

## *The President's Daily Brief*

2 January 1973

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~~Top Secret~~  
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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

2 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The Communists have begun a new offensive in northern Laos against Route 13, the only road between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Defenders of Bouam Long--assisted by effective air support--are holding their ground against continued nightly shellings by the Communists. (Page 1)

Malta

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(Page 2)


The Bangladesh Government has increased the number of security personnel around US installations in Dacca, but has not guaranteed that demonstrations will stop. (Page 3)

Israeli air strikes on Syrian Army posts and Syrian shelling of the Golan Heights during the past week have heightened tension along the border. (Page 3)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

LAOS

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**

The Communists have begun a new offensive in the north. Enemy units on 30 December drove a 1,000-man Lao Army force from Sala Phou Khoun located at the junction of Routes 7 and 13. Pathet Lao and dissident neutralists carried the brunt of the fighting although they were supported by a small North Vietnamese artillery unit.


Intercepted messages suggest that the Communists will soon move both north and south against hamlets along Route 13 which is the only road between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. The government has already sent two irregular battalions from Luang Prabang toward Sala Phou Khoun.

*The Communists occupied villages along Route 13 in 1970 and 1972, but supply problems and poor organization prevented them from mounting a serious threat to either Luang Prabang or to the government's logistic center at Vang Vieng.*


The North Vietnamese have continued their nightly shellings and ground assaults against Bouam Long, the government base north of the Plaine des Jarres, but the irregular defenders--assisted by effective air support--are holding their ground. So far, the Communists do not appear to have launched an all-out effort. Only three of the seven battalions surrounding the base have been detected in the fighting.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

***FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*****NOTES**

Bangladesh: On 31 December the USIS center in Mymensingh, a district capital, was bombed and sacked. On the following day the USIS library in Dacca was unsuccessfully assaulted by 200 to 300 students. Ostensibly, these latest attacks on US property in Bangladesh are in protest against US policy in Vietnam. We believe, however, that the attacks have been stimulated by inflammatory rhetoric of ruling Awami League politicians, who are engaged in an election campaign and are blaming the US for the country's many serious difficulties. Privately, Bangladesh officials have acted correctly toward US representatives, but they say that Prime Minister Mujib would "have difficulty" apologizing in public because of the tense political situation. The government has increased the number of security personnel around US installations in Dacca, but has not guaranteed that demonstrations will be called off. In dispersing the demonstrators on 1 January, police fired on the crowd and killed two students.

Israel-Syria: Israeli air strikes on Syrian Army posts and Syrian shelling of the Golan Heights during the past week have heightened tension along the border. Israel has closed the area to civilian traffic and alerted its troops for further action. We expect new Israeli air strikes if the Syrians should shell the heights again.

USSR-Cuba: The Soviet naval combatants that arrived in Cuba in early December are still in Cuban ports. The group includes a cruiser, a destroyer, a nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, and a diesel-powered submarine.

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Egypt: Demonstrations at Cairo University this weekend against the arrest of student protesters are a further embarrassment to the Sadat government. Sadat remains determined to discourage protests, but his inability to resolve the nation's difficulties only fosters continuing criticism.

(continued)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

Australia: The Communist-led Seamen and Water-side Workers' Unions voted today to continue the boycott of US flagships that are carrying supplies to South Vietnam until a settlement is reached between the United States and Hanoi. Prime Minister Whitlam has yet to comment on the strike, but there is some doubt as to how far or how long the ban can be enforced. The ban appears to be as much a left-wing political test of the new Labor government as of the US.

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*3 January 1973*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

3 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

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[Redacted]  
China wishes to maintain good relations with the US,  
despite the bombing of North Vietnam. (Page 2)

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[Redacted] South Vietnam [Redacted] (Page 3)  
The Soviets have published an account of the charges  
prospective emigrants must pay to reimburse the state  
for their educations. (Page 4)


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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

USSR



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CHINA-US**

There is fresh evidence that Peking's restrained reaction to US bombing of North Vietnam's heartland was due to its overriding interest in preventing damage to Sino-American relations.

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Based on

the New  
China News Agency and to Chinese envoys posted abroad [redacted] avoided directly linking the bombing with Sino-American ties until Chou En-lai did so informally on 28 December. Chou's remark almost certainly was made because of heightened concern in Peking that the bombing might imperil an early settlement.

Peking has not yet reacted officially to the new limitations on US air strikes over North Vietnam or the scheduled resumption of the Paris talks. At the US Embassy in Paris yesterday, however, Chinese diplomats delivered a New Year's greeting to President Nixon signed by Mao, Chou, and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

[redacted] the Communists  
are planning a new round of attacks as the Paris ne-  
gotiations resume. [redacted]

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The Communists are not now in a position  
to mount an offensive anywhere near the  
magnitude of the spring 1972 campaign.

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There have been some enemy deployments in  
the past few weeks pointing to a possible  
increase in offensive operations, but we  
would expect to see additional troop move-  
ments before the launching of any major,  
countrywide effort.

The South Vietnamese are aware that the  
Communists would like to make some mili-  
tary progress in the near future and are  
taking steps to counter anticipated enemy  
action.

\* \* \*

At a New Year's Eve reception for the diplo-  
matic corps, President Thieu restated his objections  
to the proposed peace terms and blamed the Commu-  
nists for blocking a settlement. Thieu is sending  
two emissaries--former foreign minister Tran Van Do  
and former ambassador to the US Bui Diem--to  
friendly capitals to drum up support for his posi-  
tion. Diem told the US Embassy that they leave this  
week for Washington to explain Saigon's policies,  
particularly to members of Congress. After their  
US visit, they plan to travel to Japan, Indonesia,  
and Canada.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR**

In an unusual interview distributed abroad by the Novosti press agency, a Soviet deputy minister of internal affairs has expounded on the regulations for emigration. He said that men over 60, women over 55, and invalids are fully exempt from the charges that the USSR levies on emigrants with a college education or its equivalent. He also claimed that men and women who have been employed for specified numbers of years are excused from refunding corresponding portions of their education costs. Those who have higher degrees or military postgraduate training must repay the state 50 percent of their education costs; those who took correspondence courses, 25 percent; and the poverty-stricken pay nothing.

The minister also asserted that the fees are charged without regard for the individual's nationality or destination. He admitted, however, that the rules do not apply to those departing for another Communist or a "progressive underdeveloped" country. In rebutting "bourgeois propaganda" about obstacles put in the way of Soviet Jews trying to emigrate to Israel, he made the misleading claim that 95.5 percent of the applicants in 1972 received permission to leave.

*Soviet Interior Ministry officials seldom make public statements containing details of their restrictions on emigration. Release of this interview is a sop to Western opinion, and suggests that Moscow has revised its regulations in the face of Western protests. Nothing was said about restricting future emigration to those with close relatives abroad, even though a Soviet Jew claimed in late November that such a regulation had been posted.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTE**

[redacted] planes yesterday, one  
of the Syrian pilots ejected after being outma-  
neuvered--without any shots being fired. Earlier,  
Israel publicly had claimed that its aircraft had  
downed the Syrian MIG-21 in a dogfight over Leba-  
nese territory.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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# *The President's Daily Brief*

*4 January 1973*

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

4 January 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The week-old Australian dockworkers' strike against US shipping is posing a difficult problem for Prime Minister Whitlam. (Page 1)

Libyan President Qadhafi [redacted] threatened to cut off subsidies to Egypt if Cairo shows interest in a separate settlement with Israel. (Page 2) 25X1

Egypt has suspended all university classes in an effort to contain the five-day-old student protests. (Page 3)

The Bangladesh Government has been unresponsive to US requests for better protection of the USIS building in Dacca, part of which has been occupied by student demonstrators since Tuesday. (Page 4)

Japan's claim to Soviet held islands north of Hokkaido is likely to remain a contentious issue between Tokyo and Moscow this year. (Page 5) 25X1

[redacted] Somali [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] (Page 6) 25X1  
25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## AUSTRALIA

The week-old dockworkers' strike against US shipping may be gaining momentum. The dockworkers' union decided yesterday to continue to refuse their services, and leaders of other unions are agitating for a general strike against all US commercial interests if a Vietnam cease-fire is not signed by the end of January.

*Prime Minister Whitlam will find it extremely difficult to deal with the current strike lest he precipitate serious problems with his Labor Party's left wing. Two cabinet ministers have already indicated sympathy for the strikers by sharply criticizing recent US Vietnam policy. Whitlam's own reservations about pursuing the war in Vietnam are also well known, even though he has emphasized Australia's intention to maintain close ties with the US.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LIBYA-EGYPT

President Qadhafi recently threatened to cut off subsidies to Egypt if Cairo does not steadfastly reject any American initiative to resolve the Arab-Israeli impasse

25X1

Disagreement between the two leaders was evident in Qadhafi's speech earlier this week that has drawn some press attention. In it he accused Egypt and the other Arab states of adopting attitudes that would lead them ultimately to make separate settlements with Israel. Qadhafi criticized all Arab regimes for their inability to join forces against Israel, and he implicitly blamed Egypt for using this failure as an excuse to pursue an independent settlement. Qadhafi admitted that it would be better to continue the current stalemate than to undertake prematurely a war that would be doomed to fail, but he warned that negotiating with Israel means abandoning the Palestinian cause. Qadhafi in no way opened any doors to a new policy, as some press treatment has suggested.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**EGYPT**

Yesterday the government suspended all university classes in an effort to contain the five-day-old student protests. The demonstrations began at Cairo University, and had spread to other campuses in Cairo, Alexandria, and Asyut in the south. The students initially protested the arrest of a number of students, but demands had moved to broader issues such as internal freedoms and war with Israel. President Sadat sought to placate the students by promising speedy disposition of the cases of those initially arrested.

*The government had earlier hoped that the protests could be kept within manageable proportions until the mid-year break began on 11 January. Although closing the universities will help in restoring order, the students are not likely to disperse immediately and further protests may occur within the next few days.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**BANGLADESH**

Student demonstrators have continued to mill around the USIS building in Dacca for the past several days, protesting US bombing in Vietnam and the killing by police of two demonstrators on 1 January. Demonstrators have occupied a portion of the building since Tuesday, when police and para-military personnel were withdrawn. The government has been unresponsive to official US requests for better protection and has indicated that it is reluctant to issue any public expression of regret for the damage already done.

*The government apparently believes that strong action against the protestors could have serious political repercussions for itself. These fears appear exaggerated. Leftist opposition parties have considerable support among students and can generate further anti-government and anti-American demonstrations, but they do not seem to pose a serious threat to the regime. The ruling Awami League, despite some loss of popularity over the past year, is still the country's largest and strongest party.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-JAPAN

In his speech honoring the USSR's 50th anniversary last month, Soviet party chief Brezhnev noted that "important Soviet-Japanese negotiations" on concluding a peace treaty are to take place this year. Brezhnev warned, however, that the talks will be sterile unless Japan is willing to work toward a "mutually acceptable understanding" on outstanding issues.


*The main bone of contention remains Tokyo's claim to the islands north of Hokkaido that the USSR occupied at the end of World War II. Brezhnev wants the Japanese to ease their all-or-nothing attitude on return of the "Northern Territories," but there is no sign that the Tanaka government is prepared to soften Japan's position in the near future.*

*The Soviets apparently are suspicious that the Japanese are seeking to use their improved relations with Peking as a means of pressuring the USSR into yielding on the territorial issue. Although the Soviets last year gave indications that they were considering returning at least some of the disputed islands, they are now taking an uncompromising line. China's open support for Tokyo's territorial claims has made it even more difficult for the Soviets to be flexible. Soviet leaders, in fact, may have reached the conclusion that even returning all the islands would not earn Moscow any enduring advantages in the growing competition with China for influence in Japan.*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

SOMALIA




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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTES**

Venezuela: President Caldera's chief oil negotiator, Julio Sosa Rodriguez, does not believe that a long-term energy agreement with the United States can be concluded before general elections next December. Sosa has told Ambassador McClintock that such other tasks as arranging Venezuela's entry into the Andean Pact will occupy his time for the next several months. Sosa and other Venezuelan officials are evidently concerned, however, that negotiations with the US might become a political football in the election campaign. Several leftist political leaders have already signaled that they will make an issue of any negotiations dealing with the extensive petroleum reserves in the Orinoco Tar Belt in eastern Venezuela.

Israel: The cabinet has approved the establishment of a new "regional center" in occupied northeastern Sinai just south of the Gaza Strip. Tel Aviv plans to settle some 350 families and to set up light industries there in the next two years. The establishment of this additional Israeli settlement in northeastern Sinai is in keeping with Israel's expressed desire to sever the Gaza Strip, with its 300,000 Arab refugees, from Sinai.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*5 January 1973*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

5 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

President Lon Nol has told Ambassador Swank that his government now may have a channel to the Khmer Communists and that the modalities have been discussed with Soviet representatives. [redacted]

(Page 1)

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25X1

Meanwhile within his government, the President's brother, Lon Non, appears to be maneuvering against two key figures. (Page 2)

The impasse over Malta's demands for additional payment for the British facilities continues, with Italy pressing for increased contributions by all NATO participants in the arrangements except Britain. (Page 3)

On Page 4 we discuss Fidel Castro's new agreements for continuing substantial economic aid from the USSR. [redacted]

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Venezuela may be preparing to ship some petroleum to Cuba. (Page 5)

A top Chilean Communist figure has stressed the indispensability of continued military participation in the Allende government. (Page 6)

The Panamanian Government is about to proceed with its request that the UN Security Council meet in Panama City in March. (Page 7)

A Soviet decree on aircraft hijacking calls for the death penalty in some circumstances. (Page 8)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

CAMBODIA

In a conversation with Ambassador Swank on 3 January, President Lon Nol expressed some rare interest in establishing a high-level political dialogue with the Khmer Communists. The Cambodian leader stated that the government now may have a channel to the insurgents, and added that the modalities of contacting them have already been discussed with Soviet representatives in Phnom Penh.

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[redacted] First Minister Hang Thun Hak claimed that he has "very recently" made contact through an unidentified intermediary with Sihanouk's "minister of interior," Hou Youn, who allegedly has been operating in the countryside since the early days of the war. Hak said that, although this link had not yet produced anything significant, he was encouraged that it would eventually result in a substantive dialogue.

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[redacted] The Soviets recommended that Phnom Penh agree to the establishment of a legal Communist party which would take part in new national elections and be included in a new government. Hak passed these concessions on to Lon Nol, endorsing them in the process. According to Hak, the President first reacted unfavorably but eventually agreed to permit him to proceed "as he saw fit for the time being."

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*Lon Nol's new-found concern with the political aspects of the Khmer Communist problem may stem from recognition that his primary approach so far--the rallier program--is likely to continue to be unsuccessful. He may also be curious to learn the Khmer Communists' private terms for negotiating, particularly whether they would be willing to disavow Sihanouk. Publicly, the Communists have shown no sign of any willingness to compromise.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

President Lon Nol's brother, Brigadier General Lon Non, who has steadily expanded his role in the government, now appears to be maneuvering against two key government figures--First Minister Hang Thun Hak and the able Army Chief of Staff, Major General Sosthene Fernandez.

[redacted] Lon Non has ordered that First Minister Hak be investigated for "leftist" activities. General Fernandez claims that Lon Non is circulating rumors that Fernandez is plotting a coup against the president. Fernandez says these allegations have cost him much of Lon Nol's confidence, thereby complicating his efforts to implement badly needed military reforms.

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*The government can ill afford the loss of Hak or Fernandez or the political stress that would result from their departures. If Lon Nol does not soon put his brother on a shorter leash, his own ebbing popularity is likely to decline further--particularly among the military.*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


**MALTA**

Prime Minister Mintoff continues to demand that if British facilities are to remain, Malta must receive an additional \$3.4 million in cash as compensation for losses suffered when the pound floated. The North Atlantic Council yesterday failed to agree on any new offer. Italy has been pressing for increased contributions of some \$2 million by all participants except the UK.

Mintoff is under pressure from his cabinet and party to avoid a complete break with the UK. In an effort to reduce that pressure by suggesting that he has an alternative, he flew to Tripoli yesterday. Mintoff is aware, however, that even a large Libyan subsidy would not solve the problem of employment for the nearly 6,000 workers dependent on the British presence.

*Mintoff may well believe that the allies will bow to his demands as they did last year. Operating on this premise, he may lock himself into a posture from which it will be politically impossible to retreat, and so bring about a British departure regardless of the effect this would have on his country's fragile economy.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-CUBA**

Agreements concluded during Fidel Castro's recent visit to Moscow give Cuba another \$370 million for development aid and a grace period until 1986 for repaying its \$3.5 billion debt to the USSR. Moscow also agreed to continue financing for at least the next three years Cuba's annual trade deficit with the USSR, which has been averaging some \$350 million annually. This deficit, however, will be reduced by the Soviet offer to nearly double the price it pays for Cuban sugar and nickel.

The new agreements represent Moscow's recognition that Cuba cannot meet its debt obligations and that a renewed effort, however costly, is needed to rationalize and develop its sluggish economy. The Soviets have chafed at the poor performance of the Cuban economy despite large and increasing infusions of aid. Since 1970, Castro has been more receptive to Soviet advice and seems to have reduced his own meddling in economic matters. His enthusiasm about the agreements, however, may be tempered by the realization that they tie his country more closely to the USSR and will restrict his freedom of action in political matters.

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[redacted] When the station is operational, probably by the end of the year, it will significantly improve both civil and military communications between Havana and Moscow.

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**VENEZUELA-CUBA**

Two leading officials of President Caldera's party are now saying that Venezuela is prepared to ship some of its petroleum to Cuba "if the Cuban Government offers good prices and favorable conditions of payment." One official told a party rally in late December that Venezuela was negotiating with the USSR to provide part of the petroleum which Moscow supplies to Cuba. Some press reports claim that shipments may be up to 100,000 barrels a day.

*This amount would be little more than three percent of Venezuelan production, but would satisfy over 75 percent of Cuba's import requirements.*

*Since coming to office in March 1969, Caldera's Christian Democratic government has moderated the strident anti-Castro tone of earlier government statements. Exchanges of low-level delegations are increasing, and a Prensa Latina office has been allowed to operate in Caracas. More recently a telephone link has been inaugurated.*

*An accommodation with Cuba would meet with little opposition in Venezuela. There are differences over timing, but almost all political parties favor a rapprochement. Few military leaders favor ties with Cuba, but they would be unlikely to mount any strong opposition to such a move.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**CHILE**

In a year-end briefing of fellow Communist leaders, Labor Minister Figueroa emphasized the indispensability of military participation in the government and the positive contributions of the officers involved.

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Throughout his briefing, Figueroa showed the pragmatism that has made the Communist Party President Allende's most valuable political ally. He dwelt heavily on the inefficiency, dissension, and disorganization of the Popular Unity parties and warned that these defects will help the opposition in the congressional elections on 4 March.

*While the Communists and the armed forces undoubtedly share concepts of authority and discipline, their basic mistrust of each other's power remains.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**PANAMA**

Within the next few days the Torrijos government plans formally to ask the United Nations Security Council to meet in Panama City from 15 to 21 March, according to UN sources. With 11 of the 15 council members firmly in favor of such a meeting, Panama has more than enough votes to carry the motion. It has not submitted an agenda but plans to focus attention on the canal negotiations as a major issue.

*Having put the details of the negotiations in the public record last month, General Torrijos may believe that he can go into some depth on Panama's efforts to gain control of the Canal Zone without creating the kind of diplomatic bombshell that might harm Panamanian interests. Torrijos is likely to wait until the last minute, however, before deciding how far Panama will go in attacking the US at the meetings.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## NOTES

USSR: A Soviet decree on aircraft hijacking calls for the death penalty in cases involving death or serious injury and for prison terms of up to 15 years and confiscation of property in other instances. The decree seems intended primarily to show other governments that Moscow is concerned over a serious international problem. The Soviet Union, however, will not support the US draft convention, providing for stiff sanctions against countries that harbor hijackers, which will be discussed next week by the International Civil Aviation Organization. Moscow believes that international sanctions should be imposed only by the UN Security Council, where it has a veto.

USSR: [redacted]

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[redacted] the Soviets have increased the number of tanks in their active field forces beyond our current estimates. The standard number of tanks in the tank battalion of Soviet motorized rifle regiments is being increased from 31 to 40. An additional tank battalion--beyond those organic to the regiments--is now directly subordinate to some Soviet motorized rifle divisions in Eastern Europe. Depending on the extent to which these changes have been implemented, Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe may now have from 500 to 1,200 more medium tanks than the 7,800 currently listed in our estimates. In the China border area, there may be some 9,000 Soviet medium tanks rather than the previous estimate of 8,100.

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Uganda: President Amin's announcement yesterday of the seizure of a large number of British companies will speed the departure of the 3,000-person British community and perhaps other Westerners as well. The president has labeled his moves against the British, as well as his expulsion of the Asians and Israelis, as an effort to put the economy in the hands of Ugandans. The trend is toward replacement of the West as a source of aid by Arab and Eastern benefactors.

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# *The President's Daily Brief*

*6 January 1973*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

6 January 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Although enemy action in South Vietnam has increased moderately so far in January, the Communists apparently have not yet issued firm orders for a substantial new military campaign. (Page 1)

President Thieu is sending a delegation of five senators to Washington next week as part of an effort to explain his government's position on the peace talks and to seek continuation of US aid. (Page 2)

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[redacted] Algeria [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] (Page 3) [redacted]

25X1

East Germany's newly enhanced international status is causing Pankow some difficulties. (Page 4)

Soviet preparations are under way for what seems likely to be an unmanned lunar probe. (Page 5)

In Egypt, most student demonstrators are dispersing. (Page 5)

Prime Minister Mujib in Bangladesh is evidently trying to tone down the anti-US line taken in recent days by several of his key lieutenants. (Page 5)

The Australian Defense Ministry has announced that army strength will be reduced by 25 percent pending completion of a review of the country's defense program. (Page 6)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

While enemy action has increased moderately so far in January, the Communists apparently have not yet issued firm orders for a substantial new military campaign.

*The Communists evidently continue to believe that peace negotiations will be considerably affected by further battle victories in the South. They seem to be moving cautiously, however, in deciding when and where to call for a major new effort.*

[redacted] provincial cadre have been urged to accelerate their planning for major operations, and [redacted] [redacted] the Communist command would try to "strike a heavy blow" on the battlefield if a cease-fire agreement was not negotiated soon. Another report described military action through mid-January as a "test offensive" to help determine the means of conducting a subsequent effort.

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*Substantial criticism of recent enemy military efforts appears in much of the covert Communist reporting now being obtained in the southern half of South Vietnam. The inability and unwillingness of some elements to carry out combat orders adequately appears to be a growing problem for the Communist command in planning the next stage of fighting.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

President Thieu is sending a delegation of five pro-government senators to Washington next week.

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The spokesman of the group arriving next week, Senator Nguyen Van Ngai, explained that his delegation plans to spend about three weeks in the US talking with selected US senators, congressmen, and leading personalities in the media field. His objective, he went on, is to explain the "valid rationale" behind the government's position on the peace talks and to seek to ensure continuation of US aid.

*In mid-December, Thieu was planning to send a fairly large official delegation of the National Assembly for these purposes. He has evidently concluded that a series of smaller groups, traveling as though on their own initiative, might be more effective. Former foreign minister Tran Van Do and former ambassador Bui Diem have already arrived in the US as the first of Thieu's emissaries.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

ALGERIA



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**EAST GERMANY**

East Germany's newly enhanced international status is causing Pankow some difficulties. The regime expects trouble in making sites available for foreign missions in East Berlin.

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More important are the claims by Western countries stemming from Nazi sequestration of allied property in what is now East Germany during World War II and from subsequent Communist confiscations. Pankow's agreement with Finland last November to discuss "juridical and economic questions dating from World War II" could also encourage some countries to pose claims for "war damages." The Israelis, for their part, are contending that when Israel settled for two thirds of its original demands for reparations from West Germany, it was on the basis that the remaining one third would be sought from East Germany.

*The Potsdam agreement, which provided that the USSR and Poland would obtain reparations from the Eastern Zone of Germany and that all other countries would obtain compensation from the Western Zones, presumably precludes claims for war damages against East Germany. Notwithstanding Pankow's apparent agreement to discuss such matters with the Finns, we doubt the East Germans have any intention of paying claims for war damages. Restitution claims are another matter, however, and this issue may well serve to slow the pace of normalization negotiations with a number of countries.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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NOTES

USSR: Preparations are under way for what seems likely to be an unmanned lunar probe.

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Favorable conditions for launching a spacecraft to the moon will exist from 8 until 11 January. The most recent Soviet lunar probe was in February 1972.

Egypt: Most student demonstrators are dispersing following the government's order of 3 January closing the universities. Although scattered protests may occur during the next few days, security forces are likely to break up any demonstrations quickly. These forces will remain on guard when classes resume in three weeks. Support for the students from other elements of the population did not materialize. The government had been concerned that laborers or some military personnel might join the protesters.

Bangladesh: Prime Minister Mujib is evidently trying to tone down the anti-US line taken in recent days by several of his key lieutenants who had blamed US as well as Chinese "agents" for growing anti-government agitation. He told a public rally on Thursday that his government is obliged to protect foreign missions and must now pay for the damage to USIS centers. Nonetheless, at last word the USIS building in Dacca remains partly occupied by leftist students. It was taken over on 2 January following a deal whereby the police withdrew on the students' promise that they would not damage the building. The government, however, now appears to have given free rein to its own student supporters. On 5 January, they set fire to the headquarters of a leftist party in Dacca and destroyed the "martyrs' monument" erected in front of the USIS building to commemorate the two student demonstrators killed by police there a few days ago.

(continued)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

Australia: The Defense Ministry has announced that army strength will be set at 31,000 pending completion of a detailed review of the five-year defense program. This represents a reduction of about 25 percent from the present force level and takes into account the fact that army strength cannot be maintained now that the new government has ended conscription. The results of the review--expected sometime this spring--could freeze army strength at about 31,000. The government has stated its willingness to maintain defense spending at current levels, nearly 3.5 percent of the gross national product.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

8 January 1973

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**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

8 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

North Vietnamese infiltration has continued at a fairly steady rate in the first three months of the 1972-73 dry season, although it remains lower than the comparable total for the previous year.  
*(Page 1)*

In Laos, North Vietnamese gunners have carried out a series of heavy shellings against government positions near Saravane. *(Page 2)*

Moscow is moving to block a possible attempt by Bonn to give full voting rights to West Berlin's representatives in the West German Bundestag.  
*(Page 3)*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**VIETNAM**

North Vietnamese infiltration has continued at a fairly steady rate in the first three months of the 1972-73 dry season, although it remains lower than the comparable total for the previous year. In the past three months approximately 45,000 men have started south, including more than 15,000 earmarked for the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. In the same period in 1971, more than 60,000 North Vietnamese troops entered the pipeline, but only 4,000 of these went to the northernmost provinces.

*The substantial rise in infiltration to the northern provinces this dry season suggests that Hanoi intends to maintain a large combat force just below the Demilitarized Zone and is willing to accept a further decline in the strength of its forces farther south. Hanoi has been sending large numbers of tanks and artillery to the southern areas, however, and presumably hopes that increased firepower will partially offset the decrease in manpower.*


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



○ Government-held location

● Communist-held location

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**LAOS**

In their sharpest action in several weeks, North Vietnamese gunners have carried out a series of heavy shellings against government positions south and southeast of Saravane. Although ground action has remained generally light, several Communist tanks were sighted on Saravane's western edge yesterday. Elements of the North Vietnamese 968th Division's three regiments are now near the town.

Irregular forces north of the Plaine des Jarres at Bouam Long are taking advantage of a lull in Communist military action to strengthen their defenses and to increase their patrolling. Recent air strikes on a supply line west of Bouam Long apparently have helped to slow the pace of the North Vietnamese offensive.

To the west, government forces have not yet organized for a counterattack against the town of Sala Phou Khoun at the junction of Routes 7 and 13-- which the Communists captured on 30 December. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has been embarrassed politically and militarily by the Lao Army's poor showing in this sector and has named a single overall commander for the area to eliminate previous command and control problems.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-BERLIN**

Moscow is moving to block a possible attempt by Bonn to give full voting rights to West Berlin's representatives in the West German Bundestag. In a statement presented to the State Department by Ambassador Dobrynin on Friday, the USSR contended that such rights would violate the Four-Power agreement on Berlin and are unacceptable. The Soviets have made similar approaches to the UK, France, and West Germany.

*West Berlin's representatives sit on Bundestag committees and vote on procedural questions, but have no vote on substantive matters. The USSR has long opposed any strengthening of political ties between West Germany and West Berlin on grounds that this undercuts its stress on the city's "separate status." Moscow's demarche indicates that, despite progress toward detente with Bonn, its concern on this question has not diminished.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

USSR-Turkey: Moscow's recent \$158-million credit to Turkey for the expansion of the steel plant at Iskenderun raises Soviet allocations for that project to \$418 million. This is higher than Moscow's previous record contribution to a single project--Egypt's Aswan Dam. The Soviets in the past six years have also provided aid to other large Turkish industrial projects, including an oil refinery and an aluminum plant.

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USSR: Early this morning the Soviets launched an unmanned lunar probe from Tyuratam [redacted]. [redacted] The probe should arrive in the vicinity of the moon on Friday. Earlier probes have returned soil samples, placed a rover vehicle on the surface, or performed scientific experiments in lunar orbit.

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*9 January 1973*

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**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

9 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Egypt

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(Page 1)

Israeli aircraft yesterday retaliated for recent Syrian and guerrilla harassment with a series of attacks against army positions and guerrilla bases in Syria. (Page 2)

India's three military service chiefs are looking for ways to lessen their country's dependence on the USSR for military supplies and assistance. (Page 3)

In the Philippines, President Marcos appears prepared to take further repressive measures following some signs of opposition to his new constitution. (Page 4)


A major break in the Peronists' ranks has occurred with the resignation of the head of the controlling bloc within the Argentine labor confederation. (Page 5)

In southern Laos, the Communists are mounting strong attacks against Saravane. (Page 6)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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**JORDAN-EGYPT-SYRIA**



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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

### Israeli Air Attacks



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## **ISRAEL-SYRIA**

Israeli aircraft carried out a series of attacks yesterday in a wide-ranging retaliatory action against Syrian Army positions and fedayeen bases in Syria. In one of these actions the Israelis claim to have downed five MIG-21s. Israeli artillery and tank fire, answering an extended Syrian artillery barrage into the Golan Heights, destroyed at least six tanks, according to an Israeli spokesman.

*Since the Munich slayings, Tel Aviv has responded fast and hard to any provocations. The Israelis hold that, whether or not the incidents cause Israeli casualties, to do nothing would only encourage the fedayeen and their Syrian hosts.*

*The border had been relatively quiet from the time of the last heavy air strike into Syria on 21 November until mid-December, when a string of minor incidents began. Three instances of fedayeen and Syrian harassment from 5 to 7 January triggered the latest Israeli action.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

INDIA-USSR

India's three military service chiefs favor  
lessening their country's reliance on the USSR for  
military assistance.

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New Delhi recently vetoed a Soviet  
proposal that would have sent a large number of  
Soviet military training specialists to India.

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Since December 1971 India has contracted  
for some \$300 million worth of arms from  
the USSR, and for smaller amounts from  
Czechoslovakia and the UK. In recent  
months, however, political leaders in  
New Delhi have appeared increasingly  
sensitive to the implications of India's  
political, economic, and military rela-  
tionship with Moscow and have sought ways  
to underscore India's independence.

In looking for Western arms, the Indians  
are concentrating on those items they  
have been unable to obtain from the USSR.  
High on their shopping list are new tac-  
tical strike aircraft to succeed India's  
SU-7s and MIG-21s, as well as an advanced  
bomber and a large guided missile cruiser  
or destroyer.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**PHILIPPINES**

President Marcos appears prepared to take further repressive steps in response to the brief reappearance of public dissent and reports of dissatisfaction with his proposed constitution. He has already reimposed strictures against free speech, which had been eased three weeks ago, and has postponed indefinitely the constitutional referendum.

*Marcos also seems to be moving toward adjournment of representative bodies at all levels. The management of local affairs would then be conducted by "citizens' assemblies" which have been established in every village. Although these assemblies purportedly would function as open meetings, the presence of martial law authorities would ensure their reaching acceptable decisions.*

Marcos has warned that "revolutionary government" may be necessary if opposition senators question his martial law decrees after Congress convenes on 22 January.

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*For the time being, however, Marcos apparently wants simply to intimidate the legislators into adjourning Congress as soon as it convenes.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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**ARGENTINA**

The head of the controlling Peronist bloc within the General Confederation of Labor, Rogelio Coria, has resigned his position following unsuccessful appeals to Juan Peron to reconsider the makeup of the Peronists' slates for the elections in March. Peron and his designated presidential candidate, Hector Campora, had refused to give labor more congressional and provincial candidate slots.

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*Coria's resignation could be the most significant break in the Peronists' ranks to date. Lanusse will do all he can to harness the dissident labor leaders onto Martinez' long-shot candidacy. Martinez' goal is to win at least 15 percent of the vote, which would qualify him to participate in the formation of two slates for the expected runoff election in April. Most workers have been primarily loyal to Peron as a person, however, and may not readily follow their leaders' bidding to switch camps.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTE**

Laos: The Communists are making a determined effort to drive government defenders from Saravane. Elements of the North Vietnamese 968th Division yesterday shelled or assaulted all 11 government battalions defending the southern provincial capital. South of Saravane several irregular battalions were heavily engaged and withdrew to the southwest. Communist infantry units also probed defenses to the north and west.

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*10 January 1973*

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

10 January 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

[Redacted]

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Syria has received substantial materiel from the Soviet Union since last summer, including new SAM and antiaircraft equipment. (Page 2)

Australia's Prime Minister Whitlam has reiterated his firm support for Canberra's alliance with the United States. In defending his decision not to intervene openly in the recent boycott of US shipping, he said such action would have been both illegal and politically unrealistic in view of left-wing pressures within the Labor Party. (Page 3)

Lao Government troops have been driven from Saravane for the third time since they first retook it last October. In the north the shelling of Bouam Long has resumed. (Page 4)

The Cambodian military situation is essentially a stalemate. (Page 5)

The Soviets [Redacted]

(Page 6)

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The Chinese [Redacted]

(Page 6)


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At Annex we examine the stalemated military situation in Cambodia, the inherent instability of the Lon Nol government, and incipient divisions among the insurgents.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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**CHINA**



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**USSR-SYRIA**

Since last summer, when the Soviets began to accelerate deliveries of arms, Syria has received substantial quantities of new SAM and antiaircraft equipment.

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The air force has received at least 18 new aircraft, mostly MIG-21s. The navy has received two Osa guided missile patrol boats, and the army has acquired about 60 T-62 tanks.

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The size of the Soviet military contingent in Syria has increased. Last summer there were approximately 800 Soviet technicians and advisers in Syria. There are now about 1,100

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Some could well be instructors to train the Syrians in the use of their new equipment.

As of now, Syria does not have enough trained pilots to operate the approximately 300 fighter and bomber aircraft in its inventory. The shortage of pilots has been aggravated by recent combat losses to Israel and by a serious air crash in December in which 15 pilots are reported to have been killed. Syria, moreover, has yet to fire a SAM at an attacking aircraft, apparently because its crews are not yet proficient in using the system. We believe that considerable time and further Soviet deliveries will be required before Syria can begin to defend itself properly against the Israelis.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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**AUSTRALIA**



Prime Minister Whitlam, in talking with the US ambassador on 8 January, defended his decision not to intervene openly to head off the seamen's and dockworkers' recent boycott of US shipping. He said such action would have been both illegal and politically unrealistic in view of left-wing pressures within the Labor Party.

Whitlam pointed out that Canberra's position on the boycott--instituted to protest US Vietnam policy--had been complicated by the government's own position on Vietnam. He said the new Labor government had a mandate not only to end Australia's participation in the war but to do what it could to ensure a speedy settlement. He stated that if talks should again be suspended and the war intensified, Canberra would consider initiatives in the United Nations.

*There is considerable anti-war sentiment within the Labor Party, and Whitlam's remarks presumably reflect his own convictions as well as domestic political realities.*

The prime minister concluded his remarks to the ambassador by stressing his firm support for Australia's alliance with the United States and specifically noting that he proposed no changes in existing defense arrangements between the two nations.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**LAOS**

Government units have been forced to withdraw south and west from Saravane although one irregular battalion still holds the airstrip. These troops report that the North Vietnamese have moved anti-aircraft guns into the town.

*This is the third time the irregulars have been driven from Saravane since they first retook it in October 1972. Fighting over Saravane during the past two months has been some of the most intense seen in south Laos. Both sides have taken heavy casualties, and the irregulars have been able to remain in the area only because of continued air support.*

In the north the government is airlifting irregular troops onto Route 13 south of Sala Phou Khoun, a road junction which was seized by the Communists in late December.

*The arrival of these troops will free others to move north again toward the junction. These forces are unlikely to retake Sala Phou Khoun without reinforcements.*

The North Vietnamese resumed shelling of Bouam Long, north of the Plaine des Jarres, on 8 January, and government defenders have sighted company-sized enemy units advancing on the base from the west. Intercepted messages indicate that two more 130-mm. guns have been moved within range of Bouam Long.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**CAMBODIA**


A moderate upsurge in insurgent offensive activity began about 1 January. According to an intercepted Khmer Communist message, it is to continue for at least another week. Most of the activity has been along the roads south of Phnom Penh and on the western and northeastern edges of the capital's defense perimeter. The Cambodian Army has taken some fairly heavy casualties in a few engagements, but it does not appear in immediate danger of losing any important positions.

*The military situation has become essentially a stalemate. We see little likelihood of any significant change until Hanoi has had time to assess its position following a cease-fire in South Vietnam. Even then the prospects for an end to the fighting will still be clouded by a number of factors, including the inherent instability of the Lon Nol government and incipient divisions among the insurgents. These factors are examined in greater detail at Annex.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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**NOTES**

USSR: [redacted]

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China: [redacted]


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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## CAMBODIA



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

### CAMBODIA MARKS TIME

Cambodia, the last of the Indochinese states to become directly involved in the war, faces immense problems in resolving its share of the conflict. As things now stand, a wide political gulf separates the Lon Nol government and the Khmer Communists and efforts to bridge it will be difficult. The Cambodian Army, while capable of containing the insurgent military threat, does not appear ready or able to regain the initiative on the battlefield and recover the large amount of countryside lost during the past two years. Strong external pressure may eventually be required to break the stalemate and force the two sides into serious political negotiations. In the meantime, the shape of things to come is clouded by the inherent instability and disunity of the Phnom Penh regime and by the complicated but obscure relationships and objectives on the insurgent side.

#### Military Stalemate

With the return of most Vietnamese Communist units to South Vietnam during the past year, the struggle in Cambodia has become much more a civil war--a development which in itself makes a settlement more difficult to reach. In the past, Lon Nol has consistently taken the view that most Khmer insurgents are misguided patriots who can be expected to rally to Phnom Penh once Vietnamese Communist forces have been withdrawn. Events may be forcing Lon Nol to back away from this dubious assessment. With the president's apparently reluctant approval, the government is now attempting for the first time to open a high-level dialogue with the insurgents. So far there has been no evidence that the insurgents are ready to respond positively to such probing. Their propaganda continues to oppose any compromise with the Lon Nol government regardless of the nature of settlement prospects in Vietnam and Laos. This attitude has been adopted in large part to accommodate the North Vietnamese, who would prefer to see continued fighting in Cambodia until their own interests in South Vietnam are nailed down.

The insurgents' hard line is also based on their favorable position in the Cambodian countryside. They dominate most of the territory east of the Mekong and north of the Tonle Sap and know that the Cambodian Army cannot readily force them out of most areas they choose to defend. Moreover, the insurgents have begun to demonstrate that they no longer need rely on the Vietnamese Communists to do

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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their fighting. Over the past few months their forces have shown a growing ability to organize and coordinate tactical operations over large areas. Insurgent troops have been largely responsible for the road interdiction campaigns that continue to threaten the supply system to the Cambodian capital. In most cases, these actions are now carried out with only a minimum of assistance from elements of the few Vietnamese Communist units remaining in the country, but the insurgents continue to rely on Peking and Hanoi for most of their military supplies and equipment.

The gradual growth in insurgent military capability is alarming when compared with the government's own uninspired combat performance. Although increasingly better armed and trained than it was in March 1970, the Cambodian Army has lost the enthusiasm and dedication it demonstrated during the early days of the war. One of the few bright spots in the present picture is the effort of Major General Sosthene Fernandez, the recently appointed chief of staff, to do something about the poor leadership, corruption and lack of discipline that plague the army. Any fundamental turnaround in the army's morale and effectiveness, however, will be slow in coming. Since the disastrous collapse a year ago of the large-scale "Chenla II" operation to open Route 6--Phnom Penh's worst defeat of the war--the government has made few vigorous attempts to regain lost ground. If past performance is any indication, the army will remain indefinitely in a defensive posture with the bulk of its forces deployed around population centers and major communication lines.

**Political Question Marks on the Government Side**

The government's lackluster direction of the war has been paralleled by its disappointing political performance. The increasingly isolated Lon Nol has been unable to sustain the broad confidence and respect he enjoyed during the first year of his rule--a fact demonstrated by his narrow victory in last year's presidential election. His reluctance to share authority or modify his arbitrary style has sent former backers like Sirik Matak to the political sidelines and dashed hopes for a unified, broadly based government. At the moment, the machinations of Lon Nol's younger brother, Brigadier General Lon Non, are adding to the political malaise in Phnom Penh. Since Lon Non acquired a cabinet position when the present government was formed last October, he has tried to extend his control over

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

governmental affairs--with the apparent approval of Lon Nol. His efforts to undercut the positions of two key government figures, First Minister Hang Thun Hak and General Fernandez, have already impaired their effectiveness.

Despite the rising level of political discontent, Lon Nol's would-be rivals remain disunited and lack an effective base of political or military support. In these circumstances, the president's health, rather than political opposition, may be the key to the current government's life expectancy.

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[redacted] There are still no logical inheritors of Lon Nol's mantle in sight.

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And for the Opposition

Phnom Penh's political problems and uncertainties may be dwarfed by those existing in the insurgent camp. In any strict sense, the term "Khmer Communist" does not accurately describe the indigenous forces operating under the banner of Sihanouk's Peking-based "Royal Government of National Union." The insurgent movement includes the "Khmer Rumdoh"--non-Communist Cambodians who opposed Sihanouk's ouster in March 1970--and "Khmer Rouge"--left-wing but nationalist-oriented elements who were in opposition to Sihanouk before his removal. The third, and now probably most important faction, is made up of members and followers of the shadowy Cambodian Communist Party. This group is largely made up of those Cambodians who took up residence in North Vietnam at the time of the 1954 Geneva settlement and who have been returning over the past two years to assume prominent positions in the expanding insurgent infrastructure. The insurgent forces allegedly are commanded by three "ministers" of Sihanouk's rump government, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Hou Youn--all of whom were in political opposition to Sihanouk until the late 1960s, when they disappeared. At that time, they were widely believed to have been executed by Sihanouk.

[redacted] a basic national-  
ist-Communist cleavage within the insurgent move-  
ment. This is best reflected in Peking where Si-  
hanouk and his small royalist entourage maintain

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

what appear to be difficult and uncomfortable relations with the Khmer Communist members of the exile government. The apparent leader of the latter group is Ieng Sary, who has a history of leftist activity in Phnom Penh in the 1960s. He then dropped out of sight for several years and finally surfaced in Peking in 1971 as "special envoy from the interior." The treatment and publicity he has received indicate that the Communists expect him eventually to play an important political role in Cambodia.

Sihanouk's future undoubtedly poses the major political problem for the insurgent movement. From all accounts, Sihanouk definitely expects to return to his homeland and serve as chief of state presiding over a coalition regime which includes the Communists. Although the Khmer Communists must appreciate his skills as a propagandist, his ability to attract diplomatic support, and his residual following among the Cambodian peasantry, they must harbor considerable reservation about allowing him to return to Cambodia in any position of real or potential power. Such a reservation is one point of possible common ground between the insurgents and the Lon Nol government, which is adamantly opposed to any solution that would bring Sihanouk back to Cambodia. A political comeback for Sihanouk would be further complicated by the murky status of his relationships with widely divergent Communist movements--the Khmers, the Vietnamese, and the Chinese. (Moscow, through its continuing but superficial support for the Lon Nol government, stands to be the odd man out on the Communist side in any serious deliberations over Cambodia's future.)

Peking has supported and probably will continue to back Sihanouk because of his unwavering regard for the Chinese as Cambodia's chief benefactor and protector and because Sihanouk would represent a hedge against undue North Vietnamese influence over Cambodia. Hanoi is probably less enthusiastic. The Vietnamese Communists have been primarily responsible for training the Khmer insurgent forces, and until recently they have borne the brunt of the fighting. The triumphant return of a Sihanouk openly pointing to his relationship to Peking as a guarantee against Vietnamese encroachment would offer Hanoi little return on this substantial investment.

During the past year, the situation in Cambodia has increasingly taken on the overtones of

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

stalemate. Consequently, all parties concerned may now consider that an end to the Cambodian conflict will eventually require some form of compromise between the existing regime in Phnom Penh and a Communist-dominated insurgency. Until the key question of Sihanouk's role in a political settlement can be thrashed out within the insurgent camp and in Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and Peking, however, it may be easier to go on fighting.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*11 January 1973*

45



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

11 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

North Vietnam is preparing its people for renewed US bombing above the 20th parallel. (Page 1)

President Thieu's decree designed to force South Vietnamese political parties to consolidate is meeting opposition from some politicians. (Page 2)

Soviets  China (Page 3)

25X1  
25X1

President Marcos is getting ready to scrap the 1935 constitution of the Philippines. (Page 4)

The USSR continues to use the Somali port of Berbera for maintenance and supply operations. (Page 5)

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NORTH VIETNAM**

Hanoi apparently believes the US may resume bombing above the 20th parallel. Recent intercepts indicate that North Vietnamese military units have been warned to expect new strikes. A message of 7 January, for instance, states that "there are many signs that the enemy will strike suddenly...to put pressure on the negotiations." Air defense preparations--including the creation of home guard antiaircraft units--are under way, according to Radio Hanoi. On 2 January, the party newspaper stressed that evacuation of cities remained an important task.

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[redacted] in Hanoi [redacted] a local newspaper of 9 January warned the populace to expect an "extremely violent resumption" of the bombings.

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*These warnings seem to be based on the assumption that another impasse in Paris is a strong possibility.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


**SOUTH VIETNAM**

President Thieu's recent decree designed to force South Vietnamese political parties to consolidate has aroused new concern among some politicians. As expected by the government, the politically influential--but non-party--An Quang Buddhists are unhappy with a requirement that all candidates for national office be endorsed by a legal party. An Quang leaders are organizing a new group of elected Buddhist officials, but they have given no indication yet that they will try to turn this group into a legal opposition party. The Buddhists are reluctant to challenge the government but they do not wish to remain on the sidelines with their vital interests at stake.

The Catholics are among the few groups responding positively. Several Catholic factions that have been cooperating in an informal alliance in recent months have decided to try to merge and seek validation as a legal party. Catholic political leaders do not believe such a party can be influential and they hope eventually to ally with non-Catholic groupings.

A number of the country's other political groups are attacking the decree, some complaining they cannot meet its requirements. Only a few are considering mergers. One party leader claims he will ignore the decree and has asked the Supreme Court to overturn it.

*One of Thieu's key lieutenants told US Embassy officers recently that such protests had been expected, but he predicted that after a period of agonizing, most important political factions would either join Thieu's Democracy Party or coalesce into one or two opposition parties. In fact, criticism is confined largely to Saigon politicians, and the decree has not seriously damaged the government's political position with the populace.*




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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**USSR-CHINA**



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


**PHILIPPINES**

President Marcos is seeking to use the newly organized "citizens assemblies" to legitimize his one-man rule. The government has instructed the assemblies to demand that instead of a national referendum, the assemblies themselves should ratify Marcos' new constitution. The assemblies have also been told to recommend that they take over the responsibilities of existing popularly elected bodies, request a seven-year moratorium on popular elections, and seek a postponement of the time when the new parliamentary system goes into effect. They will request that in the meantime Marcos continue ruling through martial law.

*The "citizens assemblies" are government controlled and can be expected to follow these instructions faithfully.*

*Marcos' decision in effect to scrap the present constitution presumably stems from his desire to avoid a constitutional crisis on 22 January, when Congress is scheduled to reconvene. Marcos has been concerned about persistent reports that the Senate would challenge his martial law authority. Although the constitution is sufficiently vague to enable Marcos to suspend the Congress, he apparently believes resort to seemingly democratic action by the assemblies will be more palatable politically.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTES**

USSR-Somalia:

[redacted] seven Soviet naval ships in the port of Berbera--the largest number yet observed there. [redacted] a submarine tied up next to a repair ship in the port. This [redacted] provides further evidence that the Soviets have acquired rights to use Berbera for maintenance and replenishment operations.

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[redacted]  
Warsaw Pact: [redacted] foreign ministers of the pact states will meet in Moscow over the weekend to deal with the resumption next week of the multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the West's invitation to begin talks on force reductions on 31 January. The Romanians, who were not invited to participate in the latter meetings, are lobbying in Western capitals for their inclusion. We expect they will take up the matter in Moscow as well.

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Fedayeen-Israel: [redacted]

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

Nationalist China: [redacted]

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
[redacted]  
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Rhodesia-Zambia: Rhodesia's closure of its northern frontier on Tuesday is intended as a warning to President Kaunda of Zambia to clamp down on guerrillas operating out of his territory, rather than an all-out economic blockade to force him to take such action. Landlocked Zambia's copper exports--half of which are carried to the sea on Rhodesian railroads--will still be allowed to pass the frontier to the economic benefit of both countries. As long as such shipments are permitted, Kaunda is unlikely to curtail his support for anti-Rhodesian insurgents operating out of Zambia.

Australia: The Australian Wheat Board may refuse any more orders for export, even from traditional customers such as England and Japan. A severe drought has reduced harvest yields, and farmers are retaining larger supplies than usual for replanting and local use. The board believes deliveries from farmers this year will barely cover existing export commitments.

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*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*12 January 1973*

*45*

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**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

12 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**



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The South Vietnamese effort to regain territory in the north has upset Communist plans for renewed attacks in some areas. (Page 2)

The enemy has increased its activity in Cambodia in an apparent effort to keep government forces well away from Communist supply lines extending into South Vietnam. (Page 3)




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The UK's NATO allies have offered Malta roughly \$2 million as a compromise settlement, but Prime Minister Mintoff's reaction was noncommittal. (Page 4)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH VIETNAM**


The government's campaign to recapture the Hiep Duc District capital in Quang Tin Province has forced the Communists to shelve plans for operations in the coastal lowlands. According to prisoners captured in nearby Quang Nam Province, all three regiments of a North Vietnamese division that were to carry out the attacks have been diverted to the defense of Hiep Duc and nearby logistics facilities. These facilities constitute an important support base for any main force action in the lowlands.

Government advances toward enemy support and troop assembly points in Quang Tri Province may also be keeping Communist planners off balance there. South Vietnamese success in retaking much of the ground around FSBs Anne and Barbara, for example, apparently prompted the Communists to shift major elements of a North Vietnamese division into the area.

Intercepts continue to reflect Communist concern that the South Vietnamese will soon try to move in force across the Thach Han - Cua Viet river line, which was reached in a government drive last month. North Vietnamese reconnaissance elements have been ordered to keep especially close tabs on all allied activity south of the river.

*Recent gains by South Vietnamese forces north and west of FSB Anne have put them within striking distance of a primary enemy support base in the Ba Long Valley. The need to counter this threat as well as to maintain defenses along the river suggest that the Communists will find it difficult to launch a major campaign at this time.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## CAMBODIA

Communist military activity in the Phnom Penh area is increasing. On Wednesday Khmer Communists forced four government battalions along Route 1 to fall back to the west toward the base at Neak Luong on the Mekong. On the same day, the enemy shelled Neak Luong and its airfield. Yesterday the Communists ousted other government troops from several outposts below Neak Luong and gained control over sections of the Mekong's east bank.

*These are the most significant attacks in this sector since last October, when the Communists thwarted government efforts to move eastward along Route 1 toward the town of Kompong Trabek. The Communists' current operations seem designed to keep the Cambodians well away from Communist supply lines that extend into South Vietnam. They also threaten the vital supply convoys from South Vietnam that move up the Mekong to Phnom Penh.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

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USSR-Somalia: [redacted]

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[redacted]  
Soviet aircraft.


Malta: The UK's NATO allies have offered Malta roughly \$2 million, or about two thirds of the losses in base rental that resulted from the floating of the pound. Mintoff's reaction was noncommittal, but he raised several objections, such as the fact that the proposal covers only 1973, and further talks will be necessary. Another problem is Mintoff's suggestion that, as an assurance against a future pound devaluation, the annual rental payment of \$36.4 million be made in the national currencies of contributing countries rather than in pounds. This would involve changing the basic agreement, something the allies have refused to do.

USSR-China: [redacted]

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
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
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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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# *The President's Daily Brief*

13 January 1973

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
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**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

13 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**



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(Page 2)

The Soviets are trying to improve their relations with the Lao Communists. (Page 3)


New Zealand's new Labor Party government evidently intends to stake out a foreign policy independent of Australia as well as of the US. (Page 4)

President Kaunda's decision not to send Zambia's copper through Rhodesia will hurt the economies of both countries. (Page 5)


*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

SOUTH VIETNAM



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
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
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
*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

JAPAN - NORTH VIETNAM



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-LAOS

The Soviets are trying to improve their relations with the Lao Communists.

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Yesterday, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma told Ambassador Godley that the Soviet ambassador in Laos had asked whether the government would have any objections to his visiting Sam Neua. Souvanna told him he had none.

This would be the first trip to Sam Neua by a Soviet envoy in a number of years. Presumably he would be going to sound out the Pathet Lao directly on prospects for a settlement of the war in Laos. Previously, most Soviet dealings with the Pathet Lao have been either in or through Hanoi. The Soviets have been urging the government side for some time to negotiate seriously toward a peace agreement.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


**NEW ZEALAND**

In a discussion with Chargé Wood on Thursday, Prime Minister Kirk called SEATO outmoded and said it should be replaced by a broader, less military-oriented organization. New Zealand will maintain its membership for the time being, but Kirk said he would refuse to attend any SEATO meeting. Kirk emphasized the importance of the ANZUS alliance, however, and said that he will speak to Australian Prime Minister Whitlam, who visits Wellington next week, of the desirability of continuing the five-power defense arrangement with the UK, Singapore, and Malaysia for another four or five years.

*Kirk's comments indicate that while his new Labor Party government is inclined to diverge in a number of respects from the US foreign policy, it does not intend merely to echo Canberra's brand of independence. Although his views on SEATO are sharper than those Whitlam has expressed, he appears somewhat more relaxed toward the five-power arrangement.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

Zambia Seeks Alternate Transportation Routes



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**RHODESIA-ZAMBIA**

President Kaunda has rejected the Rhodesian Government's offer to permit Zambian copper exports to pass through the border closed on Tuesday to virtually all other traffic. He has ordered a re-routing of the shipments, the source of half his government's revenue and about all of its foreign exchange.

Zambian officials are counting on using an improved road system to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, but they appear to have overestimated the capacity of that port. The economies of both Rhodesia and Zambia will be hurt. Perhaps most important, it will now be politically difficult for Prime Minister Smith to back down from his closure of the frontier, an act that had been intended as a warning to Kaunda to stop raids into Rhodesia by Zambian-based insurgents.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTE**

Bangladesh: The USIS building in Dacca, occupied early last week by students protesting US bombing in North Vietnam, has been restored to US control with the help of the government. Normal USIS operations have not yet been resumed, but the students did little damage. Several key officials of the ruling Awami League have recently taken a less anti-American line and have apparently decided to focus instead on domestic political opponents.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*15 January 1973*

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

15 January 1973


PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviets have supplied the North Vietnamese with low-altitude SA-3 surface-to-air missile equipment for the first time. (Page 1)

Government control of food distribution promises to become a major election issue in Chile. (Page 2)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**SA-3 Missile Canisters at Dong Dang**



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR - NORTH VIETNAM

[redacted] SA-3 surface-to-air missile equipment in North Vietnam for the first time. The equipment, spotted at the Dong Dang transshipment area [redacted] includes at least 70 SA-3 missile canisters.

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As yet no SA-3 electronic equipment [redacted] have been identified in North Vietnam, suggesting the SA-3 system is not operational. No SA-3 equipment was spotted at Dong Dang [redacted] indicating that the weapon has only recently arrived in the country.

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The SA-3 is manufactured only in the USSR. The Soviet decision to provide SA-3s to North Vietnam must have been made many months ago, perhaps in connection with the trip to Hanoi by Marshal Batitsky, chief of Soviet air defense forces, in March 1972. North Vietnamese technicians would have had to undergo a training program, perhaps lasting up to six months, to learn how to operate the system before the equipment was delivered.

When it becomes operational, the SA-3 will represent an increased threat to aircraft flying at low altitudes over North Vietnam.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**CHILE**

*The government's announcement last week that it will take over all wholesale and most retail sales of basic food commodities is likely to become a major issue in the ongoing election campaign. Although not described as such, in effect the move will amount to food rationing.*

Opposition politicians are up in arms about the announcement, some falsely claiming that Allende is trying to provoke disorders of sufficient magnitude that he could cancel the 4 March parliamentary election. So far, however, the opposition has yet to surface a legislative program to challenge the government's new policy.

The military cabinet ministers, speaking as members of the armed forces, have disassociated themselves from the partisan political manner in which the government spokesman announced the plan, but support the idea of curbing hoarding, speculation, and blackmarketeering as a means of ending chronic shortages throughout the country.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## NOTES

Malta: Malta has now agreed to accept the first rental installment for 1973 (3.5 million pounds) plus the additional compensation offered by the NATO allies to make up for losses that resulted from the floating of the pound. This assures that the base agreement will remain in force through the first quarter of the year, while efforts continue to resolve the remaining differences. Most important is Prime Minister Mintoff's concern over compensation for possible future devaluations, but there are also relatively minor questions such as security clearances for Maltese personnel working on British bases.

Morocco: The execution Saturday of 11 air force officers and enlisted men for their leading roles in the coup attempt last August is expected to increase enmity toward King Hassan. Many Moroccans thought the King would spare the plotters, but he may have concluded that his position would have been eroded further by a failure to act harshly. Resentment over the executions is likely to be strongest among the Berber element of the armed forces. Many Berbers resent the country's predominately Arabized political and social elite, and a majority of the pilots involved in last year's plot, as well as many of those behind the July 1971 plot against Hassan, were Berbers.

25X1  
25X1

Philippines: President Marcos is moving to create a so-called "revolutionary government." [ ] he has called for a meeting on Wednesday of a new national-level citizens' assembly that will include governors, mayors, heads of local citizens' assemblies, and representatives of civic associations. Marcos may ask this group--which he will designate as representative of the will of the people--to suspend Congress, and perhaps the Supreme Court as well. In the meantime, he has ordered provincial commanders of the constabulary to be more vigorous in supervising the activities of local politicians and to be prepared to assume broader political functions.

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*16 January 1973*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

16 January 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In South Vietnam, two North Vietnamese artillery battalions near Da Nang have passed orders relating to an impending cease-fire date. Meanwhile, the fight for Hiep Duc is shaping up as a major battle. (Page 1)

Rail shipments from the USSR to North Vietnam continue at high levels despite transportation difficulties within China. (Page 2)

The Chinese are seeking to block increased Japanese economic cooperation with the USSR. (Page 3)

In discussions with President Pompidou last week, party chief Brezhnev voiced displeasure over the inconclusive wrangling during the first round of the preparatory talks on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. (Page 4)

French

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
(Page 5)

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Thai Prime Minister Thanom has announced that he plans to step down as armed forces supreme commander in August--a shift that could have considerable importance over the long run. (Page 8)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

### SOUTH VIETNAM


Two North Vietnamese artillery battalions near Da Nang have passed orders relating to an impending cease-fire date, which "both we and the enemy know." In messages sent yesterday, subordinate units were told to prepare for orders to strike--in one battalion the unit is to use up all rounds by the given day and time.

The fight for the district town of Hiep Duc, meanwhile, is shaping up as a major battle. South Vietnamese forces pushing toward the town against determined enemy resistance now control two strategic highpoints on the northeastern approaches. The three combat regiments of the North Vietnamese 711th Division, supported by artillery and provincial units, are hanging on to their strong defensive positions ringing the town.

There have been substantial enemy losses in the past few days. Intercepts show that enemy ammunition stocks have been destroyed, and that the Communists have had to revamp their plans for countering the South Vietnamese advance.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

### Rail Routes Through China to North Vietnam



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**USSR - CHINA - NORTH VIETNAM**

[redacted] almost 500 railcars and locomotives at Man-chou-li, the main Sino-Soviet transit point--a figure previously equaled only last July [redacted]

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[redacted] At the Sino-Mongolian station of Erh-lien-hao-te almost 500 cars and locomotives were also noted-- [redacted]

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The presence of [redacted] railcars indicates increased use of the border crossing points for Soviet cargoes bound for North Vietnam.

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Soviet grain and petroleum products account for a large portion of these increased shipments.

Transportation difficulties within China occasionally have hampered deliveries to Vietnam. In December some shipments of Chinese foodstuffs were delayed, and this month the delivery of rice and maize is being held up.

Although China lacks enough freight cars to meet all requirements, the shortage almost certainly is not delaying the shipment of essential war supplies.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**CHINA-JAPAN-USSR**

During the visit to Peking of Japanese Trade Minister Nakasone, which begins tomorrow, the Chinese expect to be extremely blunt in warning of the dangers for Tokyo of an expansion of economic co-operation with Moscow.

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At the same time, the Chinese are dangling the prospect of a further expansion in the already high level of Sino-Japanese trade. Negotiations are apparently close to conclusion for Peking to purchase one and perhaps two entire Japanese synthetic materials plants financed by five-year Japanese Exim Bank loans at a low interest rate.

*Since the Cultural Revolution Peking has accepted only short-term commercial credits.*

*While the Chinese obviously see Japan as critical in their competition with the Soviet Union, they are still likely to proceed cautiously in their economic diplomacy. Tokyo is already China's largest trading partner, and Peking will remain wary of becoming so closely entangled with Japan as to risk economic dependence on Asia's strongest industrial power. At the same time, the Chinese will almost certainly avoid going to the other extreme of overreacting if Japan actually consummates its Siberian deal with Moscow.*

*These limitations on Peking's options could benefit Tokyo in its dealings with both the Soviet Union and China.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**USSR-FRANCE**

The French ambassador in Moscow briefed Ambassador Beam yesterday on the meetings last week between President Pompidou and party leader Brezhnev.

Brezhnev professed to be very unhappy over the inconclusive wrangling during the first round of the preparatory talks on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He complained that the big powers had not exerted their "moral authority," thus permitting those "with fewer responsibilities" to try to take the lead.

*Brezhnev was more pointed in his recent talks with Finnish President Kekkonen when he specifically blasted the Romanians and tried to get the Finnish chairman to control the talks more effectively.*

Brezhnev did hint that the Soviets may propose confidence-building measures more attractive to the smaller countries. He remained insistent, however, that the conference be completed as soon as possible and that it end with a summit-level meeting.


Brezhnev reiterated Soviet interest in the strict separation of the CSCE from the forthcoming talks on mutual and balanced force reductions. Pompidou was noncommittal on Brezhnev's call for French participation in the force reduction talks.

Commenting on US-Soviet relations, Brezhnev said there had been "no basic change" since the May summit, although "progress had been more deliberate than at first thought." He said his visit to the US would be made at the "most appropriate time," and that the schedule would be influenced by the international situation, US-Soviet relations, and domestic demands on his time. Brezhnev told the French it is now possible to envisage a Vietnam agreement and stressed that the USSR strongly desires this result.

Brezhnev admitted to Pompidou that he had been ill last autumn and absent from his duties for about two months. He seems fully back in good health now. He was relaxed and showed plenty of stamina in long sessions with Pompidou.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FRANCE



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


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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

[redacted] the Soviets have assembled another new radar at the launch complex where a new Soviet ABM system has been under development since 1970.

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This radar is similar in most respects to one that was installed at an adjacent site in the complex in late 1970. We believe that each of these radars is capable of tracking more targets simultaneously than the type associated with the Galosh ABM system at Moscow.


The missile for the new ABM system has slightly higher acceleration than the Galosh, but lacks the fast reaction capability of the US Sprint. It was last flight-tested in December 1971. [redacted]

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Two Soviet Shipyards Producing  
D-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines



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[redacted] 25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR



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We expect both yards to shift fully to production of the D-class. There should be about seven launches in each of the next two years, and most of these will be D's.

The D-class is designed to carry 12 SS-NX-8 missiles, which have a range of 4,300 nautical miles. The first D-class unit was launched early last year, and has been undergoing sea trials. We expect that it will be fully operational by the end of this year.

Deployment of the D-class will significantly expand the targeting and launching options open to Soviet naval planners. Even from the submarines' bases, almost any area of the US is within range.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THAILAND**

Prime Minister Thanom has announced that he plans to step down as armed forces supreme commander in August.

*This shift--disclosed seven months in advance--could have considerable importance over the long run. General Praphat, who shares authority in the Thai regime with Thanom, was named to the top post, which is largely ceremonial. This clears the way for the number two man in the army, General Krit Sivara, to replace Praphat as army commander. It would be the clearest indication thus far that the aging Thanom and Praphat are beginning to lay the groundwork for an orderly transfer of power to a trusted member of the military leadership. Krit is politically ambitious and popular within the business circles and the military.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTE**

USSR: Last night the unmanned lunar probe that was launched from Tyuratam on 8 January soft landed on the moon after orbiting it for about three days. The probe apparently carried a self-propelled rover vehicle similar to the one that was placed on the moon in November 1970.

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The earlier rover vehicle operated on the moon for more than ten months

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*17 January 1973*

*45*

~~*Top Secret*~~<sup>25X1</sup>

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declassification schedule of E.O. 14176  
exemption category: 5b(1), (2), (3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

17 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

A South Vietnamese [redacted] tells us that the Communists have established a special command for Saigon and vicinity in order to cope with post-cease-fire developments. The new command is to direct political as well as military operations.

(Page 1)


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The North Vietnamese continue to move tanks, artillery, and supplies toward South Vietnam. (Page 2)

President Marcos today completed his moves to legitimize his one-man rule of the Philippines. He signed into law the new constitution but said he would continue to rule by martial law. (Page 3)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

Viet Cong Military Region 4



554009 1-73 CIA

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

The Communists have established a special command for Saigon and its immediately surrounding area in order to cope with post-cease-fire developments,

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[redacted] The new command, designated Military Region 4, includes Saigon's 11 precincts and eight adjoining districts.

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[redacted] the Communists are putting high-level, trusted cadre in the administrative positions.


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The new command will direct political as well as military operations. Political agents are to be given either "strategic" or "tactical" assignments in accordance with their capabilities and access. A new military division, probably made up of elements from existing divisions, will be assigned to MR 4. An artillery regiment reportedly will be included, and at least one infantry battalion and a sapper company will be located in each district.

[redacted] the Communists are also setting up another command, which he calls the "Eastern Nam Bo Military Region," in five provinces lying to the north and east of Saigon. This command is to provide support through Cambodia for military operations in the new MR 4.

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NORTH VIETNAM**

The North Vietnamese continue to move tanks, artillery, and supplies toward South Vietnam.

Over 200 tanks, the first of which began moving south in October, are now spread from southern North Vietnam to southern Laos. Intercepted messages indicate that they are destined for southern MR 1, the central highlands and coastal provinces of MR 2, and the COSVN area. A small number of tanks had entered Quang Tri Province by last weekend.

Over 20,000 tons of supplies and equipment--about 40 percent of it ordnance--were moving through the North Vietnam panhandle in December and early January, according to intercepted communications. Additional supplies are going through the Laotian panhandle. Antiaircraft battalions in that area have been alerted to protect large numbers of vehicles moving southward.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**PHILIPPINES**

President Marcos today completed his moves to legitimize and extend indefinitely his one-man rule by signing into law the new constitution. He told a "people's congress" of officials and civic leaders that the document had been ratified by the action of local citizens' assemblies which have been in session for the past week. Marcos assumed the offices of president and prime minister, but said he would continue to rule by martial law rather than convene the new national assembly.

*Marcos acted at this time in order to head off a brewing Congressional challenge to his authority. Lacking any constitutional forum, the political opposition now has little recourse but to bow to the President's authoritarian course. Most signs point to a rising level of public disenchantment with his proclaimed "New Society," however. If the trend continues, Marcos may find it impossible to avoid further repressive measures that would increase his dependence on the armed forces.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTES**



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Chile: A two-day strike at the Chuquicamata copper mine is the most serious of the growing protests over food shortages. The loss of even two days' output at Chuquicamata, which produces 30 percent of Chile's copper, means a loss of substantial foreign exchange earnings needed to buy food for increasingly short-tempered consumers.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*18 January 1973*


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exemption category 5B(1),(2)(3)  
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

LATE ITEM



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

18 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

On *Page 1*, we note that the Vietnamese Communists are evidently moving on both political and military fronts in anticipation of a cease-fire. Indications of Communist military preparations for a cease-fire are discussed in detail at Annex.

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	British				25X1
				(Page 2)	25X1
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In Chile  the military is increasingly frustrated over its dwindling voice in the government. (*Page 3*)

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**VIETNAM**

The Vietnamese Communists are evidently moving on the political as well as the military fronts in anticipation of a cease-fire. The Viet Cong's Liberation Radio reports, for instance, that the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Revolutionary Government met last week and decided that the single most important task now is to strengthen ties with non-Communist opponents of the Thieu government.


*This foreshadows a greater emphasis on united front tactics in the post-cease-fire period.*

*We continue to receive indications from a variety of sources on Communist military preparations for a cease-fire. These are discussed in detail at Annex.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


WEST GERMANY - UK - FRANCE



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHILE

[redacted] the military's frustration over its role in the cabinet came to a head last week when the government announced stringent new economic controls without consulting the military cabinet members. The [redacted]

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Allende [redacted] spent little time trying to mollify the officers. He reminded them that they knew that his was a Marxist government when they agreed to join the cabinet in November.

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The military's dilemma over its growing identification with--but dwindling voice in--a controversial government is difficult to resolve. There is considerable sentiment in the armed forces in favor of withdrawal, but also a feeling of responsibility for guaranteeing free elections in March. [redacted]

[redacted] some officers fear that if the military pulled out, its budget would suffer. [redacted]

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

Cambodia: Government forces have reoccupied both banks of the Mekong River south of Neak Luong. With the waterway back under government control, regular supply convoys are resuming their run up the Mekong from South Vietnam to Phnom Penh.

Fedayeen: Yasir Arafat was re-elected last week as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization executive committee. The newly elected ten-man committee includes at least one representative from each of the PLO member groups. Arafat's Fatah, which previously dominated the committee, lost two seats in a shuffle reflecting long-standing dissatisfaction with Arafat's policies. The more representative distribution of seats suggests a new effort by the fragmented Palestinian organizations to move toward unity, but none of the fedayeen's problems was resolved.

China-Guyana: 

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## VIETNAM: PREPARING FOR A CEASE-FIRE

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A variety of intelligence sources show the Communists continue to keep their forces in a position of readiness for a military push on the eve of a possible cease-fire announcement. They apparently anticipate a period of uncertainty and confusion accompanying the cease-fire among both the populace and some government military forces, and hope to take advantage of it. If a cease-fire occurred in the period of the lengthy Tet festivities in early February, the Communists might expect the government's guard to be further lowered. The Communists' motive, of course, would be to strengthen their territorial position in advance of an in-place stand-down by the military units of both sides. It is evident that the Communists will be trying to tie any operations very closely to the actual implementation of a cease-fire, hoping thereby to block government efforts to retake lost ground after a truce goes into effect.

Communist preparations are evident [redacted] and in the deployment of enemy military forces. [redacted] enemy troops are being told by higher headquarters to maintain themselves at combat readiness in order to take the offensive immediately after the order is given. Intercepted messages of the past few days contain orders for the preparation of munitions, for reconnaissance, and for other support activities usually undertaken prior to offensive operations. Intercepts indicate that in MR-3, and possibly in other areas, additional enemy units have been moved into South Vietnam from Cambodia.

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The North Vietnamese continue to move tanks, artillery, and supplies toward South Vietnam. Much of this materiel is needed to replace stocks lost in the course of the Communist offensive in 1972. It could be intended to increase the level of equipment and supplies before inventories are frozen in connection with a cease-fire. Even so, the materiel, along with this dry season's infiltrators, will substantially bolster the Communists' ability to mount and sustain major operations over the near term. In the absence of heavy combat activity throughout much of the country during the past several months, many enemy main force units have been actively engaged in resupply and refitting. The main forces

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

have also attempted throughout most areas of the country to stay near populated areas which provide lucrative targets, rather than pull back into deep base areas or into winter quarters in Cambodia or Laos.

In northern South Vietnam, the combat potential of Communist forces just south of the DMZ is probably higher than at any time since early last summer. In the central highlands, the Communists have recently carried out limited offensive operations and, after achieving some of their objectives, we doubt that they are ready to mount a high level of operations any time soon. Along the central coast, Communist main force units are likely to have recovered somewhat from their losses in offensive operations late last summer and could undertake a fairly high level of operation. In MR-3, Communist forces are probably, on the whole, no stronger than they were at the time of the October offensive. In the delta, enemy forces have been attempting to refit, although there has not been much evidence of concentration for offensive operations.

[redacted] inconsistent as to just how strong an offensive the Communists might attempt in conjunction with announcement of a cease-fire. Some reports describe general orders for an all-out assault including most of those main forces that were not involved in the abortive and understrength enemy cease-fire offensive last October. Other reports, particularly from the area of MR-3, indicate that the Communists plan only fairly limited offensive action--about on a par with the level of last October. The latter reports usually give heavy stress to the substantial losses the enemy has suffered in some areas since October in attempting to maintain his forces close to populated areas. It seems most likely, based on the physical evidence of their military preparations, that the Communists hope to launch countrywide attacks on a level well above last October's, but short of an all-out effort. The enemy realizes that he must preserve much of his strength for the post-cease-fire period, or risk being gradually overcome by the government.

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Although we doubt that the Communists could overrun any major population centers, some district capitals and a number of villages and hamlets near Communist strongholds are vulnerable to enemy penetration. Rather than trying direct, heavy assaults

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
**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

on the pattern of the 1972 offensive, the Communists might attempt to break down some of the North Vietnamese main force units into small elements for use with the Viet Cong in local attacks. Small-scale but widespread assaults, backed by artillery, against lightly defended population centers and government installations could complicate the government's defensive response. In their premature October offensive, the Communists were unable to retain overrun areas for longer than a few days whenever heavily challenged by government forces. An offensive timed to a cease-fire, however, would be calculated to relieve them of the need to hold off prolonged counter-attacks.

For their part, government forces now appear to be in a stronger combat position than in October. The army has replaced most of the manpower losses it sustained during the Communists' 1972 offensive and has gone over to relatively aggressive combat operations in several sectors of the country. The most important government gains have come in the far north where, despite the enemy's rebuilding effort, Saigon's forces have pushed the Communists back from some of the positions which provided access to the populated lowlands. These operations have kept the enemy on the defensive.

The South Vietnamese are well aware that the Communists may try a cease-fire offensive, and they have deployed their forces with considerable care to deal with the possibility. Nevertheless, the Communists are in a position to cause substantial trouble for the government if they do attempt a major series of cease-fire attacks.

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*19 January 1973*

45



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

19 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**



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French President Pompidou's electoral coalition is still trailing the Communist-Socialist alliance in the opinion polls. (*Page 2*) At Annex we examine the current state of the campaign.

On *Page 3*, we report on Chancellor Brandt's second inaugural address.

The implications of the Soviet and East European response to the Western invitation for talks on force reductions are examined on *Page 4*.

Moscow is still trying to enhance its influence in Laos. (*Page 5*)

Singapore

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(*Page 6*)

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Peru may begin buying Soviet military equipment on generous credit terms. (*Page 7*)

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NORTH VIETNAM**



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FRANCE**

With the first round of the National Assembly elections little more than six weeks away, the polls still show the Pompidolian coalition behind the Communist-Socialist alliance. The governing coalition--though outwardly confident--is off to a slow start as it casts about for ways to improve its prospects.

*At this stage, it looks like President Pompidou will get something less than the clear-cut personal affirmation which a strong coalition victory would bring him.*

*[redacted] he is resigned to the loss of some hundred seats in the Assembly, which would leave the coalition with only a small majority. He fears that a last-minute "whim" of the voters could even result in defeat for the coalition. At Annex we examine the current state of the campaign.*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**WEST GERMANY**

Chancellor Brandt made his second inaugural address yesterday, stressing that the Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of West German security and that a US presence is indispensable for Europe. Brandt turned aside strong pressures to criticize American conduct in Vietnam, but confirmed that he is prepared to aid both parts of Vietnam after a cease-fire.

The Chancellor would like to see the powers of the European Parliament broadened, and suggested that his government will work for full European political union. Brandt prophesied that with "tenacity and a sense of purpose" detente could become a reality. In this context, he said that West Germany will improve relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe, placing priority on reconciliation with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, but also seeking new areas of cooperation with East Germany.

Brandt listed European inflation and international monetary reform as two international problems having a serious domestic impact. He avoided offering specific solutions to these problems or to any others, perhaps recalling his first inaugural speech, when he offered specific legislative proposals that later failed to pass in the parliament.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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
The USSR and its allies, in agreeing to take part in talks on force reductions in Europe, have added that the talks should be open to "other European states that indicate an appropriate interest." The Hungarian official who presented his government's note made it clear that this formulation does not exclude neutrals.

*This position, reached during the Warsaw Pact meetings earlier this week, should meet Romania's desire for broad participation in the talks and places the burden on the West for excluding any interested European state.*

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
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The Warsaw Pact proposals on participation apply, as do the Western proposals, only to the forthcoming preparatory talks, not the actual negotiations planned to get under way next autumn.

The Pact countries proposed Vienna as the site for the preparatory talks whereas the West had put forward Geneva.

*Most Western countries are not likely to object to Vienna, and some prefer it because other disarmament talks are being held in Geneva.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Following the latest Lao negotiating session on 16 January, Soviet Counselor Grushin called at the US Embassy for a review of the talks. He said that Moscow expects a Vietnam "settlement" to be announced in the near future and that this would lead to "an early cease-fire" in Laos. He noted the absence of an attack on Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in the latest Communist statement at the talks, and he implied that his embassy had something to do with this. Grushin also suggested that it would be useful for the US and Soviet embassies in Vientiane to maintain substantive contact, "now that the contest is being transferred from the battlefield to the negotiating table and eventually into the political arena."

*The Soviets recently have been seeking to improve their relations with both the government and the Communists. They apparently see fresh opportunities in the current situation to enhance their limited influence in Laos vis-a-vis that of the Chinese and the North Vietnamese.*


Meanwhile military activity is continuing at approximately the same level of the past several weeks. On Wednesday, enemy ground attacks and shellings dispersed two government battalions from positions some 15 miles southeast of Thakhek, a provincial capital.

*This action may be designed to divert government attention while other North Vietnamese forces to the east complete their preparations for a push along Route 9 to retake Muong Phalane.*

Farther south, lead elements of a 3,000-man government force are moving back toward the provincial capital of Saravane, from which they were ousted last week. Opposition has been light so far, but is likely to increase as the government force nears the town. Despite heavy air strikes, the North Vietnamese 968th Division and an anti-aircraft regiment remain in the area and there are indications that another regiment recently arrived there from North Vietnam.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

SINGAPORE - SOUTHEAST ASIA



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**PERU-USSR**

The Soviets are making a strong pitch to sell military equipment to the Peruvian Government. Prospects are strong that the Peruvians will buy four Soviet MI-8 helicopters. The Soviets are said to be offering generous credit terms for this and other military equipment in a bid to conclude their first military sales in South America.

*Soviet interest in Peru is also evident in the impending signature of contracts for new Soviet economic aid and the recent Soviet agreement to assist in preparatory work for the huge Olmos hydroelectric and irrigation project in northern Peru.*

Peru's access to US military equipment has been thrown in doubt since 12 December, when the seizure of a US fishing boat caused suspension of Peru's eligibility under the Foreign Military Sales program. Since then Peru seems to have declared open season on US tuna boats operating within its claimed 200-mile territorial sea.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## THE FRENCH ELECTION CAMPAIGN

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The Gaullist party, faced with its first campaign without de Gaulle, confronts a real challenge from the Communist-Socialist-left Radical alliance in the National Assembly elections scheduled for 4 and 11 March. Except for inflation, on which the government is clearly vulnerable, neither side has been able to find a campaign issue that has caught fire with the electorate. The government, plagued by 18 months of scandals and internal dissension and now handicapped by lackluster campaigning, is off to a slow start. The left, in contrast, has put on a good show of unity in the last several months and has managed to capture the headlines on more than one occasion. These factors, coupled with the news that retail prices rose in November at the highest rate since January 1969, drove the Pompidolians to a new low--and the left to an eight-point lead--in polls taken early last month. While the most recent poll shows the gap has narrowed, the governing coalition has a number of difficulties to overcome in retaining control of the National Assembly.

### The Gaullist Coalition

President Pompidou's ouster of controversial Jacques Chaban-Delmas as premier last June in favor of Gaullist purist Pierre Messmer gave the coalition a greater sense of cohesion, but rifts remain and sometimes come into the open. In December, for example, it became clear that relations among the heads of the three parties--the Gaullist Union of Democrats for the Republic, the Independent Republicans, and a small centrist party--were growing more acrimonious. Gaullist party chief Alain Peyrefitte came under heavy fire for his inability to make decisions and his lack of vision in planning election strategy. Pompidou was forced to intervene personally to warn party leaders against narrow partisanship in the face of growing support for the united left. Despite this admonition, it took weeks of semi-public wrangling for the coalition to agree on single candidates in most of the election districts. While the lion's share of those selected are members of the Gaullist party, the lineup represents a more equitable distribution than in previous years. More importantly, the agreement means the right will pose a single opponent to the left in some 433 electoral districts out of 490.

(continued)

A1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Sticky charges of corruption among the Gaullists are another cause of friction within the coalition. In early September, the latest scandal broke--one of a series that has surfaced almost continuously since mid-1971 explicitly or implicitly involving Gaullists in fraud, abuse of public confidence, influence peddling, extortion, or outright theft. The government has been able to dampen publicity on the latest incident, but the scandals have compromised the party's image after 11 untainted years under de Gaulle. While their impact has been blunted by official moves to investigate and correct the irregularities, additional revelations could surface at any time with damaging electoral repercussions.

The government clearly is in trouble over inflation. With prices increasing at the highest rate in ten years, the Pompidolians have reason to remember that the French electorate traditionally votes its concerns on bread-and-butter issues. Paris announced new measures aimed at slowing inflation in December, but they are not likely to have much effect--certainly not before the election. Pompidou feels he must avoid anything so unpopular as wage controls, which might be more effective. Government leaders are attempting to minimize the political impact of the price increases by stressing that other industrialized nations also suffer from inflation, some to a greater extent than France, and that the competitive position of French exports thus far has not been imperiled. These explanations have not impressed the voters, and the opposition is getting a lot of campaign mileage out of the "alarming" economic situation.

Voter apathy may also be a problem for the Gaullists and their partners. The elections will in no way be a rerun of 1968, when public reaction to the mid-year student and labor crisis helped swell the Gaullist vote to record proportions. A high rate of abstention would tend to hurt the Pompidolians because the leftists--in particular the Communists--are highly efficient in getting their voters to the polls. Because there is no issue on which the left and right are presenting clear-cut opposing programs, the government coalition has had a tough time demonstrating the superiority of its policies. Finding the opposition an elusive target, it has resorted to the time-honored campaign theme of the dangers of giving power to the left. Although government spokesmen loudly trumpet that only an anti-Communist regime can maintain France's special, but independent, relationship with the USSR, polls show that the left no longer appears as a bogey to the middle-of-the-road voter.

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

The United Left

Having gotten off to a slow and discordant start after signing a precedent-setting "common accord for governing" last spring, the leftists had by November shown they could give the government a good run for its money. More tightly organized than the ruling coalition, the leftist alliance--composed of the Socialists, the Communists, and the left Radicals--has been better able temporarily to submerge deep-seated differences in the interest of the campaign.

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Although there appears to be no personal rivalry between Communist leader Georges Marchais and Socialist chief Francois Mitterrand, most French Communists regard the Socialist leader with deep suspicion. Moreover, his obvious aspiration to the presidency in 1976 must cause some tension. Mitterrand is recognized by the French electorate as a shrewd opportunist, but also as the man who gave de Gaulle a close run in the 1965 presidential race and pulled the left together last year.

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Twice in the past five months, Mitterrand has put the Communists on the spot while gaining publicity for himself. A regional meeting of the Socialist International in Paris last weekend, which Israeli leader Golda Meir attended, increased Mitterrand's stature as a national and international figure. Earlier, in August, Mitterrand publicly exchanged insults with the Soviet ambassador over Jewish emigration from the USSR and Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia. In both cases the French Communists, boxed in by their own ambiguous position and their conflicting loyalties, came off a poor second.

Mitterrand is anathema to the Soviets, who see him as personally ambitious rather than devoted primarily to the course of leftist unity. For Moscow, the alliance of the French Communists with such a person illustrates the underlying inconsistency of their current position. The Communists must keep their ideological fences mended with Moscow while emphasizing at home their willingness to abide by the rules of democracy if they win. They must sustain their opposition to the governing coalition while struggling against Moscow's clear preference for a continuing relationship with the Gaullists.

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

The speech of Kremlin ideologist Suslov at the French Communist Congress last month implied Soviet reservations about the joint leftist program. Soviet party chief Brezhnev subsequently met with Marchais in Moscow, but there is no indication that the Soviets will go out of their way to assist the leftist campaign. In fact, by continuing to cite Franco-Soviet relations as a model for other West European nations and by scheduling the Brezhnev-Pompidou meeting for last week, Moscow is making it clear that it would prefer to deal with a Gaullist government.

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[redacted]  
[redacted] Pres-

ident Pompidou will attempt to exploit his Russian trip as an indication of his government's ability to deal with the USSR, but since the visit centered on foreign policy issues, he may not get much campaign mileage out of it. The timing of the visit irritated the French Communists, who were still smarting from the recent official visit to France of Marshal Grechko, which they also thought ill-timed.

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Center Split

The key to the March elections may rest with centrist politicians who have remained outside the government fold, and with middle-of-the-road and uncommitted voters. The present grouping of the electoral field into two major alliances may result in more winners in the first round than in the last election. In districts in which no candidate gains an absolute majority of first-round votes, however, centrists who choose to run in the second round could drain votes from the governing coalition and thereby indirectly aid the leftists. Where centrist voters are faced with a choice between a Pompidolian and a leftist candidate, a decision will be difficult for many of them.

If Pompidou loses a significant portion of his legislative majority, he will have the option of formally inviting centrists into his coalition or of developing an informal working relationship with some centrist legislators. Anticipating this possibility, the centrists are pulled in two directions. Although they could attempt to form a center-left bloc, most would prefer to enter the present governing coalition--a move which would reunite the old centrist bloc. Some, however, still have lingering hopes of translating into reality their dream of a true centrist government and are hesitant about being co-opted into the Pompidolian fold.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

Polls Not Prophecy

Preferences measured in the polls do not necessarily forecast the French voting pattern. In the latest poll, for instance, although 43 percent favored the opposition, only 17 percent of those questioned thought the left alliance would actually win a majority. Fifty-one percent predicted the Gaullists and their partners would continue to govern in a coalition enlarged to include the centrists, who have been receiving about 14 percent of the votes in the polls. The French traditionally vote in the first round against their grievances and in the second against their fears. This could work in favor of the governing coalition if it can arouse latent, though evidently diminishing, public fears that victorious leftists would radically change the French system. If the campaigning gets rough, the governing coalition will be tempted to exploit allegations that Marchais and Mitterrand were Nazi collaborators, but these charges are hard to prove. The leftists would likely respond to this with sharpened attacks on the more immediate issue of corruption among coalition officials.

The central theme of the ruling coalition's campaign is support for President Pompidou and his policies. Pompidou of course would like a clear personal affirmation, which would cancel the less than enthusiastic response to his referendum in April on enlargement of the European Communities. He is not de Gaulle, however, and the length of his coat-tails will be measured on 4 and 11 March.

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*20 January 1973*

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*Top Secret<sup>25X1</sup>*

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 14176  
exemption category 5B(1)(2)(3)  
declassified only on approval of  
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

20 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**


Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma says that he does not intend to seek the withdrawal of the Chinese road-building force in northwest Laos as part of an agreement with the Communists. (Page 1)

Chilean President Allende has temporarily shifted his office to a nationalized textile plant in the Santiago slums in an attempt to dramatize the strength of his lower class support. (Page 2)

Hostility toward King Hassan of Morocco continues to grow and some dissidents are turning to Algeria in search of support. (Page 3)

Zambia is seeking to ease its dispute with Rhodesia. (Page 3)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**LAOS-CHINA**

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has told French officials in Vientiane that he does not intend to seek the withdrawal of the Chinese road-building force in northwest Laos as part of an agreement with the Lao Communists.

Souvanna said that he would discuss the road building with Peking later this year, but that the talks would not be in the context of the 1962 Geneva accord that forbids the stationing of foreign troops in Laos. Souvanna added that he opposes taking action to stop the road work because the system being constructed is "basically useful" to Laos, and he indicated a willingness to consider the work as a form of economic aid.

*Souvanna recently has been showing great interest in obtaining Chinese assistance in resolving the Lao conflict. His willingness to accept a continued Chinese role in northwestern Laos is meant to keep the way open for this policy.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CHILE**

President Allende temporarily shifted his office on Thursday to a nationalized textile plant in the Santiago slums.

Although billed as a send-off for the new controls over consumer goods distribution, the carefully publicized move is more likely meant to emphasize the strength of his lower class support. Allende's grandstand play seems intended to impress military officers, particularly service chiefs and cabinet ministers who have shown concern about their inability to curb his more radical programs and officials.

At the same time, Allende seems determined to keep a well-circumscribed military presence in his cabinet.

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

Morocco: Hostility toward King Hassan continues to grow. Some of the court hangers-on and influence seekers are distancing themselves from the monarch, and others are said to be engaging in behind-the-scenes maneuvering. Some opposition elements have turned to Algeria for support. The Algerians reportedly have not provided aid thus far, but did not rule out the possibility of some assistance if the dissidents are able to undertake guerrilla activity that seriously challenges Hassan's rule and attracts international attention.

Zambia-Rhodesia: President Kaunda, fearing even more drastic Rhodesian actions against his country, [redacted] forward a conciliatory message to Prime Minister Smith.

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[redacted] Kaunda offered to restrain black Rhodesian paramilitary preparations in Zambia if Smith calls off his blockade. Kaunda cannot afford to say this publicly, and hard bargaining may remain, but it looks like a positive first step toward easing the crisis.

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Chile: Santiago's major Western creditors will meet in Paris on 25 January to discuss rescheduling Chile's debts of about \$320 million falling due this year. Although the creditors last year granted relief for some 70 percent of the interest and principal due on most debts, they are likely to be less generous this time in view of Chile's poor performance under the 1972 agreement. Its payments are in arrears with Switzerland, and nothing at all was paid to the US, UK, West Germany, or the Netherlands. Moreover, in view of continuing economic deterioration, Chile's traditional creditors remain reluctant to provide new financial aid. Of the creditors present at the 1972 meetings, only Spain and Sweden supplied major new credits.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*22 January 1973*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

22 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**


Aerial photography over North Vietnam shows an operational SA-3 surface-to-air missile site--the first in the country--about eight miles southwest of Hanoi. (Page 1)

The Soviet Union's compromise agenda for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to be proposed today, reflects Moscow's interest in sustaining the momentum of the preparatory talks. (Page 2)

Most of the NATO allies oppose the Warsaw Pact states' proposals to hold initial talks on force reductions in Vienna and to open the meetings to "all interested states." They agree that Moscow should be held to its promise to open the talks on 31 January and will try again today to draft a joint response. (Page 3)

In Chile, the military have reached a compromise with President Allende whereby its participation in the cabinet will continue, at least until after congressional elections in March. (Page 4)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



First SA-3 Site Located in  
North Vietnam

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SA-3 Missile System

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NORTH VIETNAM**

Aerial photography of 20 January shows the first operational SA-3 surface-to-air missile site in North Vietnam. The site, about eight miles southwest of Hanoi, contains eight missiles on four launchers, together with radar and associated support equipment.

*At least 70 SA-3 missile canisters were photographed at the Dong Dang rail trans-shipment area near the Chinese border on 7 January. Additional SA-3 sites will, most likely soon appear in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, improving North Vietnam's capability for defense against aircraft flying at low and medium altitudes.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-CSCE**

The Soviet Union will propose a compromise agenda at today's session of the preparatory talks for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. As privately outlined by Soviet representative Mendelevich to the US delegation on Friday, the proposal will include: 1) reference to "confidence building" measures which would involve such matters as advance notification of maneuvers; 2) a separate agenda item on "contacts among organizations and people" intended as a bow to Western interest in freer exchange within Europe; and 3) a clarified version of Moscow's proposal for a permanent organ to be established under the CSCE which the Soviets suggest be called a "consultative committee."

The new Soviet approval was foreshadowed in General Secretary Brezhnev's remarks to President Pompidou ten days ago. At that time, Brezhnev suggested that western areas of the USSR might be included in the region to be covered by the "notification of maneuvers" provision.

Mendelevich, who recently returned from consultations in Moscow, warned the US delegation against trying to gain agreement on details by all the CSCE participants at this stage. He implied, however, that Moscow would not object to further discussion of specifics under the general headings of the Soviet proposal.

*The new proposal and the manner in which it was broached privately prior to its submission reflect Moscow's interest in sustaining the momentum of the preparatory talks.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FORCE REDUCTION TALKS**

Most of the NATO allies are opposed to the Warsaw Pact states' proposals to hold initial talks on force reductions in Vienna (rather than Geneva) and to open the meetings to "all interested states" (instead of restricting participation). Many of the allies are skeptical of Soviet interest in reduction of forces and would like to test the intentions of the USSR further.

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Despite the disagreements in NATO on how to respond to the Warsaw Pact states' proposals, most of the allies agree that Moscow should be held to its promise to open the talks on 31 January. They will try again today to draft a joint response.

Ambassador Mendelevich--one of Moscow's representatives at the preparatory talks for a security conference in Helsinki--privately told US delegates that the Warsaw Pact states' response on force reduction was not intended to delay the negotiations. He said his government believed Geneva to be overburdened with arms negotiations, and argued that it seemed only "democratic" that participation in the meetings on force reductions be open. But he suggested that only those governments directly concerned work on the draft of an agreement.

The outlook for French participation in the talks is now in question. The US Embassy in Paris reports that Foreign Minister Schumann still opposes the idea, but President Pompidou may be having second thoughts and the French position could change at any time.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**CHILE**

The military and President Allende have reached a compromise whereby the military will continue participation in the cabinet, at least until after congressional elections in March [redacted]

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
[redacted] Allende has promised to postpone imposition of controls on food distribution and to delay further expropriations until after elections. He has also agreed to the posting of four senior military officers to the Ministry of Economy to assist in alleviating serious food shortages.

Interior Minister and Army chief General Prats is pleased with the compromise, although he and other military leaders are aware that the agreement could break down.

*The military opposes the stringent economic controls announced by the government earlier this month and resents the lack of prior consultation with military cabinet ministers. Some dissent to the compromise is likely to develop among officers in the navy and air force when they learn the details, and civilian politicians within Allende's coalition could also scuttle the arrangement.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*23 January 1973*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

23 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

In South Vietnam, the Communists appear to be planning four days of increased military activity between announcement of a cease-fire and the time it actually goes into effect. *(Page 1)*

Jordan's King Husayn wants a reconciliation with Egypt and Syria to take place before he comes to Washington. *(Page 2)*


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The South Africans are building a large pilot plant for the production of enriched uranium, claiming they have discovered a new method for doing so. *(Page 3)*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


**SOUTH VIETNAM**




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Intercepted enemy messages have called for preparations for action to be completed by 23 or 24 January. The Communists appear to be planning about four days of increased military activity between the announcement of a cease-fire agreement and the time that it actually goes into effect.

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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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**JORDAN-EGYPT**


King Husayn is working to achieve a dramatic reconciliation with Egypt and Syria before his arrival in Washington early next month, in the opinion of Ambassador Brown. The King hopes, moreover, that the Egyptian and Syrian presidents will permit him to speak on their behalf as well as his own. He thinks this will add urgency to his view that a Middle East solution must be found this year and that the United States must take the lead in getting it nailed down.

*An effort to patch up the feud among the three countries does appear to be in the works.*


*President Sadat sees Husayn as a useful Arab channel to Washington and may hope that the King can influence the US toward new efforts facilitating a Middle East settlement. At the same time, Sadat hopes to forestall any Jordanian move toward a unilateral settlement with Israel.*

*A formal reconciliation would make possible a greater show of Arab solidarity against Israel, but Husayn will not subordinate any of his independence to achieve this objective.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



Uranium Enrichment Plant Under Construction Near Pretoria, South Africa



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH AFRICA**

[redacted] show that construction is continuing at a rapid pace on a pilot uranium enrichment plant near Pretoria. Construction of the facility, which is located about a mile from the South African atomic research center, began in 1970, when the government claimed it had discovered a new method of producing enriched uranium that would be economically competitive with methods used by other countries. The government added that \$70 million had been allotted for construction of the pilot plant.

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*The plant is large relative to pilot facilities using conventional methods for uranium enrichment.*

*The South Africans have sought financial assistance from the US and several West European countries for the construction of a separate production plant. They plan to ask yet again. So far, their efforts have failed because Pretoria is unwilling to reveal any information about the new process.*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


**NOTES**

European Communities - Asia: The political committee of the European Communities has established a new subcommittee for the Far East. The subcommittee has been charged with preparing for China's foreign minister, who will visit Europe this month. It will also consider "problems posed by relations of member states with North Vietnam and what contribution Europe could make to all of Vietnam after a cease-fire." This is the second organizational step taken by the EC to extend the Communities' activities in Asia. In June, the EC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations created a permanent committee for consultation between the two groups.

Portuguese Guinea - Guinea: Although Guinean President Toure publicly blames the Portuguese and other "imperialists" for the murder on Saturday of Amilcar Cabral, leader of the insurgency in neighboring Portuguese Guinea, his actions suggest he believes Cabral was killed by opponents within the rebel organization. In any event, Toure clearly is concerned over the possibility that internecine warfare will break out among factions of the insurgents. The Guinean military has taken control of the insurgents' headquarters in Conakry, and orders have gone out to regional governors to disarm all Portuguese Guinean guerrillas and keep them in their bases.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*24 January 1973*

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exempt under category 5B(1), (2)(A)  
declassifying authority: [redacted]  
the Director of Central Intelligence

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**LATE ITEM**

Haiti: As of early this morning, armed gunmen were still holding Ambassador Knox and Consul Christensen at the ambassador's residence in Port-au-Prince as hostages for the release of a number of political prisoners held by the Haitian Government. The gunmen are also demanding an "indemnity" of \$500,000. President Duvalier reportedly has agreed to release some prisoners and arrangements are being made to provide an aircraft to transport the gunmen and the prisoners to Mexico City. The details are still being negotiated, however, and Deputy Undersecretary Macomber is en route to Port-au-Prince to direct the effort. The State Department has been in regular phone contact with Ambassador Knox and the gunmen since the episode began late last night.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

24 January 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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<i>Page 1</i>	North Vietnam	25X1
Japan		25X1

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Communist firepower in South Vietnam will increase sharply in the next few weeks as large numbers of tanks and artillery pieces arrive from the North.  
*(Page 2)*


Chile's Foreign Minister is due in Peking shortly,

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NORTH VIETNAM - JAPAN**




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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**VIETNAM**

*The firepower of Communist forces in South Vietnam's Military Regions 2, 3, and 4 will increase sharply in the next few weeks as large numbers of tanks and artillery pieces arrive from the North.*

Some 200 tanks and armored personnel carriers, along with a similar number of artillery pieces, have been detected moving through the logistic pipeline in recent months. The artillery includes long-range field guns and light antiaircraft weapons.


*Although the types of weapons en route have been in use by the Communists in the South for some time, the current shipments involve a considerably greater quantity of such weapons than had been detected in any comparable period in the past. The weapons apparently are intended, in part at least, to make up for recent heavy equipment losses and to build up stockpiles. In contrast, the infiltration of infantry into these regions of the South during this dry season has not been sufficient to make up for manpower losses.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**CHILE-CHINA**

President Allende's foreign minister is due in Peking shortly for a week of talks with Chinese officials.



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*Although Chinese aid to Chile is likely to remain modest, we expect Peking to be helpful. Its past performance shows that it has no intention of leaving Moscow as Chile's sole Communist benefactor.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTE**

Egypt: The Sadat government yesterday extended the universities' mid-year break by an additional week, until 3 February. Student demonstrations had caused the government to close the universities a week ahead of schedule, and it presumably believes that more time is needed to cool the situation. In an uncommon act of dissent, a group of intellectuals has privately petitioned President Sadat to show leniency toward students still detained. The petitioners claim that the protests stemmed from discontent at all levels of Egyptian society.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*25 January 1973*

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*Top Secret<sup>25X1</sup>*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

25 January 1973


PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In South Vietnam we have additional indications that the Communists will try to improve their military position before the cease-fire goes into effect, but so far their action has been mostly confined to harassment and light shelling. (Page 1)

The Thai Army is abandoning large-scale operations against Communist insurgents in favor of the use of small, specialized units directed against cadre and base camps. (Page 2)

Argentine military leaders have reaffirmed their support for President Lanusse and for proceeding with the electoral process, despite recent reports that they were pressing him to foreclose a Peronist victory. (Page 3)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM

US military authorities in Saigon report that as of 0530 EST there has not been a significant increase in Communist military action, although we have additional indications that the Communists intend to try to improve their position on the ground before the cease-fire goes into effect.

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[redacted] Communist officials have continued to meet in the past several days to disseminate orders to use small units to expand control of land and people.

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Except for a sharp clash in the western delta, most of the action remains limited to Communist harassment and light shelling. Some signs point to main force enemy attacks, possibly in an effort to capture a few district centers or even a provincial capital. [redacted] the North Vietnamese have been strengthening their forces in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon and now have at least three regiments there, possibly with armor support.

25X1

South Vietnamese forces have disrupted enemy staging and storage areas north of Saigon that would have been used in any push toward the capital itself.

25X1

[redacted] In Military Region 1 the South Vietnamese apparently have abandoned their effort to retake the Hiep Duc district capital following a series of Communist counterattacks on Monday. In Pleiku Province the government forces lost Duc Co Ranger Camp earlier this week, and there are indications that the Communists will try to oust the government from scattered fire support bases in a largely Communist-controlled area north of the Kontum provincial capital.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THAILAND**

The Thai Army is abandoning large-scale sweep operations against Communist insurgents--which have been unsuccessful--and is opting instead to use small, specialized units. Future combat operations will be conducted largely by 12-man teams that will concentrate on identifying and eliminating Communist cadre and base camps.

*This decision against sustaining military pressure upon the Communists is another indication of Bangkok's reluctance to accept the casualties and expenditures required by an all-out effort. Over the long term, the development of small, well-trained units could improve the army's counterinsurgency performance. The immediate effect of the new strategy, however, will be to give the Communists welcome relief from military pressure and opportunity for further growth.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**ARGENTINA**

Signs of growing Peronist strength and unity in recent days, combined with a rising level of political violence, have revived the old anti-Peronist fears and hatreds within the armed forces.

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[redacted] President Lanusse has been under growing pressure to take action that would foreclose a Peronist victory, even if it means postponing or canceling the elections scheduled for 11 March.

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
Following meetings held yesterday, however, military leaders reaffirmed their support for Lanusse and for proceeding with the elections. Tighter controls are to be imposed on the candidates.

Lanusse appears to have leaked accounts of his dismay over political trends in order to warn the Peronists to moderate their tactics as well as to obtain this pledge from the military. He is personally committed to returning the government to elected officials and is likely to do everything he can to keep to his promise and, at the same time, to keep the Peronists from winning.

If fear of a Peronist victory becomes overriding, however, we would expect Lanusse to step down and leave to someone else the unpleasant task of canceling the elections and dealing with the public outcry that would follow.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*26 January 1973*

**45**



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

26 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

In South Vietnam Communist offensive activity still consists chiefly of light shellings, but indications persist that heavier fighting is planned before the cease-fire becomes effective. The South Vietnamese cabinet is discussing plans to counter the Communists after the cease-fire by strengthening Saigon's image as an economically and politically viable government. (Page 1)

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma believes that an end to the fighting in Laos could be arranged by 12 February. He intends to go to India tomorrow where he will request greater Indian cooperation in settling the conflict and in supervising the eventual cease-fire. (Page 3)

New Soviet regulations, which require emigrants to reimburse the state for their education, apparently are in effect. (Page 5)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

Communist offensive activity as of 0530 EST-- including that directed against Bien Hoa and Da Nang air bases--still consists chiefly of light shellings, but indications persist that heavier fighting is planned before the cease-fire becomes effective.

*Some Communist combat units may be waiting until nearer the time of the cease-fire to launch their attacks. This strategy apparently would be designed to drive people into Communist-controlled areas and reduce the time available to the South Vietnamese for counteraction.*

There are additional indications of moves by Communist main force units which bring them closer to major population centers.

*Although these movements may be a prelude to a last-minute enemy push, they could be simply the Communists' final effort to have their troops in a favorable location when the fighting stops.*

\* \* \*

On Tuesday, immediately after President Thieu had briefed his cabinet on the cease-fire agreement, its members met under Prime Minister Khiem to discuss plans to counter the Communists by strengthening Saigon's image as an economically and politically viable government. [redacted]

[redacted] Khiem directed the ministers to complete their plans within the next two weeks. Programs to be emphasized include the resettlement of refugees, the building of new hamlets, and the reconstruction of schools and roads. Khiem noted that these plans will be the basis for President Thieu's request for continuing US economic aid "during a forthcoming trip to Washington."

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(continued)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

The prime minister asserted that the army must be diligent in protecting areas under government control, but that no attempt should be made to go into Communist-controlled areas.

Khiem directed the Ministries of Education and Interior to involve students in the government's programs to help ensure that they are not used by the Viet Cong. Khiem also pointed out that harsh measures to control street demonstrations and other civil disturbances would not benefit the government; order must be maintained without repression, he said.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## LAOS



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## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## LAOS

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma repeated to a [redacted] session of the National Assembly yesterday his publicly expressed belief that an end to fighting in Laos could be arranged by 12 February. He said that within 90 days of a cease-fire a national election should be held, but cautioned that this deadline might slip and that everything depended on the attitude of the Lao Communist peace negotiators.

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Souvanna also told the deputies that he still intends to leave on 27 January for his scheduled trip to India, where he plans to ask Mrs. Gandhi for greater Indian cooperation on the International Control Commission. [redacted]

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25X1

25X1

*Souvanna apparently attaches a good deal of importance to this trip, which, with a stop in Thailand, will take a week. In the meantime, the Communist negotiators will return from their headquarters at Sam Neua on Sunday, and the next session of the peace talks--the first since the announcement of the Vietnam cease-fire--will take place next Tuesday.*

*Souvanna is also going away at a time when there is evidence that North Vietnamese units in southern Laos are moving into positions for renewed offensive operations. One and possibly two North Vietnamese regiments have reinforced a third in the central panhandle. Some of the fresh troops have been engaged in the recent heavy fighting near Muong Phalane. Farther south, a large enemy force is still defending Saravane, and has driven Lao troops from positions west of the city. At least one Communist regiment has moved onto the Bolovens Plateau near the government-held town of Paksong.*

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Skirmishing continues east of Thakhek, a provincial capital on the Mekong, but there is no evidence at this time that the enemy intends to move on the town in force. In the north, Communist shelling and ground attacks are still going on against government positions in and around Bouam Long, but no change has occurred.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**USSR**

In late December, the Soviet Government published in its official record the decree requiring emigrants to reimburse the state for the cost of their educations. The fee scale was published early this month.

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[redacted]  
men over 60, women over 55, and invalids are fully exempt from the reimbursement tax, and that a scale had been set excusing emigrants from refunding portions of their educational costs based on the number of years that they had been employed.


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*Publication of the decree and the fee schedule is a strong indication that this is as far as the Soviets intend to go in mollifying Western critics of Soviet emigration policies. Under the new softened emigration procedures, the number of Jewish emigrants for the first three weeks of January (1,672) is comparable to last year's January rate. The educational level of recent emigrants, however, is considerably lower.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*27 January 1973*

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~~Top Secret~~<sup>25X1</sup>

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

27 January 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

A sharp upsurge in pre-cease-fire Communist attacks is under way throughout South Vietnam. (Page 1)

During the past week, North Vietnamese resupply activity reached peak levels in all of Indochina. (Page 2)

Foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will meet next month to discuss ramifications of the Vietnam accord. (Page 3)

Australia	New Zealand	25X1
	(Page 4)	25X1


A Soviet delegation now in the US may be investigating the possibilities for grain purchases for fiscal year 1974. (Page 5) 25X1

Syria	25X1	
fedayeen	(Page 6)	25X1

Laotian Government forces have retaken an important road junction in the north, but in the south they are under heavy Communist pressure east of Muong Phalane. (Page 7)

France's Pompidou and West Germany's Brandt have discussed the possibility that President Nixon may visit Europe this year. (Page 7)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



554048 1-73

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

Last night, the Communists began a widespread series of attacks in South Vietnam. As of this morning, the most serious is an assault on Tay Ninh City, located northwest of Saigon. Field reports indicate that several hamlets on the city's southeastern outskirts are in enemy hands. The main road to Saigon has been cut, and the walls of the Cao Dai religious sect's headquarters are said to have been breached. Aerial observers have reported seeing large enemy forces northeast and northwest of the city, and Communist attacks may come from those directions as well.

In Chuong Thien Province in the Mekong Delta, a district capital has been overrun and a neighboring one is under heavy attack. The efforts of government troops to slow enemy infiltration from Cambodia into the delta apparently have provoked a number of battles.

In the central highlands, the enemy has renewed efforts to cut the road between Kontum and Pleiku cities. On the coast, heavy ground and artillery attacks were reported in the northern three districts of Binh Dinh Province.

Communist gunners are continuing heavy shellings in Quang Tri Province, just below the Demilitarized Zone. Yesterday, for example, they fired more than 4,200 rounds into government positions, the heaviest shelling since the spring offensive. Early this morning, Da Nang was rocketed twice, resulting in damage to the air base and the city's power system. It was the third such attack against Da Nang in two days.

Some South Vietnamese officials anticipate fighting may continue after the deadline for a cease-fire. Two province chiefs in Military Region 2 have told US observers that they will fight as long as necessary after the cease-fire to push out any Communist units that may have occupied new territory in last-minute actions.

Intercepted messages indicate that some Communist units have been ordered to observe the cease-fire. Elements of an artillery battalion responsible for the rocketing of Da Nang have been told to conduct no attacks later than 0800 hours (local time) on 28 January. A similar message was passed to an unidentified unit in Binh Dinh Province.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## **INDOCHINA**

During the past week, North Vietnamese resupply activity throughout Indochina reached peak levels. In southern North Vietnam, for example, intercepts indicate that between 19 and 24 January over 800 vehicles moved south through Vinh. At Dong Hoi, large formations of vehicles, plus 12 tanks, were noted moving south. In addition, over 500 tons of supplies were delivered to the front just south of the Demilitarized Zone during the first 21 days of January.

The sharpest increase has been in the Laos panhandle and northeastern Cambodia. Intercepts indicate that recently nearly 100 vehicles a day have been carrying supplies through these areas bound for South Vietnam's central highlands and for the COSVN region.

*These efforts apparently represent an attempt by the North Vietnamese to move as many supplies as possible into South Vietnam before the restrictions imposed by the cease-fire agreement go into force.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## SOUTHEAST ASIA


Plans for high-level consultations on the area's future in the aftermath of the Vietnam cease-fire are moving ahead rapidly. On Thursday it was announced that the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand--will meet in Kuala Lumpur on 15 February to discuss ramifications of the settlement. Bangkok stated that it would propose convening a summit meeting of ten nations--the ASEAN countries plus Burma and the four Indochina states.

*Malaysia originally suggested a regional conference to promote its idea of declaring Southeast Asia a "neutral zone." Although early soundings in Hanoi and Rangoon were received coolly, the ASEAN members are increasingly interested in examining whether some kind of neutralization could exclude the region from future great power competition.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NEW ZEALAND - AUSTRALIA**



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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-US**

A Soviet delegation is in the US touring ports and meeting with major grain traders to speed up shipments of grain purchased last year. The Soviets are upset over the prospect that deliveries may have to be extended beyond June.

Only about six million of approximately 20 million tons of grain and soybeans bought in the US for delivery by mid-1973 have been shipped. The delay is largely due to the late resolution of shipping terms--not concluded until last November--resulting in a massive pileup at US grain elevators and ports. Soviet ports and rail systems have handled the incoming grain shipments with little unanticipated difficulty.

We suspect that the delegation may be investigating the possibility of new purchases for fiscal year 1974 and at the same time trying to find out whether shipping problems will continue. Moscow's winter grain prospects do not look good. The USSR's minister of agriculture has said he is doing everything possible to reduce foreign grain purchases, but he admitted that imports of corn and soybeans for the livestock feeding program would be necessary for a long time. Even if the Soviet Union has a good harvest, Moscow will have to buy some wheat, oats, and barley.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**SYRIA-FEDAYEEN**





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
*We know the Syrians have been severely stung by retaliatory Israeli air raids against military and civilian targets and believe that this may be dictating the new caution in Damascus. Nevertheless, we do not believe the Syrians will completely suppress incidents along the cease-fire line.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



○ Government-held location  
◎ Communist-held location

0 25 50 MILES



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTES**

Laos: Government irregulars retook the Sala Phou Khoun road junction south of Luang Prabang on 25 January but are now under heavy fire. Ultimately Pathet Lao and dissident neutralist units strung out along Route 13 may be forced to pull back. Lao Army commanders hope that their troops will then be able to reopen other stretches of Route 13. Elsewhere, heavy Communist attacks along Route 9 in the central panhandle have forced government troops to fall back and form a new defensive line a few miles east of Muong Phalane. Messages between North Vietnamese units in the area indicate they are determined to keep pressure on the government force defending that town.



France - West Germany: President Pompidou and Chancellor Brandt used their meeting early this week largely to celebrate achievements during the decade since the signing of the Franco - West German treaty of cooperation. They agreed that if President Nixon visits Western Europe this year he should meet with European Community leaders, but the two pointedly disagreed as to which leaders or which bodies should be included. The two also approved holding a "constructive dialogue" between the US and the Community--without defining its details--but the French continue to reject the notion that any dialogue should be institutionalized.

Malta-UK: Prime Minister Mintoff has backed away from his earlier suggestion that he would accept the NATO offer of partial compensation for Malta's losses caused by the sterling float. He is again threatening to abrogate the base agreement unless the British abandon their adamant refusal to discuss the compensation issue. Mintoff's latest "suggestion" is that a NATO member acceptable to both sides be named to mediate the dispute. The NATO ambassadors in Malta think this may be a ploy by Mintoff to promote a personal meeting with Prime Minister Heath.

(continued)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**French Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine**



554046 1-73 CIA

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

India: The two western states of Maharashtra and Gujarat are experiencing severe food and water shortages because of drought. Relief projects are aiding about three million people, but many millions more in need are receiving rations below the subsistence level. New Delhi has failed to meet its quotas on shipments of grain to the deficit states for the past two months, and even when scheduled grain imports begin arriving early in February supplies are likely to be inadequate. Power cuts resulting from the water shortage are also causing heavy losses in Bombay's industrial production.

France: Le Terrible, France's second nuclear-powered missile submarine, departed Brest on its first operational patrol on 18 January. A third such submarine soon will be ready for sea trials, a fourth appears likely to be launched later this year, and construction of a fifth is scheduled to begin soon afterwards.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

29 January 1973

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

29 January 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Sharp fighting persists in South Vietnam as both sides maneuver to improve their holdings. (Page 1)


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Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies state that they plan to send delegations to Vienna on Wednesday for preparatory talks on force reductions, and that they would defer until then the question of inviting other nations. (Page 3)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**VIETNAM**

Sharp fighting continues throughout the country-side as both government and Communist forces maneuver to improve their territorial holdings. Most action since the official cease-fire has resulted from South Vietnamese efforts to roll back enemy gains made just before the deadline.

Some of the heaviest fighting centers on the provincial capital of Tay Ninh, where Communist forces apparently control portions of the city as well as stretches of the roads linking it with Saigon. Government defenders, with the help of reinforcements and substantial South Vietnamese air and artillery support, have recaptured several nearby hamlets that were lost on Saturday.

Government forces in the Saigon area have made some progress retaking hamlets and villages. The main highway connecting the capital with the populous delta region has been reopened. In Chuong Thien Province, where portions of two district capitals apparently were overrun early in the weekend, all five capitals are now in government hands.

In the northern half of the country, fighting has been heaviest along coastal Route 1, notably in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces. Several district capitals were shelled, and Communist and government forces are still battling for control of Sa Huynh. In the central highlands street fighting was reported in Da Lat, and some Viet Cong flags were observed in Pleiku City. Kontum City remains isolated and several provincial and district centers are cut off by Communist roadblocks. On the government side, South Vietnamese Marines apparently recaptured a navy base at the mouth of the Cua Viet River in Quang Tri Province just prior to the cease-fire hour, despite a heavy North Vietnamese artillery barrage.

Much of the current fighting on the part of the South Vietnamese appears aimed at countering moves by Communist local forces to seize key road junctions and bridges that can be used to stop movement between government-held areas.

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
*South Vietnamese forces had been ordered to re-claim such areas even if it required fighting after the cease-fire deadline. Intercepts show that the Communists are similarly under orders to resist government efforts to reoccupy lost ground or encroach on formerly "liberated" areas.*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

CHINA-JAPAN



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FORCE REDUCTION TALKS**


Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies have replied to NATO that they plan to send delegations to Vienna on 31 January for preparatory talks on mutual force reductions. The Pact reply proposes that the question of inviting other states to participate be decided at these discussions. The note specified, however, that actual reductions be negotiated only by states whose territory and forces are directly involved.

The Soviets added orally that Romania and Bulgaria would be coming to the preparatory talks but would revert to observer status if it is decided that the area for reduction should not include these two states. Moscow reiterated its view that neutrals who so desire should eventually be permitted to participate in some capacity.

*The Pact proposal to include neutrals in the force reduction talks has had the unintended effect of increasing support among neutral and Western countries for dealing with broad military issues at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Most neutral states think that if there is to be a general discussion of force reduction issues, it might as well take place at the CSCE while actual troop cuts are negotiated in the other conference.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*30 January 1973*

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1), (2), (3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

30 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

25X1

Fighting continues throughout South Vietnam, but is less intense than in the period immediately following the cease-fire.

[Redacted]

25X1

(Page 1)

25X1

In Laos, inconclusive fighting continues on several fronts. The Communists hold open the possibility of a cease-fire by mid-February. (Page 3)

[Redacted]

25X1

(Page 4)

On Page 6 we describe Chinese defensive preparations to improve their military posture along the Sino-Soviet border.

In Chile, President Allende has reacted to open disagreement between the Communists and the Socialists by blasting extremist Socialist leaders and implying that he can get along without them if they choose to withdraw from the government coalition.

(Page 8)

[Redacted]  
Jordan

(Page 9)

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
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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

SOUTH VIETNAM

Fighting continues throughout South Vietnam, but is less intense than in the period immediately following the cease-fire. The government is still trying to break Communist roadblocks and drive North Vietnamese from villages seized just before the cease-fire while the Communists are attempting to increase their holdings in the countryside.

Major areas of activity are north of the Thach Han River in Quang Tri Province, several locations along Route 1 and in the Que Son Valley, and around Tay Ninh City. At least two highways are closed in this last region by Communist roadblocks.

In the central highlands sections of Routes 14 and 19 are reported to be under Communist control. Skirmishing continues along the coast from Binh Dinh Province south to the provincial capital of Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan Province.

Activity in the delta is now relatively small scale. The government reports all main roads and canals open and claims that it has driven Viet Cong units out of 25 of the 50 places which were overrun immediately before the cease-fire.

There have been no confirmed new deployments of major North Vietnamese or Viet Cong military units since the cease-fire went into effect. According to intercepted messages, Communist units are still being told to engage in combat only to defend themselves.

No new infiltration groups have been detected moving south since the cease-fire, but Communist resupply activity continues in the Laos panhandle. Numbers of vehicles have been noted on the move there, vehicle and artillery camouflaging has been detected, and logistics units have been instructed to position antiaircraft artillery to protect supply lines.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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
\* \* \*

Peking has sent a message to Hanoi and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam strongly endorsing the Vietnam agreement and urging the Communists in South Vietnam to take steps--in concert with the Saigon government and neutralist elements--toward holding elections there. The message, which was signed by both Mao and Chou En-lai, also expressed Peking's wish that Hanoi concentrate on political and economic development within North Vietnam and pointedly omitted any mention of Hanoi's efforts elsewhere in Indochina.

*The message made no mention of continued armed conflict. Like the editorial carried by the People's Daily on 28 January, it gives the strong impression that the Chinese are anxious to see the struggle move into the political arena.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## LAOS



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**

Inconclusive fighting continues on several fronts. Communist gunners have increased their shelling of Bouam Long, the government base north of the Plaine des Jarres, but US and Lao air strikes appear to have slowed preparations for a ground attack. To the west, government forces are still trying to regain control over sections of Route 13 north and south of Sala Phou Khoun--the road junction secured by irregular troops last week. Fighting has slackened around Muong Phalane and farther south, but North Vietnamese troops remain active in the vicinity of Thakhek, a provincial capital on the Mekong.

Communist chief negotiator Phoune Sipraseuth returned this weekend to Vientiane after ten days of consultations in Hanoi and at Lao Communist headquarters in Sam Neua. Although he was unable to say when Phoumi Vongvichit, the high-ranking special adviser to the negotiating team, would return to Vientiane, he did hold open the possibility of a cease-fire in Laos within 15 days.

At today's talks the Communists offered three new proposals--a meeting in the near future between Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao leader Souphanouvong, the resumption of private procedural talks between the two deputy chairmen, and daily meetings beginning tomorrow between several top representatives of both sides. A Lao Government source described the atmosphere at today's session as completely different from that which has prevailed at previous ones. [redacted]

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The government has not yet responded to the Communist proposals. Souvanna Phouma, before leaving Laos for India over the weekend, however, had instructed his cabinet to draw up detailed arrangements for a cease-fire.

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**FRANCE**



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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**China: Defense Along the Soviet Border**



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- Defensive area
- ← Army redeployment

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**CHINA**


The Chinese, like the Soviets, are improving their military posture along their common border. Today, China has 1.3 million men under arms (about 80 divisions) arrayed in defensive positions in depth to meet any Soviet threat. In addition, about 1,800 combat aircraft--including MIG-19 jet fighters, IL-28 light bombers, and TU-16 medium bombers--are positioned in north China, well away from the borders. Most of China's defensive preparations have taken place since 1969, while the Soviets have been steadily increasing their forces since the mid-1960s. There are now 39 Soviet divisions across the frontier.

Only in the O-Chi-Na Valley north of the Shuang-cheng-tzu missile test center, did the Chinese begin construction of defensive positions before the border clashes of 1969. Between that year and 1971, Peking added five armies from south and east China to the 13 armies already in the border regions.

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*China's ultimate strength against a Soviet invasion remains "people's war"--the mobilization of the entire population to fight the invader. Gradual modernization of the Chinese military forces, however, has enabled Peking to plan for major resistance farther forward than was practical a few years ago. China's preparations, particularly in Inner Mongolia and in the Khingan Mountain Range, are evidence of a major effort to meet a Soviet invader with strong forces as far as practical from major population and industrial*

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*centers. In most cases, the Chinese are making effective use of favorable terrain features to enhance the defensive capability of their forces.*

*We have no indication that the Chinese are preparing for offensive action against the Soviet Union. They appear to be well aware of their serious disadvantages compared with the heavily mechanized, modern Soviet forces.*

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**CHILE**

Chronic dissension between the cautious Communists and the extremist Socialists and their allies has again erupted into the open--less than five weeks before the important congressional elections. President Allende has reacted by blasting the extremist leaders as "disruptively extremist"

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*These plans do not depart from Allende's previous strategy, although in the past he has often found it expedient to defer to extremist pressures despite his preference for the less disruptive Communist line of action.*

*Allende's compromises with the military since they joined the cabinet in November have not reversed his basic program, but have slowed it enough to infuriate the extremists, particularly the Socialists. Allende would find life a good deal easier without the troublesome "support" of these extremist leaders.*

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NOTES

Jordan-Fedayeen: [redacted]



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Syria-Fedaveen: [redacted]




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Ethiopia: [redacted]



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(continued)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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USSR-Bangladesh: [redacted]

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USSR: A Soviet scientist recently acknowledged that his institute has been conducting weather modification experiments for the armed forces. The Soviets have operated a large weather modification program for civilian purposes for more than 20 years and have conducted successful programs to dissipate fog and suppress hail. Fog dissipation techniques are now used regularly at several airports. In the broader area of climate modification, the Soviets are believed to be still in an early research and development stage.

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*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

31 January 1973

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declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

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**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

31 January 1973

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Sharp fighting is going on in Quang Tri Province, but military activity is tapering off in the rest of South Vietnam. (Page 1)

Peace negotiations in Laos are reaching a serious stage. (Page 2)

For the first time, exiled Prince Sihanouk has expressed interest in a compromise solution for the political situation in Cambodia. (Page 3)

Japan [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] (Page 4) 25X1

West German [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] (Page 5) 25X1


[redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] (Page 6) 25X1

Most Latin American foreign ministers are reluctant to attend the UN Security Council meeting in Panama, but Castro and Allende may be thinking of going. (Page 7)

President Marcos is concerned that the US may be displeased about his martial law policies. (Page 8) 25X1

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

SOUTH VIETNAM

Sharp fighting is under way in Quang Tri Province along the Cua Viet River. Communist attacks since 30 January have forced South Vietnamese Marines to abandon their newly won foothold at the mouth of the river. Government paratroopers along the Thach Han River, a few miles southwest of Quang Tri City, are taking heavy artillery fire and intercepts indicate that a small number of North Vietnamese troops are trying to cross the river in order to disrupt what looked to them as paratroop preparations for an assault.

Throughout the rest of the country, military activity continues to taper off. Sporadic clashes are occurring in the coastal provinces, as both sides vie for control of hamlets that dominate many points of Route 1. The enemy still holds many areas in Quang Ngai Province, and has raised the Viet Cong flag in several districts. Last minute ground gains are still being contested in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces, but the government has recaptured nearly a score of hamlets in Binh Thuan Province. In the central highlands, roads to Kontum City are cut and the enemy is trying to isolate Pleiku as well.

No significant fighting has been reported around Tay Ninh City and all roads and waterways in the region are said to be open to government forces. In the delta, the Communists continue to make a large number of small-scale attacks.

\* \* \*

South Vietnamese interrogation of a prisoner captured on 26 January indicates that North Vietnamese troops in Military Region I have been told that "older" soldiers among them will be sent home. Troops nearing the age of 25 will be considered for evacuation north to establish families, but younger men will remain to assist in the reconstruction of liberated areas. When men in the latter age group reach 25, their status will be reviewed to determine whether or not they should return home.

*This account is plausible, inasmuch as earlier reports from prisoners had indicated that wounded and older North Vietnamese soldiers would be sent home within 60 days of a cease-fire. Most reports, however, indicate that the bulk of the North Vietnamese troops will remain in the south.*

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**LAOS**

Both sides in the Lao conflict are attaching considerable importance to the session yesterday, when the Communists appeared ready to get down to serious business in negotiating a settlement. Communist chief negotiator Phoune Sipraseuth called the meeting a "turning point." Late yesterday, the government agreed to a private meeting of top negotiators of both sides to be held in Vientiane this afternoon. Prime Minister Souvanna is not due back home until later this week from his trip to New Delhi and Bangkok.

*The private talks could be arduous. The two sides have not yet resolved major questions such as the shape and composition of a new provisional government and arrangements for the implementation and supervision of a cease-fire. During the session yesterday, the Communists made no issue of the continued US bombing in Laos and apparently do not intend to let this stand in the way of increasing the tempo of the negotiations.*

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CAMBODIA

Sihanouk has for the first time publicly expressed interest in some sort of compromise solution for Cambodia. Before departing yesterday on a brief visit to Hanoi, he told a French journalist in Peking that in the next few days he and his "government" will "re-examine their attitudes" and "analyze the situation" in the wake of the Vietnam cease-fire. Sihanouk stated that such political soul-searching was necessary because "our friends"--a reference to his Chinese backers--had warned him that he risked being labeled a "warmonger" at a time when Lon Nol was launching a peace campaign. This admonition most likely was offered by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, who met with Sihanouk last weekend.

Sihanouk nevertheless continued to insist that Lon Nol's removal is a prerequisite for any settlement. He said that he had rejected what he claimed was US and French pressure for a tripartite conference on Cambodia involving his "government," Washington, and Phnom Penh. Any political settlement, he argued, will require bilateral talks between his rump government and the US. He appeared skeptical about the prospects for such talks, however, citing his belief that the US would not abandon Lon Nol.

*Sihanouk, while seeking to be responsive to Peking's desire for progress toward a negotiated settlement, apparently has some doubt that Hanoi and the Communist-dominated Khmer insurgents will go along.*

Sihanouk hinted that he might have difficulty working out a common position with the North Vietnamese. His remarks strongly suggest that he believes Hanoi may be at odds with Peking over Cambodia.

*Over the years, Sihanouk has looked to China as Cambodia's principal benefactor and, Peking presumably would like to see him in some kind of major role in Cambodia. The North Vietnamese, however, in view of their large investment in the Khmer insurgency, are presumably not enthusiastic at the prospect of being upstaged by Sihanouk.*


\* \* \*

We have seen no significant change in the moderate level of enemy activity since the Cambodian Army's suspension of offensive actions on 29 January.

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
JAPAN



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**WEST GERMANY - MBFR**

As initial Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks open today, key government leaders in Bonn are continuing to debate whether West Germany should advocate a reduction of German as well as stationed forces. Defense Ministry officials take the view that German forces should be cut at the same time foreign forces are reduced. They argue that Bonn must share in the benefits of MBFR just as it shares the burden of common defense, and contend that reducing only US and Soviet forces would quickly generate domestic pressure for matching cuts in the German forces. They are also concerned that once the public becomes aroused over the issue of troop cuts, the government is likely to find it increasingly difficult to obtain adequate defense budgets.


Disarmament experts and Foreign Office officials, however, favor limiting initial troop reductions in Europe to "stationed" forces. They believe that Bonn must accommodate US desires on this issue and hope that US reductions in the MBFR context will eliminate the possibility of unilateral US cuts. They are also concerned that an early reduction of German forces would raise the issue of a Soviet role in verifying reductions, and that it could open the way for the USSR to influence the manner in which Bonn reorganizes its armed forces.

Foreign Minister Scheel and Defense Minister Leber will meet soon to attempt to reconcile these views, but the final decision will be made by the cabinet and Chancellor Brandt.


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
JORDAN-EGYPT-SYRIA



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**PANAMA**

Most Latin American foreign ministers are reluctant to attend the UN Security Council meeting in Panama in March because they do not wish to be drawn into the dispute over the Canal Zone.

*On the other hand, they also are reluctant to be left out of a hemispheric "event." If the larger countries decide to send high-level delegations, a bandwagon effect would develop quickly.*


[redacted] Cuban Prime Minister Castro and Chilean President Allende will attend. We would have been inclined to view this report with reserve had not the UN chief of security been instructed this week to coordinate arrangements on the basis of similar information received by the UN.

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
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NOTES

Philippines: President Marcos, who is counting on the US to provide the bulk of the aid he will need to carry out his ambitious reforms, is concerned over what he interprets to be signs of US displeasure over his martial law policies. He seems to be particularly upset over the exclusion of the Philippines from Vice-President Agnew's itinerary.

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