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The President's Daily Brief

3 January 1972

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

3 January 1972


PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

North Vietnamese artillery attacks caused extensive damage to the irregular complex at Long Tieng in north Laos this weekend. (Page 1)

Pakistan's denial of a report that it will release Mujibur Rahman this week may be more indicative of a change of timing than of a change of plans.
(Page 2)

Neither the UK nor Malta shows any sign of relaxing its terms to halt a British pull-out, while Malta is still having only limited success in seeking alternate sources of financing. (Page 3)

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LAOS

North Vietnamese 130-mm. guns have fired more than 300 rounds into the Long Tieng complex since 31 December when the Communists launched their first heavy artillery attacks against the base. All buildings and ordnance of the Lao Air Force have been destroyed, and one 105-mm. howitzer has been disabled. Although the Long Tieng airstrip is still usable, air operations have been shifted to Ban Son, about 20 miles to the southwest.

US tactical air strikes were flown against the 130-mm. gun firing positions, located just south of the Plaine des Jarres, on 31 December and 1 January. At least three of the guns are believed to have been damaged. Cloud cover and haze have hampered subsequent air strikes, however, and intercepts of 1 January indicate that the North Vietnamese are trying to confuse the US pilots by building decoy positions. They are also bringing up additional 130-mm. ammunition.

No enemy infantry attack has developed thus far, and ground activity in the area remains limited to scattered clashes. On 31 December, a four-battalion irregular task force, totaling over 1,000 men, arrived in Long Tieng from Savannakhet. These irregulars, who have been quite effective in south Laos, are deployed a few miles north of Long Tieng at Tha Tam Bleung and Phou Long Mat.

Casualties at Long Tieng have been light thus far. Even so, according to the US Embassy in Vientiane, the shelling is lowering the morale of the irregulars

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In south Laos, government positions about five miles west of Paksong on the Bolovens Plateau came under heavy attack on 31 December and were abandoned. The Lao Army troops manning them dispersed, leaving behind trucks and three 105-mm. howitzers which were later destroyed by air strikes. Other Lao Army units have pulled back to Ban Gnik, an irregular position on the western edge of the plateau. Ban Gnik is now the government's forward defense point.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH-INDIA

Pakistan's repudiation of a Time correspondent's report to the effect that Mujibur Rahman would be unconditionally released on 7 January does not necessarily mean that President Bhutto has changed his mind. It is more likely that press leaks of the story have caused Bhutto to reconsider his timing. Bhutto may hope the release of Mujib would ease the atmosphere for negotiations with India and hasten the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners.

The return of Mujib, who is regarded as Bangladesh's legitimate leader by the vast majority of the people as well as most political and guerrilla factions, would greatly help the new government to solidify its control over the country. The sheikh's presence would also help bring under control the current competition for power among the political factions.

Although some leftist parties have recently been rebuffed in their efforts to gain entry into the cabinet, pro-Soviet elements in the ruling Awami League have been gaining influence. Pro-Soviet Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad gained added responsibilities when cabinet portfolios were redistributed last week, and Abdus Samad--who is also considered friendly to Moscow--replaced a pro-West politician as foreign minister.

Meanwhile, the Bangladesh authorities, with Indian help, are making progress toward getting the country back on its feet. Rail and bus service has resumed in many parts of the country, and telecommunications links have been re-established with most areas. Many shops and banks are also reported to be back in business, as are most of the facilities at the country's main port, Chittagong. The Indian Army has been playing a major role in the restorations of roads, river crossings, and communications.

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MALTA-UK

Prime Minister Mintoff's quick trip to Libya on Friday appears to have produced only limited results in the way of alternate financing to that of the British.

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
Mintoff was promised some assistance in the form of both grants and loans, but all discussion of long-term aid was left to the future. On the same day, Mintoff told Ambassador Ellsworth that he would like the British to stay on if an agreement could be reached, but that he would prefer Malta to be "independent" if it is going to have financial troubles.

British forces, under Mintoff's last-minute extension of their departure deadline until 15 January, have begun dismantling some military equipment. In London, Foreign Office Under Secretary Wiggin raised the idea on 1 January of UK-US talks about future negotiating steps, but said he doubted any satisfactory and durable agreement could be reached with Mintoff. He reiterated that the present British attitude is to wait and see whether the imminent prospect of their departure would give the Maltese Government sober second thoughts.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

OSA Class Guided Missile Patrol Boat

Length 128 feet
Maximum speed 40 knots
Missiles 4 single SS-N-2 launchers



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
NOTES

USSR-Cuba: Two Soviet ocean-going tugs, each towing an Osa-class guided missile patrol boat with crew, were sighted on 1 January some 1,100 miles east of Cuba. If they continue toward the Caribbean, it will mark the first appearance of these patrol boats in Cuban waters. The Osa carries four guided missiles, which have a range of about 20 miles. Currently, the Cubans have 18 of the Komar-class guided missile patrol boats, which have only two missile tubes.

Egypt-Israel-US: Egyptian reaction to press reports that the US will resume shipment of Phantom jet fighters to Israel has been limited to a relatively restrained comment by "informed sources" in an interview with the Middle East News Agency. Although it is unusual for such "sources" to issue a statement on a Muslim holy day, the comment seemed pro forma and closed no doors to future diplomatic moves by the US or Egypt.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

4 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Our assessment of the state of affairs in Communist China, based on Peking's annual New Year's editorial, is on *Page 1*.

Comments on Mujib's release from house arrest in Pakistan, and reports of Bangladesh Government efforts to restructure its economy are on *Page 3*.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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COMMUNIST CHINA

Peking has issued a low-key New Year's Day pronouncement which touts China's diplomatic and economic progress but is uninformative on political subjects. The joint People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Journal editorial avoids a public airing of the recent leadership upheaval, and its emphasis on unity and re-education suggests that no sweeping purge in the ranks of the army or party is in the offing. Nevertheless, in warning that much work remains to be done on the provincial level, the editorial indicates that local party bodies will be at least selectively revamped.

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Eventual changes in the local power structure will most likely further dilute the influence of both civilian and military ultraleftists. The political status of the military establishment is still in question, and the editorial's stress on the importance of conventional military activities, as opposed to the army's political chores, underscores the sensitivity of this issue.

The editorial offers indirect testimony of Chou En-lai's influence. Reflecting predictable Chinese pleasure over Peking's enhanced international position, the statement devotes considerable attention to Peking's entry into the UN and its new diplomatic ties abroad. The United States is treated in a relatively neutral and a markedly low-key fashion. By contrast, the Soviet leadership, including party chief Brezhnev, comes in for some polemical criticisms. Contrary to last year, when Japan was characterized as a major Chinese adversary, there is almost no anti-Japanese commentary. The Taiwan issue is treated in unusual detail, reflecting Peking's serious concern over the future of the island.

* * *

Peking has also released selected statistics on the performance of the Chinese economy in 1971. This is the most year-end data that the Chinese have released since 1959.

Our preliminary analysis of these statistics indicates that industrial output grew at a rate of about ten percent over the

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previous year. This is less than the 17-percent growth we estimate for 1970, but growth that year was atypical because the Chinese easily put back into use much plant capacity previously idle. In 1971, the Chinese relied more on new facilities.

Chinese living standards remained adequate, even though bad weather kept agricultural output at the level of the previous year, when 215-220 million tons of grain were produced. China has food reserves, however, and could afford to buy more abroad if needed.

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PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH

By freeing Bangladesh President-designate Mujibur Rahman unconditionally, Bhutto apparently intends both to satisfy pro-Bengali international opinion and to pave the way for the repatriation of Pakistani troops and civilians from the east. Bhutto, who from the time he returned to Pakistan to replace Yahya said he would release the Sheikh, nevertheless delayed this action for some time, presumably to try to extract some meaningful concession from Mujib. He seems to have finally decided that Mujib's unconditional release was the only way to limit Indian influence in the former province.

As Bhutto tells it to Ambassador Farland, Mujib has been poorly informed about the course of the war and is despondent to learn that Indian troops occupied all East Pakistan. Bhutto says that Mujib is determined to resist Indian domination.

Because Mujib has been out of touch for some nine months, it may be difficult for him immediately to assert his authority as head of government. Also, some of the Bangladesh leaders who have been organizing the government in Dacca may be reluctant to give the revered Mujib real authority.

* * *

The Bangladesh Government is moving ahead in restructuring the economy. It has taken control of 274 firms, in addition to the jute and tea sectors that were taken over last week, and ceilings have been set for private salaries. A food corporation has been formed to procure and distribute rice, and efforts are being made to get fertilizer and machinery into those areas where the rice crop currently is being planted. Some money and food have been allocated for the returning refugees. Trade pacts with the USSR, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia are said to be near consummation.


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Although the Bangladesh rupee has been devalued by about one third, this will not necessarily improve the new country's foreign trade. Most sectors of the economy, including shipping and industry, must first be set in order. Dacca's major exports, raw jute and jute manufactures, are suffering from a declining world demand as consumers switch to synthetic fibers. A return to prewar economic conditions will require substantial inflows of foreign aid.

New Communist Road Construction



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NOTES

Laos: North Vietnamese units, including elements of five or six infantry regiments, are edging closer to Long Tieng and its outlying defenses. An intercept of 2 January between unidentified North Vietnamese units refers to sending in assault elements in coordination with "our big artillery." A similar message of 1 January refers to taking three more days to "be prepared."

South Vietnam: The Communists are constructing a new road within the DMZ which branches off Route 102 toward the central region of northern Quang Tri Province,

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the Communists are working to repair rain and bomb damage on the road they began last May through the western corner of the DMZ and into Quang Tri Province. These roads will shorten the supply line to enemy forces in this region of South Vietnam.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

5 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

New Delhi may soon upgrade its representation in Hanoi to an embassy as a gesture of displeasure over US support for Pakistan. (Page 1)

According to Ambassador Swank, Sirik Matak's relations with Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol have improved. (Page 2)

In Laos, the North Vietnamese have resumed their attacks on Long Tieng. (Page 3)

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INDIA

An announcement raising the Indian consulate-general in Hanoi to an embassy will be made "within a few days," [redacted]

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[redacted] two years ago [redacted]
[redacted] New Delhi had decided in principle to raise the level of its representation in North Vietnam to counter big power, particularly Chinese, influence there and to encourage Hanoi to follow an independent course in international relations. It was decided at that time to move only when the "situation was ripe."

Several recent reports have indicated that Prime Minister Gandhi has been seeking ways to show her displeasure over US support for Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi may also hope that this step would prompt socialist countries to recognize Bangladesh.

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CAMBODIA


Ambassador Swank reports that Sirik Matak's relations with Lon Nol have improved considerably, and that the two leaders seem to have reached a modus vivendi for the time being. Matak told the ambassador on Monday that both he and the army general staff were delighted with Lon Nol's pleased reaction to the President's most recent letter and to his apparent receptiveness to US suggestions for administrative reforms in the army. Matak stated that he believes the prime minister is now reconciled to a military force level of 220,000 men.

Although Matak was still somewhat skeptical regarding the good bill of [redacted] health recently given Lon Nol, he said that the important thing is for him to get adequate rest and leave details to others.

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Matak claimed that the political atmosphere is showing signs of stabilizing as memory of the recent military reverses on Route 6 recedes. He made no mention of any cabinet changes in the near future, other than the anticipated resignation of Finance Minister Sok Chhong on the valid grounds of ill health.

LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA



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NOTES

Laos: After a hiatus of two days, the North Vietnamese have resumed their attacks on Long Tieng and its immediate defenses. Last night they again shelled the base with the 130-mm. field guns, and at the same time overran an outpost three miles north of Sam Thong. Radio direction finding indicates that several North Vietnamese battalions have filtered through the defense line between Phou Long Mat and Pha Dong. Elements of the 174th Regiment remain in position around Ban Na. To the west, Pathet Lao and dissident Neutralist forces on 3 January overran a government outpost some ten miles east of Sala Phou Khoun at the junction of Routes 7 and 13. There is, however, no evidence that main force North Vietnamese units have moved westward along Route 7.

Ecuador: With the campaign for general elections in June officially opening on Friday, a number of military plotters have indicated that they might move against the Velasco government soon. The expected early return from exile of Assad Bucaram, a widely popular potential candidate, might stir rightists to move.

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The divergence and disunity among the plotters may enable President Velasco to finish his term, however, and he might even call off the elections and continue to rule with dictatorial powers as he has since June 1970.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

6 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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The North Vietnamese evidently are preparing to begin "phase two" of their dry season offensive in northern Laos. (Page 1)


[Redacted]
[Redacted] Vietnam [Redacted]
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On Page 4 we discuss the recent reduction of Communist pressure in Cambodia.

London is still readying its forces for a hasty departure from Malta. (Page 5)

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LAOS

A North Vietnamese intercept refers to attacks planned for today as the opening of "phase two" of the dry season offensive. Various highpoints between Long Tieng and Tha Tam Bleung are cited as targets for battalion-sized attacks.

As in the past, there may be some slippage in the target date, but elements of the North Vietnamese 312th and 316th divisions, supported by the 866th Independent Regiment, are in position to strike at any time.

The government is continuing to redeploy its forces around Long Tieng. Additional facilities have been moved out of the Long Tieng valley, including some tactical navigation aids. Lao Air Force T-28s now are operating out of Vientiane, a move that significantly reduces their time over targets near Long Tieng. Two additional battalions from northwest Laos arrived in the Long Tieng area on Monday and have taken up defensive positions.

Some increase in enemy activity north of Luang Prabang, plus the continuing threat of new attacks in southern Laos, will make it difficult for the government to deploy additional units to the Long Tieng area.

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VIETNAM



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


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CAMBODIA

The North Vietnamese [redacted] left the Phnom Penh area and by 4 January had moved some 40 miles to the south in western Takeo Province. This leaves [redacted] the Communist Phuoc Long Front within striking range of the capital's outer defenses.

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The pull-back from Phnom Penh apparently is part of a general reduction of enemy pressure throughout the country. The Communists have not attacked in strength any important government position for more than two weeks. Although they have conducted harassing attacks in the Tonle Toch region east of Phnom Penh and in several other areas, these seem designed to keep Cambodian Government troops away from Communist supply lines.

It is likely that the current lull in the fighting stems from the need for Communist troops to rest and refit after two months on the line, especially in the Route 6 and Phnom Penh areas. The Communists may also be trying to obtain as much of the current rice harvest as possible.

We expect that sooner or later the Communists will again accelerate their offensive in Cambodia. In last year's dry season campaign, they engaged in heavy combat during November and December, followed by three months of relatively low-keyed military activity. In April, they initiated a new round of sharp fighting along Route 4, and another during May and June in the Tonle Toch area.


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MALTA

Although Britain is being pressed in NATO to reopen negotiations with Malta with an increased financial offer, London is continuing to prepare for withdrawal of its forces. Maltese civilian employees have been given termination notices, and British officials have announced that the evacuation of military dependents, expected to begin Saturday, will be completed by 15 January.

The British apparently hope that the adverse economic effects of their withdrawal will put pressure on Mintoff to temper his demands. They may also be seeking other means to resolve the crisis, such as encouraging Mintoff's opponents.



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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

North Vietnam has apparently scheduled a "summit" conference with its other Indochinese allies to coincide with the President's trip to China.
(Page 1)

Brazil [redacted]

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(Page 2)

[redacted] UN Secretary
General Waldheim plans no major shake-up in the secretariat.
(Page 3)

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At Annex [redacted]

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INDOCHINA

Sihanouk has told reporters in Peking that he will go to Hanoi in February to confer with Premier Pham Van Dong, Laotian Prince Souphanouvong, and National Liberation Front leaders from South Vietnam.

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This is the second meeting at the "summit" of leaders of North Vietnam and these various Indochinese front organizations. The first took place in April 1970, in the wake of Sihanouk's overthrow. The new meeting apparently has been timed by Hanoi to coincide with the President's visit to Peking.

The theme of Indochinese solidarity has persisted in North Vietnamese propaganda ever since the 1970 meeting, and recent Hanoi pronouncements have been giving unusual emphasis to the common goals of all three national revolutionary movements in Indochina. In addition to trying to offset the President's trip, Hanoi undoubtedly sees a new Indochina "summit" as a good forum for focusing attention on the extent of US involvement in Laos and Cambodia as well as in South Vietnam.

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
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BRAZIL



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UNITED NATIONS


[redacted] reports from the US Mission in New York that Secretary General Waldheim does not plan a major overhaul of the secretariat he inherited from U Thant. In addition, Waldheim would prefer not to fill Ralph Bunche's post with a US citizen, on the grounds that no citizen of a superpower should hold this job, which involves sensitive areas such as peacekeeping.

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If Waldheim makes only a few changes, the chances are good that the "do-nothing" attitude which characterized Thant's secretariat will continue. It will also most likely mean the retention of C.V. Narasimhan, the Secretary General's chef de cabinet, who is a frequent thorn in the side of the US delegation.

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LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Laos: North Vietnamese 130-mm. field guns have continued their nighttime barrages against irregular positions on the ridge overlooking Long Tieng. There has been little damage, however, and no major ground attack has materialized. One of the government high points between Tha Tam Bleung and Long Tieng was overrun on 5 January by a North Vietnamese force in company strength. Irregular troops on Phou Long Mat also report being shelled by what they believe was a T-34 tank. At least one such tank was used in the recent enemy offensive on the Plaine des Jarres, but the rough terrain around Long Tieng would make it difficult for the North Vietnamese to maneuver tanks in the area.

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
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
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


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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LATE ITEM

Press reports indicate that Mujibur Rahman was released by Bhutto yesterday and arrived in London early this morning.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

8 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The North Vietnamese are raising the pressure on
Long Tieng [redacted]

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(Page 1)

As the outlines of his domestic program unfold,
Pakistani President Bhutto is beginning to feel
counterpressures from entrenched interests. (Page 3)

[redacted] Communist
Chinese [redacted]

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
Chile's President Allende seems to have turned to
his own advantage an attempt to impeach his interior
minister. (Page 5)

[redacted] Cyprus. (Page 6)

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
LONG TIENG AREA



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Enemy pressure on Long Tieng is increasing. The destruction on Thursday of the remaining ammunition at the base--probably by North Vietnamese sappers--resulted in the closing of the airstrip. Sizable probes and shellings of almost all outlying defensive posts have been reported, but no major positions have changed hands. The Long Tieng valley has been shelled again by heavy artillery, but suffered very little damage. On 6 January an intercepted message suggested that the North Vietnamese may be planning to move their 130-mm. artillery to Ban Meo, less than a mile from irregular defenses at Phou Long Mat and within easy range of Long Tieng.




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PAKISTAN

Bhutto is beginning to discover the limits of his power. He is coming under increasing pressure from members of the left wing of his own Pakistan People's Party, who are critical of the limited nature of the government's nationalization policies. A major spokesman for the left, Health Minister Rashid, is also pressing Bhutto to institute reforms designed to improve the lot of farmers and workers. Recent strikes in Karachi and Lahore give testimony to the fact that workers' expectations have been inflated beyond Bhutto's ability to satisfy them.

Although Bhutto cannot afford to alienate the strong left wing of the party, he probably will be cautious about giving in to its demands. Neither the officer corps nor the right wing of the party--which includes large landowners--would be pleased with sweeping economic reforms. Bhutto does not wish to create a split in the party, and it is most likely that he will try to steer a middle course.

Bhutto is also under pressure from the National Awami Party for quick restoration of civil government. As a result of the elections last year, the party is sure of taking control of the provincial government in Baluchistan and hopes to form a coalition with which to capture the Northwest Frontier Province as well.

The National Awami Party ultimately is aiming for autonomy for these provinces, as well as cabinet reforms that would grant them representation in the capital far out of proportion to the number of people they would represent.

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Bhutto has already promised to restore civil rule as quickly as he can, but timing is crucial and he would prefer to see political and economic stabilization measures well under way before taking such a step.

Bhutto's continuing purge of the armed forces is also beginning to irk the officer corps. Initially, the majority applauded the firings [redacted]

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
[redacted] but [redacted], the continued housecleaning in the ranks of senior officers is generating opposition.

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Eventually, however, Bhutto will have to deal with the problem and set a clear policy on retention or retirement of officers.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHILE

President Allende has finessed a Senate confirmation of the lower house vote to impeach Interior Minister Toha by transferring Toha to the Ministry of Defense. Defense Minister Rios in turn becomes interior minister. Toha was impeached by the opposition controlled lower house for alleged failure to use the security force impartially against progovernment as well as antigovernment demonstrators and dissidents.

By moving Toha to defense, Allende not only avoids a serious political defeat but puts his key Socialist lieutenant in a job Allende considers increasingly important. He may hope that Toha's demonstrated skill in organizing police and internal security forces in support of the government now will help in dealing with growing evidence of discontent among military officers.

Rios, 70 years old, had presided over the Defense Ministry largely as a figurehead. Long closely associated with Allende, in 1964 he led a leftist faction out of the Radical Party to support Allende's bid for the presidency. With this shift, the undersecretary, a capable young Communist, is likely to exercise more effective power than he did under Toha, but Allende will continue to determine the ministry's main direction.

As interior minister, Rios is first in line of succession to Allende.

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CYPRUS



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
NOTE

Israel-Lebanon-Syria: Increased fedayeen activity along Israel's borders with Lebanon and Syria has led to unofficial Israeli warnings of a possible counterstrike. Most recently, on Thursday Syria-based fedayeen killed and decapitated an Israeli Army engineer, and rockets were fired from Lebanon at an Israeli border town. Lebanese nervousness was shown in a statement Thursday by Prime Minister Salem charging that Israel was preparing to take military action against Lebanon.


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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

HW PDB FOR 9 JANUARY:

LAOS

PRESSURE CONTINUES TO MOUNT ON GOVERNMENT FORCES DEFENDING LONG TIENG, BUT THE ENEMY'S ANTICIPATED MAJOR ASSAULT ON THE GARRISON HAS YET TO MATERIALIZE. IRREGULAR UNITS REPORTED SHARP CLASHES WITH NVA TROOPS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE LONG TIENG VALLEY ON 8 JANUARY AS WELL AS PERIODIC MORTAR AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN FOUR NIGHTS HOWEVER, NO SHELLING BY NVA 130-MM GUNS WAS REPORTED, SUGGESTING THAT THE COMMUNISTS COULD BE HOARDING THEIR AMMUNITION FOR A HEAVY PRE-ASSAULT BARRAGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

IN THE SOUTH, A GOVERNMENT FORCE ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK FURTHER WESTWARD MOVEMENT BY THE COMMUNISTS ON THE WESTERN EDGE OF THE BOLOVENS PLATEAU HAS REPORTED HEAVY PRESSURE FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE UNITS. DURING THE NIGHT OF 7-8 JANUARY, THE GOVERNMENT UNIT AT BAN GNIK, ABOUT 12 MILES WEST OF PAKSONG ALONG ROUTE 23, [REDACTED] WAS SURROUNDED AND RECEIVING MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE AS WELL AS GROUND PROBES. CASUALTIES SO FAR HAVE BEEN LIGHT, HOWEVER, AND THE BAN GNIK COMMANDER APPEARS TO BE MAKING GOOD USE OF HIS ARTILLERY AND TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT.

USSR-CUBA

THE TWO SOVIET BUKLT OSA-CLASS GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOATS BEING TOWED ACROSS THE ATLANTIC SHOULD ARRIVE IN CUBA EARLY THIS WEEK. THEY PROBABLY ARE DESTINED FOR CABANAS, A NAVAL BASE WEST OF HAVANA. THE OSA IS ARMED WITH FOUR MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF ABOUT 20 MILES. THE CUBANS MAY SCRAP SOME OF THEIR 18 OLDER AND SMALLER KOMAR PATROL BOATS THAT CARRY ONLY TWO MISSILES.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

10 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

North Vietnamese troops are maintaining pressure on Long Tieng; in the south, government forces have evacuated Ban Gnik at the edge of the Bolovens Plateau. (Page 1)

In Bangladesh, leftists and militant students have pledged to cooperate for the time being with Sheik Mujibur Rahman, who arrived in Dacca this morning. (Page 2)


[redacted] Malta's Prime Minister Mintoff might scale down his financial demands on the British, but London seems unmoved by efforts to raise the NATO package offer. (Page 3)

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The Italian Government may resign in the next few days. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Irregulars at the remaining government positions north of the Long Tieng valley continue to undergo frequent shelling and ground probes by North Vietnamese troops in the area. Communist raiding parties have also been entering the valley in the past two days. One such group early yesterday attacked Vang Pao's headquarters in the center of Long Tieng before being driven off.

These raids notwithstanding, [redacted] North Vietnamese regiments massing in the area are apparently taking their time and making sure that their tactical and logistic preparations are completed before launching any major assault on Long Tieng. They may also hope that their gradually increasing pressure on Long Tieng and its forward defenses will encourage defections in government ranks.

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In southern Laos, the government force defending Ban Gnik on Route 23 was withdrawn this morning.

The troops at Ban Gnik, the last naturally defensive position on the western edge of the Bolovens Plateau some 12 miles west of Pakse, had been virtually surrounded, and supporting aircraft received heavy ground fire. The attacking force consisted of possibly two battalions with artillery support.

No effective government force remains between the Bolovens and Pakse. We doubt, however, that the North Vietnamese will press their advantage and move further west along Route 23 at this time. The Communists' objective in this region has been to control the Bolovens to permit an unimpeded flow of supplies to their forces further south.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

BANGLADESH

Sheik Mujibur Rahman arrived in Dacca this morning after a short stop in New Delhi on his flight from London. The small leftist parties as well as the militant Awami League student organization have pledged to cooperate with him for the time being. The student group says it intends to judge the government by its early performance.

It will not be long before Mujib, essentially a moderate, personally faces the kind of pressures that have already been exerted on the Awami League government. The government has successfully resisted pressure from the leftist parties to be included in the cabinet, but the appointment of their leaders to a central board for a national militia shows they cannot be ignored. Even within the Awami League, leftist elements have appeared ascendant.

Irritants regarding the status of the Indian troops may also increase. Some Bengalis are beginning to have doubts about the lack of any definite time for the troops' departure. A joint communique issued yesterday said only that Indian forces will be withdrawn when Dacca requests it. Although the population as a whole still appears favorably disposed toward the Indians, the army's attempts to disarm various guerrilla groups have caused Awami League student leaders to threaten armed resistance.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

MALTA-UK

Prime Minister Mintoff


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would be willing to come down from his figure of \$46.8 million annually to retain the British presence.

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Mintoff might accept less than his current demand.

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London so far seems unmoved by the willingness of some of its NATO partners to increase the present NATO package offer of \$26 million annually by raising their contributions. In the North Atlantic Council meeting tomorrow, the British are likely to stick to the position that the present offer is fair and reasonable, and may argue that the costs to them of either withdrawing or staying make an additional British contribution unwarranted. London, however, probably would not oppose a larger offer from its partners if it is made outside the formal NATO package.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

ITALY

Christian Democratic Party secretary Arnaldo Forlani told American Embassy officials on Saturday that the Colombo government would resign within the "next few days" because the small Republican Party had decided to withdraw from the governing majority and the Social Democrats refused to remain without them. Colombo had previously planned to ask for a full debate on the government's program and on its continuation in office when Parliament reconvenes on 18 January. Forlani contends that debate could exacerbate the situation and make inter-party negotiations more difficult.

A cabinet crisis almost certainly could not be resolved by 25 January, the proposed date of Colombo's visit to Washington. Colombo would remain as a caretaker prime minister through this period, however, and might decide to meet the Washington date in this capacity.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


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NOTE

USSR-Cuba: The two Soviet built Osa-class guided missile patrol boats being towed across the Atlantic should arrive in Cuba early this week. They probably are going to Cabanas, a naval base west of Havana. The Osa is armed with four missiles with a range of about 20 miles. The Cubans may scrap some of their 18 older and smaller Komar patrol boats that carry only two missiles.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

11 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In north Laos, Long Tieng continues to receive 130-mm. artillery fire, and some irregular positions at nearby Sam Thong have been abandoned. (Page 1)

U Nu's insurgent followers are once again active along the Tenasserim coastal strip of southeast Burma. (Page 2)


[redacted] General Torrijos now
intends to drag out the Panama Canal negotiations 25X1
(Page 3) 25X1

A comment on the death of former Chinese foreign minister Chen I appears on Page 4.

Syria [redacted] 25X1
(Page 4) 25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LONG TIENG AREA




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
LAOS

Elements of an irregular battalion manning positions near the Sam Thong airstrip abandoned them yesterday under fire. Some of these troops deserted and took off in the direction of Long Tieng. This withdrawal leaves a newly established fire support base in an exposed position with only a small Lao Army screening force to protect it. Other irregular units are in the area around Sam Thong and could still move to regain the abandoned positions. Elsewhere in the Long Tieng area, probes and shelling attacks were reported at most irregular positions, and some positions east and north of Tha Tam Bleung were lost yesterday. Long Tieng itself has been hit by 130-mm. artillery fire on 8, 9, and 10 January, but has sustained only limited damage.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

BURMA

Insurgents associated with former prime minister U Nu are beginning to roam more freely in groups of 50 to 200 men in the border districts of south-east Burma. On 3 January the rebels overran a Burmese Army outpost near the town of Tenasserim and apparently still hold it.

The insurgents have clearly recovered from their military reverses of last summer when the Burmese claim to have driven them back toward their bases across the border in Thailand. Their new aggressiveness is weakening the army's tenuous hold on the interior of the Tenasserim coastal strip, and local commanders admit that security outside the district towns is poor. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether U Nu can expand his insurgent activity much beyond the Thai border region. Despite his personal popularity with many Burmese, and the fact that his resistance movement has been in existence for two and a half years, most of his military support still comes from some 3,000 ethnic Karen and Mon dissidents. His relations with them are marred by traditional distrust between these tribes and the Burmans.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PANAMA

General Torrijos intends to drag out the Canal negotiations in the belief that the US considers the Canal a wasting asset, and will eventually give Panama everything it wants.

[REDACTED]

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Torrijos' desire to keep the talks going through August suggests that he is under no pressure to conclude a new treaty, and

[REDACTED]

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NOTES

China: The death of former foreign minister Chen I does little to change the present power equation in Peking. Chen had been in semi-disgrace since late 1968, and has not acted as foreign minister since that time. The official announcement of his death, however, indicates that a posthumous rehabilitation has taken place: all of Chen's titles, including the foreign ministry post, were listed. This speaks well for the present standing of Chou En-lai, who attempted to defend Chen throughout the Cultural Revolution, and who would presumably benefit most from Chen's restoration to grace.

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[redacted]

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Syria-USSR:

[redacted]

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[Redacted]

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The military situation in Laos is described on
Page 1.

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
[redacted] a reasonably accurate picture of the South Vietnamese armed forces' successes and problems. (Page 2)

Issues likely to be dealt with at the coming Warsaw Pact meeting are discussed on Page 3.

North Korean Premier Kim has hinted he is willing to conclude a "peace pact" with South Korea, possibly before US troops are withdrawn. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LONG TIENG AREA



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**LAOS**

Heavy fighting has broken out in the Long Tieng valley, as the North Vietnamese continue to breach the government's defenses in the area. By the early morning of 12 January, the Communists had overrun at least two positions on Skyline Ridge overlooking Long Tieng, and heavy fighting was under way in the valley near the airstrip.

Earlier, on 10 January, irregular units abandoned Tha Tam Bleung and some nearby positions and withdrew to the south. At last report these units were being shelled by the North Vietnamese 130-mm. field guns. It will be difficult for other irregular units nearby to attempt to regain the position. The North Vietnamese have now occupied Sam Thong and the Sam Thong valley. [redacted] numerous enemy are active throughout the area, reducing the likelihood that the valley can be quickly retaken.

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Many of the units in outlying positions are isolated, and their aerial resupply and medical evacuation is increasingly vulnerable to North Vietnamese firepower. With the Pha Dong - Ban Na defensive line shattered, Sam Thong lost, and heavy fighting under way in the Long Tieng valley, the government's strategy appears to be boiling down basically to defending what it now holds in the hope [redacted]

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[redacted] Communist logistic problems will keep the enemy at bay. [redacted]

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* * *

Laotian Defense Minister Sisouk has sounded out Ambassador Godley regarding the US attitude toward a proposed request to Saigon to send three ARVN battalions to the Pakse area. According to the Laotians, President Thieu has said that troops are available but would require US assistance and support while in Laos.

Saigon used this formulation as a way of turning down a previous request by Vientiane. In view of the possibility of fairly substantial Communist activity within South Vietnam this spring and summer, President Thieu would be most reluctant to airlift troops deep into south Laos at this time. The request is symptomatic, however, of the Laotians' extremely depressed mood over the worsening military situation.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM

[redacted] a shortage of replacement personnel last year tended to undercut ARVN's improvement in fighting performance.

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[redacted] now 111 battalions--compared to 83 in 1970--involved in combat operations daily, but the average infantry battalion operated at only about two thirds of its authorized strength. Army casualties during the period rose by more than 11 percent. The army's monthly desertion rate increased by ten percent over the previous year, totaling 70,000 [redacted]

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[redacted] The monthly average rate of troop replacements--which probably means total recruitments--for the armed forces as a whole in the period decreased by over 38 percent from 1970.

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[redacted]
War weariness, however, may have increased the recruitment problems of the government as well as the Viet Cong.

Although the study reports that there were also manpower shortages in the air force during 1971, this service achieved a creditable over-all increase in performance and activity. Sorties by all types of aircraft and helicopters increased by more than 50 percent [redacted]

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[redacted] *strikes us as a reasonably accurate assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the South Vietnamese armed forces.*

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

WARSAW PACT

The Warsaw Pact summit meeting to be held in Prague later this month is expected to deal with issues related to European security. The Soviets have convened such Pact meetings at key intervals in their push toward detente.

Besides calling for ratification of the Polish and Soviet treaties with West Germany, Moscow may also seek to use the meeting to keep the East Germans in step. Pankow has been conducting a sharply worded anti-West German press campaign, which reflects its concern over the destabilizing impact of the current detente atmosphere on the East German internal situation.

The Soviets also are likely to use the summit to give another push to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The summit may reiterate last month's call by the Pact's foreign ministers for the start of multilateral preparatory talks for the conference. Moscow continues to propose convening of the conference itself in 1972, but probably is willing to settle for preparatory steps this year.

Another important agenda item may be the implications for bloc solidarity of President Nixon's trip to Peking. Moscow would like to obtain a strong condemnation of Peking's opening to Washington. In the face of Romanian ties with Peking, however, the Kremlin probably will have to be satisfied with a boilerplate call for continued unity against imperialist intrigues.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

KOREA


In an exclusive interview with Japanese newsmen on 10 January, Premier Kim Il-song proposed expanding the current North - South Korean Red Cross talks to include political matters. He also said he is willing to conclude a "peace pact" with South Korea, possibly before US troops are withdrawn.

Much of what Kim said was merely an elaboration of earlier Pyongyang proposals. His suggestion that an accord might be concluded before US troops are withdrawn from the South, however, is new.

Kim's main purpose--as in earlier statements--is to project an image of reasonableness and flexibility. While accusing Seoul of foot-dragging in the Red Cross talks, the North in recent months has muted its invective against the South Korean Government and has maintained a relatively harmonious atmosphere at Panmunjom.

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LATE ITEM

Ghana: Ghana radio announced early this morning that Prime Minister Busia, who is currently in London, had been deposed and that power had been taken by Lieutenant Colonel Achampong, who commands one of Ghana's two army brigades. Some firing was heard near the Prime Minister's residence, but movement in the capital has not been impeded and there is little evidence of military activity. The coup group apparently controls the airport in addition to the radio station. Achampong, who only recently had commanded a key security battalion in Accra, was known to be personally bitter over budgetary and force cuts made last June. His take-over announcement charged Busia with economic mismanagement and with carrying out arbitrary arrests. It stated that the government will be placed in the hands of a "National Liberation Group composed of representatives of the army and civic groups."

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Long Tieng situation is reviewed on *Page 1*.

The Vietnamese Communists are being unusually open about their intentions regarding military activity in South Vietnam. (*Page 2*)


Mujibur Rahman has taken decisive action to consolidate his power in Bangladesh. (*Page 3*)

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Pakistani President Bhutto impressed Afghanistan's leaders during a quick trip on 11 January. (*Page 5*)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LONG TIENG AREA



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

The situation in the Long Tieng area remains critical, but irregular troops are still holding on. North Vietnamese troops in the Long Tieng Valley are confined to the south slope of Skyline Ridge and to a few pockets in the village of Long Tieng. Their presence in the village may have prompted an announcement today by the Pathet Lao radio that Long Tieng had been captured. A direct attack in force has not yet developed, however.

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Much will now depend upon the North Vietnamese ability to follow up with a major new attack. Vang Pao, who seems to be in good spirits, is determined to try to retake Skyline Ridge within the next 48 hours. He believes, however, that if this is not possible, a withdrawal from Long Tieng would probably become necessary.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM

The Communists are spreading the word that a "massive" spring military campaign is being planned in South Vietnam to take place in the period surrounding the Tet celebrations, which begin on 15 February, and President Nixon's trip to Peking. The latest comment on Communist intentions comes from a member of the North Vietnamese negotiating delegation in Paris.

Much of the talk about a big offensive may be rhetoric, but the volume and openness of Communist discussion of their military intentions is unusual because they normally work hard to conceal even the outlines of their plans.



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Except for the border areas of Military Regions 1 and 2, where a big spring effort seems in the works, substantial evidence is lacking regarding resupply and redeployment activities that normally precede a maximum Communist military effort. Some activity of this type has been reported recently in a few scattered areas around the country, but these do not appear to be enough to support extensive hostilities. In particular, we will be watching to see if the Communist divisions in Cambodia begin to move into Military Region 3.

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BANGLADESH


Mujibur Rahman has shifted the country to a parliamentary system of government and put himself in as prime minister. He removed Tajuddin Ahmad from that job without as yet giving him a new one, and placed Abu Syed Chowdhury--a respected jurist and educator--into the now largely ceremonial presidency. The rest of the cabinet is little changed.

Mujibur Rahman is demonstrating an ability to move decisively to consolidate his power. The ouster of the left-leaning Ahmad from the job removed a staunch ally of India and the Soviet Union who might contest Mujib's desire to put his country on as independent a course as possible.

Mujib still faces enormous problems, particularly Bangladesh's prostrate economy and internal security. Attempts to cope with these difficulties will require substantial Indian assistance. This reliance, together with his expressed gratitude to Mrs. Gandhi's government for its role in the independence struggle, assures New Delhi of paramount influence in Dacca for some time to come.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Pakistan-Afghanistan: President Bhutto made a favorable impression on Afghan leaders during his surprise visit to Kabul on 11 January. The Afghans are chronically suspicious of Pakistan, and only recently King Zahir told Ambassador Neumann that Bhutto was an "unbalanced man" and a "pathological liar." Bhutto apparently was able to change this impression, however, and the Afghans now say that he has "matured." Both Bhutto and the King appeared content to defer discussion for the time being of the problem of the Pushtu-speaking area of Pakistan, for which the Afghans have long advocated independence.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

14 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

	Soviets
(Page 1)	

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The North Vietnamese continue to move several divisions toward the northern part of South Vietnam.
(Page 2)

Tokyo will send a ranking diplomat to Hanoi next month to conclude arrangements for an exchange of permanent trade missions. (Page 3)

Pakistan has broken relations with three Communist states because of their recognition of Bangladesh.
(Page 4)

The junta led by Lieutenant Colonel Acheampong apparently has gained control in Accra. (Page 5)

Fighting continues around Long Tieng. (Page 6)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


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


Satellite photography of last November shows a considerable amount of debris at one of the Tyuratam launch complexes which has been used exclusively for initial R&D testing of all four versions of the SS-9 ICBM. The debris, which was not present in September photography, was seen just down-range of one of the two launch pads at the facility, apparently the result of an explosion of a missile shortly after lift-off. No damage was apparent which would preclude the continued use of the complex for testing.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM

The North Vietnamese are continuing to move several divisions into or toward the northern part of South Vietnam.

--Intercepts show that elements of the 304th Division, recently based near Dong Hoi, have been in the Khe Sanh area of South Vietnam since late December. The concentration includes at least one regiment [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted]

--The 320th Division headquarters and elements of its subordinate regiments set out from the vicinity of Ha Tinh in mid-December for South Vietnam's central highlands and are now in southern Laos. An intercept indicates that at least one element of the 320th is nearing its destination.

--Other intercepts indicate that the 324B Division is moving southward within North Vietnam. Earlier communications from the 324B have suggested it is heading for northern South Vietnam, where it has sometimes operated in the past.

--The 308th Division also recently moved from the Hanoi area to the vicinity of Vinh. Communications suggest it will remain in southern North Vietnam, thus freeing other infantry forces for the fighting in the South.

[redacted]

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[redacted] The North Vietnamese divisions should complete their moves within the next month, greatly increasing the Communists' capability to launch offensives in the western parts of South Vietnam's Military Regions 1 and 2. By keeping a sizable combat force just north of the Demilitarized Zone, the North Vietnamese will also be in a position rapidly to send additional troops across the border should the need arise.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

JAPAN - NORTH VIETNAM

Tokyo will send a ranking diplomat to North Vietnam in mid-February to conclude arrangements for an exchange of permanent trade missions, according to Foreign Ministry officials. The Japanese office in Hanoi will be manned by two or three representatives of the private Japan-Vietnam trade association. The mission members will have no diplomatic immunity or privileges. The Japanese will inform Saigon of their plans later this month and offer appropriate reassurances that their moves indicate no change in or lessening of their support for South Vietnam.



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN

In the past two days Islamabad has broken diplomatic relations with Poland, Mongolia, and Bulgaria because of their recognition of Bangladesh. The Bhutto government explained that the status of East Pakistan was not yet settled and noted the obstacle posed by the continued presence of the Indian Army.

The phrasing of the explanation suggests that President Bhutto seeks only to delay rather than to prevent recognition by other nations. Although Bhutto has publicly stated that he will not automatically cut ties with those recognizing Bangladesh, Pakistani public opinion still could force a break with any additional nations that Islamabad believes are acting too fast. Recognition by a country that is of some importance to Pakistan, such as the UK or USSR, would severely test the policy.

We believe that Pakistan's action will in fact give Moscow pause. The Soviets hope to maintain their presence in Islamabad and before they recognize the Dacca government would prefer that non-Communist countries test Islamabad's resolve. Yesterday Burma became the first non-Communist country, apart from India and Bhutan, to recognize Bangladesh.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

GHANA

The junta led by Lieutenant Colonel Acheampong gradually gained control of Accra yesterday without any significant armed clashes or bloodshed. A few officials in the capital who tried to rally loyal security forces surrendered shortly after the police moved in mid-afternoon in support of the rebels.

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Acheampong has suspended the constitution, banned political activity, dissolved parliament, and appointed a "National Redemption Council" to run the government. In addition to Acheampong and one civilian, the council is composed of five undistinguished and largely unknown military officers.


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The motivation for the coup appears to lie in the personal bitterness of Acheampong and others over their recent loss of pay and perquisites and over other "interference" in military matters by the Busia regime. Acheampong especially resented seeing officers he considers his inferiors promoted ahead of him. His public justification for the coup has emphasized general economic grievances, particularly those of Ghana's hard-pressed urban dwellers. Acheampong has announced that he will review recently imposed austerity measures, along with Busia's priority commitment to rural development.

The 40-year-old Acheampong studied at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in 1968-69, and is considered very favorably inclined toward the US. Neither he nor any others so far identified with his junta appear to have any connection with former dictator Kwame Nkrumah

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LONG TIENG AREA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Laos: Fighting is still going on in Long Tieng valley and nearby positions. This morning tactical activity is reported to be light. Yesterday the area was again subjected to 130-mm. artillery fire. To the southwest of Long Tieng, the Communists have launched a small rocket attack on Ban Son, the new government support base and the center of the Meo refugee settlements. There is no evidence that any main force North Vietnamese units have moved into this area, but a threat to Ban Son or the refugee settlements could well cause Meo irregulars to desert the Long Tieng area.

Israel-Egypt: The Israelis and Egyptians have increased reconnaissance overflights in recent days.

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The Egyptians flew over Israeli positions on the canal's East bank on Tuesday, their second known penetration of Israeli-held Sinai since early November.

USSR-Cuba: A Soviet oceangoing rescue tug is now nearing Cuban waters, almost certainly to relieve a similar tug that has been supporting Soviet naval operations in Cuba since September 1970. The Kashin-class destroyer and F-class diesel attack submarine which arrived in Cuba last October continue to operate from Mariel.

Two Osa-class cruise missile patrol boats arrived in Havana on Wednesday after being towed across the Atlantic. The Soviets are likely to conduct familiarization training with the Cubans before the Osas are turned over to the Cuban Navy.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

15 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Government forces in Laos still hope to reverse some of the Communist gains in the immediate Long Tieng area, but Prime Minister Souvanna has now authorized evacuation of the base, if necessary.
(Page 1)

Chinese [redacted] 25X1
 Pakistan. *(Page 2)* 25X1

The British remain pessimistic about the outcome of renewed negotiations with Malta. *(Page 3)*

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
Ghana's new rulers show little talent so far for running the country. *(Page 5)*

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LONG TIENG AREA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Government forces are making an effort to re-take Skyline Ridge overlooking Long Tieng. Four irregular battalions are being withdrawn from isolated positions in the Phou Long Mat - Tha Tam Bleung area and moved to the western end of the ridge, the only portion now in government hands. Together with irregular units already in Long Tieng, they plan to attack the North Vietnamese units now digging in on the east end. Late yesterday, government troops succeeded, despite heavy resistance, in reoccupying at least one position on the ridge.

The outcome of this effort will depend in large measure on the government's ability to move swiftly and on an early end of bad weather, which has been hampering close air support. The government's position in Long Tieng will quickly become untenable, however, if the North Vietnamese can strengthen their hold on the ridge. The Communists have already placed heavy machine guns and a field gun of unknown size on the ridge.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

The government is trying to pull some of its units closer to Long Tieng either to help defend the base or to screen a withdrawal to the southwest. Units from the Phou Pha Sai area have moved to Pha Dong and are to begin a sweep operation toward new positions seven miles southeast of Long Tieng. In addition, [redacted] battalions arrived in Long Tieng on 13 January and are moving into positions southeast of the valley.

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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA - PAKISTAN



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

MALTA-UK


The British have agreed to have Lord Carrington resume negotiations with Mintoff in Rome today. Before leaving Brussels, however, Carrington told a US official that he was not at all optimistic about the outcome. He added that, if the negotiations fail, Britain will want to go ahead with complete withdrawal from the island. In a similar comment, a cabinet minister told US officials in London on 13 January that Britain will not stay in Malta unless Mintoff does a "total turn around," implying that London will not put up with any more temporary settlements. The minister said that the fundamental issue is Mintoff's unreliability and the unlikelihood that any durable accord can be reached with him.

Despite this assessment, the British are willing to go along with the wishes of their NATO allies to increase NATO's offer to more than \$31 million annually when Valletta resumes talks with the UK. The British hope that this approach will clearly establish that failure of the negotiations is due to Mintoff's intractability and not to any British machinations.


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POLAND - USSR - WEST GERMANY



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
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

GHANA

Lieutenant Colonel Acheampong has moved to consolidate his power by placing his supporters in the key military posts. He has not, however, taken steps to fill the membership of his National Redemption Council, which is to include representatives from all important interest groups. Acheampong has announced that the unpopular austerity measures of the ousted Busia regime will be either rescinded or reviewed, but he has as yet formulated no programs of his own.


It seems obvious that the coup against Busia involved little planning for the future, and that Acheampong has little notion of what to do with the power he now holds. The obscure and uninspiring middle-level officers named to the National Redemption Council's executive appear to be united only by a common dissatisfaction with past promotions and with civilian interference with military perquisites. All share a woeful lack of governmental experience. Most of them, however, appear to be admirers of the US.

Former Prime Minister Busia left London for Ivory Coast. He has issued a statement urging Ghanaians to remove the "disgrace" in Accra [redacted]

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Indochina: Recent aerial photography and pilot sightings indicate that one and possibly two operational surface-to-air missile sites are located in the vicinity of Muong Nong, Laos. Previous SAM sites were restricted to areas close to the North Vietnam border and to Tchepone at the time of Lam Son 719 last spring. The establishment of a SAM site this far south confirms that the North Vietnamese will continue to challenge US aircraft over the logistics corridor. The Communists have also established several SAM sites close to the DMZ that can fire on US aircraft flying over northern South Vietnam.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


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
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
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
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
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
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


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17 January 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

17 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Heavy fighting continues in both the Long Tieng valley and in south Laos east of Pakse. (Page 1)

The Israelis are threatening harsher measures against the Lebanon-based fedayeen. (Page 2)

Egypt's new cabinet is discussed on Page 3.

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
(Page 4)

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All sides in the Malta-UK-NATO dispute are still willing to listen to offers, and the Rome talks are scheduled to resume on Wednesday. (Page 5)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LONG TIENG AREA



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Fighting is still going on in the Long Tieng valley and on Skyline Ridge. Government forces attempted to retake the ridge on 14 January, but were pushed back that night by a North Vietnamese counterattack. There is as yet no evidence, however, that the government is pulling back from the valley, and fresh artillery is being set up south of Long Tieng as part of efforts to shore up the southern flank.

In south Laos, government units on Route 23 west of the Bolovens Plateau have again pulled back following a heavy enemy shelling attack. The front line now is only about 15 miles east of Pakse, near the junction of Routes 23 and 231.

Hanoi is engaging in some saber rattling on the subject of the Mekong River towns.

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ISRAEL-LEBANON

At a meeting of the UN-sponsored Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission on Friday, the Israelis threatened "permanent occupation" of Lebanese territory if terrorist activity along the border did not completely stop, according to Lebanese Ambassador to the US Kabbani. Noting that this is the first time that the Israelis have made such a threat, Kabbani said that Lebanon had been compelled to order its army to take up defensive positions along the border.

Until now, the Lebanese Army has carefully stayed out of the fighting between fedayeen and Israeli forces during Israeli retaliatory strikes.

Lebanon Prime Minister Salam told Ambassador Buffum on Saturday that Yasir Arafat and other fedayeen leaders had promised to stop any current activities based in Lebanon. Salam said that Saudi Arabia had obtained a similar pledge from Arafat and that Syria had promised to intervene with Saiga leaders in southern Lebanon.

The fedayeen have violated previous agreements on cross-border operations and may not honor their latest promises. The Israelis, although increasingly sensitive to the growing numbers and aggressiveness of fedayeen in southern Lebanon, would probably turn to "permanent occupation" of Lebanese territory only as a last resort. Should terrorist attacks continue, the Israelis are likely first to resume open patrolling on both sides of the border.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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EGYPT

The new cabinet to be sworn in today will be led by former deputy premier Aziz Sidqi. His nomination to the post of prime minister was approved yesterday by Egypt's only political organization, the Arab Socialist Union. The outgoing prime minister, aging Mahmud Fawzi, was named vice president.

Sidqi is an ambitious figure who has served in a variety of economic-related government posts since the mid-1950s and has frequently been involved in economic negotiations with the Soviet Union.


Last night's broadcast by Cairo Radio of the probable line-up of the new cabinet includes a number of new personalities, among whom is a new foreign minister, Murad Ghalib. He has previously served as ambassador in Moscow. Ex-foreign minister Riad will apparently become presidential adviser on foreign affairs.

Sadat probably believes that the formation of a new "confrontation cabinet" under the younger and more dynamic Sidqi will aid in creating a sense of urgency with regard to the Arab-Israel impasse. He may also believe that Sidqi's expertise will be useful in stimulating the Egyptian economy.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Malta: Malta suspended its deadline for the withdrawal of British forces following the talks in Rome on Saturday, but Prime Minister Mintoff rejected a new UK-NATO offer of about \$31 million annually. Mintoff indicated that he would consider an offer of about \$35 million, plus bilateral economic aid from individual NATO members, as the "minimum basis" for an agreement. Talks are scheduled to resume in Rome on Wednesday. The British are concerned that even if agreement is reached Mintoff might make demands in other areas--such as higher wages for British-employed Maltese workers--that would further drive up the costs of remaining in Malta.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

18 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Heavy fighting continues on Skyline Ridge, while southwest of Long Tieng air strikes apparently have forced a Communist force to withdraw. (Page 1)

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Norway and the European Community have agreed on terms for Norway's accession. (Page 3)


At Annex, we assess the loss of momentum President Allende's government has been experiencing in its attempt to establish a Marxist-socialist state.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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REFERENCES

LONG TIENG AREA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Heavy fighting continues on Skyline Ridge overlooking Long Tieng, and skirmishing continues throughout the area. Irregular units yesterday recaptured one position on the ridge after three days of fighting at close quarters.

An irregular patrol has found evidence that air-strikes have caused heavy enemy casualties and apparently forced a battalion-sized Vietnamese force to withdraw from an area southwest of Long Tieng. South of Long Tieng, the government has moved another 400 troops into a projected fire support base. Four 105-mm. and four 155-mm. howitzers will be positioned there within a few days.


East of the Plaine des Jarres, Communist logistic elements are extremely active. Intercepts from rear service elements in North Vietnam refer to the delivery of more than 1,100 tons of supplies to north Laos. Included were 715 tons of ordnance, a considerable amount for this theater. No time frame for the deliveries was specified.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-CUBA

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Norway - European Communities: Norway will now join with the UK, Denmark, and Ireland in signing the EC accession treaty on 22 January. The way was cleared when Norway and the EC agreed last weekend on the text of a special protocol giving Norwegians exclusive fishing rights within 12 miles of most of their coast for a ten-year transition period and promising consideration of their special problems thereafter. Norway's accession, however, must still be approved by an advisory referendum sometime this spring and subsequently by parliament.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CHILE: ALLENDE LOSES MOMENTUM

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The defeat of government candidates in the two legislative by-elections on Sunday was a harsh setback for President Allende. His political opponents are encouraged and henceforth will be more resistant to his efforts to divide and weaken them. Moreover, the election setback caps a series of difficulties that have been crowding in on Allende since late last year.

In order to regain the political momentum that characterized his first year in office, Allende will have to take some decisive action. More than ten days ago he promised to make a major policy speech but has repeatedly postponed it. The delays may reflect some pulling and hauling within the administration over important policy pronouncements and perhaps also the need first to assess the political impact of Sunday's by-elections.

To give his administration a new head of steam, Allende will have to tackle myriad problems that might overwhelm a less skilled politician. His objective, the establishment of a Marxist-socialist state in Chile, is being frustrated by an increasingly confident political opposition. But economic problems now seem to be the most intractable and to these there are no easy answers.

--The populist policies he adopted early in his administration put more money in the hands of the lowest paid Chileans and substantially increased demand for food and consumer goods; by late last year this had led to annoying shortages and rising prices despite stringent government controls.

--Imports also shot up and by year's end had all but exhausted the substantial foreign exchange reserves Allende inherited.

--Mismanagement and indiscipline in the big copper mines, taken over by the government only last July, have resulted in lower production. This, together with falling world copper prices, will cut significantly into Chile's foreign exchange earnings this year.

--The business community, which profited from a sales boom early in 1971, is now feeling the pinch of restrictions on supplies and prices. Some business leaders are trying to resist government controls.

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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--Agricultural production has been disrupted by the intensified agrarian reform efforts of the past year.

The government has moved in several ways to deal with these problems. It put food distribution under official control, promoted local food production, and tightened controls on imports. The government averted a copper strike, strengthened management in the mines, and improved labor discipline. On the international front, Allende sought to renegotiate Chile's sizable debts and stopped payments due for the partial nationalization of US copper interests by his predecessor in 1967 and 1969. He obtained some credits from abroad, notably from the Soviet Union, which should ease the foreign exchange crisis and help Chile meet short-term commercial obligations.

These measures, however, have not halted the public grumbling that was evident late last year. The opposition has begun to make more effective use of its legislative majority and the influence it retains with many Chileans. Although Allende has been adept at exploiting the ideological and personal rivalries dividing the opposition groups, their new confidence and assertiveness have put him on the defensive.

--The first major outbreak of public violence in Santiago during Allende's term--a women's demonstration on 1 December to protest food shortages--was larger and more determined than the government had expected; police were unable to protect the demonstrators from attacks by leftist agitators.

--An opposition move to bring impeachment charges against Interior Minister Toha, blaming him for the clashes, culminated in a vote to impeach him in the lower house of Congress on 6 January. Allende's prompt shift of Toha to the Defense Ministry is now being attacked as unconstitutional.

--Early this month the opposition in Congress dealt Allende another blow by cutting his budget proposals in areas that affect certain key government programs.

--Throughout these troubled weeks Allende has been conscious of growing discontent within the armed forces. [redacted]

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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Allende is concerned that his efforts to assure continued military neutrality in Chilean politics may not be enough in the long run to keep the military in line. We think he is considering moves to give the military a greater share of the action--perhaps by including them in the government--as part of his longer term hope of fully subordinating the armed forces to political control.

--Student groups, some of them associated with the opposition, violently resisted government efforts late in the year to reorganize and gain control over the National University.

--Chilean businessmen have had some success in blocking government efforts to buy out the big, privately-owned paper company which holds a monopoly on Chilean newsprint.


The accumulation of pressure and problems has led to much soul-searching by Allende and his comrades. The militant Socialists and more pragmatic Communists who vie for dominance in his disparate coalition have reached new heights of mutual recrimination and haggling. Allende's position, which usually prevails, is that unity is vital to the consolidation of the revolution and that ways must be found quickly to regain lost momentum.

Reflecting on Allende's first year in office, Defense Minister Toha observed that while the government had served one sixth of its constitutional mandate, it had implemented far more than one sixth of its program. This may be no exaggeration. But Allende still must himself feel that he has not yet achieved his prime objective--assurance that the revolution has become irreversible.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

19 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Laos, irregulars have recaptured another position on the ridge overlooking the Long Tieng valley, but additional North Vietnamese units are now south of the valley. (Page 1)


[redacted] Cambodia [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] (Page 2)

Thailand [redacted] 25X1X1
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[redacted] (Page 3) 25X1

Both the UK and Malta appear to expect today's talks to break the deadlock. (Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LONG TIENG AREA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

A second position was recaptured from the Communists yesterday in the central portion of Skyline Ridge. This followed the rotation of fresh irregular units into front-line positions on the ridge and the resumption of the government's slow push eastward. The North Vietnamese, meanwhile, have kept up sporadic harassment of the Long Tieng valley with their 130-mm. field guns, and new information indicates that they may have moved up to three more battalions south of Long Tieng where two are already operating.

From such positions, enemy units could mount a flanking attack on the Long Tieng valley, threaten a fire support base being established some five miles south of Long Tieng, or try to block any irregular withdrawal from the valley. Enemy anti-aircraft positions in this area could also hinder air resupply and medical evacuation operations.

A [redacted] North Vietnamese [redacted]

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[redacted] says [redacted]
 [redacted] that Long Tieng be taken "at all costs" and no later than early February. Afterward, the troops are to move farther on and remain in the area throughout the dry season before pulling back to the North Vietnamese border.

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[redacted] at least some of the North Vietnamese units around Long Tieng are experiencing supply difficulties, particularly of small arms ammunition and food.

Such shortages and transportation problems could well account for the failure of the North Vietnamese so far to launch coordinated ground attacks against irregular units defending the Long Tieng area. These difficulties are probably the result of heavy artillery and air strikes against Communist lines of communication.


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CAMBODIA



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
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
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THAILAND



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MALTA-UK

The increased NATO package of more than \$36 million plus bilateral aid, agreed to by the North Atlantic Council yesterday, may break the deadlock when the UK resumes negotiations with Malta today. Prime Minister Mintoff has previously indicated that he will consider an offer of this magnitude [redacted]

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
The British are beginning to moderate their own hard line regarding a total withdrawal now that Mintoff shows some signs of coming to terms. The UK high commissioner in Valletta stated on Monday that British force strength would return to pre-departure levels if an accord is reached. British troops are still packing up for withdrawal [redacted]

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Indochina:

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An intercept of 9 January indicates that some unusual daylight truck movements are scheduled, at least on routes to the northwest of Tchepone.

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South Vietnam:

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Western Europe - Bangladesh: The European Community countries and Britain have agreed to recognize Bangladesh, possibly next week. These countries hope that presenting Pakistani President Bhutto with a united front will dissuade him from breaking diplomatic relations. Although Bhutto broke ties with three small Communist countries when they recognized Bangladesh, he merely recalled his ambassadors when Burma and Nepal, countries of greater importance to Islamabad, took this step.

USSR: [redacted]

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

20 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Laos, North Vietnamese units in the Long Tieng area may be preparing a major attack from the south. (Page 1)

Moscow may believe it can recognize Bangladesh without alienating Pakistan. (Page 2)

Hanoi and Tokyo are taking precautions to keep their trade mission talks secret. (Page 3)


Communist China has a new foreign minister. (Page 4)

The situation along Israel's border with Lebanon has eased, but Israel may still be considering reprisals against Syria. (Page 5)

Egyptian President Sadat is faced with student dissent. (Page 5)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LONG TIENG AREA



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Government units have made no further progress in their attempts to clear Skyline Ridge, and the enemy threat continues to develop south of Long Tieng. General Vang Pao is increasingly concerned that North Vietnamese units may attempt to approach the Long Tieng valley from the south, where its defenses are vulnerable. An irregular battalion has tried unsuccessfully for the past two days to clear this area. Elements of six North Vietnamese battalions have now been detected west and south of Long Tieng.

The Communists' strategy appears to be to keep the government's best units tied down on Skyline Ridge while they move to encircle the valley and prepare a major assault from the south.

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The South Vietnamese have rejected the Laotian appeal

[redacted] to send three ARVN battalions into south Laos. The chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, General Vien, told two high-ranking Laotian generals visiting Saigon earlier this week that South Vietnamese assistance is out of the question at this time because of the withdrawal of American forces and the new enemy buildup in several regions close to South Vietnam.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-BANGLADESH-PAKISTAN

Moscow may soon recognize Bangladesh. The agreement of the European Community countries and the UK to recognize Bangladesh, plus Islamabad's relatively mild reaction to recognition by Burma and Nepal, could convince the Soviets that they too should act. Moscow probably would like further to ingratiate itself with New Delhi by being among the first of the major powers to recognize Bangladesh and may now calculate that it can do so without causing a serious breach with Pakistan.

Moscow has already made some small gestures aimed at getting back into Islamabad's good graces. Soviet President Podgorny sent a congratulatory message to President Bhutto on his assumption of office, and Soviet media have hailed Bhutto's initial economic and political moves as steps in the right direction. [redacted]

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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JAPAN - NORTH VIETNAM

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We reported [redacted] [redacted] on Japan's efforts to work out arrangements for an exchange of permanent trade missions with North Vietnam. We now learn that Hanoi and Tokyo apparently are both taking great precautions to keep these plans from becoming too widely known. The key Japanese official involved in the contacts has told our Tokyo Embassy that, according to the North Vietnamese, Hanoi has taken no other government into its confidence on the subject and has asked the Japanese not to mention it even to friends of North Vietnam.

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The Japanese, for their part, are more and more inclined to postpone informing South Vietnam about these exchanges, presumably because they want the talks to make as much progress as possible before triggering the inevitable protests from Saigon. As for the North Vietnamese, they could use their contacts with Tokyo as a reminder to the Chinese of their independence, but they clearly want to be able to inform Peking at a time of their own choosing.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA

Peking has moved swiftly to confirm a replacement for recently deceased foreign minister Chen I. Chi Peng-fei, a professional diplomat who has been "acting" foreign minister since April 1971, was identified as Chen's successor at a theatrical performance yesterday.

Unlike Chen I, Chi is not a member of the politburo and the party central committee. Chi's appointment thus represents a downgrading of the post and reaffirms the tight rein on foreign policy-making held by Premier Chou En-lai. His posting, however, is not inconsistent with the pattern established over the past year in which several ministerial portfolios have been awarded to functionaries who do not hold high party posts.

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Israel-Lebanon-Syria: The situation along Israel's border with Lebanon has eased, but Israel may still be considering reprisals against Syria. The Lebanese have thus far had considerable success in a campaign to reduce the level of fedayeen activity in response to Israeli raids and the threat to occupy Lebanese territory. In contrast, the Israelis have warned the Syrians that they must bear responsibility for the continuing high level of incursions and other violations from the Syrian side. They have specifically referred to the decapitation of an Israeli civilian engineer on 6 January, an act for which they have yet to even the score.

Egypt: President Sadat is faced with his first significant manifestation of open dissent. Student demonstrations, beginning on Monday and continuing through yesterday, have occurred at two of Cairo's largest universities. The demonstrations appear directed almost entirely at the government, and placards have been displayed criticizing Sadat for having promised much and delivered little. The "no war - no peace" situation was also decried, with some students said to be demanding military training. Sadat has promised to talk to the students in an attempt to discourage further disturbances, but there is little he can do to ease their sense of frustration. If the demonstrations spread and intensify, Sadat could feel impelled to call in the police and army to quell the students.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

21 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Communists have renewed their ground assault on Skyline Ridge. (Page 1)

The resignation of the Chilean cabinet is discussed on Page 2.

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Soviets [redacted] 25X1
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LONG TIENG AREA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

A strong North Vietnamese ground attack has rolled back part of the government's recent hard-won gains on Skyline Ridge. Government troops were forced to abandon one position, and the other was under heavy pressure. The Communists preceded their dawn attack this morning by a steady stream of mortar, recoilless rifle, and small-arms fire throughout the night. Government casualties in the action so far have been heavy, with at least 25 killed and about 100 wounded.


In south Laos, the North Vietnamese are maintaining pressure on government forces on the periphery of the Bolovens Plateau. Lao Army units in forward positions along Route 23 have reported frequent shellings and probes over the past several days, but the Communists have pushed no closer to Pakse. The Communists are also attacking along Route 231, about 15 miles north of Route 23.

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
CHILE

Yesterday the government announced that the entire cabinet had resigned and that a new one would be presented on Monday.



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


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COMMUNIST CHINA




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
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
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USSR



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
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

22 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

On *Page 1* we comment on the outlook for Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan next week.

The battle for Skyline Ridge goes on, while to the west Communist forces appear to have overrun Lao Army positions on Route 13 between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. (*Page 2*)

President Bhutto is taking a whirlwind trip to Muslim countries in North Africa and the Near East next week, and will then hop to Peking. (*Page 3*)

Prime Minister Mintoff has coupled his acceptance of the UK-NATO offer of \$36 million annually with a request for a separate one-time payment of \$26 million by the end of January. (*Page 4*)

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(<i>Page 5</i>)			
[redacted]	Chi-	[redacted]	25X1
nese Nationalists		[redacted]	25X1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-JAPAN

Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan next week
is a major step in Moscow's campaign to improve ties
with Tokyo.

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There have been few signs that Gromyko will make any
dramatic offers. He will be anxious discreetly to
discourage Japanese overtures toward Peking.

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Gromyko will
seek further to stimulate Japanese interest in de-
veloping Siberian resources and closer economic co-
operation in general.

The Japanese will be keenly interested in whatever
he has to say on the question of the Soviet-occupied
"northern territories"--the primary obstacle to
better relations, from their viewpoint. Gromyko
might renew some hints of flexibility similar to
those dropped last summer by other Soviet officials.

[redacted]


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Both Moscow and Tokyo, of course, have reason to
demonstrate to the US, in advance of President
Nixon's visit to Peking, that they have the option
of developing better bilateral relations. The
visit may lead to an exchange of higher level vis-
its between Moscow and Tokyo.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Yesterday an irregular battalion that had earlier been pushed from a forward position on Skyline Ridge regained it after heavy fighting. The battalion, which a few days ago numbered about 300 men, could muster only 50 for the counterattack and now has been replaced. Some 2,000 government troops are dug in along the ridge. Intense fire from enemy units entrenched on the eastern end and northern slopes of the ridge is hampering aerial resupply.

One North Vietnamese battalion has been positively identified on the ridge, and other units are probably there as well. The North Vietnamese have a strong reserve force--the 312th Division and the 335th Regiment, most of whose units appear to have been largely uncommitted so far in the fighting around Long Tieng.

To the west, Communist forces apparently have overrun Lao Army positions and captured four 105-mm. howitzers at Sala Phou Khoun at the junction of Routes 7 and 13.

There is no evidence to suggest that North Vietnamese units have moved into this area, and we believe the attack was mounted by Pathet Lao and dissident Neutralists, who also occupied this area in early 1970. The severing of Route 13--the only road between Vientiane and Luang Prabang--is more a psychological than a logistical blow, since the road is used mainly for local traffic.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PAKISTAN

President Bhutto plans to leave Pakistan early next week for a whirlwind trip to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq [redacted]

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[redacted] After a day back in Pakistan, he will then go to Peking, probably on 31 January. His stated purpose is to express his gratitude for these countries' support--virtually nonexistent in some cases--during the recent war with India.

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It is more likely that in some places, particularly Libya and Saudi Arabia, Bhutto will be looking for money. [redacted]

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We believe that Bhutto's trip to China mainly involves an attempt to demonstrate to the Pakistani people that he has Chinese support. [redacted]

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

MALTA

At the talks in Rome this week Prime Minister Mintoff accepted the final UK-NATO offer of \$36 million annually, plus bilateral aid, but with the proviso that Valletta receive a separate one-time payment of \$26 million by the end of January to cover an anticipated budget deficit. The North Atlantic Council meets today to consider this request.

On the question of access to facilities on Malta, Mintoff agreed to exclude military visits by Warsaw Pact countries. He would not rule out visits by the Chinese, however. As for other countries, Mintoff suggested that the use of the UK facilities be subject to both Maltese and British approval. Mintoff said that, among NATO countries, at least Italy and West Germany would be permitted access, but the US would not. He would not agree to subject Libyan visits to prior UK approval.

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JORDAN-LEBANON




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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA - NATIONALIST CHINA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

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USSR-Cuba: A Kashin-class guided missile destroyer, an F-class submarine, an ocean-going rescue tug, and a tanker left Mariel late Thursday. They have passed through the Florida Strait and are maintaining a northeasterly course, apparently headed for home waters. The Soviets now have in Cuba only another rescue tug which arrived in Mariel earlier this week and two special support barges in Cienfuegos.

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HW PDS FOR 23 JANUARY:

LAOS

THERE HAS BEEN NO IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE TACTICAL SITUATION AT LONG TIENG. THE FIGHTING HAS EASED SOMEWHAT ON SKYLINE RIDGE, ALTHOUGH COMMUNIST GROUND PROBES AND ATTACKS BY FIRE ARE CONTINUING. GOVERNMENT PATROLS HAVE FOUND FRESH EVIDENCE OF ENEMY TROOP CONCENTRATION SOUTHEAST OF LONG TIENG, BUT NO MAJOR FIGHTING IN THAT SECTOR HAS BEEN REPORTED.

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MALTA

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL TOOK NO ACTION AT ITS MEETING YESTERDAY ON PRIME MINISTER MINTOFF'S REQUEST FOR A ONE-TIME PAYMENT OF \$26 MILLION IN ADDITION TO THE UK-NATO OFFER OF \$36 MILLION ANNUALLY. THE NEXT STEP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS SCHEDULED TO BE A MEETING BETWEEN MINTOFF AND BRITISH DEFENSE MINISTER CARRINGTON TENTATIVELY SET FOR 28 JANUARY IN ROME.

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
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Laos, the level of activity around Long Tieng remains low, but to the west government forces are trying to regroup after the loss of a crossroads town. (Page 1)

Relations between Saigon and Phnom Penh have taken one of their periodic turns for the worse. (Page 2)

The North Atlantic Council has reacted negatively to Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff's request for a separate \$26-million payment to head off a financial crisis. (Page 3)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

No major new Communist attacks along Skyline Ridge were reported over the weekend, and no positions changed hands. The North Vietnamese are still holding the easternmost portion of the ridge, and enemy troops are still dug in along the ridge's northern slope where they direct recoilless rifle and mortar fire at the irregulars' position perched on the ridge itself.

Elsewhere in the Long Tieng area, government patrols have found fresh evidence of large North Vietnamese units southeast of Long Tieng, but no major action has yet developed. The arrival in the next few days of irregular battalions after a period of rest and refitting will strengthen the government's position in the area. For their part, the Communists have started work on a road from the Plaine des Jarres that, if it is completed, should considerably ease their logistic problems near Long Tieng.

To the west, government troops are trying to regroup south of Sala Phou Koun, following the loss of that crossroads town on 21 January. Reinforcements are also being sent into Muong Kassy, a town on Route 13 about 25 miles south of the Route 7 junction. Government spokesmen in Vientiane are claiming that North Vietnamese troops were responsible for driving the 1,300-man government force from Sala Phou Koun, but intercepted messages reveal that the victory was achieved by at least three Pathet Lao and "patriotic neutralist" battalions, units with less military prowess than the North Vietnamese.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA - SOUTH VIETNAM

Relations between Saigon and Phnom Penh have taken one of their periodic turns for the worse.

- Earlier this month Saigon withdrew ARVN troops from the Krek area of Cambodia.
- Saigon has reduced river convoys to Phnom Penh from four to two per month.
- Phnom Penh is reluctant to allow Saigon to establish an office in western Cambodia to deal with South Vietnamese internees there.

The Khmer - South Vietnamese relationship will never be completely smooth, but both parties will work to preserve it as long as they face a common enemy. Relations may become more acrimonious in the next few weeks, however, if Communist military pressure increases Cambodian fears just when Saigon wants to keep its forces on hand in South Vietnam.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTE

Malta: The North Atlantic Council on 22 January reacted negatively to Prime Minister Mintoff's request for a separate, one-time payment of \$26 million to prevent an immediate financial crisis in Malta. There was a general consensus among the council members that their offer of \$36 million annually, plus bilateral aid, in return for a new Malta-UK defense agreement, should stand. The allies, however, did appear disposed to go at least part way in meeting Mintoff's need for cash by making available a large portion of the first annual payment in the near future providing that a satisfactory settlement is concluded.

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[redacted] The next step in the negotiations is scheduled to be a meeting between Mintoff and British Defense Minister Carrington tentatively set for 28 January in Rome.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

25 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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Laotian irregulars recaptured the rest of Skyline Ridge yesterday, but the Communists remain in a strong position to strike anywhere in the Long Tieng area. (Page 2)

The Soviet Union and some of its Warsaw Pact allies may try to inject the issue of Communist China's role in the Communist world into the Pact summit meeting that begins today. (Page 3)

The Israelis are making it clear they will not tolerate an increase in fedayeen attacks based in Syria. (Page 4)


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
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LONG TIENG AREA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Yesterday an irregular unit recaptured, without resistance, the last helicopter landing pad on the eastern end of Skyline Ridge. Most of the government units involved in the week-long struggle for the ridge now have been pulled back into the Long Tieng valley, leaving two battalions holding the ridge. Two fresh irregular battalions moved into Long Tieng yesterday, and additional reinforcements are scheduled to follow in the next few days.

The North Vietnamese decision to abandon the last position suggests that casualties and supply difficulties had finally incapacitated their units. The North Vietnamese apparently did not choose to throw in fresh troops from the six other infantry regiments in the Long Tieng area. Their strategy may have been to tie down and deplete the government's best units--the four irregular battalions that bore most of the fighting suffered over 25 percent casualties--while improving their own lines of communication and shifting men and supplies into position for a new assault. With enemy units now deployed south and west of the valley, new attacks could be directed either at the ridge or against Long Tieng itself.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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WARSAW PACT

On the eve of today's political summit meeting in Prague, several East European states have intensified their propaganda attacks on China. Soviet criticism of the Chinese has, of course, been running at a high level since the Indo-Pakistani conflict and the UN General Assembly session. Polish and East German articles in the past week specifically attack Peking's "splitting activities" in the socialist world and its "diplomatic maneuvers" in the Balkans.

Warsaw and Pankow seem to be fronting for Moscow on this issue, and Bucharest is the unspecified but obvious target. The Romanians, who have been subjected to this kind of performance before, will strongly resist any efforts to push through a resolution condemning Peking and will seek to confine the meeting to questions of European security.

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ISRAEL-SYRIA

The Israelis are justifying their air strike yesterday against a fedayeen camp north of Daraa in Syria as retaliation for recently increased fedayeen activity in the Golan Heights. They also charge that the character of this activity indicates cooperation between the Syrian Army and the fedayeen, implying that Israeli counteractions may not spare Syrian Army units and bases.

The increased terrorism in the Golan Heights area reflects the recent shift of fedayeen operations from Lebanon to other areas along the Israeli border. The shift is the result of Israel's recent raids into Lebanon and its threat to occupy Lebanese territory unless fedayeen activity from there ceased.

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NOTES

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Vietnam:

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Egypt: The government yesterday took tougher measures to quell an upsurge of student unrest. Security forces clashed with a small group of rioting students in one of Cairo's main squares and used force to confine demonstrations in other areas of the city. One of the primary causes of this latest upsurge apparently was the arrest of a number of protesters during earlier demonstrations. Another was the government's action in sending the students out one day early on a scheduled two-week recess. The government hopes that the recess and the students' failure to generate any visible local support will cool them down.

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
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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

There is talk in Japanese business circles that the yen may be revalued again this spring in view of Japan's continuing strong trade position. (Page 1)



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(Page 2)

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JAPAN

Many Japanese business leaders and economists believe that the yen remains an undervalued currency. According to several top businessmen, a currency reform in May will involve a three-percent revaluation and replace 100 old yen with one new yen. The yen-dollar ratio would then be three to one.

These predictions arise from Japan's continuing strong trade position. Last year Japan had the largest trade surplus of any country in the last 25 years, \$7.9 billion, including a \$3.5-billion surplus with the US. Japanese forecasters unanimously predict another huge surplus for 1972, with most estimates pointing to a \$7-billion figure.

We believe that the Sato government would be loath to revalue unilaterally, even in the small amount being rumored. It has already been chastised for going too far recently and the recession is now being felt. However, if a large trade surplus continues in the first quarter, when Japan's balance usually shows a seasonal decline, speculative pressure for revaluation would likely increase.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CHILE

President Allende is having trouble putting together a new cabinet. Some coalition party leaders appear to be resisting his demand that he have a free hand in determining the government's course. There is also objection to his intention to bring technicians into the cabinet and to broaden its political base.

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Allende has offered a cabinet post to Radomiro Tomic, his 1970 election opponent who retains some influence among leftist Christian Democrats.

An offer to Tomic would accord with earlier reports that Allende is trying to split off Christian Democratic factions and induce them to join his cabinet.

Allende's acceptance of Defense Minister Toha's resignation, following Senate approval Saturday of Toha's impeachment as interior minister, may reflect nudgings from the military chiefs. The remainder of the cabinet has stayed on in caretaker status since its resignation on 20 January.

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NOTE

Yugoslavia: President Tito's party conference speech yesterday sought to play down the nationalist unrest that has been troubling the country in recent months and to renew public confidence by emphasizing Yugoslavia's "enormous" achievements. He did, however, criticize the party for not fulfilling the tasks set forth by the last party congress. Tito repeated his earlier calls for a party reorganization aimed at creating a compact, tightly controlled, and disciplined cadre. The fact that it required an eleventh-hour presidium session on Monday to iron out specific proposals on party reform indicates that resistance from those who want to preserve a decentralized system remains strong.

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Viet Cong officials in Hanoi have issued an appeal for a popular uprising in South Vietnam presumably keyed to the coming Communist offensive. (Page 1)

In Laos, government forces are strengthening their defenses around Long Tieng. (Page 2)

North Vietnam [redacted]

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[redacted] Cambodia. (Page 3)

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Widespread opposition among black Rhodesians is threatening to upset the UK-Rhodesia settlement. (Page 4)

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SOUTH VIETNAM


In an unusual full-dress news conference in Hanoi on 25 January, Viet Cong representatives issued a "policy statement" calling on the South Vietnamese to overthrow the Thieu government and drive out the Americans. As part of the appeal, which was later broadcast by Radio Hanoi, the Viet Cong officials reiterated a two-year-old proposal by their "Provisional Government" offering amnesty to any South Vietnamese soldier or civilian who would now support a general uprising. The statement also offered lenient treatment to civilian officials, regardless of their previous record, if they will join the anti-Saigon cause. Commenting on the statement, Hanoi's official newspaper praised the amnesty proposal and emphasized that "now is the time for our entire people to arise and hit the enemy."

This is the first time since Tet of 1968 that the Communists have formally called for an uprising in the South. Hanoi undoubtedly hopes that the statement will intimidate Saigon's forces and the South Vietnamese population in preparation for the coming Communist offensive. As in the past, the Communists may also anticipate that this kind of propaganda will help them get maximum advantage from any military successes.

Calling for a popular uprising also carries a propaganda risk for the Communists; however. Although the enemy's military units are capable of striking many populated areas of South Vietnam, it is doubtful that they have sufficient assets in place to demonstrate a significant degree of popular support during the attack. Many ranking enemy cadres in South Vietnam are said to be highly dissatisfied with the way recruitment and political agitation have been going and are particularly skeptical of Communist strength in the cities, where, according to Communist doctrine, a "general" uprising must culminate. Thus, the Communists may be setting themselves up for a political disappointment that could cost them some of the credibility and support, both in South Vietnam and abroad, that might be generated by a dramatic military effort.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LONG TIENG AREA



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LAOS

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A new fire support base south of Long Tieng will soon be operational. The Long Tieng airstrip has been reopened for limited use by Lao Air Force T-28s and small resupply aircraft.

These developments should make it possible for Vang Pao to mount a more cohesive and flexible defense and to begin more aggressive patrol operations aimed at locating enemy units for air and artillery strikes.

The North Vietnamese have maintained a moderate level of ground probes and shelling attacks on irregular positions around Long Tieng.

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the Communists are continuing to push ahead with a road from the southwestern edge of the Plaine des Jarres toward Tha Tam Bleung.

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
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Most North Vietnamese combat units appear to be resupplying and refitting, and intercepts from some have made reference to receiving replacements. They could resume an assault on Long Tieng shortly after supplies are brought in over the new road.

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CAMBODIA - NORTH VIETNAM



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UK-RHODESIA

The UK-Rhodesian agreement arrived at last November called for creation of a commission to study the acceptability of the settlement among Rhodesia's Africans. The commission is now operating under the chairmanship of Lord Pearce and is encountering evidence of widespread opposition among black Rhodesians to the preliminary settlement. As expected, most urban blacks are against the accord, but there are also early signs that rural Africans are solidly opposed.


The commission still has about six weeks of canvassing ahead of it. Unless the present trend is reversed soon, which seems unlikely, Lord Pearce will have no recourse but to report to London that the agreement is unacceptable to Rhodesian Africans. In that case, the settlement, which London views as a last-ditch effort to prevent Salisbury from turning to South Africa's type of apartheid, would be dead.



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NOTES

Indochina: Both aerial observation and sensor detection indicate that the North Vietnamese are sustaining a high level of vehicle activity in the Laotian panhandle since they began their logistic push earlier this month. One logistic organization located in northeast Cambodia near Siem Pang notes, in an intercept, that it moved 118 tons of supplies on 15 January and that some 126 tons of 82-mm. mortar ammunition--more than 20,000 rounds--are stored in its area. The location of the stockpile, one of the largest of a single type of ammunition ever detected in this part of Cambodia, is such that the ammunition could be made available fairly rapidly to combat units either in South Vietnam's central highlands or in the COSVN area farther south.

Warsaw Pact: The statement on European security issued at the end of the Warsaw Pact summit meeting yesterday contained nothing new. There is no indication that Moscow has formulated a negotiating position or has arrived at a realistic way to get talks on force reductions under way. Nevertheless, the statement may well touch off a new round of pronouncements by Moscow and its allies professing interest in such talks. The Soviets may see special merit in this over the next several weeks as a means of attesting their desire to lessen tensions in Europe and to take some play away from President Nixon's visit to Peking.

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Hanoi's, Moscow's, and Peking's initial reactions to the President's peace proposal are reported on *Page 1*.

Egyptian President Sadat's forthcoming trip to Moscow seems mainly designed to divert domestic criticism away from himself. (*Page 3*)

During his visit to Japan, Gromyko succeeded in improving the atmosphere between Moscow and Tokyo. (*Page 4*)

India has set a number of preconditions that Pakistan must meet before peace talks can begin. (*Page 5*)

On *Page 7*, we report on the efforts of the Cambodian Communists to build their movement.

At Annex, we discuss Cuba's changing relations with the governments of Latin America.

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NORTH VIETNAM - US

In its initial reaction to President Nixon's peace proposal, Hanoi has reserved most of its comment and vituperation for the provisions calling for open elections in South Vietnam under a caretaker government. Only with respect to this part of the proposal have the North Vietnamese discussed any of the specifics outlined by the President. According to a Radio Hanoi commentary on 25 January, Thieu's resignation would still leave his "lackeys" in control of an election, while US troops--even though in the process of withdrawing--would still be in South Vietnam to help maintain Thieu and keep the war going.

Other aspects of the President's peace plan have either been ignored in North Vietnamese public pronouncements or have drawn a standard denunciation. No mention has been made in the North Vietnamese press or by Communist spokesmen in Paris of the proposal for international supervision of the proposed elections--a notion which the Communists themselves endorsed in their ten-point peace package two years ago. Nor has Hanoi made any effort to relate the POW issue to the new proposal. Instead, the North Vietnamese have reasserted their demand for a withdrawal of all American forces under a set deadline and US abandonment of the Thieu government in return for the prisoners' release. The North Vietnamese have termed unacceptable the President's call for a cease-fire throughout Indochina, claiming that it would deprive the peoples of Indochina of their right to self-defense and self-determination.

None of Hanoi's public pronouncements can be read as rejecting the proposal out of hand. At the very least the North Vietnamese may still be debating how to respond publicly to the initiative and avoid giving the impression that they are the primary roadblock in the way of substantive negotiations.

There has been no authoritative Soviet comment on the President's proposal, and what little treatment there has been of the subject has been essentially negative. TASS failed to carry its normally prompt news report of the President's address and did not issue its first independent commentary until after the initial Vietnamese reaction had become known. In that commentary, the Soviets complained of the President's failure to set a date for total

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US withdrawal and berated him for "trying to conduct the Paris talks from a position of strength." Yesterday afternoon a Moscow Radio commentator broadcasting in English called the proposal "nothing new," and characterized it a "propaganda stunt." Much of his denunciation followed the lines taken by the North Vietnamese.

Peking's only reaction so far has been to republish without comment the responses of Hanoi, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and Pyongyang, suggesting that the Chinese have not decided on what line to take.

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EGYPT-USSR

President Sadat's coming visit to the USSR and "other friendly states" appears mainly inspired by a need to undercut domestic critics of his inaction in the Middle East impasse. The trip is vaguely scheduled for sometime after this week, perhaps to give Sadat time to ensure that domestic unrest is under control prior to his departure. Although the recent student demonstrations are the only clearly visible manifestation of malaise in Egypt, other groups may share some of the students' unhappiness.

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While in Moscow, Sadat can be expected to stress again his need for more tangible proof of Soviet commitment to the recovery of the occupied territories. On this occasion, the Egyptian President will certainly argue that US deliveries of additional Phantom jets to Israel require a response in kind from the USSR.

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
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USSR-JAPAN

During his visit to Tokyo, Gromyko seems to have succeeded in creating a favorable atmosphere for future contacts between the USSR and Japan. While he was there, the Japanese Foreign Ministry tried to create the public impression that the two sides could agree to exchange visits of heads of government in the coming year and to begin negotiations on a peace treaty. The communique was equivocal on these points, however, stating that the USSR and Japan "expect" the visits to take place and "favor" peace talks.

Japan has hitherto insisted that negotiations for a peace treaty could not be held without Soviet willingness to discuss the problem of the Northern Territories--the four islands occupied by the Soviets after the Second World War. Thus Gromyko may privately have shown signs of flexibility on this issue, although no mention of this was made in the communique. Previously the Soviet position has been that the problem of the Northern Territories was a "closed matter," but at a press conference today Gromyko appeared to acknowledge that a solution to this problem was a prerequisite to the signing of the treaty.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN

India has established a number of prerequisites that must be met before serious peace talks with Pakistan can begin. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh has claimed [redacted] the Indians do not rule out the possibility that the Pakistani military might overthrow President Bhutto and initiate another war. Consequently, he said, they will seek to ensure that Pakistan does not maintain a military capability sufficient to threaten India's security.

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In order to survive as President, Bhutto cannot appear to be using an Indian yardstick to determine his country's military strength levels. He is already under pressure from his army commander in chief, General Gul Hasan, who recently told the acting head of the US Mission in Islamabad that he wants to maintain the level of the Pakistani Army at about prewar size, despite the loss of the east. Hasan believes such a strength level is necessary to serve as a credible deterrent against India, and claims to have Bhutto's concurrence for such an effort.

Indian spokesmen have made it plain that, while they are willing to return territory captured in West Pakistan, Islamabad first must indicate its willingness to relinquish claims to Indian-held Kashmir and make "mutually acceptable" rectifications of the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire line so as to stabilize the border situation. According to Singh, India will maintain a high state of readiness on the western front; its troops will not be withdrawn behind prewar boundaries until a comprehensive settlement has been negotiated.

The presence of these forces will make it difficult for Bhutto to meet Mrs. Gandhi's demand that he abandon a "policy of confrontation." In any case, Bhutto would have great difficulty in accepting preconditions that included relinquishing Pakistan's claims, however theoretical, to Indian-held Kashmir.

Meanwhile, Bhutto is under considerable domestic pressure to effect the release of some 90,000 West Pakistani prisoners of war. New Delhi insists that the prisoners are held jointly with Bangladesh and that Bhutto must also deal with the Bengalis on the issue.

(continued)

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Bhutto will find it difficult to do this as long as Indian troops remain in Bangladesh, and India will probably not completely withdraw its forces for several months. The return of the prisoners is also complicated by Bhutto's inability at this time to "accept the reality of Bangladesh," as demanded by the Indians, even though this problem may ultimately be solved on a practical rather than an official basis.

If the Indians persist in posing rigid preconditions, Bhutto may feel compelled to take a more strident nationalistic, anti-Indian position in order to placate the military.

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CAMBODIA

Since Sihanouk's ouster, the Vietnamese Communists have borne the brunt of the fighting in Cambodia, while the Khmer Communists have been working hard to build up their movement. The Khmer Communists now are some 15,000 to 30,000 strong and engage mostly in small-scale attacks and rear service activities in support of the Vietnamese. A recent Khmer message gives us a fairly good picture of their organizational plans and problems, particularly with regard to the Phnom Penh area.

--The Communists are stressing the formation of additional battalions and companies, possibly at the provincial and district levels.

--They may be forming some artillery units.

--They hope to increase recruitment and intelligence activities in areas south of Route 4 and just north of Phnom Penh.

--With regard to the capital itself, the Communist aim is to isolate the city even further and to increase sabotage and political agitation within the city to take advantage of the disarray in the Lon Nol government.

--To overcome organizational problems in the capital area, the Khmer Communists are considering creating a new region to include the city and its environs and a "committee" for the city itself.

Cryptic references in the message to "disagreements"

[redacted] there are political problems both within the Khmer Communist movement and between the Khmer and the Vietnamese Communists.

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NOTE

Malta-UK-NATO: Lord Carrington told Ambassador Annenberg on 25 January that London regards a number of bilateral issues as potential rupture points in the negotiations with Malta. The British have misgivings about the dependability of any agreement with Mintoff and do not want to leave loose ends that would allow him to cause trouble later. Carrington stated that, if Mintoff cannot soon be brought to terms, London tentatively had decided to halt its negotiations and leave it up to some other NATO member to carry on. In that event, London would complete the withdrawal of all its troops from the island.

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CUBA'S CHANGING RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

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Fidel Castro has greatly modified his aggressive tactics toward the rest of Latin America over the past four years. He is now engaged in a more conventional pursuit of closer economic and political ties with selected countries in the region. His new policy results primarily from the repeated failures of Cuba's previous attempts to foster subversion and insurrection, culminating in Che Guevara's death in Bolivia in 1967. The stress on exporting revolution was also diverting Cuba from its mounting problems at home, particularly the mismanagement of its economy. Castro had also come under Soviet pressure to reduce his external adventures, which Moscow saw as both unrealistic and damaging to its own strategy for increasing Communist influence in the area.

Castro's new approach has benefited not only from the fervent and frequently anti-Yankee nationalism of Latin American states generally, but more specifically from the accession to power of "independent" or leftist regimes in Peru, Bolivia (at least until August 1971), Chile, Panama, and Ecuador. By providing the leaders of such regimes with a convenient means of demonstrating their "leftism" or their independence of the US, Castro's overtures have enabled him to regain a measure of respectability in Latin America. With the passage of time, fear of Cuban subversion in many other countries throughout the area has also diminished. Both of these factors have tended to undermine the economic and political sanctions imposed on Cuba by the OAS.

Castro is working hard to capitalize on this trend, but this does not mean he has completely stopped all support for revolutionary movements abroad.

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It is highly unlikely that Castro is prepared to risk what he has gained through his new policy by reverting at any time in the near future to all-out emphasis on the fomenting of violence.

Castro's trip to Chile last fall, with stopovers in Peru and Ecuador, provides the most dramatic evidence that he is seeking ways under his new policy to advance his gains and reduce Cuba's isolation from the rest of the hemisphere. Apart from this trip,

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most of Castro's actions have taken the form of exchanges of athletic teams, cultural groups, and agricultural delegations, and these are likely to remain the cornerstone of his efforts. Offices of the Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina, are already located in Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela, and more may be established in other nations as well. Cuba may try to follow up such contacts with trade offers, aimed at the gradual establishment of permanent trade missions just short of formal diplomatic relations. Moves in this direction, however, are likely to remain selective. Castro stated during his visit to Chile that Cuba is "not desperate to normalize relations with other Latin American countries," indicating that his basic criterion for establishing diplomatic relations will be that a country's foreign policy is independent of US influence.

Cuba now has stronger ties with Chile than with any other nation in the hemisphere. Since the inauguration of President Allende, Cuba and Chile have re-established diplomatic relations, signed a two-year trade agreement and a bilateral civil air accord, and exchanged numerous cultural, agricultural, and commercial delegations. Castro will work to strengthen this relationship, probably through increased contacts and cooperation between the various agencies of the two governments.

Castro is also trying to expand Cuba's ties with Peru. Although Peru has been compelled, for the time being, to shelve its initiative in the OAS to permit individual member states to re-establish relations with Cuba, Lima is likely to normalize relations with Havana before the end of the year.

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Castro has been currying favor with Panama by publicly supporting its position against that of the US in the canal talks. The outcome of the talks is of intense interest to Castro, not only because of the impact a settlement will have on US influence in the area, but because an agreement favorable to Panama could serve Castro as a convenient tool for pressuring the US to get out of Guantanamo. Torrijos, for his part, is probably using his dalliance with Cuba both as a manifestation of his independence from the US and as an ace in the hole for use in pressuring the US in the treaty negotiations.

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The question of Havana's future relationship with Ecuador is trickier. Quito is likely to proceed cautiously in Lima's footsteps toward recognition of Cuba. This is because of military opposition partially stemming from Castro's refusal to extradite the murderers of an Ecuadorean military pilot aboard an aircraft hijacked to Havana. There are indications that negotiations may soon take place on this matter in Cuba, and its resolution could reinforce Quito's present inclination.

The new moderation in Cuba's foreign policy does not extend to the OAS. Fidel still uses his most vituperative language in speaking of the organization, and he is not likely to change his stand against rejoining it as long as the US remains a member. Cuban representatives at regional conferences continue rather to call for a "union of Latin American nations" that would replace the OAS and exclude the US.

The outlook for continued small Cuban successes under its new Latin American policy is good. Cuba will probably continue to expand its commercial and agricultural contacts in the Caribbean area, primarily in the French territories, Trinidad-Tobago, and Jamaica. In addition, once diplomatic relations are re-established with Peru and Ecuador, one or two other nations may follow suit.

A number of Latin governments, however, are still strongly opposed to Castro. Brazil, Paraguay, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and several Central American states [redacted] oppose any reconciliation with the Castro government. Such opposition is partly in deference to the US position, but a number of Latin American countries still perceive a threat from Cuban subversion. The Uruguayan Government, moreover, was especially angered by Castro's statement in Chile that violence was the only road to power in Uruguay. Uruguay's anger may only be temporary, but strongly anti-Castro countries are likely to reject ties with Cuba for some time to come even if a number of other states normalize relations with Cuba.

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The ultimate success of Castro's policy will depend upon a continuation in power of the present more sympathetic regimes in Latin America and the extent to which Castro's relations with them can set in motion a limited bandwagon in Cuba's favor. As more ties are established, however, Cuba may become a less attractive symbol by which Latin leaders can demonstrate independence of the US. Historical as

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
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well as economic and political obstacles will still stand in the way of Castro's quest for a position of leadership. South American states, for instance, have traditionally lacked rapport with the Caribbean nations, viewing them as "banana republics." Cuba's weak international economic position is not likely to give it much of an advantage with countries such as Brazil, which is already making its own claims for Latin leadership. Moreover, many other leaders still regard Castro as a brash, rude, and arrogant upstart. The Cuban leader is used to having his way at home, and it remains to be seen whether he can cope with the frustrations of occasional setbacks, the necessity to compromise, and occasional outright rejection of his views in his dealings with other Latin American nations.

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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[Redacted] (Page 1)

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(Page 2)

The Panamanian Government plans to publicize soon its dissatisfaction with the canal negotiations.
(Page 3)

Allende's changes in the Chilean cabinet do little to improve his position. (Page 4)

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

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[Redacted] indicators regarding the impending Communist offensive in South Vietnam's central highlands. (Page 6)

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
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
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
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
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PANAMA

The government will shortly issue a public statement that is expected to stress dissatisfaction with the progress on canal negotiations. The Panamanian foreign minister has told Ambassador Sayre that the statement is not intended to disrupt the negotiations.

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Panama recognizes that the main sticking points are its demands for the return of all land in the Zone not being used for canal operations and for an end to all military activities not directly related to canal defense. Panama also wants the Zone's police and postal systems to be integrated with those of Panama within a year. Moreover, the Panamanians are insisting that any new treaty be for no more than 30 years, at which time the canal must be returned to Panama.

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CHILE

Allende's cabinet shuffle announced yesterday is only a stop-gap measure which does not solve his political difficulties. In remarks on a nationwide radiobroadcast, he clearly indicated the interim nature of some of his changes. [redacted]

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
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CYPRUS

President Makarios is seeking to purchase 1,000 Belgian rifles to arm a paramilitary force loyal to him, presumably as an insurance policy against the supporters of General Grivas. Makarios believes that Grivas ordered up a recent minor civil disturbance that resulted in a clash between Greek Cypriot police and right-wing Greek Cypriot demonstrators. He is also convinced that Grivas was behind the recent theft of a large number of weapons from a National Guard armory. Besides the paramilitary force, Makarios is expanding the presidential palace guard and appointing special constables and police.

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Communist Infantry Division Movements



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
NOTE

Vietnam: [redacted] indicates regarding the coming Communist offensive in South Vietnam's central highlands. Recent radio-direction finding indicates that an advance unit of the 320th Division has arrived in Kontum Province. There has also been a sharp increase in the rate of supply movement into the highlands, including the distribution of 122-mm. ammunition to operating units. Moreover, a sizable portion--over 1,000 men--of the Communist 2nd Division appears to be moving toward the central highlands. We caution, however, that because most of the 2nd Division has been used for the past 18 months as a mobile combat force in southern Laos, the units may now be moving to strengthen the defenses of the infiltration corridor rather than to operate with other Communist troops now in the central highlands.

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The President's Daily Brief

31 January 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

31 January 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Laos, action around Long Tieng was light this weekend. (Page 1)

Japanese leaders are publicly pressing for government-level talks with Peking but [redacted] they remain cautious about prospects for normalizing relations. (Page 2)

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
Pakistan's break with the Commonwealth is not likely to halt the trend toward recognition of Bangladesh. (Page 3)

The latest round of talks on Malta made some progress but several important issues remain. (Page 4)

Peking has extended \$65 million in economic aid to Chile, the largest single credit Chile has obtained to date from a Communist country. (Page 5)

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LONG TIENG AREA



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LAOS

Action around Long Tieng was light this week-end. Four of the eight irregular battalions that came to the relief of Long Tieng from Savannakhet are scheduled to return to south Laos today for rest and reorganization. These troops suffered 25 percent casualties during the retaking of Skyline Ridge and their effectiveness and morale have declined.

A recent intercept from a North Vietnamese unit near the Plaine des Jarres indicates that the fighting is also having an effect on the enemy. According to the message, some Communist troops are afraid of the possibility of saturation bombing and do not want to go into combat. The intercept also mentioned logistical difficulties, including a lack of spare parts and explosives.

Even though the North Vietnamese are being heavily attacked from the air, there is no evidence that morale or logistical problems are of such scope that they would prevent the Communists from launching a heavy, coordinated attack after their preparations are completed.

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JAPAN - COMMUNIST CHINA

Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fukuda have told the Diet that they want to establish normal relations with Communist China. Both called for talks with Peking at the government level. Sato acknowledged Japan's close ties with Taipei, but noted that Communist China has been admitted to the UN and that Tokyo's talks with Peking should be on the basis of "realization that China is one." Fukuda, who is a leading contender to succeed Sato, did not mention Taiwan.

[Redacted]

Furthermore, while most leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have concluded that diplomatic ties must be established with Peking, they are still uncertain about the pace at which Japan should proceed.

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Fukuda's caution stems in large part from Peking's aversion to Sato personally and from indications that China is unwilling to come to terms with Japan as long as Sato is Prime Minister.

Despite considerable reservations in Tokyo, at least one press report claims that the Japanese have already sounded out the French about arranging ambassadorial talks with the Chinese. During his visit to Tokyo in mid-January, Foreign Minister Schumann is said to have offered his good offices.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PAKISTAN-COMMONWEALTH

Pakistan said yesterday that it is cutting its ties with the Commonwealth as a result of today's recognition of Bangladesh by Australia and New Zealand and Britain's apparent intention to announce recognition on 4 February.

Commonwealth withdrawal is most likely welcomed by the Pakistanis, most of whom have long questioned the organization's values, and who are resentful of the aloof attitude of Britain and the major Commonwealth countries during the war with India. The action is not likely to have much impact on the trend toward recognition by other states, however.

Besides Australia and New Zealand, the only Commonwealth countries which thus far have recognized Bangladesh are India, Barbados, and Cyprus. Cypriot recognition last week led the Pakistanis to break relations with Nicosia, as they have done with most countries taking this step. Bhutto has indicated, however, that he cannot afford to sever ties with "major powers" such as the USSR and he may have opted to withdraw from the Commonwealth in preference to breaking relations with the more powerful members of the group. Bhutto told a press conference yesterday that he is prepared to continue bilateral relations with Britain. Pakistan's need for economic assistance, moreover, may shape its reaction to recognition moves by the other larger states both within the Commonwealth and in Western Europe--most of whom have supplied economic aid to Pakistan in the past.

Although the UK has been advocating agreement on a common date for recognition of Bangladesh by the European Community countries, several states including France and Italy have not committed themselves.

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MALTA-UK-NATO

The latest round of talks which ended Saturday made some progress, but several important issues remain. On the chief financial question--the annual "rent" to be paid to Malta--Prime Minister Mintoff appears tentatively to have accepted the final Allied offer of \$36.4 million annually--provided that he gets his demand for at least some immediate cash. The North Atlantic Council will discuss this formula today.

The major bilateral Malta-UK issue--the terms for British-employed local labor--is still unsettled. Working-level discussions will continue in Valletta this week on this and other aspects of a new defense agreement in preparation for the next ministerial meeting in Rome on 7 February.

In the meantime, the withdrawal of UK forces from Malta is continuing. British officials note that they will soon begin dismantling heavy equipment, including radar facilities, a step which will be difficult and costly to reverse. Nevertheless, London believes it must continue the withdrawal as a means of pressuring Mintoff to come to terms.

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NOTE

Chile-China-USSR: Peking has extended \$65 million in economic aid to Chile, the largest single credit Chile has obtained to date from a Communist country. Moscow extended \$50 million in foreign exchange to Santiago late last year. Foreign Minister Almeyda has implied that the Chinese assistance is in the form of hard currency on a short-term basis--just what Chile needs most. Moscow's aid carried similar terms. China's action comes almost immediately after the arrival of a high-level Soviet economic delegation in Santiago, which implies that Peking is interested in competing with Moscow for influence in Chile. The composition of the Soviet delegation suggests that Moscow is undertaking a thorough examination of the Chilean economy. Thus far, the \$90 million in outstanding Soviet economic credits to Chile have been used mostly for preliminary survey work.

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