



The President's Daily Brief

1 October 1970

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

1 October 1970

(information as of 2000 EDT 30 September)

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The situation in the Middle East is discussed on
Page 1.

North Vietnam [redacted]

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(Page 2)

Cambodian authorities are anticipating some terrorist
attacks around Phnom Penh during the current reli-
gious holidays. (Page 3)

Allende appears increasingly confident of victory
in the congressional runoff elections and plans to
reject demands for democratic guarantees. (Page 3)

The latest information on North Vietnamese infiltration
appears on Page 3.


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MIDDLE EAST


Demonstrations of grief over the death of Nasir will continue today throughout the Middle East; some may take a violent turn with anti-US overtones. Meanwhile, speculation and rumors of a struggle for power in Egypt have already appeared.

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In a conversation with Ambassador Brown, King Husayn has expressed fear that radical elements in Syria and Iraq will try to fill the leadership vacuum created by Nasir's death. The King and two of his close advisers are also concerned that Egypt will turn inward and withdraw from Arab world affairs. Husayn sees Libya and Sudan tending to go their own way and slipping out of Egypt's orbit. Algeria, he thinks, will try to expand its role in the Arab world but is too far away to act effectively. The King has no special insight on who will replace Nasir but said the obvious choices were Anwar Sadat, Ali Sabri and Zakariya Muhyeddin. He speculated that this might be the time for an unknown military figure to begin thinking about making his move.


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
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VIETNAM



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**NOTES**

Cambodia: Military authorities in Phnom Penh are concerned that the enemy will take advantage of the current religious holiday that ends 2 October by staging some sort of attack near the capital. They claim that the Communists are moving ammunition into an area just three miles southeast of the city on the west bank of the Mekong. Although the enemy is capable of launching terrorist attacks on Phnom Penh, there are no reliable indications that any large-scale action against the city is imminent. Meanwhile, the Communists continue to harass the government column on Route 6, and government troops have not yet moved in force beyond Tang Kouk.

Chile: Salvador Allende plans to reject the democratic guarantees recently demanded of him by a commission of the Christian Democratic Party. According to sources of the US Embassy, Allende now is sure that his defeated rival, Radomiro Tomic, will deliver enough Christian Democratic votes to ensure his victory in the congressional runoff on 24 October anyway. In his mood of growing confidence, Allende is warning bankers and businessmen against maneuvers that could weaken the economy, and the Communist Party press is accusing the US of plotting with Chilean rightists against him.

North Vietnam: Communications intelligence has provided additional evidence on the southward deployment of enemy troops [redacted]

[redacted] During September, at least 11,000 enemy troops started south, including substantial numbers from regular North Vietnamese infantry units. Only two battalion-sized replacement groups, involving 800 - 1,200 men, are earmarked for duty in South Vietnam. Some appear to be headed for southern Laos, probably to ensure the viability of the infiltration and logistic routes in the face of increasing guerrilla interdiction operations. Some of the troops may be used in Communist dry-season offensive operations in southern Laos, Cambodia, or possibly South Vietnam.

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2 October 1970

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

2 October 1970

(information as of 2000 EDT 1 October)

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The situation in the Middle East is discussed on
Page 1.

The Poles [redacted] have stressed the ne-
gotiable nature of the Viet Cong's eight-point
proposal. (Page 3) 50X1

Government forces continue to have little success
in improving their tactical position in northern
Laos. (Page 4).

In Chile, Allende's refusal to provide "democratic
guarantees" foreshadows increased dissension at
the Christian Democratic National Congress this
weekend. (Page 5)

The Soviets have quickened the pace of the Four-
Power talks on Berlin. (Page 6)

The leadership turnout at the National Day celebra-
tion in Peking provided additional indications of
a rift in the ruling hierarchy. (Page 6)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

MIDDLE EAST

Jordanian Army officers and fedayeen have signed an agreement to end the fighting in the north. The agreement calls for forces already in the front line against Israel to remain there and for armored units of both sides to pull out of the Ramtha-Irbid-Jarash triangle. Armed fedayeen who wish to go to Syria are to be allowed to do so, and unarmed fedayeen are permitted to go south to Amman or other Jordanian towns. Jordanian armored units are to pull back two and one-half miles from either side of the main road from Syria to permit movement of fedayeen supplies. There was no fighting in the north yesterday.

Field Marshal Majali told Ambassador Brown yesterday that the back of the fedayeen movement was broken. He claimed that their recent experience had been so painful that the fedayeen--and their Syrian and Iraqi supporters--would hesitate before making trouble again. The army is trying to cooperate with the committee set up by the Cairo agreement, but if the fedayeen do not leave the cities willingly the army will remove them by force.

*Majali's assessment of fedayeen morale
is optimistic.*

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Amman was quiet yesterday, four days after the cease-fire. The fedayeen still occupy some areas--the area around the US Embassy still appears to be under their control--but Ambassador Brown noted after touring the capital yesterday that Amman's population is returning to normal civilian life.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Lebanese officials are increasingly concerned over disruption accompanying the mourning of Nasir's death. Three people were killed yesterday by stray shots fired in tribute to Nasir, several cars have been burned, and a supermarket has been bombed. The embassy has taken precautions against possible mob action near the chancery, but so far the violence has not been directed at specific targets.

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VIETNAM

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[redacted] the Viet Cong's eight-point proposal is "flexible" is matched by a similar soft line from Polish officials in Warsaw. The Poles, in conversations with visiting US congressmen and with Ambassador Stoessel, stressed the "negotiable" nature of the proposals and claimed the Communists are now willing to come to grips with "certain realities" in South Vietnam.

Although the Poles have their moments of unfounded optimism, the similarity of their recent approaches to that of Xuan Thuy suggests something new is in the wind. It seems likely in any case that the Communists are ready and willing to renew private talks with the US, and possibly to soften their refusal to deal directly with the Saigon government. In short, Hanoi may be angling for better ways to attack its old problems: getting the US out of Vietnam, and getting a solid stake in the South.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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LAOS

The government's drive to take Ban Na appears to have been turned back again, and the parallel push toward Muong Pot, six miles to the east, is making little headway. On the western edge of the Plaine des Jarres, a 1,200-man irregular force is stalled on the outskirts of Muong Soui. A new operation to the east of the Plaine has had some success in harassing enemy movements on Route 4, the road that runs south from the Plaine to the Mekong, and in destroying small ammunition caches.

An intercept of 29 September indicated that a subordinate of the NVA 238th SAM Regiment was located near the junction of Routes 911 and 912, about 20 miles inside Laos from the North Vietnamese border. It is not certain whether this unit's mission is to fire antiaircraft artillery or missiles. If it is the latter, it would be the first deployment of SAMs into the panhandle and indicative of North Vietnam's heightened concern with the security of its Laotian supply lines.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CHILE

Salvador Allende has, as anticipated, refused to provide the "democratic guarantees" requested by the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democratic Party Council announced on 30 September that Allende's response was "unsatisfactory" and that the guarantees now must be incorporated into the constitution by legislative action. This position is probably not acceptable to the party's left wing, and its publication increases the likelihood of a divisive struggle at the Party National Congress this weekend.

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[Redacted]

A formal statement by the country's Roman Catholic bishops in effect counseling Christian acquiescence in Allende's victory in the popular elections last month helps to strengthen Allende's position.

In the economic field, French and British interests have signaled--probably with their government's approval--their intention to conduct business under Allende. Without waiting for the congressional runoff, two French automotive firms will go ahead with a \$2.2 million investment in a new assembly plant, and British banking interests will proceed with a \$10 million loan for suppliers' credits to the Chilean Government development corporation.

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NOTES

Cuba: A U-2 mission was flown over Cuba on 30 September. There were no significant changes noted. The next mission is scheduled for 2 October.


USSR-Berlin: The Soviets have quickened the pace of the Four-Power talks on Berlin. Western ambassadors agreed Wednesday to Soviet proposals to meet on 9 rather than 30 October and to hold a working level meeting prior to the ambassadorial session. Although there was no substantive progress Wednesday, the Soviets simplified their list of demands which previously had been so wide-ranging as to be unnegotiable. Moscow appears sensitive to being blamed for delaying the talks and eager to begin real bargaining.

Communist China: Hsieh Fu-chih, public security minister and boss of the Peking municipal government, and Ch'en Po-ta, politburo standing committee member and Mao's personal secretary, did not appear at the National Day celebrations in Peking yesterday. Because of his close association with Mao, it is unlikely that Ch'en is out of favor, but Hsieh, who also is a politburo member, has been absent from public view since last March and probably has been purged. The regime, however, has been careful not to reveal any shifts in the power structure. In the past year, for example, the press has listed leaders attending major events in the Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order rather than by rank. This could be an attempt to disguise the continual maneuvering for position at top levels.

Cambodia: Military activity, consisting mainly of Communist harassing actions, remains at a low level.

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The President's Daily Brief

3 October 1970



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

3 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In the Middle East, Amman remains quiet and signs continue to appear of maneuvering for the leadership of Egypt. (*Page 1*).

On *Page 2* we highlight and analyze the speech Brezhnev delivered yesterday.

The situation in Cambodia is discussed on *Page 3*.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

MIDDLE EAST

With Amman quiet, all Jordanian armed forces have withdrawn at least three miles outside the city. The government now apparently intends to rely on public security forces to maintain law and order in the capital. These forces are poorly qualified, however.

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The Jordanians remain nervous about possible actions of Iraqi forces.

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In Cairo there continue to be signs of maneuvering for the succession to Nasir. The al-Ahram stories that two possible contenders, acting president Anwar Sadat and former vice president Ali Sabri, suffered heart attacks may have been intended to show that neither is fit to carry on Nasir's work. The paper's editor apparently favors another leading contender, former vice president Zakariya Muhyeddin

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USSR

Brezhnev's nationally telecast speech yesterday was an authoritative endorsement of themes already evident in Soviet foreign policy. On the whole it was more bristling than conciliatory with regard to the West.

--Brezhnev praised the new Communist negotiating proposals in Paris and said they had the "full approval and understanding of the Soviet Government." Brezhnev's remarks gave no indication, however, that the Soviets actually think the new proposals will break the log jam in Paris.

--Brezhnev's comments on the Middle East were the harshest by a Soviet leader in some time. He warned against any foreign intervention in the Middle East, stating "one could not only burn one's fingers, but--who knows--even lose an arm." He described US complaints of cease-fire violations as an effort to frustrate peace negotiations "behind a smokescreen of invented accusations against the UAR." He also scored US support for Israel, condemning with special vigor "new consignments of offensive arms."

--Brezhnev was unusually defensive in discussing the Soviet-West German treaty. He defended it against unnamed critics "here and there" as an even-handed agreement from which "all have gained equally." His remarks seem aimed primarily at lending indirect support to the Brandt government's attempts to counter domestic opposition to the treaty, but he may also have intended these comments for the ear of East German and Soviet critics.

--The speech did not contain any reference to the SALT talks.

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
CAMBODIA

The lull in major military activity continues. Communist forces, however, are maintaining pressure against government positions along primary roadways.

* * *

The Thai apparently intend to provide further military assistance to Cambodia despite their lingering dismay over Phnom Penh's rejection of the Thai-Khmer volunteer force.

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The President's Daily Brief

4 October 1970

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

4 October 1970

(Information as of 2000 EDT 3 October)

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The situation in the Middle East is discussed on
Page 1.

Cambodia will be proclaimed a republic this week.
(Page 2)

[Redacted] 50X1

Allende has reversed himself and now plans to ne-
gotiate democratic guarantees with the Christian
Democrats. *(Page 3)*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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MIDDLE EAST

The Jordan cease-fire is being respected by both the fedayeen and the Jordanian Army.

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Progress continues to be made in restoring communications and services in the capital, and private cars and buses were allowed back on the road Saturday morning.

The fedayeen remain in control of three key sectors of Amman, including the area where the US Embassy is located. Jordan south of Amman is in the hands of the army. In the north, the fedayeen apparently remain in control of Ramtha, Irbid, and, with Iraqi assistance, Mafraq.

The Arab Supervisory Committee has directed that the cease-fire agreement, including demilitarization of the cities, be completed by 1200 Monday. The compliance of the fedayeen in the north, however, remains in doubt. This area is the stronghold of the more extreme fedayeen organizations which so far have refused to endorse the cease-fire agreement negotiated by Arafat.

Public security forces and customs officials at Ramtha have been ordered to return to work. This will clear the way for the formal reopening of the Syrian-Jordanian border, which will allow thousands of Jordanians who fled to Syria during the fighting to return home.

* * *

Calm has returned to Cairo, but a heavy police and military guard is being maintained throughout the city. Yesterday at least 15 different student demonstrations took place in the capital but the authorities did not appear to be unduly perturbed.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CAMBODIA

Lon Nol has told Ambassador Swank that Cambodia will be proclaimed a republic this week. For reasons which are not entirely clear, Lon Nol appeared to be somewhat defensive about the step: he explained that there was considerable pressure for a republic and that he feared "some troops might lay down their arms" unless the move was taken soon. Lon Nol added that the proclamation of a republic would make it more difficult for Sihanouk to return to Cambodia. Swank believes the government may also hope that the conversion to a republic will revive some of the elan of the heady days immediately following Sihanouk's ouster.


* * *

The military situation continues to be quiet.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTES



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Chile: In a change of tactics, Allende has agreed to negotiate with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) on its demands for the inclusion of democratic guarantees in the constitution. Ambassador Korry reports that Allende's concession eliminates "any possibility" that the PDC convention this weekend will adopt an anti-Allende position. Allende only needs about 20 of the 75 PDC votes to be confirmed as president-elect in the congressional runoff later this month.

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The President's Daily Brief

5 October 1970

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

5 October 1970

(information as of 2000 EDT 4 October)

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Egyptian leaders want to sustain the US peace initiative but not at the expense of domestic stability. (Page 1)

Each side is competing for support in the aftermath of the Bolivian coup attempt. (Page 2)

In Cambodia, the enemy appears to be preparing for large-scale attacks against the government column on Route 6. (Page 3)

U-2 photography of 3 October reveals no significant new activity in Cuba. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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MIDDLE EAST

Acting President Sadat told Secretary Richardson in Cairo Friday that he intends to continue Nasir's search for a peace settlement along the lines of the US initiative. He said Egypt hopes for an early resumption of the Jarring talks. Sadat was willing to discuss a formula for rectification of the missile situation, but he stressed that he could not ask the military to remove "even one missile" from the canal zone. The serious destruction caused by the Israelis before the cease-fire required that strong defenses be maintained along the canal.

Foreign Affairs Adviser Fawzi, meeting with Ambassador McCloy, also stressed that Egypt wants to maintain the momentum of the peace initiative. Like Sadat, however, Fawzi saw little hope that missiles could be withdrawn from the canal zone. He was not in a position "to deny or confirm a buildup," but any unilateral Egyptian withdrawal of weapons could provoke a reaction from extremists that the new leadership would be hard pressed to handle. He did say that rectifications might be possible if Egypt were convinced that Israel really accepted the principle of no expansion or if Egypt believed the US were willing to apply pressure on Israel to this end.

Egypt's leaders appear to be genuinely interested in sustaining the US peace initiative and the cease-fire. At a minimum, they fear renewed hostilities at a time when they are wrestling with the succession problem and other uncertainties in the post-Nasir period. By the same token, their concern for domestic stability makes it unlikely that the Egyptians will make obvious compromises to get the talks going again.

* * *

The Jordanian Army is releasing thousands of fedayeen prisoners as it pulls back from Jordanian cities. The fedayeen still say they intend to implement the peace agreement, which may mean that army prisoners will be released soon. Amman is returning to normal, although fedayeen remain entrenched in some refugee areas and concentrations of army armored units linger at various points just outside the city.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

BOLIVIA

The revolt that has been smoldering for months within the military against President Ovando moved toward a showdown Sunday morning when a group of middle level officers issued a communiqué demanding Ovando's resignation. The decision for this move was made Saturday at a meeting presided over by Army Commander Miranda. The officers had anticipated that the majority of units in the La Paz area would join their cause. When their demands were publicized, however, the defense minister, presidential guard commander, and various provincial commanders issued counter demands that the rebels lay down their arms. Since then there has been a rash of conflicting statements of support, making it impossible to estimate the strength of either side.

The signers of the communiqué are largely middle and junior grade officers, including the son of Interior Minister Ayoraa. Major Cayoja seems to be the leader, but he is probably acting as a front man for Miranda. Cayoja returned from the US Command and General Staff College last June and has been described as pro-American.

The cabinet met in emergency session Sunday and in the afternoon Miranda held a press conference calling on Ovando to admit defeat and resign. The executive committee of the Bolivian Labor Center also was in session yesterday and all affiliated unions claim to be in a state of emergency. University students claim they will support whatever action the unions decide to take. Ovando was expected in La Paz late Sunday and his return will set the stage for the next development in the crisis. So far, there have been no major disturbances in La Paz.

Miranda has had several confrontations with Ovando in recent months, but he has yielded each time when it appeared that Ovando's ouster might trigger a civil war. This time, however, he is more heavily committed and probably will be less inclined to back down. If Ovando can survive the challenge, he will emerge with more freedom of action than he has previously enjoyed in his year as president. If Miranda's forces are victorious, they probably will establish a more moderate military rule while preparations are made for a return to a civilian constitutional government.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

Recently intercepted Communist messages indicate that the government column along Route 6 is being kept under constant surveillance "in preparation for upcoming operations."

Large numbers of Communist troops have been spotted for the first time west of the road, and the location of the North Vietnamese 174th Regiment headquarters has been confirmed within striking distance of the government convoy. The rapid movement of the 174th Regiment from its base in southeastern Kratie Province suggests that the Communists are now attaching some priority to the fighting along Route 6.

Government troops continue to dig in near Tang Kouk village, and there is no information as to when northward movement will be resumed. The apparent diffidence of Cambodian commanders may be reinforced by recent reports that villagers between Tang Kouk and Kompong Thom are cooperating increasingly with the enemy and that the Vietnamese Communists have promised them that action will be taken to prevent the column from pressing on to Kompong Thom.

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NOTE

Cuba: A U-2 photographic mission was flown over Cuba on 3 October. No significant new activity was observed. No further U-2 coverage is scheduled until at least 6 October.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

6 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The cease-fire is continuing to hold in Jordan.
(Page 1)

Anwar Sadat's nomination to the Egyptian presidency
is discussed on Page 3.

In Chile, the Christian Democrats' decision to back
Allende in the runoff election virtually assures
his victory. (Page 4)

Bolivia

(Page 5)

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Soviet

Laos

(Page 6)

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Harassing attacks continued against the Cambodian
column on Route 6. (Page 7)


Soviet

(Page 7)

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President Pompidou departs today for his one-week
visit to the USSR. (Page 7)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

JORDAN

The situation in Amman continues to improve. On Sunday, the US ambassador was able to drive freely around the capital without an escort.

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The fedayeen have begun to withdraw from northern cities. There are still some 2,000 in Irbid, but they are behaving peacefully and their withdrawal is expected within the next two or three days

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The fedayeen control the area from the outskirts of Ramtha northwest to the Syrian border while the army controls the perimeters of the city and the roads to the south. Fedayeen forces remain in control of Jarash

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The fedayeen are almost entirely out of Zarqa and the army is turning control of the city over to the Public Security Forces.

A clash between army units and fedayeen forces occurred yesterday at the village of Harima, eight miles north of Irbid, but it appears to have been an isolated incident. It points up, however, the intense mutual distrust between the army and the fedayeen that could lead to other such incidents.


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On 4 October, Yasir Arafat met for the first time with Jordanian representatives on the mediation committee.

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EGYPT

Anwar Sadat's nomination by the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's only legal political organization, virtually assures him of the presidency. Egypt's legislative body, the National Assembly, has been called into session to confirm the nomination. The Assembly will present his name to a referendum tentatively scheduled for 15 October.

Sadat has appeared in the past to be a figure-head in the Egyptian Government who owed his position more to his loyalty to Nasir than to his own political strength or acumen. He brings an aura of legitimacy to his new position, however. He was a member of Nasir's original revolutionary group and Nasir named him vice president in December 1969. These claims to legitimacy may have made Sadat the easiest choice for Egypt's leaders, especially if they wanted to avoid delays in this period of uncertainty. The military, for example, had indicated that it wanted the new president to be a senior member of Nasir's original group.

Sadat has espoused strong nationalist views and has often severely castigated the UK and the US for their actions in the Middle East. He was apparently in Nasir's disfavor for several weeks for opposing Nasir's acceptance of the US peace initiative. Sadat acknowledged his earlier opposition to the US plan in his recent conversation with Secretary Richardson, but said that he would now faithfully carry out Nasir's will which was to accept the US initiative. Sadat told Richardson he hopes for a quick resumption of the talks under Jarring.

The selection of Sadat does not end the maneuvering in the Egyptian hierarchy, and other changes in the government are likely in the next few months. Western correspondents in Cairo claim that high posts will go to Minister of Interior Sharawi Jumah--whom they say will become prime minister--and to pro-Soviet former vice president Ali Sabri, but there is as yet no firm evidence regarding possible further moves.

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CHILE


Christian Democratic supporters of cooperation with Salvador Allende prevailed yesterday in a party congress. By a vote of 271 to 191, the congress decided to back him in the runoff Congressional election later this month, requiring only a fairly loose pledge from him to back a constitutional reform bill to be worked out with his followers. Anti-Allende forces had sought prior enactment of all Christian Democratic reform proposals and their approval by Allende as the price for party support.

This action virtually assures that Allende will receive enough Christian Democratic support for election to the Presidency. It marks a victory for those of Allende's advisers, including the Communist Party, who persuaded him late last week to soften his earlier rejection of the Christian Democratic demands (see The President's Daily Brief, 4 October 1970). The vote also deepens the internal Christian Democratic split.


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
BOLIVIA



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


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
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
LAOS



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NOTES

Cambodia: Harassment of the government column on Route 6 continues. According to late press reports, the Communists launched new attacks against the column early today and against the provincial capitals of Kompong Chhnang and Kompong Thom.

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USSR:

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France-USSR: During his visit to the Soviet Union from 6 to 13 October, President Pompidou probably will press for Soviet moves to demonstrate that De Gaulle's "special relationship" has not deteriorated markedly. Pompidou is known to fear that Bonn's Ostpolitik might relegate France to the sidelines, and to be concerned over the recent lack of Franco-Soviet consultation. Moscow, anxious that a resentful Paris not improve ties with Washington, has already sounded out the French on the chances of arranging regular high-level political consultations. A specific proposal to accomplish that may well be made to Pompidou.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

7 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The situation in Bolivia following President Ovando's ouster is discussed on *Page 1*.

Jordan

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(*Page 2*)

The South Vietnamese Army has begun an offensive against long-time Communist base areas in the delta provinces. (*Page 3*)

assessment of the military situation on Cambodia's Route 6 and around the capital appears on *Page 5*.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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BOLIVIA

Military officers who ousted President Ovando yesterday are facing a serious challenge from forces led by General Juan Jose Torres. Operating from El Alto Air Force Base just outside La Paz, Torres yesterday demanded that he be recognized as president of a "revolutionary government" to succeed Ovando. Torres, who was removed as armed forces commander last July because of objections to his leftist tendencies, has the support of the air force, most of the 800-man presidential guard regiment, and a battalion of elite paratroops flown in from Cochabamba, Bolivia's second city. He has also gained the support of leftist student and labor leaders, who have called for a general strike to begin today. Yesterday Torres directed a token bombing and strafing of the presidential palace to show that he could and would use force.


Earlier in the day General Miranda, who led the ouster of Ovando, stepped down as army commander after naming a junta composed of the chiefs of the three services in an apparent attempt to pacify troops opposed to his assumption of power. The army junta member, Efrain Guachalla, appointed a predominantly military cabinet, indicated that the new government would not retract measures taken by Ovando, and announced that elections would be held by the end of 1972. Late last night, however, the air force commander reportedly resigned his position on the junta, placing the longevity of this government in serious doubt.

The balance of power appears to favor the Miranda forces. They control most of the military units in the La Paz area, have brought in reinforcements from outside the capital, and reportedly are moving into position for an attempt to seize El Alto. Torres' hopes for winning out appear to depend heavily on the success of the student and labor leaders in attracting active, massive support for his cause.


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
JORDAN




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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM

The South Vietnamese Army has begun new offensive operations against long-time Communist base areas in the delta provinces south of Saigon. Senior officers of the army's 7th and 9th divisions report that they have already begun implementing some of the aggressive tactics of the new Military Region 4 commander, General Truong, who was recently transferred from the northern provinces. Employing Truong's fire support base concept, two regiments of the 7th Division have been tasked with establishing permanent positions deep within the Communists' Base Area 470 in the swampy region of western Dinh Tuong and eastern Kien Phong provinces. In Chau Doc Province, the 9th Division has also sent upwards of three regiments into the Seven Mountains area with the objective of driving the North Vietnamese 18B Regiment and supporting units from this key enemy safehaven on the South Vietnamese - Cambodian border.


Although Communist forces are not up to full combat strength and food and supply shortages have increased in recent months, the terrain offers a defensive advantage for the enemy. The South Vietnamese commanders, including General Truong, acknowledge that these operations will be costly, but believe that aggressive operations will boost the morale of government forces in the area.

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CAMBODIA

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
--The government column in the Chenla operation on Route 6 may soon come under heavier enemy pressure. The column is well spread out, with troops deployed to its front, rear, and flanks. If it tries to move beyond Tang Kouk, it is likely to encounter Communist forces equipped with antiaircraft weapons. Unless suppressed by close air support, the enemy could use such weapons to rake the government column along an area where lateral movement is difficult because of flooding on both sides of the road. An attack from the rear, or on its flanks with its rear blocked, would also put the column in "serious difficulties." The movement of elements of the North Vietnamese 174th Regiment into an area east of the column, reports of increased enemy supply movements, and various unconfirmed reports of a buildup south of the column, all indicate that the enemy may be taking steps to isolate the column, perhaps before making a flank attack in force against it.

--The approximately 3,000 enemy troops in the general area probably are not enough to overrun the column, however. The morale of the Cambodian soldiers is still high, and they reportedly are getting good intelligence on Communist movements from local villagers. The column itself probably will hold its positions, which, on balance, are better than the enemy's. A heavy firefight could develop and bring substantial losses on both sides.

--There are still no signs that the Communists will make an assault on the capital itself. Enemy forces continue to move with relative ease around Phnom Penh, but Cambodian estimates of the strength and intentions of these forces probably are quite exaggerated. The most likely enemy actions against the city include continuing harassment in its outlying areas, the initiation of occasional incidents within the city proper, and possible mortar or rocket attacks.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Soviets Have Problems with Swing-wing Flogger Fighter Aircraft



Length	53 ft
Wing span	46 ft extended, 26 ft swept
Speed	1,400 knots
Combat radius	350 nm
Combat ceiling	60,000 ft
Payload	4,400 lbs



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USSR

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[redacted] two of the new Flogger swing-wing fighters crashed recently on separate test flights near the Ramenskoye test center outside Moscow. Deployment of the Flogger to operational units had already begun prior to the crashes, after an unusually short developmental period. The loss of two aircraft flown by experienced test pilots suggests problems of a magnitude beyond the sort normally encountered after a new aircraft has gone into service. The wing of one of the planes apparently failed after engine problems resulted in excessive speed.

The Flogger is expected eventually to supplant the MIG-21 Fishbed as the Soviets' primary tactical fighter and export aircraft. The Mach-2.3 aircraft is faster and is estimated to perform better at low altitudes than the MIG-21. The swing-wing design gives it the capability to operate from airstrips shorter than those required by fighters now in service.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Egypt: Cairo's announcement of its willingness to accept a three-month extension of the cease-fire suggests that Egyptian leaders are seeking a breathing period in which to adjust to their new circumstances without Nasir. Foreign Minister Riad indicated that the extension depends upon continued efforts to implement the UN Security Council resolution on the Middle East of 1967, and on the resumption of UN mediator Jarring's mission. Many Egyptians are not anxious for a renewal of active hostilities with Israel. Moreover, an extension of the cease-fire would put off having to decide whether or not to resume Nasir's war of attrition until the political situation in Cairo is somewhat stabilized.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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8 October 1970

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

8 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

General Torres' takeover as president of Bolivia is discussed on *Page 1*.

[redacted] 50X1
Jordan. (*Page 2*)

[redacted] 50X1
Egypt [redacted] *Page 3*.

Infiltration to southern South Vietnam and adjacent Cambodian areas is being resumed. (*Page 5*)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

BOLIVIA

General Juan Jose Torres is rapidly consolidating his control after declaring himself president yesterday. His forces occupied government installations in La Paz with little resistance from the forces of General Miranda that had engineered President Ovando's resignation. Miranda's forces backed down in the face of Torres' considerable strength in the air force and army as well as among students, workers, and peasants.

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The key to the successful seizure of power by Torres was the backing he received from radical leftist student and labor leaders. This support was conditioned upon his acceptance of at least some of their demands for participation in the government, university autonomy, wage increases, and free elections within six months.

During the time that Torres actively participated in the Ovando government, he demonstrated a proclivity for demagogery. He has remained close to the leftists whom Ovando originally appointed to his cabinet and was apparently one of the prime movers in the expropriation of the US-owned Bolivian Gulf Oil Company.


There were student-led raids yesterday on several US installations in La Paz as well as on the homes of some pro-Miranda officers. At least two newspapers were also seized. A new list of demands has also been presented to Torres by a group of leftist leaders, including some from the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking Communist parties. Among these demands are the removal of foreign military missions and other "imperialist" agencies, abrogation of the compensation agreement with Gulf, nationalization of foreign banks and the US-owned Matilde Mines, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with "all socialist countries."

Torres had declared at his swearing-in ceremony that his government would include civilians from the groups supporting him. Apparently he will need to grant the leftists' new demands to ensure continued cooperation by all of these groups.


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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

JORDAN




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
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


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
EGYPT-USSR



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


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
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Four new infiltration groups, with a total strength of about 1,700 troops, were detected in intercepted North Vietnamese messages on 4 and 5 October. The numerical designations of these groups indicate that they will come under the authority of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), and are destined to operate in southern South Vietnam or adjacent parts of Cambodia.

This is the first time since last April that any infiltration groups of battalion size have been noted heading for the COSVN area. Gaps in the sequence of numbers assigned to these new groups suggest that as many as 8,000 troops are possibly scheduled to head southward within the next several weeks. The Communist resumption of large-scale infiltration bound for South Vietnam has occurred about a month earlier than last year.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Chile: Confidence in the economy is ebbing within the business community. Sales are down sharply and Chile's largest port, Valparaiso, is badly congested because importers are not claiming their merchandise. In addition, a strike at Chile's largest copper mine has cut back exports. Strict controls have hampered the heavy demand for foreign currency exchange, and official foreign monetary reserves continue at a record high.

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9 October 1970

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

9 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

On *Page 1* we speculate on Vietnamese reactions to President Nixon's proposals.

La Paz has returned to a high state of tension [redacted]

(*Page 2*)

50X1

Cambodian Government spokesmen have overstated the number of enemy troops involved in attacks against the relief column on Route 6. (*Page 3*)

[redacted] 50X1

The cease-fire continues to hold in Jordan. (*Page 5*)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM

The Communists are reacting to President Nixon's proposals with stiff reiterations of themes heard many times before. This is Hanoi's easiest interim approach and the one Communist negotiators took in Paris yesterday: the US program is propaganda; the Viet Cong's various "points" provide a "correct" basis for a settlement; and a cease-fire should be the last step, not the first. A very hard-line commentary carried by Hanoi's press agency on 8 October contains the most comprehensive statement along these lines.

The Communists could play this tune for some time, but we do not rule out a more positive public response of the kind that followed a few days after the announcement of a partial bombing halt in March 1968. Hanoi acted fast and positively on that occasion because it was ready with an initiative in response to such a US move. It now has to digest a more comprehensive package of substantive proposals than ever before, but Hanoi almost certainly has been anticipating something of this sort for some time. Therefore, a fairly rapid Communist response aimed at recapturing the initiative may be in order, perhaps a follow-up to the Viet Cong's eight points, which in themselves are pretty thin gruel. We think the Communists will find the President's message worth exploring, especially because of the tone and intent it conveyed.

South Vietnamese attitudes toward President Nixon's proposals will hinge, as always, on their estimate of Hanoi's reaction. President Thieu and his colleagues undoubtedly take comfort from the knowledge that the allies had already proposed many of the key substantive points in the 7 October proposals and these had already been denounced by the Communists. On the other hand, they are probably concerned that the Communists may be encouraged by the tone of the President's language.

The South Vietnamese leaders probably fear that Hanoi may eventually be tempted to explore the allied proposals more seriously. Because any serious negotiations would imply that the present government would be in jeopardy, Thieu would expect South Vietnamese acceptance of his authority to decline. Thieu does not separate his twin objectives of keeping his own regime in power and of keeping South Vietnam non-Communist, and he is counting heavily on the successful implementation of the Vietnamization program to achieve them. Both would be endangered, in his view, if the political underpinnings of the South Vietnamese Vietnamization effort were to be severely shaken.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

BOLIVIA


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[redacted] signs late yesterday that authority was breaking down in La Paz. Students broke into the offices of the criminal investigation department and confiscated records. There are some reports of looting and armed students and workers were stopping traffic in the university area last night. The campesinos occupied the agricultural ministry and threatened to block all roads unless they were given the right to name a campesino agricultural minister.

Torres spent most of yesterday discussing the formation of his cabinet with leftist labor, student, and political groups. So far only 10 of the 18 cabinet posts have been announced and it appears that there is considerable disagreement over the division of the spoils.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Current Situation



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

Government spokesmen in Phnom Penh greatly exaggerated the size of two ground attacks on 8 October against the Cambodian Army column on Route 6. Two sharp ground probes did occur in the Tang Kouk area, but neither side suffered many losses.

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The government's allegation that "7,000 to 10,000" enemy troops were involved was particularly off base.

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[redacted] there probably are no more than 3,000 Communist troops within striking distance of government forces between Skoun and Tang Kouk.


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The Cambodians give no indication of revising the plans for the overland relief operation to Kompong Thom. Three battalions recently returned to Phnom Penh from Tang Kouk, but these may be on temporary security duty in the capital in connection with festivities for today's proclamation of the republic.


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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SOUTH VIETNAM



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Jordan: The cease-fire continues to hold. There are no new reports of fighting, and both sides are continuing to release prisoners. Press reports indicate that the Arab follow-up committee is meeting in Amman to work out a permanent pact between the government and fedayeen. The committee has been surprisingly effective in implementing the vague truce agreement reached in Cairo. It may be trying now to capitalize on this momentum, and the at least grudging confidence it has obtained from the government and fedayeen, to arrange a more detailed pact dealing with the longer-term relations between the two sides.

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10 October 1970



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

10 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

General Torres' new cabinet reflects a compromise with his opponents in Bolivia's military. (Page 1)

Chancellor Brandt has reacted negatively to the tougher Soviet line on Berlin. (Page 2)

[Soviet] (Page 3)

50X1

[Laos] (Page 4)

50X1

All major Libyan oil producers have now signed agreements with the government. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

BOLIVIA

General Torres' new cabinet contains a roughly equal mix of left and center, military and civilian, and pro- and anti-US ministers. There are four holdovers from the Ovando cabinet, but only one of these is a member of the young leftist group that was opposed by moderates in the armed forces. None of the leftists who were forced out of the Ovando government in recent months is included. In a press interview Thursday Torres said that his government will be "nationalist and revolutionary" but "by no means extreme leftist." He said that he will respect the compensation agreement on Gulf Oil's expropriated property.

The make-up of the cabinet, and the failure of the threatened coup to materialize, suggest that the military officers opposed to Torres gained at least some of their objectives through negotiation.

Torres' apparent compromise with the military will cost him support among extreme leftist elements. A student-labor group called off a pro-Torres demonstration yesterday after the cabinet was announced. Some labor leaders are saying that they are disappointed with the cabinet and that Torres no longer enjoys complete labor support.


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

WEST GERMANY - BERLIN

Brandt has reacted negatively to the tougher line taken by the Soviets at the four-power working-level meeting Wednesday. He has told Ambassador Rush that the Soviet proposal to reach a general agreement first--leaving a detailed Berlin settlement until later--was "out of the question," even though such an arrangement could help Brandt justify ratification of the Soviet - West German treaty. He urged the Allies not to "give an inch" on Soviet demands that Bundestag committee meetings be among West German activities banned in West Berlin. He said that the whole Soviet list of prohibited Berlin activities would dangerously increase Soviet and East German influence in the western sector.

Brandt was taken aback by the Soviet stance at the meeting Wednesday, and may on reflection be less adamant about the Soviet proposals. He attaches great importance to the four powers reaching an agreement on Berlin, now that it has become an essential element in maintaining the momentum of his Ostpolitik.




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USSR




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
Laos:

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Libya: Esso, Mobil, and BP--the last holdouts among Libya's major oil producers--have signed new tax and revenue agreements with the government. Output in Libya should now reach about the same level as last year, thus reducing the threat to tight West European oil supplies. With the new pacts, Libyan oil revenues are expected to reach about \$1.45 billion in 1972, a 20-percent increase over that realized in fiscal year 1970.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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The President's Daily Brief

Sunday
11 OCT 1970
~~10 October 1970~~



Top Secret^{50X1}

SPECIAL SUNDAY CABLE TO
SAN CLEMENTE

CAMBODIA

Elements of the Chenla column on Route 6 came under Communist harassment near Tang Kouk for the fourth consecutive day on 10 October.

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A mortar attack on a government battalion about nine miles southeast of Phnom Penh late on 9 October may have been timed for effect on the Republic Day festivities

50X1

Siem Reap city to the northwest of the capital and Kompong Cham to the east were shelled the same day. Several major elements of the Viet Cong 9th Division have recently assembled at a plantation near Kompong Cham, and intercepted messages have mentioned plans to attack the city.


BOLIVIA

The country is settling down but there are already cracks in the coalition put together by General Torres. Labor tends to view his new cabinet as a reinstallation of the "old guard," but is staying in line for the present. Students are even more disappointed at the cabinet's lack of a radical image and are now regarding themselves as a politically independent force. Torres has not gained the full support of the military and remains under pressure from them to adopt a moderate course. Meanwhile, General Miranda has left his refuge in the Paraguayan Embassy [redacted]

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[redacted]
There does not appear to be an immediate threat to the Torres government, but active military opposition could rapidly develop if Torres veers to the left in an effort to regain the full support of labor and students.

JORDAN



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USSR-INDOCHINA

Moscow, following North Vietnam's lead, has issued its strongest criticism of the President's speech through an article in Pravda which attacks the US five points as "legalizing and perpetuating US intervention in Indochina." Moscow's rapid move to discredit the US proposals is probably partly inspired by a desire to avoid any suggestion that it would use its influence to gain Hanoi's acceptance. It also suggests that the USSR is concerned that the US has captured the initiative and wants to refocus attention on the Communist peace plan.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

12 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Recent military developments in Cambodia are discussed
on *Page 1*.


Jockeying for power continues behind the scenes in
Egypt. (*Page 2*)

Government irregulars have taken a town in northern
Laos, but some reverses were reported in the pan-
handle. (*Page 3*)

Canada plans to announce its recognition of Peking
tomorrow. (*Page 4*)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Current Situation



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

No new significant ground attacks developed against the government column on Route 6 yesterday. Despite the constant enemy pressure against the column, the task force commander still believes that the situation is well in hand, principally because of his air and artillery superiority.

In the Phnom Penh area, a Cambodian Army battalion located some six miles east of the capital came under heavy fire throughout the night of 9-10 October. Several towns also experienced harassing fire.

The attack near Phnom Penh probably was intended to draw attention from the festivities surrounding Cambodia's declaration as a republic, but Cambodian authorities think it may also portend an increase in military activity near the capital.

1,500 enemy troops have recently moved into the area, but there is no other hard evidence that a force of this size has deployed so close to Phnom Penh.

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Several major elements of the Viet Cong 9th Division recently have converged at the Chup rubber plantation just east of Kompong Cham city. The buildup of enemy forces at Chup may be related to a recently intercepted message from Hanoi's Central Research Directorate to COSVN's military intelligence bureau which told of Communist intentions to attack and occupy Kompong Cham. The message also spoke of the necessity of opening up a new infiltration route from Laos through northeastern Cambodia to Kompong Cham.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EGYPT

Two loosely knit triumvirates have emerged from the political infighting following Nasir's death. The members of the in group--acting President Sadat, Minister of Interior Jumah, and Ali Sabri--have worked together to ward off other contenders for their present position of pre-eminence, but they are maneuvering against each other for key posts in the new government.


Three other close associates of Nasir, Minister of Guidance Haykal, Kamal al-Din Husayn, and Zakariya Muhyeddin, appear to be shut out of the power structure. [redacted] Haykal, who has dominated the press as editor of the Cairo daily Al-Ahram, will soon be replaced. Husayn has been confined to his home by security officials, and Muhyeddin has indicated that he is content to remain on the sidelines for the present.

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Egypt's disgruntled students, who in general support Muhyeddin, are another factor in the fragile political situation. Jumah recently ordered the arrest of 150 student leaders as a protective measure. This move probably will rekindle the antiregime mood of the students, who already hate Jumah because of his repressive actions against them during antigovernment demonstrations in 1968.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS: Current Situation



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Vang Pao's irregulars this weekend occupied the deserted town of Muong Soui and its nearby airstrip on the western edge of the Plaine des Jarres. The Communists have used Muong Soui as a storage and transshipment point on Route 7, but it probably has more political than strategic importance. Southwest of the Plaine, irregulars made limited advances but reported one enemy surprise attack behind their lines.

In the Laotian panhandle, government forces operating against enemy supply lines in the Toumlane valley area have sustained serious setbacks in recent days. Intercepted government messages indicate that strong enemy counterattacks have forced them to withdraw from the valley. Government forces operating in the area of Route 9 between Muong Phine and Muong Phalane are also meeting stiff opposition from Communist troops in this sector of the panhandle.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Canada - Communist China: All last-minute problems have been resolved and Foreign Minister Sharp will announce Canadian recognition of Peking in parliament tomorrow. The agreed communique represents a considerable retreat on the part of the Chinese from their initial hard-line stand on the crucial issue of Taiwan. The Canadian announcement will put greater pressure on the Italians to conclude their own long drawn-out recognition negotiations with Peking and may cause Belgium to move in the same direction.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Top Secret



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Top Secret^{50X1}

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

13 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

[Redacted] 50X1

In Laos, Communist forces in the panhandle are keeping pressure on government units operating against their supply lines. (Page 2)

[Redacted] 50X1

Egypt

(Page 3)


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR




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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS: Current Situation



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Communist forces in the panhandle are keeping pressure on government units operating against their supply lines. On 11 October, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops overran a small outpost on the northeastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau overlooking Route 16. Farther south on the plateau, enemy units continued to probe the defenses around Site 26 near Attopeu, but government forces held their ground.

The government withdrawal from the Toum-lane Valley, noted in yesterday's Daily Brief, was not caused by enemy pressure. The units had completed more than a month of successful harassment operations, during which they destroyed enemy supplies and mined about 25 miles of Route 23 in anticipation of increased Communist supply movements during the dry season.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Egypt-USSR:

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14 October 1970

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

14 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The agreement between the Jordanian Government and the fedayeen is discussed on *Page 1*.

viets

Singapore

So-
(Page 3)

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The French-Soviet communique, issued at the conclusion of Pompidou's visit, is discussed on *Page 4*.

Brandt appears to have recovered from his disappointment last week over the Soviet hard line on Berlin.
(*Page 5*)

/ North Vietnam. (*Page 6*)

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Chile

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(*Page 6*)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**JORDAN**

The Jordanian Government and fedayeen signed a detailed agreement late yesterday as a follow-up to the Cairo cease-fire accord of 27 September. A three-man committee, consisting of Tunisian Prime Minister Bahi Ladgham or his representative and members from the government and fedayeen, is charged with implementing the new agreement. A military subcommittee, including observers from Arab countries with forces in Jordan, has also been set up, presumably to help prevent a renewal of fighting.

The government has made some gains in the new agreement. Although the actual location of fedayeen bases has not been made public, the government has been promised that they will not be near cities and villages. The Palestinian Liberation Organization's central committee has been made fully responsible for enforcing its obligations on all fedayeen groups.

Other government objectives have also been realized, but they are somewhat weakened by vaguely worded exceptions. One article, for example, subordinates freedom of fedayeen action to Jordanian law but then waters down the point by speaking of unspecified exceptions. The fedayeen are barred from carrying weapons in towns, but again, provision is made for "certain exceptional cases." Commandos are apparently answerable to the civil courts for ordinary crimes, but the fedayeen command seems to have been made responsible for general discipline.

The fedayeen, however, have obtained concessions that the government earlier seemed determined not to grant. The Amman headquarters of the central committee will be protected by fedayeen guards and is apparently free to conduct a full range of activities, including military. No one is to be detained or suspended because of the recent incidents, although the government had earlier intended to exempt from amnesty those holding official government positions.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


The fedayeen have also been promised that the government will not establish or operate organizations "contrary to the interests of the Palestine revolution."

As with the earlier cease-fire accord, much may depend on the effectiveness of the three-member committee. Neither the government nor fedayeen can claim a victory from this agreement and maneuvering by both sides will continue. Husayn and the moderate fedayeen have had the upper hand since the end of the fighting, but as disputes inevitably develop over the agreement they will be under pressure again from the hard-liners in the two camps.


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
SINGAPORE




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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FRANCE-USSR

Pompidou's week-long visit ended yesterday with an official communiqué endorsing a "properly prepared" all-European conference aimed at East-West detente. The two countries also signed a protocol calling for regular political consultations, and emergency consultations when there is a threat to peace.

The French have been skeptical about a Conference on European Security and have been adamant in reserving support until the Soviets made positive concessions on Berlin. There were indications in July that Paris was changing its attitude, but Pompidou's endorsement in the communiqué is the first public--and most positive--affirmation of French support to date.

Both the French and Soviets probably see the protocol on consultations as largely symbolic. For the French, it symbolizes closer links with Moscow and demonstrates Pompidou's ability to strengthen the ties established in 1966 by De Gaulle. Moscow has accomplished one of its main objectives in the visit--preventing deterioration in Franco-Soviet relations because of its closer contacts with West Germany.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

WEST GERMANY - BERLIN

Brandt has told Ambassador Rush that he sees no reason for "great discouragement," despite the hard line taken again by the Soviets at the ambassadors' meeting on 9 October. He thought the Soviets were engaging in standard pressure tactics and he appeared to attach little significance to the details of Soviet positions at this stage. Brandt said he was in no hurry; the talks could go on as long as next April. Brandt also said--going a step further than Foreign Minister Scheel--that he believed there could be no movement on a Conference on European Security until there was not only a Berlin settlement but also an agreement with East Germany.

Brandt was less negative than after the four-power working-level meeting last week. (See The President's Daily Brief, 10 October 1970.) He probably believes that it is too early to judge the reasons for the Soviets' present hard line, and that at any rate there will be little movement for a few weeks while Gromyko is talking in New York and London.


It is unlikely, however, that Brandt wants negotiations to drag out to next April. The momentum of Ostpolitik could suffer from such a delay. Brandt needs further progress on this front soon in order to ease his increasing domestic problems.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


NOTES

North Vietnam:



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
Chile:



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The President's Daily Brief

15 October 1970

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

15 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Cambodian Government forces have launched a major road-clearing operation south of Phnom Penh. (Page 1)

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Egypt has requested a General Assembly debate on the Middle East beginning on 26 October [redacted]

(Page 2)

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[redacted] Chinese [redacted] Soviet [redacted]

[redacted] /Page 3.


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Fedayeen are threatening a sabotage campaign against Western oil refineries beginning tomorrow. (Page 3)

Press polemics have resumed between Belgrade and Moscow. (Page 3)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Current Situation



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

Government forces have launched another major road-clearing operation. Thirteen battalions are now trying to open Routes 2 and 3 to a distance of 20 miles south of Phnom Penh, where large numbers of enemy troops have been sighted during the past month. The Communists have destroyed bridges on the roads both within the operation's area and beyond.

The size and timing of this latest drive indicate Phnom Penh remains confident of its offensive capabilities, despite the problems it has encountered in trying to reopen Route 6 to Kompong Thom.

Further south, the Communists are increasing pressure on government forces in Kampot Province. The town of Kompong Trach, to the east of Kampot city, was attacked on 13 October. The Communists control portions of Route 16, northeast of Kompong Trach, and have cut that road in several places.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

UN - MIDDLE EAST


Egypt has requested a General Assembly debate on the Middle East to begin on 26 October, immediately following the UN's commemorative ceremonies.

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Cairo's apparent aim is to counter US and Israeli charges about missile deployments by obtaining Assembly condemnation of Israeli intransigence. Although such a resolution would stand a fair chance of getting a majority vote, it would be less likely to receive the necessary two thirds if the issue is declared an Important Question. The acrimonious debate it would provoke, however, would substantially reduce the prospect of any early resumption of the Jarring talks.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Communist China

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USSR

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Arab States: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is again threatening to sabotage US, British, and West German economic interests in the Middle East in retaliation for alleged support of Israel.

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Yugoslavia-USSR: Open press polemics between Belgrade and Moscow have resumed following a relatively quiet three months in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The Soviets have quoted US Communist Party chief Gus Hall's criticisms of President Nixon's trip to Yugoslavia and Hall's assertions that Moscow believes Yugoslavia has sold out to the US. The Belgrade press is blasting this as personal abuse of Tito. The two-way invective is especially intense for a time when Belgrade is hosting a visit by a Soviet parliamentary delegation.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Top Secret



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16 October 1970

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

16 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

On Page 1 we comment on Hanoi's rejection of the President's peace proposals.

Russia

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US

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(Page 2)



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(Page 5)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NORTH VIETNAM

The "categorical" rejection of the President's peace proposals by the Vietnamese Communists in a foreign ministry statement from Hanoi on 14 October, and at the Paris talks yesterday, suggests that they see little opportunity for fruitful negotiations at present. The Communists have had a week to reflect on the proposals, and their statements clearly represent a considered judgment that there is more to be gained for the moment by adopting a firm rather than a flexible public stance and by sticking with the Viet Cong's tough eight-point proposal.


Hanoi charged that the President's proposals were "vague" on the key issues of troop withdrawal and the shape of a post-war political structure in the South. The Communists probably would like the US to elaborate on these two points in private talks. In this case, they might tailor their future diplomatic and political tactics to whatever the US may say about these matters. Any discussions of this kind would go very slowly at best, especially if the Communists believe they can improve their military position as US troops withdraw during the coming months.

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
USSR-US



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


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
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
SOUTH VIETNAM



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


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
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FEDAYEEN



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


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


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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**NOTES**Egypt-UN

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Laos: In an intercepted message of 14 October, the senior Communist logistic authority in the Lao-tian panhandle informed a subordinate unit responsible for supply activity that as many as 100 vehicles would move during the period 14 through 18 October. This development confirms earlier indications that supply movements in the central panhandle are scheduled to begin in mid-October, about a month earlier than last year.

Cambodia: Elements of two Cambodian Army battalions clashed yesterday with a Communist force about 20 miles south of Phnom Penh, sustaining only light casualties. The government troops were part of the 6,000-man operation clearing Routes 2 and 3 south of the capital. The enemy troops may have been from the North Vietnamese 1st Division located nearby. The government operation is scheduled to end today.


Japan: Prime Minister Sato yesterday made the long-expected formal announcement that he will seek another two-year term as party president, and therefore his fourth consecutive term as prime minister. He faces only token opposition at the Liberal Democratic Party election on 29 October.

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party
opposition to Finance Minister Fukuda, his choice for a successor, was apparently a major reason for his decision to remain in office. He might, however, step down before his new term expires if a suitable candidate could be found to carry on his brand of conservative policies.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Top Secret



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17 October 1970

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

17 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Panama's fiscal problems are likely to be a major topic of discussion during President Lakas' visit to Washington. (Page 1)

Soviets

(Page 2)

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The Soviet Union has joined the International Civil Aviation Organization but Moscow is not expected to endorse the US proposal for a multilateral boycott of air services against countries harboring hijackers engaged in international blackmail. (Page 3)

Egypt

(Page 4)

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The British

Singapore

(Page 4)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PANAMA

Panamanian officials have informed Ambassador Sayre that the government expects to run a deficit of \$56 million next year. They have indicated an urgent need for \$40 million by the first part of 1971. The government says it is no longer sanguine about raising additional money from private international sources and is even beginning to worry about refinancing existing short-term private debts. Officials also are skeptical about the ability of international lending organizations to respond to their needs quickly enough to be of assistance.

The Panamanians appear to be counting on the US to prevent the impending fiscal crisis. President Lakas is likely to raise this issue when he meets with President Nixon on 25 October. Lakas also is expected to outline his country's hopes for revisions in the canal treaties.

The high level of government spending is largely the result of a Panamanian commitment to sustain an economic growth rate of between 7 and 8 percent despite the sluggish increase in domestic private investment. A substantial decline in the growth rate could create conditions serious enough to imperil the present government. If initial approaches to the US are unproductive, strongman General Torrijos may well threaten to seek assistance from socialist states, despite the likelihood that such an approach would frighten domestic and foreign investors and aggravate his political difficulties.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

INTERNATIONAL AVIATION

The USSR joined the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Thursday, ending its long holdout as the only major air transport nation without membership. On the same day the ICAO legal committee completed work on a draft convention that would require adhering states to extradite or prosecute hijackers. The draft will now be considered by a diplomatic conference at The Hague in early December.

The US-proposed air transport sanctions convention, which would apply a multilateral boycott of air services against any nation harboring hijackers engaged in international blackmail, is still under consideration by the ICAO. Chances of approval at the current session do not appear favorable.

Membership in ICAO will allow the Soviets to participate in multilateral decisions relating to the wave of hijackings. Soviet reluctance to antagonize Arab views may, however, serve as a partial brake on their cooperation.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Egypt-USSR

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UK-Singapore

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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19 October 1970

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

19 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS


Laotian Government irregulars have captured the air-strip at Ban Na near the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 1)

North Vietnamese diplomats in Vientiane have conveyed the impression that Hanoi [redacted] 50X1
[redacted] desire for early negotiations [redacted] 50X1
[redacted] (Page 2) 50X1
[redacted] Syria [redacted] Iraq [redacted] 50X1
[redacted] Jordan. (Page 3)

A clash in northern Jordan over the weekend probably was the result of fedayeen resistance to an army redeployment. (Page 4)

[redacted] pressure in Italy to vote for admission of Communist China to the UN. (Page 5) pres- 50X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Government irregular troops captured the air-strip at Ban Na near the Plaine des Jarres on 17 October, and are now consolidating their defenses around the strip. The irregulars had been pushing toward Ban Na for two months with the aim of blocking any Communist drive against their complex at Long Tieng, to the southwest, during the dry season.

Some Communist counterattacks against the irregulars may be in the offing. Intercepted messages indicate that enemy forces had been ordered to hold this point "at all costs."

In southern Laos, references to a new rear-service entity designated "470" have been noted in the communications of the senior Communist logistic authority in the panhandle and its associated military units. At least 1,000 personnel who have entered the infiltration pipeline since late September are destined for "470," probably in the extreme southern panhandle area. The new organization appears to have been established in order to provide support to Communist forces operating in Cambodia.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NORTH VIETNAM

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The [redacted] ambassador to Laos has told Ambassador Godley, [redacted] about a dinner conversation [redacted] with two senior North Vietnamese diplomats in Vientiane [redacted]

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[redacted] According to the Vietnamese Charge [redacted] claimed that lack of progress [redacted] is due to President Nixon's ignoring the Viet Cong's eight-point proposal and criticized the President's proposals for failing to discuss the Vietnamese internal political problem, which he termed "essential" to Hanoi. [redacted] noted, however, that there were "obscurities in the President's proposal on which there could be further useful explanation."

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We have speculated [redacted]

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[redacted] that, despite their negative approach to the US proposals, the Communists would probably like to explore them further in private talks. [redacted] statement to the

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[redacted] who claimed to be quoting the charge's remarks as closely as he could remember them, goes farther in this direction than any we have noted.

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On the subject of Laos, [redacted] said that "we" were disappointed in the President's failure to mention bilateral negotiations between the two sides in Laos. He added that Hanoi feared a rightist coup in Vientiane and that talks between the two princes were desirable "as soon as possible."

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These are the strongest indications we have noted that North Vietnam is eager for such talks to get under way. Although we are not certain how reliably [redacted] speaks for the Hanoi leadership and although it is possible that the [redacted]

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account is somewhat biased, the latter reported that the North Vietnamese diplomats seemed to have carefully prepared their comments to him.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SYRIA-IRAQ

[redacted] 50X1

the tumult besetting the Iraqi and Syrian governments following the hostilities in Jordan. In Syria, the ineffectiveness of the intervention in Jordan has increased infighting between civilian and military wings of the ruling Baath party. [redacted]

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[redacted] 50X1

[redacted] 50X1

In Iraq, [redacted] Vice President Hardan Takriti was removed from all his positions on 15 October [redacted]

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[redacted] 50X1

Hardan's dismissal apparently was connected with his leading role in blocking Iraqi military intervention on the side of the fedayeen in Jordan. Controversy over the degree of support for the fedayeen may well soon trigger many more changes in both countries, where the power struggle between military and civilian elements is chronic.


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

JORDAN

Army and fedayeen forces clashed over the weekend near the Syrian border, apparently when the fedayeen attempted to force the army to withdraw from locations northwest of Ramtha to which it had moved on Saturday.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

ITALY - COMMUNIST CHINA

Italy may vote for the Albanian solution to seat Communist China when the UN General Assembly takes up the issue early next month, according to Foreign Minister Moro. A majority of parties at a recent Italian Senate committee meeting favored an affirmative vote even if the protracted Rome-Peking negotiations on recognition were still not completed. Moro explained that Canada's recognition of Peking had increased parliamentary pressure on this issue

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A decision by Italy to support the Albanian resolution would influence the votes of several other nations, and increase the chances that for the first time a majority would vote for seating Peking. The issue will almost certainly still be declared an Important Question requiring a two-thirds vote, however, and that kind of margin is nowhere in sight this year.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTE

West Germany - USSR

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

20 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Cuba / Chile / [redacted] 50X1
(Page 1)

[redacted] Panama / [redacted] 50X1
[redacted] Page 2.

[redacted] Soviet / [redacted] 50X1
(Page 3)


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
CUBA-CHILE



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
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Allende's victory was virtually assured yesterday when Alessandri, the conservative candidate, withdrew. Alessandri issued a public statement calling on parliamentarians who supported his candidacy not to vote for him in the congressional run-off on 24 October.




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
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


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
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
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
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NOTE



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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

21 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Lon Nol disclosed his current military strategy in a recent conversation with Ambassador Swank. (Page 1)

Our first impressions of the new Egyptian cabinet appear on Page 2.

The Japanese leadership continues its cautious approach toward shifts in its defense policies. (Page 3)

Egypt

(Page 4)


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Soviets

(Page 4)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

Lon Nol told Ambassador Swank in a briefing on military strategy Monday that the Route 6 column will resume its slow advance toward Kompong Thom city once Tang Kouk is secured and the population in rear areas is organized. The column will try next to take the enemy-held town of Kompong Thma, at the junction of Routes 6 and 21.

Over the longer run, Lon Nol wants to secure Route 6 up to Kompong Thom and Siem Reap by moving troops well north of Route 6--perhaps as far as the Lao border--in order to plug Communist infiltration routes. Such an operation would move slowly with efforts being made to "mobilize" the people along the way before each new step forward.

Army Deputy Chief of Staff Sutsakhan will probably cover the same ground in his meeting with Admiral McCain in Honolulu later this week. Sutsakhan is expected to press for additional US military aid, including more arms and M-113 personnel carriers.

Ambassador Swank found Lon Nol's presentation unusually disjointed but thought it reflected some confidence in the present military situation. Swank was impressed by Lon Nol's emphasis on conducting a "people's war" that calls for winning over the rural population and consolidating control over the countryside as the army moves forward militarily.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EGYPT

The new cabinet announced yesterday seems to reflect a desire for continuity, peace, and stability by Egyptians in high places. The selection of Mahmud Fawzi, a skilled diplomat who served as Nasir's foreign policy adviser, as Premier underlines Cairo's continued interest in seeking a negotiated solution to the confrontation with Israel. Fawzi does not have a power base of his own, an added advantage in this instance, because his appointment will not stir the bitter political infighting that might have developed if the more influential Ali Sabri or Zakariya Muhyeddin had been selected.

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[] Fawzi is popular with the officer corps, another important qualification for a durable government in Egypt.

The makeup of the new cabinet also extracts maximum political mileage from the memory of Nasir by creating the impression that the policies of the lost leader continue uninterrupted. Virtually all of Nasir's cabinet members were retained and Abd-al-Muhsin Abu-al-Nur, a former military colleague of Sadat and Nasir, was named secretary general of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's sole political party. Abu-al-Nur had been the ASU's assistant secretary general since the June 1967 war.

In sum, the distribution of power has not been seriously altered by the formation of the new government. The transitional collegial leadership remains intact and Sadat, Minister of State Sami Sharaf, and Interior Minister Sharawi Jumah are still the key decision-makers in Egypt. Ali Sabri, a pro-Soviet member of the hierarchy, is reported to be slated for the post of vice president in charge of foreign affairs where he could serve as a channel to Moscow.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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JAPAN

The cabinet made some significant last-minute revisions in the defense policy paper it approved yesterday. Instead of saying "present" government policy opposes defensive tactical nuclear weapons, the revised draft notes that even if these weapons are constitutionally permissible, the government adheres to its traditional rejection of nuclear armaments. Statements that the US-Japanese mutual security treaty should continue "semipermanently" and that Japan would never reintroduce military conscription were also deleted.

The policy guidelines in this paper--the first defense policy paper since World War II--are relatively cautious. Last year the paper was shelved because the government wanted to avoid controversy during the period prior to the renewal of the US-Japanese security treaty. The paper's emphasis on the purely defensive nature of the military forces is intended to ease fears in Japan and elsewhere that militarism is being revived. Nevertheless, a small but increasingly vocal group, led by Defense Agency chief Nakasone, favors a stronger defense posture which does not exclude nuclear weapons.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTES

Egypt:

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USSR:

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Singapore: Lee Kuan Yew has admitted that his offer to open Singapore facilities to Soviet naval vessels is largely intended to frighten the Australians into establishing a permanent defense presence in Singapore. In a talk with a Department of State officer this week, Lee also denied any thought of permitting Soviet use of the naval base itself--he had in mind only "casual visits" to commercial shipyards for minor servicing. Lee probably realizes that his ploy is not likely to alter substantially Australia's limited "forward defense" policy but hopes that, at a minimum, it will bring about increased Western use of Singapore facilities.

Italy: Colombo's coalition government faces a crucial test in Parliament on the ratification of fiscal and economic decrees that are central to the government's reform program. These decrees have been in effect since August but will expire on 26 October without parliamentary approval. Passage seems likely, but there will be intense maneuvering among diverse political elements within the coalition, and calculated obstructionism by extreme left Proletarian Socialists and a militant splinter group within Italy's Communist Party.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Romania: Ceausescu's address to the UN General Assembly Monday was a typical Romanian performance of measured criticism directed at East and West. While he did not hesitate to call on the United States by name in connection with the war in Vietnam, his repeated references to the rights of small nations were an obvious allusion to Romania's struggles against Soviet hegemony. His remark that a "people can be truly free" only to the extent that it has a powerful economic and scientific foundation seems aimed primarily at preparing the United States for talks on closer economic ties. This topic, along with Romania's championship of Communist China's cause, is likely to be on Ceausescu's mind when he talks with President Nixon next Monday.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

22 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Laos, enemy forces are preparing to counter recent government gains along the southwestern edge of the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 1)

Infiltration from North Vietnam this month continues at a relatively high rate. (Page 2)

Soviets

West Germans

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(Page 3)

Austria is moving toward recognition of Communist China on the basis of the Canadian formula. (Page 4)

Soviet

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
(Page 5)

Zond 8 indicates the Soviets have not abandoned plans for a manned circumlunar mission. (Page 5)

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We have nothing to confirm press reports that Iraq's military force is withdrawing from Jordan. (Page 5)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

North Vietnamese forces are preparing to attack the twin peaks of Phou Seu Mountain which Vang Pao's irregulars captured on 18 October. At least three battalions will be involved, according to recent intercepts. One message indicated that a certain battalion would lead the operation against Phou Seu "since it had tanks."

Phou Seu is the highest elevation on the Plaine's western perimeter and is about five miles from Muong Pot and Ban Na, which government forces seized last week after several months of fighting. For some time both sides have attached considerable importance to controlling the high ground on the Plaine's southwestern rim. If the Communists succeed in retaking Phou Seu, they are likely to go on to contest the government's hold on Muong Pot and Ban Na.

Signs continue to accumulate, however, that the North Vietnamese are scaling down their strength in the north. Messages from North Vietnam's Northwest Military Region indicate a significant reduction in the number of its subordinate units in northern Laos since last May. A regimental-sized force that has been operating along the eastern edge of the Plaine may be returning shortly to North Vietnam. There is no new information on the location of the NVA 312th Division--for the last year the major backup force in vicinity of the Plaine--but the weight of evidence suggests that it has been transferred to the Vinh area of North Vietnam.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NORTH VIETNAM

About 9,600 North Vietnamese troops have been detected entering the infiltration system so far this month.

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Around 5,500 of these are slated for southern South Vietnam and adjacent areas of Cambodia. About 1,200 are headed for northern South Vietnam, and 2,800 are designated for southern Laos. The destinations of a few groups are not clear.

About 1,000 of the troops headed for south Laos probably are part of the three regiments of the 308th and 320th divisions which have been moving south since early September. One of these regiments has now been detected in Laos, along with a forward element of the 320th Division headquarters; the other two apparently are still in southern North Vietnam. One other regiment from the 320th, which had been near the Demilitarized Zone since June, is now moving north, and two regiments from the 308th are still in garrison near Hanoi.


Last year, infiltration to South Vietnam did not begin until late October, and no troops set out for southern South Vietnam until early November. The total number of troops leaving for South Vietnam last October was about 4,500.

The early resumption this year of personnel and supply movements to the south suggests that Hanoi is prepared to carry out a large-scale manpower and logistic support program during the 1970-71 dry season. The North Vietnamese will probably need to maintain a substantial flow of men and supplies through the dry season to sustain even the present low level of combat activity.


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
USSR - WEST GERMANY




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WESTERN EUROPE - COMMUNIST CHINA


Austrian Foreign Minister Kirchschlaeger told Secretary Rogers early this week that he had proposed to his parliament's foreign affairs committee that Peking be recognized on the basis of the Canadian formula.

The Austrians had previously warned that their position as a neutral state would require a new China policy if additional NATO members recognized Peking. The government now apparently has only to secure the agreement of the opposition People's Party, which should not prove difficult. When press reports of this move appear--probably this week--other states that are reviewing their policy may well be influenced to shift.

The Belgian Foreign Ministry has authorized certain of its diplomats to make contact with the Chinese Communists to determine Chinese interest in obtaining recognition. The Belgians, in addition to having a special problem with Peking because of the imprisonment of one of their nationals, are at present not willing to break relations with Taipei. Luxembourg recently indicated that it would not be far behind Belgium on recognition. It had already decided to switch from opposition to abstention on the Albanian resolution to replace Taiwan with Pe-
king in the UN.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

USSR:

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USSR: The launching of Zond 8 [redacted] indicates the Soviets have not abandoned plans for a manned circumlunar mission.

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Iraq-Jordan: We have nothing to confirm press reports that Iraq's military force is withdrawing from Jordan.

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[redacted] The Baghdad authorities have preferred to keep a sizable force in Jordan as a demonstration of their militancy toward Israel and to provide a holding area for unreliable troops. Only last week they rebuffed Husayn's suggestion that their force be removed or subordinated to the Jordan Arab Army. It is possible, however, that circumstances in Iraq--the political maneuvering going on in Baghdad or the threat of renewed Kurdish insurgency--could impel the recall of all or part of the Iraqi units.

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
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

23 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS



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On *Page 5*, we comment on the Soviet handling of the landing in the USSR of three US officers and a Turkish colonel.

The Burmese Government appears concerned that outside aid may encourage U Nu's efforts to spark uprisings.
(*Page 6*)

Four truck battalions are about to enter southern Laos from North Vietnam. (*Page 7*)

Our comment on the attempted assassination of Chile's army commander appears on *Page 7*.




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
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
SOUTH VIETNAM



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


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
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
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USSR



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
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
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
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
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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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USSR-EGYPT



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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USSR-US-TURKEY

In announcing the landing in the USSR of three American officers and a Turkish colonel, TASS emphasized the violation of Soviet territory by a US military aircraft. This suggests that Moscow will use the incident to highlight the dangers of foreign bases near the borders of the USSR. The Soviets can also be expected to warn Turkey that if it continues to play host to the US military, there are distinct limits as to how far Soviet-Turkish relations can improve. The subject of US bases in Turkey touches a particularly sensitive nerve in Turkish domestic politics, and the Soviets never fail to play on this theme.

Nevertheless, we would expect the Soviets to permit the safe return of the men and the aircraft as soon as these propaganda points have been scored. In that way, Moscow will have made the best out of a fortuitous incident: an opportunity to warn the US and one of its NATO allies regarding the dangers of foreign bases near the Soviet border, and a chance to play the role of international good guy at a time of hijacking incidents and Soviet-American exchanges of bad faith.

The presence of the Turkish officer aboard the aircraft, however, offers the Soviets the opportunity to make a stronger pitch for the return of the two Lithuanians who hijacked a Soviet airliner last week. The Russians have already orchestrated a propaganda campaign toward this end, and Turkish authorities are still trying to decide what to do with the hijackers. Moscow may well segregate the Turkish officer from his American colleagues as an implicit bargaining chip for the return of the hijackers.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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BURMA

A government statement printed by all Rangoon papers yesterday scoffed at reports that U Nu had gone underground in Burma from his Thai exile and said that his efforts to spark uprisings would continue to be futile.

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[Low-key Burmese insinuations of foreign involvement suggest, however, that Rangoon is concerned over the encouragement that outside assistance would give U Nu and is prepared to speak out against such help.]

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Laos-Vietnam: Four truck battalions possibly totaling about 400 vehicles, some pulling artillery, are about to enter Laos from North Vietnam using routes around the western edge of the Demilitarized Zone, according to an intercept. Support units in the panhandle have been ordered to assess road conditions and provide camouflage and concealment by 24 October. This movement apparently reflects increased logistics requirements for Communist forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam. Other recent messages have revealed that a "large volume" of unspecified "technical" equipment and vehicles, including Soviet-built medium tanks, would be moving through the panhandle this season.

Chile: The attempted assassination of Army Commander in Chief Rene Schneider yesterday has raised tensions but is unlikely to affect the congressional confirmation of Salvador Allende as president-elect tomorrow. General Carlos Prats, who was named to fill Schneider's post temporarily, has resisted all efforts to enlist him in plots against Allende. The Frei government will not hesitate to use the emergency powers that it immediately invoked if necessary to maintain order.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

24 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS



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North Vietnam has apparently fired 100-mm. antiaircraft artillery in the Lao panhandle. (Page 4)


Allende is coming to power strengthened by the latest events in Chile. (Page 4)

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
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
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


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


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
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
COMMUNIST CHINA



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


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
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EGYPT




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NOTES

North Vietnam - Laos: In the last week North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns fired four times at B-52s over southern Laos near the Ban Karai Pass. The artillery fire, apparently from 100-mm. guns, missed by wide margins. Communications intercepts had indicated that such guns were being emplaced in the Ban Karai Pass - Ban Laboy Ford area for use against B-52s. During another B-52 mission in the same area, there were indications of tracking by a surface-to-air missile (SAM) radar probably located in North Vietnam. There have been tenuous indications that a SAM unit recently moved into Laos.

Chile: The shooting of General Schneider has strengthened Allende's position with the armed forces, the political parties, and the public, according to the embassy in Santiago. The incident has appeared to confirm claims by Communists and leftists that "rightist plotters" and "foreign agents" would attempt a desperate action to keep Allende from power. Allende's confirmation today as president by a decisive majority is a foregone conclusion.

Japan: Yasuhiro Nakasone is "widely expected" to leave his defense post in a cabinet reshuffle anticipated next week, according to a US Embassy report. Although the ambitious Nakasone has made an impact as defense chief, he probably now wants a higher cabinet post or a significant position in the conservative party in order to build a base for a future bid for the prime ministership.


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Egypt-USSR

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The President's Daily Brief

26 October 1970

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

26 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

More Communist forces from South Vietnam are being deployed to southern Laos, apparently to improve security along the infiltration corridor. (Page 1)


A recent defector has provided information on the Communists' problems in Cambodia and their uncertainties about capitalizing on a political settlement in South Vietnam. (Page 2)

In Czechoslovakia, a firm decision appears to have been made to discontinue political trials. (Page 3)

In Chile, a major effort is under way to apprehend those responsible for the assassination of General Schneider. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Communist Troop Deployment Away From South Vietnam



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM-LAOS

Recent intercepts indicate that one and possibly two infantry regiments are being sent to southern Laos from the B-3 Front, the Communist command in the western highlands of South Vietnam. Part of the 28th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment was near Attopeu on 23 October, well outside the B-3 Front's usual area of operations. Other intercepts suggest that the 66th Regiment from the same command also is moving, but its destination is unknown. Another B-3 Front regiment was moved into Cambodia in early summer in support of the Communist effort around Stung Treng.

The transfer of regiments from the western highlands increases further the manpower buildup in the panhandle. Since early summer two or possibly three infantry regiments have moved, or are in the process of moving, into this area from North Vietnam. Elements of the 2nd NVA Division normally based in northern South Vietnam have been stationed in the Tchepone area since mid-summer. At least 10,000 other men have been sent to southern Laos through the infiltration system.

The movement of regiments from the B-3 Front reduces the immediate military threat to South Vietnam's western highlands and may have left the B-3 Front with only two of the five North Vietnamese regiments it normally has on hand. Hanoi's willingness to draw off forces from South Vietnam to help its buildup in southern Laos underlines again the high priority the Communists attach to improving security for their supply and infiltration system through the panhandle.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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VIETNAM-CAMBODIA

A former COSVN staff officer who defected last month says that a tightly-held portion of a new COSVN directive alleges that it would be "easy" to overthrow the Lon Nol government by military means but that the Communist movement in Cambodia is not strong enough to form an effective or lasting government. Vietnamese Communist units have been forced to help the Cambodians organize already liberated areas. The directive, [redacted] said by the defector to have been issued in August, indicates that additional assets will be taken out of South Vietnam for work in Cambodia and suggests that local commanders in South Vietnam will have to fend increasingly for themselves.

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The claim that local commanders are being asked to fend for themselves fits neatly with other evidence that self-sufficiency is the current watchword for many Communist forces in South Vietnam. The directive implies, in effect, that cadre should wage a holding action even though there was some rhetoric calling for more and stronger military attacks.

The official also told of a briefing of high-level cadre which stressed the need for the Communists in South Vietnam to gird for a political settlement. Briefers said that the withdrawal of US forces and the setting up of a coalition government excluding the present South Vietnam Government leadership would not automatically lead to a Communist takeover. They stressed the strength of anti-Communist forces and organizations in the South, in particular the present government apparatus, and underlined the morale problems cadre would face as they were exposed to the material comforts of peacetime after years of military struggle. The US, it was said, would use economic aid to "create the impression of prosperity." This might confuse and demoralize cadre, undermining their willingness to persist in the struggle.

This testimony does not suggest that the Communists anticipate an early political settlement or that they are prepared to modify their tough public demands to get one. But it does indicate that in their private councils, Communist leaders are sometimes less than confident about their long-term prospects and about the staying power of their own forces.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Our Embassy in Prague reports that a firm decision appears to have been made to discontinue political trials, judging from the "categorical" statement to that effect by a government official coupled with [redacted] the release of the last two defendants. The editor of the party daily Rude Pravo has been quoted as stating that even the strongly pro-Dubcek Pachman group will not be brought to trial, lest martyrs be created.

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At the same time, hardliner Josef Groessner has been removed as Czech state interior minister, according to an official announcement. A supporter of tough measures against the liberal activists of 1968, Groessner was replaced by a virtually unknown party functionary.

Husak probably would not have attempted such moves unless he felt relatively secure. If he can continue to weaken the position of his hard-line opponents, prospects for the success of his moderate course will improve significantly.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Chile: With the election of Salvador Allende as president Saturday under strict security measures, a major effort is under way to apprehend those responsible for the murder of army commander Schneider, who died yesterday. The plot now appears to have been of right-wing origin. Several dozen arrests have been made but the chief investigator believes the full ramifications of the plot will not be fully determined until long after Allende's inauguration next week.

Laos: There was little military activity over the weekend. In the north, government forces encountered only light opposition as they captured two more tactical positions in the territory southwest of the Plaine des Jarres. Intercepts continue to indicate that the North Vietnamese are preparing for a counterattack, which will initially be directed at Phou Seu Mountain on the edge of the Plaine.

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27 October 1970

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

27 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

A draft new constitution for Communist China provides a codification of changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution, and is being circulated pending ratification by the long-delayed National People's Congress.
(Page 1)

On *Page 2* we comment on recent shifts in the Italian Communist Party leadership.

The first report on the status of the American and Turkish officers whose plane landed in the USSR last week appears on *Page 3*.

At Annex, we review major trends in Cambodia since Sihanouk's fall and look a bit into the future.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA

A new state constitution was approved by a Chinese Communist Party plenum last month and is now being given local circulation pending ratification by the long-delayed National People's Congress. []

[] appears to be a greatly shortened version of the original 1954 version--30 articles compared to 106--but departs from the original on several counts. It amounts to a highly generalized codification of the changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution.

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Unlike the 1954 version, which mentioned neither Mao Tse-tung nor the army, the new constitution enshrines Mao and heir-designate Lin Piao as China's personal rulers and notes specifically that they are supreme commander and deputy, respectively, of all of the nation's armies. The army's role in politics is further legitimized by a provision authorizing its participation, along with veteran civilian cadres and former revolutionaries, in the newly established Revolutionary Committees, which are formally described as local organs of government.

In addition, the new constitution makes no provision for a head of state--the office last held by the disgraced Liu Shao-chi, ignores the several legislative powers of the National People's Congress, and gives short shrift to the judiciary system. The judiciary is no longer authorized to operate independently, subject only to state laws. China is, for the first time, declared a socialist state and all references to private property rights are eliminated, with the significant exception of "small-scale" peasant land holdings.

The new constitution is, in effect, a political manifesto rather than a legal instrument, and contains no real surprises. It affirms the major role of the military in Chinese politics, while leaving Mao as the sole head of the party, government, and military apparatus. [] as a whole, however, is a series of loosely worded propositions and may have been deliberately designed to allow varying interpretations. The section dealing with the sensitive subject of economic policy, e.g. peasants' private plots, is especially general in its wording and smacks of controversy and compromise.

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ITALY

Shifts in the Italian Communist Party leadership announced last week suggest that neither of the principal rivals for the right to succeed ailing Secretary General Luigi Longo has yet gained a clear edge. A strongly anti-Soviet ally of Enrico Berlinguer, Longo's deputy, received one key appointment, while another went to a backer of Giorgio Amendola, who has adopted a pro-Soviet stance. At the same time, Amendola has for the second time in a little over a year publicly stated his wish to see the party participate in the government.

Amendola's statement probably is a ploy designed to aid him in the leadership struggle, for there are no early prospects that Premier Colombo's government will invite the Communists in. An Amendola victory, however, would result in a stronger effort by the party to evolve into an acceptable coalition partner. It would also lessen the chill between the Italian and Soviet parties that has prevailed since the Italians criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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
NOTES

USSR-US-Turkey: The three American officers and the Turkish colonel whose plane landed in Soviet Armenia last week are being detained together, according to the US consuls who visited them yesterday. Apparently no effort has been made to drive a wedge between them as a possible bargaining device in seeking the return from Turkey of two Lithuanian hijackers, but the consuls reported their strong impression that the Soviets do intend a linkage between the officers and the hijackers. The Soviet official present at the interview stated that the officers were being investigated under an Armenian civil air statute, and when queried on the time involved said only that the investigation would be completed as soon as possible.

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X**CAMBODIA**

In this annex we take another look at major trends in Cambodia and offer a few projections into the months ahead.

From a strategic point of view, in the first few months after Sihanouk's fall the Communists achieved at least their minimum tactical objectives. They protected the rear areas of those forces that had been based on the Cambodia - South Vietnam border and brought under their control a swath of Cambodian territory that could be used for a southward extension of the Laotian infiltration corridor. They established enough of a presence in the populated areas of Cambodia and began the exceedingly difficult work of building and generating a Communist movement.

By mid-summer, however, the Communists' offensive was clearly running out of steam. Since the action against Prek Tameak in August, when large numbers of Cambodian Communists were turned back with heavy losses, the Communists have avoided large-scale ground assaults. Harassments by fire and small-scale probes continue on an almost daily basis, but the large cities have been free from the intense pressure they were subjected to several months ago. Even in the countryside, where much of the Communist effort has been focused since early summer, there has been a discernible decline in Communist attacks.

The ebbing of Communist military activity is directly related to the monsoon season. The enemy finds it difficult to pre-position supplies and move troops through an inundated Indochinese countryside. This is particularly so in Cambodia, where the enemy is operating in an unfamiliar and largely hostile environment, and where there is no long-established local organization to facilitate the operations of large combat units. Some fall-off in the pace of the war during the late summer and early fall was, therefore, not unexpected.

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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The combination of Cambodian tenacity and allied air support has also played a role in determining the enemy's current tactics. Cambodian reports of Communist casualties are probably exaggerated--just as Cambodian estimates of enemy combat strength are not noted for their conservatism--but there is little doubt that the Communists have taken some substantial losses. No Communist commander can assume that an important Cambodian target will fall without the risk of substantial casualties. The Communists, with most of their immediate objectives in Cambodia already achieved, may have estimated that the reversion to more economical tactics--especially in view of possible logistic restraints--was the most prudent course, at least until the dry season.

The North Vietnamese can take considerable satisfaction from the gains they have already made in Cambodia, but there are many aspects of the situation--particularly over the past several months--which must be of concern to them.

With each day, the Cambodian Army gets a bit stronger, the government in Phnom Penh more entrenched, and, if possible, more confident about the future. The Cambodian attitude was summed up best by the radio commentator who, speaking of the war, said "we have this indestructible faith."

Although it may be only a temporary phenomenon, some of the military initiative has now passed to the Cambodians and, for the first time in the war, the Cambodian Army has taken the action to the Communists. Large sweep operations south of Phnom Penh and Battambang in recent weeks and the massive deployment along Route 6 are operations that--despite their considerable deficiencies--would have been unthinkable in the dark days of May and June.

The leadership in Phnom Penh appears to be demonstrating a facility in turning adversity to its own advantage. The Route 6 operation is a good case in point. By most criteria, i.e., weighing its achievements against its costs and risks, it would be chalked up as a failure. The operation was designed to open

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

a land route to Kompong Thom city. The size of the force committed to the operation has swelled from eight to about 20 battalions. After almost two months on the road, and casualties numbering in the hundreds, the task force has moved but 15 miles from its starting point. The objective of reaching Kompong Thom city at any time in the near future has been all but abandoned. But the Cambodians are convinced that the operation has been a great success. And to the extent that it has lifted morale and has proved that it is possible to retake territory once under Communist control, the Route 6 operation has been a success.

Making success out of seeming failure is only one of the achievements of the Lon Nol leadership. More important has been its ability to turn the sense of elan that permeated "progressive" and opposition elements into support for Lon Nol--a figure who long had been closely associated with Sihanouk, who had personally profited from the arms deals with the Communists, and who had himself once been the target of the intellectuals and students. In this area, the war was of great assistance to Lon Nol. With the Vietnamese tiger at the gates, opposition elements have not felt the time propitious to press for changes in the way Cambodia is ruled. We have some doubts about Lon Nol's long-term prospects--quite apart from what the Communists may do militarily--but at this juncture there is no evidence that he is in serious political trouble with any powerful segments in Phnom Penh or that his rule will be seriously challenged in the near future.

None of this means that the Cambodians are out of the woods. On the contrary, if the Communists became convinced that the trend of events in Cambodia was running strongly against them, they would probably move quickly to rectify the situation. We think that how things go in Cambodia still depends for the most part on the North Vietnamese. What does seem reasonably clear, however, is that if the Communists want to bring down the Lon Nol government, they will have to do a great deal more than they have been doing; they will have to commit far more troops and accept far greater losses than up to now; and they will almost certainly have to move--in some fashion--against Phnom Penh itself.

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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There is no hard evidence--either from documents or prisoners or intercepted messages--that provides the basis for a compelling argument about what course the enemy is most likely to pursue in the next few months. The recently reported COSVN Directive [redacted] (noted in the Daily Brief of 26 October) suggests that the Communists are now working toward an early show-down, but this is far from conclusive. What can be said is that the Communist capability to step up the fighting should improve in the coming months. With improving weather, the Lao infiltration complex will begin to disgorge supplies into Cambodia; fresh North Vietnamese units and replacements, some probably slated for action in the Cambodian theater, are already making their way south, and cross-country movement within Cambodia should become a good deal easier.

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
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28 October 1970

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

28 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

North Vietnam

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(Page 1)

Jordan

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Page 2.

On Page 3 we discuss the Ecuadorean Government's response to the kidnaping of General Rohon.

Soviets

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(Page 4)


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
NORTH VIETNAM



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


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JORDAN



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ECUADOR


The government has taken strong measures in the wake of yesterday's kidnaping of air force General Rohon by still unidentified assailants. It has placed the entire country under martial law and imposed a night curfew. The capital has been sealed off, and all plane flights have been halted. Orders have been issued for the arrest of suspected terrorists and prominent leftists

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The kidnaping will give further impetus to the crackdown that the government has already undertaken against its opponents since Velasco assumed dictatorial powers in June. The President probably believes that a strong stand will rally military support behind him and give him a free hand to deal with the small subversive groups in the country as well as with his legitimate political opponents.

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NOTE

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29 October 1970

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

29 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Communists have made another proposal for peace
talks in Laos. (Page 1)

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 East German 
(Page 2)

50X1

 Franco-German 
(Page 3)

50X1

 Egypt
(Page 4)

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A commentary on Jordan's new premier appears on
Page 4.

Members of Allende's coalition are vying for influ-
ential posts in the new government. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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LAOS

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The Communists are attempting again to open
peace talks.

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A main sticking point on the talks has been the government's refusal to accept Pathet Lao insistence that discussions be between representatives of the "two princes," because this formulation does not recognize Souvanna's position as head of the Laotian Government. The new Communist initiative does not concede on this point, but both sides may now be willing to sidestep the issue to get the talks going.

Government leaders are optimistic that substantive talks will get under way; some believe that they may even lead to a settlement. Pheng has told a US official that an agreement to meet would be reached and that talks might begin at Khang Khay in early December.


The crucial question is still the bombing halt, which the Communists continue to insist is essential to any settlement. Presumably this will be the first issue raised at Khang Khay. Pheng says that the government will insist that no cessation can occur without a supervised withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces, but believes that the Communists will be willing to discuss a partial bombing halt in return for some reduction of hostilities in northern Laos.

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
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
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
WEST GERMANY - FRANCE



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NOTES

Egypt: [redacted]

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Jordan: Wasfi Tal, named by Husayn yesterday to head a new cabinet, is a tough-minded former prime minister with strong backing within the army and among East Bank Jordanians. The appointment reflects Husayn's belief--since the recent fighting--that only a strong, more authoritarian government can keep the fedayeen under control and provide at least short-term stability. Husayn had already restored his tough cousin, Zaid bin Shakir, to his position in the army; the new premier's appointment gives Shakir a strong civilian partner.

Chile: The Socialists, the most radical party within Allende's Popular Unity coalition, are making a grab for power in the cabinet and for lesser, but important posts. They are insisting that one of their members be appointed minister of interior. This portfolio controls the police and provincial governments, and the incumbent is first in line for succession to the presidency. If the Socialists prevail, the new government will be moving more rapidly to the left than either Allende or Chile's Communist Party had intended before their position is consolidated.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

30 October 1970


PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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(Page 1)		50X1
South Vietnam		50X1
	Cambodia. (Page 3)	
Soviets		50X1
(Page 4)		
Chinese		50X1
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Soviet		50X1
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Soviets		50X1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


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
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


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
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
SOUTH VIETNAM




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


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
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
SOUTH VIETNAM - CAMBODIA



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


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USSR



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


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NOTES

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Communist China: [redacted]

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USSR: [redacted]

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USSR: [redacted]

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(continued)

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USSR: [redacted] a dep-
uty chairman of the State Planning Commission
(Gosplan) said that last April the Commission was
directed to rework the draft of the next five-year
plan (1971-75) in order to reflect a Politburo de-
cision to devote more resources to agriculture.
The decision was causing major problems, in part
because the share of investments available for var-
ious otherwise unidentified "large new industrial
projects" had to be reduced. [redacted]


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[redacted]
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The President's Daily Brief

31 October 1970

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

31 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Egypt

Israel

(Page 1)

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Several radical fedayeen groups are preparing to oppose any attempt to carry out distasteful provisions of agreements with the Jordanian Government. (Page 2)

Allende's announced cabinet is dominated by committed Marxists and especially favors his own Socialist Party. (Page 3)

Soviets

(Page 4)

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Soviet

(Page 5)


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The South Vietnamese Supreme Court has voided the conviction of a Lower House deputy held for pro-Communist activities, but the government is determined not to set him free. (Page 5)

Italy and Communist China have reached tentative agreement on recognition. (Page 5)

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
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
ISRAEL-EGYPT

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JORDAN

Several of the more radical fedayeen groups, chafing at the cease-fire, are strengthening their defenses and stockpiling food and ammunition

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Government authorities, for their part, expect trouble and are preparing for it.

Tensions are likely to rise sharply after 9 November, when the "transition period" provided for in last week's protocol between the government and fedayeen expires. At that time all of the more restrictive provisions of agreements stemming from the crisis take effect. The two sides do not seem headed for an early renewal of large-scale fighting, however, for the stronger and more moderate groups--Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization--appear willing to carry out their end of the agreements and will do their best to keep clashes from escalating.

By appointing the hawkish Wasfi Tal as prime minister, Husayn has served notice of his intent to enforce the agreements strictly. Even if Arab leaders meeting in Cairo next week press Husayn to remove Tal, he seems in no mood to make such a concession.

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CHILE

The cabinet Salvador Allende announced yesterday is dominated by committed Marxists and especially favors the president-elect's own extremist Socialist Party. Allende's closest confidant, Jose Toha, will be minister of interior, the post first in succession to the presidency. In that job Toha will control all the police forces as well as the chief executives of Chile's 25 provinces. The Socialists' three other portfolios include the Foreign Ministry, which went to Clodomiro Almeyda, a man with close ties with both Havana and Peking.

The Communist Party, chief architect and organizational core of Allende's six-member coalition, placed long-time stalwarts as ministers of finance, public works, and labor.

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[redacted] Pedro Vuskovic, a "leftist independent" named as minister of economy and development.

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The Radical Party received three posts-- defense, education, and mining. The first two appear to be non-Marxist window dressing, but the new minister of mines is a leftist close to Allende and will have the key role in the promised takeover of Chile's vast copper industry.

The three smaller non-Marxist coalition members share the other four posts. Among them, the designated minister of agriculture broke with the Christian Democrats last year after playing a major role in President Frei's controversial agrarian reform program.

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
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USSR

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


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NOTES

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South Vietnam: In a clear assertion of its independence from the executive, the Supreme Court yesterday voided the conviction of imprisoned Lower House Deputy Tran Ngoc Chau, who was tried before a military court last March for pro-Communist activities. Under normal legal procedures, Chau should be released within two weeks, but a presidential aide has told [redacted] that the deputy would never be set free as long as Thieu was in office. Nevertheless, the government has not discovered a satisfactory way to hold Chau, despite the urgency placed on this matter by Thieu.

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Italy - Communist China: Tentative agreement on recognition was reached during talks in Paris on 27-28 October. The formula is similar to that of the successful Ottawa-Peking negotiations earlier this month. The Italian Government must still make up its mind on how it will vote in the UN on the question of Chinese representation.

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