



The President's Daily Brief

1 March 1971

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

1 March 1971

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Vietnam

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Laos

(Page 1)

Both sides have sustained fairly heavy losses in weekend actions in Cambodia. (Page 2)

A Soviet demarche records Moscow's concern over allied activity in Laos and possible action against North Vietnam. (Page 3)

Jordan

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(Page 4)

The Africans have reacted calmly to Britain's decision to sell helicopters to South Africa. (Page 5)

Soviet

Cuba


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Operation LAM SON 719 Situation Map

General location of ARVN forces




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VIETNAM-LAOS

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
The main tactical goal of a major North Vietnamese counterattack is control of the crossroads at Ban Dong, where Routes 9 and 92 intersect. Intercepts of the past few days continue to reflect enemy plans to launch assaults against the crossroads and nearby hills that command the two routes. On 27 February, for example, an intercepted North Vietnamese message reported that Communist forces were in the process of encircling the area. The message included orders, said to be straight from Hanoi, that the main ARVN force at Ban Dong was to be cut off, surrounded, and destroyed.



Fighting has slackened in the high ground north of Route 9, where ARVN airborne and ranger positions have borne the brunt of the enemy thrust. The situation is fluid, however, and control of Hill 31 is uncertain. Losses are heavy on both sides. Enemy tanks have been spotted around Hill 30 and a Communist regiment is not far from another strongpoint farther east.

South toward Muong Nong, Communist resistance continues to ebb and flow, although it generally has stiffened over the past few weeks, and there are signs that sharp fighting may break out soon. Intercepts of the last several days suggest that North Vietnamese infantry and artillery are maneuvering to step up pressure on South Vietnamese field positions; one unit radioed on 27 February that it had encircled an ARVN strongpoint some ten miles northeast of Muong Nong.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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CAMBODIA

Fairly heavy losses were sustained by both sides in weekend actions in central Kompong Cham Province. Most of the fighting occurred in the vicinity of the village of Dambe on Route 75. The main encounter involved a clash between a South Vietnamese ranger battalion and a battalion of enemy troops just south of the village on 26 February. The rangers claimed 250 enemy killed, primarily as a result of air strikes. On the same day, two heavy enemy mortar barrages near Dambe killed several South Vietnamese soldiers, wounded 123, and destroyed seven vehicles. There were several actions around Dambe again on 27 February but casualties on both sides were lighter.

To the east, Communist harassing attacks were reported against South Vietnamese positions near Snuol, in southern Kratie Province, but casualties were light. A possible Communist threat to the South Vietnamese base at Neak Luong, southeast of Phnom Penh, apparently has eased. Direction finding shows that the headquarters of the Communist 88th Regiment, which was located near the base on 25 February, has returned to its normal area of operations east of Prey Veng city.

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USSR-US-INDOCHINA

Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov has presented Ambassador Beam with an oral demarche on the allied incursion into Laos. Kuznetsov underscored the seriousness with which the USSR views allied activity in Laos, and warned against any action aimed directly at North Vietnam. In addition, Kuznetsov raised the specter of Chinese intervention by noting that "other members" of the socialist commonwealth "would not remain indifferent."

The manner in which the demarche was made suggests that Moscow does not really expect the US to support an allied incursion into North Vietnam. Press speculation about such a possibility and the incursions into Laos and Cambodia, however, have raised some doubts in the Soviet Union and Moscow wants to be firmly on record against such a move.


Kuznetsov also expressed his government's doubts about carrying on negotiations with Washington in the face of US activities in Indochina.

The Russians made similar statements last year in the wake of the US incursion into Cambodia and again in December after the US increased the bombing of North Vietnam. There have been no indications thus far, however, that the Soviets actually intend to use current US activity in Indochina as an excuse to stall any ongoing negotiations with the US.


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
JORDAN-FEDAYEEN



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UK-AFRICA

African reaction to the Heath government's announcement that it will sell helicopters to South Africa has been muted. Even Tanzania and Zambia, which led the opposition to such sales, have decided not to react strongly at this time. They recognize that they cannot bring much leverage to bear on the British, and that precipitate action would exhaust what little influence they have. The Organization of African Unity foreign ministers meeting now in Addis Ababa can be expected to issue a strongly worded denunciation, but most black African Commonwealth states are waiting to see if there will be further sales.

The British argue that they are obliged to sell seven Wasp antisubmarine helicopters and spare parts under a 1955 agreement that provides for joint British - South African defense of the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope. London also views the sale of maritime arms to South Africa as a way of offsetting a growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the British will probably gauge the wind carefully before deciding whether to sell Pretoria more naval equipment.

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NOTE

USSR-Cuba:

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

2 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

USSR

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(Page 1)

East Pakistanis might react sharply to the postponement of the National Assembly session, posing further serious problems for President Yahya Khan. (Page 2)

Egypt

(Page 3)

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Cambodia's only oil refinery has been hit by an enemy mortar attack. (Page 4)


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Communist China

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
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
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
USSR




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PAKISTAN

In his statement yesterday postponing the convening of the National Assembly, which was to have met tomorrow to begin drafting a new constitution, President Yahya Khan cited the inability of East and West Pakistani politicians to compose their differences and the refusal of the major West Pakistani party to attend. Yahya added that when conditions improve sufficiently, he will call the assembly into session "immediately."

The major point of disagreement between East and West Pakistan has been the East's insistence on a constitution that would limit the central government's responsibilities to defense and foreign affairs. East Pakistanis had hoped to use their majority in the assembly to push through this program despite West Pakistani objections.


In reaction to Yahya's announcement, there have been pro-independence demonstrations in Dacca, East Pakistan's capital. A spokesman for Mujibur Rahman's Awami League, the majority party in the assembly, has called for general strikes today and tomorrow. Mujib himself has bitterly criticized the postponement, and will have more to say on the subject in a major address scheduled for 7 March.

Yahya is aware that he risks a strong East Pakistani reaction, but he presumably decided that the alternative--disorders in West Pakistan and unrest within the predominately West Pakistani army--would be worse. Should Mujib take a strong stand, possibly even proclaiming East Pakistan's independence, Yahya could face another dilemma: whether to let East Pakistan secede or try to hold the country together by force. The latter course would be extremely difficult in view of strong separatist sentiment among the 70 million East Pakistanis, and the limited army and police forces available in the province.


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EGYPT




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NOTES

Cambodia: A Communist mortar attack against the country's only oil refinery at Kompong Som early today destroyed two thirds of its oil storage capacity. Government troops stationed there apparently suffered only minor losses repelling a ground attack that followed the mortar barrage. Later, another mortar attack was directed against the airfield outside Kompong Som. These are the first enemy attacks in the vicinity of Kompong Som. Only limited amounts of petroleum have been moved from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh on Route 4 since that highway was reopened in January. The government will now be more dependent than ever on the Mekong River convoys from South Vietnam to maintain essential petroleum stocks in Phnom Penh.

Vietnam-Laos:

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Communist China:

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

3 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

[Soviets]

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(Page 1)

[Laotian]

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(Page 2)

President Yahya has taken steps to contain reaction
in East Pakistan to his decision to postpone the
Constituent Assembly. (Page 3)

The government crisis in Norway is discussed on
Page 4.

In Uruguay, the Tupamaros have released Claude Fly
following his heart attack. (Page 5)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


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USSR



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


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Operation LAM SON 719 Situation Map


← General location of ARVN forces




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VIETNAM-LAOS



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Hanoi evidently plans to continue to push large amounts of supplies through the Tchepone area this month. An intercept of 28 February indicates that the first phase of the enemy's so-called "crash" logistics effort was completed on schedule at Binh Tram 33 (located just south of Tchepone) and that the second phase is to begin momentarily. Farther down the line, below Muong Nong, Binh Tram 34 began the first phase of its "crash" effort during the last week of February.

Thus, substantial Communist supply shipments through the Laotian panhandle probably are projected for March and well into April. In the past, the amount moved during the second phase has been less than the amount shipped during the first phase.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PAKISTAN

On the heels of his indefinite postponement of the Constituent Assembly, President Yahya Khan has removed the five provincial governors and named martial law administrators in their stead, and has also imposed censorship.

Although applying to the entire country, the moves are aimed at containing East Pakistani reaction. The governor of East Pakistan has tended to rule leniently, and the local army commander who replaced him is considered to be somewhat tougher.

The general strike called by Mujibur Rahman completely tied up Dacca yesterday. The strike is to be extended to the rest of East Pakistan today. Assorted acts of violence have caused authorities to place Dacca under a nighttime curfew.

Consul General Blood comments that it would be difficult to overestimate the sense of shock, frustration, and anger which has gripped the people of East Pakistan. Mujib remains committed to announce his plans at a mass rally next Sunday. He may limit himself to a policy of noncooperation, such as refusing to pay taxes, stopping work at vital facilities, and boycotting West Pakistani goods. The atmosphere in Dacca, nevertheless, is conducive to a unilateral declaration of independence.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NORWAY

Prime Minister Borten, who submitted his government's resignation yesterday, is expected to ask the King to call the president of Parliament, a conservative, to lead talks on the formation of a new cabinet. This move, combined with the adjournment of Parliament until Friday, allows the four government parties additional time to negotiate an extension of the center-right coalition.

Although the present crisis was precipitated by Borten's indiscreet handling of a document on Norway's policy toward the Common Market, it reflects the basic instability of the center-right coalition which has been governing with only a two-seat majority since the election of 1969. Dissatisfaction with Borten's leadership had been growing among the coalition parties as the government seemed to stumble from crisis to crisis and as the parties' standing declined in public opinion polls.

The Labor Party, with 74 seats in the 150-member Parliament, is likely to form a cabinet if the present government parties are unable to do so. Although a Labor government would be unstable--it could be brought down any time the other four parties united against it--it would give stronger voice to certain themes popular in Scandinavia but troublesome for the US. Under either Labor or the center-right coalition, Norway's membership in NATO would remain firm, but Labor might move to recognize North Vietnam, a policy to which it committed itself in the last election campaign.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Uruguay: The release of Claude Fly yesterday after he suffered a heart attack reflects the Tupamaros' sensitivity to the public outcry which would certainly have followed the death of another of their captives. The terrorists still hold British Ambassador Jackson and may be even more inclined to drive a hard bargain for his release after giving up Fly for no return and after releasing the Brazilian consul in a private ransom deal last week. To recoup prestige, the Tupamaros may also try to increase urban terrorist attacks and could make an early attempt at another kidnaping. The government shows no sign of granting any terrorist demands, however, and is unlikely to change its firm policies in this election year.

Turkey:

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

4 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Sharp fighting has resumed in eastern Laos. (Page 1)

President Thieu, with his domestic audience as well as Hanoi in mind, has warned that South Vietnamese forces might attack the North. (Page 2)

In Cambodia, South Vietnamese forces have engaged in a series of sharp battles east of the Chup plantation (Page 3)

50X1

Mujibur Rahman has rejected a bid by President Yahya to mollify East Pakistani anger. (Page 5)

Lee Kuan Yew says that the Soviets have invited Singapore to bid on a "huge" maintenance and repair facility. (Page 6)


The Chinese launched their [redacted] space satellite
(Page 7)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Operation LAM SON 719 Situation Map

General area of ARVN operations




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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM-LAOS

Sharp fighting has resumed in eastern Laos, with Communist attacks on 2 and 3 March against Hills 30 and 31 north of Route 9, against the high ground south of Ban Dong, and against a South Vietnamese strongpoint just north of the intersection of Routes 9 and 92. Some of the assaults were preceded by heavy shelling and ground probes.



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


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In South Vietnam, widely respected former prime minister Tran Van Huong, now a senator, has publicly criticized the US for failing to provide adequate air support for the campaign in Laos. [redacted]



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM - NORTH VIETNAM

President Thieu told a provincial cadre meeting yesterday that South Vietnamese forces might attack the North unless Hanoi stopped sending its forces into the South. He added that the Communists no longer retain the initiative, and that anti-Communist forces now have the capability to attack the enemy anywhere.


Thieu has only recently adopted this bellicose line more characteristic of Vice President Ky. He clearly wants to keep North Vietnam thinking about its own defenses while it attempts to counter Lam Son 719. He probably also wants to impress on Hanoi that the time has passed when it can invade the South without much concern over retaliation. Thieu also had his domestic audience in mind, for many of the cadre addressed may be able to help his re-election, and an element of bravado stands well with them.

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The speech will reinforce Hanoi's apprehensions about possible attacks against the North.

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CAMBODIA-VIETNAM

South Vietnamese armor, infantry, and ranger troops around Dambe fought a series of sharp battles along Route 75 east of the Chup plantation on 1 and 2 March. They reported killing about 270 enemy troops while their own casualties were 58 killed and over 200 wounded. The South Vietnamese also lost a substantial amount of weapons and equipment, including one tank.



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Since the clearing operation began in early February, the South Vietnamese claim to have killed over 2,500 Communists, at a cost of about 330 killed and 1,700 wounded.




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the enemy appears determined to keep the South Vietnamese forces tied down to divert or delay them from moving into the important storage and base areas in the countryside around Dambe.


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
CAMBODIA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN

Yesterday Mujibur Rahman rejected a major bid by President Yahya Khan to mollify East Pakistani anger over his postponement of the Constituent Assembly. Earlier in the day Yahya had called for leaders of Pakistan's political parties to meet in Dacca on 10 March, and intimated that the assembly might be able to meet soon afterwards. Mujib quickly announced, however, that he would not attend, charging that the conference was being scheduled "at gunpoint."

Mujib's stand increases the significance of his promised statement to a mass rally on Sunday, when he says he will announce his plans. By turning away from this chance to defer a definitive pronouncement pending the proposed conference, he is at least partly seeking to safeguard his leadership of the irate East Pakistanis. Consultant General Blood believes that unless some dramatic breakthrough occurs, a declaration of independence by Mujib on Sunday appears increasingly likely.

Also yesterday, on the second day of a scheduled two-day general strike, Mujib extended the work stoppage through Saturday, while still urging restraint. The army appears to have supplanted the police in Dacca, and nighttime curfews remain in force.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SINGAPORE

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew told Ambassador Cross yesterday that the visiting Soviet maritime delegation has invited Singapore to bid on a "huge" maintenance and repair arrangement for Soviet ships. Lee said he estimated that the arrangement would cover 25 to 40 percent of the Soviet fleet and an even larger amount of merchant shipping. Although he did not say what he had replied to the Soviets, Lee reiterated to Ambassador Cross his earlier position that if the US, UK, and Australia kept Singapore facilities busy there would be no room for the Soviets.

Previously, Lee had given assurances that he would not entertain any proposals for Soviet naval use of Singapore's facilities and that he would make no arrangements about Soviet shipping without first consulting his Commonwealth defense partners. Lee's attempts to pressure these partners and the US into a substantial commitment to use the Singapore facilities show up clearly in his obvious exaggeration of potential Soviet business.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTES

Communist China: The Chinese launched their
space satellite [redacted]

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Yemen (Sana) - US: [redacted]

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Berlin: The slowdown of West German civilian traffic on the autobahn to West Berlin is an attempt by Pankow to strike a balance between its current relatively flexible approach toward matters of mutual interest with Bonn and its much harder view on matters which it considers illegal, such as West German political meetings in West Berlin. The Christian Democratic Party is now holding a three-day meeting there. The traffic harassment caused Mayor Schuetz to postpone the opening scheduled today of West Berlin Senat talks with the East Germans on Easter passes.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

5 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

East Pakistani leader Mujib has intimated that he will soon declare what amounts to independence for the East. (Page 1)

In Turkey,

[redacted] security forces seeking to track down the kidnaped US airmen have become involved in a clash with students. (Page 2)

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Egypt and Israel are showing wariness of each other's intentions as the cease-fire deadline approaches, but there are no indications that either is about to initiate hostilities. (Page 3)

The parliamentary chief of West Germany's opposition Christian Democrats appears to be bidding for some US support to strengthen his hand on controversial party issues. (Page 4)

Soviet

(Page 5)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PAKISTAN

East Pakistani leader Mujib has confided to a group of foreign correspondents that, at the mass rally scheduled for Sunday, he will call for the drafting of separate constitutions for East and West Pakistan, with discussions on the form of federation to follow.

Although such a procedure would appear on the surface to be less drastic than a unilateral declaration of independence, Mujib admitted to the correspondents that the plan would be equivalent to independence for East Pakistan. The proposal probably will be unacceptable to the West Pakistani-dominated government and military.

Violence has lessened somewhat in East Pakistan following Mujib's address to a rally on Wednesday afternoon. Although he castigated the government for firing on civilians and demanded that the troops return to their barracks, he also urged East Pakistanis to halt the looting and arson that had been going on since Tuesday. On the other hand, he urged East Pakistanis to disrupt communications, to barricade roads, to impede military movements, and to refuse to pay taxes.

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
Before the disturbances began, about 20,000 troops were stationed in East Pakistan. One fifth of these, however, were Bengalis whose loyalties probably lie with their fellow East Pakistanis.

Pakistan's airlift and sea transport capacity is not adequate to handle the large numbers of troops we think would be required to contain a major uprising. The military, in any case, would not want to shift units away from the defense of West Pakistan's border with India. Despite these limitations, the Pakistani military profess confidence they have sufficient force to contain the situation so long as it remains short of a full-scale rebellion.


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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY



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Turkish security officials, acting on information that the four US airmen kidnaped near Ankara were being held somewhere at the Middle East Technical University, have sealed off the entire campus area. Some 4,000-5,000 gendarmerie and police are searching the area today, and have clashed with students who are armed and barricaded in dormitories.

The Turkish Government has been broadcasting parts of the lengthy "manifesto" sent by the group responsible for the kidnapings, thereby meeting one of its demands. The manifesto is in effect a call to arms for a popular uprising and guerrilla warfare throughout Turkey. One of the abductors, who was apprehended soon after the incident, has identified the five kidnapers as members of the Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation, the primary organization involved in the recent upsurge of terrorist action in various parts of Turkey. The kidnapers have threatened to execute the four airmen if their demands, including a ransom payment, are not met. The original deadline was extended and is currently set at 11:00 PM EST tonight.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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EGYPT-ISRAEL

As the cease-fire deadline approaches, the tone of Cairo's propaganda has been less strident than it was just prior to the previous expiration date of 5 February. The rhetoric has concentrated on political maneuvering rather than on military threats, with some emphasis on the responsibility of the US to prod Israel toward a more forthcoming attitude.

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[redacted] International efforts to gain a more positive commitment from the Israelis on withdrawal, together with appeals for continued military restraint, could provide Cairo with sufficient justification for continued reliance in the immediate future on political rather than military action. Sadat is expected to make his intentions public in a major speech prior to 7 March.

On the military side, both Egypt and Israel continue to be wary of the other's intentions. Each has stepped up reconnaissance flights along the canal and, with increasing frequency, is penetrating air-space over the other's positions. Although these overflights do not go undetected, no attempts to intercept them have been noted.

The only military preparations by both sides appear to involve contingency planning and alerting of forces. There are no indications, however, that either the Egyptians or the Israelis are mobilizing or redeploying forces to initiate hostilities.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

WEST GERMANY

Rainer Barzel, parliamentary chief of the opposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU), has told a US Embassy officer he is facing increasing difficulty in holding his party to the position that ratification of the treaties with the USSR and Poland should be tied to the ability of the Brandt government and the Allies to obtain a "satisfactory" agreement on Berlin.

Barzel said he hopes to meet with President Nixon during a visit to the US next month. Barzel said such a meeting would strengthen his authority against those in the CDU who would set unrealistically high terms for a Berlin settlement in order to prevent ratification of the treaties and defeat Ostpolitik.

Barzel is no great proponent of Ostpolitik and has in fact criticized Brandt's policies openly on occasion, but his own political ambitions require him to stay in the middle of the road. A meeting with the President would boost Barzel's chances to succeed former chancellor Kiesinger as party chairman and chancellor-candidate.

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NOTE

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

President Sadat's ambiguous threat to let his military chiefs decide on the resumption of hostilities after 7 March is discussed on *Page 1*.

North Vietnam South Vietnam Laos.
(*Page 3*)

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Peking appears to have made its case regarding the threat against China posed by allied operations in Laos, and in fact may have begun to take a more relaxed view. (*Page 4*)

Pakistani President Yahya has announced that the postponed session of the National Assembly will convene on 25 March. (*Page 5*)

The ransom deadline has passed, but there is still no word on the whereabouts of the four airmen kidnaped by Turkish extremists. (*Page 6*)

The curbing of inflation in South Vietnam since last July will improve President Thieu's election prospects. (*Page 7*)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

MIDDLE EAST

President Sadat's ambiguous threat to let his military chiefs decide on the resumption of hostilities after 7 March is a calculated Soviet-Egyptian move to bring formal international pressure on Israel. The signal for Sadat's action apparently was the failure of the Soviets to win a four-power statement condemning Israel's recalcitrance on the territorial issue. Egyptian forces have been on a semialert since December, and press reports today assert that they and the Syrian forces are now on full alert.

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Further tightening of Egyptian and Israeli military alert postures can be expected in the wake of Sadat's statement, and there will be increased danger of inadvertent or individual shooting which could then escalate. But a deliberate resumption of military action by the Egyptian armed forces Monday morning does not appear likely at this time.

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Egyptian official and press statements of the past 24 hours have made it clear that Cairo expects a formal condemnation of Israeli intransigence as the minimum price for Egypt's active cooperation in a cease-fire extension. The Soviet representative's insistence on a condemnatory communiqué by the four-power committee in New York indicates Egyptian-Soviet agreement on this point.

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Sadat's announcement to Donald Bergus that he had had "intensive talks" with Soviet leaders in Moscow on 1 and 2 March was clearly aimed at conveying the notion that Cairo had Moscow's full concurrence in the decision not to extend the cease-fire. It is, in fact, likely that the Soviet leaders have acquiesced in Cairo's decision, and that the USSR also supports Egypt's determination to pursue immediate tactics aimed at sharp intensification of pressure against Tel Aviv. The Russians would not, however, be sympathetic to any bona fide move by Sadat to leave to the Egyptian military the question of a possible resumption of hostilities.

Over recent months the USSR has expended considerable effort urging caution on Cairo's leaders. Lately, to be sure, there has been ample evidence of mounting exasperation among Egyptian and Soviet leaders over what they regard as Washington's failure to bring the Israelis around, despite new signs of flexibility on Cairo's part. Frustrated though Cairo and Moscow may be at the lack of give in Israel's stance, however, there is little reason to believe that they now feel compelled to resort to significant offensive military action. Rather they appear to have decided, in concert, to up the ante and play out their strongest diplomatic cards.


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
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
VIETNAM-LAOS



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA - INDOCHINA

Peking appears to have made its case regarding the threat against China posed by allied operations in southern Laos, and in fact may have begun to take a more relaxed view of the situation in Laos.

The Chinese still refer occasionally to the government statement of 12 February, which contained the warning that allied actions in Laos threatened China itself, but they have not adverted directly to this "threat" in two weeks. Speeches by two Politburo members during this period discussing current military developments in Indochina did not even mention China's security interests. In addition, references in Chinese media to the possibility of the US using tactical nuclear weapons in Indochina have virtually ceased since President Nixon's statement ruling out this possibility.

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The apparent change in Peking's attitude toward Laos may be one result of top leadership meetings recently held in Peking. These conferences probably were mainly concerned with domestic political problems, but discussions concerning the situation in Indochina were presumably also on the agenda. The two Politburo members appear to have attended some of these meetings, and their comments, as well as those of Chinese officials abroad, almost certainly accurately reflect current regime thinking on Indochina.


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
PAKISTAN

President Yahya announced today that the postponed session of the National Assembly will convene on 25 March. He said that his failure to arrange a meeting of political leaders to discuss their differences left him no choice but to proceed with the assembly session. He said that he felt "duty bound to resolve this impasse by taking a decision myself."

We do not have the full text of Yahya's speech, but the tone of his remarks does not suggest much progress in his efforts to bring about a compromise between the East and West Pakistanis.



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Yahya talked with Bhutto at some length yesterday, but there was no announcement as to what transpired. After the meeting, a spokesman for Bhutto's party criticized Mujib and his colleagues for their "most unwarranted" reaction to the postponement, but he refused to say whether Bhutto's group is now willing to participate in the assembly.


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
TURKEY

There is still no word on the whereabouts of the four US airmen kidnaped Thursday. Yesterday's raid on the Middle East Technical University campus by several thousand gendarmes and police, assisted by army helicopters, failed to turn up the kidnappers or their hostages, although it did have the effect of disrupting one of the major centers of leftist extremism in Turkey. In a seven-hour pitched battle between students and the security forces, at least two persons were killed and many wounded. Students barricaded themselves in the dormitories and fought with guns, Molotov cocktails, and sticks of dynamite used as hand grenades. Nearly 200 students were taken into custody.

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NOTE

South Vietnam: Prices in Saigon have risen by only one half of one percent since last July, according to the USAID index, in contrast to an annual rate of nearly 30 percent in 1969 and early 1970. This will remove some steam from one of the most telling issues used against Thieu, and improve his prospects for re-election.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Mujibur Rahman yesterday stopped short of proclaiming East Pakistan's independence, but set conditions for cooperation that President Yahya will find virtually impossible to accept. (Page 1)

North Vietnam

(Page 2)

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On Page 3 we review military activity elsewhere in Laos.

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The Turkish dragnet still has produced no information concerning the missing US airmen. (Page 6)

In his speech yesterday Sadat left open Egypt's military options and showed continuing interest in a political solution

(Page 7)

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the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine

(Page 8)

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Ceylon has been placed in a state of emergency.
(Page 9)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN

Mujibur Rahman's much-heralded address yesterday stopped short of proclaiming East Pakistan's independence, and thereby averted an immediate showdown with President Yahya Khan. Instead Mujib announced a policy of noncooperation whereby East Pakistan would largely return to normal but with government functions suspended. Mujib also said that his party would not consider attending the Constituent Assembly called for 25 March unless several conditions were met: the end of martial law, withdrawal of the army to barracks, and transfer of power to elected representatives of the people.

If Mujib's call to keep government offices closed is heeded, he and his Awami League will move farther toward becoming the de facto authority in East Pakistan. At the same time, by failing to declare independence, he has lessened the chances of an open confrontation with Yahya, who on Saturday expressed his determination to preserve Pakistan's integrity.


Yahya does not need to respond immediately, and some room has been left for negotiation. Nevertheless, he will find it virtually impossible to accept Mujib's demands in their present form, which would be tantamount to acquiescing in de facto self-rule for East Pakistan. Indeed, he will be under some pressure to crack down on Mujib's noncooperation movement.

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
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


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
VIETNAM-LAOS



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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Government irregulars and village defense forces north of the Plaine des Jarres have recaptured Phou Cum, which fell to the Communists two weeks ago. The loss of Phou Cum had left only one position on the northern edge of the Plaine in government hands.

Although ground action remains light throughout northern Laos, shelling attacks and scattered clashes have continued to be reported in recent days around the Long Tieng complex. On 6 March, some 40-50 North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attacked a refugee support center at Ban Son, about 20 miles southwest of Long Tieng. Rockets and explosives were used in the attack, destroying several vehicles and a refueling unit; nine civilians and three soldiers were killed.

In southern Laos, the village of Houei Nam Phak, about 15 miles south of Pakse, was overrun on 7 March by an estimated 100-200 Pathet Lao. The villagers were robbed and the village school, dispensary, and USAID office were destroyed.

The attacks over the weekend on civilian centers, coming on the heels of the rocketing of Pakse late last week, raise the possibility that the Communists may be embarking on a campaign of harassment against civilian facilities in government areas.


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COMMUNIST CHINA - NORTH VIETNAM



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


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
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY

A dragnet by some 30,000 police, troops, and plainclothesmen has still produced no information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing American airmen. The search has now spread as far as 70 miles outside of the capital.

Turkish politicians of diverse orientation have condemned the kidnapers. Prominent opposition leaders and ranking press representatives are behind the government's drive to recover the airmen and apprehend the culprits. Even some of Turkey's best-known leftists have denounced the crime.



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The firm measures [redacted] taken may help to dampen military criticism. Early passage of pending legislation to strengthen the government's hand in dealing with extremism should now be assured. Demirel continues to oppose a declaration of martial law.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EGYPT

Sadat's speech yesterday rejecting a further cease-fire extension carefully left open Egypt's future military options against Israel while showing a continuing interest in a political solution. Sadat directed a special plea to the US to "discharge its duty" and get Israel to agree to withdraw from the occupied Arab territory.

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
[redacted]
the uncertainty created by the absence of a formal cease-fire increases the chances of an inadvertent or miscalculated incident. Under the present full-scale defense alert conditions, any such incident could escalate rapidly.

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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MIDDLE EAST - FEDAYEEN



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NOTE

Ceylon: Last night Prime Minister Bandaranaike placed the country in a state of emergency and called out the armed forces to maintain law and order. Despite a seeming lack of concern over Saturday's attack on the US Embassy by a self-styled "Mao Youth Group," Mrs. Bandaranaike's leftist coalition government had clearly been worried over the violence perpetrated in the past year by a developing new left element, and yesterday police blocked a second march on the embassy.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

On *Page 1*, we discuss recent developments in Communist Chinese - UK relations which reflect Peking's current efforts to project a conciliatory international posture.

The North Vietnamese have not yet made a serious attempt to dislodge South Vietnamese forces from positions overlooking the Tchepone Valley in Laos.
(Page 3)

Soviet

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(Page 4)

50X6

(Page 5)

The proposal by Japan's defense chief to inspect Okinawa for nuclear stocks may gain enough support to prove embarrassing to the Sato government.
(Page 6)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA - UNITED KINGDOM

Recent developments in Sino-UK relations give some insight into the pace and progress of Peking's current campaign of international amiability. The patterns that can be seen in this area are likely to be repeated elsewhere as the Chinese seek to maintain the momentum of their diplomatic drive.

Both London and Peking have been moving cautiously toward some improvement in their mutual relations since at least last summer, but neither side initially seemed anxious to force the pace. Each retained deep suspicions of the other, reinforced on the British side by memories of the "storming" of the British Embassy in Peking by uncontrolled Red Guards in the summer of 1967. These suspicions were supplemented by specific grievances: on the British side by the fact that a number of British subjects were languishing in Chinese jails, and on the Chinese side by the fact that authorities in Hong Kong had jailed a considerable number of Chinese "activists" following the riots in the Crown Colony in 1967 and that London continued to maintain a consulate in Taipei.

British interest in an apparent change in atmosphere in Peking was evident by late last spring, and London attempted to "test the water" by releasing a number of Hong Kong prisoners before their jail terms expired; the Chinese responded in kind. After several such exchanges, all British subjects in Chinese jails have been released, and only a handful of "activists" remain in Hong Kong jails.

The turning point came when a Chinese official in London "informally" told the Foreign Office shortly before Chinese representation came to a vote in the United Nations last autumn that Peking was prepared to overlook the British consulate on Taiwan if London would vote against the Important Question resolution in the UN. This would permit raising diplomatic representation between the two countries to ambassadorial level--something London had sought in vain since recognizing Peking in 1950.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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Although the Foreign Office did not further explore this feeler prior to the UN vote, the Chinese have since returned to the attack and are now pressing the British hard on this issue. The coupled questions of Chinese representation in the UN and a mutual exchange of ambassadors were a major ingredient in the conversation Chou En-lai had with the British chargé in Peking last week; Chinese officials in London are to take up the subject again shortly. The British, with a chance to take an important step forward in Sino-UK relations, are strongly inclined to seize the moment by the forelock, but are faced with the problem that US policy on the UN representation issue is still under review. As the head of the Far Eastern department in the Foreign Office remarked last week, London's "difficulties" in keeping in tune with the US on the representation issue increase with every step toward better UK-PRC relations.


Lord Cromer told Undersecretary Irwin last Friday that the British would take no irrevocable step on the representation issue without first consulting with Washington, but pointed out that the Chinese were in a position to set the pace on improvement of relations--particularly on the question of ambassadorial exchange. Peking is certain to press its case hard and quickly, and the tone of Foreign Office comment suggests that London is hardlu in any mood to resist.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Operation LAM SON 719 Situation Map




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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM-LAOS

Enemy antiaircraft fire in the Lam Son 719 area remains intense, but Communist ground action in recent days has been limited largely to harassment of advancing South Vietnamese units and of allied rear areas. The enemy has not yet made a serious attempt to drive the South Vietnamese from their westernmost positions--landing zones Sophia and Hope--overlooking the Tchepone Valley.



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


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
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
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


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
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
AUSTRALIA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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JAPAN

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Defense chief Nakasone said in the Diet on 4 March that he planned to send Self-Defense Force personnel to Okinawa after reversion next year to make sure that nuclear weapons and poison gas had been removed.

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[redacted] According to later press reports, Nakasone said he would attempt to obtain US approval of his plan shortly.


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Nakasone's statements could be an officially sanctioned trial balloon, but more than likely they are designed simply to get himself back in the political lime-light. In any case, the opposition parties and the media will probably pick up the theme since many Japanese doubt that nuclear weapons will not be kept on Okinawa after reversion, despite Prime Minister Sato's promises.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Soviet Infantry Combat Vehicle



Main armament..... 76mm gun
..... Sagger antitank guided missile
Weight.....about 15 tons
Capacity.....3 vehicle crew, 8 man squad

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

USSR: A new Soviet infantry combat vehicle has been seen for the first time in East Germany.

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Communist China - North Vietnam: Hanoi has reported on the delegation accompanying Chou En-lai on his trip to North Vietnam. In addition to the Chinese ambassador to Hanoi and Chou, five Chinese officials made the trip: a politburo member who has been reported to have wide responsibilities in organizing aid to North Vietnam; a politburo member who is also head of the armed forces "rear services department" (i.e., the military logistics arm); the officer in charge of the equipment section of the rear services department; and two civilians who have foreign affairs responsibilities in the party and government respectively. The composition of the delegation strongly suggests that an increase in military supply was high on the agenda of the Sino-Vietnamese talks over the weekend.

Arab States - Israel: No military clashes have been reported since the expiration of the formal cease-fire between Egypt and Israel on Sunday, although the armed forces of Israel and the surrounding Arab states remain in a high state of alert. Air reconnaissance activity continued yesterday, but no signs of preparations for imminent offensive action were apparent. As a follow-up to Sadat's warning on Sunday that his people should be prepared for "blows" from the enemy, Egyptian officials have put into effect various civil defense measures.

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The themes to be highlighted at the Soviet party congress are discussed on *Page 1*.

The Communists have taken the last major government base on the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau in Laos. (*Page 2*)

Cambodia

(*Page 3*)

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William McMahon has been chosen by the Australian Liberal Party as the new prime minister. (*Page 4*)

The effect of the massive outflow of US short-term capital to Western Europe is discussed on *Page 5*.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

[redacted] the themes
 to be highlighted at the Soviet party congress have been distributed by the party to its own members and to East European parties. The congress, it is said, will cite the precarious nature of current US-Soviet relations and will portray these relations as unlikely to improve in 1971. US actions in Indochina and alleged intransigence at SALT will be mentioned as factors contributing to this situation. The congress will hail three foreign policy "victories": Soviet advances in the Mediterranean area; the move from fighting to talking with China; and the Soviet and Polish treaties with West Germany.

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These themes are fairly predictable. We do not expect anything to be said at the congress that would close the door to continued US-Soviet negotiations on various issues, but the sober assessment of US-USSR relations may appear particularly gloomy alongside the foreign policy "triumphs" that will be loudly proclaimed at the congress. Indeed, if improved relations with Western Europe are to be emphasized at the congress, a certain amount of criticism of the US is especially necessary to satisfy those party members who are concerned that not enough is being done to maintain Communist "vigilance."

On the domestic front, according to the report, the congress will dwell on two "victories": the good 1970 harvest, and the promise of improved consumer welfare under the new five-year plan.

Predictions that the congress will focus on the consumer reinforces our belief,


[redacted]
 that real economic reforms will be eschewed in favor of promises and exhortations.

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[redacted]
 except for this report, there has been remarkably little authoritative communication from Moscow on the prospects for the congress. Soviet leaders seem to be scratching to compile a positive record and a program that will head off criticism of their performance. Polish events in December have added to their anguish and most likely contributed to the decision to beat the drums on consumer welfare.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Site 22, the last major government base on the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau, was evacuated by its four battalions of irregular defenders yesterday after more than two days of almost continual shelling and ground attacks by a Communist force estimated at three battalions. On 8 March, two irregular battalions abandoned Site 165, which is some five miles southwest of Site 22. All six irregular battalions are withdrawing westward, and heavy government air strikes are being called in on the enemy forces.

Fighting in the Bolovens region had been at a low ebb since early January, when government defenders repulsed a Communist assault on the northern side of the Plateau. Communist forces have been regrouping for a new thrust at the irregulars, especially on the eastern rim where the government bases have been an irritant to Communist operations along the infiltration corridor into Cambodia.

The tenacity of the assault on Site 22 suggests that the Communists place considerable emphasis on clearing the heights overlooking Route 16 and the Se Kong River. These have not yet figured prominently in the Communists' logistic effort in the lower panhandle, but it is possible that the enemy would like to make greater use of the westerly river and road routes to Cambodia in the waning months of this year's dry season.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


CAMBODIA




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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

AUSTRALIA

The Liberal Party today chose former foreign minister and deputy party leader William McMahon to replace John Gorton as prime minister. McMahon will lead a coalition government composed of the Liberal and Country parties, which has a majority of six in the larger and more important 125-member House of Representatives. The coalition is a minority in the 60-member Senate, however, and its control there will depend on support from the small Democratic Labor Party.



William McMahon

McMahon brings to his posts a depth and breadth of government experience and expertise equaled by few of his colleagues. He has been a firm supporter of the Australian-American alliance, of an Australian military presence in Southeast Asia, and of the allied commitment in Vietnam. McMahon has displayed some sensitivity, however, over the degree of US influence on the Australian economy because of extensive private American investment.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

US - WESTERN EUROPE

The massive outflow of US short-term capital to Western Europe, which has occurred since the reduction of interest rates in the US, has caused deep resentment on the part of European central bankers,

[redacted] Between 1 April 1970 and 28 February 1971, Western European central banks increased their dollar holdings by about \$11 billion. West Germany took in nearly \$7 billion of this total, including \$900 million in February alone. The short-term capital flow to Europe, which totaled over \$1 billion in the last week of February, has continued at a high rate in early March.

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This flow has made it particularly difficult for the Europeans to exercise the monetary controls they believe are necessary to fight their own inflationary problems. If they were to combat the influx of dollars by making parallel rate reductions of their own, they would, of course, only add to their problems. The present situation greatly strengthens the long-felt resentment in Europe over large US balance-of-payments deficits, which have forced European bankers to accumulate billions of unwanted dollars year after year instead of gold. Europeans may express their displeasure in the short run by converting some of their dollars into gold.

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[redacted]

There is no doubt about the antidollar mood of European central bankers. Other economic officials, as well as political and military leaders, however, may be less willing than the central bankers to accept the consequences of a disruption of present international monetary arrangements.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTE

Pakistan: There has been little significant movement in the dispute between East and West. President Yahya Khan is expected to arrive in Dacca soon, presumably to see whether it is still possible to reach a compromise with Mujibur Rahman. The general secretary of Mujib's Awami League says the party is now in de facto control of the province's civil administration, but he fears that the military will soon try to re-establish its control and to arrest or kill Awami League leaders.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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The President's Daily Brief

11 March 1971

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

11 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Arab-Israeli

(Page 1)

50X1

Lon Nol's absence from the country and his uncertain future have stimulated political ferment in Phnom Penh. (Page 2)

A status report on Chinese road building in northern Laos appears on Page 4.

Prime Minister Gandhi's party has taken a solid lead in the early returns from India's national elections. (Page 5)

Argentina

(Page 6)

50X1

Turkish

(Page 7)

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New attacks against US property in Ceylon are being planned by revolutionary groups. (Page 8)

Soviet ship positions in the Caribbean area are noted on Page 9.

(Page 9)

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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ISRAEL - ARAB STATES



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

[redacted] signs of growing political ferment in Phnom Penh. Students and Buddhist monks in the capital are planning anticorruption demonstrations, including one aimed specifically at Acting Prime Minister Sirik Matak, whose alleged venality has been criticized sharply in civilian circles. [redacted] student agitators are also thinking of circulating petitions calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, including the South Vietnamese.

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The regime is aware of these developments, and several as yet unidentified persons apparently have been arrested for planning such activities. The possibility of demonstrations is being used by supporters of Prime Minister Lon Nol to discredit Matak. One junior officer, for example, is spreading the story that the demonstrations are part of a Matak-inspired plot to dump Lon Nol. Although this mischief-making is not likely to get out of hand, it is symptomatic of the fear for the future among those closely associated with Lon Nol.

Concern that a threat to the government's stability may be developing apparently prompted a meeting of the government's extralegal "special coordinating committee." The committee, which is headed by the Prime Minister's brother, Lon Non, has obtained Matak's approval in principle to establish a new ad hoc committee, ostensibly to facilitate action against government corruption and incompetence. The committee's recommendations may also be designed to increase its own power, which appears to have been in eclipse since Lon Nol's illness.

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

In addition to these immediate manifestations of political unease, a more fundamental issue--namely, the question of Lon Nol's ultimate successor--may be involved. Chief of State Cheng Heng and National Assembly President In Tam have recently said [redacted] that they are convinced that Lon Nol will have to step down soon. Some top military officers, who have been given an uncommon degree of freedom by Matak, have also expressed the view that even if Lon Nol returns, he will not be able to exercise as much authority as before his illness. Under these circumstances, political rumormongering and maneuvering for power have intensified and are likely to continue as long as Lon Nol is out of the country and his physical well-being is in doubt.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA - LAOS

[redacted] Chinese road
builders in northern Laos are widening and improving
Route 45, the northeast branch of their road, between
Muong La and the Nam Ou River. In order to link up
with Route 19, which leads to North Vietnam, the Chi-
nese will have to cross the wide Nam Ou barrier.
There is no evidence of bridge or ferry construction
at this location.

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[redacted] 50X1

[redacted] 50X1

[redacted]
*It seems clear, how-
ever, that the Chinese consider the road a
priority project and intend to push ahead
with improvements before the rainy season
begins in May.*

On the other hand, there is still no indication
that Route 46, the southwest branch toward the Mekong,
is being extended beyond its present terminus at
Muong Houn, some 25 miles from the river. Improve-
ments on the existing road between Muong Sai and
Muong Houn are almost complete, however, and storage
facilities and upgraded air defenses have been ex-
panded in the Muong Houn area.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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INDIA


Prime Minister Gandhi's party jumped to an early lead in the national elections, winning 200 out of the first 271 results announced. Her party also is leading in a majority of the remaining elections for parliamentary seats. The vote thus far reflects strong support for Mrs. Gandhi from the young, the poor, and the minorities and should result in a comfortable majority in Parliament for her party.

Mrs. Gandhi's campaign focused on the need for a more equitable distribution of wealth and better conditions for the poverty-stricken masses of India. Her party's victory will endorse the Ruling Congress as India's only truly national party and will provide the central government with the stability to develop moderate socialism at home while maintaining India's traditional independent foreign policy.


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
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
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CEYLON

The American Embassy in Colombo received a new warning in the mail yesterday which threatened "to exterminate all concerned at the appropriate places." It was signed by the "Maoist Youth Front," the signature on leaflets left at the embassy when it was attacked on 6 March.

[redacted] a group within the Ceylon Communist Party/Peking (CCP/P) was to meet yesterday to discuss possible attacks on homes of US Embassy personnel. This group is said to have a layout of the residence of the US ambassador, who is currently in Washington. [redacted] a rebel group within the CCP/P was responsible for the attack on 6 March, but [redacted] other revolutionary groups may attempt to outdo each other in staging incidents against US property.

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
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The CCP/P is a badly splintered organization which has two main wings and an undetermined number of so-called "Che Guevarist" revolutionary groups. In addition, there are other similar revolutionary groups in Ceylon not connected with the CCP/P, and the competition among all these elements makes it difficult to pin down the responsibility for any given incident.

The Ceylonese Government, apparently concerned over the implications for its security, has invoked emergency powers. The Ceylonese Navy, which is considered a more disciplined force than the army or police, has assumed responsibility for guarding some of the US property in Colombo.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

USSR-Cuba: The Soviet guided-missile cruiser and a tanker that have been visiting Cuba are now southeast of Bermuda, apparently heading for home waters. The submarine tender returned to Cuba yesterday and entered the port of Antilla, [redacted]

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
[redacted] Two Soviet nuclear submarine support barges and a rescue tug are still in Cienfuegos.

USSR:

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The President's Daily Brief

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

12 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

A new "quotation" attributed to Mao Tse-tung suggests that China's internal disputes have spilled over into questions of policy toward Indochina. (Page 1)

Some Nationalist Chinese are privately showing flexibility on the UN representation issue, but officially Taipei still insists on the status quo. (Page 3)

General Minh, the new commander of South Vietnam's MR 3, is showing a more cautious style in his Cambodian operations than the late General Do Cao Tri. (Page 4)

The Turkish military leadership has evidently decided against a direct take-over of the government just now. (Page 5)

On Page 6 we report the current situation in Pakistan.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA

China's internecine disputes may have spilled over into foreign policy matters. Evidence of this is contained in a "quotation" of Chairman Mao cited in part by Chou En-lai during his weekend visit to Hanoi and further expanded by a People's Daily editorial on 11 March. The "quotation," a new one never before published, states "if anyone among us should say that we cannot help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against US aggression and for national salvation, it means mutiny and it means betrayal to the revolution."

This is extremely strong language for Chinese polemical debate. Although there have been indications of continuing serious disputes during the past year over the pace and direction of the rebuilding of China's party and governmental apparatus, a reference to mutiny and betrayal attributed to Mao has not been seen since the height of the Cultural Revolution.

Aid to Hanoi is unquestionably a factor in whatever is now at issue in Peking, but there are no current signs that the Chinese are contemplating a sharp reversal of their long-standing policy of caution with respect to the war in Indochina. The impression created by Chou's speeches in Hanoi, together with the joint communiqué issued at the end of his visit and ancillary propaganda from Peking, is that the Chinese expect the "three Indochinese peoples" to continue to bear the brunt of the fighting so long as allied operations retain their present scope and character.

Chou's statements and Chinese propaganda, however, raise the specter of a greater Chinese commitment if the war should expand further. The apparent dispute in Peking may revolve around this question and whether such an expansion would be a threat to China's security, necessitating the dispatch of combat troops to North Vietnam. Some in Peking may have been arguing that, even if the allies should move or threaten to move into northern Laos or North Vietnam, caution would still dictate against sending Chinese troops into North Vietnam. If so, it would appear that for the moment Mao has resolved the argument in favor of an opposite view. We believe, in any event, that what is now at issue in Peking involves future contingencies rather than immediate moves on the part of the Chinese.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

It may also be that the foreign policy aspect of the presumed debate in Peking has compounded existing antagonisms within the politburo. There have been no previous indications of a foreign policy debate in recent Chinese propaganda, and disappearances of major politburo figures in recent months antedate the present allied operations in Laos. Thus any disputes among the Chinese leaders almost certainly involve domestic issues as well. It is apparent that some form of "China first" argument has been put forward, but it is unclear whether Mao's strictures are directed against so-called "radicals" or his more conservative associates, since either group might have reason to argue against foreign "adventures."

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NATIONALIST CHINA


In recent discussions of the Chinese representation issue, Nationalist Vice Foreign Minister Yang centered his official comments on the need for continued use of the "Important Question" resolution. He added that the Nationalists appreciate US consideration of a new approach, but that Taipei "cannot at this time subscribe to any dual representation" formula.

In contrast to this insistence on the status quo, since last November senior Nationalists in private talks with US officials have realistically appraised the probable unfavorable voting pattern next fall. For the first time they have discussed various tactics--including several dual representation formulas--for coping with the situation. Most recently, on 10 March the Chinese representatives agreed with every point made by the US officers--but emphasized that the conversation must be kept completely "off the record." Yang has privately assured Ambassador McConaughy that he has stated to Chiang Kai-shek the "dangers of the present position" and the "need for a new formula."

In light of Nationalist officials' admitted reluctance to present unpleasant details to Chiang, it is likely that he expects any new formula to be clearly pro-Nationalist. Taipei's unyielding approach in official consultations probably is an effort to prevent the US and other supporters from committing themselves to drastic shifts; it is unlikely that Chiang, who will make the final decision, has yet considered the need to alter significantly his UN tactics.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Cambodia: Current Situation



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM - CAMBODIA

General Minh, successor to the late General Do Cao Tri as commander of South Vietnam's Military Region 3, several days ago pulled his forces back from Communist strongholds in the Chup Plantation and Dambe areas and has been regrouping them along Route 7. [redacted] Minh intends to set up blocking positions along Route 7 aimed at preventing the Communists from moving supplies and troops into South Vietnam.

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These moves by the new commander constitute a change in style from the free-wheeling thrusts of Do Cao Tri. President Thieu had previously indicated his concern that South Vietnamese forces not become overextended, and a decision to reconsolidate before mounting new attacks probably would have his support. The heavy fighting near Dambe last week which resulted in substantial casualties to both sides may have been a factor in Minh's more cautious approach. In any event, the South Vietnamese have already put the enemy on the defensive within their Cambodian bases, and Minh may feel that other areas now have greater priority.

Nevertheless, it seems likely that the South Vietnamese will continue to probe in strength toward Communist bases near Chup and Dambe as part of a mobile defense along Route 7.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY

The Turkish military leadership has decided against a direct take-over of the government at this time, [redacted] In their eight-hour meeting on Wednesday the top commanders opted instead for pressing their demands on the Demirel government for as yet unspecified political, social, and economic reforms.

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Demirel, heading what has become a minority government, is in no position to force the required reform legislation through parliament. He may thus find that the only alternatives to direct military intervention are to form a national coalition organized for the specific purpose of expediting the reforms, or to resign.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN

President Yahya Khan apparently still plans to meet Mujibur Rahman in Dacca to seek a political solution, but has not yet set a date for his visit.

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In East Pakistan, several army supply convoys have been stopped by crowds, and the navy has been refused bunkering facilities by distributors under pressure from the Awami League. In response, the government has declared that such acts constitute an "act of aggression" and are punishable, but has yet to take any action.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

13 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Demirel has been asked to stay on as head of a caretaker government while political leaders seek a formula for satisfying the military and still preserving a democratic framework. (Page 1)

Moscow and Peking have both recently reiterated their support for Souvanna's leadership in Laos. (Page 2)

North Vietnamese forces are preparing moves to counter South Vietnamese troops in the Tchepone area of Laos, while apparently trying to shift some of their supply operations to routes farther west. (Page 3)

At Annex, some of the factors which led to the downfall of the Demirel government in Turkey are examined in greater depth.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY

Demirel, after tendering his resignation as prime minister, has been requested by President Sunay to head a caretaker government until a new one can be formed. Sunay and various political leaders are now seeking a formula that will both satisfy the demands put forth by the military commanders in their ultimatum yesterday and keep the government within the bounds of the democratic system provided by the constitution. The lower house of Parliament met briefly but inconclusively yesterday and the Senate is scheduled to hold an extraordinary session today.

Sunay and the parliamentary and party leaders apparently hope these consultations will turn up a political figure who can organize a national coalition government and assure passage of the political, social, and economic reforms needed to satisfy the military establishment and to put an end to extremism.

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After the military's initial show of force in Ankara yesterday, during which copies of the ultimatum were provided for broadcasting by the radio station, the armed forces are remaining in the background. All military units in the capital area have been placed on alert, however, and full security measures have been implemented

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Now that the die is cast, the situation should remain relatively quiet until the national coalition gambit is played out.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR - LAOS

During a conversation with a US Embassy official in Moscow on 9 March, the deputy chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Southeast Asian division flatly stated that the Soviets still view Souvanna as prime minister of Laos despite their official position that the tripartite coalition government has collapsed.

Last fall, the Chinese chargé in Vientiane provided the first of several recent indications of Communist China's position on Souvanna when he said China wanted to see Laos return to "strict neutrality," with the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) participating in the government. He also stated he was doing everything he could to persuade the NLHS to negotiate with the Royal Lao Government.


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Other Chinese officials in Vientiane have also made it known that Peking is solidly behind Souvanna and that China will support Laos' neutrality and all provisions of the 1962 Geneva Accords that concern it.

Thus, despite Souvanna Phouma's acquiescence in the South Vietnamese incursion into the Laos panhandle, both Moscow and Peking have recently reiterated their support for his leadership. Both countries have made it clear that they still regard Souvanna's presence in Vientiane as crucial to maintaining political stability and keeping alive the possibility of a future political settlement under the umbrella of the Geneva Accords. Their position is a clear sign that while the Communists may doubt the efficacy of Souvanna's "neutrality" as a restraining influence on allied operations in Laos, they are reluctant to see the 1962 agreement become a dead letter. The Communists see the agreement as legitimizing the Communist movement in Laos and affording it a position in a coalition government.

Moscow's expressions of support for Souvanna also seem designed to prevent possible challenges to him from Laotian rightists. Like the Chinese, Moscow clearly thinks Souvanna's continued rule is far more desirable than the uncertainties that would attend his fall.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM-LAOS

The North Vietnamese appear to be weighing the impact of the recent South Vietnamese push into the Tchepone area and to be preparing countermoves. Intercepts indicate that the enemy is especially concerned with defending the Route 914 network south of Tchepone where South Vietnamese forces have recently arrived in some strength. Additionally, a North Vietnamese artillery unit west of Tchepone has sent out an order for "large-scale" attacks during the next few days.

The North Vietnamese are continuing to move supplies through the Mu Gia Pass and the Binh Tram 32 area northwest of Tchepone. The status of supply movements on Route 914 south of Tchepone is not clear; there appears to be some northward withdrawal of enemy vehicles on Route 914 away from the South Vietnamese forces, but south of this area enemy supply units near Ban Bac claimed on 9 March that they were more than meeting their quotas.

There are signs that the North Vietnamese may have begun to shift some of their supply movements to Route 23, the corridor that runs south through the panhandle well to the west of current South Vietnamese operations. The force of Laotian irregulars operating in the Muong Phine area along this route reportedly destroyed several enemy trucks on 11 March with the help of air strikes.

The North Vietnamese have improved an old road, Route 233, that connects Route 23 with the traditional main trunk of the supply-infiltration complex far to the south of the current area of South Vietnamese operations. Putting this road into shape to carry heavy truck traffic could enable the North Vietnamese to bypass the part of Route 914 where the South Vietnamese units are now present.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Pakistan: [redacted] 50X1
Mujibur Rahman told an intermediary sent by President Yahya that the only way out of the present impasse is to let Mujib govern East Pakistan while Bhutto forms a government in West Pakistan. The two leaders would then negotiate a new constitution--or separate constitutions for the two parts of the country. Yahya is unlikely to see in Mujib's remarks much hope for compromise; the West Pakistanis would presumably view the proposal as a device for setting East Pakistan irretrievably on the path toward independence. Nevertheless, the President apparently still plans to fly to Dacca in a last-ditch effort to find a peaceful solution.

USSR: [redacted]

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Yemen (Sana) - US: Yemen has decided to postpone its plan [redacted] 50X1
[redacted] to approach the US regarding a restoration of diplomatic relations. The political situation in Yemen is in a state of flux following the recent resignation of the prime minister, and legislative elections are under way. [redacted] 50X1
[redacted] any approach to the US will 50X1
await the installation of a new government, probably sometime after 1 April.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY

ANNEX

Pressures within the military establishment for intervention in the Demirel government began to build up late last year against a background of political uncertainty, fiscal difficulty, and social unrest. Current developments have their origin in the revolution of 1960, in which the military ousted the Democrat Party regime of President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

Following a series of weak and ineffective coalition governments operating under close military scrutiny, Demirel's Justice Party formed the first postrevolution majority government in October 1965. His party was the acknowledged heir to the banned Democrat Party, however, and even though Demirel succeeded in dispelling much of the antagonism of the top military leadership, the Justice Party remained under a lingering shadow of suspicion that it might try to reverse the revolution and ultimately act against those officers primarily responsible for carrying it out.

Realizing that his party must govern circumspectly in order to nurture the tenuous goodwill he had so painstakingly cultivated, Demirel during his first four years in office concentrated on consolidating his leadership within the party, within the government, and throughout the country. He went to great lengths to avoid any hint of reverting to repression or arbitrary rule in the Menderes pattern, and refused to be provoked by opposition politicians into acts that might raise the military's hackles.

Demirel's legislative record was not impressive. From the beginning his efforts in Parliament encountered obstructive tactics, including lengthy filibusters, by the opposition Republican People's Party for essentially partisan reasons. The Constitutional Court, largely controlled by the opposition, often rejected legislation on technicalities and forced its return to Parliament for a new run through the political gauntlet. Thus the government was unable to pass significant economic and social legislation, and desired constitutional amendments have not stood a chance.

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

At the same time, the incipient forces of the left became more active in the atmosphere of political permissiveness which emerged from the revolutionary period. Of basic importance was government tolerance toward the spread of leftist influence in the universities, among youth groups in general, and among significant segments of Turkey's press.


As the political left gained coherence, extremist elements and factions began to appear. For a time these groups pinned their hopes on the Marxist-oriented Turkish Labor Party, formed in 1961 as the spearhead of a new socialist movement. When the party failed to gain popular support, especially among the peasantry and organized labor, and when the extremist elements perceived that they had little chance of gaining influence through normal democratic procedures, they turned to direct action often marked by violence. At the same time, the leftist press unleashed a barrage of bitter attacks on the government, pointing to the country's economic and political woes.

The leftist student movement exploited legitimate grievances against the archaic academic system and ultimately gained control of several major youth groups. The Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation became the principal student organization and promoted massive demonstrations against visits by units of the US Sixth Fleet, against Turkey's role in NATO, and against the Demirel government for allowing the spread of foreign economic and diplomatic influence in Turkey. Violent clashes with extreme rightist students and with the police often resulted, thus fostering a growing and almost persistent crisis atmosphere. One product of this climate was the minuscule "People's Liberation Army of Turkey" which staged the kidnapings of the four US airmen.

In recent months the government had become progressively weaker, primarily because of action taken by Demirel himself following the 1969 elections. At that time, with his party holding a comfortable margin of 256 of the 450 seats in the lower house, Demirel purged his cabinet of dissident elements that had remained in the Justice Party. The purge led to an erosion of his strength in Parliament and, as a result, stagnation began to set in. By early this month, the Justice Party's strength in the lower house had dwindled to a plurality of 224 seats. Charges of corruption against Demirel also tarnished

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*his personal prestige. Only the fragmentation of
the political opposition into several widely diverse
parties covering the entire spectrum from the far
left to the far right kept his government from fall-
ing.*



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The President's Daily Brief

15 March 1971

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

15 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The implications of the Social Democratic Party's setback in the West Berlin elections are discussed on *Page 1*.

In Cambodia, an officer of the elite Khmer Krom forces says he and some of his colleagues believe that Sirik Matak is planning to move against Lon Nol's followers. (*Page 2*)

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South Vietnam
(*Page 4*)

The no-confidence motions introduced against Israeli Prime Minister Meir have virtually no chance of being carried. (*Page 6*)

Mujibur Rahman told the press today that he is taking over the administration of nearly all of East Pakistan. (*Page 7*)

Turkish President Sunay met with military and political leaders over the weekend in his search for an acceptable coalition government. (*Page 8*)


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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WEST BERLIN

The ruling Social Democratic Party (SPD) suffered a substantial decline in yesterday's municipal election. The party barely maintained its majority with 50.4 percent of the vote, a loss of 6.5 percent. The opposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU) gained over five percent at the polls, and the small Free Democratic Party also made advances. West Berlin voters again repudiated the Communist Party, although its 2.3 percent did represent a fractional gain.

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Some of the SPD losses are probably attributable to the uninspiring leadership of Schuetz, whose job may now be in some jeopardy. The election outcome is likely to refuel the strife between moderate and left-wing factions of the SPD, who will blame each other for the setback.

The Free Democratic Party, which during the campaign had cited its restraining influence on Ostpolitik in government councils, has strengthened its position as a coalition partner of the SPD in both Bonn and Berlin.

The chances for a better SPD showing yesterday were impaired by the failure of the West Berlin and East German negotiators to reach agreement on 12 March on Easter visits through the wall. The East German representative continued to press for a broad bilateral agreement on relations, which would derogate from the four-power Berlin talks, but he did not categorically reject a one-time Easter visit arrangement.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

An officer of the elite Khmer Krom (KK) forces told a US [redacted] attaché in Phnom Penh on Saturday that he and other KK officers believe that Matak is planning on 18 March to arrest all of Lon Nol's key followers--including KK leaders. The officer claimed that such a "royalist" move had been expected for several weeks, and described detailed plans to use KK units in and around Phnom Penh to contest such a coup.

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The officer went on to say that various KK commanders regard the government's recent orders to send their troops on field combat assignments as a ploy to tie down those forces so that they could not interfere with Matak's anticipated power play. As a result of this suspicion, some KK units in Kompong Cham have balked at orders to go on operations along Route 7 in that province.

Since Lon Nol's absence the Khmer Krom units apparently have been largely ignored by Matak and the military establishment. This communications gap, and the growing uncertainty about Lon Nol's future, appear to have fired KK apprehensions and suspicions about Matak's political intentions. There is no evidence to support the rumors about a Matak coup. It is possible that the KK leaders themselves are spreading rumors to justify a move against Matak or, short of that, to impress on him that they intend to play a significant political, as well as military role. It is also possible that the Communists may have planted these rumors to sow dissension.

Whatever the case, Matak may have already allayed KK fears on this matter. Another KK officer told the same US attaché that several KK officers were to meet with Matak last Saturday to discuss their concern about possible events on the 18th. Ambassador Swank's representations to some KK leaders, via the attaché, that they have nothing to fear from Matak and that the US fully supports the present government apparently has had some calming effect on the situation. These leaders indicated to the attaché that they were fully prepared to accept Matak's orders.

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
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
Nevertheless, the danger still exists that in this charged atmosphere some KK elements could misinterpret government intentions. A number of KK units are located in areas from which they could converge rapidly on Phnom Penh, and they thus have the capability of reacting quickly to any real or fancied threat to Lon Nol and themselves.

Besides the present KK imbroglio, there are indications of other political restiveness in Phnom Penh. Rumors of additional plots and counterplots recently have begun to circulate in the capital. Most, if not all, of these rumors contain elements that make them hard to credit. At a minimum, however, their persistence does indicate some form of maneuvering and jockeying for position among political factions is afoot.

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
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
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
SOUTH VIETNAM




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


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ISRAEL

Right-wing opposition parties introduced no-confidence motions yesterday to protest proposals made by Prime Minister Meir on ultimate borders. They were reacting to the interview published in the London Times on Saturday, in which Mrs. Meir called for an Israeli presence at Sharm ash-Shaykh and retention of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but implied that much of the West Bank would be returned to Jordan.

The Gahal and Free Center parties, which introduced the no-confidence motions, favor retention of most of the occupied territories.

At a cabinet meeting yesterday, Mrs. Meir is reported to have said that her statement reflected only personal suggestions and did not commit the government. Nevertheless, the National Religious Party (NRP), which is a member of the government, announced afterward that it was not satisfied with her explanations and would call for further clarification.

There is practically no chance that the no-confidence motions will be adopted when they are debated on Tuesday. In the unlikely event that the NRP, which advocates retention of the West Bank for religious and historical reasons, should leave the government and vote for the motions, Mrs. Meir's Israel Labor Party and other parties affiliated with it would still control a majority of the Knesset votes. The political tumult caused by Mrs. Meir's statements, however, is an indication of the type of crisis which might occur once the government attempts to adopt an official policy with regard to the disposition of the occupied territories.

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PAKISTAN

According to press reports, Mujibur Rahman claimed early today that he has taken over administration of East Pakistan, except for the cities of Dacca, Comilla, and Jessore. This assumption of power follows one week of a noncooperation campaign called by Mujib, during which he became the de facto ruler of East Pakistan. His announcement may be an attempt to force the West Pakistan - dominated central government to accede to his demand that power in East Pakistan be turned over to elected representatives of the people as a preliminary step before the recently elected National Assembly meets to write a new constitution.

Mujib's action is the closest step he has taken toward a declaration of independence for East Pakistan. It is not yet certain that he prefers such a declaration, except as a last resort. His preference seems to be for some type of confederation between East and West Pakistan in which the eastern province would be virtually autonomous. The central government is unlikely to find a confederation scheme acceptable and will probably resist Mujib's announced take-over attempt.

President Yahya flew to Dacca today to confer with Mujib. The East Pakistani leader has reiterated that he is willing to meet with Yahya without pre-conditions.

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TURKEY

With Demirel continuing in office on a caretaker basis, President Sunay met over the weekend with military leaders and with representatives of ten political parties in his search for a coalition government that would secure passage of reform legislation and prepare for early elections. Both houses of Parliament have suspended their sessions for the present.

The military are demanding a broad coalition in which members would eschew partisan politics, and they may well insist on naming at least one minister. They would likely endorse Suat Urguplu

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The 67-year-old senator has no political affiliation, and his nine months as interim premier in 1965 were relatively unmarked by political strife.

Sunay could announce the make-up of the interim government today when he is scheduled to address the nation, although it will likely take more time to find an array of acceptable figures who meet the requirements of the military.

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
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16 March 1971

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

16 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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The Cambodian Government has reported thwarting a plot, but the current air of intrigue is likely to persist. (Page 2)

In talks with President Yahya, Mujibur Rahman plans to press his drive for complete authority in East Pakistan. (Page 3)

North Korea has issued its first public denunciation of an overflight by a US SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. (Page 4)

The Chinese Communists have moved additional anti-aircraft weapons and air defense troops into north-western Laos. (Page 5)

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
SOUTH VIETNAM - LAOS



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
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CAMBODIA

The government has told the local press that Sirik Matak has ordered the arrest of a number of officers who allegedly were moving to place a member of his family on the throne.

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It seems likely that Matak has surfaced this story to allay the fears of Khmer Krom leaders and other military officers loyal to Lon Nol that Matak was planning a royalist coup while Lon Nol is out of the country. Matak seems also to be using the "royalist plot" to be rid of Srey Saman, a man Matak has wanted to remove from his post. In any event, the government's press announcement is not likely to clear the air of allegations that now involve virtually every major political figure.

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PAKISTAN

According to one of Mujib's advisers, the East Pakistani leader intended to urge President Yahya, during discussions between the two in Dacca, to turn over power in East Pakistan to Mujib's Awami League immediately. Mujib also planned to demand the withdrawal of troop reinforcements sent to East Pakistan in the last few weeks. Should the military attempt to use force, Mujib plans to proclaim independence.

Yahya will be reluctant to agree to such actions. On the other hand, he will find the alternatives--East Pakistani secession or a costly and probably futile effort to hold the country together by force--just as unpalatable.

Meanwhile, there has been no central government response to Mujib's latest move toward complete independence for East Pakistan. The 35-point directive that Mujib issued yesterday essentially clarifies and amplifies actions to be taken under the noncooperation movement he launched on 7 March. If and when implemented, the actions would put Mujib in effective control of East Pakistan's government.

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
NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang, in its first public denunciation of an overflight by a US SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft, has broadcast statements over both domestic and international radio services linking a flight on 14 March to alleged US war preparations and warning obliquely of retribution.

No military reaction was noted to this flight or to 13 earlier ones since the program began in June 1969. The North Koreans have gradually become more proficient in tracking the SR-71, but they have little, if any, capability to intercept the aircraft.

Although the denunciation may be nothing more than propaganda to discredit such US intelligence collection activities, it could also be designed as a warning that Pyongyang might retaliate against some more accessible US target of opportunity in the Korean area.

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NOTES

Communist China - Laos: Aerial photography shows that the Chinese have moved additional anti-aircraft weapons into northwestern Laos since late last year. Judging from the numbers of such weapons, we now estimate that there are 6,000 to 7,000 Chinese air defense troops in this area. We continue to estimate that there are an additional 10,000 to 13,000 Chinese in engineer units there. Over half of the 400 Chinese antiaircraft weapons now in northwestern Laos are light or medium radar-controlled guns. Most of them protect bridges, construction sites, and barracks in the Muong Khoua, Muong La, Muong Sai, and Muong Houn areas. The smaller pieces are more widely scattered to defend road construction forces. Additional air surveillance radars have also been noted emplaced along the road network.

Turkey: Talks among top political leaders are continuing amid expectations that President Sunay will announce the selection of a new prime minister tomorrow. Yesterday, Sunay called upon all Turks to rally behind the new government but gave no hint of who might head it. If agreement on a new cabinet is not reached within a reasonable time, however, military leaders reportedly are prepared to ask Sunay to dissolve Parliament and to take control themselves.

Japan: Foreign Minister Aichi has told Ambassador Meyer that he fears US Senators from textile-producing states will oppose an Okinawa reversion agreement as a consequence of last week's flurry over textiles and be able to muster enough votes to prevent the necessary two-thirds approval. The Japanese Government, which is under pressure in the Diet not to be too compromising on the unresolved Okinawa issues, had been hoping to wrap up the reversion negotiations by 1 April, before local and national elections this spring. Aichi now evidently considers this timing questionable.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

17 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The easing of Sino-Soviet tensions since the late 1960s has led to a gradual improvement in economic relations. (Page 1)

Turkey's chief of staff is taking steps to purge dissidents from the armed forces in the hope of defusing a "potentially explosive" situation. (Page 2)


Allende is charging that there is a conspiracy to frustrate the Chilean revolution; his government has also taken over the operation of two large copper mines. (Page 3)

Rumors of impending government change in Argentina are widespread following the rioting in Cordoba. (Page 4)

West German - Czech talks are expected to begin at the end of March. (Page 4)

The government of Ceylon has declared a full state of emergency in the belief that it is the real target of recent anti-US violence. (Page 4)

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USSR - COMMUNIST CHINA

There has been a recent improvement in Sino-Soviet economic relations.

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Sino-Soviet trade plummeted to a low level of around \$55 million in 1969 from a peak of about \$2 billion in 1959. In 1970 trade was even lower, according to Soviet officials. The two countries signed a new trade agreement last November, however, and [redacted] the volume of trade this year will be twice the levels of 1969 and 1970.

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The relative easing of the intense hostility created by the Cultural Revolution and by border fighting of the late 1960s has enabled Moscow and Peking to move toward a resumption of some of the economic contacts disrupted during that period. The extremely low levels of trade over the past few years have been economically disadvantageous to both countries. As long as both sides fail to resolve their fundamental political differences and view each other as potential military antagonists, however, trade is likely to remain far short of the levels of the early 1960s.

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TURKEY

General Tagmac, the chief of the Turkish General Staff, is apprehensive over what he regards as a "potentially explosive atmosphere pervading the military ranks," [redacted] In an apparent effort to purge the armed forces of suspected dissident elements, Tagmac yesterday "forcibly retired" five general officers. Also being summarily dismissed are eight or nine colonels and a "larger number" of middle- and junior-grade officers.

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It is not surprising, in view of prevailing conditions and the sentiment within the armed forces for a complete military take-over, that such a purge is being conducted. Although the purge increases the danger that some threatened group may attempt a coup in desperation, the widespread military alert should make it easier for the armed forces to quash any such attempt outside the chain of command.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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CHILE

President Allende has charged that an "international and internal conspiracy" exists to frustrate the Chilean revolution. Speaking at a meeting of his own Socialist Party on Sunday, Allende cited, among other things, an alleged sales maneuver designed to drive down copper prices on the world market as evidence that such a plot exists.

Allende and his backers are prone to blame the US and opposition elements within the country for its economic problems, and we expect more such charges as the municipal elections of 4 April draw nearer.

* * *

The Allende government announced yesterday that it has taken over the operation of two large copper mines in which Chile has a majority interest of 51 percent and the US-owned Anaconda Copper Company 49 percent. The grounds cited for the government's intervention were production irregularities.

Production in the mines has fallen below projected levels this year. Labor unrest and inefficiency probably are the cause of the production shortfall, but the government has chosen to blame the US copper companies.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Argentina: Rumors of a government crisis, including the imminent resignation of President Levingston, are widespread in the wake of Monday's rioting in Cordoba, which resulted in two deaths before being brought under control. The rumors appear to have been sparked by high-level military meetings even though Levingston appeared to be speaking for the junta of commanders in chief yesterday in ordering the arrest of top Cordoba labor leaders and in taking control over major provincial unions. Even if antigovernment activity is defused by these tough measures and by the resignation of the unpopular governor of Cordoba, changes in the government and a reappraisal of Levingston's political and economic policies seem likely.

West Germany - Czechoslovakia: Bonn now expects that political talks with the Czechs will begin about 30 March in Prague and will proceed at a slow pace until May or June.

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[redacted] if the Czechs persist, throughout this opening round, in their demand that West Germany declare the 1938 Munich agreement invalid from the start, Bonn will not permit the Prague talks to move to a more intensive phase. An equally important factor in the cautious West German approach to the talks is Bonn's reluctance to enter full-fledged negotiations with the Czechs until some break occurs in the domestically controversial Berlin talks.

Ceylon: Prime Minister Bandaranaike, clearly worried by the growth of a self-styled "Che Guevarist" movement, has declared a full state of emergency on the island. On Monday she confided to Chargeé Petersen that she believed the recent attack on the US Embassy, and subsequent threats she and others had received, were part of a plan to bring the government down. Yesterday the local press reported that an attempt to kidnap a cabinet minister had been foiled by the police.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

18 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Cambodia is taking precautionary measures to prevent trouble today on the first anniversary of Sihanouk's downfall. (Page 1)

Soviet commentary on new silo construction at the SALT is discussed on Page 2.

Developments in Pakistan are discussed on Page 3.

An economic agreement was signed Tuesday between the USSR and Egypt. (Page 4)

Mexico's attitude toward Communist countries appears to be cooling. (Page 5)

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CAMBODIA

Phnom Penh is taking precautionary measures to prevent trouble today on the first anniversary of Sihanouk's downfall. All popular demonstrations have been banned, a nighttime curfew ordered, and army (FANK) units in and around the city have been placed on full alert. These steps are prompted in part by fear that the Communists are planning terrorist acts or harassing attacks in or near the capital. Some 22 FANK battalions are conducting sweep operations in three separate areas in the Phnom Penh special military region. They have made few significant contacts with enemy elements, however.

The possibility, reported in The President's Daily Brief of 15 March, that Khmer Krom troops or other non-Communist elements might take some ill-considered action in the capital around this date has diminished, but the leadership is still nervous over possible antigovernment activities. The government believes, for example, that some students and Buddhists have been planning to demonstrate against the presence of South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and the effects of US air strikes in the countryside.

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USSR-SALT

Initial attempts by US negotiators at the fourth round of SALT to elicit Soviet commentary on the significance of their recently detected silo construction met with studied ambiguity. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov and other representatives have side-stepped questions as to the precise meaning of Semenov's remark to Ambassador Smith that Moscow's new silo construction "does not have a bearing" on the US-USSR strategic relationship. During the informal conversations following the 16 March plenary, some of the Soviets responded to US queries on this issue with allusions to the need for "modernization."

Generally speaking, the Soviets thus far have been slippery but affable, low-keyed, and vague. They clearly feel themselves on the defensive with respect to the disclosure of the new silos and doubtless wished to assess the US reaction before giving another aggressive push to Moscow's position on other contentious issues.
The Soviet delegation has not yet homed in on forward-based systems or Moscow's proposal for an ABM-only agreement, but there is no real sign of new flexibility in its view on either count.

There is, in fact, slim prospect for much early progress. Semenov himself will leave for Moscow on 27 March to attend the Soviet Party Congress, and he will probably not be back in Vienna until well into April.

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PAKISTAN

After a second meeting with President Yahya in Dacca yesterday, Mujibur Rahman appeared discouraged but said he hopes discussions will continue. Another meeting is scheduled for today.

According to a report reaching the Consulate-General in Karachi, Yahya does not believe Pakistan can be held together by force. He therefore intends to give in to most of Mujib's demands and turn "the whole bloody business" over to him--meaning the National Assembly, which is to write a constitution. According to other reports, the main barrier to an agreement is Yahya's insistence that martial law will continue until a constitution is written.

Meanwhile, the pro-Peking East Bengal Communist Party may already be trying to take the initiative away from Mujib and his moderate followers.

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USSR-EGYPT

Moscow has extended \$200 million in credit for new aid projects to Egypt under agreements signed Tuesday. (The Egyptians report that the total amount of aid involved is \$400 million, but half of this we believe includes credit provided but not yet used.) Cairo news accounts say the Soviets will provide almost \$70 million for rural electrification and \$40 million for additional land reclamation; both projects were discussed during Soviet President Podgorny's visit to Cairo in mid-January. The USSR is also said to have agreed in principle to provide more civil aircraft to the Egyptian airline. In addition, Moscow will provide more than \$30 million for construction and expansion of cement factories and \$55 million for grain silos and commercial development of Lake Nasir.

The 1971 trade protocol also was signed. It calls for total trade of about \$470 million, roughly the level of trade in recent years. Egypt has agreed to ship primarily consumer goods to the USSR while Moscow will send crude oil, petroleum products, and cast iron to Cairo.

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MEXICO

The government is continuing its efforts to round up the remaining members of the Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR), an extremist organization of young Mexicans trained in sabotage and terrorism by North Korea. On Monday the government announced that it had arrested 19 of the extremists whose objective was the overthrow of the Mexican Government and the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime. The MAR apparently was in the final stages of placing cadres in strategic locations around the country and is said to have planned to begin its program of sabotage this summer. Interrogation of those arrested so far has resulted in a detailed account of travel routes and contact networks involving numerous Communist countries.

The Echeverria administration apparently intends to keep publicizing the details of the "plot," particularly Soviet and East German involvement in providing transit facilities, funds, and equipment to the revolutionaries. The US Embassy notes that the affair could have a significant effect on the government's attitude toward the activities of Communist diplomatic, cultural, and trade missions in Mexico; toward the activities of exiles from all over Latin America; and toward leftist groups within the administration. The recall yesterday of Mexico's ambassador to Moscow is a clear sign that the government's attitude toward Communist countries is beginning to cool.

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
NOTES

Argentina: The Cordoba labor confederation has called for another 14-hour strike today, and the government is likely to use the federal police, or perhaps army troops, if Monday's violence recurs. The politically motivated labor leaders in Cordoba have already accomplished one of their principal objectives--the resignation of Governor Uriburu--and now they have their sights on the removal of President Levingston.

Turkey: The leaders of the four largest political parties are meeting again today with President Sunay to search for a new government that would be both acceptable to the military and politically feasible. There is some speculation that retired General Fikret Esen will be named prime minister, but such a move probably would be strongly opposed by the political leaders unless the government is given a provisional status that would limit its mandate and duration. Meanwhile, the purge of military officers suspected of holding personal political ambitions reportedly is continuing, and troops, especially in the Ankara area, remain in a high state of readiness.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

19 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Peking has issued its strongest anti-Soviet polemical blast in nearly a year in anticipation of the Soviet party congress opening. (Page 1)

Problems in the Communist Chinese leadership are assessed on Page 2.

A leftist group in Turkey may try to kidnap a diplomat as hostage for the release of a terrorist leader. (Page 3)

Five Soviet diplomats [redacted] have been declared persona non grata in Mexico. (Page 3)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA - SOVIET UNION

A joint editorial by the major Chinese propaganda organs, essentially restating the ideological differences that divide the two parties, is the strongest anti-Soviet polemical blast in nearly a year. It appears designed to drive home the point that, despite recent improvements in state-to-state relations, the fundamental gulf between Peking and Moscow remains as wide as ever. The Chinese clearly wish to set the record straight on this score before the Soviet party congress begins on 30 March; in a sense the editorial can be viewed as Peking's reply to the reported invitation from Moscow to attend the conclave.

In comparing Chinese adherence to "revolutionary violence" with Soviet "revisionism," the editorial accuses Moscow of going "all out" in the arms race while oppressing people at home and abroad, and repeatedly denounces Brezhnev by name. Nevertheless, specific grievances against Moscow such as the putative Soviet "threat" to Chinese territory are not stressed, presumably because the occasion calls for a more ideological statement of the Chinese position. Indeed, the editorial appears to have been drafted with a view to avoiding as much as possible language that would hamper Peking's diplomatic offensive in both the Communist and non-Communist world. This approach is particularly evident in the handling of Moscow's policies toward Eastern Europe.

Like the classic anti-Soviet blasts of the early and mid-60s, this attack on the "revisionists" has domestic as well as international implications. The editorial dwells at length on themes that were prominent at the height of the Cultural Revolution, particularly on the necessity for continued "class struggle." In this respect, Peking seems to be warning cadres at home against the sins of complacency and bureaucratic rote.



The shadowy Chen Po-ta, longtime ghostwriter, propagandist, and ideologue for Mao, had been chief of the Cultural Revolution Group since its formation in the fall of 1966. Deriving his political stature solely from close association with Mao, Chen had generally been found on the radical side of controversies at the center.



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Kang Sheng, the former chief of the secret police, had been "adviser" to the Cultural Revolution Group from its inception. This title and his extreme [redacted] statements painted Kang as one of the prime movers behind the destructive radical impulses of the Cultural Revolution.

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[redacted]
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA

On 2 December last year, we reported infighting within the Chinese politburo, origins of which probably dated back to the Cultural Revolution and allegedly involved an attempt by members of the politburo to discredit an ultraleftist Red Guard organization and other members who supported it. We noted that the result of the infighting could prove embarrassing particularly to Kang Sheng and Chen Po-ta.

Kang has now been out of public view for four months, and a story is circulating in Peking that at a party plenum late last summer he and Chen, and to a lesser extent Madame Mao, were criticized for "extremist" activities during and since the Cultural Revolution. Chen has been out of sight since 1 August, and it would appear that both he and Kang have been sidelined or purged.

The issues in dispute are extremely complex, but it seems safe to assume that the fate of the fallen politburo members is linked to quarreling over post-Cultural Revolution reconstruction policies and perhaps over the shape of China's rebuilt party and government apparatus, now heavily dominated by regional military leaders and veteran party cadres. Criticism of this revamped apparatus by Chen and Kang may have pushed some of their colleagues on the politburo to coalesce against them.

Whatever the case, the balance of forces in Peking's unstable leadership coalition seems to have shifted considerably since last fall, and the political setbacks suffered by Chen and Kang cast serious doubt on the future prospects of other leaders who were associated with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. The heavy criticism in domestic propaganda of the political performance of senior military and civilian officials continues to suggest that whatever issues are troubling the politburo have not been resolved. Moreover, the regime's failure since last March to acknowledge publicly any of the breaks that have occurred in the ranks of the top leadership indicates that a covert power struggle of significant proportions is still being waged in Peking.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Turkey:

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[redacted] the leftist Revolutionary Youth Federation may soon try to kidnap a diplomat or a member of his family as a hostage for the release of terrorist leader Deniz Gezmis. Gezmis, who as the self-styled leader of the embryonic Turkish People's Liberation Army engineered the earlier kidnapings of Americans, was captured last Wednesday as he tried to escape to Syria. Another member of the gang was also captured after being seriously wounded, and two others are still at large.

Mexico: In The President's Daily Brief of 18 March, we reported that the discovery of the Mexican guerrilla group trained in North Korea could have an effect on the Echeverria administration's attitude toward activities of Communist diplomats. Yesterday the Soviet chargé d'affaires and four other diplomats in the embassy [redacted] were declared persona non grata. Although Moscow had relatively minor contact with the revolutionaries, [redacted] these "diplomats" made them ideal targets for a display of Mexican displeasure.

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20 March 1971

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

20 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

On *Page 1* we comment on the draft ABM agreement which Semenov tabled at yesterday's SALT session.

The first Soviet military airlift to Egypt this year is under way. (*Page 2*)

Cairo yesterday made its first public claim of a shooting incident in the Suez Canal area since last August. (*Page 3*)

In Turkey, Nihat Erim, a moderate, is forming an interim government while the radical left shifts its activities to Istanbul. (*Page 4*)

On *Page 5* we review the military situation in northern Laos.

Chinese

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(*Page 6*)

The Italian police have rounded up right-wing conspirators in a move to quiet criticism from the left. (*Page 7*)

North Korea

(*Page 8*)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SALT


At yesterday's plenary, Semenov tabled a "Draft Treaty on the Limitation of Deployment of ABM Systems." He took the familiar line that an early ABM-only agreement as a "first step" would create better conditions for solving problems related to limiting offensive weapons.

The Soviet draft is essentially a rehash of the "basic provisions" tabled last December, but contains additional specific details. These include provisions for a numerical limitation of 100 ABM launchers/interceptors within a 200-kilometer radius of Moscow and Washington. The draft treaty seems deliberately patterned on the US proposal set forth in Option E, and the new specifics are clearly aimed at making the Soviet provisions appear responsive to repeated US requests for further detail. There are still, however, two significant differences: Moscow's failure to limit the number of ABM radars within the permitted zone and its failure to ban the upgrading of SAMs.

The Soviets probably believe that tabling a draft treaty at this time has tactical advantages. In making a detailed proposal, they seem intent on trying to throw the ball back into the US court. Moscow may hope in so doing to give Washington something to ponder during Semenov's absence during the Soviet party congress.


The Soviets seem to feel that their stand on forward-based systems gives them a plausible argument for creating a stalemate on the offensive side, while they focus on ABM limits. Semenov's new push for discussion of ABMs, however, does not rule out concurrent discussions in Vienna on limiting offensive weapons. During the post-plenary discussions, a Soviet adviser commented that both offensive and defensive limits could still be discussed.

Soviet Airlift to Egypt



AN-22

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AN-12

	AN-12	AN-22
Length	109 ft	186 ft
Payload with full fuel	9,500-18,400 lbs*	99,000 lbs
Range	2,200-3,800 nm*	5,100 nm
Cargo compartment	10ftX8ftX44ft	14ftX14ftX88ft

*These figures vary depending on the model flown.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-EGYPT

The first Soviet military airlift to Egypt this year is now under way. Since early this month, 13 Soviet AN-12 and three AN-22 military transports have arrived in Cairo;

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
Between February and April of last year about 45 MIG-21 jet interceptors, which were subsequently piloted by Soviet personnel, were airlifted to Egypt. In late July another airlift occurred in which replacement aircraft for four Soviet-piloted MIG-21s lost in aerial combat were delivered. There is no evidence that MIGs are included in the present airlift, but we cannot rule out the possibility that the cargo includes replacements for two Soviet-piloted MIGs that recently crashed.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EGYPT-ISRAEL

Cairo radio yesterday made the first public claim of a shooting incident in the Suez Canal area since last August. It alleged that Egyptian anti-aircraft guns had fired on two Israeli Phantom jets over Port Fuad at the northern end of the canal.



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Cairo's purpose in making the claim may have been to underscore the fragility of the current de facto cease-fire and to give added emphasis to international peace efforts. In an apparent effort to convey the impression of Egyptian readiness for renewed conflict, Cairo radio in recent days has reported preparations by President Sadat and various military commanders for a meeting today of the "Committee for Preparing the State for War."

Aside from the fairly regular reconnaissance by both Egyptian and Israeli aircraft, and the increased state of alert in effect since the cease-fire expired on 7 March, no unusual military activity has been detected in recent weeks on either side of the canal. Away from the immediate canal area in Egypt, regular training and defensive measures have continued but there is no evidence of preparations for offensive military action.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



Nihat Erim, Turkey's new prime minister - designate, a political moderate and an outstanding legal authority, appears to be a reasonably good choice to head the government during this troubled period. He has had wide experience in both domestic and foreign affairs and in balancing divergent political forces. Reformist in outlook, Erim is also one of Turkey's foremost authorities on the thorny Cyprus problem.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY

The new government to be formed by Nihat Erim during the next few days will be composed largely of representatives of the four largest political parties and perhaps some independents from the Senate. Neither former prime minister Demirel as head of the Justice Party nor Ismet Inonu, the head of the Republican Peoples Party, is expected to participate.

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Under the constitution, an interim or provisional government is not subject to a vote of confidence. Erim's mandate, however, appears to be somewhat broader than normal for such a government. The question of new elections is yet to be resolved but there have been suggestions that they may be held next October.


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With some degree of normalcy returning to Ankara, the radical left, which has been responsible for most of the recent unrest, is now shifting the focus of its activities to Istanbul.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS


The Communist offensive west of the Plaine des Jarres--now nearly two months old--has yet to make any major gains. Over 10,000 North Vietnamese troops still surround government positions at Ban Na, Phou Long Mat, and Phou Pha Sai, and they continue to harass the main complex at Long Tieng on a regular basis. No important positions have changed hands, however.

Since their damaging sapper attack on Long Tieng in mid-February the North Vietnamese have apparently concentrated on resupplying and repositioning their units, and have generally avoided large-scale ground assaults against fortified positions. Intercepted messages suggest that the Communists have suffered substantial casualties from air strikes and government artillery bombardments and that they continue to have supply problems. The government, meanwhile, has significantly reinforced the Long Tieng region. Aggressive patrolling in recent weeks has helped to keep the Communists off balance. Over 10,000 irregular combat forces are now in the area.

Although the North Vietnamese offensive has lost some of its momentum, there is no evidence that the enemy is disengaging. Only about two months of good weather remain, however. If the Communists are determined to take Long Tieng, they should begin to press harder soon.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


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
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
COMMUNIST CHINA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

ITALY

Nationwide police raids last week against right-wing conspirators are now being sensationalized played up in the Italian press. The primary targets were the leaders of the neo-Fascist National Front [redacted]

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[redacted]
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Allegedly the culmination of investigations begun when the National Front made a ludicrously half-hearted and closely monitored move last December, the raids were in fact timed to quiet criticism from the left about government inaction rather than to quell any genuine right-wing threat. The government may now find itself under pressure to take some balancing action in order to appease those already complaining that the real danger to Italy comes from the left and not from the "insignificant right."

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

North Korea

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Pakistan: President Yahya Khan and Mujibur Rahman continued their talks today, despite several deaths yesterday in what appears to have been the most serious clash involving the army in almost two weeks. Mujib again took a tough stance on Thursday when he rejected Yahya's proposal to conduct an investigation of killings earlier this month, partly because the probe was to have been held under martial law. At the same time the refusal of Z. A. Bhutto to join the talks in Dacca, at least for the time being, underlines the pressures against making concessions which West Pakistani politicians and military are bringing to bear on Yahya.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

22 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The unexpected appointment of a long-absent politburo member gives a new fix on the balance of forces in China's unsettled leadership. (Page 1)

In Laos, government troops have abandoned a number of defensive positions northeast of Luang Prabang. (Page 3)

[Redacted]

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South Vietnam

(Page 4)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA

The unexpected appointment of long-absent politburo member Hsieh Fu-chih to the top party post in Peking city gives us a new fix on the balance of forces in China's unsettled leadership which was last reported in The President's Daily Brief of 19 March.

Hsieh was the first of a trio of important politburo members to have dropped from sight in the past year. Although the regime never acknowledged that he was in disgrace, there were a number of strong indications that he was involved in behind-the-scenes infighting within the politburo. Peking's sudden announcement on Friday that he had been "elected" first secretary of the new municipal party committee suggests that he has undergone a political resurrection after a concerted effort to oust him from the Chinese leadership. The fact that Hsieh did not deliver the major address at the municipal congress which "elected" the new party committee and that he has not yet been identified again as politburo member and minister of public security, however, may indicate that he is not yet completely out of the political woods.

The precise reason for Hsieh's lengthy disappearance is still obscure, but he may have been a temporary victim of "leftist" pressure within the politburo. In his position as head of public security he was almost certainly involved in the investigation begun in January 1970 to ferret out officials who had supported the ultraleftist supporters of the Red Guard organization. According to Red Guard accounts, these people were backed by a number of leaders on the present politburo, including Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, both of whom may have felt politically endangered by the investigation.

China's present politburo is composed of individuals who were often bitter rivals during the Cultural Revolution and who must necessarily be concerned with securing tenable political positions for themselves and their followers in anticipation of the death of 77-year-old Mao Tse-tung. Indirect evidence suggests that these rivalries have been extended and renewed by the process of rebuilding the nation's party and government apparatus--a process in which some of the militant ideologues who have been closest to Mao appear to have been losing ground. They seem to have

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

been unable to form many bases of power in the reconstructed party organs which, like the new Peking committee, are led in most localities by military men and veteran officials. Many of the latter were once victims of political attacks inspired by radical leaders such as Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. Indeed, the formation of party committees at the important provincial level did not begin until the disappearance of Chen and Kang.

The confirmation of Hsieh Fu-chih in an important party job while Kang and Chen remain sidelined suggests that the balance within the politburo has now swung in favor of a loose grouping of relative moderates which includes Chou En-lai and some of the powerful central and regional military leaders. It also raises serious questions as to the present power of Mao himself. Since he has close personal and philosophic ties with Chen and Kang, a setback to them seems to tarnish his image and suggests there are constraints on his authority.

Neither of these important leftist leaders has been denounced in public and it is possible that, given the fluid state of Chinese politics, they may be eventually "rehabilitated" much like Hsieh Fu-chih. Nevertheless, even their reappearance would not belie the impression that the "leftists" on the politburo have lost a round in the ongoing struggle and have even less chance than before to carry much political clout in the post-Mao era.

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LAOS


Government troops have abandoned a number of defensive positions northeast of Luang Prabang following a series of coordinated Communist attacks yesterday. For the first time this dry season the Communists placed rocket fire on the Luang Prabang airfield. One attack early this morning destroyed an ammunition dump, but otherwise damage to the field and aircraft was light. The rocket attacks underscore the continuing vulnerability of the city, however.

The US Embassy thinks that a Communist attack against Luang Prabang is unlikely, but US dependents have been temporarily evacuated to Vientiane as a precautionary measure. Steps have also been taken to send three additional irregular battalions to the area if they are needed.


This is not the first time Luang Prabang has been threatened, but the Communists are now closer to the city and in larger numbers than ever before. As in the past, the North Vietnamese could move into the city almost at will, but this would mark a major departure in their strategy in Laos. Almost without exception, the Communists have refrained from direct attack, harassment, or terrorism against major population centers in the country. It seems more likely, therefore, that the current campaign near Luang Prabang is to further Communist objectives in the countryside and to demonstrate once again to Lao leaders the essential precariousness of their country's situation.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM



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NOTE

Pakistan: President Yahya Khan and Mujibur Rahman apparently made some progress in the last three days, but both sides are being very tight-lipped about the substance of their talks. The Western press speculates that Yahya will give in to Mujib's demands, which would mean that Pakistan would remain one country but almost all power would be in the hands of the provincial governments. The two leaders are scheduled to meet again today, and Z.A. Bhutto, in a complete about-face, flew to Dacca yesterday to participate in the discussions.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

23 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Argentine Army commander Lanusse has removed President Levingston and a junta has assumed command.
(Page 1)

The situation in Luang Prabang is assessed on *Page 2*.

Peking says Japanese Government leaders are welcome at any time. *(Page 3)*

A four-state Arab federation may be formed on Sunday.
(Page 4)

The Pakistan National Assembly has been postponed again but broad outlines of an agreed solution may have been reached. *(Page 5)*

The Turkish situation remains in flux. *(Page 5)*

Japanese Communist Party representatives will attend the Soviet party congress. *(Page 5)*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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ARGENTINA

The shaky situation in the country since the violent riots in the city of Cordoba last week finally erupted yesterday and early this morning. President Levingston made an abortive effort to oust army commander General Alejandro Lanusse and when it failed a junta of the commanders of the three armed services assumed power and removed the President. The junta announced that it would "re-assume political power until the objectives of the Argentine revolution are fulfilled."

General Lanusse will certainly be the strongman in this apparent attempt at collective rule designed to return Argentina to an elected government. The desire of the military to accelerate the return to a representative democracy was largely responsible for the ouster of President Onganía last June and may have been the most serious point of disagreement with Levingston, who wanted to wait four or five years.

Lanusse seems to have the necessary support in the military to carry out a more rapid return to civilian government. All major troop commanders rallied to the general's side when Levingston announced he was being removed.

This support could weaken quickly if Lanusse fails to demonstrate early progress in solving the nation's pressing political and economic problems.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Defense Minister Sisouk accompanied Prime Minister Souvanna on a visit to Luang Prabang yesterday. Sisouk later said he believed the situation had stabilized but he expressed dismay that government units north and northeast of the town had fled in the face of what he believed was a small enemy force of some 300 to 400 attackers. Sisouk has ordered two generals and several other officers from the General Staff to move to the royal capital to assume control of all tactical operations in Military Region 1. General Vang Pao, commander of Military Region 2, has also visited Luang Prabang and has ordered the move of some 850 of his irregulars to reinforce the town and clear the area.

King Savang, assuming a more active role, has commanded that government units recapture the positions nearest the airfield. The King canceled his traditional appearance at Army Day in Vientiane yesterday in order to remain in Luang Prabang; his continued presence there should help to calm the jittery residents.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST CHINA - JAPAN

Chou En-lai remarked that Japanese Government leaders are welcome to visit China at any time. He singled out the "present prime minister and foreign minister."

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Chou's statement stands in marked contrast to Peking's public posture of irreconcilable hostility toward the Sato government. Chou can hardly expect this gesture to be acted on, but his remarks suggest that Peking is prepared to deal with Sato if it finds an opportunity to make a significant change in key bilateral issues.

The most important of these issues appears to be Tokyo's relations with Taiwan. Peking's new flexibility is designed to forestall the possibility that Japan, as a result of its large economic stake in the island, will replace the United States as "protector" of the Nationalist regime. Peking recently underlined its concern on this issue when it for the first time demanded that Tokyo abrogate the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty of 1950 as a "condition" to establish diplomatic relations.

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Chou En-lai recently encouraged the visit of many more "leftist" businessmen to China and defined as leftist anyone who "visualized" severing relations with Taipei. This formulation is clearly meant to suggest to Japanese business circles that mainland markets will prove more fruitful than those in Taiwan.

Peking's rigid policy toward Japan until now has stood in contrast to its conciliatory attitude toward most of the rest of the world in the past year. This approach has neither undercut the Sato government nor appreciably arrested a drift toward a "one China, one Taiwan" policy in Tokyo. Chou's recent remarks suggest that Peking is now considering substituting honey for vinegar in its Japan policy.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

ARAB FEDERATION

A four-state union bringing together Egypt, Syria, Libya, and the Sudan will be announced on Sunday if Libyan-Sudanese differences can be resolved, according to Arab press circles. Failing this, a three-state union, excluding the Sudan, will be formed. The union is to encompass defense, foreign, and economic affairs.

The decision to proceed with the formal union likely was confirmed during President Sadat's unannounced one-day trip to Libya last week. Sadat, fully aware of the popular opposition to such a federation in both Libya and the Sudan, has heretofore resisted Libyan Premier Qadhafi's calls for unification. Sadat may now believe, however, that at least a facade of a united front will help maintain Arab support for his policy of negotiations.

Sadat may also hope Syria's inclusion will generate additional domestic support for President Asad. Since he came to power last November, Asad has muted Damascus' opposition to a negotiated settlement and has endorsed Cairo's stand.

The Sudanese position on joining the union is still unclear. President Numeiri, moving cautiously on an issue unpopular in the Sudan, has insisted on a protracted timetable for formal union. His position has caused Qadhafi to react critically and there have been some bitter exchanges between the two.

Despite the broad scope of the planned merger, it is not likely that effective political integration is in the cards.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Pakistan: President Yahya, after a meeting with Bhutto and Mujib, has postponed the convening of the National Assembly that had been scheduled to begin writing a new constitution on Thursday.

[redacted] he and Mujib have already agreed to the broad outlines of a solution. Although many details remain to be worked out, martial law would end, civilian provincial governments would begin to function, and an interim national cabinet formed. With all parties apparently in agreement that more time is needed for negotiations among the political leaders, it seems unlikely there will be a repetition of the violence that followed Yahya's earlier postponement of the assembly on 1 March.

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Turkey: Prime minister - designate Erim now has received pledges of support from both major parties, although the second largest, the Republican People's Party, apparently split over the issue. He is reported intending to select up to half of his cabinet ministers from among independents and from outside Parliament. The threat of an ultimate military take-over persists, and many Turks view Erim as "a last chance" for some time to come. Although the nationwide military alert has been relaxed, security precautions in some areas have actually been tightened because of new warnings of leftist terrorism.

USSR-Japan: The Japanese Communist Party will attend the Soviet party congress which opens next week. This decision resulted from recent consultations between the two parties in Moscow, and, as a concession, the Soviets apparently have pledged to cease their support of a pro-Soviet Japanese Communist splinter group. It does not appear that the parties reconciled their conflicting ideological views on such issues as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but the wording of their joint communique suggests that they agreed to keep their differences private. The presence of the Japanese party at the congress will be a significant gain for Moscow and may benefit politburo member Suslov, who apparently was instrumental in easing the strained relations between the two parties.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

24 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

At yesterday's SALT session the Soviets proposed a separate treaty on measures to reduce the danger of war by accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. (Page 1)

The Pakistani disputants offer some sharply conflicting public statements on the state of their talks, but some behind-the-scenes progress appears to have been made. (Page 2)

The Argentine junta has begun naming its cabinet. (Page 3)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SALT

At yesterday's session the Soviets tabled yet another proposal for an early agreement limited to one topic discussed at SALT. This time Semenov pushed for a separate treaty on measures aimed at reducing the danger of an outbreak of war between the US and USSR caused by accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Semenov contended that the substantive views of both sides on this matter already "coincide to a great degree," and he termed it "unjustifiable" to link agreement on this subject with the solution of other questions at SALT.

The text of the new Soviet proposal shows that Moscow's views do, in fact, closely parallel US provisions tabled on 4 December at Helsinki. At that time, however, the US made it very clear that it was proposing inclusion of such provisions on accidental or unauthorized incidents in a wider limitations agreement encompassing offensive and defensive weapons.

The rationale served up with this new overture echoes that voiced by Semenov in arguing Moscow's brief for an early ABM-only agreement. Both proposals appear aimed in part at deflecting attention away from topics the Soviets would plainly rather not discuss at present--in particular, of-fensive strategic systems. Moreover, the Soviets presumably see some merit in pushing for limited, separate agreements, both in an effort to accustom the US to accept a piece-by-piece approach to the issues at hand, and as a possible way of achieving some show of progress at SALT.

In a post-plenary conversation with Semenov, Ambassador Smith broached the third US alternative on ABM limitations, which would limit the US to defense of four Minuteman complexes, and the USSR to its present system around Moscow. Semenov's initial reaction was that the US proposal was aimed at obtaining unilateral advantage, and he said he could state "even now" that it was not acceptable to the USSR. He promised a more detailed response later.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN

The disputants appear to have made some progress behind the scenes toward a political agreement, despite their sharply conflicting public statements. Bhutto says he is examining an "agreement" reached by Mujib and President Yahya. Presumably this is the one noted in The President's Daily Brief yesterday calling for an end to martial law, the start of civilian governments in the provinces, and the formation of an interim central cabinet.

Bhutto may be overemphasizing the progress made thus far in an attempt to enhance his own role and to forestall other West Pakistani leaders now in Dacca from eroding his position. Mujib, for his part, denies the existence of any agreement. However far the discussions have gone, Mujib may believe that unsettled matters such as the division of powers between the provinces and the central government are more important than any of the agreed points. At least until this is settled, he would be loath to admit to agreeing to anything short of full provincial autonomy.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Argentina: The country remains generally calm and apathetic following the assumption of power by a three-man junta. As the cabinet-forming process begins, the junta has retained Minister of Economy Ferrer and at least one other holdover, according to press reports, indicating a desire at the moment to avoid abrupt changes. An early announcement is likely that steps will be taken to hold elections, but the timetable will probably be so long that little popular support will be attracted to the new government.

Communist China - USSR: Chou En-lai called in Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov and chief border negotiator Ilichev for four hours of talks on 21 March--a move that may have been designed to soften the hostile impression created by Peking's polemic against Moscow issued on 17 March. TASS reports merely that "questions of interest to both sides" were discussed. A number of issues--such as the border question or Indochina--may have been reviewed, but Chou's primary aim may have been to attempt to separate problems arising out of continuing ideological differences between the two parties from those involving improvement of state-to-state relations.

Singapore-USSR

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Top Secret



The President's Daily Brief

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

25 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Chile's Christian Democrats have begun to stiffen their opposition in the congress to the Allende government. (Page 1)

Panama

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(Page 2)

Burmese

Page 3.

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Chinese

Soviet

(Page 4)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHILE

On 22 March the opposition Christian Democrats seized on several issues to challenge the Allende government in congress. The issues included the alleged involvement of government officials in a shady copper sale maneuver on the world market and amendments to the government's constitutional reform bill nationalizing remaining US copper holdings. On the same day party leaders refused Allende's offer to join the government.

The Christian Democrats seem finally to have concluded that their accomodating attitude was strengthening the Popular Unity (UP) government's steady consolidation of power and further weakening their own divided party. They hope their challenges will improve their modest chances in the nationwide municipal elections on 4 April.

The Communist Party is concerned about the increasing and outspoken opposition to the government, [redacted]


[redacted] and plans to counterattack strongly. Communist leaders want to remove all remaining UP opponents from the information media and have already staged one of a series of demonstrations planned to mobilize popular support for the administration. Both the Communists and the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left are reported to be aware of plots against the government and are making plans to counter such action.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PANAMA




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


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
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BURMA



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


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
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
USSR-CHINA



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

USSR:

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South Vietnam: Evidence has been increasing in recent days of Communist plans to intensify shellings and sapper activities in South Vietnam later this month. Prisoners have reported that elements of three North Vietnamese regiments in the central highlands are preparing to attack a South Vietnamese strongpoint near the tri-border area.

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[redacted] Communist units plan limited actions against selected targets in several areas of the country, and [redacted] in the Da Nang area an especially vigorous propaganda campaign will be launched to brand the recent fighting in Laos as a major South Vietnamese defeat.

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The President's Daily Brief

26 March 1971



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

26 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The military is attempting to reassert its authority in East Pakistan. (Page 1)

Communist forces in Cambodia appear to be increasing the tempo of their modest dry season military campaign. (Page 2)

Cambodia
South Vietnam

(Page 3)

50X1

South Vietnam

(Page 4)

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On Page 5 we review the military situation around the Laotian royal capital of Luang Prabang.

The Soviet reaction to Mexico's expulsion last week of five Soviet diplomats is discussed on Page 6.

In Egypt, a press feud
(Page 7)

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Sudan

Israeli-
Congo. (Page 8)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN

The military is attempting to reassert its authority in East Pakistan. Citing the "deteriorating situation" arising from "unbridled political activities," the martial law administration has issued a series of orders banning political activity of any kind, outlawing the three-week old boycott of central government activities, and making the carrying of weapons illegal.

Before issuing the orders, the army moved to take control of Dacca, East Pakistan's capital. The US consulate-general reported that firing and explosions began about midnight Dacca time (2 p.m. Thursday EST) and army patrols and fixed sentries could be seen from the consulate firing at civilians. A curfew is in effect, and Dacca radio--which had been under local control--has been taken over by the military.

So far, there are no reports from other parts of the province. There have, however, been serious clashes between the army and East Pakistanis at the southern port of Chittagong and in the far north-western part of East Pakistan in the past two days.

According to unconfirmed press reports from India, fighting has broken out between West Pakistani troops and East Pakistani police and para-military forces. East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rahman has reportedly called for resistance to "the enemy forces at any cost." Another unconfirmed report that six ships landed troops at Chittagong and another port yesterday may well be exaggerated, but could have some basis. Four C-130s, loaded with troops, have left Karachi for Dacca.


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Yesterday, leaders of Mujib's Awami League presented their final position to President Yahya. Apparently they asked for the immediate establishment of a civilian provincial government and assurance that any constitution to be written would limit the central government to control of defense and foreign affairs.

Initial indications had been that Yahya would agree to their demands, but the recent reports from Dacca seem to indicate that a decision has instead been made to try to hold the country together by force. Yahya--who returned to West Pakistan from Dacca late yesterday--is scheduled to make a public announcement presumably explaining the situation this morning.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Current Situation



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

Communist forces appear to be increasing the tempo of their modest dry season military campaign.

The Communists staged a prolonged attack yesterday against the two poorly prepared Cambodian Army battalions holding the Pich Nil pass on Route 4, and also ambushed an eight-truck government munitions convoy near the pass. Communist attacks were also reported further south on Route 4, where enemy forces apparently have gained control over a section of the highway by overrunning three villages between the seaport of Kompong Som and the town of Veal Renh.

Earlier on Wednesday, the Communists carried out their first significant action in the Phnom Penh region in several weeks when they fired five 122-mm. rockets into the Pochentong airfield area. No damage was reported.

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
Communist operations in Svay Rieng Province also appear to be on the rise.

[redacted] the failure of government troops to man some of the positions recently vacated by South Vietnamese troops along Route 1 has permitted the enemy, possibly elements from the 88th Communist Regiment, to interfere with the movement of supplies from villages along that highway to Svay Rieng city. In the northwest, Communist leaflets spread during last week's attack on a sugar factory in Battambang Province have threatened enemy attacks closer to Battambang city.

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
During most of the dry season, the Communists have concentrated on keeping a fairly steady level of pressure against the government's main lines of communication; this, in most cases, has caused only temporary disruptions. In the countryside, Communist activities have been limited mainly to small-scale harassment.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM - CAMBODIA



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
General Minh, who replaced the late General Do Cao Tri several weeks ago, pulled South Vietnamese forces back from Communist strongholds near Chup and Dambe north of Route 7 early this month to regroup and refit. Since then, he has mounted a number of forays on roads north of Route 7 but the fighting has been considerably less intense than that seen earlier. The generally lighter action seems to result in part from the more conservative approach of the South Vietnamese, but also in part from the enemy's unwillingness to stand and fight. In several instances the Communists have moved out of the path of the South Vietnamese probes.

Current South Vietnamese tactics in Cambodia also are in line with the general views expressed by President Thieu last year.

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further large expenditures of men and materiel in Cambodia might put unnecessary burdens on the army, run the risk of a major military setback, and thus undercut his chances for re-election.


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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM



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LAOS

For the second straight day, elements of the North Vietnamese 335th Regiment on Wednesday turned back Laotian troops attempting to advance northeast of Luang Prabang. Heavy mortar fire and sharp ground fighting stopped the government forces about a mile and a half short of their objective.

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small enemy units are making a number of offensive jabs, keeping government forces off balance and further constricting the capital's defense perimeter.

Government officials in Vientiane are increasingly restive over continuing enemy pressure on Luang Prabang and are especially concerned for the safety of the King. The Permanent Committee of the National Assembly voted on Wednesday to recommend that Souvanna urge the King to come to Vientiane, despite his oft-repeated intention to remain in Luang Prabang.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-MEXICO

A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement handed to the Mexican Government on Wednesday termed the expulsion of the five Soviet diplomats "totally groundless" and "an unfriendly act." It charged that the move helps "elements" interested in disrupting Soviet-Mexican relations. Moscow tempered the tone of the statement somewhat by saying that it is working for normal, friendly relations with Mexico.

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Moscow professes to be "astonished" by the embarrassing turn of events. There is, in fact, no evidence of direct Soviet support for the Mexican terrorists--the Revolutionary Action Group--and the Kremlin probably views itself as the victim of circumstances. Thus far, the Mexican Government has only circumstantially implicated the Soviets with the terrorists by citing the presence of some of the guerrillas at Lumumba University in Moscow several years ago, and the fact that some of them transited the USSR using North Korean passports.

Moscow's policy has been to cultivate friendly relations with all Latin American states, and it particularly values Mexico as a base for intelligence activities. It has on occasion actively discouraged formation of terrorist organizations and has generally urged pro-Moscow Communist parties to follow the example of the Chilean party by working for the formation of popular front governments.


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
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EGYPT


The chief editor of the semiofficial newspaper al-Ahram, Muhammad Haykal, has been accused in recent weeks of writing articles that are "defeatist" in nature and unmindful of Egypt's determination to liberate the occupied territory. The charges against Haykal have appeared in some of Egypt's less prestigious newspapers, and most of the criticism has been levied by members of Egypt's sole legal political organization, the Arab Socialist Union.




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
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
CONGO (KINSHASA) - ISRAEL - SUDAN



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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NOTE

Libya: Signature of an agreement with the oil companies has been delayed--and perhaps jeopardized--by further Libyan demands. Preliminary reports indicate that the Revolutionary Command Council insists on certain changes in the draft settlement that representatives of Libya and the oil companies had agreed to last Sunday, including still higher prices. Moreover, Tripoli refuses to consent to a five-year agreement, which the oil companies consider an essential point. No further meetings are scheduled to take place before Saturday.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

27 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The current situation in Pakistan is assessed on
Page 1.

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The situation in Luang Prabang appears on *Page 4.*

President Thieu is said to have offered Prime Minister Khiem the vice presidential nomination next fall. (*Page 5*)

Lanusse takes the Argentine presidency on a rotating basis. (*Page 6*)

Two days of clashes have been reported in Jordan.
(*Page 6*)

The Soviets are sending naval replacements to the Mediterranean area. (*Page 6*)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN

The army's ability to re-establish central government authority in East Pakistan remains in doubt. According to clandestine East Pakistani broadcasts, paramilitary forces and troops from the army's East Bengal Regiment have surrounded West Pakistani forces in most garrison towns. The Indian press reports that East Pakistanis have seized the government radio station in Chittagong, the province's major port. These reports are unconfirmed, however

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Reports from the US Consulate-General indicate that Dacca is under army control and relatively calm, despite scattered shooting and an enormous fire which burned through the night in the Old City. The curfew has been lifted from 0700 to 1600, but is still in effect at night. Twenty-five foreign correspondents, including five Americans, were ordered out of East Pakistan for their own safety and flown to Karachi by way of Colombo, where they were not permitted to disembark.

Yesterday, in a radiobroadcast, President Yahya Khan tried to justify the military intervention as necessary to preserve the nation's unity. He accused Mujib of treason and banned his party. According to Yahya, in the recent series of meetings to resolve differences over the projected constitution, Mujib had insisted on a program that would have resulted in chaos, and Yahya could not allow "some power hungry and unpatriotic people" to destroy Pakistan.

The clandestine radio claims that Mujib has proclaimed East Pakistan independent as the People's Republic of Bangla Desh (the Bengali Nation). Early today, however, the government announced that Mujib had been arrested some hours before the proclamation of independence. Mujib's followers deny this


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
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
COMMUNIST CHINA



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
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
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


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LAOS

In coordinated attacks beginning at sundown on Thursday, Communist units advanced on a two-mile front through the rugged terrain overlooking the Luang Prabang airfield. By yesterday morning the North Vietnamese had occupied a position about one mile east of the runway, while three battalions of government troops had withdrawn to the flatlands near the Mekong River. As of early this morning no government aircraft were using the field because North Vietnamese units armed with recoilless rifles were within range. Three additional irregular battalions arrived in Luang Prabang from other military regions two days ago and another three are expected soon.

In Vientiane, Pathet Lao representative Soth Pethrasy told reporters yesterday that the attacks were intended to enforce the neutrality of the Laotian capital and were a "warning to the Americans and Laotian rightists not to use the airfield as a military base." The government now uses Luang Prabang as a base for a small force of T-28 attack aircraft and AC-47 gunships. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is considering a number of diplomatic steps to bring pressure on the Communists to withdraw from Luang Prabang.

Soth's statement is consistent with a new letter from Pathet Lao chief Souphanouvong which Souvanna received on Tuesday. The Communist leader is said to have posed tough new conditions for the initiation of peace talks, including cessation of bombing in Xieng Khouang Province and the withdrawal of all Thai troops and American "advisers."

The Communists demanded a similar bombing halt last year, but in their efforts to get talks under way subsequently called for a stand-down only in the Plaine des Jarres area--the agreed venue for discussions. Souvanna then countered by proposing Luang Prabang as the site. King Savang believes Communist attacks in the Luang Prabang area are intended to be taken as a rejection of Souvanna's proposal.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SOUTH VIETNAM

President Thieu would like Prime Minister Khiem
as his running mate in the election next fall, [redacted]

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If Thieu in fact has selected Khiem, the decision carries the risk that Ky, if not chosen as Thieu's running mate, will run for the presidency and draw support away from Thieu. Such a diversion of votes from Thieu could, in turn, be of great help to Big Minh's candidacy.

There has been some speculation among South Vietnamese political observers that, despite the friction between them, Thieu would eventually opt to keep Ky. If Thieu has indeed ruled out Ky, the decision may have been prompted in part by irritation at Ky's recent criticism of South Vietnam's operations in Laos.

Khiem has some stature in his own right, particularly in military and government circles, but he is unlikely to be of much help in broadening support for Thieu's ticket among such groups as the Buddhists or junior officers. An offer to Khiem from Thieu therefore would probably reflect the latter's desire to have a more compatible vice president and to divest himself of the kind of major nuisance he regards Ky to be.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Argentina: As President, army chief Lanusse now has prime responsibility for initiating the return to constitutional government. According to new changes in the 1966 "Statute of the Argentine Revolution," the President will exercise both the executive and legislative functions, obtaining the concurrence of the junta on matters of "special significance." An important check in the new system is the planned rotation of the presidency among the three services. Lanusse is to be succeeded on 1 January 1972 by air force commander Rey, who will take over as head of the junta and as President.

Jordan: There have been two days of clashes in Irbid between the army and fedayeen, with each side blaming the other for sparking various incidents. It is clear, however, that the fighting resulted from the army's continuing policy of attempting to clear Jordanian cities of armed fedayeen.

USSR: The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean will be temporarily strengthened during the next ten days as replacements arrive for forces that have been there some five months. In addition to a relief group of seven diesel submarines and four surface ships off the Portuguese coast, four warships now in the English Channel evidently are en route. Before heading home, the force now in the Mediterranean probably will conduct joint operations with the relief group.

SALT: The Soviets stood pat at yesterday's formal meeting. Semenov reiterated Moscow's well-worn argument for an initial agreement confined to limitations on ABMs. Ambassador Smith tabled the alternate ABM proposal which would limit the US to defense of four Minuteman complexes, and the USSR to its present system around Moscow. Reacting in the same vein as he had when Smith first broached the matter privately on Tuesday, Semenov read off a formal rejection of this plan, terming it "obviously unacceptable."

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SUNDAY CABLE
28 March 71

PAKISTAN

High-ranking Pakistani military officers are now claiming to US officials that the armed forces are rapidly re-establishing control over East Pakistan. The military situation remains confused, however, and Indian press reporting in particular, claiming that the army is battling the paramilitary East Pakistani Rifles together with police and civilians in various provinces, appears to be exaggerated.

The condition of the Martial Law Administrator for the East, Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, is not clear; he has been variously reported killed and seriously injured.

International press treatment of events is likely to be somewhat colored for the next several days as a result of the forcible departure, at gunpoint, of several correspondents from Dacca on 26 March. Included in the group were representatives of at least nine US press and television services.

The US Consul General in Dacca reported that the city experienced an uneasy calm yesterday and that the daytime curfew was lifted. He reports that the military crackdown on the city was accomplished "swiftly, efficiently, and often with ruthless brutality." No Americans are known to have been injured and evacuation is not being recommended at this time because the army is in full control of Dacca and popular retaliation against Americans is not now considered likely.

Despite repeated denials from the clandestine East Pakistani radio that Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman is under

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arrest, the army continues to claim that he and several other League leaders are in military custody.

In addition to the sympathy being expressed by Mrs. Gandhi and other Indian leaders for the East Pakistanis and the Bengalis, the Chief of Staff of India's Eastern Command has told a US official in Calcutta that the army is making contingency plans for intervention in East Pakistan. He said that, although the army considered such a course "militarily unfeasible," it could become "politically necessary." He also said that he personally believed the army could easily provide arms, ammunition, and other supplies to the East Bengalis.

SUNDAY CABLE
28 March 71

LAOS

Government forces are attempting to contest the enemy's control of the high ground overlooking the Luang Prabang airfield.

Lao irregular forces are trying to clear enemy units along the foot of the hill-mass located about five miles northeast of the capital. One government battalion advanced onto the high ground during the morning hours of 28 March and so far has encountered only light enemy resistance. North Vietnamese forces, however, can be expected to oppose the new government initiatives.

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Morale in the royal capital appears shaky. [redacted]


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[redacted] the King believes that the North Vietnamese intend a siege of Luang Prabang and is concerned about arranging airdrops of food and supplies. The King remains determined to stay in the capital.

It seems doubtful that the Communists have any intention of entirely isolating Luang Prabang, much less entering the town. They may hope, however, to maintain their grip on the territory surrounding the airfield in order to prevent its further use as a military base.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

29 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In East Pakistan, the army is harshly asserting its control in Dacca but the situation elsewhere is less clear. (Page 1)

The Communists have apparently initiated their anticipated spring offensive in northern South Vietnam. (Page 2)

Laotian Government forces are continuing their efforts to push the Communists from high ground near the royal capital. (Page 3)

On Page 4, we comment on the Soviet draft agreement tabled at Friday's four-power talks on Berlin.

At Annex we present some thoughts about the Soviet party congress which opens tomorrow.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PAKISTAN

Dacca remains under firm army control, but complete news censorship, the forced evacuation from Dacca of Western newsmen, and a breakdown of communications with the interior have combined to make the situation in the rest of East Pakistan extremely unclear. Conflicting claims continue to be broadcast by the government and secessionist radios, with the government declaring yesterday that peace had been restored throughout East Pakistan except for a few disturbances, and with the clandestine "Free Bangla" radio proclaiming that widespread fighting persists and that the population is rallying behind Mujibur Rahman's leadership.

Mujib's status is still uncertain. Clandestine broadcasts maintain that he has escaped arrest and is at his headquarters in the port of Chittagong. Yesterday, however, a broadcast identified the leader of the newly proclaimed Bangla Desh regime not as Mujib but as a Major Zia Khan, said to head the Bengali "Liberation Army."

*Earlier reports have stated that Mujib was taken into custody on the night of
25-26 March*

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*[redacted] The
vagueness of the broadcasts tends to con-
firm that Mujib is in government hands.*

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Reports from Dacca indicate that, although the city is relatively quiet, many sections have been destroyed and throngs of refugees have been leaving for the countryside. There is some evidence that the army is attempting to round up all leaders from the Awami League, including recently elected members of the provincial and national assemblies, as well as university students and faculty members.

If, as rumored, a program of eliminating opponents of the regime is indeed under way, the effect will be to destroy the relatively moderate leadership that has characterized the Awami League. This would place future direction of Bengali efforts toward independence in the hands of more extremist political parties such as the currently small Communist organization in East Pakistan. This organization is closely patterned after the Naxalites who have been causing considerable havoc in the neighboring Indian state of West Bengal.

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SOUTH VIETNAM

In the northern province of Quang Tin yesterday, a Communist force heavily shelled and temporarily overran a US fire support base, inflicting unusually heavy casualties. Early today, Da Nang airfield was struck by several rounds of 122-mm. rocket fire, resulting in light to moderate damage. Communist forces also launched a series of attacks against several South Vietnamese military outposts and a refugee center in Quang Ngai Province on 26 March.


These actions apparently mark the start of the anticipated Communist spring campaign in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Recent intercepts show that Communist units in Quang Nam Province were ordered to begin a new phase of military action on 28-29 March. It is likely that Communist plans call for further attacks around Da Nang and elsewhere in the northern half of the country, including the central highlands.

In the Khe Sanh region, there were several Communist shellings and ambushes over the weekend, but none caused serious allied casualties.

The recent movement of the headquarters of the North Vietnamese 308th Division to a point some 11 miles northwest of Khe Sanh could presage more extensive ground attacks. The headquarters is now in an area where Communist antiaircraft gunners have been active in recent days and from which the Communists have staged attacks against Khe Sanh in the past.

To mount a concerted drive in western Quang Tri Province, the Communists would have to reinforce the 308th Division. It sustained heavy casualties during the South Vietnamese thrust into Laos, and intercepts indicate that some of its subordinate units are still having morale and manpower problems. There are at least five infantry regiments and another division headquarters--the North Vietnamese 324B--southwest of Khe Sanh that could be moved in to apply additional pressure on the base.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Government forces defending Luang Prabang have made several attempts to contest Communist control of high ground some four miles east of the town. On the afternoon of 28 March, after two days of heavy fighting, irregular units regained an artillery position at the village of Ban Dan Cho, but their advance farther north along Route 4 has so far been blocked by sustained enemy mortar fire. An effort to retake Phou Luang, a terrain highpoint seized by the Communists on 25 March, was broken up by heavy enemy resistance and by misdirected artillery fire that fell among the government troops.

The threat of enemy artillery fire from this high ground has curtailed the use of Luang Prabang airport, which lies between the heights and the royal capital. Moreover, morale among military leaders in Luang Prabang appears to be low.

Army chief of staff General Ouan expressed doubt late last week that government troops, despite reinforcement from the other military regions, could redress recent Communist gains in the Luang Prabang area. [] the King, believing that the North Vietnamese intend a siege of Luang Prabang, is concerned about arranging air-drops of food and supplies. He remains determined to stay in the capital.

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It is doubtful that the Communists have any intention of entirely isolating Luang Prabang, much less entering the town. They may hope, however, to strengthen their grip on the territory surrounding the airfield to prevent its further use as a military base.

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
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-BERLIN

The Soviet draft agreement on Berlin, tabled at the four-power ambassadorial session on Friday, demonstrates Moscow's determination to drive the hardest possible bargain. Although it is relatively close in form to the Western draft of 5 February, it falls far short of Western desires on the issues of civilian access, freedom of inner city movement, and the federal German right to represent West Berlin abroad.

The Soviet draft concentrates on pushing the cause of East German sovereignty, while reducing the rights and prerogatives of the three Allied powers regarding access and inner city movement by a proposal that would indirectly delegate political responsibility to the respective German parties. The draft also calls for a drastic reduction in federal German activities and a significant expansion of the Soviet presence in West Berlin.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**NOTES**

Cambodia: A Cambodian Army armor and infantry force that attempted to move west over Route 4 toward the Pich Nil Pass this weekend was pushed back by heavy enemy mortar and ground fire, leaving the Communists astride a ten-mile section of the roadway. Initial reports suggest that government casualties and material losses were heavy. In addition, enemy forces have renewed attacks on government troops at the northern end of the pass and are reported to have surrounded other troops farther south on Route 4 near Veal Renh.

Jordan: The northern city of Irbid is now generally quiet and under curfew, [redacted] occasional exchanges of fire were continuing yesterday. The army has seized on Friday's fighting as an excuse to conduct a house-to-house search for arms stockpiled by the fedayeen. In Amman, firing also broke out at several points yesterday, apparently touched off by a student march in support of the fedayeen in Irbid. The government has previously indicated that it would crack down strongly on any incidents in Amman, where security forces have been seeking an opportunity to pick up illegal arms.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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USSR

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The 24th Soviet party congress will open tomorrow and last about ten days. On the whole, we believe that internal conflicts will be subordinated to the interests of party unity and stability and that we will see no major policy departures.

Much of the fare will be pretty standard. Party chief Brezhnev will deliver a report on the politburo's activity since the last congress in 1966, including its assessment of the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic affairs. On the foreign front, the US will be raked over the coals for its Indochina and Middle East policies. What the Kremlin regards as its own "successes"--the treaty signed with West Germany, the growth of Soviet influence in the Middle East, and the "normalizing" of Sino-Soviet state relations since the low point of 1969--will be trumpeted. We also expect Brezhnev to speak on such "peace and security" proposals as the Conference on European Security. On the domestic side, he will point to "victories" in the economy and may use the theme of the "strengthened loyalty" of the people to the party as an excuse to warn Soviet intellectuals against dissension and Western "subversion."

The new draft Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) will be presented to the congress for approval by Premier Kosygin. The draft directives, already published in mid-February, show that resources will be allocated among defense, investment and consumption along much the same lines as in recent years. The omission of some statistical data normally published, however, suggests efforts to cover up a somewhat pessimistic outlook for economic growth. The omission may also indicate that allocation priorities--always a divisive issue for Soviet leaders--are still being fought over.

The personal struggles that are endemic within the 11-man coalition politburo have intensified with the approach of the party congress and with Brezhnev's bid to increase and consolidate his pre-eminence over the past year. Although he has allies within the ruling group, his efforts have almost certainly raised some hackles among his peers.

Brezhnev has not yet achieved control of the all-important power of personnel appointments. He apparently has been able to remove some opponents from party and government posts, but appointments to key positions are still a matter for decision by the

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politburo as a whole and Brezhnev has not yet been able to ensure selection of his own supporters. We will be watching closely for clues such as whether or not Brezhnev has enough clout to install Andrey Kirilenko, one of his important politburo allies, as the number-two man in the party secretariat. At the last congress ideologist Mikhail Suslov, now an important counterweight to Brezhnev in the politburo, got this protocol ranking, but most of the responsibilities of Brezhnev's second-in-command have since been assumed by Kirilenko. If Kirilenko is now formally appointed to the job, it will signal a considerable rise of Brezhnev's power.

Despite the vicissitudes of age, health, and political fortunes, there has been no change in politburo membership during the five years since the last congress. Even if 72-year old Arvid Pelshe, who serves as a kind of party inspector general, were to retire now, it would confront the other ten members with a problem of finding somebody sufficiently neutral to succeed him. If one of the young members were to depart--such as Aleksandr Shelepin, currently head of the trade unions and a perennial Brezhnev challenger, or Gennady Voronov, head of the Russian republic and an independent-minded "moderate"--it would create a sharp imbalance in the collective leadership and greatly increase tensions. If there are no changes at all in the politburo, it will mean that the delicate balance among the leadership has led to stalemate and immobility.

Stalemate is already evident in the politburo's efforts to cope with its current major concern, how to get better returns from capital investments and labor resources. Not only are top Soviet leaders hampered by political and bureaucratic infighting, but they fear that reforms may weaken the party's monopoly of power. This fear was reinforced by events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, where party control rapidly dissolved under pressures for economic reform. On the other hand, the dangers of not getting the economy moving were also sharply pointed up to Soviet leaders this winter in Poland when worker protests over food shortages and high living costs forced changes in Warsaw's political hierarchy. In a way Soviet leaders see themselves damned if they do and damned if they don't, and their frustration is mirrored in the economic "reorganization" proposals now before the congress--generally anemic compared with measures under discussion in Eastern Europe.

(continued)

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The way even these weak Soviet ventures into economic experimentation are debated and handled by the congress and the Kremlin will provide clues as to the degree of unity among the leadership and the strength and ranking of individual politburo members. We believe that domestic issues will be far more troublesome than international ones. Despite some occasional disagreements over how to respond to flare-ups in the Middle East and despite a few dim signs of differences over West Germany, Soviet leaders in our view are far more united in foreign than in domestic policy.

The one really sensitive and intractable issue dividing Soviet leaders is that of Stalin's image. Essentially, the dispute is over how far Soviet policy should go in moving back toward Stalin-symbol of the old way of doing things--and away from Khrushchev-symbol of change and innovation. In the past, Soviet liberals cited Stalin's "mistakes" to argue for change; now, conservatives point to Stalin's "successes" to argue against change. Rumors that there will be a major rehabilitation of Stalin's image, however, have not been supported by the preparatory party congresses of the republics, and it currently seems likely that this issue will also be muffled in the national party congress.

We cannot know, of course, what new initiative some party leader may have up his sleeve that may set events at the congress moving in unexpected ways. But it now appears that there will be no significant new policy directions and that changes in the politburo and secretariat will be kept to a minimum, if indeed there are any at all. Brezhnev may end up having greater precedence accorded him in his position as party secretary general, and he seems more likely to gain than lose from such changes the congress may make, but we believe that his powers will continue to be limited by the system of collective leadership.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

30 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In South Vietnam, the Communists' spring campaign is gathering momentum. (Page 1)

The current situation in East Pakistan is assessed on Page 2.

Egypt

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(Page 3)

President Allende apparently will try to replace the present congress if his coalition wins a majority in Chile's municipal elections next Sunday. (Page 4)

China

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(Page 5)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

COMMUNIST SHELLING ATTACKS, 28 March 1971



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SOUTH VIETNAM

Enemy forces followed up their weekend attacks in the northern provinces by hitting Duc Duc, a district seat in Quang Nam Province, early yesterday. Following a heavy mortar barrage, the town's weakened defenses were breached by the attackers. Thirteen South Vietnamese were killed, 21 wounded, and 100 homes burned.

The Communists' spring campaign also is spreading to the Mekong Delta. Cang Long, a district town in Vinh Binh Province, was hit hard on Sunday. Following a 200-round mortar and grenade attack, an enemy force--probably a battalion of the Viet Cong D-3 Regiment--struck the town, killing 45 and wounding 72. The attackers left six of their dead behind. Other enemy attacks in the delta on 28-29 March included a 20-round mortar bombardment of a South Vietnamese regimental command post and a light shelling of the Vinh Long airfield. Enemy forces in this area have been lying low for most of the past year, employing tactics designed to conserve their personnel strength and supplies.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PAKISTAN

Widely conflicting reports continue to obscure the situation in East Pakistan. It appears that disorder continues in much of the province, and even if government claims of holding the cities are true, it is unlikely that the military yet controls the countryside.

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In the meantime, pressure continues to mount in India for intervention. Mrs. Gandhi--in response to popular sentiment--has agreed to move a parliamentary motion of support for the "freedom struggle" in East Pakistan. [redacted]

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[redacted] there is no indication that current plans call for more than moral support for the East Pakistanis. India is also sounding out members of the UN Security Council about an emergency meeting and has asked U Thant to issue a statement of concern. Thant has declined to comment at this time and has indicated that a Security Council meeting would "pose difficult problems."


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In West Pakistan, the press continues to charge the US with favoring East Pakistani independence. It cites Voice of America broadcasts specifically.


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
[redacted] said that a victory would enable him to call for a plebiscite within three months on the question of substituting a unicameral "people's assembly" for the present bicameral congress in which his coalition has a minority. Such a change was called for in Allende's campaign platform, and he has the legal tools to resort to a plebiscite under constitutional reforms passed in 1969.

[redacted] Allende expressed a desire for revenge against some leaders of the Christian Democratic Party, which holds 75 of the 200 seats in congress, for their recent strong attacks against him and his government. Allende blamed the "sluggish performance" of his administration partially on its multiparty structure, but praised the Communist Party as the most cooperative and efficient member of his coalition.


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
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
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COMMUNIST CHINA




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NOTES

Communist China:

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USSR-Egypt: There have now been 32 flights carrying military equipment since the Soviet airlift to Egypt began on 4 March. Six were performed by Moscow's largest transport, the AN-22, and the remainder by AN-12s. The unprecedented use of the AN-22 in a military airlift outside the USSR suggests that bulky new equipment is involved.

Turkey: The new government headed by political moderate Nihat Erim is certain to get an overwhelming vote of confidence from Parliament. The government has been described by some observers as a "brain trust" cabinet because it consists largely of professional experts; none of the ten representatives from the largest political parties is a key political figure. The naming, as ministers of state, of two former army officers who played roles in the 1960 military revolution will permit continuing close military supervision of the government; one of them is to be deputy prime minister. Erim has stated that there will be no change in Turkey's foreign policy.

Bolivia:

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

31 March 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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The situation in Pakistan

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[redacted] appears on
Page 1.

South Vietnamese attitudes toward the Laotian opera-
tion are viewed on Page 3.

Soviet

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Egypt. (Page 5)

Foreign policy aspects of Brezhnev's party congress
speech are analyzed on Page 6.

Egypt-Jordanian relations have worsened over the past
several days. (Page 7)

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
PAKISTAN

East Pakistani claims that a major battle is under way in Dacca have no basis. The city remains relatively calm with the army in complete control. In other places, such as the southern port of Chittagong, however, both sides agree that fighting continues, although their accounts differ widely. The military situation appears serious enough to require the government to use air strikes by F-86 jet fighters and to have additional army reinforcements flown in.

The army may originally have hoped that a ruthless campaign would quell the Bengalis quickly. Although it is still possible that resistance might collapse in the next few days, fighting may already have lasted longer than some military men expected.

Evacuation of foreign nationals from East Pakistan continues, with a large contingent of Yugoslavs leaving yesterday. When asked by the US defense attaché, on a contingency basis, the senior air force officer in East Pakistan expressed the view that Dacca airport could handle no more than two evacuation flights a day. The attaché thinks that six a day would be technically feasible. The Pakistanis claim there is no fuel, service, or controller at Chittagong, where over 100 Americans are located, and suggested that in case of necessity it might be best to have them flown to Dacca in Pakistani aircraft.


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
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
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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Not surprisingly the Laotian operation has added to the political ferment of an election year.

Many independent and progovernment politicians have publicly praised the operation. One moderate opponent of the government told [redacted] that the operation achieved its objective of disrupting Communist supply routes. He thinks this will relieve Communist pressure on the northern provinces, and that as a result the people there feel more secure. A prominent progovernment senator described the operation as a necessary measure, but he argues that the government failed to explain it adequately, and that the population was alarmed by news accounts reporting South Vietnamese forces were in trouble.

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Public criticism of the operation has been muted, but, [redacted] opponents of the government claim that President Thieu's position has been weakened. One of Big Minh's advisers argues that losses suffered by South Vietnamese forces were too great to justify the operation. Minh and his entourage believe that popular reaction to events in Laos will work to their advantage, and they are now more hopeful of being able to win the presidential election next fall.


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Some outspoken opposition figures privately describe Lam Son 719 as a failure. Even a relatively moderate opposition leader thinks that, whatever the facts, the South Vietnamese people believe the operation failed and will blame Thieu. The same politician believes that at least in psychological terms the Communists have come out on top and he fears that this will lead to a resurgence of Viet Cong terrorist activity, even in Saigon.


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


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
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EGYPT-USSR




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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

Brezhnev's foreign policy statement at the opening session of the party congress alternated between firmness and flexibility. He defended Moscow's past policy toward both the Communist movement and the West in terms suggesting there is little prospect for any major changes in the near future. Though sharply critical of US policies, he took pains to re-endorse the principle of "peaceful coexistence."

Brezhnev served up a potpourri of proposals on disarmament, including a call for a conference of the five nuclear powers on nuclear disarmament. Although this marks the first time the USSR has broached this concept on its own initiative, Moscow has given support to a similar French proposal along these lines.

Brezhnev reiterated the Soviet desire to see SALT produce "positive results," while stressing that the talks can only be successful if "no one seeks unilateral advantage."

His remarks on China routinely combined a firm rejection of Peking's "anti-Soviet line" with a pledge to continue to seek better state relations. The party chief took note of China's territorial claims and the border clashes in 1969 but carefully avoided any hint of saber rattling. He specified the "useful steps" that recently have been taken to improve state ties, but could only offer his audience a hope that a restoration of friendly relations would be achieved in "the long run"--i.e., after Mao.

Brezhnev duly noted a "substantial shift" in relations with West Germany. He contended that the treaties signed by Bonn with the USSR and Poland "confirmed with all precision" the inviolability of postwar borders in Europe and thus contributed to a stable peace. He repeatedly called upon Bonn to ratify the treaties.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

EGYPT-JORDAN

In recent days Cairo has shown its pique over events in Jordan in several ways. Last week it recalled its chairman of the joint Arab committee in Amman which was trying to ease disputes between the government and fedayeen, and last night it announced that all other Egyptian members of the committee were also being withdrawn. Over the weekend Sadat publicly deplored the outbreak of fighting in Jordan and vowed that the Palestinian resistance would not die. On Monday broadcast facilities in Cairo were restored for the Palestinian guerrilla program, the Voice of Fatah--suspended last summer after the Palestinians criticized Nasir's acceptance of the US peace initiative. The program immediately renewed its attacks on the Jordanian Government.

During the past week the Jordanian Government's continuing efforts to clear cities of armed fedayeen resulted in several clashes in Irbid and some firing incidents in Amman. Cairo views the fedayeen movement as an important element in its effort to apply pressure on Israel to withdraw from occupied territories. Sadat may also believe that a show of support for the guerrillas will improve his own position within Egypt during the current diplomatic maneuvering.

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