



The President's Daily Brief

1 November 1972

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

1 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

A Communist spokesman in Paris has criticized the US for not signing the truce agreement yesterday, but added that the US must respect the text of the accords and sign them as soon as possible. Meanwhile, South Vietnamese President Thieu has used his toughest language to date in denouncing the proposed peace agreement. (Page 1)

The possibility of a cease-fire is inducing the Cambodian Government to pay greater attention to possible military and political approaches to the Khmer Communists. (Page 2)

In Chile, opposition moves to impeach four members of President Allende's cabinet have provided the occasion for the resignation of all 15 ministers. Allende may now seek to form a "technical" cabinet with some military participation. (Page 3)

The unrest in Bolivia over devaluation appears to be easing. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM

In a prepared statement to the press, the spokesman for the PRG delegation in Paris, Le Van Sau, criticized the US for not signing the truce agreement on 31 October, but went on to say that the US must respect the text of the accords and sign them as soon as possible. Similarly, a broadcast over Hanoi's domestic service yesterday avoided any hint of a deadline, stating only that the US was responsible for the prolongation of the war.

Meanwhile, Moscow continues to hold back from a formal endorsement of North Vietnam's statement of 26 October. The Soviets appear to be waiting for some sign that the issues currently dividing Washington and Hanoi are close to being resolved before making any authoritative statement in support of the North Vietnamese. A Pravda commentator yesterday issued a comparatively mild call for early US signature of the agreement. He noted that Hanoi's deadline had expired and disparaged as "unconvincing" the argument that South Vietnamese President Thieu must be brought aboard.

* * *

President Thieu, in a National Day address on 1 November, used his toughest language to date in denouncing the proposed peace agreement. As in similar statements during the past week, Thieu did not attack the US directly, but denounced those individuals and organizations that would "sell out" the country. Thieu continued to claim that he is not an obstacle to a peace settlement and called on the Communists to hold serious talks.

* * *

Emissaries of President Thieu now touring various Far Eastern countries apparently are exercising restraint. US Ambassador Lydman in Kuala Lumpur, for example, has been told by Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Ismail and South Vietnam's Ambassador Quang that the weekend visit of Ambassador to the US Phong produced no requests on the part of Saigon. Phong explained his government's objections to the Communist proposals and Saigon's concern that Hanoi was trying to exploit the imminence of the US elections to force a premature settlement. According to both sources, Phong did not present his case as a criticism or rebuttal of the US position and his listeners were generally sympathetic.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

The possibility of a cease-fire is inducing Phnom Penh to pay greater attention to possible military and political approaches to the Khmer Communists. Charge Enders reports that the government is embarking on a program aimed at rallying as many Khmer Communist troops as possible. As a first step, instructions have been passed to all provincial leaders and to all Cambodian Army field commanders to try to contact local Khmer Communist elements in order to persuade them to rejoin government ranks.

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Thus far, there has been no significant Khmer Communist response to the new program. [redacted]

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Lon Nol and other Cambodian leaders are now only beginning to delve into the political aspects of the Khmer Communist problem. There are no indications as yet that Phnom Penh has begun to think about the question of high-level negotiations with the Khmer Communists aimed at a broad political settlement.

Nonetheless, the question of coping with the Khmer Communists appears to have impressed upon Lon Nol the need for stronger political support for the government. Lon Nol has asked former Democratic Party head In Tam to play a major role in the new rallier program, but he is still reluctant to accept such a post. Lon Nol has also shown some signs of interest in Sirik Matak's proposals for the inclusion of opposition elements in the government, and has added Matak to the committee working on the government cease-fire program.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHILE

Opposition moves to impeach four members of President Allende's cabinet provided the occasion for the resignation of all 15 ministers yesterday. Allende has accepted the resignation of two of the targets for impeachment, the interior and education ministers (both are preparing to run for Congress next March), but has not yet indicated how he will deal with the other resignations.

Allende may be preparing to form the kind of "technical" cabinet with some military participation that he has long wanted. The service chiefs remain divided in their attitude toward participating, however. Some are reluctant to join the cabinet, lest a political advantage accrue to Allende. Others, possibly including Army Chief Prats, hope that as part of the cabinet they could moderate official policies. Of the principal government parties, the Socialists are less attracted to military participation than are the Communists, but even they might find certain officers acceptable.

The government meanwhile has offered to reopen negotiations with the strikers. Our latest reports indicate that some protest leaders still hope to hold out, but the resolve of others is weakening. Shutdowns continue to be widespread but uneven, and essential services and supplies are being maintained with the aid of the armed services.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Bolivia: The government is making headway in its efforts to defuse the crisis over devaluation. Troops overcame pockets of worker resistance in La Paz yesterday and the government claims that negotiations to end strikes have been successful.

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The President's Daily Brief

2 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

2 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

General Secretary Brezhnev now has not appeared in public for three weeks [redacted]

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[redacted] 25X1

(Page 1)

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] USSR [redacted]

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[redacted] (Page 2)

For the first time in a year and a half, Phnom Penh's land link with its seaport at Kompong Som has come under Communist pressure. (Page 3)

The South Korean Government is leaving nothing to chance in planning for the referendum on the new constitution on 21 November. (Page 4)

Political observers in Cairo are becoming increasingly uneasy over the outlook for stability since the firing of War Minister Sadiq last week. (Page 5)

The planned shipments from China to North Vietnam this month are to be the largest since the mining of the ports. (Page 6)

The Israelis have moved additional troops and armor to the Golan Heights. (Page 6)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

General Secretary Brezhnev still has not reappeared in public since he received the Shah of Iran on 11 October.




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


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
USSR



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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

Phnom Penh's overland route to its seaport at Kompong Som--Route 4--has come under Communist pressure again. Communist troops attacked two widely separated government positions on the highway yesterday and now control two short stretches of the road. Government reinforcements have been dispatched to help clear the sections.

These attacks, apparently mounted by Khmer Communists, are the first significant military activity against Route 4 for a year and a half. A prolonged closure of this highway would cause additional serious supply problems for the Lon Nol government, since it relies increasingly on the route for deliveries of imported rice and military equipment.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul is taking no chances that proposed constitutional changes will fail to receive overwhelming popular endorsement. President Pak is orchestrating an intensive propaganda campaign to drum up support for the draft constitution, which will go to national referendum on 21 November.

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[redacted] So far the public has remained largely indifferent despite the fact that the proposed constitution gives the chief executive unlimited tenure, broad authority over weakened legislative and judicial branches, and considerable latitude to alter national policy goals.

Pak has attempted to assuage any domestic concerns by appealing to Korean nationalism. In announcing the new constitution, he stressed the need to disregard "foreign" democratic forms and to develop a uniquely Korean system which would satisfy popular aspirations for unification.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EGYPT

Observers of the political scene in Cairo are becoming increasingly uneasy over the outlook for stability since the removal of War Minister Sadiq last week. The Saudi ambassador has gone so far as to warn his king that "the situation in the Egyptian leadership" is deteriorating rapidly and that "something" is likely to happen in the next several weeks.

While we see no imminent threat to President Sadat's position, we do feel that he took a serious risk in removing the war minister and that the consequences of this action have not yet been fully played out. Sadiq, popular for his anti-Soviet stand, was one of the most powerful figures in Egypt, and he now represents a potential rallying point for anti-regime malcontents. There are many such malcontents in Egypt today, and frustration continues in the military and elsewhere over Sadat's inability to do anything about the protracted "no war - no peace" relationship with Israel.

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NOTES


North Vietnam: The North Vietnamese commercial counselor in Peking informed Hanoi last week that 220,000 tons of goods were to be delivered from China in November. This quantity, nearly all of which was to move overland, would be the highest monthly level of deliveries since the mining of North Vietnamese ports, and nearly 20 percent higher than the average monthly seaborne shipments to North Vietnam in 1971. Foodstuffs were to comprise more than half the total, and petroleum a quarter.

Israel-Syria: The Israelis have moved additional troops, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and 175-mm. artillery into the Golan Heights, [redacted] They may be trying, as in September, to intimidate Damascus into stopping its artillery attacks and curbing fedayeen activities. A cross-border ground operation involving armor and infantry (and losses) still seems less likely than a continuation of air strikes against Syrian targets, although helicopter-commando raids might also be undertaken.

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The President's Daily Brief

3 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

3 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Representatives of a number of international grain companies are in Moscow discussing execution of the grain contracts made last summer. Shipping delays cause concern on both sides. Some of the companies are discussing new Soviet purchases of rye and corn.
(Page 1)

President Allende has named three senior military officers to his new cabinet, a move that should strengthen his hand in efforts to overcome the continuing protest movement by the private sector.
(Page 2)

Recent incidents of restiveness among Egyptian university students, though relatively minor, point up yet another potentially troublesome issue for President Sadat. *(Page 3)*

Cambodia's new "national committee for peace and concord" could become a forum for discussing high-level contacts with the Khmer Communists if President Lon Nol chooses. *(Page 4)*

Jamaica's Prime Minister Manley has informed the US ambassador that Jamaica will join the other three Caribbean Commonwealth countries in granting diplomatic recognition to the Castro government. *(Page 5)*

For the first time in recent months, Hanoi is sending infiltrators farther south than Military Region I. *(Page 6)*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-US

Representatives of a number of international grain companies are in Moscow discussing execution of the grain contracts made last July and August. Shipping delays caused by late resolution of the US-Soviet maritime agreement have caused concern on both sides. As of the end of October, shipments were 1.7 million tons behind schedule. Unless shipments can be speeded, the lag could reach 3 million tons by the end of November.

Some of the company representatives are in Moscow to discuss new Soviet purchases of rye and corn for feed grains.

Total US stocks of rye come to only 1.6 million tons, but enough corn is available in the US to cover any Soviet purchases.

The Soviets could still be uncertain about the size and quality of this year's grain crop and thus may believe it necessary to purchase more grain than the 28 million tons already under contract. By mid-October, a record eight percent of the total areas sown to grain in the USSR had not been threshed, indicating significant losses. In the European part of the USSR, some fields were abandoned or turned over to grazing animals because the grain was too poor to thresh. In Siberia and the Urals, winter overtook the threshers.

Moreover, the 1973 grain crop is off to a bad start. As the fall sowing campaign was ending, only 75 percent of the planned area was sown to winter grains--a record shortfall. The lack of soil moisture in some areas hit by the summer drought apparently prevented fall seeding. As in 1972, the barren areas will have to be re-sown with lower yielding spring grains.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHILE

General Carlos Prats, former army commander, was sworn in last night as President Allende's new interior minister. Two other senior military men, an admiral and an air force general, became minister of public works and minister of mines. Chile's top Communist labor leader, Luis Figueroa, is the new minister of labor and radical Socialist Party member Rolando Calderon took over as minister of agriculture.

General Prats' successor as army commander has not yet been named.

President Allende has long sought to bring the military into his cabinet but until now was unable to overcome strenuous objections among some members of his political coalition. The move should strengthen his hand in efforts to overcome the continuing protest movement by the private sector and to prepare the way for the crucial congressional elections next March.

General Prats, after being sworn in, described his participation in the cabinet as "not a political commitment, but a patriotic contribution toward social peace." He echoed Allende's own warning that the full force of law will be applied against excesses by extremists of either the left or the right.

Some military officers, presumably including Prats, feel participation in the cabinet will permit them to moderate government policies. The positions held by military officers, however, do not offer them direct influence over key economic and social policies. Nevertheless, as the senior cabinet officer, Prats is now first in the presidential line of succession.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EGYPT

The first signs of yet another potentially troublesome issue for President Sadat have emerged in the past week at Egypt's universities. According to the US Interests Section in Cairo, three separate instances of modest student restiveness have occurred since 28 October. Two of the incidents apparently involved issues not directly connected with the performance of the Sadat regime, but during the third, students voiced criticism of Sadat and Prime Minister Sidqi for following policies toward Israel and the USSR without discernible goals.

The authorities are concerned that student demonstrations could lead to more serious manifestations of discontent and they have attempted to assuage some student grievances. The roots of student discontent, however, lie largely with the lack of direction of the Sadat regime, an uneasiness apparently shared by other Egyptians as well.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CAMBODIA

President Lon Nol has formed a "national committee for peace and concord" to oversee the government's political program for dealing with the Communists. It is to include all cabinet ministers and representatives of Cambodia's two Buddhist orders. The President has also asked opposition political parties to join. Republican Party chief Sirik Matak has agreed to participate [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Some members of the Democratic Party may also take part.

25X1

25X1

The new committee could become a forum for discussing high-level contacts with the Khmer Communists if Lon Nol chooses to move toward that objective. Meanwhile, the government continues its all-out effort to persuade local Communists to rally to the government side.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

JAMAICA-CUBA

Jamaica's Prime Minister Manley informed Ambassador De Roulet Wednesday night that he would grant diplomatic recognition to the Castro government before the end of the month. This would be a joint action with Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago, and Barbados, he explained, and the ambassadors accredited to Havana would not reside there. Manley added that he agreed to the joint move reluctantly and only after receiving certain commitments from the other prime ministers. These commitments apparently include assistance in the struggle Manley is having with Trevor Munroe, a radical leader active at the Jamaican branch of the University of the West Indies.

Joint policy toward Cuba was agreed at the conference of Caribbean Commonwealth prime ministers early last month. Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad-Tobago took the lead in tabling the Cuba resolution at the conference, but Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham has been the real sparkplug on the issue. Guyana has already announced its intention to establish diplomatic ties with Cuba. Jamaica's main interest in Cuba is the presence of some 20,000 of its citizens who have long lived there, but there is no significant public pressure in Jamaica for diplomatic ties. Neither is there such pressure in Trinidad-Tobago or Barbados.

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
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NOTE

Vietnam: For the first time in recent months, Hanoi is sending infiltrators farther south than Military Region 1. In the past few days, intercepted messages have shown the movement of eight new infiltration groups. They are now in southern North Vietnam. Seven of them are earmarked for COSVN-controlled areas of South Vietnam and Cambodia, and the other is bound for the central highlands. The group going to the highlands has 516 men. The intercepts did not reveal the sizes of the other groups, but if they are of average size, the replacements for COSVN could total upwards of 3,000 men.

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4 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

4 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

China's fourth commentary this week about Vietnam implies anxiety about the peace negotiations.

(Page 1)

The Soviets [redacted] West 25X1
German [redacted] (Page 2) 25X1

Government forces have recaptured recently lost towns in southern Laos. (Page 3)

The Soviets [redacted] (Page 3) 25X1

[redacted] Chinese [redacted] (Page 3) 25X1
[redacted] 25X1

The French Air Force is now in possession of tactical nuclear bombs. (Page 3)

[redacted] West Germany [redacted] 25X1.1
(Page 3) 25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHINA-VIETNAM

In their strongest attack yet on the US position regarding a Vietnam settlement, the Chinese have charged that Washington is stalling in order to re-negotiate the "basic content" of an agreement it already had accepted. Peking's commentary, its fourth this week on Vietnam, appeared in People's Daily over the authoritative signature "Commentator" on 3 November. Commentator asserted that the "half-dozen or so points" referred to by Dr. Kissinger last week "are by no means trivial" but are central to a settlement. Because they mesh with President Thieu's main objections, Commentator argued that the US is using Thieu as the cutting edge of its own efforts to "revise all the principal articles in the text of the agreement"--an accord that Peking claims the US accepted in official notes to Hanoi in late October.

This statement sharpens the divergence between Peking and Moscow, which has been markedly more equivocal. Peking's earlier statements also implied anxiety about the state of play in the negotiations, but Commentator on 3 November said flat out that "if the US plan is successful...there will hardly be any prospect of restoring peace in Vietnam." As in earlier commentary, however, Peking's latest statement avoided ruling out further negotiations.

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
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USSR - WEST GERMANY




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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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NOTES

Laos: Government forces have recouped most of their recent losses in the south. On 2 November a five-battalion irregular task force recaptured Keng Kok, a village about 30 miles southeast of Savannakhet, after three days of close combat. The two battalions of North Vietnamese troops that overran Keng Kok last weekend have apparently withdrawn to the east to regroup and resupply. In the southern panhandle, Lao Army units met no opposition in reoccupying the provincial capital of Khong Sedone.

USSR:

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China:

25X1
25X1

25X1

France: Early last month the French Air Force received its first tactical nuclear weapons, according to a recent statement to Parliament by Defense Minister Debré.

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
Debré stated that the Jaguar tactical fighter may also carry nuclear bombs when it is introduced into service in early 1973.

West Germany:

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The President's Daily Brief

6 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

6 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

North and South Korea have agreed on the composition and functions of a committee to work on national unification, and a general spirit of cooperation is evident. A significant increase in the scope and pace of North-South contacts may be ahead. (Page 1)

[redacted] (Page 2)

25X1

25X1

In Laos, Communist attacks have forced an irregular task force to abandon positions south of the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 3)

Cambodian government forces trying to reopen several key highways are making little progress. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

KOREA

In an atmosphere remarkable for its cordiality, Seoul and Pyongyang have reached agreement on the composition and functions of a "Coordinating Committee" to undertake the work of national unification.

The agreement, fashioned in three days of negotiations in Pyongyang by South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak and senior North Korean officials including Premier Kim Il-sung, charges the committee to discuss a broad range of political, social, and economic matters. The ten-man committee is to be made up of individuals of vice ministerial or ministerial rank. The committee will meet alternately in the two capitals every two or three months, with subcommittees convening more frequently. A joint secretariat will be set up at Panmunjom.

To underscore the spirit of cooperation evident in this meeting, the two sides agreed that on 10 November they would end propaganda activities directed at each other. Yi indicated in a press conference in Seoul on Saturday that the agreement could presage a whole range of cooperative endeavors in the near future. He cited as examples a proposal by Kim Il-sung that South Korean fishing boats might fish in northern waters and a suggestion by President Pak Chong-hui that the two sides jointly develop tourism.

While neither side is contemplating steps which would modify their domestic social or political institutions, these recent moves, added to other recent evidence, suggest that there may be a significant increase in the scope and pace of the North-South contacts in the weeks ahead.

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USSR



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


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LAOS

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
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LAOS

The Communists have again struck hard against irregular forces in northern Laos. After several days of preparation, elements of two North Vietnamese regiments on 2 and 3 November carried out ground assaults and heavy shellings against the task force that had been trying to regroup along a ridge about four miles south of the Plaine des Jarres. The attacks forced the irregulars to abandon their positions in that area, and most of them have now fallen back to Pha Dong--some ten miles south of the Plaine's southern edge.

It seems unlikely that this task force, which is the largest of Vang Pao's forces operating against the Plaine, will be able to mount any new offensive operations in the near future. Consequently, it appears that there is little chance for Vang Pao's campaign in the north to achieve any significant successes before the dry season about to begin.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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NOTE

Cambodia: Government forces are making little progress in their efforts to reopen several key highways fanning out from Phnom Penh. The attempt by five government battalions to clear a short stretch of Route 4 has faltered in the face of sharp resistance, and the Communists have mounted harassing attacks elsewhere along the road. Operations to reopen Route 5 to Battambang, closed since mid-August, are making no headway largely because of command and discipline problems. In the south, government troops are offering no serious resistance to Communist pressures against Route 2, about ten miles of which is Communist-controlled.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

7 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Syria [redacted]

2525X1

[redacted] Soviet [redacted] (Page 1)

25X1

The West and East German governments are scheduled to review today the general political treaty concluded yesterday. (Page 2)

The British last week proposed that the US, France, and the UK begin to discuss procedures for diplomatic recognition of East Germany. (Page 3)

In Chile suspension yesterday of the prolonged protest shutdowns permits President Allende to proceed with plans to go abroad and to leave his new interior minister, General Prats, as acting chief executive. (Page 4)

The Black September Organization may be preparing to separate from Fatah and to enter a loose alliance with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. (Page 5)

[redacted] China [redacted]
(Page 6)


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General Secretary Brezhnev appeared on the rostrum yesterday during traditional speeches on the eve of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution.
(Page 6)


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
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SYRIA-USSR



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
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WEST GERMANY - EAST GERMANY

The West and East German governments are scheduled to review today the general political treaty concluded yesterday.

The final version of the draft treaty is not yet available, but according to West German negotiator Bahr, Pankow was willing to include a reference that it disagrees with Bonn on the "national question"--after long rejecting any mention of the issue of common German statehood. Pankow appears willing to receive a West German "letter on national unity," but it is likely to publicize its own views on the question. The East Germans may also have agreed to include, among supporting documents to the treaty, a letter to Bonn in which they acknowledge that Allied rights and responsibilities are not affected by the inter-German treaty. In Bonn's view, such a letter would make clear that this treaty leaves open the question of a final peace treaty for all Germany.

If the two governments approve the treaty, it could be initiated soon in Bonn with formal signature sometime after the West German parliamentary elections on 19 November.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EAST GERMANY

The British last week proposed that the US, France, and the UK begin to discuss procedures for diplomatic recognition of East Germany. A French Foreign Ministry spokesman informed Assistant Secretary Stoessel late last month that France too is interested in establishing formal ties with East Germany. France will consult, he said, but his government wants to be in the forefront of any general Western movement toward normal relations with East Germany.

The British and French--like the Scandinavian governments already on the brink--have political and commercial reasons for recognizing the East Germans. Britain and France are awaiting completion of the inter-German political negotiations and the subsequent lifting of Bonn's objections before approaching Pankow directly.

Should the process of inter-German reconciliation be held up, say by Chancellor Brandt's failure to be re-elected, serious differences could easily arise among the British, French, West Germans, and the US. Some Scandinavian governments, which are more eager to act, would proceed without further regard for Bonn's wishes.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CHILE

Suspension yesterday of the prolonged protest shutdowns has permitted President Allende to proceed with his plans for a trip abroad. His two-week tour will include Mexico, Cuba, and United Nations headquarters. He is expected to leave on or about 17 November.

Allende's willingness to leave his new interior minister, General Prats, as acting chief executive during his absence indicates that he expects no serious problems in the near future.

The long-planned stops in Mexico and Cuba would be in return for visits to Chile during the past year by President Echeverria and Prime Minister Castro.

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General Prats did not resign as army commander when he took the senior cabinet post. He still holds the title of army commander in chief; the army chief of staff is "interim" commander. The way is open for Prats' return to his old post, presumably after the congressional elections in March.

The US Embassy in Santiago points out that whatever commitments Prats feels he may have secured from President Allende, he has in fact assumed considerable personal responsibility for assuring that the government lives up to the promises it made in return for an end to the protest movement.

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FEDAYEEN

The Black September Organization may be preparing to separate from Fatah and to enter a loose alliance with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.



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NOTES

China: [redacted]

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A large rectangular area of the document has been completely redacted with a solid black box.

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USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev appeared on
the rostrum yesterday during traditional speeches
on the eve of the anniversary of the Russian Revolu-
tion. [redacted]


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[redacted] The major speech
was given by politburo member Kiril Mazurov, who em-
phasized Soviet accomplishments in developing better
relations with the West.

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The President's Daily Brief

8 November 1972

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

8 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

West Germany's Chancellor Brandt is trying to make the treaty of reconciliation with East Germany into an election campaign asset. (Page 1)

The Soviet party's foreign policy apparatus seems to be rivaling the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the conduct of relations between states. (Page 2)

Soviet media have prepared the population for President Nixon's re-election. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

WEST GERMANY

Chancellor Brandt is determined to make the treaty of reconciliation with East Germany into an asset in the final days of West Germany's close election campaign. He has announced that the treaty will be initialed today, but not signed until after a new government takes power.

The inter-German treaty is not as strong a document to campaign on as Brandt had hoped. Its strengths are in its psychological impact on the voter as a symbol of the end to cold war with fellow Germans, and in the many practical improvements in communication and travel between the two states. The most popular aspect is likely to be an exchange of letters providing for reunification of families and easier contact with relatives and friends on both sides of the border. West Berlin will be represented in Pankow by Bonn, thus ending fears there that the government might have disregarded the city's interests to achieve a treaty.

From Brandt's point of view, the accord's weaknesses are in its failure to include specific references to eventual reunification of the two Germanies and in the fact that the document is not a final peace treaty ending World War II. Both concepts have long been held as basic to West Germany's policy toward the East; indeed, reunification is stated as a national goal in Bonn's constitution. The government settled for a compromise clause in the document that refers indirectly to the "national question," and for a supplementary letter suggesting that the accord leaves open the question of a peace treaty for all Germany.

Rainer Barzel, the Christian Democratic candidate for chancellor, homed in on this portion of the treaty yesterday, saying that the section on national unity will be particularly scrutinized by his party. He also reserved the right to reopen negotiations with East Germany, if he should be elected.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

We believe there is a shift in relationships under way in Moscow affecting the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The party Central Committee's International Department, which has heretofore concentrated on inter-party relations, has begun to rival the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the conduct of relations between states.

The most compelling evidence of the shift is the increasing prominence of candidate member of the politburo Boris Ponomarev, who oversees the operations of the International Department. Ponomarev has become more and more conspicuous in Soviet diplomacy. He was most recently in evidence during the visit of Italian Premier Andreotti during October, despite the fact that he holds no government position that would justify his participation in the talks.

Until 1970, Ponomarev was rarely seen in a public role not related to his formal responsibilities for dealing with foreign Communists and leftist movements. The only exceptions concerned relations with Arab and African states, and these exceptions may well have been justified by the allegedly "socialist" and "anti-imperialist" nature of many of the governments involved. Since then, his activities have become more diversified, and his competence seems to have broadened to include relations with the West and Japan. During September, for example, in the absence of Foreign Minister Gromyko Ponomarev was the senior Soviet official to confer with a visiting Japanese parliamentary delegation.

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Because Ponomarev rose through the ranks of the party as an associate of Mikhail Suslov, the party's ideologist, his new stature could signify an enhancement of Suslov's influence on the formulation of foreign policy. On the other hand, the rise in prominence of the International Department parallels the

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growing involvement of General Secretary Brezhnev in foreign policy, and could mean that Brezhnev is using Ponomarev and his staff rather than turning to the Foreign Ministry. Many of the men recently appointed to Brezhnev's growing staff of personal foreign policy advisers are veterans of the Central Committee's foreign policy apparatus.

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NOTES

USSR: Soviet media have for some weeks been preparing the Soviet people for the re-election of President Nixon. In commentaries aimed primarily at the Soviet domestic audience, the media have pointed at length to the President's lead in pre-election polls and have stressed voter "dissatisfaction" with various positions of Senator McGovern. The recent improvement in US-Soviet relations has invariably been advanced as one of the primary reasons for the public support of the President.

The US Embassy in Moscow observes that the upturn in US-Soviet relations has resulted in more balanced and thorough treatment of the campaign than in the past, with fewer polemics calling the US election process a sham.

Chile: Kennecott Copper Corporation continues to seek attachment of copper shipments from its expropriated Chilean mine. After favorable court decisions in France and the Netherlands, the company now has a similar case pending in Sweden.


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Laos: The month-old peace talks in Vientiane have yet to register any substantive progress. Both sides are marking time, waiting for Prime Minister Souvanna to return on Thursday from abroad and for further developments in the Vietnam negotiations. To fill in the time, during their weekly meetings government and Lao Communist negotiators have discussed minor procedural matters. Each time both sides have rehearsed their basic positions without any significant change.

Iran: The Shah announced last weekend his intention to expand the Iranian Navy's striking force "several times over" within two years and to extend its defensive operations into the Indian Ocean. This is the first public announcement of the Shah's naval policy and will likely be followed by efforts to obtain more modern naval equipment from the US, Britain, and France.

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9 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

9 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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[Redacted]
Hanoi appears
to be sending a fresh armor regiment and two field
artillery regiments into northern South Vietnam.
(Page 1)

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
Pakistan is taking a number of diplomatic moves favorable to Asian Communist regimes. These steps may reflect President Bhutto's dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his relations with the US. (Page 3)

The Argentine Government appears to be preparing for the return of former dictator Juan Peron. (Page 4)

Uganda's deadline for the departure of non-citizen Asians passed yesterday without major incidents, and most of those required to leave have been evacuated.
(Page 5)

At Annex, we examine the confusing domestic political scene that has prevailed in China since the purge of Lin Piao one year ago.


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VIETNAM



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* * *

Hanoi appears to be sending a fresh armor regiment and two field artillery regiments into northern South Vietnam. Recent North Vietnamese messages, as well as aerial photography and US pilot sightings, have disclosed large numbers of tanks, tracked vehicles, and convoys of artillery moving through the panhandle toward the Demilitarized Zone. One intercept disclosed that 92 tanks had moved through the Vinh area, and other units farther south have reported the passage of three groups of tanks that could be an armor regiment. A message of 5 November from the major enemy logistics authority in northern Quang Tri Province noted that "two ground artillery regiments..." equipped with tracked vehicles and 120 trucks were to move along Route 9 in Quang Tri Province.

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CHINA

It has been a year since the purge of Lin Piao. The ruling politburo has still not been reconstituted by replacement of those military members who went down with Lin. Leadership turnouts and authoritative policy pronouncements have been rare.

Despite the outward appearance of order in China, tensions clearly persist among the surviving leaders. This is evidently recognized by many low- and middle-level party members in China.

Moreover, the protracted campaign throughout the country to repudiate Lin Piao and the absence from view of an increasing number of provincial military leaders suggest that military powerholders in the provinces are under pressure. This involves real risks for domestic political order.

At Annex we examine the confusing domestic political scene in greater detail.

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PAKISTAN

The Bhutto government is taking a number of diplomatic moves favorable to Asian Communist regimes. Yesterday, Islamabad began its formal withdrawal from SEATO. On Tuesday, it recognized Hanoi, and it intends to recognize Pyongyang today. Moreover, Islamabad's next step may be early recognition of Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union."

There appear to be several factors behind these moves. Bhutto wants to increase Pakistan's contacts with other Asian nations, he wishes to ingratiate himself further with Peking, and he needs to counter criticism by leftists at home that his policy is too pro-American.

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A growing dissatisfaction with US policy could also be involved.

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ARGENTINA

On Tuesday Hector Campora, Peron's personal representative in Argentina, announced that the 77-year-old former dictator would return to his homeland on 17 November. Within a few hours President Lanusse told the nation that the armed forces would guarantee Peron's personal safety and deal with any threats to domestic peace by either Peronists or their opponents.

Peron has said before that he would return, and this announcement may be only another attempt to throw the opposition off balance and to pressure Lanusse into agreeing to his demands on Peronist participation in political activity. It seems more likely, however, that this time Peron recognizes that he must return or face a serious loss of prestige.

If Peron does return he may well stay for only a few days, long enough to endorse an electoral accord with the military. The short lead time on Campora's announcement and the tenor of Lanusse's speech suggest that the Peronists and the government are close to an agreement on the conduct of the national elections next March and on the orientation of the government that will take office in May.

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NOTE

Uganda: President Amin's deadline for the departure of non-citizen Asians passed yesterday without major incidents, and most of those required to leave have been evacuated. Some 1,500 stateless Asians remain, however, along with a few thousand Asians with Ugandan citizenship and those exempted because of their much-needed technical skills. The UN has set up departure centers in Kampala for the remaining stateless Asians and will try to move them to facilities in Europe and elsewhere by the end of the week.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO

(Elected April 1969)

STANDING COMMITTEE

Mao Tse-tung (78)
Chairman, Central Committee

 Lin Piao (64)
~~Vice Chairman, Central Committee; Defense Minister~~

 Chou En-lai (73)
Premier

 Ch'en Po-ta (66)
~~Chairman, Cultural Revolution Group~~

 K'ang Sheng (72)
~~Adviser, Cultural Revolution Group; Internal Security Chief~~

WIVES

Chiang Ch'ing (56)
Wife of Mao; First Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution Group

 Yeh Ch'un (44)
~~Wife of Lin Piao; Military Affairs Committee~~

MILITARY LEADERS

Huang Yung-sheng (62)
~~Chief of Staff; Military Affairs Committee~~

 Ch'iu Hui-tso (56)
~~Deputy Chief of Staff; Army Logistics Chief, Military Affairs Committee~~

 Li Tso-p'eng (60)
~~Deputy Chief of Staff; Political Commissar, Navy; Military Affairs Committee~~

 Wu Fa-hsien (58)
~~Deputy Chief of Staff; Commander, Air Force; Military Affairs Committee~~

 Yeh Chien-ying (72)
Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Committee

PROVINCIAL LEADERS

Chi Teng-k'uei (40)*
Vice Chairman, Honan Provincial Revolutionary Committee

 Ch'en Hsi-lien (60)
Commander, Shen-yang Military Region; Chairman, Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Committee

 Li Hsueh-feng (64)*
~~Chairman, Hopeh Provincial Revolutionary Committee~~

 Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (59)
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Second Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution Group

 Li Te-sheng (61)*
Commander, Anhwei Military District; Chairman, Anhwei Provincial Revolutionary Committee

 Hsu Shih-yu (64)
Vice Minister of Defense; Commander, Nanking Military Region; Chairman, Kiangu Provincial Revolutionary Committee

 Yao Wen-yuan (36)
Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Member, Cultural Revolution Group

GOVERNMENT LEADERS

Hsieh Fu-chih (69)
~~Public Security Minister; Chairman, Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Vice Premier~~

 Li Hsien-nien (66)
Finance Minister

 Wang Tung-hsing (age unknown)*
Public Security Vice Minister; Director, General Office, Party Central Committee

HONORARY ELDERS

Chu Te (85)
~~Chairman, National People's Congress~~

 Liu Po-ch'eng (79)
~~Vice Chairman, National People's Congress; Military Affairs Committee~~

 Tung Pi-wu (85)
~~Vice Chairman, People's Republic of China~~

*Alternate Members

Inactive

Purged or dead

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

DOMESTIC POLITICS, CHINESE STYLE

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The events of last autumn drastically altered the political edifice in Peking, but the surviving leaders have, at least up to now, managed the crisis well. Basic social order has been maintained. The military has remained stable while being urged by the regime to be subordinate to civilian party control. The trend toward moderation in domestic policies--a trend evident since 1969, and one that has wide popular support--has been even more pronounced since Lin's departure from the scene. In the conduct of foreign affairs, Peking has scored a succession of triumphs in 1972, the fruition of its decision several years ago to adopt a more pragmatic and outgoing foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the domestic political difficulties faced by Peking are major ones, and the leadership has thus far reacted with extreme caution. Peking's problems are most evident within the politburo itself; only 16 of the original 25 members named in 1969 are still being mentioned in the official press by name, and of these only a dozen appear to be participating in the affairs of state in a meaningful way. The delay in reconstituting the politburo is doubtless associated with the question of the military's future representation on that body. While the regime wrestles with this problem, the armed forces are without a designated leader. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying has been serving as de facto defense minister but has not been formally appointed to the position.

The Issues

Because Lin was officially designated Mao's successor, Peking also faces a major task of working out a new formula for succession. For several years, Peking has delayed convening the National People's Congress, the state forum for legitimizing institutional and personnel changes. Presumably this delay has stemmed from disputes within the leadership, and among these issues has been the wisdom and utility of many of the changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution. The idea of a post-Mao "collective leadership" has persistently surfaced in the past year; it is likely that it is the mix of this collective, rather than the principle itself, that is now at issue.

The regime's handling of the Lin affair has made it appear that the central issue in Peking is one of civilian versus military control. In fact, the issue is much more complex. Evidence--some of it antedating Lin's demise--indicates the institutional problem is a real one. Nevertheless, the

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leadership is deeply divided on a much wider range of policy and personnel questions. Moreover, developments during the Cultural Revolution clearly created and intensified antipathies between leaders who were identified with its excesses and those of a more moderate persuasion. It is hard to believe these antipathies have now vanished, or that they no longer cut across institutions and interest groups, including the armed forces.

Some Anomalies

The actual facts surrounding the demise of Lin Piao in September 1971 may never be known. Most of those at politburo level who were purged with Lin had long been associated with him and were clearly identified with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. In fact, however, the affair claimed high-level military victims at both ends of the political spectrum. Moreover, a campaign against ultra-leftists--which began in late 1969, evidently under the direction of Chou En-lai--has been muted if not terminated altogether, even though it has not reached all of its potential victims. Chiang Ching, deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group which directed Mao's purge of the old party apparatus, seemingly should have been the next target, but as Mao's wife she apparently is immune. Two other prominent leftists, Shanghai party leaders Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, also continue to appear frequently in Peking.

In contrast to these inconsistencies in personnel matters, China appears at present to be traveling on a single policy track. Rationality and pragmatism seem to be the order of the day, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic areas dear to Mao's heart, such as education. There are no convincing signs that this approach is being opposed or debated at the moment.

One element that almost certainly is raising political temperatures is the protracted effort to repudiate Lin Piao. The notion that Lin, the defense minister and Mao's designated successor, could turn against his mentor has sharply eroded confidence in the country's leadership, not only among party officials but among the populace at large. Since early this year, cadres have been studying a succession of documents purporting to spell out the details of Lin's coup plot. The key item in this series, the so-called "571 document," contains Lin's purported operations plan. The plan lists not only those forces that Lin allegedly could count on for support--primarily the air force--but also a number of other military units he supposedly was attempting to enlist in the plot. The implication is that there

CHINA: Missing Provincial Military Leaders



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

still are elements within the armed forces whose loyalty is questionable. The most ominous sign in this connection is the latest available document in the anti-Lin series, issued in early July, which suggests that the central authorities will not in the future need written evidence of complicity in the Lin "conspiracy" in order to move against given individuals.

Problems in the Provinces

Some members of the leadership may in fact be exploiting the Lin affair in order to move against military powerholders in the provinces. This impression has been reinforced in recent weeks by the failure of an increasing number of these leaders to make public appearances

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A move against provincial military leaders, even on a selective basis, risks jeopardizing domestic political order. The Cultural Revolution destroyed the leadership of the old party and government bureaucracies, leaving the military as the only effective instrument of control. Some efforts have been made to re-establish the civilian party structure and reassert its traditional leading role in the Chinese polity. It is clear, however, that military leaders still hold the balance of power in the party apparatus outside of Peking. Thus a move against these military leaders, particularly if it is widespread, could cause a breakdown in control, with no alternative mechanism available to fill the void.

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The continuing denunciation of Lin and the accompanying "rectification" movement within the party and the army seem to have Mao's consent.

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Mao may see the campaign as an opportunity to settle personal scores with a number of provincial military leaders, primarily those whose opposition to the Red Guard movement led him to close out the Cultural Revolution before he felt he had accomplished all of his objectives.

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On the other hand, Mao must recognize that his close personal identification with Lin renders him vulnerable in certain important ways. The 571 document contains some unusually harsh words about Mao's leadership. In effect, it accuses Mao of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, characterizing him as a "cruel tyrant." This attack on the Chairman is attributed to Lin, and it has been circulated

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with Mao's explicit approval, but the effect has been to give wide publicity to a list of grievances against Mao with which most of the populace can readily identify.

Mao and Chou

During 1972, Mao and Chou have seemed to work very closely on most matters. Chou has constantly been at Mao's side during the Chairman's meetings with visiting state leaders, and in the course of the detailed negotiations with foreign powers, Chou has made it clear that he always defers to Mao on broad policy matters. Similarly, Mao has on several occasions publicly acknowledged his confidence in Chou.



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Provincial leaders are not now faced, either collectively or individually, with the massive public attacks and orchestrated violence that were so provocative in the 1967-68 period. In the absence of such a direct challenge--and Peking has gone to some lengths to indicate that such a challenge is not forthcoming--it is unlikely that they could or would unite to defy the authority of the Chairman directly. This seems particularly to be the case in the absence of a strong and authoritative leader for such a move.

It is difficult to cast Chou in such a role. His concern for the loyalty of the armed forces to the political system is surely as great as his concern for the cohesion of the military establishment, and on both grounds he is likely to attempt to "limit the damage" rather than place himself at the head of a group determined to end the selective purge of the military by open defiance of Mao. Today Chou seems to have the endorsement of the Chairman for much of his domestic program as well as for his foreign policy, and this is an asset he will not cast away lightly. Thus, a Mao-Chou split seems highly improbable now.

Mao's motives in the present situation are equally complicated. Certainly vindictiveness and a desire to settle old scores play a major part in the current moves against the provincial military. But the explicit attempts to reassure the military

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

that it is not about to suffer a thoroughgoing "rectification," coupled with continued emphasis on relatively conservative and pragmatic policies at home as well as abroad, seem to indicate that the Chairman's offensive is at this point a limited one. Like Chou, he seems intent for the moment to limit the damage. His objective could well be to establish a better balance between competing leftist and conservative forces--and hence further increase his own freedom of maneuver--by whittling away at the predominantly conservative military leaders in the provinces through a process of linking them, however tenuously, to the Lin "plot."

To create this better balance, Mao may eventually do more than merely whittle away. Most recent appointments have involved relatively conservative persons who were under attack during the Cultural Revolution, but two others do not fall into this category. These latter appointments suggest at least the possibility of a leftward swing in the political pendulum. Whatever the case, it is clear that further changes are in prospect and that tensions will persist for some time within the leadership.

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10 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

10 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In South Vietnam, Communist forces appear to be having some morale problems, partly because of uncertainty about a cease-fire date. Both they and the South Vietnamese are cutting down on military action. (Page 1)

Bangkok is moving ahead toward improved relations with China despite deep skepticism regarding Pe-king's intentions. (Page 2)

We have indications that the fedayeen may take some anti-Israeli action on Cyprus. (Page 3)

Cambodian government forces have ousted the Communists who have been blocking Route 5 since last August. (Page 4)

Some of Chilean President Allende's political allies appear to be challenging Interior Minister Prats over handling the recent strikers. (Page 4)

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VIETNAM

Reports of declining enemy morale are cropping up with increasing frequency. Many captured enemy soldiers appear disillusioned and confused, complaining of food and supply shortages and hardships caused by allied air and artillery power. The slippage in the expected cease-fire deadline has contributed to the demoralization. The Communist hierarchy is trying to counter this problem by portraying the agreement worked out with the US as a "fundamental victory" for the Communists. A recently captured COSVN document providing guidance to cadres and soldiers claimed that the cease-fire should be understood as a "transitional period" that will lead to "greater victories."

Uncertainty about a cease-fire date has prompted some military commands in the northern provinces to withdraw troops from the battlefield and send them to rear areas for political indoctrination.

The recent trend away from frequent use of artillery to less expensive mortars may also reflect indecision on the part of some local commanders. These commanders had received orders to stage large-scale attacks immediately preceding and just following the announcement of a cease-fire, but the unexpected delays in the cease-fire timetable may have forced them to alter their tactics and to conserve ammunition.

The South Vietnamese are also letting up. Although some commanders are claiming victories in keeping the enemy away from Saigon's doorstep, much of the territory that has fallen to the Communists since last spring has not been retaken. A South Vietnamese Marine operation launched last week against enemy defenses west of Quang Tri City was beaten back, and units in other areas have had difficulty in keeping the major roads open.

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THAILAND-CHINA

Thai envoy Prasit Kanchanawat, who headed the Thai delegation to the Canton Trade Fair last month following an earlier visit to Peking, told Ambassador Unger early this week that Thailand would begin trading with China as soon as arrangements for a formal mechanism are worked out. Prasit indicated that Bangkok prefers to set up a state trading organization, a process he believed would take at least two months.

In discussing general relations with Peking, Prasit tried to sound out the US reaction to any loosening of Thailand's ties with Taiwan along the lines of the recent Japanese move in that direction.

Despite deep skepticism regarding Chinese intentions, Bangkok appears to be moving steadily ahead in improving relations. When and if the Thai decide to establish diplomatic links, we do not see them letting the Taiwan issue stand in the way.

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FEDAYEEN-CYPRUS


The Israeli ambassador in Nicosia has told Ambassador Popper he has fragmentary information that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine will soon attack the Israeli Embassy. His concern is heightened by what he considers to be an unsatisfactory response from the Cypriot police to his requests for stronger protection for official Israeli installations.

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So far the fedayeen have refrained from direct action on Cyprus so that the island would not be denied to them as a transit stop and contact point for operations elsewhere. They may now believe, however, that a spectacular action against the Israelis in Cyprus would outweigh the risks to their local assets.

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NOTES

Cambodia: Government forces have dislodged the Communists from the section of Route 5 south of Kompong Chhnang City they had occupied for nearly three months. The highway must undergo repairs, however, before it can be reopened to regular commercial traffic from Battambang in the northwest. Other forces trying to clear Route 4 continue to meet heavy resistance. In the south, the government is preparing to launch a new operation to reopen Route 2 to Takeo, which is under increasing Communist pressure.

Chile: Socialist Party leader Altamirano is demanding severe punishment for those who took part in the long protest movement that ended on Monday. Moreover, some of the merchants who took part in the strike are now unable to secure goods from the government-dominated distribution system. General Prats, when he became interior minister last week, guaranteed that there would be no reprisals against the strikers. He thus seems to be facing a direct challenge by some of President Allende's political allies.

Guatemala: [redacted]

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East Germany - West Germany: The increased flight of East German refugees to West Germany could create difficulties in improving East-West German relations. The number of refugees has tripled since the implementation last June of the Four Power and inter-German transit agreements on Berlin. More than 200 refugees have registered with West Berlin authorities since June. One of Pankow's principal concerns regarding the Berlin accords was that they would result in a sharp increase in illegal departures. The East Germans have not yet raised the issue with Bonn, perhaps because they want to avoid adding to Brandt's re-election problems.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Israel-Syria: An Israeli military spokesman has announced that the Israeli air attack yesterday on two Syrian Army posts near the Golan Heights was in retaliation for an attempted guerrilla ambush yesterday and a mining incident the previous day in which an Israeli civilian was wounded. The attack drew a Syrian artillery response and this in turn led to further heavy Israeli air strikes against Syrian artillery positions. The Syrians admit to the loss of two MIG-21s. Despite Syrian claims, no Israeli aircraft appear to have been lost.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Top Secret



The President's Daily Brief

11 November 1972

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declassification schedule of E.O. 14176
exemption category 5B(1)(2)(3)
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

11 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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[redacted] (Page 1)

In Laos, Vang Pao is preparing new offensive operations toward the southern tip of the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 2)

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Chancellor Brandt is skillfully exploiting the inter-German treaty in the election campaign.
(Page 5)

At Annex, we examine the inter-German treaty in relation to Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik and analyze what the agreement does for each side.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

General Vang Pao is preparing another attempt to advance north toward the Plaine des Jarres. Several understrength irregular battalions, about 1,300 troops, are being airlifted to Khang Kho to join the 500-800 irregulars holding the government's only remaining high ground position in the hills about four miles south of the Plaine. They will attempt to secure the area in preparation for offensive operations toward the Plaine.

An intercept of 9 November shows that Communist units have been alerted to the possibility of another government advance.

The North Vietnamese still have major elements of three infantry regiments in the area, in addition to armor and artillery units. They should be able to repel Vang Pao's troops. Nevertheless, the push will hamper any Communist concentration against the government's defense lines between the Plaine and Long Tieng.

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USSR



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


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
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


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WEST GERMANY

Chancellor Brandt is skillfully exploiting the inter-German treaty in the current election campaign. The publicity attending each of the stages involved in concluding the treaty has served to keep Brandt in the limelight and to focus public attention on Ostpolitik, his strong point, rather than on domestic issues such as inflation, where he is vulnerable.

Opposition leader Barzel's public comments on the treaty have been cautious, but he is worried about its effect on the elections. Yesterday, Barzel complained bitterly to Ambassador Hillenbrand about the Four Power declaration on the treaty, characterizing the declaration as interference in the German electoral campaign. He sharply criticized the treaty itself and said it was unacceptable as it now stands. Barzel said he would accordingly make a comprehensive statement on the subject before the elections, although he did not intend to criticize the allies in that statement.

Despite the treaty, the election is far from in the bag for Brandt. A late October poll--taken before the treaty but after the announcement of a further rise in the cost-of-living index in September--showed new slippage for the government parties. Although the coalition Social Democrats and Free Democrats together remained slightly ahead of the opposition, the Free Democrats hovered just above the minimum five percent needed for parliamentary representation.

Aside from the treaty's immediate impact on the election, it is a development of major importance for West Germany and its role in Europe in the era of detente. These aspects are discussed at Annex.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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WEST GERMANY - EAST GERMANY

The inter-German treaty initialed in Bonn on 8 November is a compromise. Although the negotiators were unable to resolve sharply opposed views on the fundamentals of relations between the two states, the treaty establishes a basis on which East and West Germany can take up formal relations with each other for the first time. Beyond this, the pact complements the West German treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland of 1970 in satisfying Eastern conditions for more normal relations, and is thus a principal element in Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik. The treaty is part and parcel of Brandt's innovative effort over the past decade to ease East-West tensions and lift the mortgages of the war--all with the greater goal--in Brandt's view--of promoting conditions in Central Europe conducive to eventual German reunification. Although an inter-German treaty was not a prerequisite for holding a Conference on European Security or beginning MBFR talks, it nevertheless serves to generate new momentum in this area.

For Pankow, the treaty opens the way to the long-elusive Western acceptance of its legitimacy, which in turn will lead to general international recognition, membership in the UN and other international organizations, and participation in international accords and conventions. For Moscow the treaty, along with the earlier Soviet and Polish treaties, provides a kind of confirmation of postwar Central European "political realities."

The treaty will quickly open the way to completing Ostpolitik's structural framework. Bonn and Prague will soon renew their efforts to find a compromise on the issue of the Munich Agreement of 1938--the major roadblock to conclusion of a treaty of reconciliation. Bonn will then move to establish diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria. The ensuing fleshing out of Ostpolitik will see a gradual expansion of West German economic and political activity throughout Eastern Europe.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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The treaty undermines some fundamental pretensions of both states--East Germany as the nucleus of a Communist Germany, and West Germany as the only legitimate German government--but leaves others untouched. The statement that the two continue to disagree on issues of principle, "including the national question," allows Bonn to maintain that there is still a common German nationhood. It also permits Pankow to assert that common nationhood disappeared with the creation of two German states. Pankow refused to include in the treaty itself references to the absence of a World War II peace treaty and to continuing Four Power rights and responsibilities in Germany and Berlin, on grounds they would impugn East Germany's sovereignty. Pankow did, however, agree to exchange letters acknowledging that the treaty does not affect Allied rights and responsibilities, and Bonn can point to the new Four Power declaration affirming these rights as safeguarding its position. The agreement to exchange "permanent representatives" is a compromise designed to meet Pankow's desire to establish diplomatic relations and Bonn's insistence on not recognizing East Germany as a foreign country.

Brandt never expected the treaty to "bring down the Berlin Wall." He does, however, hope to inaugurate an era of easing tensions and abating hostilities in inter-German relations, and to improve the conditions of people in both countries. Thus, for him, almost as important as the treaty itself are the ancillary agreements that have been or soon will be reached with East Germany. As arranged during the negotiations, the East Germans will open a number of new border crossing points, permit children to join parents who fled to West Germany, and allow West Germans residing near the frontier to visit adjacent areas in East Germany. For the first time Bonn and Pankow will accept and accredit each other's press correspondents.

Recognition of East Germany

Several countries, including many NATO allies, are eager to recognize East Germany for what they see as both political and economic advantage. Bonn is seeking reaffirmation by NATO that recognition should await treaty ratification, but Denmark and

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Norway claim to be under domestic pressure and may disregard any NATO strictures. [redacted]

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[redacted] the British are urging that the US, British, and French missions in Berlin begin consultations to coordinate their approaches to Pankow. The neutrals--Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Switzerland--may move as soon as late November or early December, regardless of Bonn's views.

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The international recognition and UN membership that the inter-German treaty will bring in its train should give an unprecedented boost, at least in the short term, to the self-confidence of the East German regime. At home, however, it will have to maintain its guard against any erosion of its control stemming from increased contacts with West Germany. Interest in travel to the West has revived since the conclusion of the Berlin agreements, and there has been a marked increase in refugees.

Internationally, Pankow can be expected to follow the Soviet lead closely, for East Germany remains the linchpin of Moscow's European security system. Nevertheless, it is possible that CSCE and MBFR will evolve in such a way as to weaken the East German - Soviet interdependency and to promote assertiveness in Pankow. There is evidence, even aside from Ulbricht's dismissal, that Ostpolitik has caused some strain in Pankow's relations with Moscow. Soviet diplomats involved in the Four Power negotiations on the Berlin Agreement in 1971 and in the talks this year concerning UN membership of both German states have testified to East German sensitivity and stubbornness on issues affecting Pankow's conception of its sovereignty.

With Ostpolitik, of which this treaty is a major component, West Germany has served notice that it has come of age in international affairs. The essence of the new spirit in Bonn is that West German governments henceforth will be more assertive of what they perceive to be their national self-interest. Although West Germany's orientation will remain essentially Western, leaders in Bonn will increasingly be dealing with the Soviets, Chinese, and Eastern Europeans, and these states

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

will have a greater presence in West Germany than heretofore. Should Barzel replace Brandt, however, he would be politically more limited in the pursuit of Ostpolitik.

In any event, the inter-German treaty does not necessarily signal the end of all the old cold-war tensions. There are still many differences and much mutual distrust that will not be quickly overcome. Moreover, the treaty is something of a gamble for Bonn. Pankow's gains--international recognition and UN membership--cannot be withdrawn, but West Germany's are largely intangible. Bonn's concrete gains lie largely outside the treaty in the areas of practical improvements granted by Pankow. These presumably are still subject to restriction when and if it should suit Soviet and East German interests.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



The President's Daily Brief

Summer cable, 12 Nov 72

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12 NOV 1972

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Saigon's pro-government newspaper Tin Song has published a commentary on General Haig's visit. Quoting a "highly placed source," Tin Song stated that President Thieu, in his talks with General Haig and Ambassador Bunker, maintained that the Communists have over 300,000 troops in the south, not 140,000 as the US claims, and that all of these must be withdrawn. The newspaper quoted the source as saying that Thieu would not be satisfied with "any temporary withdrawal of a symbolic number of 14,000 North Vietnamese troops," and that any "tacit agreements" were invalid. The commentary maintained that all future agreements on South Vietnam "must be decided by the South Vietnamese people themselves," that the "right of self determination" for the country's entire population must be respected, and that "no future peace agreement can be signed on their behalf."

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Sunday Cable, 12 Nov 72

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM

The Vietnamese Communists have begun hitting the "Thieu-must-go" theme again, which they had been avoiding over the past several weeks. The Hanoi party daily on 10 November called Thieu an "obstacle to be removed." The same point was made again yesterday. Also, Madame Binh stated at the Paris talks on Thursday that he "should resign." Under pressure from nowhere, however, PRG spokesman Ly Van Sau acknowledged that the PRG was still willing to talk with a Saigon government headed by Thieu after truce
the agreement is signed.

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
FEDAYEEN



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Lufthansa has been the target of two fedayeen hijackings this year. In February, a reported \$5 million dollars was paid for the release of one Lufthansa aircraft commandeered by the PFLP, and in October the perpetrators of the Munich incident were given their freedom for the release of another taken over by the Black September organization.



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The President's Daily Brief

13 November 1972

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

13 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

A pro-government Saigon newspaper reports that President Thieu asserts the Communists have over 300,000 troops in the South, and that all of these must be withdrawn. The Communists, meanwhile, have begun hitting the "Thieu-must-go" theme again, which they had been avoiding over the past several weeks.
(Page 1)

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A South Vietnamese operation launched north and west of Quang Tri City on Saturday has encountered increased resistance.

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(Page 2)

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In Laos, government irregulars reoccupied Dong Hene in the central panhandle on Saturday, capping a ten-day counteroffensive that began with the recapture of nearby Keng Kok. *(Page 4)*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM

A South Vietnamese operation launched north and west of Quang Tri City on Saturday has encountered increased resistance. Intercepts show that elements of one North Vietnamese division north of the city have been ordered to positions blocking the South Vietnamese, and that elements of another division have been alerted for possible relocation to the Quang Tri City area.

Although these divisions bore the brunt of the enemy's defense of the city before it was recaptured by the government last August, they apparently are now sufficiently recovered to return to combat.

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In the Que Son Valley, a regiment of the North Vietnamese 711th Division has been detected close to Fire Support Base Ross. Intercepts and prisoners indicate that the Communists will soon mount new attacks in the Que Son area, possibly with armor and artillery support. South Vietnamese forces in coastal Binh Dinh Province, meanwhile, have retaken Hoai An District capital, the last district center that was under enemy control in the province.

In the southern provinces, the Communists directed a 51-round rocket barrage in two separate attacks against Bien Hoa Airbase yesterday, causing only light damage and a few casualties. A North Vietnamese regiment that had been heavily engaged in the fighting north of Saigon appears to have pulled back for rest and refitting. Another Communist regiment in the same area is reported to have lost nearly two thirds of its personnel during the past few weeks, including the regimental commander and deputy commander.

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
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
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
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LAOS:Central Panhandle



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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Laos: Government irregulars reoccupied Dong Hene in the central panhandle on Saturday after several days of bitter fighting, capping a ten-day counteroffensive that began with the recapture of nearby Keng Kok. At the same time, however, a North Vietnamese battalion overran a lightly defended government outpost some 15 miles southeast of Keng Kok. On Sunday, enemy forces also attacked the town of Thakhek in the Mekong Valley. In the north, General Vang Pao's forces made no significant headway over the weekend near the Plaine des Jarres. Late yesterday, the Communists hit Luang Prabang airfield with 40 122-mm. rockets, which destroyed one aircraft and damaged ten others. The airfield itself suffered only light damage, and casualties were also light. The enemy failed to follow up the barrage with a ground attack.

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The President's Daily Brief

14 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

14 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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The Libyans are seeking large amounts of Western military equipment, and have secured a major arms package from Italy and a lesser one from Britain. At least some equipment is likely to end up in Egyptian hands. (Page 3)

On Page 4 we discuss the outlook for the Japanese elections called for 10 December, including their significance for the factional balance within the ruling party.

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


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
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LIBYA

The Libyans are seeking large amounts of Western military equipment. A joint Libyan-Egyptian arms purchasing mission now in London has obtained some small arms

The Italians recently agreed to a deal involving a major arms package, in exchange for favorable terms to the Italian state-owned oil firm operating in Libya. This agreement may encourage the Libyans to reiterate their request to purchase F-5 aircraft from the US, citing US oil interests in Libya as a bargaining tool. Libyan Prime Minister Jallud also recently tried to buy additional French arms, including tanks and light armored vehicles, rockets, and long-range artillery.

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The Libyans are likely to turn at least some of these arms over to Egypt, which could provide Cairo with a partial alternative to Soviet weapons. The French will require the Libyans to adhere to terms similar to those in the 1969 Mirage aircraft contract that forbids third-country use of the arms, but such stipulations will become meaningless if the prospective merger between Egypt and Libya, scheduled for September 1973, is carried out.

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JAPAN


The Liberal Democrats should retain a comfortable majority in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 10 December. Broad public support for Prime Minister Tanaka's normalization of relations with Peking, and his unprecedented personal popularity, have dimmed the opposition's hopes of recouping losses suffered in the elections three years ago.

With rather modest prospects for gains by the opposition, Japanese public attention will be on competition among the Liberal Democrats. In many cases, the voters will choose among candidates representing factions of the same party as well as among the parties.

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
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


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The President's Daily Brief

15 November 1972

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excluded under authority 5B(1), (2), (3)
declassified under authority of
the Director of Central Intelligence

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

15 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Campaigning has opened for the Australian election on 2 December. The Labor Party, out of power for 23 years, is likely to make a strong pitch for votes by taking issue with aspects of the government's defense policies. (Page 1)

Uruguay's President Bordaberry is cast in the delicate role of middleman between the restive military and angry politicians in the case of a prominent political leader who is currently under military detention. (Page 2)

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(Page 3)

South Vietnamese troops are advancing against Communist forces north and west of Quang Tri City. (Page 3)

At Annex, we discuss the military-civilian crisis in Uruguay.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

AUSTRALIA

Campaigning officially opened this week for the election on 2 December. The Labor Party, out of power for 23 years, is making a strong bid to replace Prime Minister McMahon's Liberal-Country coalition government. The polls suggest that the vote will be close.

We expect defense policies to be the main campaign issue. Labor has no quarrel with the present level of defense expenditures. It takes sharp issue, however, with the government's doctrine of "forward" defense that resulted in the commitment of Australian forces to Vietnam and the presence of almost 3,000 Australian troops in Singapore and Malaysia.

A Labor government might also accelerate the trend already under way toward a more independent international stance, but both contenders continue to look on alliance with the United States as the cornerstone of Australian foreign policy.

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
URUGUAY

Senator Jorge Batlle, the prominent political leader arrested more than two weeks ago, remains under military detention pending a decision on how--or whether--he will be punished for his strong denunciation of growing military involvement in public affairs. Batlle's supporters, a strong faction within President Bordaberry's own Colorado Party, have been unable thus far to have the case transferred to a civil court. The president continues in the delicate role of middleman between the respective military and the angry politicians.

Tension has temporarily eased but could quickly flare again. The spark may come later this month when the military seeks congressional approval for yet another period of suspended constitutional guarantees.

At Annex, we discuss this military-civilian crisis as just one symptom of the decay that in recent years has beset Uruguay--once Latin America's shining example of a working democracy and a progressive welfare state.

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


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
NOTES



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South Vietnam: South Vietnamese troops are advancing against well-entrenched Communist forces north and west of Quang Tri City. Airborne troops, who recaptured Fire Support Base Anne yesterday, intend to move north toward Fire Support Base Pedro and eventually as far as Cam Lo. South Vietnamese Marines have also been clearing Communist forces out of the area south of the Cua Viet River. Intercepted messages show continuing North Vietnamese efforts to reinforce Communist troops defending in this area.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

URUGUAY: THE MILITARY IN A CRUMBLING UTOPIA

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The recent emergence of the army as a power in Uruguayan public life is unprecedented in this century. It is a reflection of the steady deterioration in Uruguayan life under way since the early 1950s. Many officers feel they may be able to help reverse the decline. Thus some form of extra-constitutional military action has become a real possibility.

During the first half of this century Uruguay enjoyed the highest per capita wealth in Latin America, and distributed it more equitably than any other country in the area. An effective democratic political system under civilian control and one of the world's most comprehensive social welfare systems made it the symbol of Latin American enlightenment.

The bubble burst about 20 years ago when world demand and prices for Uruguay's beef, hide, and wool exports began a drastic plunge. The country has been sliding from riches to rags ever since, and has suffered one of the world's most devastating inflationary spirals. It can no longer afford the bloated costs of its welfare system and yet, politically, the government cannot afford to make the drastic cuts and changes required to stem the tide.

--Today, about 60 percent of government expenditures are paid in wages to government workers, who make up about 25 percent of the country's total work force.

--Agriculture is in decline, the land has not been improved for lack of investment money and, in the critical cattle industry, it now takes almost double the number of steers to produce a ton of beef that it does in the US or Argentina.

--Industry has become less competitive because of government subsidies and controls.

--Nineteen of the 22 government-controlled corporations are in the red.

The prolonged economic deterioration has had a profound effect on the lives and the attitudes of the people, particularly the young people. Denied opportunities for a meaningful livelihood and unable to see any hope in the decrepit and immobile

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political system, thousands of them have emigrated. Some of them, however, imbued with a Latin sense of revolutionary mystique, chose to try to destroy the system in the hope that something better might emerge from the ashes. These formed the nucleus of the Tupamaros, who emerged by the late 1960s as Latin America's most formidable terrorist group.

Last April, the Tupamaros deliberately raised the level of terrorism by gunning down four government officials, including two police officers and a former cabinet member. The new president, Juan Maria Bordaberry, with uncharacteristic swiftness, demanded that a "State of Internal War" be declared and that the nation's armed forces lead the battle against the terrorists. Although many of Bordaberry's supporters in the congress, as well as his opposition, expressed serious fears that the measures might curtail popular freedoms, they gave Bordaberry and the military a limited period of special powers. These included the transfer of persons suspected of security crimes to military jurisdiction and the suspension of constitutional guarantees. Powers like this had been granted under the preceding administration, but for the first time the armed forces were to become completely involved in the anti-terrorist campaign.

In less than seven months the military has managed to wreck a terrorist organization that had earned the envy and respect of guerrilla groups throughout the Western Hemisphere. This result was achieved by a push to capture as many members and suspects as possible, by rapid and forceful interrogations, and by hunting down Tupamaro weapons caches and hiding places. As the campaign progressed, some Tupamaros surrendered without duress, and the organization came crashing down. Although the Tupamaros retain some residual capability to harass the government, it will be a long time before they could again be equipped or manned to mount a major operation.

The success against the Tupamaros marks a spectacular victory for the armed forces--perhaps the first really positive step forward by any sector of Uruguayan society in two decades. The army, which has been at the heart of the anti-terrorist campaign, is flushed with success. Its leaders have reasoned that their victory over the guerrillas might possibly be translated into a campaign to correct the many ills of the society. They have but to look around them to see other military forces already started down that road--in Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. Unlike those countries, however, Uruguay has a long and strong tradition of military


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non-involvement in politics, an officer corps that has been generally opposed to overt political activity, and a highly sophisticated and politicized population that generally favors the existing democratic process.

Yet, the extensive interrogation of the Tupamaros and the resulting accumulation of intelligence information have revealed to the military leadership that corruption--or "economic crime"--is a factor in the poor performance of the economy, and a major issue on which the Tupamaros had won popularity. More significantly, the "economic criminals" appear to be some of the leading political figures in the nation. Suspects include Senator Batlle, one of the major factional leaders in Bordaberry's Colorado Party; Wilson Perreira Aldunate, the leader of the opposition Blanco bloc in the congress; and Jorge Peirano Facio, a former foreign minister. Under army pressure, President Bordaberry permitted Batlle's arrest. Batlle remains in jail, and the military, having come this far on essentially ad hoc maneuvers, must sit down and ponder the next move.

Bordaberry's government, while notable for quieting the threat of terrorism, has done little to solve the problems that are causing Uruguay to decay. No effort has been made to correct the serious abuses of the welfare system and no moves are planned to expand traditional exports or to stimulate the economy in any direction. It seems clear that the armed forces are no longer going to be satisfied to leave the Uruguayan "mess" in the hands of the politicians, but it is also clear that they do not, at this stage, have a plan of action. Continued lack of movement by Bordaberry and the civilian government to correct the economic slide may stimulate army pressure for action. If the response is unsatisfactory, the long tradition of military non-involvement could be broken.

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16 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

16 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Laotian peace talks are getting to serious discussion of the Communist proposals. (Page 1)

Britain's forceful entry into Europe is causing concern in Paris about France's role as a leader of the Communities. (Page 3)

East German propaganda reviling Bonn's Social Democrats is designed to help enhance internal security rather than to signal a renegeing on the inter-German accord. (Page 4)

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LAOS


For the first time since peace talks opened five weeks ago, government negotiator Pheng Phongsavan on Tuesday spoke directly to the Lao Communists' five-point peace proposal.

Simply stated, the Communist proposal calls for freedom of resettlement and travel of people displaced by the war;

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
[redacted] neutrality in Laotian foreign policy; formation of a new provisional government and other entities to prepare for a permanent government; and a cease-fire in place.

The key areas of disagreement, not surprisingly, concern the mechanics of an internal political settlement and the precise terms of a cease-fire. The Communists refuse to resume their place in the present government. The government insists that a settlement provide for withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from Laos, and not just Thai forces and US advisers.



During talks on the issue of a cease-fire in place, the government negotiator has counterproposed that both sides withdraw to 1962 cease-fire lines. This is not as simple as it sounds, for no cease-fire lines were agreed to in the Geneva Accords of that year. In fact, both sides accepted the 1962 accords without abandoning conflicting claims to large chunks of territory.

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At the moment, the Communists control more territory than they did in 1962. In the south, they hold the Bolovens Plateau, and in the north, the Plaine des Jarres. During the latest negotiations, neither side has given up efforts to gain territory in advance of a cease-fire. The Communists have been successful in keeping General Vang Pao's irregulars from reoccupying any part of the Plaine des Jarres, but the government has retaken several towns near the Bolovens Plateau.

Souvanna told a journalist yesterday that he has called for a meeting with Souphanouvong in Luang Prabang, the royal capital, presumably to try to work out details of a settlement as they did in 1962.

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UK-FRANCE

Britain is demonstrating a growing assertiveness in European affairs since it was accepted for membership in the Common Market. Prime Minister Heath's strong role during his first European summit meeting in October is but one example. Britain's Defense Minister, Lord Carrington, has indicated that his government wants to formulate a continental defense policy based on a European nuclear force.

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The French are concerned that Britain's assertiveness will be at the expense of their leadership role in Europe. President Pompidou admitted to uneasiness about France's relative influence during his briefing of the press last month, contending that the British were seeking disproportionate influence in the Communities. Pompidou's statement may also reflect some personal rivalry with Heath. The French official who told the US Embassy in Paris of the Eurogroup proposal has characterized it as "highly dangerous," because planning now for a European defense force could encourage the US to withdraw from Europe.

As for a joint Franco-British nuclear force, current French thinking does not exclude it but reasons that it may be some 20 years away, after Europe is integrated in an economic, monetary, and political sense.

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EAST GERMANY - WEST GERMANY

East German media have loosed a barrage of invective against the social philosophy and domestic policies of West Germany's Social Democratic Party. The criticism focuses on the Social Democrats' "adherence to capitalistic doctrines" and their "corruption of the international socialist movement." The regime hits hard at what it calls the Social Democrats' efforts to influence the East German population and emphasizes the "unbridgeable differences" between East and West German societies.

Pankow's blast reflects its desire to limit the impact at home of the recently initialed inter-German treaty, which clears the way for increased contacts between the two German states. The regime is attempting to underscore to its citizens that differences with Bonn will continue, and that for them, the advantages from detente will be limited. Pankow's concern for its own stake in detente, reinforced by pressure from Moscow, should, however, keep East Germany from reneging on the practical improvements worked out with Bonn.

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NOTES

India-USSR: Plans for a joint Soviet-Indian naval exercise this autumn, [redacted] have evidently fallen through. The Soviets may have balked at the exchange of sensitive information on naval tactics that would have been required for a combined exercise.

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Pakistan-France: [redacted]

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
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17 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

17 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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Libya [redacted]

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[redacted] (Page 1)

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Several contacts of the US Interests Section in Cairo have reported a recent incident that may have been a coup attempt by some air force officers against the Sadat government. (Page 3)

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Soviet [redacted]

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Egypt [redacted] (Page 4)

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The Argentine Government has imposed tight security precautions for the scheduled return of Juan Peron this morning, but his arrival could trigger some incidents. (Page 5)

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
Chilean President Allende has told his Socialist colleagues that military participation in his government is necessary to consolidate the policy changes of the past two years. (Page 6)

At Annex, we give a retrospective examination of the rainy season's military activity in Laos.

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LIBYA-ISRAEL




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LAOS

The continuing peace talks and the prospect of an end to the fighting have clearly become uppermost in the thoughts and actions of the contending military forces. As the new dry season begins in Laos, we can expect a series of attacks and maneuvers in anticipation of some form of in-place cease-fire.

The recent rainy season leaves the Communist side in a relatively good military position. At Annex, we give a retrospective examination of the season's military activity.

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EGYPT

Several contacts of the US Interests Section in Cairo have reported an incident that may have been a coup attempt by a group of air force officers at an airbase south of Cairo within the past few days. Details are sketchy, but as many as 20 arrests may have been made. According to one account, a senior officer of army intelligence was dismissed following the incident.


The activities of Egypt's two leading military figures provide an indication of official concern. War Minister Ahmad Ismail Ali, who had been scheduled to attend the meeting of Arab foreign and defense ministers in Kuwait beginning on 15 November, apparently delayed his departure by one day. During that day he visited the troops and renewed his exhortations to "maintain discipline," and to focus on strictly military matters in preparation for "the battle against Israel." Chief of Staff Shazli did go to Kuwait, but returned after one day.

We have noted a number of other recent manifestations of malaise in Egyptian society, including the public denunciation of the Sadat regime by a small number of army personnel in Cairo early last month and some instances of student restiveness. So far the disaffected elements in the military and elsewhere in Egyptian society remain disorganized, and Sadat presumably is taking greater security precautions. As discontent with the regime's lack of direction increases, however, so does the danger to his position.


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USSR-EGYPT




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ARGENTINA

The Lanusse government has imposed tight security precautions for the scheduled return of Juan Peron at 9 this morning, Washington time. Troops have cordoned off the airport 21 miles from downtown Buenos Aires and have occupied radio and TV stations to prevent take-overs. The government has pre-empted plans for strikes by declaring a public holiday.

Peron's presence in Argentina, even for a week or less, will nevertheless provide dissidents of the right and left with the best chance they are likely to get to sabotage the elections scheduled for next March. Overreaction to any incidents by Peronists or by the security forces could set off a chain reaction of violence.

President Lanusse is out of the capital until tomorrow. We have some indications that he and Peron have reached an understanding on the conduct of the elections, and they may get together to provide the finishing touches.

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CHILE

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President Allende's explanation to a recent Socialist Party plenum of why he brought senior military officers into his government. The plenum was called last week to challenge his course of action. His statements on this issue and on his plans for his coming trip abroad included:

--The armed forces are in the government to stay as an essential element at all levels.

--He had promised that he will not interfere in the military chain of command and that his government will comply with judicial decisions.

--The military presence is vital to re-establishing an image of a peaceful and productive Chile deserving foreign assistance.

--His coming trip abroad is necessary to refurbish Chile's reputation, badly damaged by his coalition's record.

--In Moscow he will ask for a \$500-million loan to be made available immediately, challenging the Soviets to demonstrate that they believe in the Popular Unity government. Until now the switch to friendship with Socialist countries has been fruitless.

--In his address to the UN General Assembly he will attack multinational corporations, but he will also seek signs during his stay that the US desires frank discussions of US-Chilean differences.

Allende has evidently decided that the armed forces are the key to consolidating the many social and economic changes his government has set in motion. Although the Socialist leaders appear to have concluded that they must go along with him for the time being in view of the disorganized state of their party, the extremist allies of party chief Altamirano are unlikely to change their view that the military should be removed from the cabinet.

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LAOS: THE RAINY SEASON IN RETROSPECT

As the new dry season begins in Laos, the Communists must view the results of their military activities during the rainy season with some satisfaction. In the north, they managed to turn back all of Vang Pao's efforts to repeat last year's recapture of the Plaine des Jarres. In the south, they succeeded in keeping government forces well away from the Ho Chi Minh supply corridor to South Vietnam and Cambodia.

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The Contest for the Plaine

As the rainy season began in April in north Laos, the Communists were still maintaining pressure against Long Tieng. Their siege of Vang Pao's headquarters quickly ended, however, when the early arrival of rainy weather washed out their supply route and the 312th North Vietnamese Division was sent to South Vietnam. When the Communists abandoned positions overlooking Long Tieng, they shifted the bulk of their forces to a line of hills southwest of the Plaine to check possible government offensives. With the departure of the 312th, the North Vietnamese were left with four regiments--the same number they had during the 1971 rainy season when they did not make any real attempt to defend the Plaine.

The North Vietnamese pullback allowed government forces to recapture Sam Thong, a former refugee center just north of Long Tieng, and several nearby hills. The irregulars tried unsuccessfully to breach the Communist defensive line southwest of the Plaine in June and July, but relatively few irregular units were involved because most of Vang Pao's tribal forces had returned to rear areas for badly needed rest and refitting. By mid-August, Vang Pao was able to commit nearly all of his 6,000 retrained tribal troops, plus some 4,000 troops from other areas, to a major offensive against the Plaine. The military objective was to push the Communists far enough back to limit the effectiveness of any enemy drive on Long Tieng the following dry season. The political aim was to regain as much territory as possible to strengthen Prime Minister Souvanna's hand in any possible peace negotiations with the Communists.

For the next two and a half months, irregular task forces tried to move onto the Plaine from the north, west, and south. The North Vietnamese used one of their crack regiments to hold the defensive

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line southwest of the Plaine, while their other three regiments--despite heavy air strikes--maneuvered from one sector of the Plaine to another to inflict a series of defeats on the irregulars.

As the rains began to taper off in mid-October, Vang Pao concentrated over 5,000 men--including some of the government's best troops--in a single task force on the southern tip of the Plaine. After making some limited progress, these troops lost just enough momentum to allow the Communists to concentrate the bulk of three regiments--around 3,000 men--against them. On 26 October Communist ground forces, tanks and artillery routed the government troops, killing over 100, wounding 200, and capturing many more. Vang Pao is currently attempting to regroup the remaining elements in the hills a few miles south of the Plaine, but they are still under heavy enemy pressure.

Fighting in the South

In south Laos, the North Vietnamese objective was little different from previous years--keep the government at arm's length from the Ho Chi Minh trail complex. The North Vietnamese were, however, a bit more aggressive. Communist pre-emptive moves began in mid-May, when a North Vietnamese regiment for the first time occupied Khong Sedone, a provincial capital north of Pakse. Although government troops managed to recapture Khong Sedone in early June, it took them another two months to drive the North Vietnamese well away from the surrounding area. The fighting at Khong Sedone had resulted in some heavy casualties on both sides, and the irregulars had to have several weeks of rest and retraining before they could be committed to regaining lost ground.

At the same time that the North Vietnamese moved into Khong Sedone, other Communists were launching attacks farther south against government defensive positions just 15 miles from Pakse. Elements of one North Vietnamese regiment kept up these attacks throughout the summer, successfully tying down government troops east of that important town. The combined pressure in the Khong Sedone and Pakse sectors prevented the government from organizing any sizable offensive operations in the south until mid-October. Since then eight irregular battalions succeeded in driving Communist troops temporarily from Saravane--a provincial capital north of the Bolovens Plateau--while other government units have moved into the village of Ban Lao Ngam, which is on an important Communist supply route. The Communists

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attempted to forestall this government offensive by once again attacking Khong Sedone and the frontline east of Pakse, but they failed. With the irregulars blocking their supply routes, the North Vietnamese shifted units to counter government moves north of the Bolovens and, on 15 November, the Communists again attacked and reoccupied Saravane.


Looking Ahead

The government's failure to redress the losses sustained in the previous dry season leaves the Communists in a good military position. The prospect of an imminent settlement in Vietnam and a cease-fire in Laos, however, adds political dimensions to the military situation. An end to the fighting is now obviously uppermost in the thoughts and actions of both sides, and the dry season seems likely to bring a series of attacks and maneuvers in anticipation of some form of in-place cease-fire.

In some areas this seems well under way. Early this month, the Communists staged their strongest attacks in over a year to drive dispirited irregular battalions back to within ten miles of the royal capital of Luang Prabang and have recently attacked the airfield there with rockets. Enemy units made an unprecedented attack on Keng Kok, southeast of Savannakhet, and broke a long-standing informal local arrangement by attacking Thakhek, a provincial capital on the Mekong and several other positions to the north near Route 13. The timing of these unusual attacks suggests that they were aimed in part at making limited territorial gains in light of the peace talks now under way in Vientiane. At a minimum they serve to remind the government that military pressure can be increased if the negotiations become stalled.

In the north, the course of future fighting seems less clear. It is not at all certain that the North Vietnamese will mount a major attack on Long Tieng once they have chased Vang Pao's remnants away from the Plaine. Any full-scale attack on the defenses around Long Tieng would require a buildup of new troops and supplies from North Vietnam. Some troops to fill out the ranks of units already in place have been detected moving toward the Plaine, but no significant amounts of supplies have been shipped.

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LAOS: Communist Controlled Areas

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
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If a cease-fire is arranged in the next several weeks, the Communists will control more than half of Laos, more territory than they held at the time of the 1962 cease-fire. An exact comparison between 1962 and 1972, however, is not possible because no effort was made ten years ago to draw an agreed upon cease-fire line or to pinpoint troop locations.

If North Vietnamese forces are eventually withdrawn, and the government accedes to Communist demands that irregular units be disbanded, the opposing military forces would consist of the Royal Lao Army and the Pathet Lao. Vientiane's regular army stands at some 48,000 men--including some nominally "neutralist" units--while the Lao Communists have approximately 35,000 to 45,000 combat and support troops spread throughout the country. Over the years these indigenous Lao forces of both sides have not been particularly aggressive or effective. Without foreign prodding they would presumably be generally willing, if not eager, to comply with the terms of any cease-fire.

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
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

18 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS



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The Soviets are preparing to launch their largest space booster, the "J-vehicle," sometime within the next week or so. (Page 2)

Moscow has extended \$200 million in credits for a major irrigation project in northern Peru. (Page 3)

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
Juan Peron's arrival in Argentina yesterday sparked no major disturbances. (Page 5)

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SOUTH VIETNAM



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USSR

The Soviets are again preparing to launch their largest space booster, the "J-vehicle," sometime within the next week or so from the Tyuratam test center.

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We expect the coming event will be an attempt to send an unmanned spacecraft to orbit the moon, with recovery either in the Indian Ocean or in the Soviet Union. Conditions will be most favorable for a lunar launch between 19 and 22 November.

Development of the J-vehicle, vital to the Soviets' manned lunar program, has not gone well. The only two previous tests in July 1969 and in June 1971 resulted in early in-flight failures. The launch of the current booster was originally expected in September, but was called off at the last minute. We do not now expect the Soviets to try their first manned lunar landing until the late 1970s.

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USSR-PERU


Moscow has extended \$200 million in credits for a major irrigation project in northern Peru. The project, which will require at least ten years to complete, is to consist of a trans-Andean tunnel, a hydroelectric complex, and an irrigation network covering nearly 500,000 acres.

The Peruvians have been seeking foreign credits for this project for some years, but US engineers who studied it considered it unfeasible. The Soviets themselves completed two feasibility studies before deciding to become involved.


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MOZAMBIQUE-TANZANIA




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
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
NOTES

Argentina: Juan Peron's arrival yesterday sparked no major disturbances. Despite the years of bitter antagonism between Peron and Lanusse, the two do not seem far apart in their requirements for a political accord at this point. By some accounts Peron is even willing to support an active army officer for president in the elections scheduled for next March. Late yesterday, however, he refused to see a representative of the government in protest against the tight security measures keeping him from the masses of his followers.

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Japan:

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
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

20 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Chancellor Brandt led his coalition to a strong victory in West Germany's parliamentary elections.
(Page 1)

In Argentina, the government is attempting to maintain its political advantage over Peron. *(Page 2)*

The conference of Arab foreign ministers accomplished nothing to alleviate the disarray among Arab states.
(Page 3)

ILLEGIB

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WEST GERMANY

Chancellor Brandt led his coalition to a strong victory in yesterday's parliamentary elections, largely on the basis of his Ostpolitik. According to official results, Brandt's Social Democrats won 45.9 percent of the vote and 230 seats in parliament. For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, the Social Democrats are the strongest single party in the lower house, and thus will select the president of the Bundestag as well as chairmen of committees. They will also have a majority membership on committees, an advantage not enjoyed in the past. Brandt's coalition partners, the Free Democrats, won 8.4 percent of the vote and 42 seats.

The Christian Democrats will continue to control the upper house, where they will be able to delay legislation. However, the Christian Democrats and their Bavarian allies, the Christian Socialist Union, gained only 44.8 percent of the vote and 224 seats, their worst showing since 1949.

Brandt's first major move will be to bring the recently initialed treaty with East Germany into effect. In a victory speech yesterday, the Chancellor repeated a campaign pledge to visit East Berlin before Christmas to sign the accord. Ratification of the treaty and application for membership in the United Nations should come shortly after that. For their part, the East Germans quickly indicated their pleasure about the results of the election and its favorable impact on the treaty.

Several governments, particularly the Nordic states, are likely to recognize East Germany in the immediate future. Finland, long in the forefront of this movement, announced yesterday that it has decided in principle to recognize both Germanies.



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ARGENTINA

Some elements of the government and the armed forces are concerned that President Lanusse, in yielding to Peron's demand for freedom of action, has allowed the former dictator to gain the upper hand.

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Moreover, the decision to permit Peron to address a mass rally reflects Lanusse's belief that Peron, at 77, cannot live up to the myth that has developed during his 17 years in exile.

Lanusse is also taking steps to block Peron's effort to put together a political coalition.

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Peron, meanwhile, has been cautiously seeking to muster strength for his coming public appearances and political talks. The crowds surrounding his mansion in a Buenos Aires suburb attest to his continuing popularity, but unless he ends his seclusion soon government charges that he is avoiding the public will begin to have a telling effect. He may move slowly with political negotiations, however, in the hope that the military's doubts about Lanusse's handling of the affair will grow and undercut the government's position.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTES

Arab States: The Arab foreign ministers' conference in Kuwait, which ended Saturday, did nothing to alleviate the disarray among Arab states. The participants were not able to agree even on a joint communiqué, much less make any progress on such issues as Jordan's long-standing quarrel with the fedayeen. The Jordanians refused to go along with the terrorists' demand that they be allowed to operate everywhere, including Jordan. Efforts by some ministers to promote an Arab summit meeting also apparently got nowhere.

Jordan: [redacted]

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Honduras: [redacted]


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The President's Daily Brief

21 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

21 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

South Vietnamese Marines north of Quang Tri City have moved close to the Cua Viet River, the last natural barrier held by the Communists south of the Demilitarized Zone. Meanwhile, North Vietnamese resupply operations in southern North Vietnam are continuing at very high levels. (Page 1)

General Torrijos is reported to have decided to maintain a firm position when ambassadorial level negotiations on the canal resume, but will also press for a top level meeting to break the impasse. (Page 2)

South Korea's new constitution, which will permit President Pak Chong-hui to rule indefinitely, will be approved today in a national referendum. (Page 3)

Soviet [redacted]


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VIETNAM

South Vietnamese Marines north of Quang Tri City have moved close to the Cua Viet River, the last natural barrier held by the Communists south of the Demilitarized Zone. Heavy rains now are hampering the Marines, however, and have slowed a South Vietnamese paratroop attack west of the provincial capital into an area that has been under enemy control since last spring.

In the central highlands, elements of a North Vietnamese division are continuing a week-old series of attacks in western Pleiku Province. On Sunday, South Vietnamese regulars west of Thanh An District capital turned back a sharp ground attack and repelled a sapper raid on a government strong-point.

These highlands actions are similar to those mounted by the Communists against border ranger camps in Kontum and Pleiku provinces during the past several weeks. The enemy apparently is trying to eliminate any significant government presence in the highlands near the border.

Military activity in the south remains light and sporadic. The Communists continue mortar and rocket fire against scattered district and provincial cities in the delta, but none of these actions has been followed up by major ground attacks.

* * *

The partially restored rail line from Hanoi to Thanh Hoa is being used to move large quantities of supplies into southern North Vietnam. On 19 November, a major logistic headquarters in the Thanh Hoa area reported that its units would move nearly 10,000 tons of "merchandise" south between 19 and 30 November. The supplies are being transferred from rail to truck around Thanh Hoa for shipment farther south. Heavy supply activity has also been scheduled near Vinh.

Resupply operations in southern North Vietnam, which began about two months ago, are continuing at very high levels.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PANAMA

In early November, General Torrijos, after conferring with top political and foreign policy advisers, is reported to have issued new guidelines to his Canal negotiators. These guidelines show no weakening of Panama's basic demand for complete jurisdiction and control of the Canal Zone. Torrijos, however, now wants three treaties rather than a single comprehensive document.

--One treaty would cover such issues as the timing of the cession of the present Canal to Panama and the amount of compensation Panama is to receive.

--Another agreement would concern construction of a new sea-level Canal and would provide for joint US-Panamanian ownership and management.

--The third treaty would constitute a defense agreement and would call for a large annual rent for US bases in Panama, limitations on personnel strengths, and Panamanian jurisdiction over US citizens off base.

Torrijos presumably realizes that these demands are unacceptable to the US and will not advance the ambassadorial level negotiations. He tends, in any case, to be deeply suspicious of diplomatic negotiations and is said to have remarked last week that the best way to reach an understanding with the US is for the heads of governments to work out a basic understanding and then let the diplomats handle the details. Torrijos also said that he is attempting to arrange a meeting with President Nixon.


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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

South Korea: South Korea's new constitution, which will permit President Pak Chong-hui to rule indefinitely, will be approved today in a national referendum. The government has pulled out all stops to ensure a heavy vote in favor. Pockets of opposition among the intellectual and Christian communities have been thoroughly intimidated by the regime's tough application of its martial law authority. They can show their displeasure only by boycotting the referendum.

USSR-Cuba:



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Morocco: King Hassan has announced a new "government of technicians." Hassan will continue to command the military himself, and Ahmed Osman, his brother-in-law, is prime minister. The major political parties are not represented and the new government therefore will appear to the public as a continuation of Hassan's unpopular rule. Elections are promised for early next year, but the parties are not now inclined to participate.

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The President's Daily Brief

22 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

22 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

[redacted] *Page 1* [redacted]
[redacted]
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General Lon Non [redacted] admits that the program for inducing Khmer Communists to rally to the government has failed so far, but President Lon Nol does not seem ready to consider any different approach. (*Page 2*)

Israel's air and artillery strikes in southwest Syria yesterday were stronger than its attacks of two weeks ago. A state of continuous, if limited, warfare could be developing. (*Page 3*)

Juan Peron has made clear progress in putting together a political coalition during his five days back in Argentina. (*Page 4*)

In Chile, the major opposition parties are at odds on how to cope with President Allende's bringing military officers into his government. (*Page 5*)

Unusually large numbers of North Vietnamese civilians have been moving to join the Communist administrative apparatus in the South. (*Page 6*)


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SOUTH VIETNAM



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
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CAMBODIA

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President Lon Nol's brother Lon Non, the cabinet official responsible for inducing Khmer Communist forces to rally to the government [redacted] admits that so far the program has failed.

A number of prominent Cambodians have criticized the rallier program as unrealistic, and believe that the government should either negotiate with the Khmer Communists or allow them to participate in elections. For the time being, however, Lon Nol does not seem prepared to give serious consideration to such suggestions.

The Khmer Communists are equally intransigent, echoing Sihanouk's line that no political compromise is possible with the Lon Nol government. They also insist that they will not be bound by any cease-fire for Cambodia that might be included in an agreement between Washington and Hanoi.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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ISRAEL-SYRIA

The Israeli chief of military intelligence has explained that yesterday's air and artillery strikes in southwest Syria were in response to fedayeen mining incidents and mortar shellings in the Golan Heights on 17 November and earlier yesterday. He said the raids were intended to send a "clear and loud message" to the Syrians to close their borders to the fedayeen. The action was stronger than the Israeli attacks against Syria on 9 November. This time, Israel claims to have downed six Syrian MIG-21s, destroyed 15 tanks, and knocked out a radar facility and several Syrian artillery positions.

These episodes are increasing both in frequency and intensity. If the Syrians remain deaf to the Israeli message, a state of continuous, if limited, warfare could develop similar in some ways to the situation that prevailed along the Suez Canal prior to the cease-fire of 1970.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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ARGENTINA

In the five days Juan Peron has been back in Argentina he has made clear progress toward putting together a political coalition. He has still to secure the cooperation of the large Radical Party. Nevertheless, Radical leader Ricardo Balbin seems interested in reaching a working agreement with him that will also be acceptable to the armed forces.

Peron's hope is that continuation of his early success in bringing a wide spectrum of political leaders into at least preliminary accord will significantly strengthen his hand when he sits down to bargain with President Lanusse.

Lanusse retains the backing of his senior generals and faces no immediate threat of military action against him. Nonetheless, doubts among military officers about his handling of Peron's return could make it more difficult for him to accept the political compromises which Peron's strength may require if Lanusse is to achieve his aim of bringing the country to peaceful national elections next March.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CHILE

The major opposition parties now agree that President Allende's inclusion of three military officers in his cabinet strengthens his government, but are at odds on what to do about it.

National Party leaders consider that Interior Minister Prats is lending his support to the Popular Unity program for socializing Chile. Since Allende is proceeding by constitutional means, they are unimpressed by Prats' assurances that he will not permit illegal actions by either side. The National Party wants to bring impeachment charges against a Communist cabinet minister in order to force Prats to define his position. By tradition the Interior Ministry defends accused ministers.

The more cautious Christian Democrats fear this would only push the military into closer identification with the government. They also view National Party - inspired press criticism of the military ministers as counterproductive, even though some fear the expansion of the military role in government.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTES

Vietnam: Recent intercepts show an unusually large number of North Vietnamese civilians moving south to strengthen the Communist administrative apparatus in South Vietnam. Since early this year nearly 100 groups involving as many as 2,000 civilian administrators have been detected. Other groups may have transited the pipeline undetected. Approximately half of these infiltrators are destined for the coastal areas of central South Vietnam.

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USSR - Indian Ocean:

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Jamaica-Cuba: Jamaica's Prime Minister Manley told Ambassador De Roulet on Monday that he had changed his mind and has now "abandoned all thought of recognizing Cuba for the time being." He added that he would try to persuade the prime ministers of Trinidad-Tobago and Barbados also to hold off. Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham, who had wanted the four Caribbean Commonwealth states to make the move toward Cuba jointly, is evidently continuing talks with the Cubans.

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The President's Daily Brief

23 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

23 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviets have failed in a third attempt to launch their largest space booster, the "J-vehicle." (Page 1)

President Ceausescu has declared Romania's opposition to separate talks on European security and force reductions, again breaking ranks with the Warsaw Pact. (Page 2)

[redacted]	India.	25X1
(Page 3)		25X1
Malta [redacted]	(Page 4)	25X1
Jordan [redacted]		25X1
[redacted]	(Page 5)	25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

The Soviets launched their largest space booster--the "J-vehicle"--this morning, but it failed early in flight.

The "J-vehicle," about the same size as the US Saturn V space booster, was expected to send an unmanned spacecraft toward the moon with recovery either in the Indian Ocean or in the Soviet Union. Both previous tests of the "J-vehicle"--in July 1969 and in June 1971--also failed shortly after liftoff. Because of continuing problems with the booster, the Soviets' first attempt at a manned lunar landing is not expected until the late 1970s.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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ROMANIA

President Ceausescu has publicly taken positions on European security and force reductions which mean that Romania has again broken ranks with the Warsaw Pact. On Tuesday he declared his opposition to separate talks on these two major issues, expressing fear that talks on force reduction without participation of all European states would result in the division of the continent into Soviet and US spheres of influence. In Ceausescu's view such a step would mean Romania's domination again by the Soviets.

In addition, Ceausescu called for a European detente to include withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other states, the closing of all foreign military bases, the creation of regional nuclear-free zones, an end to military maneuvers, and lower military budgets.

Most of these Romanian policy goals are contrary to those of the USSR. Ceausescu does not expect to achieve them, but he calculates that, if Romania remains silent on such issues during this period of negotiations, its independence will be eroded.


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INDIA



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


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
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
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
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
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JORDAN-LEBANON-FEDAYEEN



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
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
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


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Libya-Fedayeen:




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The President's Daily Brief

24 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

24 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

		South
Vietnam		
	(Page 1)	

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Soviet commentators have expressed relief and pleasure at Chancellor Brandt's victory in the West German elections. (Page 3)

The US country team in Buenos Aires believes that the Peronist movement may be peacefully reintegrated into Argentine political life. (Page 4)

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SOUTH VIETNAM




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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR - WEST GERMANY

Moscow is evidently quite pleased with Chancellor Brandt's election victory last Sunday. Soviet press comment reflects relief and pleasure that Moscow's heavy investment in resolving the German problem has paid off, and that the German electorate endorsed Brandt's "realistic" foreign policies.

Although Moscow has not made a formal public statement on the election, a West German Embassy official in Moscow says that party chief Brezhnev sent his personal congratulations to Brandt soon after the outcome was known. The US Embassy in Moscow observes that Brezhnev had more at stake in the election than did any other Soviet leader, and that the way is now clear for Brezhnev to accept a long-standing invitation to visit Bonn.

Soviet press commentary indicates that the USSR now looks for rapid completion of remaining steps in the rapprochement process, including signature and ratification of the inter-German treaty, UN membership for both German states, and the normalization of West Germany's relations with Czechoslovakia.

Specific mention of the West German - Czechoslovak talks and the absence of any endorsement of Prague's views suggest that the kind of Soviet arm twisting applied to East Germany in recent years may now be in store for Czechoslovakia.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTE

Argentina: A week has passed since the return of Peron, and according to an assessment by the US country team in Buenos Aires, it may be possible peacefully to reintegrate the Peronist movement into Argentine politics. The former dictator has demonstrated that after 17 years in exile he is still adept politically and can influence developments in Argentina. For his part, Lanusse has shown that he is capable of maintaining public order despite widespread fears that Peron's return might lead to civil war. Lanusse has kept the support of the armed forces, his power base, even though Peron's maneuvering has caused nervousness among some general officers.


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The President's Daily Brief

25 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

25 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Finland's recognition of East Germany yesterday--the first by a West European country--will soon be followed by several others. (Page 1)

The Soviet Navy appears to have acquired expanded port privileges in Somalia that permit the use of Soviet support and repair ships. (Page 2)

Israel's latest commando strike inside Lebanon was directed against fedayeen elements that have repudiated the recent Fatah-Lebanese agreement halting cross-border operations. (Page 3)

[Redacted]

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The new Philippine constitution, which will permit President Marcos to remain in power indefinitely, will be submitted to a referendum vote on 15 January. (Page 3)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

WESTERN EUROPE - EAST GERMANY

Finland, which yesterday became the first West European state to recognize East Germany, will soon be followed by several others. Helsinki's unilateral recognition of both German states followed a meeting of the Scandinavian countries earlier this week at which all five indicated their readiness to recognize East Germany soon. Despite its membership in NATO, Denmark is the most anxious to move ahead.

Iceland, another NATO member that feels itself under pressure from leftist domestic elements, may wait until the NATO foreign ministers' meeting on 7 and 8 December, but not much longer. Sweden, as a non-NATO country, is under little constraint to delay. Only Norway, which presumably wants to avoid annoying Bonn at a time when it is seeking to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EC, is likely to put off recognition until other countries have blazed the way.

At a recent EC foreign ministers' meeting, Italy, the Benelux countries, and France all claimed that their governments were under heavy pressure to recognize Pankow soon. While they indicated that they would not act before the NATO ministerial meeting, as desired by Bonn, most regarded recognition as likely before the end of the year. A French Foreign Ministry official speculated on 22 November that his government might act immediately after Chancellor Brandt signs the inter-German treaty in the third week of December.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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USSR-SOMALIA

A Soviet F-class submarine was seen in recent satellite photography alongside a Soviet repair ship in the Somali port of Berbera. Photography of last summer showed a J-class submarine next to the repair ship at the Berbera dock. The position of the ships indicates that the submarines, both of them diesel-powered, were undergoing maintenance or replenishment.

An agreement to permit Soviet-controlled ship support operations at Berbera may have been concluded during the visit of Soviet Defense Minister Grechko in early 1972. The Soviets, who have considerable influence in Mogadiscio, have long had access to Somali ports, but use of Soviet repair ships is a new development. Soviet support ships, including a repair ship, have been in the Gulf of Aden continuously since 1968, but earlier support operations took place at anchorages in international waters.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTES

Israel-Lebanon: The Israeli commando strike inside Lebanon Thursday night was directed against members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, a group that repudiated Fatah leader Arafat's recent agreement with the Lebanese to cease cross-border operations. The firefight left one fedayeen dead and four fedayeen and one Israeli wounded. The border had been quiet since the Lebanese Army imposed controls on fedayeen activity after the last Israeli ground incursion in September. The raid seems to be a clear warning to Beirut that it must impose further measures to prevent the resumption of fedayeen activity near the border.

USSR: [redacted]

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[redacted] Brezhnev has made several public appearances in recent days and at last word is still scheduled to visit Hungary next week.

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Philippines: The constitutional convention is putting the final touches on the new constitution. The draft will be submitted to public referendum on 15 January, and overwhelming approval by the Filipino voters is expected. Marcos will portray this as a vote of confidence in his rule under martial law. The document empowers Marcos to head an interim government in which he will exercise the presidential powers of the current constitution as well as those of a strong prime minister under the new constitution. Marcos himself will determine when to implement the parliamentary system, which means he may retain authority indefinitely.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Bolivia: Mishandling of labor unrest, which led to a series of strikes and the declaration of a state of siege on 23 November, has further shaken the Banzer government. The strikes occurred when the Interior Minister, Colonel Adett, ordered the arrest of some 30 labor leaders even though the unions had just reached a tentative settlement with the Labor Minister. The unions had been threatening to strike over demands for wage increases to offset losses suffered in the recent devaluation of Bolivia's currency.

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27 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

27 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Lao Communist leader Souphanouvong has for the present ruled out personal peace talks with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, but Souvanna remains optimistic about prospects for a settlement.
(Page 1)

General Secretary Brezhnev arrived in Budapest this morning for his first official visit to Hungary in nearly two years. *(Page 2)*

Bolivia's labor crisis has eased. *(Page 2)*

The new Labor government in New Zealand is likely to make some foreign policy changes. *(Page 2)*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Lao Communist leader Souphanouvong has ruled out any personal peace negotiations with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma because "the present situation" does not warrant such a meeting. According to a spokesman, Souphanouvong specifically blamed Vientiane for the lack of progress in the talks to date and accused the government of stepping up the fighting in north and south Laos. The spokesman indicated, however, that if Souvanna should adopt "a positive attitude to make negotiations progress favorably" then Souphanouvong might be willing to meet with Souvanna.

This rebuff probably will be taken in stride by Souvanna, who remains relatively optimistic about the prospects for peace. Last week, he is said to have told the cabinet and government peace negotiators that he is firmly convinced a settlement in Laos is at hand. At the same time, however, he emphasized that such a settlement could not be reached until Washington and Hanoi have achieved definite agreement on Vietnam.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES


USSR-Hungary: General Secretary Brezhnev arrived in Budapest this morning for his first official visit to Hungary in almost two years. The pace of his itinerary may well be relaxed out of deference to his health, and there are no pressing problems between the two countries that might upset the schedule. We expect Brezhnev to endorse Hungarian party chief Kadar's leadership and in turn to receive complete Hungarian approval of Soviet foreign policy. The two may discuss differences over trade policies and Soviet apprehensions about the political impact of Hungary's economic reforms, but we do not expect them fully to resolve these issues, which do not, however, lessen Hungary's firm ties to the USSR.

Bolivia: The labor crisis in La Paz eased over the weekend as the government released arrested union leaders, and striking workers returned to their jobs. Discussions on wage-price consequences of devaluation are to resume, but in the meantime the nation will remain under a state of siege.

New Zealand: If the new Labor government abides by its election manifesto, it will during its period of rule bring home the small New Zealand training contingent in South Vietnam, initiate steps to establish diplomatic relations with Peking, and work toward eventual withdrawal of troops stationed in Singapore and Malaysia under the five-power defense arrangement with Australia and the United Kingdom. No significant changes in relations with the US are expected. The new Prime Minister, Norman Kirk, has stated his commitment to the ANZUS treaty and has made it clear that he views the US as the guarantor of New Zealand's security.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

28 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

	South Vietnam	25X1
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		25X1

A Soviet naval group, including a diesel submarine,
is in the Caribbean. (Page 3)

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SOUTH VIETNAM



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
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
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
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NOTES

USSR-Cuba: The two Soviet surface combatants and the diesel attack submarine en route to Cuba entered the Caribbean on Sunday. These ships, accompanied by a tanker and an intelligence collection ship, should arrive in Cuba within the next two days. If these ships follow earlier patterns, they will conduct anti-submarine operations with Cuban naval units.

25X1

Romania: The large Romanian delegation at the talks in Helsinki preparing for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is making a strenuous effort to establish itself as an equal participant, independent of the Soviets. In order to stay independent, the Romanian delegation is fighting hard, chiefly against the USSR and its allies, on procedural matters. The Romanians tell us that one of their motives is to block any joint consideration of conference matters by the Warsaw Pact states as a bloc.

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS



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(Page 1)

The South Vietnamese drive in northern Quang Tri Province continues to meet stiff resistance. Fresh government units nevertheless have regained territory recently lost near the coast and have renewed their advance. (Page 2)

Lao irregulars are pushing ahead with their campaign to recapture territory in the south. (Page 3)



25X1

Minor losses for the Christian Democratic and Liberal parties in scattered local elections have jolted Italian Prime Minister Andreotti's fragile coalition government. (Page 4)



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
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
USSR-SYRIA



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SOUTH VIETNAM

The government's military drive in northern Quang Tri Province continues to meet stiff resistance. Fresh government units nevertheless have regained territory recently lost near the coast below the Cua Viet River and have renewed their advance.


Recently captured prisoners report that Communist divisions have received numerous replacements. Some may now be near normal strength for the first time in many months. Also, intercepts and prisoner reports indicate that new equipment, including tanks and artillery, has arrived.

* * *

In many parts of the country the Communists are relying on terrorist tactics to sustain their position during the current period of uncertainty about a cease-fire. The targets are mostly soldiers, police, and local officials.

We expect the Communists to pursue these relatively inexpensive tactics in the weeks ahead as they seek to rest and re-fit many of their major combat units.

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LAOS

Irregular forces have launched an operation to retake Paksong, the principal town on the Bolovens Plateau held by the Communists for nearly a year. Seven battalions dispersed a small Communist blocking force and on 27 November had advanced to within eight miles of the town. Only one untested North Vietnamese battalion is now at Paksong, but intercepts indicate that at least one of three enemy battalions near Ban Lao Ngam has been ordered to move to meet the government threat.

North of the Bolovens, irregulars are clashing sporadically with Communist units near Saravane, a provincial capital recaptured by the government last week. Although four North Vietnamese battalions remain nearby, heavy casualties have forced these units to rest and refit before attempting to retake the town.

In the central panhandle, a 12-battalion irregular force is encountering strong resistance from elements of a North Vietnamese regiment entrenched in the village of Muong Phalane on Route 9.

The Communists can be expected to put up a determined defense in the Muong Phalane area in order to forestall any government moves against the Ho Chi Minh trail complex directly to the east.

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Italy: Minor losses for the Christian Democratic and Liberal parties in scattered local elections have jolted Prime Minister Andreotti's fragile coalition government. Although only about one-tenth of the electorate was involved, the election has taken on national importance as the first test of public opinion since the national election last May. The pattern of results will strengthen the argument for inviting the Socialists back into the government in another center-left coalition.

Greece: [redacted]


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The Yemens: The two Yemens signed an agreement in Tripoli yesterday to form a single state, called the Yemeni Republic, with the capital at Sana. Despite this initial progress, much remains to be done before actual unity is achieved, and reconciling Aden's Marxism with Sana's more traditional government will not be easy.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

25X1

South Vietnam

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(Page 1)

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Nearly two weeks after Juan Peron's return to Argentina, both he and President Lanusse are trying to contain differences within their own camps.
(Page 2)


The Chinese apparently are extending their road net in northwestern Laos. (Page 3)

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
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SOUTH VIETNAM



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
ARGENTINA

Within the interparty working group Juan Peron has organized, each member party is pressing hard for the adoption of its own position. The group three times changed the negotiating points it sent to the government. Peron has managed to stay above the haggling, but serious ideological differences are said to be surfacing among his own coterie of advisers.

President Lanusse's adroit handling of events in the past two weeks has smoothed over some of the differences within the armed forces aroused by Peron's arrival and the freedom he has been accorded. Nevertheless, top generals blame Peron for the lack of progress toward a political agreement and are urging Lanusse to curb his activities.

The real test of strength will come when serious negotiations begin on the designation of presidential candidates for the elections next March. The key point of contention is the Peronists' demand that the government rescind its decree barring from the race anyone who was not in the country on 25 August.

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NOTES

China-Laos: The Chinese apparently are extending their road net in northwestern Laos. Recent photography shows intermittent clearing and grading along the alignment of old Route 3 extending southwest from the border town of Nam Tha. Preliminary construction has already covered 12 miles, half the distance to Vieng Pou Kha, a former refugee center which the Pathet Lao overran two weeks ago. In addition, work continues on a segment from Muong Sing to Nam Tha and on Route 46 north of Pak Beng on the Mekong. The Chinese still have made no move to go beyond Pak Beng.

USSR: [redacted]

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