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# The President's Daily Brief

November 1, 1975

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~~Top Secret~~ 25X1



Exempt from general  
declassification under E.O. 14176  
exemption category SB(1)/(2)(3)  
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the Director of Central Intelligence



November 1, 1975

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
Angola: Portuguese authorities now expect an attack on Luanda by forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola before November 11.  
(Page 1)

Portugal: Leftist elements in the military continue to resist demobilization procedures, and reportedly have petitioned army chief Fabiao to allow dismissed soldiers to stay in the military until at least next March. (Page 2)

Lebanon: Sporadic fighting continued yesterday in the southern suburbs of Beirut, following disagreements over the conditions of the latest cease-fire. (Page 3)

Notes: Azores; USSR - South Korea - North Korea; Israel (Page 5)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



## ANGOLA

Portuguese authorities now expect an attack on Luanda by forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola before November 11.

Forces of the National Front, assisted by several hundred Zairian troops, are now concentrated at Quifangando, some 12 miles northeast of the capital. Their advance has been delayed temporarily by lack of supplies and the destruction of two key bridges by the Popular Movement.

Tensions are running high in Luanda. The morale of Popular Movement forces in the capital is low, and recent military reversals may be causing some shake-ups in the Movement's military command structure. Large numbers of black residents of the city are fleeing into the countryside, many of them to escape the mass mobilization of all men between the ages of 18 and 35 ordered by Popular Movement leaders last week.

The National Front also is massing a sizable force and large amounts of equipment near Carmona in preparation for an assault on Lucala. The Front and its military ally, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, are continuing to press the Popular Movement in the central coastal area as well. The Movement's forces there are stretched thin and may be forced to pull back into defensive positions around Benguela and Lobito, the territory's major port and rail complex.

[redacted] the force that took Mocamedes from the Popular Movement earlier this week is now moving toward Benguela.

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The force reportedly consists of 500-600 troops from the National Union and the National Front [redacted]

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[redacted] It includes some highly trained [redacted] special forces troops who fought with the Portuguese during the insurgency. A detachment from the force is advancing southward on Porto Alexandre.

The Popular Movement apparently has made some progress, however, in its advance on the National Union stronghold of Nova Lisboa. The Movement claims to have recaptured Alto Catumbela, site of the hydroelectric project that supplies power to Nova Lisboa.

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PORUGAL

*Leftist elements in the military continue to resist demobilization procedures. They reportedly have petitioned army chief Fabiao to allow dismissed soldiers to stay in the military until at least next March.*

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A top aide on the [redacted] that the government is concerned that many of the politicized troops will not leave after they are discharged. Some may refuse for political reasons, but others--according to the source--are not anxious to return to civilian life at a time when unemployment is on the rise.

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[redacted] is prepared to meet such contingencies by cutting the pay and food for the discharged troops. He points out, however, that left-wing parties could offer to support those who remain in the barracks.

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[redacted]

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All of this turmoil within the military has spawned a barrage of warnings about coup attempts from the right and left. One prominent antigovernment newspaper has taken this a step further and asserts that a right-wing coup has already occurred. Other press rumors indicating that various military elements are planning live-fire maneuvers are adding to the overall tension in Lisbon.



LEBANON

*Sporadic fighting continued yesterday in the southern suburbs of Beirut, following disagreements over the conditions of the latest cease-fire. Muslim forces reportedly refused to leave a building as specified in the cease-fire, and the Phalangists were reported to have moved back into the three hotels in the Qantari area.*

The Phalangist move could again involve the major fedayeen organizations in the fighting. Since Wednesday, when the cease-fire was arranged, Fatah and Saqiya appeared to have been reverting to their usual role of attempting to calm the situation. According to our embassy, the involvement of the less radical fedayeen organizations in the battle in the Qantari area, which began last weekend, came about largely because they were already present in the area as part of the Palestinian-leftist force set up to enforce a previous cease-fire. Their participation in the fighting, in the opinion of the embassy, does not mean the abandonment by Palestine Liberation Organization chief Yasir Arafat of his policy of attempting to avoid direct involvement in the conflict.

The violations of the latest cease-fire may be attributable, at least in part, to leftist Muslim and Palestinian "rejectionist" elements who believe their best interests are served by continued conflict. [redacted]

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One result of the latest fighting has been the emergence of Nasirist leader Ibrahim Qulaylat as a significant figure on the Lebanese internal scene. Qulaylat, who controls the Ayn al-Muraysa area near the embassy, is estimated to have 500 militiamen and 1,000 other supporters under his control. The

(continued)

embassy reports that most of the fighting in the Qantari area and adjoining areas involved Qulaylat's followers, members of the Lebanese Communist Party, and supporters of leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt.

Efforts on the political front to find a solution appear to have slowed. The embassy reports that parliament has no plans to meet and that the "national dialogue" committee is inactive, with no sessions scheduled for any of the three subcommittees. The new ten-man security committee established last weekend is continuing to meet, but without the participation of the major protagonists, Jumblatt and Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil. The continuing fighting raises the possibility that Prime Minister Karami may actually carry out his threat to resign.

## NOTES

*Our consulate in Ponta Delgada has received a report that a faction of the Azorean Liberation Front might attempt a move for independence early this month.*

The source of the report said that the plotters would agree to drop their plans if the Portuguese government consented either to a referendum on independence or to "very extensive autonomy." He also asked the US to "discreetly counsel" Portuguese leaders to accept one of these alternatives. Lisbon recently rejected an appeal by the Front for a referendum on independence, but successive Portuguese governments have made major concessions in an effort to meet the Azoreans' demands for a greater voice in their own affairs. Although this threat cannot be dismissed entirely, it is most likely part of the Liberation Front strategy to wring maximum concessions from Lisbon.

\* \* \*

*The USSR's decision to allow an official to visit South Korea is a measure of Soviet pique with North Korea, but it does not presage any radical departure in Moscow's policy toward Seoul.*

This and other gestures toward Seoul reinforce indications that Soviet relations with North Korea are not good. Military and economic assistance to North Korea has declined markedly in the past two years.

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
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[redacted] The Soviets made modest conciliatory gestures to Seoul in 1971 and 1972 to show Pyongyang that they also had policy options. Moscow backed off in 1973, however, after North Korea protested and took steps to assuage Soviet concerns.

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*The Greek freighter carrying a cargo of cement for Israel arrived too late to join the southbound convoy that transited the Suez Canal yesterday. The ship is scheduled to sail with today's convoy.*

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# The President's Daily Brief

*November 3, 1975*

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declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
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Spain: The Communist Party has made concessions in a bid to unite the Spanish left. (Page 8)

Spanish Sahara: Spain apparently has decided it has little alternative but to turn again to the UN. (Page 9)

Notes: China-India; Bangladesh; [redacted] Palestine-UN (Pages 11 and 12) Pales-

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

USSR

Preliminary data from several Soviet republics indicate that this year's grain crop in the USSR was even worse than we estimated. We now expect a crop of 150 million to 155 million tons--5 to 10 million tons below our last estimate and 60 to 65 million tons less than the Soviets had planned on. Contrary to normal practice, the Soviet Union has not yet reported this year's grain production, even though the harvest has ended.

The range in the revised forecast reflects our uncertainty about the area that has been abandoned or used as forage, although we believe it to be more than 10 percent of the area sown.

The Soviets have reentered the US grain market following the end--on October 20--of the moratorium on new sales. By the end of October, Moscow had contracted for an additional 1.6 million tons of US corn, raising estimated Soviet purchases of all types of grain from all sources to about 25.5 million tons. More than half of this is believed to be wheat, with corn making up much of the remainder.

The US is the leading supplier, followed by Canada and Australia. If, as we expect, the Soviets purchase a total of 30 million tons of grain for delivery between July 1975 and September 1976, the US will supply over half this amount.

The Soviets are sending conflicting signals on their purchasing intentions. They have indicated that they are prepared to buy substantial additional amounts of US grain, but have also suggested that their buying program in the US is about completed.

Neither Soviet nor US ports can handle large new shipments at this time. Moscow may hope that a delay in additional purchases for several months may cause grain prices to decline. The Soviets are likely to make substantial new purchases around the beginning of next year.

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Imported grain will only partially fill the gap between Soviet supply and demand. Even allowing for additional purchases and the reduction of stocks to a minimum, the USSR will still be roughly 30 million tons shy of normal grain requirements.

Belt-tightening measures have already begun. Distress slaughtering of livestock, mainly hogs, started in August and continued through September, when industrial meat production reached a record high. The number of hogs is falling more rapidly than pork production figures indicate because animals are being slaughtered at below-normal weights, thus avoiding intensive grain feeding during the last stages of fattening.

LEBANON

Street fighting in Beirut slackened again yesterday after the arrangement of yet another cease-fire--the twelfth in the past seven months. Some of the heaviest fighting to date took place in the capital on Friday and Saturday.

This cease-fire, like those that preceded it, may provide only a brief lull in the fighting. None of the leaders of the warring factions seems to be in complete control of his forces.

Previous cease-fires have been used primarily as a time to replenish depleted supplies rather than to seek a genuine solution to the situation. There is no reason to believe the present cease-fire will be any different.

Prime Minister Karami has called a meeting of the national dialogue committee for today. The committee, which is charged with seeking a political solution to end the fighting, has made little progress and has not held a session for almost two weeks. The committee continues unlikely to make much headway because of deteriorated relations between Prime Minister Karami, who is a Muslim, and key Christian leaders--President Franjiyah, Interior Minister Shamun, and Phalanges chief Jumayyil.

Karami angered both the Phalangists and Shamun's National Liberal Party on Friday when he assumed personal direction of security matters which previously had been directed by Shamun. Fears have abated, however, that Karami will resign. He stated publicly yesterday that he intends to remain prime minister until the security situation is under control.

[redacted] It seems likely that, at a minimum, Syria has reinforced Saiga units inside Lebanon because of the increased fighting late last week. Damascus may also have spread rumors that Syrian regulars had intervened or were about to intervene in order to put pressure on the Phalangists to accept a new cease-fire.

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
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[redacted]  
[redacted] We continue to believe that Damascus does not want to send its regular forces openly into Lebanon for fear of provoking a military reaction from Israel.

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## SYRIA-ISRAEL

Syrian military forces apparently  
are no longer at the high level of alert  
they assumed more than a week ago. [redacted]

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[redacted] noted, during a tour of the capital area last Thursday, that more troops than usual seemed to be on pass. Among them were personnel from the four Syrian divisions stationed along the Golan Heights, and members of the Saudi contingent positioned at Al Kiswah, some 12 miles south of Damascus. The attaché also noticed that vehicle workshops at Al Kiswah had closed for the weekend, despite the large amount of equipment awaiting repair.

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[redacted] 25X1

Syria and Saudi Arabia have continued preparations for their twice-postponed joint air and ground exercise. [redacted]

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that current Syrian plans call for a practice exercise on Wednesday or Thursday and the actual exercise the day following the practice. The exercise will include an air-drop of about 120 paratroops near Dumayr, about 30 miles northeast of Damascus. The operation will be supported by Saudi F-5 fighters operating from an airfield in northern Jordan.

[redacted] today

and to depart on November 10. The Jordanians reportedly will not participate in the exercise but will provide airfield support and radar assistance to the Saudis.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY  
PORTUGAL

Prime Minister Azevedo and other anti-Communist military leaders are appealing for calm and unity to cool the political unrest stirred by the approach of Angolan independence next week. Leftist forces in Portugal claim that the arrest last weekend of two supporters of former president Spinola justifies their insistence that a right-wing coup is imminent.

Two former military officers, who reportedly left the country with Spinola following the coup that failed last March, were picked up by security troops at a camp for Angolan refugees in northern Portugal. They were said to possess Spanish currency and are believed to have entered Portugal secretly from Spain. The US embassy in Lisbon reports that several individuals with ties to the conservative Portuguese Liberation Army also may have been detained.

The left has been agitating to alter Lisbon's declared policy of impartiality among the three Angolan liberation movements in favor of the Popular Movement. In addition to pressure from left-wing political parties, press, and radical military officers, there is evidence that activists of Popular Movement are arriving in Lisbon on refugee flights to take part in coming rallies that will support the Movement. The first of these is scheduled for tonight.

As the airlift of refugees from Angola comes to an end, conservative refugee groups are certain to become bolder in registering their discontent with left-wing support for the Popular Movement and for the meager resettlement assistance offered by the Lisbon government. The bombing and sacking last month of an Angolan cultural center controlled by the Popular Movement indicates that the returnees are willing to employ violence. They have planned a rally of their own later in the week to protest the Movement.

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Despite the political turmoil, the 19-man Revolutionary Council is attempting to carry on as usual. The council did not, as rumored, take action against army chief Fabiao or security chief Carvalho at its session during the weekend. It did, however, approve the long-awaited legal framework for the investigation and trial of nearly 1,300 members of the former regime's security police who have been detained since the coup of April 1974. The council also established a tribunal to deal with persons implicated in the attempted coup last March and announced its intention to arrest civilians possessing military arms.

SPAIN

*The Spanish Communist Party has apparently made significant concessions in an effort to create a facade of unity between the two loose coalitions of the Spanish left. The joint communiqué issued Saturday by the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta and the more moderately leftist Democratic Platform of Convergence did not condemn Prince Juan Carlos out of hand as the Communists would have preferred.*

The communiqué was also vague on Communist demands for the establishment of a provisional government and the calling of a national referendum to choose between a monarchy and a republic. The statement called for a "democratic break" with Francoism and referred to a "constituent period" which would lead to a referendum. No deadlines were set for the referendum. Three other main objectives listed in the communiqué are issues on which there is broad agreement among the Spanish opposition:

--Amnesty for political prisoners.

--Freedom for labor unions and political parties and guarantees of human rights.


--Full political rights and "freedoms" for regions, such as Catalonia and the Basque country.

The communiqué closed with the statement that the two coalitions would remain in contact and cooperate from time to time, but would continue to seek their own particular objectives.

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SPANISH SAHARA

Spain--faced with Algeria's resistance to a bilateral settlement of the Spanish Saharan issue by Spain and Morocco and with Moroccan unwillingness to call off the mass march into the territory--apparently has decided it has little alternative but to turn again to the UN. Madrid, moreover, presumably sees such a course as focusing international attention on Spain's desire to honor its obligation to Spanish Sahara. Prince Juan Carlos' surprise one-day visit to the territory yesterday not only committed him to support UN efforts but also demonstrated his solidarity with the army, whose backing is essential to him.

The Security Council resolution passed yesterday calls on Secretary General Waldheim to resume consultations with the concerned parties. It omits any reference to a UN trusteeship arrangement that Waldheim had previously discussed with Spain and the involved North African states.


Spain's acceptance of a UN role leaves Moroccan King Hassan little choice but to proceed with the march--reportedly sometime in the next few days. Rabat will probably claim that Madrid's determination to stop the march by force if necessary, rather than Morocco's own actions, is contrary to yesterday's Security Council resolution.

Once marchers cross the border, there will almost certainly be clashes with Spanish forces or with armed partisans of the Polisario Front, a pro-independence Saharan group supported by Algeria. In event of the latter, Moroccan troops stationed in the south are likely to intervene.

Morocco has "categorically denied" press reports that its forces crossed the border into Spanish Sahara yesterday and clashed with the Polisario Front. The Moroccan information minister said, however, that he could not exclude the possibility that pro-Moroccan residents of the territory might have "raised the Moroccan flag" in some areas. It is possible that Moroccan irregulars posing as Saharans crossed the border to establish a symbolic presence and clashed with a Polisario force.

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Algeria will support the Security Council's call for restraint. It wants to return the Saharan problem to the General Assembly, which in the past has strongly supported self-determination. The new Security Council resolution, in fact, pointedly refers to the role of the General Assembly in the Saharan question.



NOTES

China has not commented on the clash along the Sino-Indian border which the Indian foreign ministry reported on Saturday.

New Delhi says that on October 20, a routine patrol "well within Indian territory" was ambushed by some 40 Chinese troops. Four members of the Indian patrol were killed. The foreign ministry said the incident occurred in Arunachal Pradesh, the former Northeast Frontier Agency, but an Indian army officer told the US consulate in Calcutta that the clash was inside Sikkim. India absorbed Sikkim as a state early this year.

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[redacted] it is unlikely that the clash will lead to serious fighting. The weather in the Himalayas this time of year would impede the movement of reinforcements and supplies for both sides.

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The Palestine debate begins today in the UN General Assembly with the Arab states split among themselves and possibly with the nonaligned states, hitherto their most consistent allies, over how far to push for reaffirmation of Palestinian rights to a homeland.

The proposed resolution calls for implementation of the resolution passed last year, which recognized the rights of the Palestinians to a national homeland. This year, the Arabs are demanding that a special committee be formed to work out a timetable for achieving Palestinian self-determination and independence. Reactions of the UN representatives of the EC to the draft resolution have been unfavorable.

*Top Secret*

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# The President's Daily Brief

November 4, 1975

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Bangladesh: Brigadier Musharraf appears to have gained control of the government with little or no bloodshed. *(Page 2)*

Syria: We present the precis of a Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Syria - The Next Step?"  
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

LEBANON

The latest cease-fire is threatened today by sniper fire, just as attention had begun to shift to the feuding between Prime Minister Karami and Interior Minister Shamun.

The uneasy relationship between the two leaders has sharply deteriorated as a result of Karami's recent accusations that Shamun's National Liberal Party was partially responsible for the most recent round of fighting. Karami has also taken over security responsibilities previously handled by Shamun, including the negotiation and implementation of the latest cease-fire. The Prime Minister will hold a cabinet meeting today to gain majority approval of the new truce, apparently to head off anticipated criticism from Shamun.

Past quarrels between Karami and Shamun have been successfully mediated and, in the latest, President Franjiyah and others apparently are trying to work out a reconciliation. There is now talk, however, that Shamun will resign from the cabinet. US officials in Beirut believe that the withdrawal of the only effective spokesman for Christian interests would further erode the authority of the government and probably would trigger another round of serious fighting.

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The security situation in Beirut has improved since the weekend. [redacted]

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[redacted] security forces have been able to strengthen their positions in the luxury hotel district where fighting had been especially fierce. Although sporadic clashes and sniper fire continue in some areas of the city, violations of the truce seem to be declining gradually. [redacted]

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there is guarded optimism about this cease-fire because it was negotiated by those actually engaged in the fighting, rather than by politicians and other intermediaries of the warring factions.

## BANGLADESH

Brigadier Musharraf appears to have gained control of the Bangladesh government with little or no bloodshed. President Mushtaque offered to resign, but Musharraf [redacted] plans to retain the President for the time being in a figurehead role. Both the President and Musharraf probably wanted to avoid serious fighting.

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In exchange for the President's capitulation, Musharraf has apparently agreed to permit the Chief of Staff, General Ziaur Rahman, and the young majors who led the coup last August to leave the country.

Musharraf and Ziaur have been rivals within the military. Musharraf had a supportive role in the coup last August but subsequently lost ground in the hierarchy when he quarreled with some of the coup leaders.

New Delhi may have been caught off guard by the coup. [redacted] India did not expect any moves by the Bangladesh military against the government [redacted]

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Musharraf's power grab increases chances of further anti-government moves, especially by supporters of Ziaur and the majors. Ziaur is extremely popular in the army as a result of his leadership during the independence struggle and the war with Pakistan. The majors probably have a following among troops who were dissatisfied with the regime of former president Mujib.

SYRIA

*The following is the precis of a special national intelligence estimate, "Syria - The Next Step?" approved yesterday by the US Intelligence Board.*

Despite Syria's increasingly intransigent public position on future peace negotiations, we believe President Asad is still interested in talks concerning a second-stage Israeli withdrawal on the Golan Heights.

The Syrians, however, are likely to continue to insist as a precondition that the Palestine Liberation Organization be recognized in some way as a party to the negotiations before they will engage in such talks.

Meanwhile, Damascus will exert maximum pressure on the US and Israel, hoping thereby to underscore an urgent need for diplomatic movement and to force concessions to Syria's negotiating demands.

Between now and November 30, Asad's strategy will be to increase military tension in order to create concern about Syria's military intentions and whether it will agree to the renewal of the UN disengagement observation force.

If necessary, however, Asad will go beyond mere posturing, and this will lend further credibility to his "war of nerves."

The Syrians have few, if any, good diplomatic moves to play. They do, however, have a range of military options that include:

--Additional troop movements, exercises, alerts, overflights, reserve call up.

--Military "incidents," including firing across the UN buffer zone at Israeli patrols, short incursions into the Israeli disengagement area, and the facilitation of fedayeen terrorist and sabotage operations on the Golan Heights.

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--Some form of a "war of attrition" involving artillery barrages.

--Major military operations with the aim of seizing and holding specific objectives.

--Resumption of major hostilities.

We do not believe Asad will deliberately resort to full-scale war. He may, however, take military actions short of war if his current pressure campaign fails to produce acceptable diplomatic results. Under these circumstances, we believe that:

--Syria will continue to step up its pressure campaign as November 30 draws nearer. Some serious "incidents" will probably occur during this period.


--If this "war of nerves" does not produce diplomatic results, there is a good chance that Asad will increase the pressure even further by letting the UN mandate run out, perhaps while continuing to abide by the military limitations of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement. This would create a crisis atmosphere without provoking an Israeli attack.

--At this point, however, limited military operations by Syria cannot be ruled out and these would run a high risk of Israeli retaliation and a general escalation of the fighting.


--The situation in Lebanon could deteriorate in a way that drew in Syrian and Israeli forces. Fighting between them in Lebanon could rapidly spread to the Golan Heights as well.

The Israelis, for their part, are reluctant to take any new diplomatic initiatives concerning the Golan Heights both because of the area's military importance and the very difficult domestic political problems that could be raised. They will be even less interested in doing so in a situation of increased tension induced by Syria.


EGYPT-USSR




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NOTES

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*Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary and his Thai hosts in Bangkok have apparently established a favorable atmosphere for future contacts between the two countries.*

The agreement to establish diplomatic relations was probably particularly gratifying to the Thai, who have thus far made little progress in resolving their differences with the Vietnamese or the Lao. Nevertheless, the joint communiqué's vague formulation on the timing of ambassadorial exchanges--at a convenient date "depending on prevailing conditions"--confirms that the Cambodians are not yet ready to permit noncommunist diplomats in Phnom Penh.

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After meeting with his French counterpart last week, West German Defense Minister Leber told Ambassador Hillenbrand that he believes France is prepared to cooperate more closely with both the West Germans and NATO.

Leber said that meaningful progress had been achieved in the areas of military planning and arms standardization. He also claimed that French Defense Minister Bourges agreed to have French military officials participate in planning with the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe on hypothetical military contingencies.

*Top Secret*



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Lebanon: The cease-fire held yesterday for the fourth day. (Page 1)

Angola: The National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola are setting up joint committees to coordinate future political and military activities. (Page 2)

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Turkey-Cyprus: [redacted]

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[redacted]  
(Page 4)

Notes: Syria-Israel; Spanish Sahara; Portugal; Bangladesh; Thailand-Laos (Pages 5 and 6)

At Annex, [redacted]

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[redacted] Lebanon.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LEBANON

*The cease-fire in Beirut held yesterday for a fourth day.*

Army units reportedly have opened several key highways into the capital. Christian and Muslim militiamen have thinned out some of their forces in the residential Qantari section and in the luxury hotel district of the city. Neither side, however, has shown any willingness to relinquish its vantage points. The tense atmosphere in the downtown area has kept the citizens off the streets, despite Prime Minister Karami's repeated appeals for government and private employees to return to work.

Political attention, meanwhile, continues to focus on the rift between Karami and Interior Minister Shamun. Shamun apparently boycotted the meeting of the national dialogue committee on Monday. Shamun and the Prime Minister were to meet privately yesterday, presumably to iron out their differences before today's cabinet meeting.

Karami reportedly has made some behind-the-scenes headway in negotiations with Christian and Palestinian leaders, despite the poor showing of the dialogue committee. [redacted]

[redacted] preparations are underway for a direct dialogue between Phalanges Party leaders and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

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ANGOLA

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola have announced that they are setting up joint committees to coordinate future political and military activities. These committees probably represent a first step in the establishment of a government to rival the one that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is expected to proclaim on November 11.

Cooperation and communication between the National Front and National Union groups, however, are poor. Their respective troops do not get along well with each other in the field, and military leaders on both sides believe the other group is trying to take credit for recent battlefield successes.

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The two groups also expressed their willingness to confer with the Popular Movement in Kampala, as proposed by President Amin, the chairman of the Organization of African Unity. They made no reference, however, to the cease-fire that Amin called for last weekend. The National Front and the National Union are in no hurry to agree to any cease-fire as their joint force moves to recapture the Benguela-Lobito rail and port complex in central Angola. Heavy fighting apparently is taking place in that area and the two groups seem confident they will be able to take both towns soon. Their success would significantly strengthen the credibility of any government they may proclaim.

The hard-pressed Popular Movement has sent a representative to Kampala. The Movement needs a respite in order

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to bolster its defenses at Benguela, Lobito and around Luanda.

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
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The Soviet media are devoting increasing attention to Angola as the scheduled date for independence draws near. Recent commentaries in *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and *Red Star* portray the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as beleaguered patriots struggling against an alignment of forces--including Chinese, American, and South African--bent on reversing Angola's movement toward independence and retarding Africa's decolonization process. The articles apparently are designed to prepare the domestic audience for a setback to a client that Moscow has touted as a successful pro-Soviet liberation movement. By emphasizing foreign intervention on behalf of the Popular Movement's adversaries, Moscow may also be attempting to justify to a foreign audience its own stepped-up assistance to the Popular Movement.

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
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TURKEY-CYPRUS



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NOTES

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*Morocco's efforts to dissuade Spain and Algeria from seeking a UN-sponsored solution of the Spanish Sahara dispute apparently were unsuccessful.*

Spanish leaders reportedly told Moroccan Prime Minister Osman that negotiations could continue only under UN auspices and provided Morocco called off its planned mass march into Spanish Sahara. Osman has stated that talks will continue, but that the march will go on. Morocco continues to use the date for beginning the march as its trump card in talks with Spain. It may offer a further delay in the hope of wringing some concession from Madrid.

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Portuguese Prime Minister Azevedo paid a visit to the provinces yesterday to enlist popular support for his government.

Azevedo's trip to the southern resort city of Faro also is an expression of support for the newly installed non-Communist civil governor and for the commander of the southern military region. Before the Prime Minister left Lisbon, his cabinet issued a communiqué reaffirming its decolonization policy in Angola and urging rapid reorganization of the news media.

\* \* \*

Five high-level officials of former president Mujib's regime in Bangladesh who were imprisoned last August by the Mushtaque government reportedly have been executed.

In reaction to the killings, President Mushtaque's cabinet has resigned, and Mushtaque himself is reportedly attempting to resign. The cabinet has not played an important part in the government, but its resignation could make it difficult for Musharraf, the new strongman, to build political support for his regime. A general strike occurred in Dacca this morning to protest the deaths. There is further evidence that Musharraf moved to take over the government out of personal ambition and that he has no major ideological or policy difference with President Mushtaque.

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Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai has informed the US ambassador that Bangkok has decided to return to Laos aircraft claimed by Vientiane to help ease difficulties with the new regime there.


The planes--mostly T-28s--were in Thailand for servicing at the time of the communist takeover in Laos. Chatchai said Bangkok is aware of US reservations over such a return and that he would talk to the ambassador again before the government acts on the decision. The return of aircraft to Laos would make it difficult for Thailand to avoid a similar concession to the Vietnamese communists.

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
LEBANON



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*




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# The President's Daily Brief

*November 6, 1975*

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

November 6, 1975

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Angola: The fighting has escalated dramatically.  
(Page 1)

Lebanon: The security situation in Beirut has improved enough to permit the resumption of some vital services, but the city remains extremely tense. (Page 3)

Bangladesh: The situation remains unsettled following General Musharraf's seizure of power Monday and President Mushtaque's resignation yesterday. (Page 4)


Spanish Sahara: Spain and Morocco have reached an understanding designed to reduce the threat of a major clash during the march of Moroccan volunteers into the colony. (Page 5)

Argentina: President Peron announced last night that she does not intend to resign or ask for a leave of absence. (Page 7)

Note: [redacted] (Page 8)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



ANGOLA

*The fighting has escalated dramatically. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola reportedly has lost the major rail and port complex of Benguela-Lobito and is under heavy attack in Cabinda by forces of a Zairian-backed Cabindan separatist group.*

The joint military force of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, supported by South African and former Portuguese army advisers, reportedly captured Benguela early this week after encountering only token opposition from the Popular Movement.

The Popular Movement apparently fell back to concentrate its forces in defense of Lobito, the territory's major port and the Movement's key resupply point in central Angola. As of yesterday, however, Popular Movement forces were reported to have been pushed out of the port city after heavy fighting.

Heavy fighting also broke out yesterday in Cabinda between the Popular Movement and the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda, a small separatist group which has been supported by Zaire for the past year or so. Troops from Zaire, and perhaps from Congo as well, may be involved in the fighting.

Press reports out of Brazzaville indicate only that Congolese forces are mobilizing to defend Cabinda from an invasion by mercenaries. Zairian news reports claim, however, that the fighting broke out following a Congolese "invasion" of the enclave. The Zairian government announced that its own military forces along the Zaire-Cabinda border have been placed on alert.

Zairian President Mobutu has been planning to intervene in Cabinda for some time in order to force the Popular Movement to give up Cabinda before independence. [redacted]

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Zaire may be using a Congolese "invasion" as a pretext to justify its own involvement.

The Popular Movement has about 1,500 troops in Cabinda, a force probably about equal to that from Zaire. In addition, the Movement has the support of several hundred Cuban personnel, reinforced with armor, who arrived in the Congo last month as part of a larger force and were sent to Popular Movement bases on the Congo side of the border with Cabinda. Portuguese troops in Cabinda, who number only about 100, will not be able or willing to stop the fighting.

LEBANON

*The security situation in Beirut has improved enough to permit the resumption of some vital services, but the city remains extremely tense.*

Security forces have made some progress in removing barricades from city streets, although their task has been complicated by the efforts of warring factions to improve their positions. Christian and Muslim militiamen are still occupying areas of the hotel district where only a tenuous truce is in effect. For the first time in several days, fuel and food supplies are being replenished. Some banks are scheduled to open today, which should encourage citizens to respond to government calls for a return to normal business activity.

A meeting on Tuesday between Prime Minister Karami and Interior Minister Shamus is receiving wide publicity. The feuding leaders apparently have agreed to cooperate in the interest of public security. The uneasy reconciliation will ease the task of the cabinet in dealing with immediate problems, but rivalry between Karami and Shamus will continue to impede efforts of the national dialogue committee to find political solutions.

BANGLADESH

*The situation in Bangladesh remains unsettled following General Musharraf's seizure of power Monday and President Mushtaque's resignation yesterday.*

A. M. Sayem, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, has been named to succeed Mushtaque. Sayem, a respected non-political figure, presumably will be a figurehead, with real power wielded by Musharraf and other officers on a "military council" reportedly being formed.

Mushtaque had come under considerable criticism because of the killing of five to ten imprisoned high-level officials of the late president Mujib's government. Most of the killings apparently were perpetrated early Monday by military followers of Mushtaque who were involved in the coup against Mujib in August. The deaths triggered a partially successful protest strike in Dacca yesterday.

Reports that troops loyal to Musharraf's main rival, ousted army chief of staff General Zia ur-Rahman, were moving on Dacca have not been confirmed, but Zia retains considerable popularity within the armed forces.

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SPANISH SAHARA

*Spain and Morocco have reached an understanding designed to reduce the threat of a major clash during the march of unarmed Moroccan volunteers into Spanish Sahara, which begins today. Even so, some violence is likely.*

Prince Juan Carlos told Ambassador Stabler yesterday that Madrid and Rabat have agreed that the marchers will come only a few miles into Spanish Sahara and stay only a short time in the border area from which Spanish troops have been withdrawn. The Prince added that a token delegation of some 50 Moroccans will be allowed to go on to the territorial capital of El Aaiun.

The area beyond which the marchers are not supposed to go is delineated by clearly marked mine-fields, according to another Spanish official. Juan Carlos said Spanish forces will use every means at their disposal to prevent the Moroccans from moving beyond the agreed area.

King Hassan made no mention of the agreement with Madrid during his short speech yesterday announcing that his green march would proceed today. At the same time, he gave no indication of how far into the territory the marchers will proceed, suggesting that he may intend to honor the agreement.

Hassan stressed the need for order and discipline during the march and told the Moroccan volunteers to be "hospitable" to any Spaniards they encounter. Hassan did not threaten to use force if the Spanish put up armed resistance, but he assured the marchers that if "anyone else" fires on them the Moroccan army will defend them. He was obviously referring to Algeria and the Polisario Front, a pro-Independence group of Saharans backed by Algeria.

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
Once the marchers cross the border, the situation could easily get out of control.

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


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The pro-Algerian position Moscow recently has adopted toward the Spanish Sahara dispute has led to a deterioration in Soviet-Moroccan relations.

In the UN, the Soviets have sided with Algeria's view that the Spanish Sahara question should be resolved by granting self-determination to the colony's inhabitants.



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King Hassan has shown his displeasure with Moscow's position by canceling the visit of a Soviet delegation that was to put the final touches on a major Soviet-Moroccan phosphates agreement. This agreement is important to Moscow because the Soviets want improved access to develop Moroccan phosphates to supplement the USSR's sagging domestic production.

ARGENTINA

*President Maria Estela Peron announced last night from the hospital that she does not intend to resign or ask for a leave of absence. Nevertheless, her emotional state appears to be deteriorating rapidly and her political position seems all but lost.*


The President reportedly has responded to the defection of her last strong supporter--labor leader Lorenzo Miguel--by isolating herself in a Buenos Aires clinic, apparently refusing to meet with anyone except her physician and her private secretary. Sources of the US embassy say she has had a special telephone line installed so she can talk directly with her former mentor, Jose Lopez Rega, now in exile in Spain.

There seems no hope for any arrangement that would allow her to remain in office, even as a figurehead.

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
The generals are waiting in the wings in the hope that civilian leaders can come up with a solution. Peronist labor leaders and politicians have been meeting since yesterday trying to agree on how to get the President out of office and what to do after that. Many observers expect Senate President Italo Luder, who was acting chief executive during Peron's vacation last month, will again become interim president until an election can be held.

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
NOTE



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# The President's Daily Brief

November 7, 1975

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 14176  
exempted category (b)(1)(D)(3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

November 7, 1975

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Spanish Sahara: The dispute is building toward a violent showdown. (Page 1)

Lebanon: Efforts by warring factions to rearm themselves threaten both the cease-fire and the uneasy reconciliation between Prime Minister Karami and Interior Minister Shamun. (Page 2)

Bangladesh: Major General Zia seized power early this morning. (Page 3)

USSR: The message being conveyed by the Soviet press on personnel shifts in Washington is that the changes are likely to be favorable for the USSR. (Page 4)

Portugal: Prime Minister Azevedo's government may face new challenges in the next few days as extremist elements recognize that their opportunities for attaining power are slipping away. (Page 5) 25X1

China: [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted]  
[redacted] (Page 7) 25X1

Notes: USSR - Anniversary Speech; USSR-Angola; UN; USSR-Somalia (Pages 9 and 10)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

SPANISH SAHARA

*Morocco's threat last night to break the agreement with Spain limiting its mass march into Spanish Sahara, coupled with a stern warning from Algeria that the Moroccans must be forced to withdraw soon, sets the stage for a violent showdown.*

Morocco last night "unofficially" informed the Spanish that the agreement to stop the march a few miles inside Spanish Sahara had "lost its value" because Madrid had publicized it. Unless Spain agrees to a new round of negotiations on the fate of the territory, the Moroccans say the march will continue today. The Moroccans indicated that if Spanish forces fire on the marchers, Rabat will find it difficult to avoid intervening with its own forces.

The Moroccan ultimatum preceded the adoption last night of a UN Security Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of the marchers, but there is no sign that Rabat has been deterred by the resolution.

Algeria last night issued what Ambassador Parker interprets to be an ultimatum threatening intervention in the disputed territory. President Boumediene summoned the ambassadors of all permanent Security Council members and told them that some concrete action must be taken to stop the Moroccan march. With the US ambassador, he was somewhat more direct, noting that he believes the US has enough influence with King Hassan to force him to stop the march simply by telling him to do so.

Satellite photographs taken in late October confirm an Algerian buildup of military equipment at two border cities. [redacted]

[redacted] Algerian forces are in position to move against Morocco, and Ambassador Parker says he has no doubt they will do so if Hassan does not recall his people.

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LEBANON

*Beirut was relatively quiet yesterday, but efforts by warring factions to rearm themselves threaten both the cease-fire and the uneasy reconciliation between Prime Minister Karami and Interior Minister Shamun.*

A showdown between Karami on the one hand and Shamun and President Franjiyah on the other is developing over attempts by Christian forces to unload a shipment of arms that arrived Tuesday at Juniyah, 12 miles north of Beirut. Karami complained to Ambassador Godley yesterday that his order to army units to halt unloading of the ship's cargo was not being followed. [redacted]

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BANGLADESH

*Major General Zia ur-Rahman seized power in Bangladesh early this morning. Major General Musharraf, who had taken over earlier this week, may have been killed.*

The 39-year-old Zia is evidently highly popular among army troops; he played a leading role in Bangladesh's war of independence in 1971, and it was he who first broadcast the country's declaration of independence. The US embassy reports that Zia's take-over seems to have aroused more enthusiasm among civilians as well as among the troops than did either Musharraf's power play earlier this week or the coup last August.

India, which was caught off guard by Musharraf's move, seems to have been surprised again. The continuing instability in Dacca increases the chance that India will try directly to influence events in Bangladesh. Indian officials have indicated in recent months that continued turmoil in Bangladesh or a massive influx of refugees into India, such as happened in 1971, could result in Indian military intervention.

USSR

Soviet press coverage of this week's personnel shifts in Washington has been essentially factual, but the message being conveyed to the Soviet audience is that the changes are likely to be favorable for the USSR.

In covering your press conference, Moscow has concentrated on continuity in policy toward the Soviet Union and the mutually advantageous nature of the US-Soviet relationship. The Soviets have also been careful to include your statement that Secretary Kissinger will continue to play the dominant role in US foreign policy.

*Izvestia*'s Washington correspondent reported your remarks on pursuing strategic arms limitation talks with the USSR but omitted the statement that the US is not negotiating under pressure of time.

Borrowing heavily from US media interpretations to explain the changes, *Izvestia* described Secretary Schlesinger's "removal" as unexpected but noted "well-known differences with the secretary of state, particularly on the detente question and the SALT talks." It also cited clashes between the defense secretary and congressional advocates of reduced military spending.

The departure of Director Colby was attributed solely to efforts to "repair the badly tattered public image of the intelligence community."

Vice President Rockefeller's "self-elimination" from the 1976 race was viewed as improving your room for maneuver in response to pressure from the political right.

The Soviets have generally limited public comment on the nominees to brief career sketches. The Soviet military daily *Red Star*, however, carried US press assessments of Donald Rumsfeld as a member of the "moderate wing" of the Republican Party.

PORUGAL

*Prime Minister Azevedo's government may face new challenges in the next few days as extremists recognize that their opportunities for attaining power are slipping away.*

Although many problems remain, Azevedo has had considerable success in asserting the government's authority and demonstrating his own popular support. He has also reduced Communist influence in the media and the military, and he is determined to purge Communists and their allies from key positions in the government.

Azevedo's success has put the Communists on the defensive. Communist Party leader Cunhal had a long private session with President Costa Gomes on Tuesday. Costa Gomes has been relatively responsive to Communist pleas in the past, and it is likely that Cunhal appealed to the President for support.

The Communists are also resorting to street action in attempts to recoup some of their losses.

--Communist transport workers occupied the office of the labor minister on Wednesday to protest the "purge" of leftists from the ministry's staff.

--Leftist telephone workers occupied Lisbon's main post office yesterday, demanding the dismissal of five administrators with alleged right-wing connections.

--Communist and Socialist workers battled Wednesday night for control of one of Lisbon's main newspapers.

--Leftist mobs protesting the government's drive to reduce Communist influence in the media yesterday attempted to seize the information ministry.

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
*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY  
In addition to testing the regime's will, these disturbances may have a more devious purpose. They may be intended to provoke a coup attempt by those people within the government that have become increasingly impatient with the lack of discipline in Portuguese society. The Communists are betting that such an attempt would not be successful and that their own fortunes would rise in the aftermath.


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CHINA



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NOTES

Soviet Politburo member Pelshe, who delivered the traditional speech yesterday on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, made only cursory references to relations with the US.

Pelshe's party responsibilities are primarily on the domestic side, but even so his treatment of relations with the US was brief for this key aspect of Soviet foreign policy. He said nothing about the contribution of summitry to the relationship or about General Secretary Brezhnev's next trip to the US. He did endorse the strategic arms limitations talks, but lumped them with the force reduction talks in another part of his speech.

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Soviet [redacted]

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[redacted] Angola [redacted]

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UN General Assembly debate on the resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism--passed by a subsidiary committee last month--threatens to strain traditional UN voting alignments and further erode support of the organization by some of the developed countries.

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The Arab countries themselves are divided in their support of the original resolution. [redacted]

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
any event, amendments to the resolution probably would not substantially change alignment for or against it. Many countries may opt for abstention as the safest course. The only hope at present for defusing the issue lies in motions to defer the vote until the end of the session or to postpone the entire debate until next year. Although not promising, this tactic has some chance for success.

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# The President's Daily Brief

November 8, 1975

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

November 8, 1975

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Portugal: The cabinet, with strong backing from the ruling Revolutionary Council, has announced a crackdown on civil disturbances by the far left. (Page 1)

Spanish Sahara: Morocco is sending two infantry battalions into border areas recently abandoned by Spanish troops, and skirmishing is under way with pro-Algerian Saharans. (Page 3)

Spain: The Sahara problem has given Prince Juan Carlos an opportunity to create an initial impression of energetic leadership, and fragmentation within the Spanish opposition so far has averted any serious challenge to his leadership. (Page 4)

India-Bangladesh: India is examining its options in Bangladesh, and military intervention is one of them. (Page 5)

Angola: A last-ditch effort to patch together a coalition government before independence day on Tuesday seems doomed, and the Portuguese are likely simply to withdraw without turning over sovereignty to any group. (Page 6)

China: In its first official reaction to personnel changes in Washington, Peking yesterday expressed unhappiness over the departure of Secretary Schlesinger. (Page 7)

Notes: USSR; Lebanon; Turkey; USSR-Zaire; South Vietnam (Pages 8 and 9)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PORUGAL

The Portuguese cabinet has warned the left that it will no longer tolerate breaches of public order and will take whatever measures are necessary to enforce its authority and ensure civil peace. The government statement was released Thursday evening after a joint session of the cabinet and the Revolutionary Council and following several days of leftist disturbances.

The Council subsequently issued its own endorsement of the cabinet's position. It also cautioned unspecified groups to refrain from exploiting discontent among the 200,000 refugees who have recently returned from Angola.

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Underlining its support for the government's new policy toward the left, the Council yesterday authorized paratroopers to seize and destroy a leftist-occupied radio transmitter outside Lisbon. Leftists had used the radio to urge leftist demonstrators to lay siege to the information ministry.

The government's position contrasts sharply with previous indications that the cabinet would assert its authority gradually and in areas where there is little organized opposition. Direct confrontation with militant leftists had been regarded as a risky policy that might make martyrs out of the dissidents.


The government has been encouraged in recent weeks by the failure of the far left to mount effective anti-government demonstrations and the impressive support given the Azevedo government in the provinces. Provincial support has been carefully stage-managed by the military's government partners--the Socialists and the Popular Democrats.

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The danger in a crackdown is that the government may not have had time to put together the security force necessary to enforce its will upon a well-armed, recalcitrant left.

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the government will soon launch military maneuvers involving units throughout the country. One of the purposes of the exercises will be to test the responsiveness of these units to the government's directives.

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SPANISH SAHARA

Morocco is sending two infantry battalions with supporting artillery into Spanish Sahara to reinforce the regular and irregular forces that have been skirmishing with the pro-Algerian Polisario Front during the past few days along the central and eastern border.

The Spanish have been shifting their forces for the past two weeks toward the coast. They recently abandoned eight posts near the central and eastern border to avoid attacks on their more isolated positions. Moroccan irregulars and Polisario guerrillas have clashed as each has tried to take the abandoned Spanish posts.

The Algerians are still reinforcing their units around Tindouf. Press reports from Algiers say there has been a "total mobilization" of troops on the southeastern border.

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The Moroccan information minister, meanwhile, says King Hassan has halted any further advance of his marchers for 24 hours to permit bilateral diplomatic efforts to move forward. Press reports, however, assert a second column of marchers crossed the border late yesterday at a point 120 miles east of Tarfaya.

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SPAIN

*The Sahara problem has given Prince Juan Carlos an opportunity to create an initial impression of energetic leadership. His surprise visit to Spanish Sahara last weekend boosted his public image; even the illegal opposition has praised it. Perhaps even more important, the visit strengthened his political base with the military, whose support will be crucial during the transition period.*

As long as Franco lives, however, the Prince probably does not feel free to begin policy innovations on internal issues. Meanwhile, the left is stepping up its demands for liberalization.

So far, fragmentation and bickering within the Spanish opposition have averted any serious challenge to Juan Carlos' leadership. The joint communiqué issued recently by the two loose coalitions of the left--the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta and the Socialist-dominated Platform of Democratic Convergence--lacked teeth and required over two weeks of arduous negotiations.

The recent rash of arrests and detentions of students and non-extremist opponents of the regime--should they continue--will make it more difficult for the opposition to give Juan Carlos a "period of grace" in which to move toward liberalization.

Labor Minister Suarez told Ambassador Stabler that the arrests did not reflect a hard-line attitude at the upper levels of government. He attributed the actions to the "policeman in the street" who has been used to having his own way for the past 35 years.

INDIA-BANGLADESH

*India is examining its options in Bangladesh, and early military intervention is one of them.*

In discussions yesterday, an Indian foreign ministry official painted a dark picture of the Bangladesh situation and implied that New Delhi cannot live indefinitely with the new leaders there. He described them as unprincipled, unpopular, and interested only in staying in power. He declared India would consider its own security interests to be threatened if the government in Dacca were to grant military facilities to China or declare Bangladesh an Islamic state and move against the Hindu minority.

The Bengalee government that took over in August made initial moves to designate the country an "Islamic republic," but dropped the idea because of concern over India's reaction.

New Delhi's views of the situation probably were colored by demonstrations in Dacca yesterday. Reports that two Indian army officers were killed during the demonstrations will inflame Indian opinion, already stimulated by emotional stories in the press.

The Indian foreign ministry's view of a lack of popular support for the new regime in Dacca appears overdrawn. The seizure of power by Major General Zia ur-Rahman yesterday seems to have generated considerable enthusiasm among the citizens of Bangladesh. Zia enjoys the backing of key units in Dacca and other cities. Calm appears to be returning to Bangladesh, and Zia has ordered army and police units to return to their barracks. He will probably try to reassure the Indians.

Zia's regime, like its predecessors, will probably be preoccupied with staying in power and have little success in dealing with the country's massive problems. As a result, public support for the new government is likely to be short-lived. Zia's ability to survive may also be limited by his lack of experience in politics.

ANGOLA

*The Organization of African Unity's last-ditch effort to patch together a coalition government for Angola in time for independence day next Tuesday seems doomed to failure, and the Portuguese are likely just to withdraw without turning sovereignty over to any of the three nationalist groups.*

The final 2,000 Portuguese troops will depart Angola on Monday night. The Portuguese high commissioner in Luanda remarked recently that, if he must, he will simply "take down the flag and sail away."

The Angolan nationalist groups, meanwhile, are preparing for the Portuguese departure. The Popular Movement on the one side and the National Front and the National Union on the other will probably declare rival "governments" and intensify the civil war as they compete for international recognition. The Popular Movement seems to have a leg up in this department; according to one of its spokesmen, some 80 communist, third-world, and African states will recognize a Popular Movement "government" on Tuesday.

Heavy fighting continues in the territory, and Portuguese officials in Luanda expect an attack on the capital by the National Front at any time. Fighting also continues in Cabinda, probably involving Zairian and Congolese troops as well as the Angolan nationalists each supports.

CHINA

*In its first official reaction to the personnel changes in your administration, Peking yesterday expressed unhappiness over the departure of Secretary Schlesinger.*


A New China News Agency article asserts the changes have touched off "strong repercussions" in the US and abroad. The article replays comments by Senators Jackson and Goldwater as well as others who reacted negatively. Senator Jackson is quoted as saying that Secretary Schlesinger's departure was due to his differences with Secretary of State Kissinger.

The Chinese apparently considered Secretary Schlesinger to be the member of your administration whose views are closest to their own. Peking has long given approving treatment in the press to his positions on detente, defense spending, and NATO.

The Chinese press handling of the personnel changes clearly indicates the Chinese are apprehensive that Secretary Schlesinger's replacement will mean that US-Soviet detente will move forward more easily and that Washington is more likely to make concessions to Moscow in Europe. The news agency cites a statement by a Soviet commentator welcoming the change.

It is extremely rare for the Chinese to take a public position on high-level personnel appointments in the US, and their decision to do so is a clear indication of their deep concern.

The Chinese article mentions in passing the other personnel changes but gives little hint as to how the Chinese regard them.



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**V-class Submarine**

## NOTES

*What probably is a Soviet V-class, nuclear-powered attack submarine has been identified some 120 nautical miles off the coast of North Carolina.*

No submarine of this type has previously been spotted closer than about 300 miles from the US coast. [redacted]

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[redacted] it presumably is attempting to gauge our navy's response to Soviet submarine operations in waters near the US coast.

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[redacted] Lebanon [redacted]

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*The Turks are still holding to their decision not to allow even a partial reactivation of US [redacted] facilities until major progress has been made in the negotiations on a new defense relationship with the US.*

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[redacted] General Staff Chief Sancar, the most influential military man, recently told a senior US military official that he agrees with the need for an early reactivation of the facilities and is working hard to bring this about. He noted, however, that he needs more time to out-maneuver those who are opposed.

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\* \* \*

*Relations between Zaire and the USSR are seriously strained over their support of rival groups in Angola's civil war.*

The Soviet chargé in Kinshasa presented a demarche to the Zairian government concerning Angola late last month. The Zairians immediately and publicly rejected it. Since then, the Zairian media and President Mobutu's party have kept up a steady barrage of attacks on the Soviet Union. So far, Soviet officials in Kinshasa have remained silent. In Moscow, Soviet media have emphasized foreign intervention in Angola, with specific references to Zaire's support for the National Front.

\* \* \*

*The militant resistance of anti-communist groups in South Vietnam has forced the communist regime to maintain large security forces and may have hampered efforts to reconstruct the South Vietnamese economy.*

Elements of at least four North Vietnamese divisions have been dispatched to the central highlands, the Mekong Delta, and areas north of Saigon to oppose the dissident groups. The resistance forces do not pose a serious threat to the government, but their disruptive activities have delayed the regime's efforts to resettle people in rural areas and restore agricultural production.

*Top Secret*



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# The President's Daily Brief

*November 10, 1975*

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[Redacted]

—Top Secret 25X1—

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 13526  
exemption category SB(1)(2)(i),  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

November 10, 1975

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UN - Middle East: The General Assembly today takes up three resolutions on Middle East issues that could have permanent repercussions on the organization. (Page 7)

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## SPANISH SAHARA

*King Hassan yesterday canceled the mass march of Moroccans into Spanish Sahara, strongly implying that Spain has agreed to negotiate a settlement favorable to Morocco.*

In a brief speech from Agadir, Hassan ordered the marchers to return to the closest assembly point in Southern Morocco. He said the march had "accomplished its mission" and hinted that Morocco's claim to the territory will be resolved through negotiations. It may take a few days for all the marchers to return. A second column crossed the border Saturday some 50 miles east of the main group.

Hassan stressed his desire for a new era of good relations with Spain and praised the Spanish army for avoiding a fight with the marchers.

The King's speech came one day after he held talks in Agadir with a senior Spanish official. Although Hassan did not reveal any specifics of an understanding or a framework for future negotiations, he has too much personal prestige at stake to have backed down empty-handed.

The cancellation of the march will defuse tension in the area and provide a good atmosphere for further talks with Madrid. At the same time, however, Hassan will be under growing domestic pressure to demonstrate soon that progress is being made toward a settlement.

Morocco and Spain will still have to deal with Algerian opposition to a direct transfer of the territory to Morocco and to Mauritania, which also claims part of Spanish Sahara. Hassan pointedly ignored Algeria in his speech; he opposes Algerian participation in any negotiations. He is likewise unwilling to accept a referendum on self-determination, as Algiers had demanded, despite Spanish assurances that the results could be manipulated.


SPAIN

*The length of the waiting period  
for Franco to die is causing new unrest.*

The Communists now are regretting their willingness to grant Juan Carlos a grace period when he becomes king. They reportedly have appealed for a general strike through the Communist-dominated clandestine Workers' Commissions, calling for "democratic action to mobilize the masses."

A date for a strike has not been set, but a week to ten days after Franco's death is the most likely choice. Most of the non-Communist labor organizations are likely to reject the strike call, however, and it probably would be a failure. Any strike effort would be likely to provoke police repression and strengthen the far right.

A sudden crackdown on the Spanish press, meanwhile, may raise political tensions. Several weekly magazines that urged reform have been seized. In addition, over the weekend the editor of a prestigious Madrid daily was charged with attacking the constitution. The charge stemmed from an article he published last week urging increased democratic participation in government after power has passed to Juan Carlos. The decision to crack down on the press may have been made by the information ministry without consulting Juan Carlos.



BANGLADESH

A revolt by enlisted men and non-commissioned officers that erupted in Dacca on Saturday appears to be easing, and conditions are returning to normal. The rebellion emphasizes the indiscipline among the troops and the difficulty the new government faces in imposing its authority on the army.

A resurgence of factional fighting could easily lead to widespread turmoil and the exodus of much of Bangladesh's sizable Hindu minority to India. Officials in New Delhi have indicated in recent months that a flight of refugees into India, such as the massive influx in 1971, could result in Indian military intervention. So far, it does not appear that New Delhi has decided to intervene.

The origins of the mutiny are obscure; it appears to have developed out of the confusion surrounding the ouster and killing of General Musharraf on Friday and the subsequent rise to power of General Zia ur-Rahman. Enlisted men apparently played a large role in Musharraf's fall, and the government has not fully regained control over them.

Some mutinous elements, including extreme leftists, took advantage of the confusion to make demands on their officers for better treatment for enlisted personnel and for release of some political prisoners. Other mutineers reportedly settled old scores; they killed several officers and detained others.

President Sayem has released some leftist political prisoners who are influential with the rebellious troops. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
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It will be difficult for strongman General Zia to reimpose discipline. The events of the past few days revealed that officers have less influence over their troops than was generally believed. This situation is complicated by contention in the officer corps between those who fought in the 1971 war of independence and those who were held in Pakistan until 1973.

BANGLADESH

*We present the key paragraphs of an interagency Intelligence Alert Memorandum, The Deteriorating Situation in Bangladesh and the Increasing Possibility of Indian Intervention, issued on November 8.*

The normal command structure of the armed forces has been disrupted with junior officers and enlisted men reportedly making demands of their seniors, even of the new strong man, Major General Zia ur-Rahman. Some of these mutinous groups appear to be radical in orientation, and rumors in Dacca suggest that some may be operating under Indian influence.

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
--The Dacca press has labeled the overthrow of Musharraf a "sepoy (enlisted man) mutiny."

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
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


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--The senior Bangladesh military representative in New Delhi has warned that if the eight majors who participated in the August 15 coup against Mujibur Rahman return to Dacca from their exile in Bangkok, the likelihood of Indian intervention will increase markedly. (Our latest information is that the majors are still in Bangkok.)



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We doubt that India as yet has decided to intervene militarily in Bangladesh. Prime Minister Gandhi, following her victory in court, is in a strong position domestically. She has no need at present for a foreign victory to enhance her prestige. Therefore, we judge that she will not deliberately embark on intervention for internal political purposes.

India's foreign relations would also argue against intervention--at least until a good case could be made for it, such as would be furnished by a large movement of refugees into India. India's awareness that there would be a strong negative reaction from other countries, especially from the Muslim world, to intervention would be a major deterrent to precipitate action.

(continued)

Indian spokesmen have repeatedly warned, however, that the nation cannot be unconcerned over events in Bangladesh, and that chaos in that country followed by a movement of refugees into India would force New Delhi to intervene regardless of the consequences. New Delhi has also warned that India would intervene if Bangladesh proclaimed itself an Islamic state.

UN - MIDDLE EAST

*The General Assembly today takes up three resolutions on Middle East issues that could have permanent repercussions on the organization. The first to be dealt with concern the rights of Palestinians to a homeland and to international recognition. The assembly then will turn to the resolution equating Zionism with racism.*

The resolutions have split the Arab caucus over how far to push for Palestinian rights and for isolation of Israel.

A unified Arab position on the more controversial Palestinian resolution was reportedly worked out only Friday, primarily through the efforts of Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika. This resolution--originally offered by Egypt in an attempt to paper over differences--calls for an invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in any UN-sponsored peace conference on the Middle East. It also now calls for the Security Council to adopt measures to enable the Palestinians to exercise their national rights.

The second resolution on the PLO, originally sponsored by Syria, calls for the establishment of a special UN committee to work out a timetable for implementing last year's resolution affirming the rights of the Palestinian people to a national homeland and self-determination. It contains an implicit threat to suspend or expel Israel from the UN if it should obstruct the committee's work.

The resolution equating Zionism with racism goes beyond previous UN condemnations of Israel. It has had the effect of polarizing attitudes in the UN and may lead to accelerated erosion of support for the organization. Most Western and developed countries are strongly opposed to it, as are the African states, whose campaign against racial discrimination and apartheid could be jeopardized.

Most countries are hesitant to oppose an Arab-sponsored initiative openly, but a motion to defer voting on the resolution until next year appears to have wide support.

NOTE

Portuguese Prime Minister Azevedo told cheering supporters in Lisbon yesterday that his government would persevere in the tough policy it announced last week against leftist disturbances.

Even as he spoke, however, leftist militants momentarily disrupted the rally by throwing teargas when the strongly pro-government crowd tried to burn effigies of Soviet boss Leonid Brezhnev and Portuguese Communist Party chief Alvaro Cunhal. In a message aimed at his Communist and far left detractors, Azevedo said his government represents the majority of the Portuguese people and will uphold the law as long as it remains in power.

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# The President's Daily Brief

*November 11, 1975*

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 14176  
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November 11, 1975

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Angola: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has proclaimed independence unilaterally, and its two rival liberation groups have set up a rival government. (Page 1)

Australia: In a surprise move that has thrown Australia into an unprecedented constitutional crisis, Governor-General John Kerr early today announced the dismissal of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam. (Page 3)

Lebanon: Prime Minister Karami is making a renewed effort to find a political solution to the Lebanese crisis. (Page 4)


Spanish Sahara: Spain and Morocco will try to hammer out a firm agreement on the territory from the loose understanding King Hassan reached on Saturday with a senior Spanish official. (Page 5)

Cyprus-UN: Debate on the Cyprus question begins in the UN General Assembly this week amid signs that the parties concerned will not be able to agree on a substantive resolution. (Page 6)

Notes: UN; Israel (Page 7)

At Annex we present the principal judgments of a memorandum, "Prospects for and Consequences of Increased Communist Influence in Italian Politics."

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



ANGOLA

*The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which controls Luanda and some other areas of the country, proclaimed independence for the country unilaterally after the Portuguese high commissioner yesterday turned the former colonial territory over to the "Angolan people."*

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola--along with Angola's third liberation group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola--meanwhile has set up a rival government. According to an announcement out of Kinshasa, where the National Front and National Union had been conferring, the administrative seat of their new government will be Nova Lisboa, which they have renamed Huambo.

The rival government will have a president, a prime minister, and a 24-member council of revolution.

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In a separate news announcement, the National Union called for a cease-fire, neutralization of Luanda, and the establishment of a government of national unity made up of the three liberation groups.

Portuguese leaders are divided over whether to recognize the Popular Movement as the legitimate government.

Foreign Minister Antunes and President Costa Gomes are said to favor doing so, while Prime Minister Azevedo and Socialist leader Soares prefer that Portugal take no position. Azevedo reportedly has insisted that his government would never recognize a single liberation movement.

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A variety of reports yesterday indicate that a number of European and other African countries intend to withhold recognition from either rival claimant.

Soviet diplomatic recognition of the Popular Movement could occur today. An authoritative *Pravda* commentary over the weekend indicated that Moscow is moving toward official recognition of the Popular Movement. It also suggested that the Soviets are becoming increasingly nervous about the Popular Movement's sagging military fortunes.

## AUSTRALIA

*In a surprise move that has thrown Australia into an unprecedented constitutional crisis, Governor-General John Kerr early today announced the dismissal of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam.*

Complicated parliamentary maneuvering is still under way, however, and it is unclear whether the sacking will stand up.

Kerr said his decision was based on Whitlam's inability to get government appropriation bills through the opposition-controlled senate, where they have been stalled for more than a month.

The Governor-General named opposition leader Malcolm Fraser to head a caretaker government until an election next month for both houses of parliament.

The senate, which has adjourned indefinitely, approved the appropriation measures after Kerr announced that Fraser would take over the government. The house countered by advising Kerr that Whitlam's ouster is not necessary now that senate action has freed the budget.

Kerr, as Queen Elizabeth's representative in Australia, is constitutionally empowered to dismiss a prime minister and call a new election. There had been some speculation that Kerr might intercede in the current deadlock in an attempt to work out a compromise.

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LEBANON

*With the latest cease-fire now ten days old and generally being respected, Prime Minister Karami is making a renewed effort to find a political solution to the Lebanese crisis.*

Karami on November 8 called on the country's warring factions to allow the Lebanese army and internal security force to play a more forceful role in restoring civil order. He has pledged that once calm has returned, the government will work to implement comprehensive political, social, and economic reforms.

Karami's assertion that security and reform are inseparable represents an attempt to be even-handed and to elicit concessions from both sides. His statement that order must be restored before reforms can be implemented, however, constitutes a concession to right-wing Christians.

Phalanges Party leader Jumayyil has approved Karami's initiative, claiming the Prime Minister has finally conceded the Phalangists' basic point--that the government must assert its authority. Lebanese leftists so far have not reacted and may withhold comment until Karami elaborates his ideas. The Prime Minister is expected to spell out his program at a cabinet meeting tomorrow.

SPANISH SAHARA

A Moroccan delegation will return to Madrid this week to try to hammer out a firm agreement on Spanish Sahara from the loose understanding King Hassan reached on Saturday with a senior Spanish official.

In an attempt to maintain pressure on Madrid, Rabat has announced that the marchers returning from the Sahara will remain at the Moroccan town of Tarfaya near the border until negotiations conclude.

Algerian President Boumediene, who still insists on a referendum for the Saharans under UN auspices, is holding talks with Mauritanian President Ould Daddah. Boumediene will try to enlist the support of the Mauritanian leader and hopes to learn from him details of Morocco's understanding with Spain.

Mauritania supports a partition of the Sahara with Morocco but is willing to go along with a limited UN role to resolve the dispute. Mauritania would accept a referendum that does not include independence as an option.

CYPRUS-UN

*Debate on the Cyprus question begins in the UN General Assembly this week, amid signs that the parties concerned will not be able to agree, as they did in 1974, on a resolution calling for withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island and return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes. The diametrically opposed positions of the Turks and Greeks could be further hardened by acrimonious debate which would impede the resumption of the inter-communal talks--where the problem must ultimately be solved.*

The Greeks and Greek Cypriots view the UN debate as an opportunity to move the Cyprus issue out of the regional arena--where Turkey's military dominance gives it the upper hand--to an international forum they see as more sympathetic to their side. They seek a detailed hearing of their position and will probably urge a resolution criticizing the Turks for not implementing previous UN resolutions.

The Turks hope to focus international attention once again on regional efforts to deal with the Cyprus question. The Turkish UN delegation has already lobbied extensively for a brief, non-substantive resolution, stressing the need to revive the intercommunal talks. The Turks oppose reaffirmation of the resolution passed last year.

The tone of the debate will probably reflect the increasingly anti-Turkish mood at the UN. The General Assembly's desire last year to nurture the intercommunal talks by not pressing the Turks has given way to exasperation with the Turkish position. Those nonaligned countries that worked out the compromise resolution last year, however, have agreed to try again if asked by the Greeks and Turks.

NOTES

*The UN General Assembly passed a resolution last night equating Zionism with racism.*

The resolution's passage may lead some of the developed countries to suspend their financial support of the entire UN anti-discrimination program. By a vote of 72 to 35, with 32 abstentions, the Zionism resolution passed under the same rubric as the traditional UN campaign against racism and racial discrimination.

\* \* \*

*Israel probably will fail to achieve a net population gain from immigration this year, for the first time since its founding in 1948.*

According to data reported to the Israeli cabinet late last month, the number of persons leaving the country permanently in 1975 is expected to equal roughly the number of those arriving to take up permanent residence--about 18,000 in each case. The average annual rate of emigration from Israel since the 1973 war has been more than double the pre-war rate. The Israelis recognize that they must look to the Soviet Union as the major source of potential newcomers, a factor which may become increasingly important in determining the government's policy toward the USSR. Jewish emigration from the USSR this year has averaged slightly over 1,000 people a month--down approximately 30 percent from the first ten months of 1974.

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ITALY

*We present the principal judgments of a memorandum, "Prospects for and Consequences of Increased Communist Influence in Italian Politics," which has been approved by the US Intelligence Board.*

The mid-June regional and local election results presented the Christian Democrats with their most serious challenge in nearly 30 years as Italy's dominant party. The Communist Party's gains of about 6 percent brought it to within 2 percent of the Christian Democrats at the regional level. Unless the Christian Democrats act soon to improve their standing, the Communists could pull ahead of them in the next national parliamentary election--to be held no later than the spring of 1977.

The vote had little to do with Italy's foreign policy. It reflected increasing frustration over inefficient government, inadequate services, tax inequities, and a host of other complaints for which the Christian Democrats were held responsible. It also reflected the sentiments of several million new voters, enfranchised when the voting age was recently lowered to 18, and economic strains, which have hit the middle class harder than in the past.

A marked deterioration in the economy, though we do not think it likely, would hurt the Christian Democrats and thus might help the Communists duplicate or improve on their success when the next national election is held.

In the period before the next national parliamentary election, the Christian Democrats have enough maneuvering room to avoid seeking Communist support in forming a governmental majority. The Communists, moreover, do not want to press the issue.

After the election--even if the Christian Democrats remain the largest party--their options are likely to be cut down to a choice between allying with either the Socialists or the Communists.

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A1

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

The Christian Democrats are likely, in the pre-election period, to consider:

--Keeping the Moro government in place. The chief advantage of Moro's government, in which only the Christian Democrats and Republicans hold cabinet posts, is that its existence affords the parties time to sort out their options and deal with internal problems, but it is increasingly clear that the government's weaknesses prevent it from taking actions that could help contain Communist gains in the next election.

--Making concessions to the Socialists, whose moderate gains put them in a pivotal position. The Socialists want major programmatic changes, some of the more important ministries, and an arrangement that would force the Communists to share some of the government's programmatic responsibilities, without actually holding cabinet posts.

--Forming an all-Christian Democratic "mono-colore" cabinet. This is a traditional way of letting the dust settle, but it is only a stopgap.

--Setting up a centrist coalition. Although substituting the small and conservative Liberal Party for the Socialists is mathematically possible, the centrist coalition's slim parliamentary majority would make this alternative just another stopgap.

--Calling early national elections. This choice does not look very inviting now, but the Christian Democrats may consider it, if failure or inability to put together an effective government convinces them they would lose more by waiting until 1977.

The next national election is likely to deprive the Christian Democrats of all options except an alliance with the Socialists--on terms more favorable to the Socialists than in the past--or a deal with the Communists.

(continued)

A2

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

A centrist coalition will no longer be possible, because the losses suffered by the Liberal Party in the local contests are almost certain to be duplicated in a national race. The mathematical possibility of a center-right alliance--this has never been a politically feasible option--will also be gone if, as is likely, the neo-fascists lose as much in the national election as they did in June.

The Socialists will drive a hard bargain, because they have concluded that current political dynamics threaten their survival as a separate party. They believe that they are being hurt at the polls by their subordinate association with the Christian Democrats while the Communists are helped by their opposition status.

On the other hand, the Socialists are afraid they would be overpowered in any alliance with the Communists at the national level. That is why the Socialists want concessions from the Christian Democrats that would give the government a more leftist cast and obligate the Communists to support its program.

While the Communist Party works for a formal share in national power it will continue the soft line toward NATO, Europe, and the US, which Berlinguer has pushed since taking over the party in 1972 and which has been vindicated by the party's electoral successes. This means:

--Tolerating Italy's NATO membership while resisting any broadening of its commitment to the Alliance or any expansion of the US military presence in Italy.

--Encouraging West European Communist parties to work out coordinated positions on social and economic issues, whether or not these positions coincide with the prevailing view in Moscow.

--Calling for eventual dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact as part of the detente process.

How much this soft line would harden should the Communists come into the national government

(continued)

A3

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

and how responsive the Communist Party would be to Soviet influence are questions on which differences of opinion remain in the US Intelligence Community.\*

There is no doubt that the greater the party's influence on or in the government the more difficulties NATO will have in Italy. And for all the Communist Party's clear differences with Moscow, there are close ideological ties, and the policies of the two are parallel in many respects. In addition, there is evidence of division within the Communist Party on questions of foreign policy; some party leaders, at least, would probably prove more responsive to Moscow once the party got into the government.

If they entered the government, the Communist leaders would probably avoid at the outset any precipitate move (trying to pull Italy out of NATO, for example) that could endanger their position over the longer run. They would realize, moreover, that allowing the Soviets a strong say in how Italy is run would jeopardize the Communist Party's painstaking efforts over the years to stress its Italian identity.

The Communist leaders would be heavily influenced by tactical considerations. They would want to move cautiously, at least at the outset, in

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\*The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force believe that the relationship of the Communist Party to Moscow is a more fundamental one than suggested here. Although the Communist Party is no longer fully subservient to the dictates of the Soviet Politburo, the text does not sufficiently emphasize that the party would be responsive to Moscow, particularly on East-West issues, once in power.

(continued)

order to avoid the risks of conservative counter-reaction, or alienation from Western Europe and the US, which would arise from all-out opposition to NATO or from behaving, for example, like the Communists of Portugal.

The Communist Party's cautious approach would be complicated, however, by increased pressure for results from its own rank and file. In any event, there is every reason to believe that the Communists would be able to influence government policies substantially.


While Communist membership in the national government may have been brought closer by the party's recent success, the Christian Democrats have other options and will take them--at least in the period before the 1977 elections. In terms of real political influence, however, the Communist Party, which now participates directly in the governments of most major cities, five of the 20 regions, and nearly a third of the 94 provinces, is much stronger today than before the elections.

Communist leader Berlinguer has always stressed the gradual nature of his "historic compromise" strategy and will welcome additional time to consolidate these gains. Continuing his cautious approach, Berlinguer's major aim will be to demonstrate that the party can deliver the efficient local-level administration it promised during the campaign.

Any success he achieves in that respect will go far toward breaking down the remaining psychological and traditional barriers to Communist membership in the national government.

Our estimate of probable Communist behavior is based on the near certainty that the party would not only have to share power with other parties if it entered the government, in the near or medium term, but would also have to take account of public opinion. Further into the future, the Communists would work to gain predominant power and, if this were achieved, constraints on their behavior would clearly diminish. In such circumstances, the Communist Party could be expected to become more aggressive and doctrinaire.

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# The President's Daily Brief

November 12, 1975

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USSR: Recent photography shows that the Soviets have installed an ABM radar on the Kamchatka Peninsula. (Page 1)

Angola: The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola yesterday named its leader, Agostinho Neto, president of the "People's Republic of Angola." (Page 2)

Turkey: General Staff Chief Sancar again has exhorted Prime Minister Demirel to face up to the country's pressing international and domestic problems. (Page 4)

Note: China (Page 5)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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USSR


Recent photography shows that the Soviets have installed an ABM radar--designated Flat Twin--on the Kamchatka Peninsula about 80 miles from the main impact area for ICBM re-entry vehicles. The new radar is situated to track re-entry vehicles launched from test ranges and operational complexes in the Soviet Union.

The radar was first observed on poor-quality photography [redacted] and was firmly identified in excellent imagery [redacted]. Construction of the operations area where the radar is located probably was started a year ago, and the radar now appears complete. We do not know, however, if it is operational.

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The Flat Twin radar is part of an ABM system under development at Sary-Shagan. This phased-array radar is capable of simultaneously tracking a number of widely spaced objects, and is being tested against simulated ICBM launches from the Kapustin Yar test center to Sary-Shagan. By installing a Flat Twin radar at Kamchatka, the Soviets could continue to test and develop it against a wide variety of targets--including MIRVs.

The radar also could be used as an instrumentation radar. It has considerably better capabilities than the existing radar on Kamchatka.



ANGOLA

*The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola yesterday named its leader, Agostinho Neto, president of the "People's Republic of Angola."*

The Neto government was quickly recognized by the USSR, Romania, Cuba, and several African states with long ties to the Popular Movement. A number of other East European states have expressed "readiness" to establish diplomatic relations with the new People's Republic.

The Popular Movement's rivals--the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola--marked Angolan independence and the inauguration of their joint provisional government in ceremonies at Nova Lisboa, the National Union's headquarters, and at Ambriz, the Front's headquarters. The seat of the provisional government will be at Nova Lisboa, renamed Huambo.

After the independence ceremonies, the two rival "governments" quickly resumed military activities. The Popular Movement dispatched a column of troops and tanks southward to meet an advancing National Front - National Union force advancing on Luanda. That force, however, is still approximately 350 miles from the capital.

At Quifangando, the National Front has still not been able to break through Popular Movement defenses after almost three weeks of combat.

The Front and the Union still hope to force the Popular Movement to compromise. The Popular Movement will probably not be inclined to consider a political accommodation with its rivals, however, now that it has been recognized by Cuba and the USSR and continues to receive military aid from them.

(continued)

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In Cabinda, [redacted] heavy fighting is taking place between the Popular Movement and Cabindan liberation forces, which are probably augmented by Zairian troops. The inability of the Cabindan liberation forces to secure a quick victory, in what was supposed to have been a surprise attack, suggests that the Popular Movement may hold the upper hand at the present time.

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TURKEY


*General Staff Chief Sancar again has exhorted Prime Minister Demirel's government to face up to the country's pressing international and domestic problems, especially the recent epidemic of left-right student violence.*

There is no evidence at this time to suggest that Sancar's statement should be construed as anything but a stern warning to the government. Nevertheless, the military leadership may be becoming increasingly disenchanted with what it sees as the politicians' penchant for playing politics at the expense of vital national concerns.


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# The President's Daily Brief

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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


USSR




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JORDAN-SYRIA-EGYPT

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

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Algeria		

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The Indian Supreme Court, which last week overturned Prime Minister Gandhi's conviction for campaign violations in 1971, yesterday dealt her a major setback by refusing to reconsider a two-year-old ruling restricting the power of parliament to amend the constitution.

The Prime Minister and other members of her government have complained that parliament--representing "the people"--is frequently blocked by the courts, which they allege represent only a "small minority." She often has used her large majority in parliament to push through constitutional amendments when other means of attaining her goals have failed. One of these amendments recently was struck down by the courts. The court's decision has led to speculation that Gandhi may be planning action to strip the courts of some of their powers. One way for her to do this legally would be to call a constituent assembly, perhaps made up of the present parliament, to rewrite the nation's constitution.

(continued)

\* \* \*

*The European Free Trade Association has agreed to offer project aid to Portugal, but it is much less than Lisbon had requested.*

EFTA last week approved a \$100-million investment fund for Portugal and a five-year delay in requiring Lisbon to eliminate tariffs on certain industrial imports from the other six members. The EC also has offered aid, but Lisbon is making little progress in drawing up acceptable projects. Any major flow of money into Portugal from either of these sources evidently is still some way off.

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# The President's Daily Brief

*November 14, 1975*

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Portugal: A major test between the government and Communist-led workers apparently ended early this morning with agreement on a new collective labor contract. (Page 1)

Angola-Cabinda: The invasion of Cabinda by Zairian-led forces has been pushed back by the Popular Movement. (Page 2)

USSR-CSCE: Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko's substantive response to a US démarche on CSCE implementation indicates that Moscow feels obliged to engage in a serious dialogue on some implementation issues. (Page 4)

Notes: USSR; Syria-Israel; Spanish Sahara; Lebanon (Pages 5 and 6)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

PORUGAL

*A major test between the government and Communist-led workers apparently ended early this morning with agreement on a new collective labor contract.*

While there has been no official announcement of the details of the settlement, initial press reports say Prime Minister Azevedo bowed to the workers' wage demands. He apparently refused to fire Labor Minister Rosa, but the press says he agreed to an investigation of the Labor Ministry, which has been a target of the Communists in recent weeks. The workers evidently were placated enough to end their siege of Sao Bento palace, where Azevedo had been a hostage the past two days.

There was a danger yesterday that the workers' protest, which began Wednesday, would develop into a major crisis when the workers demanded not only a 44-percent wage hike, but also the return to power of pro-Communist former prime minister Vasco Goncalves. Last night, President Costa Gomes appealed to a nationwide radio audience for calm and for support for the sixth provisional government.

The government will have serious problems if it has agreed to the construction workers' demands for a 44-percent wage increase, especially after details of a new austerity program were published in the Lisbon press this week. The document outlines the need for increased prices, reduced real wages, rationing of essential foodstuffs, and adjustments in the escudo exchange rate to put Portugal on the road to economic recovery.

Before implementing this program, the government will have to weigh very carefully its ability to withstand the tension the program is bound to create against the chaos that might result if something is not done to improve the economy. The Communists have already attacked the program for demanding sacrifices of the working class.

ANGOLA-CABINDA

*The invasion of Cabinda by Zairian-led forces of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda that was launched from Zaire last week has been pushed back by troops of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.*

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The failure to dislodge the Popular Movement will be a blow to Mobutu. He seems to have counted on the element of surprise and expected the force to move rapidly and capture the city of Cabinda, some 35 miles from the border. Should he decide to renew the attack, he will probably have to commit substantially more Zairian troops.

Mobutu, however, may not want to risk further involvement in Cabinda immediately, particularly in light of growing Cuban support for the Popular Movement and reports that the MIG aircraft may soon be operational, piloted by Cubans. He may prefer to wait in the hope that military pressures on the Popular Movement in Angola proper eventually will force the Movement to withdraw troops from the enclave.

[redacted]

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USSR-CSCE

*Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko's substantive response to a US démarche on CSCE implementation indicates that Moscow feels obliged to engage in a serious dialogue on some implementation issues.*

The USSR consistently has held that the provisions of the Helsinki agreement are not automatically self-implementing, but must be negotiated bilaterally. With a follow-on meeting of CSCE signatories scheduled to take place in Belgrade in 1977, the Soviets have an interest in appearing to be cooperative and responsive to Western initiatives.

Moscow would like to appear to be living up to the letter and spirit of the agreements. Thus, the Soviets have asserted that, in contrast to the US, they have widely disseminated the text of the agreement. They also have approved multiple exit and entry visas for US journalists; the same arrangement was reached with the French as a result of President Giscard's visit.

Appearances notwithstanding, the Soviets are laying out the limits to which they will go. They have been particularly unreceptive on the military-related aspects of CSCE, the so-called confidence-building measures, refusing either to acknowledge Western advance notification of military exercises or to send observers to them. They also have stressed the aspects of the conference document they regard as advantageous, especially the statement on "inviolability of frontiers."

In addition to putting forth their own interpretations of what the Helsinki agreement does and does not require, the Soviets, as well as the East Europeans, have been trying to put the West on the defensive. Korniyenko complained about problems the Soviets have had in obtaining US visas and the inadequate dissemination of the CSCE text in the US. He also threw in an attack on Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America broadcasts as incompatible with the Helsinki agreement.

NOTES

*Satellite photography obtained in October shows that the Soviets have started to dismantle two more above-ground launchers for the SS-7 ICBM and have resumed the dismantling of eight other launchers.*

The launcher dismantling program now involves at least 36 SS-7 launchers. As of last month, the Soviets had 775 launchers on submarines that were then operational or on sea trials. Under the strategic arms limitation interim agreement, the Soviets are allowed to build more than 740 launchers for modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles on nuclear-powered submarines if older missile launchers--equaling the number of SLBMs in excess of 740--are dismantled.

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Spanish, Moroccan, and Mauritanian officials apparently have made little progress toward a firm agreement on the future of Spanish Sahara after two days of talks in Madrid.

Algerian opposition to a partition of the territory between Morocco and Mauritania is a major factor in Madrid's decision to stand by its earlier promises to seek a UN role involving a referendum in the disputed territory. Algiers is on record as favoring a UN-supervised referendum. Meanwhile, the evacuation of Spanish civilians from the territory is virtually complete. Any evacuation of military forces will depend on the outcome of the negotiations.

\* \* \*

Security in Beirut has deteriorated this week, although the principal combatants seem to be trying to forestall heavy fighting.

Efforts by Lebanese and Palestinian politicians to find a solution have so far achieved no result. The committee considering political reform has been meeting regularly, however

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Prime Minister Karami's security committee has also been meeting, primarily to seek ways to stop the recurring waves of kidnapings. The cabinet goes through the formality of meeting but the split between Christian and Muslim members is as deep as ever.

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# The President's Daily Brief

November 15, 1975

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November 15, 1975

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Portugal: Lisbon was relatively calm yesterday; a leftist demonstration scheduled for Sunday will keep pressure on the government to grant workers' demands. (Page 1)

Spanish Sahara: Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania have agreed to govern Spanish Sahara in a joint provisional administration until Spain's withdrawal at the end of February. (Page 2)

Angola: The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola apparently now controls the railroad from Teixeira de Sousa to the coastal rail and port complex of Benguela-Lobito. (Page 3)

Vietnam: A North-South conference on reunification is now meeting in Saigon. (Page 4)

Notes: [ ] 25X1

Mexico; Pakistan-Bangladesh (Pages 6 and 7) 25X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

PORUGAL

Lisbon was relatively calm yesterday after the government agreed to grant a temporary wage increase to construction workers while a permanent scale is being negotiated. The deadline for the permanent increase is November 27. A demonstration scheduled by leftist groups for Sunday will keep pressure on the government to grant the workers' demands.


The Socialists and the Popular Democrats were unable to organize an effective counter-demonstration in Lisbon and were limited to pressuring President Costa Gomes--with little success--to take strong action against the leftists. Party activists at several locations in the north, however, turned out in large numbers to protest the Lisbon disturbances.

In the south, farm workers in Beja cheered a statement by security chief Otelo de Carvalho that he is "with the people." The main themes of the Beja rally were the overthrow of the Azevedo government and the restoration of former pro-Communist prime minister Goncalves.


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A party statement issued yesterday took the less radical line, supporting the right of the workers to demand higher wages. It disapproved restricting the freedom of movement of government officials.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## SPANISH SAHARA

Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania have agreed to govern Spanish Sahara in a joint provisional administration until Spain's withdrawal. The Spanish information minister has stated that Spain will be out of the Sahara by February 28. He said that details of the agreement would not be made public in Spain until the Spanish parliament has completed the formality--scheduled to start Tuesday--of "decolonizing" the territory.

Madrid has apparently abandoned its insistence on a referendum for the area. A Spanish source who talked to US embassy officials said "consultations" will be held with local tribal leaders on the future of the Sahara.

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The UN role, if any, in the arrangement is unclear.


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The agreement is a victory for Morocco's King Hassan, who has long sought to annex at least part of the territory. As co-administrators, Morocco and Mauritania will be able to select Saharan tribal leaders for consultations.

The outcome would be a "voluntary" decision to partition the territory, giving Morocco the northern region with its rich phosphate deposits and granting Mauritania the southern portion which contains iron ore. Both parties will benefit from a profitable fishing industry.

Algeria, which favors independence for Spanish Sahara, can be expected to seek support in the UN to reverse the trilateral agreement. Algiers will argue that "consultations" are not in accord with an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which upheld the Saharans' right to self-determination. Algeria would like to return the Saharan problem to the UN General Assembly.

Algiers will create as many problems for Morocco as possible. It will continue to provide arms, training, and possibly some "volunteers" to the Polisario Front, a pro-independence Saharan group, and may also renew its support of Moroccan dissidents.



## ANGOLA

*Forces of the National Union for  
the Total Independence of Angola cap-  
tured the key rail city of Teixeira de  
Sousa on Tuesday[redacted]*

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*[redacted] The National Union appar-  
ently now controls the entire length  
of the railroad, from Teixeira de Sousa  
to the coastal rail and port complex of  
Benguela-Lobito.*

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National Union President Jonas Savimbi hopes to reopen the railroad to Zambian and Zairian traffic by mid-December or whenever several sections of track have been repaired.

We cannot confirm reports--attributed to East European diplomatic sources--that some 400 Soviet "troops" arrived in Luanda on Thursday. Some Soviet military advisers and civilian technicians may well appear at any time, however, in view of the materiel Moscow is providing the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

It seems likely that Cubans rather than Soviets will pilot any MIGs that the Soviet Union may send to Angola. The Soviets have been using Cubans to support the Popular Movement in the field in order to avoid direct Soviet involvement.

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VIETNAM

A North-South conference on reunification is now meeting in Saigon. The decision to convene this conference indicates that Hanoi is now ready to proceed with a formal merger of the two countries. The process could be completed as early as next spring.

The joint conference will be a cosmetic exercise, giving the appearance of mutual agreement to what has been a political reality since the collapse of the former government last spring. Vietnam has already experienced de facto reunification under a single party and military structure with Hanoi essentially making all the important decisions. Heading each of the delegations to the conference are ranking members of the North Vietnamese politburo.

According to the official announcement, the conference will formulate plans for a new national assembly and new "common" state organs. The announcement gives the impression that countrywide elections will be held soon for the assembly. Southerners will undoubtedly be appointed to positions in executive ministries and commissions.

Following Saigon's fall, most early indications were that a gradual process of reunification would take place over several years. The communists themselves added to speculation by pressing foreign governments for diplomatic recognition of the southern Provisional Revolutionary Government, by maintaining that economic aid would have to be provided separately for each state, and by trying last summer to gain separate membership in the UN for both Vietnams.

By late summer these signs of a "gradualist" approach to reunification were disappearing. Public statements by Vietnamese leaders began to avoid any suggestion of an independent southern regime of indefinite duration. A promised civilian administration never materialized, and no foreign state, including North Vietnam's closest allies, was permitted to establish diplomatic representation in Saigon.

(continued)

Hanoi apparently decided that any diplomatic or economic benefits to be derived from two Vietnams would be outweighed by the problems flowing from such a strategy. The most fundamental concern to Hanoi, however, is the problem of control of the political process in the south.

With the end of the war, the question of the political role to be played by southern elements, heretofore relegated to front groups or the management of local problems, became a pressing issue for Hanoi. Although Hanoi firmly controls the southern segment of the Lao Dong party, a separate southern regime could, over time, only encourage independent southern tendencies. Hanoi's desire to limit the potential for such growth must have been a major factor behind its decision to move ahead on reunification.

There are tentative signs that the North Vietnamese will convene their first party congress in over 15 years sometime early next year in order to put the capstone on the reunification process. The congress will probably be held shortly after the elections for a joint national assembly and after formal reunification has been announced.


The congress will probably deal with the question of southern political equities. It seems likely to expand the Politburo and central committee by adding members identified with the southern party apparatus.

Such a step will hardly do away with the problem of southern resentment. The absorption of southern cadre into the northern party and government structure is bound to remain a sensitive political issue for years to come.

NOTES

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*The Mexican government will use herbicides to destroy opium and marijuana crops for the first time in an eradication campaign that begins today and will last through March 1976.*

The Mexicans have long declined to use herbicides for ecological and political reasons. The decision to go ahead with them reflects Mexico's growing concern over recent criticism in the US Congress and press of its anti-narcotics efforts. This year's destruction campaign is starting early in the hope of destroying the plants before they can be harvested; in some areas, however, growers had planted early, and harvesting has already begun.

\* \* \*

*The Pakistani government appears pleased by General Zia ur-Rahman's overthrow of General Musharraf's four-day-old regime in Bangladesh last week, according to the US embassy in Islamabad.*

Pakistani officials had viewed Musharraf, who was killed in Zia's counter coup, as sharing the pro-Indian orientation of the late president Mujib, rather than the more pro-Pakistani, pro-Chinese, and pro-West outlook generally attributed to General Zia and to former president Mushtaque.

The Pakistanis are not being hasty, however, in seeking close ties with the new government. At present, they are waiting to see whether the new regime will send an ambassador to Islamabad. Pakistani officials do not expect India to intervene militarily in Bangladesh in the immediate future. They think India would make such a move only if there is an outbreak of Muslim-Hindu strife in Bangladesh and a flight of Hindus to India.

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# The President's Daily Brief

November 17, 1975

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Portugal: The Communists continue trying to regain an influential role in government; yesterday, they managed to muster more than 20,000 demonstrators in Lisbon. (Page 1)

Spanish Sahara: Algeria is opposed to the agreement on the disputed territory worked out last week between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania. (Page 2)

Ethiopia: A power struggle in the ruling military council has culminated in increased influence for the chairman, who had previously played a figurehead role. (Page 3)

Notes: Rhodesia; USSR-Angola (Page 4)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

PORUGAL

*The Portuguese Communist Party is continuing its efforts to regain an influential role in government. Yesterday, the party managed to muster more than 20,000 demonstrators to march through Lisbon. The crowd dispersed peacefully.*

The latest surge of Communist pressure in the streets of Lisbon has been largely through manipulation of the construction workers, who have been demanding wage increases and other concessions. The government granted the workers a temporary raise last week--an average increase of 28 percent--but a statement by Labor Minister Tomas Rosa yesterday suggests Lisbon may not grant all the workers' demands. The labor minister told an anti-Communist rally in the northern town of Viseu that the government will not give way to the workers who, he charged, are being used by "politically motivated leaders."

The government's effort to restore discipline in the armed forces is still being undercut by General Otelo de Carvalho. His replacement by an anti-Communist officer was reportedly discussed by the Revolutionary Council on Saturday. President Costa Gomes may be reluctant to fire Carvalho but might approve a plan that would kick the general upstairs to the post of vice chief of staff of the armed forces, a job that at least would remove him from direct contact with radical troops.

SPANISH SAHARA

*Spanish efforts over the weekend apparently did nothing to overcome Algerian opposition to the agreement between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania on Spanish Sahara.*

Neither the Spanish nor the Algerians have commented on the talks held Saturday in Algiers between Madrid's special envoy and Algerian officials. This suggests the discussions did not go well. Yesterday, an Algerian government press statement strongly denounced the Spanish Sahara agreement as a callous move to divide the territory's mineral riches and to deny its inhabitants the right to decide on their own future.

Algiers will probably launch a campaign this week to enlist support in the UN to reverse the agreement. Algeria is reported already threatening to request a special Security Council session to take up the matter as soon as the terms of the agreement are made public. This is expected once the Spanish parliament completes the process--scheduled to start tomorrow--of formally decolonizing the territory.

Both sides will lobby vigorously in the UN. Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika has already been at the UN for several weeks, arguing the Algerian case for a self-determination referendum under UN auspices for Spanish Sahara. Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki arrived in New York yesterday and, together with his Mauritanian counterpart who is expected to arrive shortly, will orchestrate efforts to neutralize the Algerian campaign.

ETHIOPIA

*A power struggle in the ruling military council has culminated in increased influence for the chairman, General Teferi Benti, who had previously played a figure-head role. Teferi and his supporters will probably moderate some of the council's policies and try to reach an accommodation with its military and civilian opponents.*

A number of council members have been aware during the past year of declining support for the government in the armed forces and among the public. Key military units have frequently criticized the council's radical socialist policies and its repressive rule. They have also expressed doubt about the qualifications of council members for leadership and have called for more civilian representation in government or even a return to civilian rule.

The emergence of the Teferi group in the council may not end maneuvering within the military. Teferi's own survival will probably depend on his success as arbiter among competing factions within the council and the armed forces.

NOTES

*Joshua Nkomo, leader of one faction of Rhodesian nationalists, has talked several times in Salisbury with Prime Minister Ian Smith during the past few weeks concerning a resumption of settlement talks.*

Nkomo, who is backed by Zambian President Kaunda, hopes to gain support also from Tanzanian President Nyerere and Mozambican President Machel. His prospects may depend on whether Smith shows any signs of compromise. The Prime Minister recently told the South Africans, who have been pressing him to reach a settlement with the Rhodesian nationalists, that he wants to conclude talks with Nkomo by next March. Smith gave no indication that he is ready to agree to an arrangement that would lead to early black rule, and he may be talking with Nkomo only to keep the blacks divided and to try to stave off a resumption of guerrilla warfare.

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Angola.

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# The President's Daily Brief

*November 18, 1975*

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Syria: UN officials in the Middle East are said to be convinced that Syria will renew the mandate of the Golan observer forces. (Page 1)

Lebanon: A new 300-man government security force will attempt to stop the kidnaping, sniping, and looting that continue to threaten the two-week-old cease-fire. (Page 2)

Egypt-USSR: Agreement seems unlikely in talks beginning today in Cairo on rescheduling Egypt's debt to the USSR. (Page 3)

Angola: The National Front and the National Union, despite their recent successes in joint military operations, have been unable to agree on the "government" they proclaimed on November 11. (Page 4)

Notes: Portugal; Israel; USSR - South Yemen; USSR; Canada; Thailand; China - North Korea - Australia (Pages 5, 6, and 7)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

SYRIA

*UN officials in the Middle East are said to be convinced that Syria will renew the mandate of the observer forces stationed on the Golan Heights, due to expire on November 30.*

Lieutenant General Silasvuo, the UN coordinator of Middle Eastern peacekeeping operations, reportedly came away from talks last week with Syrian Defense Minister Talas and chief of staff Shihabi so convinced that Syria would extend the mandate that he has advised Secretary General Waldheim that he need not make a special visit to Damascus at this time.

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President Asad and his advisers may have concluded that Syria has no attractive alternatives and must therefore renew the mandate. Nevertheless, we are puzzled by these reports since we still expect the Syrians to withhold formal approval until the last moment in hopes of obtaining some diplomatic quid pro quo from the US and Israel.

LEBANON

*Interior Minister Shamun announced yesterday that a new 300-man government security force will begin patrolling Beirut today. The heavily armed unit will attempt to stop the kidnaping, sniping, and looting that continue to threaten the two-week-old cease-fire.*

Shamun, the most powerful Christian in the cabinet, emphasized that the force is composed of "commandos" from both the Lebanese army and the internal security force. Shamun has been arguing for greater use of the army, and he will interpret the cabinet's approval of the special unit as a victory over Prime Minister Karami.

Karami, a Muslim, has referred to the unit only as a "special detachment" of the regular security service. The Prime Minister recently has had great difficulty controlling some of his radical followers and must minimize any concessions to the Christians.

Karami apparently allowed the security unit to be formed in return for Christian acceptance--at least in principle--of his proposals for political and economic reforms. The cabinet agreed last Saturday that Karami and President Franjiyah should together formulate specific proposals for ensuring Muslim and Christian equality in parliament and the civil service, for limiting unemployment, and for stimulating economic recovery.

The right-wing Phalangists, who are not represented in the cabinet, have offered cautious approval of Karami's proposals. They are relieved that the Prime Minister is not now threatening a formal reduction of the powers of the Christian president, and that his program falls short of the more fundamental changes suggested only last week by the committee on political reform.

Muslim leftists on the committee and some Beirut newspapers are attacking the Christians for refusing to make greater concessions and Karami for his willingness to compromise. One such leftist, Baath Party leader Assam Qansu, has threatened that he may withdraw from the reform committee.

EGYPT-USSR

A Soviet delegation will arrive in Cairo today to continue talks on rescheduling Egypt's debt to the USSR. It seems unlikely that the two governments will reach agreement.

President Sadat has claimed that the total Egyptian debt to the USSR is \$4 billion, most of which is for military purchases. The Egyptians want a ten-year moratorium and the right to make future payments in goods rather than in hard currency.

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The Soviets are likely to come up with some counterproposals, but they will probably fall far short of meeting Egyptian demands. The Soviets will also discuss trade relations with the Egyptians.

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By continuing the debt discussions, Moscow hopes to suggest flexibility in its position and to indicate that responsibility for any further deterioration in relations rests with Sadat. The Soviets apparently plan to maintain pressure on Cairo until Sadat makes some specific political gesture acceptable to Moscow.

ANGOLA

*Despite the recent successes in their joint military operations, the National Front and the National Union have been unable to agree on the structure or the leadership of the "government" they proclaimed on independence day, November 11.*

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The National Front's Holden Roberto and the National Union's Jonas Savimbi seem to be hesitating about too close an identification with the joint government for fear of compromising their postwar political ambitions.

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NOTES

Portugal's Prime Minister Azevedo is said to be ready to make some changes in his government in reaction to the recent Communist-led attacks on government ministries.

The changes being considered reportedly do not involve any officials above the sub-cabinet level. Shifts even at that level, however, could be significant if they involve the politically sensitive labor or social communications ministries, which have borne the brunt of the Communist offensive. A reshuffle in these ministries might mollify the opposition temporarily and buy some time for the government, but it would be unlikely to have any sustained effect upon the Communists' drive to gain greater representation in the government and the ruling Revolutionary Council.

\* \* \*

The government and press in Israel are reacting sharply to the statement on the Palestinian question made last week by Deputy Assistant Saunders.

After the regular Israeli cabinet session on Sunday, a communiqué said all ministers had strongly criticized the Saunders statement, claiming it contained errors and distortions. Government officials reportedly are concerned by what they believe is the statement's assumption that the main obstacle to peace is the Palestinian problem rather than the Arab refusal to recognize Israel. They also are worried that it may be the first step in a US campaign designed to convince the Israelis eventually to accept the PLO as a negotiating partner.

There appears to be a widespread feeling in Israel that Washington is now emphasizing the Palestinian question because it has begun to take seriously Syrian President Asad's repeated assertions that he will not enter into talks on a settlement with Israel unless the Palestinian issue is included.

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*The Soviet Union successfully launched an un-manned Soyuz spacecraft, Soyuz 20, into Earth orbit yesterday.*

The craft is in position to rendezvous and dock--probably today--with the Salyut 4 space station, which has been in orbit since December 1974. Indications are that the mission will last about 90 days and will check out the reliability of space-craft systems in preparation for a manned flight of long duration next year.

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*The Canadian cabinet's committee on priorities has decided to maintain Canada's land and air forces in Europe at their current levels.*



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The committee's decision is tantamount to full cabinet approval. The committee is chaired by Prime Minister Trudeau and includes the ministers of finance and external affairs. The modernization of Canada's forces assigned to NATO apparently will be delayed to accord with the government's efforts to cut spending.

(continued)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

\* \* \*

A high-level Thai government official has privately assured the US embassy that Foreign Minister Chatchai was not speaking for the Thai government two weeks ago when he claimed that Bangkok had decided to return US aircraft to Laos.

Chatchai's failure to raise the question with the US ambassador last week is a further indication that he has been overruled by Prime Minister Khukrit. The Thai government maintains the position that disposition of the aircraft should be settled directly by the US with Laos and Vietnam. A new clash between Thai and Lao forces along the Mekong River border erupted yesterday and was continuing early today. It will likely further harden Bangkok's position against sending back the planes.

\* \* \*

The Chinese have made clear their displeasure over North Korea's suspension of diplomatic relations with Australia.

As the Australians prepared to leave Pyongyang, the Chinese ambassador shook hands with each of them in full view of Korean officials. The Chinese also made a special effort to facilitate issuance of Chinese visas to the Australians, who traveled through Peking on their way home. Although Peking will not make a major issue of the incident with Pyongyang, the Chinese almost certainly hope to make it clear to Australia--and probably other countries--that they played no part in North Korea's over-reaction to Australian handling of the Korean question at the UN.

*Top Secret*

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# The President's Daily Brief

November 19, 1975

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~~Top Secret~~ 25X1

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1), (2), (3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

November 19, 1975

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Lebanon: Extremists killed passersby indiscriminately in several suburbs of Beirut yesterday, presumably in the hope of upsetting the two-week-old cease-fire. (Page 1)

Portugal: Continuing tensions have provoked renewed Communist warnings of a rightist coup, further discussion of a plan to move the government to the north, and demonstrations in the Azores protesting "anarchy" on the mainland. (Page 2)

South Africa - Angola: South Africa has, in recent weeks, considerably expanded its support for the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. (Page 3)

Notes: USSR; Cambodia-Thailand (Page 5)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

LEBANON

*Snipers killed passersby indiscriminately in several suburbs of Beirut yesterday. The attacks almost certainly were carried out by extremists hoping to upset the two-week-old cease-fire and halt the little progress that has been made in political negotiations.*

Despite the killings, central Beirut remained relatively calm, and the large private militias did not allow themselves to be drawn into sustained clashes. The deputy commander of the national gendarmerie, Fuad Kiwan, announced that he had been named to head the new 300-man security force, and that the unit would be in the streets in force today.

Splinter groups on the Lebanese far left probably were responsible for yesterday's attacks. At least ten such organizations have been involved in the recent fighting. They are feeling especially belligerent now as a result of Prime Minister Karami's offer last weekend to reach a political compromise with the country's Christian leaders.

Representatives of most Palestinian and Lebanese leftist groups met last night to "review their support" for Karami, according to press reports from Beirut. Kamal Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party and spokesman for the leftist coalition, demanded earlier in the day that Karami spell out the details of the reforms he is proposing.

In a speech to parliament, Karami avoided a direct response to Jumblatt. The Prime Minister has limited himself for the past week to lengthy but obscure statements designed to convince Muslims that reforms are coming but to assure Christians at the same time that these reforms will involve "reinterpretations rather than amendments" of Lebanon's constitution.

PORUGAL

*Continuing tension between the government and the Communist Party has provoked renewed Communist warnings of a rightist coup, further discussion of a plan to move the government to the north, and demonstrations in the Azores protesting "anarchy" on the mainland.*

The Communists apparently fabricated the coup rumors to serve their own purposes. Two Communist-dominated Lisbon dailies alleged yesterday that a coup would be launched today by prominent anti-Communist officers led by Northern Military Region Commander Pires Veloso. The Armed Forces General Staff has denied the story.

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
The popularly elected constituent assembly continues to discuss a plan to move the government to Porto. Broached last week when Prime Minister Azevedo was prevented from leaving his residence for two days by pro-Communist demonstrators, the proposal reportedly is favored by the center-left Popular Democrats and Socialists. The Prime Minister and others see it, however, as premature, and at least one government official has described the plan as unlikely to become a reality.

Demonstrations in the Azores on Monday are a clear signal to Lisbon that there is widespread concern in the conservative islands over recent events on the mainland. If the turmoil in Portugal remains unchecked, the move for independence advanced by the Azorean Liberation Front could make substantial progress.


SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA

*South African support of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola has expanded considerably in the past few weeks, though we do not know how many South Africans are involved in the fighting.*

Pretoria reassessed its relatively detached position toward Angola last summer as the country slipped toward civil war, and Soviet assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola increased and became more open. At that time, the Popular Movement ousted its Angolan rivals from Luanda and began to gain a military advantage farther south.



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South African assistance has been essential to the recent successes of the National Front and National Union in recapturing several seaports and pushing the Popular Movement back toward Luanda. The South Africans are skeptical that the Front's stalled campaign north of Luanda will be as effective.

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Pretoria's commitment is not open-ended. Prime Minister Vorster has carefully reviewed each step of the growing involvement before giving his approval and at one point seriously considered withdrawing before Angola became independent on November 11. The South Africans finally decided to stay for the near future, apparently because of the success of the National Front - National Union push into central Angola.

Vorster may also have been encouraged by the general absence of criticism of South African involvement by either black Africa or the international community. His efforts at detente with black Africa do not appear to have suffered.

Nevertheless, Vorster also realizes that a withdrawal now would seriously weaken the National Front - National Union campaign. [redacted]

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Vorster is concerned over the growing Soviet and Cuban support of the Popular Movement, particularly the appearance of nearly 3,000 Cubans in Angola and Cabinda. In a recent talk with US officials in Pretoria, he was clearly worried that the increased Soviet and Cuban aid may tip the balance again in favor of the Popular Movement. If this happens, he will pull out South African personnel on short notice [redacted]

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## USSR: Probable Effects of Soil Moisture on Winter Grains



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NOTES

*This year's severe drought has left important Soviet winter grain areas short of the soil moisture required for a good crop next summer.*

Persistent drought conditions have limited germination; the seedlings that have come up are not sturdy and hence are more vulnerable to winter-kill. The winter crop, which usually accounts for one third of total grain production, is critical because grain stocks are extremely low. In an effort to recover from the 1975 harvest failure, the Soviets have planted the largest area in winter grain since 1970.

\* \* \*

*Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary and Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai apparently agreed on November 17 on the modalities for liaison offices and for government-to-government trade.*

Ieng Sary announced that joint liaison committees will be located in a Thai and a Cambodian border town to maintain communications and to deal with any problems between the two countries.

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

November 20, 1975

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~~Top Secret 25X1~~

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
November 20, 1975

Table of Contents

Spain: The Regency Council has released word on the installation of Juan Carlos as King Juan III and on the burial of Franco. (Page 1)

Portugal: The Azevedo government suspended its functions today, blaming a split within the military for an inability to continue governing. (Page 2)

25X1



PLO-Egypt: Yasir Arafat appears to be trying to improve relations with Egypt. (Page 4 and 5)

Angola: The National Union reportedly has captured two more towns from the Soviet-backed Popular Movement. (Page 6)

Notes: USSR (Page 7)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SPAIN

*Death came to General Franco last night following weeks of medical efforts to prolong his life.*

Spain's Regency Council convened this morning, and an official announcement said Prince Juan Carlos will be installed on Saturday (6:30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time) as King Juan III.

Franco's body is to lie in state at the Royal Palace in Madrid from tomorrow until burial on Sunday at the Valley of the Fallen, outside the capital. There will be an official mass next Thursday, for foreign dignitaries to attend, in Madrid.

PORUGAL


*Prime Minister Azevedo's government suspended its functions early this morning, announcing that a split in the military made governing impossible.*

The government apparently has taken this action in an attempt to force President Costa Gomes to resolve the differences within the military between the anti-Communist ruling faction, led by Foreign Minister Antunes, and the faction backed by the far left and the Communists.

The split has led to a breakdown in military discipline which has crippled Azevedo's efforts to maintain public order and concentrate on governing the country.


Leaving it to Costa Gomes to solve the present dilemma is a serious sign of weakness--and perhaps resignation--by Portugal's present pro-Western leaders. The President's penchant for damaging compromise does not augur well for a prompt or satisfactory solution.

The Revolutionary Council meets later today to discuss the government's decision. The Council must act firmly if the government is to be saved.



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PLO-EGYPT

*Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat appears to be trying to improve relations between the PLO and Egypt. Relations have been strained since early September, when Palestinian leaders attacked Cairo for accepting a second Sinai accord that included no promise of Israeli concessions for the Palestinians.*

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The PLO decision to improve its standing with Egypt almost certainly was prompted by Sadat's forceful defense of Palestinian rights during his visit to the US last month. In addition, the Palestinians appreciate Egypt's help this month in winning UN General Assembly approval of two pro-Palestinian resolutions.

PLO spokesmen continue to emphasize, for the record, that their approval of the UN resolution inviting the Palestinians to participate in all conferences on the Middle East does not constitute a PLO agreement to take part in a future session of the Geneva peace talks. This, however, is surely a bargaining ploy. The Palestinians would undoubtedly attend if invited on an equal basis with the other participants or as part of a single joint Arab delegation.

The current lull in the fighting in Beirut has provided Arafat time to seek wider Arab and international support. He visited Libya early this week and is now in Saudi Arabia.

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Arafat also plans an early trip to Moscow, according to press reports from the Middle East. He has been considering such a visit for some time. He may have decided to go there now because of Moscow's call early this month for Palestinian participation in the Geneva conference "from the very beginning."

ANGOLA

*The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola says it has scored two new victories in central Angola against the Soviet-supported Popular Movement.*

The National Union announced on Tuesday that its forces--presumably in conjunction with those of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola--had just captured Malanje, some 270 miles east of Luanda.

Malanje was one of the Popular Movement's few remaining strongholds in central Angola. Its loss leaves a wide gap between Popular Movement forces in Luanda and in eastern Angola, where the Movement has a major strike force.

Yesterday, the National Union announced the capture of Gabela, about 150 miles southeast of Luanda.


The Zairian news agency reported yesterday, however, that the National Front - National Union force's northward advance on Luanda has been "fatally delayed" by the Popular Movement's destruction of six bridges along the route to the capital.

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
A similar tactic several weeks ago deterred a National Front advance on Luanda from the north.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

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November 21, 1975

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November 21, 1975

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Portugal: The government's suspension of activities yesterday represents an ultimatum to President Costa Gomes. (Page 2)

USSR: The Soviet Union's first true aircraft carrier, the Kiev, will soon be operational. (Page 3)


China: Peking has apparently secured Mao's endorsement for policy changes that will permit the elevation of academic training in China's universities. (Page 5)

Notes: USSR; Egypt-Israel; Spanish Sahara; Cyprus (Pages 6 and 7)

At Annex we present the conclusions of a National Intelligence Estimate on short-term prospects in Spain.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

### Israeli Reconnaissance Mission



ISRAEL-SYRIA

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
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## PORTUGAL



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[redacted] the  
Portuguese government's suspension of its activities yesterday represents an ultimatum to President Costa Gomes to fire security chief Otelo de Carvalho and Army Chief of Staff Carlos Fabiao. The government's action reportedly was endorsed by all three anti-Communist factions, and apparently their demands are not negotiable.

No resolution is likely for several days, but Costa Gomes will probably propose various compromises and in the end may bow to the government's wishes. If he refuses to go along, he too could be replaced.

Portuguese officials reportedly believe that a showdown with Costa Gomes is necessary if the government is to function. While the Communists and the far left are expected to fight back and the risk of armed hostilities is high, the government appears united and prepared to take risks to establish once and for all that its authority is based on the support of the majority of the people.

**Kiev Carrier**



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USSR

*The trappings of great-power status for the USSR will soon be enhanced with operational deployment of the first true Soviet aircraft carrier, the Kiev.*

Nine hundred feet long, with an angled flight deck of about 600 feet, the Kiev will carry a mix of some 30 to 40 helicopters and short-take-off-and-landing aircraft to provide defense and reconnaissance for cruise missile ships. Two additional Kiev-class carriers will become operational around the end of this decade; one is in the initial phases of construction, and the other was recently launched and will be operational in about two years.

The major significance of the carrier may lie less in its role as flagship of an anti-submarine task force than in its potential political utility and in what it might portend for further naval development. From a political standpoint, the decision a decade ago to build the Kiev represented a sharp break with naval thinking during the Khrushchev era, which contended that it was costly and unwise to follow the Western lead in developing forces with a potential for distant, limited military action.

Under Brezhnev's leadership, the navy has evidently decided that Soviet possession of carrier aircraft is militarily advantageous and politically useful. Soviet navy men have periodically pointed to the political utility of US attack carriers, which can project US power in remote areas. The main striking power of the Soviet navy, however, will continue to be provided by submarine-launched missiles, land-based aircraft, and surface ships.

The Kiev-class will be no military match for US attack carriers, but this point could be lost on all but the most sophisticated third-world audiences. The very appearance of new Soviet aircraft carriers will be interpreted in many parts of the world as a demonstration of Moscow's determination to support its clients.

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There probably will be instances when the Soviets can employ their carriers to affect regional developments--in the Indian Ocean, for instance. In the Mediterranean, where the new carrier is most likely to operate initially, it could give the impression of reducing one area of clear-cut US superiority--sea-launched air operations--although sophisticated observers might note the obvious inferiority of the latest Soviet warship in that role.

From a developmental standpoint, the Kiev-class carrier may be part of a trend, initiated with the appearance of the Moskva-class helicopter carrier several years ago, toward a greater role for aircraft at sea in the Soviet navy. Although the Soviets have disavowed any intention of developing carriers similar to those in the West, it is conceivable that they will be swayed by the multi-purpose advantages that attack carriers offer.

In any case, Soviet leaders seem at present unwilling to concede to the US a continued monopoly of any highly visible symbols of military and political power.

CHINA


*Peking has apparently secured Mao's endorsement for policy changes that will permit the elevation of academic training in China's universities.*

The renewed concern for academic quality, in line with China's drive to modernize the economy by the end of the century, would reverse the educational policies adopted during the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s. Those policies emphasized politics rather than scholastic achievement and rendered China's universities virtually ineffective as institutes of higher learning.

According to a document circulating within China, Mao has called for more study of basic scientific theory and has warned students to learn from their teachers rather than waste time stating their opinions. The Chairman's turnabout on the educational issue is the latest and most startling confirmation that he has now abandoned some of his visionary ideas of the late 1950s and 1960s and that the party left wing is currently in eclipse.

Possibly emboldened by Mao's show of support for the new educational policies, the minister of education made a speech in September in which he strongly criticized the educational policies of the Cultural Revolution. The minister claimed that the goal of education is not to send students to the rural areas to work as common laborers but to equip them with fundamental knowledge that they can apply to their field of work.

As a result of the minister's speech, Peking and Tsinghua universities, two of China's best, announced that current curricula will be revamped, that science and research will be emphasized, and that entering students will be required to take examinations.



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[redacted] the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement area [redacted] no major changes in either the Egyptian or the Israeli forces.

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[redacted] The Israelis continue to withdraw units from the canal area. Hawk surface-to-air missiles and launchers have been removed from the site southeast of Ras Sidr.

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*Algeria's denunciation of the Spanish-Moroccan-Mauritanian agreement on Spanish Sahara paves the way for UN debate on the future of the territory.*

In a formal note attached to UN Secretary General Waldheim's latest report on the Spanish Sahara problem, Algeria declared the agreement null and void. Algeria is unlikely to initiate direct military intervention but will continue to provide arms, training, and possibly some "volunteers" to the pro-independence Polisario Front. The Front is in fact quietly acquiring a foothold in the Sahara. A French official recently told Ambassador Handyside in Nouakchott that elements of the Front have established themselves along the Mauritanian-Saharan border now that Spain has withdrawn from two thirds of the territory.

\* \* \*

*The UN General Assembly last night voted overwhelmingly for a resolution supporting the Greek Cypriot case against Turkey. This will make the Greek Cypriots more amenable to resuming intercommunal talks with the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks, smarting from this rebuff at the UN, will probably hesitate to resume negotiations.*

The vote dramatizes Turkey's increasing isolation, even from the Muslim states on whose support it had counted. Although this may increase the Turks' flexibility in the long run, for the time being they are likely to assume a tough line. At the same time, the Turks are mindful that the question of military aid will again come before the US Congress next month. This could prompt a unilateral gesture, such as the withdrawal of more Turkish troops from Cyprus.

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SPAIN

*We present the conclusions of a National Intelligence Estimate, Spain: Short-Term Prospects, that was approved yesterday by the US Intelligence Board.*

The transfer of powers from Franco to Prince Juan Carlos has so far proceeded without surprises, but has also done little to resolve the serious problems the government will inevitably face. The difficulties of reconciling a political system born in the Civil War and dominated for decades by Franco with a socio-economic system that has changed rapidly since the early 1960s will remain acute.

The critical question is whether a controlled liberalization can gain broader support for the regime without triggering reactions from the Franco right--which may still be able to obstruct political change--and without being exploited by Spain's clandestine Communist Party and separatist groups.

The significant leaders and groups--inside and outside the governing establishment--look to the future with varying combinations of hope and apprehension; all share the uncertainties. Despite many inherent unknowns, prospects for the succession and short-term maintenance of the regime are favorable.

--No combination of opposition elements appears able effectively to challenge the state in the short run at least.

--Terrorism will harden attitudes and make liberalization difficult, but it will not threaten the government's control.

--A large proportion of the people are not politically involved. They are reasonably satisfied with the regime, have prospered under it and do not support any rapid, radical transformation of the system.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

There will almost certainly be some opening up of the system to accommodate democratic opposition groups heretofore excluded. This will probably stop short of legalizing the Communist Party.

--Most opposition groups are, for some months to come, likely to prefer cautious tactics rather than risk the kind of showdown that would strengthen hard-line rightists and undermine liberalization.

--Opposition forces will nonetheless step up their activities and will be pushing for a speedier opening up of the system than the regime will want to permit.

--The Communist Party is the best organized force on the left; it dominates the clandestine workers' commissions and thus has considerable influence in labor.

--If the Communist Party remains excluded from the political process, it can be expected to resort to more militant tactics; it would have some support from the non-Communist left, notably the Socialists.

--Pressures for regional autonomy in the Basque provinces and Catalonia are likely to rise.

Thus, there is likely to be considerable political turbulence and Juan Carlos will play a pivotal role, certainly in the near term. There is little positive enthusiasm for him or the monarchy, but there is a widespread disposition to support him for lack of a more viable alternative.

At the moment, Juan Carlos must be considered an untested figure, and confident predictions cannot be made about precisely how he will come out on specific issues. If he succeeds in preserving law and order while gradually opening up the political process, he will gain more positive acceptance. But the task will be formidable and we are far from certain that he has the qualities to meet it.

(continued)

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

The unity and loyalty of the armed services will be a decisive factor in the orderly transition and subsequent government strains. We estimate that the government can count on effective military backing for the short term. Some of the political and social tensions of Spain as a whole are incipient in some quarters of the officer corps, and while that body remains generally conservative, a polarization of Spanish politics would have some unsettling effect--particularly at junior and middle levels.

At least for the next six months or so, however, we estimate that the military is not likely to intervene in political situations unless one or all of three contingencies occur: a breakdown of law and order that the civil authorities appear unable or unwilling to control; a radical shift to the left in Spanish politics signaled, for example, by legalizing the Communist Party; and/or the emergence of a significant group of young officers calling for faster political change. None of these contingencies appears probable in the short term.

If the right proves able to frustrate significant liberalization, this is likely over time to lead the forces of the left and center into more aggressive opposition. If major disorder ensues, the military would have to intervene. Although the military would probably be able to restore order in the short term, its new role would widen fissures within the military itself and perhaps even lead to precipitate action by politicized junior- and middle-level officers. In such circumstances, the situation could deteriorate rapidly.

The new government will value good relations with the US, although differences over specific economic and political issues will persist. One sore spot could be a tendency to portray the new base agreement as the result of Washington's having taken advantage of Madrid at a particularly vulnerable moment; the Spanish may press to reopen the negotiations.

Madrid's European ties will improve from the recent low point reached after the execution of the terrorists, but the question of accepting Spain into Europe will continue to be a contentious one.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

Some improvement in European attitudes will result simply from Franco's leaving the scene, but more tangible progress toward incorporation into NATO and the EC will be impeded for some time by insistence on more liberalization than the Spanish regime will believe possible without risking loss of effective control over radical groups. Spanish relations with Portugal will continue to be wary on both sides.

The foregoing estimates take account of Spain's current economic slowdown, and the fact that the dramatic economic progress of the past is not likely to be repeated. In time, this could produce political dissatisfaction, but it is not likely to be a critical factor in the next six months or so.

Certain contingencies that are difficult to predict could throw considerably more uncertainty on the prospects for Spain. [redacted]


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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

November 22, 1975

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1), (2), (3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

November 22, 1975

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PORUGAL

*The all-military Revolutionary Council has laid the groundwork for a compromise solution to the government impasse.*

At a meeting called to discuss the government's refusal to carry out its activities, the council:

--Criticized the government's action and instructed Prime Minister Azevedo to ensure the normal functioning of the government until a solution is found.

--Called for immediate talks with the political parties to find a common platform which could involve "remodeling" the government.

--Named Vasco Lourenco, a leader of the anti-Communist Melo Antunes group, to replace extreme leftist Otelo de Carvalho as commander of the Lisbon Military Region.

--Dissolved the special "military intervention force" which was set up to enforce the authority of the government.

The replacement of Carvalho--which President Costa Gomes apparently has postponed at least until Monday--would clearly be a victory for the anti-Communist ruling group. If Lourenco remains as commander of the Lisbon region, the country's four military regions will be headed by officers loyal to the government.


The council's other decisions seemed to indicate that the Antunes group--which has a majority on the council--has backed away from strong support of the cabinet. The cabinet is composed of Socialists, center-left Popular Democrats, anti-Communist military officers, and one Communist.

The council's criticism of the government's suspension of its activities is puzzling, since the Antunes group--with the Socialists--reportedly instigated the move.


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PLO-SYRIA-EGYPT


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
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
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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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LEBANON

*Three days of fighting in the Beirut suburbs threatens to draw the large Christian and Muslim militias into sustained clashes. Renewed clashes of undetermined severity are also occurring in the Tripoli-Zagharta area of northern Lebanon.*

The government's 300-man "shock force" created early in the week has begun patrolling Beirut. The force will be of little use in halting shooting in the suburbs, however, since it was designed primarily to apprehend snipers and stop firefights in the city center.

Leaders of the Christian militias doubt that the political negotiations will result in any compromises on important issues. Interior Minister Shamun's National Liberal Party has nearly despaired of making progress in private talks with the Palestinians.

Officials of Pierre Jumayyil's Phalanges Party are also increasingly pessimistic. They do not believe Lebanese leftists will negotiate seriously and are resolved not to give in to Muslim demands. The Phalangist militia--like the several Muslim and leftist groups--continues to rearm in preparation for possible new fighting.

Leftist politicians are apprehensive at Karami's recent moves to by-pass the national dialogue committee--where the left is dominant--in favor of negotiating reforms personally with President Franjiyah. Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt, although continuing to support Karami as prime minister, held a press conference late this week at which he repeated his preference for working through the committee and reiterated his call for electoral reform.

French mediator Couve de Murville arrived in Beirut on Wednesday. He is engaged in a round of consultations with all major Lebanese and Palestinian political and religious leaders.

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SPAIN

*Juan Carlos was sworn in and proclaimed King of Spain early today. He becomes Spain's first ruling monarch since his grandfather, Alfonso XIII, fled the country in 1931.*

*Franco's funeral will be held on Sunday. Another religious ceremony and palace reception in honor of the new King and Queen are planned for November 26.*

Personally designated and groomed by Franco, the 37-year-old Juan Carlos in public maintained a studiously correct deference toward the general and Francoism. Juan Carlos was careful to give Franco, who until the very end could always have named someone else as successor, no excuse for displeasure.

Privately, however, Juan Carlos has over the past few years confided to leading Spanish reformers and visiting dignitaries from Western Europe and the US that he would like one day to liberalize Spanish institutions. He has made clear that he intends to be an active chief of state and to resist firmly any attempts to turn him into a figurehead.

Constitutional Power

The constitution suggests that the prime minister will be the most powerful man in the new government. Much, of course, will depend on the personalities involved. There is enough leeway in the law to allow a strong chief of state to exercise significant power.

Under the constitution, the chief of state:

- Commands the armed forces, although the King's command will probably be only symbolic.
- Presides over the cabinet.
- Approves and promulgates laws and provides for their execution.

(continued)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

--Acts as final arbitrator in disputes between high government bodies like the cabinet, the legislature, and the judiciary.

--Dismisses prime ministers with the approval of the 17-man advisory Council of the Realm.

--Chooses a prime minister from a slate of three selected by the Council of the Realm.

These powers are, however, restricted by a requirement that all official acts of the chief of state be approved by one of four persons: the prime minister, the president of the Parliament, the president of the Council of the Realm, or the minister whose office is involved in the decision.

#### Personal Goals


Juan Carlos has said he recognizes that Spain needs a more representative government, and he knows it is urgent for him to demonstrate his own support for a more liberal system. He believes that if the monarchy is to work in post-Franco Spain, he must show it is an effective agent of social change and political stability.

Juan Carlos has pointed out, however, that this cannot be done overnight and that he must take into account what would be acceptable to the military, which will be his main support. He has cultivated his relations with the military.

There is little enthusiasm in Spain for Juan Carlos or the monarchy, but there is a widespread disposition to support him for lack of an alternative. If he succeeds in preserving order while gradually opening up the political process, he will gain more acceptance. The task will be difficult and we are far from certain that he has the ability to deal with it.

Leaders of the leftist opposition have intimated that they are disposed to give the new King a period of grace. Any such grace period is likely to be short, and if change does not come quickly, the left is likely to turn against him.

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A Good Reputation

Though quiet-mannered and rather diffident in public, in private he has what Spaniards call "the Bourbon charm"--informal, friendly, and bluff. He is articulate, inquisitive, and well-informed.

Juan Carlos is physically vigorous and an accomplished athlete. A competent linguist, he speaks English, Portuguese, French, and Italian, in addition to his native Spanish.

He has been married since 1962 to Princess Sophia of Greece, the elder daughter of the late King Paul and Queen Frederika and the sister of deposed King Constantine II.

Since his marriage, Juan Carlos seems to have gained confidence in himself. Sophia has provided emotional support and seems [redacted] to be a positive influence. [redacted]

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
Juan Carlos and Sophia have a son and two daughters. The son will be next in line for the crown.

ANGOLA

*Forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola reportedly have advanced to within 65 miles of Luso, a key town astride the Benguela railroad that was captured by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in September.*

The attacking force, supported by armored cars, moved out toward Luso several days ago from Henrique de Carvalho, the easternmost stronghold of the Popular Movement. The offensive presumably is intended to ease pressure on the Movement's forces in central Angola where the National Front has recently scored important gains.

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


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Nigerian leaders [redacted] feel they can no longer ignore the support South Africa is giving the National Union. They also regard the Front as little more than a puppet of Zairian President Mobutu, who they believe wants to annex Cabinda. Lagos' distrust of Mobutu derives partly from Zairian-Nigerian competition for leadership of [redacted] Africa.

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NOTES

Israel is likely to interpret the fedayeen attack on an Israeli settlement Thursday in the southern Golan Heights as part of Syria's effort to increase tension as the expiration date of the UN forces' mandate approaches.

The terrorists, who said they were from a Syrian-based unit of Yasir Arafat's Fatah, got back to Syria after killing three Israelis and wounding another. Israeli retaliation is more likely to be in Lebanon than in Syria. The Israelis will tighten security measures on the Golan, however, and initiate more aggressive patrolling of the disengagement line. Such activities could increase the risk of clashes with Syrian troops along the UN buffer zone.

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*Criticism of the US by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and other top officials, which had quieted for some time, resumed in mid-November.*

In remarks directed primarily at the US, Gandhi spoke out several times last week against "some countries" which, she said, have complained about setbacks to democracy in India while working in other countries to overthrow democratic governments and support authoritarianism. Foreign Minister Chavan has warned of dangers posed by "imperialists and their agents." A leftist newspaper that supports Gandhi's Congress Party last week accused the US ambassador in Dacca of playing a "significant role" in the coups there.

The US embassy in New Delhi states that some of the reasons for the renewed criticism could be suspicion that the US was involved in recent events in Bangladesh--or the need to claim foreign involvement to justify India's possible intervention sometime in the future; unhappiness over American criticism of Gandhi's domestic policy; and the need of some kind of jolt to reinvigorate domestic support for the state of emergency.

\* \* \*

*Zairian President Mobutu reportedly foresees a resumption in diplomatic relations with Israel sometime after the first of the year.*

Mobutu broke relations with Israel in October 1973, just two days before the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war. Since then he has become disillusioned with the failure of the Arab states to offer Zaire and other African countries any significant financial assistance, particularly concessions in oil prices, in return for African support. The Central African Republic reportedly also plans to renew diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv sometime in the coming months.

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

*November 24, 1975*

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November 24, 1975

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Angola: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola accelerated its operations north of Luanda over the weekend. (Page 2)

Note: Lebanon (Page 3)

*At Annex we present the key judgments of a National Intelligence Estimate, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

PORUGAL

Major Melo Antunes, the leader of the anti-Communist ruling faction, has warned that the country will be plunged into civil war if Prime Minister Azevedo's government falls. Antunes, interviewed by a French newsweekly magazine, said the Communist Party is preparing to seize power and that the result of the ensuing struggle will be a return to fascism.

The Communists, Antunes said, are engaged in a campaign to subvert the armed forces and paralyze the state, but will wait until the country becomes ungovernable to make their move. Government paralysis, he said, has reached an advanced stage.


Socialist party leader Mario Soares seconded Antunes' attack on the Communists at a party rally yesterday in Lisbon. He called on the Communists to leave the government and said that the non-Communist ministers had no intention of resigning. Soares said that the Socialists would take up arms if necessary in order to defend democratic freedoms.

Like Antunes, Soares blamed the present government impasse on Communist subversion of the military, but the Socialist leader severely criticized President Costa Gomes for allowing his actions to be too easily influenced by pro-Communist demonstrations.



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So far the government's ultimatum to Costa Gomes to restore authority in the military has been a failure. When the government's demands were put before the Revolutionary Council last week, the council not only criticized the government, but revived a scheme to establish direct ties between the military and the people which is anathema to the democratic parties.



ANGOLA

*The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola accelerated its operations north of Luanda over the weekend and is exerting heavy pressure on the forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the Zairian army.*

The combined Front-Zairian force [redacted] is showing signs of demoralization and disarray. Following heavy rocket attacks, the Front has abandoned its positions near Quifangando and retreated in disorder towards Caxito.

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[redacted] the Front may have even abandoned Caxito and may now be trying to establish a new defensive line along the Lifune River. Movement forces apparently remain in the vicinity of Quifangando but may soon try to push north if the Front's disarray continues.

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
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Somalia's call for an emergency meeting of the Organization of African Unity to discuss the situation in Angola is gaining momentum. Supporting Somalia's proposal are the ten African states that recognize the Popular Movement's "government" in Luanda and other states that are sympathetic toward the Movement but still adhere to the OAU's request to remain neutral.

African backers of the Popular Movement under Agostinho Neto clearly hope to use the meeting to gain official OAU endorsement of the Neto regime as the legitimate government of Angola. The consent of 30 of the OAU's 46 members is required to convene an emergency conference; Somalia has so far obtained the approval of 21 nations for its proposal.

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


NOTE

*Lebanon's political leaders are demoralized following the collapse of the three-week-old cease-fire. They acknowledge that they have run out of ideas for negotiating peace.*

Prime Minister Karami said on Friday that "Lebanon is on the verge of collapse." The statement apparently was an attempt to shock the country's warring factions into stopping the fighting. President Franjiyah had scheduled a major address for Lebanon's national day on Saturday, but canceled it at the last minute.

The talks between Karami and Franjiyah that are supposed to result in specific proposals for political and economic reforms have not yet begun. The national dialogue committee apparently will meet today despite the increase in fighting. The session will be important as an indicator of whether the country's principal political groups remain interested in negotiating a settlement.



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USSR

*We present the key judgments of National Intelligence Estimate 11-3/8-75, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s, which was approved last week by the US Intelligence Board.*

In this estimate, we call particular attention to current and prospective developments which could markedly increase Soviet strategic capabilities during the next ten years:

--The Soviets are steadily deploying new types of ICBMs. In about 1980 they will have a force of up to 900 missiles of these types, most of them with MIRVs. They are also moving ahead with the development of several ICBMs beyond those now being deployed.

--The capability of the Soviet ICBM force to destroy US Minuteman silos is growing. It will probably pose a major threat in the early 1980s. A more rapid increase in this threat is possible but unlikely.

--The Soviets have the potential to make the task of penetration by bombers to targets in the USSR considerably more difficult by 1985 than it is today.

--The Soviets are pursuing extensive research and development in such areas as submarine detection and defensive lasers.

Large Uncertainties

We also call attention to the large uncertainties about some aspects of Soviet strategic policy and forces, especially about the quality of key weapons and supporting systems in the future. Forecasts of the strategic environment over the next ten years must therefore be made with varying degrees of uncertainty:

--*It is almost certain that, despite prospective improvements in Soviet forces, the USSR will not acquire deployed forces capable of launching a nuclear attack so effective that the US could not cause devastating damage to the USSR in retaliation.*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

--It is probable that US and Soviet strategic capabilities will remain in roughly equal balance,\* although the long-standing US qualitative superiority in strategic weapons and supporting technology will come under increasing challenge.

--It is possible but unlikely that the Soviets will acquire capabilities that would be perceived as providing them with more strategic power to back up their policies than that available to the US.

#### Offensive Force Developments

In strategic offensive forces, the Soviets continue their broad program of major improvements. The trends are about as we had forecast in last year's estimate, but the diversity of the ballistic missile submarine program and the potential hard-target capabilities of ICBM systems are somewhat greater than we had expected. The main things we have learned during this past year are:

--The new ICBMs are being deployed at a moderate pace. About 100 of the new ICBMs, most of them with MIRVs, are now operational in new and converted hard silos. In accordance with the Interim Agreement, the Soviets have started to deactivate older, soft ICBM launchers in exchange for new SLBM launchers.

--Despite some continuing developmental problems, the new ICBMs are estimated to have better accuracies and higher yields than we had expected, implying somewhat better capabilities to destroy hard targets like Minuteman silos.

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\*The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes there is little reasonable doubt that the Soviets are striving for general strategic superiority over the US by the end of the next decade. If the current massive Soviet R&D programs achieve the breakthroughs being sought, an important shift in the USSR's favor in the strategic balance could occur by 1985.

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--Development of a land-mobile ICBM could now be complete, but there is as yet no sign of its deployment.

--Two and possibly three models of ballistic missile submarines capable of carrying long-range SLBMs are believed to be in production. A new and large type of ballistic missile submarine may have started construction. A new small SLBM and a new or modified large SLBM have begun flight testing; a MIRV payload has very recently been identified on the latter.

--The Soviets continue to maintain only a few ballistic missile submarines on patrol stations. Limited probes near North American coasts were conducted this year, possibly portending changes in patrol patterns. There is also an increasing number of SSBNs with missiles of sufficient range to reach targets in the US at any given time, even without leaving port.

--The Backfire bomber has been deployed in small numbers this year, both in Naval Aviation and in Long Range Aviation at bases occupied by intermediate-range bombers. The Backfire has extensive capability for use in various missions in Eurasia and for naval missions over the open seas. We continue to believe it has capabilities for operation against the continental US. There are differing views within the Intelligence Community about Soviet intentions to use it for this purpose.

--We have obtained no confirmation of Soviet hints that a new heavy bomber is being developed.

--There is no evidence that the Soviets are developing long-range cruise missiles, but they have the design and development experience to be able to do so.

#### Defensive Force Developments

The Soviets continue to devote more resources to strategic defense than they do to forces for intercontinental attack. In addition to routine improvements in what is by far the largest air defense system in the world, the following are the main developments in Soviet strategic defenses we have noted during the past year:

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--The Soviets continue to construct ballistic missile detection and tracking systems to close small gaps in existing coverage, to increase their assurance of reliable warning, and perhaps to provide some additional warning time.

--They are placing additional emphasis on surveillance systems and training for defense against aircraft at low altitudes, though there are no indications of major improvements in performance.

--We have obtained additional evidence supporting earlier indications that nuclear warheads are available for a significant number of Soviet surface-to-air missiles.

--The Soviets continue their research and development on ABM systems (at a pace not significantly reduced from that which existed prior to the ABM Treaty), on radars, on SAMs designed for low-altitude air defense, and on directed-energy systems which probably include lasers with capabilities against low-orbiting satellites.

--They have continued their extensive investigation of techniques for overcoming their deficiencies in detecting and tracking SSBNs at sea. Soviet attempts to trail US SSBNs near our operating bases have resulted in no known successes.

#### Soviet Objectives

Our judgments about the strategic objectives of the Soviet leaders are based on what they say (in public and sometimes in private), on what we observe of their programs, and on our appreciation of the internal and external forces operating on them in the present period of risky opportunities. It is apparent that they see no contradiction between their policies of detente and arms-limitation negotiations and their continuing buildup of strategic forces.

Much that we observe in their present posture and programs can be attributed to a combination of traditional defensive prudence, a military doctrine which stresses war-fighting capabilities, superpower competitiveness, worst-case assumptions about US capabilities, and a variety of internal political and institutional factors.

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

But the scope and vigor of these programs, at a time when the USSR has achieved a powerful deterrent as well as recognition as the strategic equal of the US, raise the elusive question of whether the Soviet leaders embrace as an objective some form of strategic nuclear superiority over the US.

Deeply held ideological and doctrinal convictions impel the Soviet leaders to pose as an ultimate goal the attainment of a dominant position over the West, particularly the US, in terms of political, economic, social, and military strength. We do not doubt that, if they thought they could achieve it, the Soviets would try to attain the capability to launch a nuclear attack so effective that the US could not cause devastating damage to the USSR in retaliation.

Although the Soviet leaders may now entertain some hope--and, in the view of some agencies, already believe--that US resolve as a strategic competitor is weakening, they know realistically that the US need not concede the USSR a superior position in the next ten years. Nevertheless, they are probably striving for a strategic posture which has some visible and therefore politically useful advantages over the US and which would give the USSR better capabilities than the US to fight a nuclear war.

#### Objectives Under SALT II Accord

The Soviets probably view SALT as having the potential for limiting the costs and risks of the strategic arms competition. Their objectives for the SALT process probably include constraining US options (especially in areas where they fear they may be less able to compete), and leaving open their own options to the extent possible.

Considering the history of Soviet strategic policy and force improvement programs, we believe that under a SALT II agreement based on the Vladivostok accord, the Soviets would probably seek in their strategic programs:

- To ensure deterrence of all forms of nuclear attack on the USSR.
- To improve war-fighting capabilities, aimed at the survival of the USSR as a national entity should deterrence fail.

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- To counterbalance, with both peripheral and intercontinental forces, the combined nuclear strengths of the US and its allies and of China.
- To narrow or close the gap between the US and the USSR in important weapon technologies and to hedge against future US force improvements.
- To acquire strategic advantages, real or perceived, should US behavior permit.

Without SALT II Accord

If a SALT II agreement is not achieved, we believe that the Soviet leaders' objectives for their strategic forces would be much the same. But they would be free of SALT II restrictions, which would have forced them in 1977 to make a small reduction in the number of their intercontinental delivery vehicles, and thereafter to have confronted the difficult choices involved in trading old weapons for new to stay within the 2,400 aggregate ceiling.

In the absence of such restrictions, we would expect the Soviets to build and retain strategic offensive forces larger than the limits proposed at Vladivostok and considerably larger than US programmed forces. Increases in force levels would be especially likely if US-Soviet relations significantly worsened. In any case, the Soviets would not expect quantitative competition to alter the strategic balance.

Implicit in the Vladivostok accord was a Soviet judgment that the USSR could not achieve significant advantages over the US by continued competition in numbers of strategic weapons. The Soviets have evidently come to recognize that the strategic environment in the 1980s will be affected most importantly by the qualitative aspects of the forces of the two sides. Their progress in this area will be largely independent of SALT II.

Dramatic near-term changes in Soviet strategic policy would not be likely under a post-Brezhnev regime. The policies now being pursued have emerged from the interplay of many factors which would remain unaltered. To the extent that Brezhnev as an individual may be a moderating influence, any changes would likely be in the direction of increases in strategic capabilities, especially if SALT II fails to produce an agreement.

(continued)

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

Other adjustments in Soviet policy for strategic forces could result from the USSR's own technological advances or from US-Soviet confrontations over the next ten years. Finally, changes could emerge in response to US force developments such as improvements in hard-target kill capabilities; deployment of small, accurate long-range cruise missiles; and concepts and options for the selective use of nuclear weapons in limited intercontinental warfare.

#### Future Capabilities

Varying degrees of uncertainty characterize our estimates of Soviet strategic policy and of the quantity and quality of Soviet forces. Forecasts for the next few years can be made with relatively high confidence by extrapolating from current evidence.

For the period of primary concern, five to ten years hence, estimates of system characteristics and force composition must be based on very limited evidence and indirect considerations. A SALT II agreement based on the Vladivostok accord would considerably reduce quantitative uncertainties about forces for intercontinental attack.


We warn, however, that uncertainties about the quality of strategic weapons and forces—which exist now and will persist in the future—are in some areas large enough to affect judgments about important aspects of the future strategic balance.

#### Future Offensive Forces

Our best estimate of Soviet offensive force development over the next ten years, assuming a SALT II agreement, is that deployment of new systems will continue at about the pace now demonstrated, that ICBM accuracy will continue to improve, and that force survivability and flexibility also will improve. Soviet ICBM forces will probably pose a major threat to US Minuteman silos in the early 1980s, assuming that the Soviets can perfect techniques for precisely timed two-RV attacks on a single target. This is somewhat earlier than forecast last year.

Moreover, by the early 1980s Soviet offensive forces will lead programmed US forces in numbers of missile RVs, though the US will retain a large lead in the total number of missile and bomber weapons combined.

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We have examined a number of other alternatives for future Soviet forces, which are all plausible but not equally consistent with past trends and current evidence. These range from (a) a force the Soviets might regard as meeting minimum requirements for strategic parity and military effectiveness against currently programmed US forces under a SALT II agreement, to (b) a force the Soviets might build if the SALT process failed, US-Soviet relations worsened, and the Soviets achieved high rates of deployment and technological advance.

The principal differences in the countersilo capabilities of these alternative forces are encompassed by the large range of uncertainty in our estimates of such key weapon characteristics as ICBM accuracy. At the more threatening but highly unlikely extreme of this range of uncertainty, Soviet ICBMs would pose a major threat to Minuteman silos by the end of the 1970s.


The Soviets could increase the threat against US bombers on alert by deploying some of their SSBNs closer to the US coastline to reduce the potential warning time of an attack. In assessing the military advantages of adopting this more threatening posture, the Soviets would have to consider planned introduction of the B-1 bomber and countermeasures available for existing bombers.

We believe the Soviets would conclude that the US could preserve the survivability of most of its alert bombers against attacks by SLBMs throughout the next ten years.

#### Future Defensive Forces

In the field of strategic defense, it is unlikely that the Soviets will significantly improve their low-altitude air defenses before 1980. The most likely improvements we foresee in their air surveillance and control, interceptors, and SAM systems would have the potential for overcoming most of the technical deficiencies in their capabilities to counter low-altitude bombers by 1985, but it might be possible for them to do so earlier with a very high level of effort. Assuming rapid and widespread deployment of such systems, low-altitude penetration of Soviet air defenses by bombers will be considerably more difficult by 1985 than it is today.

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The actual effectiveness of Soviet air defenses, however, would continue to depend heavily on the degree of degradation resulting from ballistic missile strikes and on the performance of US electronic countermeasures and bomber penetration aids and tactics. Neither we nor the Soviets would likely be able to predict these effects with confidence.

The future effectiveness of Soviet defenses against ballistic missile submarines on patrol will depend in large part on how successful the Soviets are in detecting and tracking SSBNs in broad ocean areas. From our understanding of the technologies involved and research and development programs in the US and the USSR, we conclude that the Soviets have little potential for achieving success in either of these areas in the next ten years.

Moreover, improvements in US SSBNs and expansion of their operating areas will compound the Soviet problem of finding, tracking, and attacking them. These judgments must be qualified, however, by gaps in our knowledge [redacted] of possible future Soviet developments.

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The Soviets will almost certainly continue to develop their strategy and capability for detection of SSBNs, and we expect improvements in their capabilities to detect and destroy SSBNs in confined water areas. We conclude, however, that these improvements will not overcome deficiencies in open-ocean detection and submarine tracking, and that Soviet ASW capabilities will fall short of being able to prevent most US submarines on station from launching their missiles.

#### Formidable Problems

Despite prospective improvements in their forces, the problems and uncertainties which the Soviets would face if they contemplated attacking the US would remain formidable for the next ten years:

--The Soviets would be uncertain about the outcome of an attack on US Minuteman silos and would probably expect a considerable number to survive.

--They would almost certainly consider their ASW forces to be unable to locate and simultaneously destroy more than a few US ballistic missile submarines at sea.

(continued)

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--Under the ABM Treaty their ABM defense would be insignificant.

--They would still not have high confidence in their ability to defend against US bombers.

--They would probably expect their civil defenses to be able to preserve a political and economic cadre and to contribute to the survivability of the Soviet Union as a national entity, but they would have to expect massive casualties, industrial destruction, and a breakdown of the economy.

Under these circumstances, with the forces and weapons we can foresee, it is extremely unlikely that during the next ten years the Soviet leaders would come to believe that either side could launch an attack which would prevent devastating retaliation. During the period, however, Soviet offensive forces will gain considerably relative to the US in such quantitative measures as missile throw weight and missile RVs, although SALT II limits would establish and preserve symmetry in total delivery vehicles and MIRVed missile launchers.

Furthermore, the long-standing US qualitative superiority in strategic weaponry and supporting technologies will come under increasing challenge. Under the most threatening but unlikely circumstance of very rapid Soviet technological advance, especially if combined with a large Soviet buildup in the absence of a SALT II agreement, the USSR could achieve capabilities that might be perceived as giving it more strategic power to back up its policies than that available to the US. Foreseeable Soviet strategic forces, however, would not eliminate the USSR's vulnerability to retaliation.

A crisis resolution, therefore, probably would not rest on the strategic weapons balance, but rather would depend on other factors, such as the comparative strengths and dispositions of US and Soviet conventional forces.

We have reexamined Soviet R&D programs and prospects for major advances in fields having strategic offensive and defensive applications that might seriously erode US deterrent capabilities. We have given particular attention to lasers for use in air and missile defense and to systems for

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

detecting and trailing US ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets are working actively in both fields, and there are gaps in our knowledge of this work.

The available evidence, together with our appreciation of the physical, engineering, and operational hurdles which must be overcome, leads us to rate as small the chances that the Soviets can sharply alter the strategic balance through technological advance in the next ten years.\*

Nevertheless, the scope and progress of Soviet R&D, particularly in strategic air defense and ASW, bear especially close watching in the years ahead.

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*\*The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that the USSR is embarked on a directed-energy weapons research program of such magnitude that it could have a major if not decisive impact on the strategic balance before 1985.*

All

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

November 25, 1975

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~~Top Secret~~ 25X1

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5R(1)(2)(3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

November 25, 1975

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Cuba-US: Havana's interest in improving relations with Washington seems to have abated. (Page 2)

Cuba-Angola: [redacted]

(Page 4)

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Thailand: Foreign Minister Chatchai, who arrives in Washington today, hopes to gain national stature as the man who liquidated the American role in Thailand. (Page 5)

Notes: Egypt-Syria; Saudi Arabia - France;  
Portugal; [redacted] (Pages 6 and 7)

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At Annex we discuss the Spanish opposition, its strength, and the role it hopes to play in post-Franco Spain.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

LEBANON

*The suspension of the national dialogue committee meeting yesterday will reduce further the chances for success in private talks going on between Lebanese Christians, Lebanese Muslims, and the Palestinians, and probably will prolong the fighting in Beirut.*

The continued fighting and the reduced ability of all government bodies to function effectively appear to have reinforced the determination of the Christian leaders to stay in office and to resist making political concessions.

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The Christians apparently have held to this hard line in their talks with French mediator Couve de Murville. Maronite spokesmen on Sunday reportedly rejected outright a tentative French suggestion that the Christians might reasonably offer the Muslims a 50-50 split in parliament.

The situation in Lebanon reportedly has created serious problems within the Palestine Liberation Organization and the large, less radical fedayeen groups.

[redacted] their groups have become preoccupied with Lebanon's domestic problems to the neglect of the struggle against Israel.

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CUBA-US

*Havana's interest in improving relations with Washington seems to have abated.*

In late 1974 and up until mid-1975, there were signs that the Castro regime--partly because of pressure from Moscow--wanted to better its relationship with the US. Since then interest has appeared to wane. A reversal of this trend in the next several months is unlikely because:

--Havana insists on its "right" to press the Puerto Rican independence issue.

--Escalation of the fighting in Angola has reaccentuated the mutually antagonistic roles of the US and Cuba.


--Pressure from Moscow for better relations between Cuba and the US appears to have lessened.

--The partial lifting of US economic sanctions in August has reduced pressures to achieve a reconciliation.


--Havana's first party congress next month is expected to include heightened anti-US rhetoric.

--The visit of Panama's General Torrijos to Cuba in January is likely to produce further anti-US rhetoric from Havana in support of Panama's canal claim.

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
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
Regime officials appear convinced that Cuba has more to lose from compromising its revolutionary reputation than from retarding progress toward improved relations with Washington.

CUBA-ANGOLA



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More Cuban troops and materiel appear moving to Africa. A Cuban merchant ship seems to be headed there, and a second ship, which reportedly had earlier taken troops to Angola, was seen by a Western diplomat loading cargo and "many young men" in Havana harbor in late October. If these sailings are confirmed, they will bring to at least seven the number of trips made by Cuban ships carrying men and arms to Angola for the Popular Movement.



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THAILAND

Foreign Minister Chatchai will arrive in Washington today to discuss the future of US airbases in Thailand, the disposition of aircraft flown to Thailand from Vietnam in the last days of the Vietnam war, and the status of US military and economic assistance. Chatchai may request US assistance in establishing an indigenous arms industry and may seek to reduce the number of military advisers by at least one third.

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According to the US embassy in Bangkok, Chatchai hopes to gain national stature as the man who liquidated the American role in Thailand. In the early days of the Khukrit government last spring, Chatchai was responsible for the policy statement calling for the withdrawal of US forces by March of 1976.

Chatchai also successfully reduced the authority of the military command in dealing with the US presence in Thailand. Chatchai and his ministry have acquired an increasingly important voice regarding the closure of US bases and related problems.

Chatchai is by no means free to determine policy, even though he has a significant impact on its formulation.

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The success of Bangkok's efforts to improve relations with China has allowed Chatchai's opponents to argue effectively that with close links to Peking there is no longer a compelling reason for extensive concessions to Hanoi.

## NOTES

Egyptian Vice President Mubarak told an interviewer in Sudan last week that Syria could not necessarily count on Egyptian support if it initiated an attack on Israel.

Mubarak's statement was the most direct suggestion by an Egyptian official that Cairo might stand aside in such circumstances. President Sadat and other Egyptians have always skirted the issue by affirming their belief that Syria would not attack in any case. Mubarak said Egypt supports Syria but that coordination would be necessary before any warfare is begun. The statements were picked up by all major Egyptian papers.

Egypt's critics will regard Mubarak's remarks as proof of their charge that Cairo has turned its back on other Arabs since the second Sinai agreement.

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Saudi Arabia [redacted] France [redacted]

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A military aid to Portuguese President Costa Gomes told the press early this morning that Captain Vasco Lourenco would replace leftist General Otelo de Carvalho as commander of the Lisbon military region.

President Costa Gomes, who as armed forces chief of staff had to approve the change of command, had been reluctant to move against Carvalho. The leftist forces will see the decision as a major setback; Communist-led workers yesterday held a two-hour work stoppage to show support for Carvalho. The Communist Party might seek to use worker demonstrations to force Carvalho's reinstatement and block what it will say is a major shift to the right.

Even if the anti-Communist faction can make the changes stick this time, Carvalho may stay on as commander of the internal security forces, although he would have no direct command of troops in that position.

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## SPAIN

*The tranquility of the transition period in Spain will depend in large measure on the reaction of the political opposition to what it perceives to be the attitude of King Juan Carlos toward political liberalization.*

*The initial reaction of the opposition to the King's accession speech last Saturday was mixed. Christian Democratic leader Ruiz Gimenez said he thought it was the most the King could say to the Cortes, which is dominated by right-wingers who would have been affronted by a liberalizing gesture on the eve of Franco's burial.*

*Other opposition leaders expressed disappointment that the King did not announce specific steps toward opening the political process. The leader of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, and some of his colleagues in the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta coalition found the speech totally unacceptable.*

*An analysis of the opposition, its strength, and the role it hopes to play in post-Franco Spain follows.*

The Spanish opposition, weakened by nearly four decades of proscription, is composed for the most part of poorly organized remnants of former political parties and regional groups. Many of them have both exile and domestic organizations. Personalities are often as important as ideology in determining political loyalties.

The Communists tried to develop a coalition of opposition factions in the summer of 1974, when they announced the formation of the Democratic Junta. Most elements of Spain's two major non-Communist political groupings--the Socialists and the Christian Democrats--refused to join, and have formed their own coalition.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

The Communist Party

The Communist Party is the strongest and best organized force in the Spanish opposition. It has an estimated 5,000 active members in Spain and at least twice that many abroad, mostly in France. Outlawed since the end of the Civil War, the party has been harshly repressed by the Spanish government--in contrast to the official toleration given many other opposition parties--and its leaders rarely venture into Spain. Santiago Carrillo Solares, now 60 years old, has been secretary general since 1960.

The principal source of Communist strength lies in its dominance over most of the Workers Commissions--illegal labor groups that appeared in the 1960s. Communist organization, discipline, and financial backing have helped make the commissions the most effective protest mechanism available to the Spanish worker. They will provide an important means of exerting pressure on Franco's successors, particularly if Juan Carlos does not establish other avenues to express worker grievances to management.

The Communist Party also has at its disposal a well-oiled propaganda machine in *Radio Espana Independiente*, which broadcasts from Romania. The party has support in the universities and is said to have good connections in the media.

Communist efforts to infiltrate the military have apparently met with little success. The military forces have been a prime target for many years, but there is no evidence of significant penetration. The basic Communist aim is to assure the neutrality of the military during the post-Franco evolution of Spain's political system.

The Communists have not been spared internal dissension. A serious rift reportedly exists between the Madrid Central Committee and the exiled senior leadership in Paris over present party tactics.

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The party is said to be losing "considerable numbers" of young workers and university students to more extremist groups.

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

On international issues, Spanish Communist attitudes and positions are close to those of the Italian Communist Party. Carrillo's relations with Moscow have been strained ever since he denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Like the Italians, Carrillo makes a point of stressing his party's independence from Moscow and has criticized Portuguese Communists for their hard-line, revolutionary tactics.

Carrillo professes to favor a more gradual approach in bringing about change. He recently claimed, for example, that he cannot object to the US military bases in Spain as long as the Soviets keep troops in Czechoslovakia.

#### Rival Coalition

The Platform of Democratic Convergence was formed last summer as a counter to the Communist-controlled Junta. Dominated by Socialists and Christian Democrats, the Platform is composed of some 15 opposition parties, organizations, and trade unions.

Their program calls for the eventual drafting of a new democratic constitution setting up a federal state that would grant autonomy to the component regions. Most of the groups in the Platform would accept a gradual evolution toward Western style democracy, although there is considerable squabbling over how gradual the evolution can be.

The dominant force in the Platform coalition is the Spanish Socialist Workers Party--the major Socialist faction in Spain. The Party and its affiliated illegal trade union, the General Union of Workers, will provide the principal competition to the Communist Party during the transition period. Although clearly smaller and less well organized than the Communists, the Socialists are believed to enjoy widespread popular support.

Four Christian Democratic factions have joined the Platform, and a fifth is expected to join soon. Two Christian Democratic leaders claim that the various factions are collaborating closely. Effective unification, however, appears unlikely.

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Cooperation Between Coalitions

Cooperation between the Democratic Junta and the Platform of Democratic Convergence has been limited. The two coalitions have issued two joint communiqués--the first in September condemning the decree law on terrorism and the government's death sentences, and the second in October setting out "objectives" for the transition period.

Agreement was reached after two weeks of arduous negotiations and then only because the Communists made major concessions. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
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Major differences separate the two coalitions:

--The Communists and other leaders of the Junta reportedly hope to fuse the two coalitions into one "popular front." Platform leaders are not prepared to go further than establishing a committee of coordination.

--The Junta believes the structure of the government should be completely reorganized. Platform leaders feel that modification of the existing structure would be sufficient.

--There are differences over how to handle demands for autonomy in the Basque provinces and Catalonia.

--Long-standing personal rivalries inhibit joint activity.

There is general agreement, however, on the two most immediate issues that Juan Carlos will have to confront--amnesty for political prisoners and the legalization of political parties. There is deep disagreement within the government as to whether such actions should be taken and whether they should include the Communists.

At this point, Juan Carlos seems likely to exclude the Communists from the benefits of a freer political system. Some members of the opposition

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

believe that this isolation would only benefit the Communists, who could be challenged more effectively if they were compelled to compete openly. It would also hurt Juan Carlos' chances of keeping order because the Communists are almost certain to respond by playing a more active spoilers' role.


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Antonio Giron--a powerful politician of the old Falangist school--and other figures of the far right have publicly condemned political parties. Giron and his followers played a major role during the past year in scuttling Prime Minister Arias' moves toward limited pluralism, and they believe there can be no compromise on the principles of the regime.

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*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

November 26, 1975

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

LATE ITEM

The Indian government is reacting very strongly to the attempt this morning to assassinate its high commissioner in Bangladesh (Page 7). The possibility of an Indian military move into Bangladesh is high,

[redacted] 25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

November 26, 1975

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Portugal: Anti-Communists in the military appear to be in a stronger position following the rebellion yesterday by leftist paratroopers. (Page 1)

Lebanon: Prime Minister Karami has intensified his attacks on Christian leaders, claiming that their hostile attitude is preventing him from doing anything to restore order. (Page 2)

Syria-Israel: Damascus is taking a tough stand on the political concessions it requires in return for agreeing to another extension of the UN forces on the Golan Heights. (Page 3)

USSR:

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Angola: [redacted] the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola captured both Caxito and Barra do Dande from the National Front last weekend. (Page 5)

Spain: King Juan Carlos' initial efforts have been primarily aimed at wooing the military, apparently in the hope that firm support in the armed forces will help free his hand in the political sector. (Page 6)

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Notes: India-Bangladesh; Syria-Israel; USSR; North Vietnam - Thailand; China (Pages 7, 8, and 9)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PORUGAL

*Anti-Communists in the military appear to be in a stronger position following the rebellion yesterday by leftist paratroopers.*

At last report, the government had regained control of the three air bases and the Lisbon region air force headquarters that were occupied by the rebels yesterday. The mutinous paratroopers, however, have regained control over their home base at Tancos, some 77 miles north of the capital, after temporarily losing it to loyalist forces.

Backed by several members of the Revolutionary Council--including a subdued Otelo de Carvalho--President Costa Gomes last night told the nation he had imposed a state of seige in the Lisbon military region, ordered a midnight-to-six curfew, and banned publication of all newspapers in the region today.

Despite broadcast pleas for leftists and workers to come into the streets to support the paratroopers, the only significant civilian participation was by anti-Communists in a town north of Lisbon who assisted in recapturing the local base from the rebels. The Communist Party [redacted] took no action.

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The Communists' failure to join in the rebellion has prompted Labor Minister Tomas Rosa to speculate that the party may have encouraged the effort in the hope it might spark a coup from the right. The Communists presumably reasoned that the rightists would meet swift resistance and the Communists would be able to reclaim some popular support. Whatever the Communist role yesterday, the party must regard the outcome as a reversal. The party, however, still has most of its political assets.

Anti-Communists in the military, as well as the non-Communist political parties, are in a strong position to exploit the incident, just as the left exploited the abortive rightist coup last March 11. The campaign to purge radical leftist officers from the military could be given a strong boost.

Whether the anti-Communists are prepared to follow through, however, is another question. President Costa Gomes appears to have read the trend yesterday in time to side with the stronger force, but he prefers a balance of forces and may try to rein in any group that seeks to capitalize on the situation.

LEBANON

*Prime Minister Karami in the past two days has intensified his attacks on President Franjiyah and Interior Minister Shamun, the two key Christians in Lebanon's government. Karami, a Muslim, has said he can do nothing to restore civil order in the face of their "hostile attitude."*

In a speech to parliament yesterday, the Prime Minister condemned Christian leaders in general for their refusal to allow political reform and the references some of them have made to the possible partition of Lebanon. Karami acknowledged that his government's failure to restrict the flow of arms to all combatants had contributed to the resumption of heavy fighting, but defended his continued refusal to call in the Lebanese army.

[REDACTED]  
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Shamun acknowledged publicly yesterday that his militia is involved in the current fighting. He told parliament that the private Christian militias have taken matters into their own hands because government security forces are inadequate to restore order or to prevent "destructive elements" from overthrowing the government.

The unrestrained activity of Shamun's group apparently has embarrassed even the right-wing Phalangists. Party leader Jumayyil has tried to calm Muslim tempers by playing up the importance of the national dialogue committee, and his party has issued a statement urging an end to "ideological quarrels."

The fighting between the Christian militias and the Muslim leftists remains heavy and widespread, although it has not yet reached the level of late October.

Syria may soon revive its efforts to mediate the Lebanese dispute as a result of the increased fighting and because of reports from Beirut that Egypt may attempt to negotiate a settlement.

SYRIA-ISRAEL

Damascus is taking a tough stand on the political concessions it requires in return for agreeing to another extension of the UN forces on the Golan Heights. How far the Syrians believe they can go in using the mandate as a bargaining lever is not clear. Indeed, we believe the Syrians themselves may not make a final decision on the matter until perhaps as late as next Sunday, when the mandate expires.


Asad has told Secretary General Waldheim that Syria wants the UN Security Council to become the main forum for future peace negotiations and the PLO to be invited to participate in its deliberations.

Asad, however, may simply accept minor changes in the wording of the renewal resolution to justify an extension of the mandate because he believes allowing the mandate to lapse would be too great a risk. Even if Asad has decided that non-renewal is an acceptable risk, we believe it is unlikely that he would at this time make military moves that might provoke a major conflict with Israel.


By championing the Palestinian cause as they have recently, the Syrians appear to have concluded that they can expect little from the US during the next few months and to have decided therefore to stake out a hard-line position, partly in anticipation of a long diplomatic stalemate. They are likely to continue their efforts to embarrass and isolate Egypt as well as keep the pressure on the US and Israel. At least for the time being, these tactics would help shield Asad from attack by his domestic critics and his most persistent Arab critic, Iraq.

Israeli Prime Minister Rabin reportedly told Waldheim yesterday that Israel could not accept any Syrian condition regarding the extension of the forces' mandate. The Israelis remain interested in obtaining Syrian agreement to renew and might agree to minor changes in the wording of the renewal resolution. Rabin still does not appear prepared to take the initiative and, instead, will continue to look to the US to find a way to break the deadlock.


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
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
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
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ANGOLA

Recent military successes by forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola north of Luanda follow the arrival this month of substantial additional military assistance from the USSR and Cuba.

the Popular Movement captured both Caxito and the neighboring coastal town of Barra do Dande from the National Front last weekend.

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The loss of the two towns is a serious setback for the National Front, which has now been pushed back to a line along the Lifune River more than 40 miles from Luanda.

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We do not have late news regarding operations of the National Union column approaching Luanda from the south.

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Meanwhile, the National Front and National Union have finally announced the composition of the coalition government they proclaimed on November 11 in opposition to the Luanda-based regime headed by the Popular Movement's Agostinho Neto. According to press reports from Kinshasa, the two groups have set up a 16-man government with two co-equal prime ministers, each of whom will hold office alternately a month at a time.

The prime ministerial posts are to be filled by Johnny Eduardo Pinnock of the National Front and Jose Netole of the National Union. They had been the ranking representatives of their respective groups in the transitional government that collapsed last summer.

Neither Holden Roberto nor National Union leader Jonas Savimbi will hold an official position in the arrangement. They are both unwilling to be closely identified with the fragile coalition regime, which so far has won no international recognition.

SPAIN

*King Juan Carlos' initial efforts have been primarily aimed at wooing the military, apparently in the hope that firm support in the armed forces will help free his hand in the political sector.*

*report that the reaction of the Spanish military to the King so far has been enthusiastic.*

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The King's efforts may already be paying dividends. The three service ministers reportedly contacted a leader of the extreme right to warn against using military veterans' organizations to attain political objectives. The restrained behavior of the Falangists and veterans at Franco's burial may reflect this warning.

While giving tentative signals that some degree of political liberalization will eventually emerge in Spain, Juan Carlos is also paying attention to Franco's old supporters. The King moved to placate some far rightists, who were angered by his failure to mention Franco's National Movement in his accession speech, by giving his first official audience to the National Confederation for Veterans, which includes many ultrarightists.

The Catholic Church in Spain has offered its support to the King and for evolutionary change.

The King's standing with the opposition could be improved by the announcement last night of an amnesty that will reduce prison sentences, except for convicted terrorists. More important, all death sentences have been commuted.

The first violence since the death of Franco was the assassination of the mayor of a small Basque town on Monday, apparently by members of a Basque terrorist group. This organization may fear that recent gestures by Juan Carlos and the government to accommodate regional aspirations will diminish the appeal of terrorism. The terrorists probably hope to resume the cycle of violence and repression in order to keep alive Basque resentment against the central government.

NOTES

*The attempt on the life of the Indian high commissioner in Dacca early this morning will prompt New Delhi to intensify its pressure on Dacca and increases the chances that India will intervene militarily in Bangladesh.*

An official spokesman in New Delhi has announced that India takes a "grave view" of the incident. The Indians have complained for several days that the government in Dacca has refused to take action to stop a growing anti-Indian campaign in Bangladesh. The spokesman linked the shooting of the high commissioner directly to Dacca's refusal to put a stop to the campaign.

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*We now expect the Soviet hard currency trade deficit in 1975 to be close to \$5 billion.*

A weak gold market this fall has forced Moscow to borrow heavily in Western money markets, and the Soviets are already lining up credits for 1976. If Soviet exports continue to be sluggish, Moscow may be forced to trim imports at some point next year. The USSR will finance its 1975 deficit through a combination of Western credits, gold sales, revenues from shipping and tourism, and probably a reduction in foreign exchange holdings. Arms sales should provide substantial earnings this year--perhaps \$300 to \$500 million in hard currency.

Soviet efforts to raise loans in Europe and in the US, which have shown a marked upswing since mid-year, are probably aimed at meeting next year's anticipated obligations. Grain imports, judging from purchases already concluded or anticipated, will amount to between \$3 and \$4 billion in 1976.

\* \* \*

*North Vietnam has intensified its demands that Thailand abandon cooperation with the US on security matters. Hanoi obviously wants to drive home this message in view of Foreign Minister Chatchai's talks in Washington.*

A recent Vietnamese broadcast, for example, labeled as "nonsense" Chatchai's condemnation of Hanoi's public support for the Lao communists during Thai-Lao border clashes last week. The broadcast maintained that Bangkok was seeking to justify continued Thai "collusion" with the US. The North Vietnamese recently have gone well beyond their earlier demands for the return of the aircraft flown to Thailand last April and are now publicly pressing Bangkok to end U-2 flights from Thailand and to remove completely all the remaining vestiges of the US military presence.

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*Early this morning China placed a satellite  
into orbit.*

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*Top Secret*



# The President's Daily Brief

November 28, 1975

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~~Top Secret 25X1~~

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
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November 28, 1975

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Bangladesh-India: Bangladesh leaders are trying to lower tensions with India since the attack on the Indian High Commissioner in Dacca on Wednesday. (Page 1)

China: High-level meetings apparently are either under way or have already concluded in Peking. (Page 2)

Portugal: Army Chief of Staff Fabiao and security chief Carvalho have resigned as a result of the abortive military rebellion. (Page 3)

Spain: The King's limited pardon decree will do little to prevent a break between his government and the leftist opposition. (Page 4)

Lebanon: President Franjiyah has replied to heavy domestic criticism. (Page 6)

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## BANGLADESH-INDIA

Bangladesh leaders have been trying to lower tensions with India since the attack on the Indian High Commissioner in Dacca on Wednesday. In addition to expressing regret over the incident, the President of Bangladesh is sending a special delegation to New Delhi to discuss ways to improve bilateral relations.

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[redacted] Dacca [redacted]  
[redacted] has decided that diplomacy is its only real defense against India. Dacca will make every effort to reassure New Delhi that it wants friendly relations. [redacted] the decision could be reflected in future statements by Bangladesh leaders who, in the recent past, have pointedly referred to "outside forces"--obviously India--as being behind Dacca's problems.

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For the present, Bangladesh officials continue to express fear of imminent Indian military intervention in their country. They also accuse the Indians of giving aid and sanctuary to Bengalee armed dissidents operating in northern Bangladesh.

Officials in New Delhi deny that their government is about to intervene militarily in Bangladesh but warn that intervention would be almost a certainty if communal violence should flare across the border.

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CHINA

*High-level meetings in Peking apparently are either under way or have already concluded.*

Between November 10 and 20, VIP aircraft flew to a number of provincial capitals and returned to Peking.

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The American Liaison Office in Peking notes that on November 24, "scores" of limousines picked up Chinese officials in front of the Great Hall of the People. The Chinese foreign minister last week canceled his first round of talks with the visiting French foreign minister, and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping did not meet the French minister until Monday.

The purpose of the meetings can only be speculated. There is no evidence that they are related to your visit, although this is a possibility. Just before former President Nixon's trip in 1972, some high-ranking officials were brought from the provinces to Peking, presumably for a briefing.

The meetings may be concerned with China's Fifth Five-Year Plan which is scheduled to begin in January. A conference of officials of the Bank of China reportedly was under way in mid-November to discuss financial allocations for the new plan. The banking conference could be one of a series of meetings dealing with the nation's economy.

It is unlikely that the meetings are connected with the health of Premier Chou En-lai or Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

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PORUGAL

*The abortive Portuguese military rebellion has claimed its first political victims--Army Chief of Staff Carlos Fabiao and security chief Oteло de Carvalho, both of whom resigned yesterday.*

The government announcement did not link the resignations with the leftist rebellion, but the anti-Communist majority in the Revolutionary Council had sought their dismissal for weeks because of their open encouragement of leftist dissident groups within the armed forces.

General Fabiao, once one of Portugal's most highly respected officers, has received much of the blame for the increasingly divisive political factionalism in the army. He has been replaced temporarily by an obscure infantry lieutenant colonel.

Carvalho's resignation was largely pro forma, since he was stripped of his commands earlier this week. The mercurial Carvalho is widely credited with having planned and executed the April 25, 1974 coup. He had become the standard-bearer of the radical left, however, and in recent weeks the Communists also rushed to his defense as he came increasingly under attack for his failure to support government policies.

President Costa Gomes has announced that the government will withhold judgment on who was responsible for the paratroopers' rebellion pending an official inquiry. Meanwhile, 51 officers and enlisted men captured during the uprising are being held.

In the absence of formal charges, the Socialist and Popular Democratic parties have rushed to seize the political initiative by blaming the Communists.

Communist Party members discreetly avoided direct participation in the mutiny, but military officers believed to have close ties to the party appear to have played a major role. The Communists are also vulnerable because of their strident calls for the government's resignation just prior to the rebellion.

On Wednesday Costa Gomes said legislative assembly elections, scheduled for early next spring, would be held as promised.

SPAIN

*The limited pardon issued by Spanish King Juan Carlos on Wednesday appears to have done little to reduce chances for an open break between his government and the leftist opposition.*

Many leftists have reacted angrily to the King's royal pardon. Riot police yesterday broke up two demonstrations staged to demand total amnesty for political prisoners.

The political opposition has been calling on Juan Carlos to grant a general amnesty for the roughly 2,000 Spanish political prisoners as a token of his commitment to reform.

The Socialist Workers Party--the largest non-Communist opposition group--pointed out that Franco had approved several pardons similar to the King's and charged that the decree showed only that nothing has changed. Opposition Christian Democrats were disappointed, but were more willing to look on the pardon as a "positive step" which might be followed by others.

The decree has come under heavy criticism for its vagueness. Much will depend on how the Justice Ministry interprets the law.

It will not apply to terrorists, Communists, anarchists, and separatists. The Communists will probably view their exclusion as confirmation that the government is trying to isolate them from the rest of the left. To counter this the party is trying to stir up opposition to the government that will attract broad support.

The Communists have had little success in this effort so far, and the Communist-dominated Workers Commissions reportedly have now postponed plans for a national general strike within a week or ten days of Franco's death.

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The Communist Party and the Workers Commissions plan instead a series of local "days of struggle," beginning next week, to help create a more favorable climate for a general strike.

The government has continued to crack down on dissidents. The latest edition of the leading political weekly magazine was seized for containing a speculative article on the King's liberalization plans, and new arrests of dissidents have been reported.

LEBANON

*President Franjiyah has moved to defend himself against recent heavy attacks by his Muslim, leftist, and Christian critics.*

In a statement [redacted] Wednesday Franjiyah said he would disregard criticism of him personally, but that attacks on the office of the president were harming the country and should cease. He said contradictory charges by some that he has not been assertive enough and by others that his powers should be curbed prove that he is maintaining a proper, middle-of-the-road policy.

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Franjiyah said the government is prepared to consider seriously any "well-studied plans" for political, social, or economic reforms. His less-radical Muslim critics--including Prime Minister Karami--may at least be willing to test him with specific proposals.

The first test apparently will come from Ghassan Tuwayni, a Christian member of the cabinet and a political independent. He reportedly has proposed a detailed program that over a three-week period would implement a cease-fire and launch specific social and economic reforms. The success of this plan, if it wins cabinet approval, will hinge on the willingness of the country's political leaders to have their private militias act as a national guard in patrolling Beirut.

Leaders of the right-wing Phalanges Party may welcome both Franjiyah's speech and Tuwayni's initiative. They will see Franjiyah's willingness to speak up for Christian interests as providing at least some assurance that they will be able to resist giving up too much in any negotiations that might follow a cease-fire. A cease-fire, at a minimum, would provide another opportunity to rearm.

The Phalangists, like the other Christian groups, remain pessimistic that the Muslims will temper their political demands to the extent necessary to allow agreement on fundamental issues. Any negotiations without preconditions would buy time,

(continued)

however, and would allow the Christians to contend that they were heeding the advice of foreign media-tors who counsel a more conciliatory attitude.

[redacted] even the ultra-con-servative Maronite monks may have become slightly more reasonable as a result of urgings from the Vatican early this month. There is no chance the monks will endorse proposals for political reform, but even reduced opposition from them would give conservative Christians like Franjiyah more freedom to negotiate. Maronite religious orders and lay groups are a principal source of arms and funds for the Christian militias.

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The tentative signs of political progress have combined with heavy rains to reduce the fighting in Beirut. Government spokesmen are cautiously opti-mistic that commercial activity can resume on Mon-day.

NOTE

*Large-scale population relocations involving one-half million people are under way in Cambodia.*

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300,000 people from southeastern Cambodia are to be relocated--100,000 of them into the sparsely populated northeast and the rest to the north and northwest. The northwest region is also scheduled to receive an additional 200,000 people from southwestern Cambodia beginning this month.

This new forced migration is probably part of a broad effort by Phnom Penh to increase agricultural production. Over the short term, the human cost will probably be high. As was the case in the initial relocations last spring, these transfers appear to be taking place abruptly with little if any preparations to provide housing and other facilities.

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# The President's Daily Brief

November 29, 1975

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November 29, 1975

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Portugal: Anti-Communist military leaders moved yesterday to bring much of the radical Portuguese press under direct government control.  
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Saudi Arabia: The Saudis have stated their intention to continue adherence to the Arab boycott against firms doing business with Israel, even if it jeopardizes their "special relationship" with Washington. (Page 2)

North Yemen - USSR - Saudi Arabia

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(Page 3)

Laos: The communists are apparently ready to discard the facade of a coalition government.  
(Page 4)

Notes: USSR; Turkey (Page 5)

At Annex we present the precis of an interagency memorandum on short-term military and political prospects in Angola.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

PORUGAL

*Anti-Communist military leaders moved yesterday to bring much of the radical Portuguese press under direct government control--further indication that they intend to capitalize on their victory this week. The general staff has been running Portugal by fiat since martial law was declared a few days ago during the rebellion led by leftist paratroopers.*

Following the forced resignation of Army Chief of Staff Fabiao and security chief Carvalho on Thursday, the management and editorial boards of eight newspapers and magazines, most of them dominated by the Communists or the far left, were dismissed. The general staff has announced that the publications will remain suspended until the government can appoint new administrators.

According to a decree issued yesterday, all labor contract negotiations will be suspended until the end of the year, and the government will define a wage policy aimed at eliminating large wage inequities. The decree apparently is intended to reverse recent wage concessions made by the government to Communist-led construction workers and to indicate that a program of economic stabilization will be coming.

Prime Minister Azevedo indicated last night that the state of emergency in the Lisbon military region will be lifted soon and that the government will resume its normal functions.

Other actions which reportedly are being considered include:

--Military action to end Communist-inspired occupation of farms in the south.

--Disarming of illegally armed civilians, possibly by means of a nationwide house-to-house search.

--A crackdown on foreign revolutionaries, mostly Latin Americans who, according to some reports, have formed an international brigade to assist Portuguese leftists.

SAUDI ARABIA

*The Saudis have stated their intention to continue adherence to the Arab boycott against firms doing business with Israel, even if it jeopardizes their "special relationship" with Washington.*

In a demarche to Ambassador Akins on Thursday, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud asked for clarification of your recent statements on US actions to fight foreign discriminatory practices. Prince Saud said that Saudi Arabia does not intend to relax its boycott rules in the absence of an Arab League decision--a stand that gives the Saudis little room for flexibility.

He was less specific about Riyadh's reluctance to grant visas to Jews. He reiterated the Saudi rationale for treating Jewish visa applicants with caution but noted that, in practice, most Jews who apply are admitted.


Saud said that Riyadh does not want to see its economic relations with the US harmed. He was nevertheless firm and unemotional, according to Ambassador Akins, in pointing out that the problems posed by recent US actions are of crucial importance to Saudi Arabia, and that his country has no intention of changing its policies.

The Saudi presentation was clearly designed to persuade the US not to push Riyadh too hard on these issues, and may have been deliberately overdrawn. Nevertheless, the Saudis show little inclination to compromise.

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NORTH YEMEN - USSR - SAUDI ARABIA


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LAOS

*The communists are apparently ready to discard the facade of a coalition government. They launched a well-rehearsed campaign against it yesterday in Vientiane.*

The communist party newspaper featured a speech by Pathet Lao cabinet member Khamouane Boupha calling for the replacement of the coalition with a "people's democratic government." Demonstrations began later in the day in several areas of Vientiane calling for the abolition of the coalition. One group of about 1,000 marched to the residence of Prime Minister Souvanna demanding his removal. Radio Pathet Lao also carried appeals from local revolutionary councils in several parts of the country requesting the dismantling of the coalition government.

Four days earlier, most of the remaining non-communist politicians in Vientiane were flown to the communist headquarters near Sam Neua, in northeastern Laos, ostensibly to attend a meeting of the coalition joint national political council. It is likely that they will be detained there indefinitely, joining other former ranking politicians and military officers in lengthy reindoctrination sessions.

Prime Minister Souvanna was hustled off to Luang Prabang on November 27--perhaps to prevent him from attempting to escape into exile. One of Souvanna's sons fled to Thailand when he learned that most non-communists had been flown to Sam Neua.

The communists have been laying the groundwork for Souvanna's retirement since last September, but the Prime Minister had expected to remain until the completion of national elections in April. Now the communists have apparently decided that they have neutralized all opposition and can effectively operate the government. They have the election process well under way throughout the country and see no reason to maintain the occasionally cumbersome coalition structure.

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
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*Student violence in Turkey has spread to nearly every part of the country and could threaten Prime Minister Demirel's fragile coalition government.*

Several deaths and numerous injuries have led to the temporary suspension of classes at universities and technical schools. The problem appears to have spread to secondary schools. Urged on by the press, government and opposition leaders have flailed ineffectually at each other on the subject.

The military leadership is doubtless watching the situation closely, particularly given its concern about renewed activities by the radical left. Earlier this month the chief of the general staff warned Demirel's government that the military could not tolerate continuing serious student violence.



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## ANGOLA

*We present the precis of an inter-agency memorandum on short-term military and political prospects in Angola.*

The prospects for Angola are bleak. The fighting shows every sign of continuing indefinitely. Neither the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) nor its adversaries--the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)--can hope to gain effective military control over all of Angola in the near term. Prospects for a political solution are equally remote, since at present there exists no basis for agreement among the three movements for participation in a government of national unity.

The military advantage in Angola already appears to be shifting once again in favor of the MPLA, largely owing to substantially increased foreign military assistance. Angola's strong ethnic and regional divisions, reflected in the three liberation movements and reinforced by the fighting among them, will make it exceedingly difficult for any one movement to gain effective political and military control over the entire country. Nevertheless, it may soon be possible for the MPLA to challenge the FNLA and UNITA in their ethnic strongholds in the north and south and to extend its military presence throughout much of the territory. Even so, the MPLA would continue to be threatened by serious political and military opposition, and its Luanda-based regime would be both politically and economically unstable, possibly for years to come.

Ideally, some kind of political solution could be found in which all three of Angola's liberation groups could participate in a government of national unity. The major obstacle to a government of national unity is the MPLA, which has arrogated to itself the role of Portugal's successor. It has been encouraged to maintain an uncompromising stand toward its rivals by the massive military and political support it is receiving from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

The future of the FNLA and UNITA depends on their ability to force the MPLA, either militarily or politically, into accepting them into a government of national unity. While this seems to be UNITA's preferred option, it is less certain that the FNLA would even now be prepared to accept a power-sharing arrangement with the MPLA. Their ability to force a military stalemate depends in part on their obtaining continued military assistance on a par with that provided the MPLA by Moscow and Havana. Without this support FNLA-UNITA strength is likely to erode gradually, leaving them dependent on foreign political pressure to convince the MPLA to agree to a coalition government.

Equally important is the ability of the two movements, which have both suffered serious organizational weaknesses in the past, to survive the likely intensification of MPLA military pressure. Moreover, given the undercurrent of mistrust and suspicion that still exists between the FNLA and UNITA, their continued political and military co-operation cannot be counted as certain.

The MPLA's political dominance is by no means assured. The MPLA's African supporters have mounted a campaign to reverse the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) policy of neutrality toward Angola and gain OAU endorsement of the MPLA. The longer the fighting continues without a political solution in sight, the greater will be the pressure within the OAU to grant recognition to the MPLA in order to avoid protracted and acrimonious debate over the Angola problem, which has already placed severe strains on African unity.

Initially, Portugal's refusal to recognize either of the self-proclaimed "governments" in Angola influenced many non-African countries to remain neutral. Leftist pressures in Lisbon and "radical" African pressure on the OAU to recognize the MPLA continue, however. If Lisbon and the OAU, or even significant numbers of OAU members, recognize the MPLA regime, there will be little reason for other countries not to follow suit. If Lisbon refuses to extend recognition, its position eventually will become irrelevant--if it hasn't already--and more countries will look to the OAU for guidance on recognition.

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# The President's Daily Brief

*November 30, 1975*



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Top Secret 25X1

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November 30, 1975

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Lebanon: President Franjiyah and Prime Minister Karami have jointly appealed for an end to factional fighting and have provided the outline of a government program to initiate political reform. (Page 1)

Angola: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has reportedly captured the important town of Luso. Ugandan President Idi Amin, in his capacity as chairman of the Organization of African Unity, is trying to postpone an OAU summit on Angola. (Page 3)

Portugal: Prime Minister Azevedo and anti-Communist leaders of the armed forces are carrying out a full-scale purge of pro-Communists and other extreme leftists in the military and the government. (Page 5)

Notes: Spain; Jordan (Page 7)

(This Brief, with information as of 11 AM EST, was cabled on this date to the President.)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## LEBANON

*President Franjiyah and Prime Minister Karami--noting that the continued existence of Lebanon is at stake--joined in a public appeal Saturday night for an end to factional fighting and provided the outline of a government program to initiate political reform.*

In an address to the nation, Karami announced that agreement had been reached on expanding the cabinet and on starting a dialogue aimed at making the "necessary adaptations" in Lebanon's political balance. Observing that all Lebanese factions are minorities, Karami stated that "the triumph of one party over another" would not provide a lasting resolution of Lebanon's problems. He avoided specifics but said the solution lies in providing the necessary guarantees for the continued existence of all "communities."

President Franjiyah's endorsement of the government program gives it added weight. Franjiyah, a Christian, has been working at cross purposes with the Muslim Karami throughout the fighting and, by a combination of inaction and behind-the-scenes encouragement to Christian factions, has thwarted previous attempts at political reform.

The government's adoption of a reform program and the reconciliation--possibly temporary--between Franjiyah and Karami may have resulted from the efforts of Ghassan Tuwayni, a moderate Christian member of the cabinet, and of French mediator Couve de Murville. Tuwayni drew up a plan last week for a three-stage program to enforce the cease-fire and begin political reform. Both Tuwayni and Couve de Murville have urged that the cabinet be expanded to include Pierre Jumayyil, leader of the Christian Phalanges Party, and Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt.

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
Jumblatt has consistently refused to serve in a cabinet with Jumayyil

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A concentrated effort is also under way to split less radical Lebanese Muslims from extreme leftist and Communist groups supported by Libya and Iraq. Spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, which fears the rise of leftist influence in Lebanon, the effort reportedly involves establishing contacts between Sunni Muslim leaders and the Phalanges Party.



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ANGOLA

*Heavy fighting continues in central Angola between forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. The Popular Movement has reportedly captured several towns, including the important town of Luso astride the Benguela railroad.*

The offensive force of the Popular Movement is probably the one that has been reported moving south from Henrique de Carvalho after having been resupplied with Soviet equipment airlifted from Luanda. If Luso has been recaptured, this would be clear indication that the National Union's push from the south has been blunted.

Cloud conditions over several key locations in Congo and Angola have prevented overhead photography of ground activity or identification of possible Soviet-supplied aircraft in these areas.

\* \* \*

Ugandan President Idi Amin, in his capacity as chairman of the Organization of African Unity, is seeking to postpone an OAU summit on Angola. Presumably in an attempt to head off what would almost certainly be acrimonious debate, Amin announced on November 27 that Uganda will not play host to such a meeting.

The proposal for the summit, which has been pressed by Somalia, seems likely to attain the required approval of two thirds of the Organization's 46 member states. Somalia and other backers of the Popular Movement--Guinea, Congo, and Mozambique--hope to force a change in OAU policy from neutrality to endorsement of the Movement's regime in Luanda as the sole legitimate government of Angola.

Amin would prefer to convene a meeting of the ad hoc military advisory commission on Angola established at the regular OAU summit meeting in July. It seems unlikely that Amin can accomplish

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

anything at a meeting of this commission. His earlier call to African nations to contribute to an OAU peacekeeping force for Angola fell on deaf ears.

Whatever kind of conference eventually takes place, it appears that the OAU may be moving away from an effort toward mediation by focusing instead on the issue of outside intervention, particularly that of South Africa. Indeed, Agostinho Neto, President of the Popular Movement's regime in Luanda, is trying to turn the OAU in this direction. Neto recently sent word to the OAU that a meeting on Angola would be useful, but he believed it should only involve a discussion of ways to help "his government" cope with foreign invasion forces.

PORtUGAL

Prime Minister Azevedo and anti-Communist leaders of the Portuguese armed forces are carrying out a full-scale purge of pro-Communists and other extreme leftists in the military and the government.

Admiral Rosa Coutinho and navy chief of staff Filgueiras Soares are the latest high-level officers to be forced out in the wake of the abortive paratrooper rebellion of last week. Their departure leaves only two Communist sympathizers on the Revolutionary Council--both navy officers--who also are likely to go as the purge of the military extends to the navy.

Generals Carvalho and Fabiao, who were forced out last week, may have had some connection with the rebellion, but Rosa Coutinho and Filgueiras Soares have clearly been purged on ideological grounds, indicating that the anti-Communist faction is moving across the board to solidify its control of the military.

President Costa Gomes has come in for some sharp criticism, but the anti-Communists apparently intend to retain him in office unless he tries to impede the purge. So far Costa Gomes has offered little resistance.

The government, which had earlier suspended its activities, is now back at work, but the purge of leftists seems unlikely to end the partisan squabbling. The Socialist Party is insisting that the Communists publicly repudiate the rebel uprising and swear allegiance to the Azevedo government if they are to continue to participate in the cabinet. [redacted]

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

The Popular Democrats, who are also seeking to capitalize on the retreat of the left, have called for the removal of the one Communist representative in the cabinet and have demanded immediate elections. Workers in the northern city of Porto have petitioned for the removal of Foreign Minister Antunes, who said last week that the Communists still had an essential role to play.

The Communists themselves have taken a relatively conciliatory position in contrast to their earlier efforts to bring down the government. The party's most recent communique makes no criticism of the government's purge of the left. It simply warns the Socialists and the Antunes military faction that the extreme right will try to take advantage of the situation.

NOTES

*The Spanish government has promised to clarify its recent amnesty decree which has provoked widespread dissatisfaction for going no further than similar actions by Franco.*

The government has already released a number of prisoners, some of whom were jailed for political offenses. Marcelino Camacho, a top leader of the Communist-dominated Workers' Commissions, was among the first to be released.

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*Jordanian Crown Prince Hasan, whose ten-day visit to the US begins today, is his country's chief spokesman on economic development.*

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