NOTES

*Prospects for an Icelandic-UK fishing agreement--which seemed to have improved a few days ago--have declined once more.*

Iceland has refused a British request for clarification of certain issues in the Reykjavik proposal conveyed to the UK last weekend. Foreign Minister Agustsson has now made clear that Iceland's proposal was put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and should not be viewed as an opening for further negotiations. Reykjavik has also demanded that London drop its opposition to the draft free trade agreement between the EC and Iceland that would assure the latter continued access to West European markets.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

\* \* \*

*Panama's chief negotiator in the canal treaty talks, Juan Tack, has reportedly resigned.*

General Torrijos may have to handle the negotiations even more gingerly than heretofore. Tack is said to be unhappy with the course of the talks. If he decides to criticize publicly any of the government's compromise positions, he could force Torrijos into a more defensive, hard-line negotiating posture.

\* \* \*

*West Germany plans to provide Egypt limited economic aid and trade credit guarantees when Sadat visits Bonn next week.*

Bonn will provide about \$40 million in capital aid and trade credits of some \$52 million. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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# The President's Daily Brief

*March 27, 1976*

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March 27, 1976

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<u>Lebanon:</u>	[redacted]	25X1
	[redacted]	25X1
	[redacted]	25X1

(Page 1)

USSR-Egypt: President Sadat publicly confirmed yesterday that Cairo has barred the Soviets from using Egyptian port facilities. (Page 3)

USSR-Cuba-Angola: An interagency intelligence memorandum concludes that the USSR and Cuba provided Angola with about \$125 million worth of goods last month, much of it food. (Page 4)

Ethiopia: The ruling military council has moved sharply to the left over the past two months. (Page 5)

Notes: Egypt-Israel; Argentina (Page 6)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

LEBANON



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The Syrians may attempt to salvage their mediation effort, but much will depend on a meeting tentatively scheduled for today between President Asad and Arafat. Lebanese leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt also plans to go to Damascus today. His attitude--as much as Arafat's--will determine Syria's next step.

The Syrians have been in contact with major Lebanese Christian leaders and, after talking with Arafat and Jumblatt, they may decide whether a renewed attempt at mediation is worth risking another diplomatic failure.

Phalanges leader Pierre Jumayyil and Interior Minister Shamun--who together hold the key to the Christians' next move--apparently are coordinating their tactics, but neither seems sure about what to do next. Jumayyil issued a statement yesterday in which he called partition the "most abhorrent" solution to the crisis. He expressed some hope that Syrian mediation might still succeed, but raised the possibility of putting the Christian case before the UN or the Arab League.

Heavy fighting continued yesterday and early today in Beirut and in the mountainous district east of the city, although neither Muslim nor Christian forces appeared to be making appreciable gains.

The US defense attaché in Syria reported no unusual military activity along the Damascus-Beirut road as of early yesterday. After conversations with various Syrian army commanders on Thursday, he concluded that the Syrians are now in a

(continued)

readiness posture that would enable them to move forces into Lebanon within a few hours, should Asad take the political decision to do so.

The Israelis yesterday flew several reconnaissance missions over Lebanon and the eastern Mediterranean.



USSR-EGYPT

*Egyptian President Sadat publicly confirmed yesterday that Cairo has barred the Soviets from using Egyptian port facilities.*

*Several Soviet naval ships in the eastern Mediterranean are apparently reacting to events in Lebanon.*

[redacted] the Soviets have been given until April 15 to evacuate the Al Gabbari shipyard at Alexandria. Three Soviet vessels--two F-class submarines and an ocean-going tug--are still being overhauled in the yard. There are some indications that the Soviet evacuation of Alexandria is under way.

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[redacted]

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A Sverdlov-class cruiser and a Kashin-class destroyer have moved from their anchorage in the Gulf of Sollum and are now near Tartus, Syria, and may already have entered port.

[redacted]

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The Soviets may be reacting to the movements of a US naval force in the Mediterranean. Alternatively, in view of their imminent ouster from Alexandria, the Soviets may be using the crisis in Lebanon as a pretext for establishing a greater naval presence in Syria than has previously been permitted. Moscow could also simply be considering the possible need to evacuate Soviet civilians from Beirut.

USSR-CUBA-ANGOLA

(Following are the key points from an interagency intelligence memorandum on Soviet and Cuban aid to the MPLA in Angola during February 1976.)

The value of support provided the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola by the Soviet Union and Cuba in February 1976 amounted to at least \$125 million, measured in US equivalent costs. This brings total estimated Soviet and Cuban aid to the MPLA for the year beginning March 1, 1975, to over \$400 million.

Although overall tonnage of goods delivered in February rose above the January level, we believe that the amount of military goods shipped declined. Arms deliveries, however, included the first confirmed shipments of MIG-21 aircraft.

A large portion of the February deliveries was foodstuff.

We believe an additional 1,500 Cubans were sent to Angola in February, raising the total number of Cuban military personnel in country to about 13,500. Since late February, the number has probably remained at this level, as further arrivals have been offset by an equal number of troops, including some wounded, returning to Cuba.

The airlift from the Soviet Union during February was limited to one flight, and passenger flights from Cuba were put on a regular every-other-day schedule beginning in mid-month.

Sealift operations between Cuba and Angola were increasingly integrated into the Cuban merchant fleet's worldwide schedules.

## ETHIOPIA

*Ethiopia's ruling military council has moved sharply to the left over the past two months.*

Leftists on the council--led by First Vice Chairman Mengistu Hailemariam--are emphasizing a radical socialist program in an effort to broaden the council's narrow base of popular support.

Since mid-February the council has reshuffled the cabinet and has arrested thousands of middle-of-the-road and conservative civilians, government officials, and military officers. For several weeks the official media have been campaigning against "bureaucratic capitalists" for holding back Ethiopia's socialist reconstruction.

Mengistu's bid for leftist domestic support has been accompanied by an attempt to draw closer to communist countries, especially the Soviet Union. Praise of the USSR has increased markedly in the Ethiopian media, and visiting Soviet delegations have received fulsome local coverage. Early this month, a high-level mission was dispatched to Peking, and its activities also have been heavily publicized.

The council hopes Moscow will use its close ties to Mogadiscio to restrain Somalia's aggressive designs on the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, through which Ethiopia's principal rail outlet passes.

Media attacks on Western capitalists and "racists" for alleged wrongdoing in Africa have a strong anti-American flavor, although the US is usually not named directly. Despite these attacks, the government still follows its official policy of maintaining good relations with the US.

NOTES

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Argentina's military government is extending and consolidating its control. Officers now occupy all federal executive posts and top jobs in the 22 provinces and some local jurisdictions.

Apparently encouraged by the lack of resistance thus far, the junta is relaxing some of the more obvious controls. The US embassy reports that roadblocks are now down, airports are operating normally, and censorship of the press has been eased. The greatest potential for opposition lies with the terrorists, who so far have remained relatively inactive. Labor, too, can be expected to protest when, as seems likely, the government announces further economic austerity measures.

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

*March 29, 1976*

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
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Lebanon: Syrian President Asad's meeting with leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt ended late Saturday with no agreement on terms for a cease-fire in Lebanon. (Page 1)

Jordan: Jordan is becoming a significant factor in the Middle East power balance as a result of its efforts to bolster its military capabilities and to improve defense coordination with Syria. (Page 3)

At Annex we present an assessment of the insurgency situation in Rhodesia following the collapse of talks between Joshua Nkomo and Prime Minister Smith.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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LEBANON

Syrian President Asad's meeting with leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt ended late Saturday with no agreement on terms for a cease-fire.

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Jumblatt's refusal to agree to an immediate truce has prompted Syria to seek "international guarantees" allowing it to intervene in Lebanon with regular Syrian troops.

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Damascus, [redacted] intends to ask for assurances from a number of countries that no other outside military force will interfere if Syria decides to move into Lebanon. The Syrians believe it would take only two days to enforce a cease-fire if their troops were to enter Lebanon.

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[redacted]

Syrian forces generally remain in a high state of alert, according to the US defense attaché in Damascus. During his travels this weekend in and around the city and the northern part of the Golan Heights, he saw no indication of actual or impending military moves toward Lebanon by Syrian troops.

The attaché believes, however, that the Syrian 1st Armored Division--based at Al Kiswah, ten miles south of Damascus--has significantly increased its state of readiness. The attaché observed the division's military police in full combat gear, armored vehicles uncovered and fully loaded, and ammunition trucks heading toward Al Kiswah. Throughout the area around Damascus, antiaircraft units remain on alert.

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Egypt yesterday called for joint Arab mediation of the Lebanese crisis and asked for the dispatch of "token joint Arab security forces" to maintain peace while the mediation effort proceeds. Cairo has asked the Arab League to contact all Arab states urgently to obtain agreement on the Egyptian initiative.

## JORDAN

*Jordan is becoming a significant factor in the Middle East power balance as a result of efforts to bolster its military capabilities and to improve defense coordination with Syria. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli war made Jordan especially aware of its own military weaknesses compared to Israel and Syria, and Amman is concerned that it has been steadily losing ground as a result of massive arms aid to its neighbors.*

The Jordanian armed forces suffer in firepower and mobility compared to the Israelis and have an inadequate ground-based air defense system. The air force is small, generally equipped with obsolescent aircraft, and based at only two vulnerable airfields. There has been a chronic manpower shortage in the armed forces, and logistical and maintenance capabilities are relatively limited.

To overcome its weaknesses, Jordan has accelerated its efforts to modernize and strengthen its armed forces since the 1973 war. It has acquired about 130 tanks and 320 armored personnel carriers from the US since 1973, and plans to have nearly 750 tanks and 1,350 APCs in its inventory by the end of the decade. Large numbers of TOW antitank missiles and self-propelled artillery also are on order. The air force is obtaining new F-5E fighter aircraft, constructing additional air bases, and operating improved radars. It has 75 combat aircraft and should have over 100 within the next several years. Amman now is also attempting to obtain modern Vulcan and Hawk air defense systems from the US, although the deal has run into difficulties because of Saudi funding limitations.

Despite the modernization program, Jordan remains aware that it continues to be unable to sustain military action effectively against Israel. It will be several years before Jordan can build up the logistical infrastructure and technical expertise to absorb and use all the new military equipment it is receiving. Amman, therefore, has turned to increased military cooperation with Syria


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to improve its potential to participate more effectively in any new hostilities. Such coordination serves to improve Jordanian credentials as an Arab confrontation state and increases its political and military leverage against Israel.

Amman has become increasingly dissatisfied with US military aid over the last few years as a result of rising costs and long delays in delivery. The government also is unhappy with the lower priority apparently accorded Jordan compared to Israel, as well as the political conditions being attached by the US Congress. If the Hawk air defense sale with the US falls through, Amman conceivably could turn to the Soviets for arms, particularly air defense missiles and strike aircraft. Such a move, however, would risk disrupting the entire US aid effort and the modernization program.

If the current trend in Jordanian military co-operation with Syria continues, as now appears likely, the two countries could considerably enhance their joint capabilities against Israel by the end of the decade. Because of its modernization program, Jordan could play a far more effective role in any new fighting by then, even without concluding a formal alliance with Syria.

The two countries are unlikely to be able to match Israeli military strength for the foreseeable future. Despite any quantitative edge they may achieve in manpower or weapons, Israeli qualitative superiority in such factors as leadership, technology, tactical flexibility, technical proficiency, and manpower utilization is likely to continue to be decisive. Nevertheless, improved Jordanian defense cooperation with Syria over the next several years will increase both countries' ability to put military pressure on Israel and make any action against them more costly to Tel Aviv.



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## RHODESIA

*The collapse of talks between Joshua Nkomo and Prime Minister Ian Smith leaves Rhodesia's black nationalists with almost no option but to use military means to achieve majority rule.*

Even before talks broke off, nationalist guerrilla forces based in neighboring Mozambique had renewed the insurgency against the Smith regime after a lull of more than a year. The guerrillas now are getting greater support than before from Rhodesia's black neighbors and from their long-time communist sources of supply.

The Fighting

Beginning last fall, veteran insurgents moved from camps in Tanzania and Zambia to bases along Mozambique's border with Rhodesia. In late January, small, lightly armed units began infiltrating Rhodesia again, staging hit-and-run attacks, mining roads, and terrorizing local villagers. The guerrillas are now spread out in small groups in Mozambican villages along most of the 700-mile border with Rhodesia.

Thus far, Rhodesian defense forces--although stretched thin--have been able to contain the incursions to within a few miles of the border. The Rhodesians have used their limited air power to chase the guerrilla bands back into Mozambique. Several recent air attacks, in fact, have inflicted casualties on Mozambican regular forces and civilians as well as the guerrillas.

The ability of the insurgents to expand their activities beyond the current level depends in large part on whether they have overcome serious divisions within their ranks. The final plans for the guerrilla campaign may have been set in a meeting in Mozambique in early February, at which Zambian President Kaunda, Tanzanian President Nyerere, and Mozambican President Machel met with guerrilla leaders Muzorewa and Sithole and some of Nkomo's representatives. Machel and Nyerere made a strong

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TOP SECRET PRESIDENT ONLY

effort to put together a new guerrilla leadership, but it remains to be seen if tribal, personal, and factional rivalries will continue to jeopardize the unity they have sought.

Insurgent Strength and Foreign Assistance

Estimates of the size of the guerrilla forces vary widely. Some nationalist leaders have claimed a strength of up to 20,000 guerrillas, but this figure appears to be highly exaggerated. At present, at least 500 guerrillas probably are in action inside Rhodesia, with at least 2,000 more in the Mozambican border area. We do not know how many are in training in Tanzania, but there could be as many as 500 in Zambia.

It is not clear what ties exist between the insurgents and blacks inside Rhodesia, particularly in the important urban areas. With the settlement talks broken off and the fighting likely to increase, the insurgents might try to stage terrorist attacks in urban areas and promote political action against the Smith government.

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Nyerere and Kaunda want to avoid direct Cuban and Soviet involvement such as occurred in Angola; they fear that such a development would transform an African problem into a US-Soviet confrontation.

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Rhodesian Forces

The Rhodesians have about 7,000 active army troops and an equal number of police to deploy against the insurgents. Army reserves total about 10,000 and police reserves some 35,000 to 45,000. About half of the army regulars and nearly three fourths of the police are black, but all of the

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army reserves and three fourths of the police reserves are white. These defense forces, including the small air force, are fairly well equipped to deal with the current level of insurgency, but over the long term they will have considerable difficulty replacing equipment.

Outlook

Although the fighting seems certain to increase in the coming months, it may be some time before we are able to judge the effectiveness of the insurgents. The onset of the dry season, which begins shortly, will make them more vulnerable for a time to Rhodesian counterinsurgency operations. When the rains come next fall, they presumably will try to take advantage of the lessened mobility of the Rhodesian military.

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March 30, 1976


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LEBANON

*Syrian mediation efforts remain stalled as leftist forces continue their drive against Christian strongholds in Beirut and the mountains east of the capital. Damascus seems for the moment to pin its hopes for slowing the leftists' offensive on its arms cut-off and on PLO chairman Yasir Arafat's efforts to persuade Lebanese leftist Kamal Jumblatt to accept a cease-fire.*

Syria's proposed solution reportedly calls for an immediate cease-fire and a meeting of the Lebanese parliament to amend the constitution and elect a new president. All the leftist leaders except Jumblatt agreed yesterday to support it. Jumblatt apparently is holding out in hopes the leftists will first capture the port area of Beirut.

We doubt that Asad has made a decision yet to intervene openly in Lebanon. He would probably face strong opposition in Damascus if such intervention appeared aimed at preventing the leftists from scoring a military victory. He may believe it best to delay a decision, hoping the leftists will soon run out of steam.

Leftist forces, however, made some additional inroads against the Christians yesterday, especially in the hotel district of Beirut and at Al Kahhalah, astride the main road to Damascus just east of Beirut. In see-saw fighting, leftist troops reportedly occupied at least part of Al Kahhalah yesterday and continued to put strong pressure on the Christians in their principal stronghold in Beirut.

Christian forces in the mountains east of Beirut held their own and may even have made some gains around the villages of Aynturah and Al Mutayn.

Fighting in the Tripoli-Zagharta area in the north apparently was limited to intense artillery exchanges, with neither side making appreciable gains.

(continued)

Israeli officials, meanwhile, continue to monitor Lebanese developments closely, while avoiding extensive public comment. In an interview published Friday, Defense Minister Peres emphasized that Israel would not intervene simply to maintain the status quo in Lebanon. He reiterated the position that Israel would take necessary "defensive measures" if there were "direct Syrian military intervention which might endanger the security of Israel."

Jordan has placed some of its military units on alert--probably in reaction to the crisis in Lebanon.

US attachés in Amman have reported that units at Jordan's two principal fighter bases have been in an increased state of readiness since Sunday. Fighter aircraft reportedly have been armed and put into protective shelters. Antiaircraft artillery units are reported to have been moved to combat positions near the airfields.

The attachés said some Jordanian ground force units were on increased alert yesterday, although most of the army appeared to be in a normal status. Air defense elements of Jordan's 2nd Infantry Division were on alert, and support elements were seen moving from rear areas toward the northwest border area. The 2nd Division is responsible for defending that border area.

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We have no indications of unusual Syrian or Israeli military activity. The US defense attaché in Damascus saw no evidence, as of early yesterday morning, of Syrian troop movements that might be related to the Lebanese situation.

## WEST GERMANY

The economic and political constraints of a West German election year have led Chancellor Schmidt to respond negatively to US attempts to obtain financial support for several costly military projects.

Affected are a new agreement to offset the cost of stationing US troops in West Germany, a US-built airborne early warning system, and new facilities for a US brigade assigned to NATO's Northern Army Group.

Schmidt's reservations result from several factors.

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[redacted] Schmidt has closely identified himself with the widespread feeling in West Germany that Bonn should stop serving as the paymaster for NATO and the EC.

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He is also determined to project an image of fiscal responsibility by keeping a tight rein on the budget. All West German ministries have been ordered to cut expenditures, and the Chancellor is insisting that the bureaucracy keep an anticipated budget deficit as small as possible.

Bonn's unwillingness at this time to provide financial assistance does not represent a fundamental change in policy. After the election, Bonn will probably be more flexible on defense matters and more forthcoming in providing financial assistance.

In the meantime, West German officials are hinting that Bonn will not support the airborne warning system unless the US purchases the German-built Leopard II tank. This linkage was made most forcefully last week by a defense expert of the opposition Christian Democrats.

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[redacted] Carl Damm, the defense expert, will testify at a US Senate hearing tomorrow and will propose the swap at that time.

NOTE

The Iranian ambassador in London has approached British officials about renting facilities at an air base in the Maldives archipelago that the Royal Air Force is leaving.

Under the 1965 independence agreement, the British retain a veto until 1986 over Maldivian proposals to lease RAF facilities to a third country.

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[redacted] it seems likely that London will respond favorably.

The Maldivian government has said it will not allow another foreign power to use the facility. It realizes that India, with which it has good relations, would disapprove. Iranian financial inducements, however, might persuade the Maldivian government to reexamine its position.

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

LEBANON

*Fighting is continuing in Beirut as Kamal Jumblatt and other Lebanese leftists resist pressure from Syria to agree to a cease-fire.*

Jumblatt today reiterated his demand that President Franjiyah step down before a truce begins. Jumblatt also publicly criticized the Syrians for cutting off arms and ammunition to the leftists.


Both Jumblatt and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat have been under increasing pressure from Damascus to accept a truce. [redacted]

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There were no indications yesterday of unusual activity by either Syrian or Israeli forces.



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USSR

*The Soviet navy is moving ahead with the evacuation of Alexandria, which must be completed by April 15.*

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
There are now eight Soviet naval units at Tartus, Syria. Before the Egyptian decision regarding Alexandria, the Soviets kept only a naval repair ship permanently stationed in Tartus. The port lacks the extensive repair facilities found in Alexandria, but it would be adequate for mooring some of the support ships.

The Soviets are substantially reducing their naval forces in west African waters. A Kresta-II guided missile cruiser that had been off the West African coast since mid-January now is off Western Sahara, apparently heading back to the Mediterranean. Two other Soviet ships, an F-class submarine and a small tanker, have left Conakry in the past few days and also may be on their way to the Mediterranean.

An Alligator-class landing ship, a destroyer, and a tanker are still at Conakry

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## Southern Africa



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ZAIRE

*President Mobutu is moving to associate his government with the radical position on southern African issues. His earlier criticism of Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola has been replaced by warnings to all major powers to stay out of southern Africa.*

In view of his failure to influence events in Angola, Mobutu wants to refurbish his credentials as a leading African nationalist. He does not want to be in a position of publicly opposing other Africans who might endorse a Soviet and Cuban role--should it come to that--in forcing majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Early this month Mobutu strongly endorsed the decision of Mozambican President Machel to close his country's border with Rhodesia. Before the Rhodesian settlement talks collapsed, Zaire's controlled news media implicitly endorsed guerrilla war and criticized the efforts of nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo to achieve a negotiated settlement with Ian Smith.

Nevertheless, in conversation with US embassy officers in Kinshasa, high Zairian officials continue to reflect Mobutu's concern over Soviet and Cuban intentions. These officials have stated that Zaire's more militant public posture will be paralleled by discreet support for moderate solutions in Rhodesia and Namibia that they hope will preempt Soviet and Cuban involvement.

NOTES

Presidents Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania, Machel of Mozambique, and Khama of Botswana have failed again to persuade Rhodesian nationalist Joshua Nkomo and his rival, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, to bury their differences.

[redacted]

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[redacted] there is no indication as to what if any new plans were agreed upon. The presidents apparently have little hope that any new attempt at a peaceful settlement can be mounted, although our embassy in Lusaka believes that Nkomo and possibly Kaunda are still ready to grasp at any straw that might avert all-out warfare.

\* \* \*

[redacted]

Greek Cyp-

riots mark the start of their anti-colonial guerrilla war against the British in 1955.

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The anniversary last year was marked by exchanges of gunfire all along the cease-fire line separating Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces. There have been indications that US officials and property may be potential targets of terrorist attacks.

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