



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*1 February 1972*

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*Top Secret*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

1 February 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Vietnamese Communists are still being defensive about the President's peace proposals. (Page 1)

Egypt

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(Page 3)

On Page 4 we report on Mujib's desire to make Bangladesh a little more independent of India.

Page 5.

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NORTH VIETNAM**

The Vietnamese Communists are working hard to regain the propaganda initiative in the wake of the President's speech. On Monday the spokesman for Hanoi's delegation in Paris charged, among other things, that it was Washington rather than Hanoi that had ended the series of private talks. He also claimed that North Vietnam's position has been entirely consistent throughout the talks. To support this case, the delegation has published its nine-point proposal of last May, the text of what it claims is the US eight-point proposal of October, and the exchange of messages that preceded the break in the private contacts.

*The delegation's communiqué claims that North Vietnam's private negotiating position "fully conforms" to the Viet Cong's seven points. The nine points do not in fact alter the essential substance of the Viet Cong package, but some of them differ in detail and emphasis. For instance, they give greater attention to Indochina as a whole and accord sketchier treatment to the problem of a political settlement. Moreover, Hanoi's whole series of disclosures leaves unclear the relationship between the two sets of demands.*

Hanoi has also left obscure how the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government now fits into the negotiations. For the first time since 1965, it has put itself rather than its southern front organization on record as sponsoring a specific negotiating package. Having done so, the North Vietnamese may need a special public relations effort to refurbish the Provisional Revolutionary Government's image as the "legitimate representative" of the South Vietnamese people.

*The Communists' [redacted] statements suggest that they will seek to strike a note of righteous anger in their current propaganda. On substance, they are trying to keep from giving a completely negative impression with regard*

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
**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*to the US proposal, while at the same time avoiding any concrete commitments. Both the questions they posed at the last session of the Paris talks and their current rehashing of the history of the secret contacts serve these purposes. We do not anticipate any diplomatic initiatives from Hanoi until it can judge the results of the military and political campaigns that appear imminent in Indochina.*

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EGYPT



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BANGLADESH

Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman continues to seek a foreign policy independent of India. [redacted]

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Mujib's ability to move away from Indian domination, however, is greatly circumscribed by the security situation in Bangladesh. Over the weekend, the largest outbreak of fighting since independence occurred between Bengalis and Biharis. Although regular Bangladesh troops and police managed to restore order, tensions remain high. Over 50,000 irregulars are not wholly under government control, many are still armed, and Mujib still needs the Indian Army, which remains 45,000 strong in Bangladesh, as the ultimate guarantor of his authority. In the clashes this weekend, in fact, the Indians quickly became embroiled with some of the Mukti Bahini, but, anxious to maintain a low profile, pulled troops away from the Bihari enclaves.

Mujib also continues to be heavily dependent on the Indians for aid. New Delhi has agreed to provide about \$85 million in grants and loans, as well as several ships and planes. [redacted]

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
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
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NOTE

Laos:

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[redacted] It is unlikely that this is a serious step toward negotiations. In the past, Souvanna has consistently refused to negotiate under military pressure, and we expect that he will reject this latest approach, just as last December he rejected a renewed Communist call for a bombing halt. On the military front, the situation is relatively quiet.

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*2 February 1972*

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

2 February 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

On Page 1

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The Indians apparently have handed over some Bengali prisoners, including former East Pakistan governor Malik, to the Bangladesh government. (Page 2)

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
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**SOUTH ASIA**

The Indians have told a UN representative in Dacca that they have handed over former East Pakistan governor Malik and some other Bengali prisoners to the Bangladesh regime on 31 January for prosecution on war crimes charges.

*New Delhi advised the UN Secretary General last month that it regarded the Dacca government as having the right to try accused war criminals. The Bangladesh authorities are already planning trials for the hundreds of accused collaborators they have arrested themselves.*

*In addition to Bengalis such as Malik who helped Islamabad administer East Pakistan, India might also turn over some West Pakistanis who held civilian posts in the East. Even some selected military figures accused of war crimes might also be yielded up. India's action could trigger reprisals against Bengalis in West Pakistan and diminish chances for Indo-Pakistani peace talks, which New Delhi in any event does not seem in a hurry to hold at this time.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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NOTES

India: Six million refugees, or about 60 percent of the total, have returned to Bangladesh since the hostilities ended in mid-December. New Delhi is strongly encouraging repatriation, and most refugees, both Hindu and Muslim, are willing to return home soon. Our consulate in Dacca reports that, even though the returnees are proving resourceful in rebuilding bamboo homes and settling back into village life, concern is rising over the lack of organized medical, food, and other programs. Most of the cost of refugee support and repatriation has devolved on India. Only \$220 million in foreign aid has so far been pledged to meet what New Delhi estimates will be total costs of about \$475 million by the end of March. In addition, a good deal more is needed for rehabilitation of refugees within Bangladesh.

Communist China: [redacted]

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Indochina: [redacted]

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*3 February 1972*



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**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

3 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

On *Page 1* we comment on yesterday's statement by Viet Cong representatives in Hanoi on their requirements for a settlement.

Communist supply movements in southern Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia continue to increase, and [redacted] elements of the 2nd Division are following the 320th toward the central highlands. (*Page 3*)

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Probes and shellings persist around Long Tieng, and Communist forces have made some gains to the west along Route 13. (*Page 4*)

The communiqué issued at the end of President Bhutto's visit to Peking shows that China is not about to increase its political support for Pakistan. (*Page 5*)

[redacted]  
[redacted]

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The Panamanian Government has begun a campaign to air the canal issue in international forums. (*Page 7*)

Last week's party conference in Yugoslavia approved some stopgap measures aimed at tightening central control, but they offer little hope of resolving the issue of regional nationalism. (*Page 8*)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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**VIETNAM**

Viet Cong representatives in Hanoi yesterday issued a statement which ostensibly elaborates some of the key elements in their seven-point proposal of last July, particularly with regard to a South Vietnamese political solution. According to the new statement, the Communists' Provisional Revolutionary Government is now willing to discuss with the "Saigon administration" arrangements for a caretaker regime and new elections. Such discussions, however, could take place only after the resignation of President Thieu, the freeing of "political prisoners," the disbanding of Saigon's "machine of oppression and constraint against the people," the ending of the pacification program, and a guarantee of free movement throughout Vietnam to the Viet Cong.

*Previously the Communists have called for the immediate and total elimination of the Saigon regime, stating that they would deal only with forces "favoring peace and national accord" in setting up a transitional administration to prepare for elections. In their refinement of this position, they may be trying to undercut the US charge that they are insisting that a Communist government be formed in South Vietnam. They may also hope their demands for Thieu's immediate resignation and for the setting of stringent demands on the remaining Saigon administration will undermine morale and confidence in Saigon.*

*The Viet Cong statement fails to include the standard explicit call--included in the seven points--for an end to all US support and backing for the Saigon regime, although it does generally assert that the US must end its interference in South Vietnamese internal affairs. It remains rigid and explicit, however, on the issue of the withdrawal of US military forces and arms, specifying that the US must set a terminal date for all US air, ground, and naval action in both North and South Vietnam, and that the withdrawal of US forces and arms must be unconditional.*

*Instead of pacing the return of US prisoners to the US withdrawal, the Viet Cong statement indicates that the prisoners will*

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*not be returned prior to the end of the US withdrawal. Unlike most formulations of the past few months, the statement does not say that US military withdrawal and implementation of a political settlement are "closely linked," but it does say that agreement on the two issues will make it "easy" to resolve the other problems in a settlement. The omission of the cease-fire issue in the statement suggests that the Communists may intend to preserve some flexibility on this subject.*

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
**INDOCHINA**



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We also have further signs that elements of the Communist 2nd Infantry Division appear to be following the 320th Division toward the highlands--tentative radio direction-finding indicates that one element of the 2nd Division has arrived in the tri-border area. [redacted]



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Most of the 320th Infantry Division, which has been moving south since December, apparently now is in the tri-border area. [redacted]



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
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LAOS

Probes and shellings continue daily in the Long Tieng area but no positions have changed hands in the last several days. Communist intercepts continue to stress resupply and reconnaissance in preparation for future action.

To the west of Long Tieng, increased Communist pressure has caused some Lao Army forces to abandon their positions near Muong Kassy. Small Communist units have also overrun Kiou Kacham on Route 13 between Sala Phou Khoun and Luang Prabang.

*The Communist forces operating along Route 13 are Pathet Lao and dissident Neutralist troops. The fact that they are outnumbered by Lao Army forces and are operating at the end of long supply lines suggests that they will not pose a serious threat either to Luang Prabang or to the government base at Vang Vieng. Nonetheless, the poor performance of Lao Army units will make government leaders uneasy and perhaps cause them to divert resources from other areas to the Route 13 defenses.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA - PAKISTAN**

The joint communiqué issued in Peking yesterday to mark the end of President Bhutto's visit provides further evidence that China is not prepared to increase its political support for Pakistan and is reserving its freedom of maneuver. The communiqué contains a plea by Bhutto that all states refrain from legitimizing "Indian aggression"--i.e., by recognizing Bangladesh--but Chou En-lai's response is limited to expressing his understanding and respect for Pakistan's stand.

The communiqué also suggests that Peking is not now interested in increasing economic assistance to Pakistan. The Chinese agreed only to convert their four previous loans into grants and to defer payment for 20 years on their 1970 loan of \$200 million. Peking also promised to provide Islamabad with fresh loans "on similar terms," but only after the 1970 loan has been utilized.

Both sides call upon India to withdraw its troops from occupied territory and to fulfill its Geneva Convention obligations for the safety of Pakistani prisoners of war. The language, however, is nonpolemical and does not represent an intensification of earlier Chinese propaganda attacks on India.

*Although the Chinese had appeared reluctant to play host to Bhutto at this time, they apparently went along with his visit in order to bolster his political position at home and to maintain some pressure on India to come to an accommodation with him. Long ago, however, Peking warned Islamabad that China intended to improve its relations with India, and this goal has undoubtedly assumed greater urgency with India's new pre-eminence in the subcontinent and Pakistan's diminished utility as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the region. The Chou-Bhutto communiqué does not depart from this policy.*

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**PANAMA**

The Torrijos government has begun using international forums to focus world attention on the canal issue. Panama's Ambassador Boyd, in his only two statements to the UN Security Council following Panama's election to the Council, has featured his country's complaints against "US neocolonialism." At a recent meeting of the OAS Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture the Panamanian education minister spoke in a similar vein.

Boyd told Ambassador Bush on Tuesday that Panama planned to submit a resolution to the Security Council on the canal issue. If the US vetoed it, Boyd said he would take the issue to the General Assembly.

*Since General Torrijos apparently believes that by discomfiting the US at international meetings he can compel Washington into further concessions in the canal negotiations, we expect that he will continue to exploit opportunities in the UN and OAS. Recent Cuban and Soviet pronouncements are likely to have convinced Torrijos that he has the diplomatic and propaganda support of Communist states. By portraying Panama's stand in the canal negotiations as part of the world-wide struggle against colonialism he is bidding hard for third world support.*

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## YUGOSLAVIA


The party conference last week approved some organizational changes aimed at tightening national control over party organization. The most important move was the naming of three Serbs to a tight-knit eight-man party executive bureau. (Serbs traditionally tend to support the federal party's rights and prerogatives as against regional interests.)

*These changes are no more than stopgap measures. They offer little hope of resolving the divisive issues such as regional nationalism that are deeply troubling the country. The failure to adopt stronger measures shows that there is much resistance in the party to any retreat from Yugoslavia's decentralized system.*

*The party's continued failure to find a way of reasserting itself as a unifying force could eventually cause the military to play such a role. The armed forces have long regarded themselves as guardians of a unified Yugoslavia. This feeling has been reinforced by Tito's reliance on them for support in times of crisis, as he did most recently during his move against Croatian nationalists.*

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**NOTES**


Communist China - Laos: Recent photography shows that since early December the Chinese have added two miles of construction and improvements to the road being built southwest from Muong Houn toward Pak Beng on the Mekong River. The road now is motorable to within seven miles of Pak Beng. The Chinese are also continuing to improve Route 45 as far as the Nam Ou River, are widening and straightening Route 321 from the Chinese border to Muong Sing, and are building a new road southeast of Muong Sing.

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International Monetary Situation: Major European currencies rose sharply against the dollar yesterday, and a growing demand for marks caused the Bundesbank to support the dollar substantially for the first time since the realignment last December. The Belgian and Dutch central banks may soon follow suit. European bankers apparently do not expect the dollar to strengthen until an increase in the price of monetary gold seems certain. Continued upward movement of the European currencies could cause central bankers to resume currency floats or tighten controls on movement of capital rather than absorb new, large amounts of dollars.

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# *The President's Daily Brief*

*4 February 1972*



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**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

4 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Peking has denounced the US peace plan but its comments differ in some aspects from those of Hanoi.  
*(Page 1)*

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Chile. *(Page 4)*

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On *Page 5* we note a change in Communist propaganda concerning the Viet Cong's seven-point peace proposal.

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**CHINA-VIETNAM-US**

Peking has loyally weighed in to denounce the President's eight-point plan as an attempt to impose "truculent and unreasonable" conditions for a US troop withdrawal. Chinese commentary, however, has stressed the importance of troop withdrawal while fuzzing the political aspects of both the North Vietnamese and US proposals. Unlike the North Vietnamese, the Chinese have refrained from characterizing the proposal as "deceitful."

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The most obvious divergence from Hanoi's treatment of the US plan appears in a Chinese account of an article in the North Vietnamese party press on 29 January attacking the US package. The Chinese version of this article carefully deleted those portions of the Vietnamese comment which claimed there was nothing new in the proposal. It also omitted Hanoi's characterization of the Viet Cong seven-point proposal as one comprising "two basic and closely related points." This Chinese reluctance to couple the military and political aspects of a Vietnamese settlement as closely as does Hanoi has been evident at least since Pham Van Dong's visit to Peking last November.

*The Chinese seem to be trying to protect their own interests vis-a-vis both Hanoi and Washington. Peking is reluctant to accuse the President of bargaining in bad faith on the very eve of his visit to China. At the same time it is anxious to indicate to Hanoi that it is not deserting the Vietnamese cause in order to strike a deal with the United States. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Peking's own priorities place an American military withdrawal from the Indochina peninsula ahead of a political settlement in Saigon thoroughly acceptable to its North Vietnamese allies.*

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
**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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*The Chinese, however, are painfully aware that their leverage on Hanoi is limited, particularly in areas in which the Vietnamese believe their vital interests are involved. Peking knows that too much pressure on Hanoi would simply push the Vietnamese into the arms of Moscow. In these circumstances, the Chinese are likely merely to let Hanoi know how the situation looks from Peking, hoping that their allies will then draw the proper conclusion as to what course to pursue.*

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
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CHILE



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**NOTE**

Vietnam: Communist propaganda yesterday concerning the new "elaboration" of the seven-point Viet Cong proposal contains a noteworthy change from Wednesday's formulation. In their original statement Wednesday in Hanoi, the Viet Cong had declared that the "specific terminal date" for the completion of the US withdrawal "will also be the date for the release" of all prisoners. This left the impression that no prisoners would be freed until the end of the US withdrawal. In their statement on Thursday, however, the Communists talked of a "terminal date" for prisoner release as well as for withdrawal. This language suggests that the Communists have not in fact changed their earlier position--contained in the seven-point plan--which envisions a possible agreement on a phased release of prisoners to match the pace of the US withdrawal.

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**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

5 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

[Redacted]

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(Page 1)

Egypt's President Sadat received a promise of more defensive weapons in Moscow, but the communique issued after his departure showed no Soviet backing for renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities. (Page 2)

[Redacted]  
South Vietnam [Redacted]

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[Redacted]  
Cuban [Redacted]

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Latin America [Redacted] (Page 5)

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**USSR-US**



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
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**USSR-EGYPT**


*Yesterday's Soviet-Egyptian communique will not inspire confidence among President Sadat's domestic critics. Sadat had set the tone for his trip to Moscow when he said he was going in order to determine the "zero hour" for liberating Sinai. He left the USSR, however, without any open expression of Soviet support for a renewal of hostilities, although the language of the communique allows Sadat to say that additional aid for Egypt's defenses will be forthcoming. The wording of the communique does not indicate that the Soviets are planning to give Sadat the kind of sophisticated offensive weapons that he says he wants.*

*Beyond these meager results, the joint statement called for "immediate" resumption of Jarring's mission, most likely as a counter to the US-Israeli agreement for "proximity" talks. Soviet party chief Brezhnev accepted an invitation to visit Egypt at a date to be agreed upon later, but this is not likely to excite Egyptians who seek a resolution of the impasse, either through war or negotiations.*


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SOUTH VIETNAM



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
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


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CUBA - LATIN AMERICA



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**NOTE**

Communist China: Hsu Shih-yu, a ranking moderate military leader, made his first public appearance in eight months earlier this week at a rally in Kiangsu Province. He was identified as retaining all his previous titles: member of the politburo, commander of the Nanking Military Region, and first secretary of the Kiangsu provincial party committee. Hsu's lengthy disappearance was probably related to the events that precipitated the Lin Piao affair, and his political fate almost certainly has been one of the most controversial personnel issues confronting the regime. His reappearance coincides with indications that the fortunes of other moderate military leaders are rising.

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# *The President's Daily Brief*

January 27  
1972

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6 Feb 72

LAOS

Government units attempting to maintain a foothold on the western approaches to the Bolovens Plateau are still being pushed back by the Communists. On 4 February, two Lao Army battalions abandoned their forward positions on Route 23, about two miles west of Ban Gnik. The battalion commanders reported receiving heavy weapons fire and being surrounded by an unidentified enemy force before leaving their posts.

*The loss of these positions narrows the distance between Communist-held territory and the key river town of Pakse to 15 miles. It remains unlikely, however, that the enemy has serious designs on Pakse. The Communists appear to be widening their margin of protection for the Bolovens and can be expected to continue to do so. Their immediate objective may be the road junction of Routes 23 and 231, about 3-4 miles further to the west.*



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PDB  
6 Feb 72

CYPRUS

A shipment of small arms and ammunition arrived from  
Czechoslovakia in late January. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

President Makarios plans to use most of the  
weapons to form a 2,000-man paramilitary force personally  
loyal to him in order to counter what he views as a  
threat from General Grivas' supporters.

Press accounts of the shipment have stirred sharp  
responses from Athens and Ankara. The Greek Government  
quickly protested to Makarios, and yesterday Turkey issued  
a public statement promising to protect the rights of the  
Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken told  
Ambassador Handley that because the new Czech shipment  
might eventually be used against Turkish Cypriots, Ankara  
might consider sending arms to them.

Adverse reaction to the arms shipment could  
disrupt recent progress toward resuming the inter-  
communal talks. Even while expressing his dismay  
at that development, however, Bayulken told  
Ambassador Handley that he hoped the talks could  
begin by the end of February.

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


7 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The Lao Army has abandoned forward positions on Route 23 on the western approach to the Bolovens Plateau. East of Long Tieng, General Vang Pao has assembled a force of over 5,000 men and some have started moving northeast toward Route 4.  
*(Page 1)*

A shipment of Czechoslovak arms has arrived on Cyprus, stirring sharp protests from Athens and Ankara. *(Page 2)*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

LAOS

Significant military action over the weekend was confined to the south where government units continue to be pushed back from the western approaches to the Bolovens Plateau. On 4 February, two Lao Army battalions abandoned their forward positions on Route 23, about two miles west of Ban Gnik. The battalion commanders reported receiving heavy weapons fire and being surrounded before leaving their posts.

*The loss of these positions narrows the distance between Communist-held territory and the key river town of Pakse to 15 miles. We still doubt, however, that the enemy has serious designs on Pakse. The Communists appear to be widening their margin of protection for the Bolovens and most likely will continue to do so. Their current objective may be the road junction of Routes 23 and 231, about three to four miles farther west.*

South of the Plaine des Jarres enemy action was limited to brief clashes and artillery fire on government troops. The Communists' shelling was heaviest in the Sam Thong sector.

General Vang Pao is continuing to assemble a substantial guerrilla force at Pha Dong, 12 miles east of Long Tieng. The airlift of at least 3,600 irregulars to the base over the past few days raises the total government strength there to more than 5,000 men. On Saturday approximately 1,000 of these troops began to move northeast toward Route 4. No significant contact with the enemy has been reported thus far.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CYPRUS**

A shipment of arms and ammunition arrived from  
Czechoslovakia in late January.

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President Makarios apparently plans to use most of the weapons to form a 2,000-man force personally loyal to him in order to counter what he views as a threat from General Grivas' supporters.

Press accounts of the shipment have stirred sharp protests from Athens and Ankara. Because of the origin of the arms, Athens suspects that they will be given to the Communists on the island rather than to the Greek-controlled National Guard. Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken told Ambassador Handley that because the new Czech shipment might eventually be used against Turkish Cypriots, Ankara in turn might consider sending arms to the Turkish minority.

*Adverse reaction to the arms shipment could disrupt recent progress toward resuming intercommunal talks. Even while expressing his dismay over the arms shipment, however, Bayulken told Ambassador Handley that he hoped the talks could begin by the end of February.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*8 February 1972*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

8 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The South Vietnamese are showing considerable sensitivity to public discussion of US flexibility regarding President Thieu's tenure or the status of his administration. (Page 1)

Infiltrators moving south from North Vietnam this dry season are more numerous and better equipped than last year. (Page 2)

Bangladesh army and police forces are seeking to establish full government control over the Bihari enclave of Mirpur and to disarm its inhabitants. (Page 3)

The number of Jews receiving exit visas for Israel continued at a record level in January but there are signs that Moscow may slow down the exodus. (Page 3)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH VIETNAM**

The Thieu government is showing considerable sensitivity to public discussion of US flexibility regarding President Thieu's tenure or the status of his administration. Deputy Foreign Minister Phuong told the US Embassy that "everyone in the palace" is very disturbed by Secretary Rogers' mention of the "flexibility" of the peace proposals during his press conference of 3 February. Phuong said that the allies should not demonstrate flexibility in ways that represent important concessions to an enemy that has yet to agree to negotiate. On 5 February, the Saigon press, quoting government sources, extensively criticized the US position. One moderate and respected daily even speculated that the US might topple the present government and set up a provisional government before elections, thus fulfilling Communist demands.

*In reacting so strongly, Thieu is no doubt trying to ensure that speculation about his "stepping down" remains within bounds. The government may also be trying to dampen criticism from the right, such as surfaced in the national assembly last Saturday, when opposition deputies charged that the peace plan was unconstitutional and that the US was interfering in South Vietnam's internal affairs.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


INDOCHINA



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[Redacted] Based partly on intercepts of planned movements, we believe the rate of infiltration this year will stay ahead of last year's. One reason for the disparity in rates is that the flow of men was interrupted between January and April 1971 while the North Vietnamese were preoccupied with the South Vietnamese incursion into southern Laos. Later, the Communists resumed the movement of men from the North, and by the end of June a total of just under 110,000 had started into the pipeline.

An unusual feature of this year's infiltration is that a large portion of the men moving south are transporting individual and crew-served weapons, including mortars and artillery. According to intercepts, most groups have been 30 to 70 percent equipped, and a number of infantry groups have been 100 percent equipped.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

Bangladesh: Bangladesh army and police forces are seeking to establish full government control over the Bihari enclave of Mirpur near Dacca and to disarm its inhabitants. Government operations over the past few days have overcome resistance in most of the enclave

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The fighting has been heavy, as attested by 760 killed or wounded on the government side. Two areas in the enclave are holding out and are likely to resist the army's pacification efforts. Dacca, however, appears determined to move decisively against the Biharis in order to prevent a recurrence of clashes between Bengalis and Biharis such as those that occurred late last month.

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USSR: The Soviets approved 2,300 exit visas for Jews emigrating to Israel in January, a slight increase over the previous monthly high of 2,200 in December. Nevertheless, Moscow may be considering slowing down the exodus. Over the last few weeks the Soviet media have highlighted the "problems" of Soviet Jews in Israel and have hinted that the number of applicants for emigration is declining. The Soviets are also getting more static from the Arabs.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

9 February 1972



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

9 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

There are many indicators of impending Communist attacks in South Vietnam. (Page 1)

The military situation in Laos is reported on Page 2.


North Vietnam [redacted] Indonesia [redacted]

(Page 3)

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The Indians now appear to want negotiations with Pakistan and may be ready to turn some of their earlier preconditions for talks into ultimate goals. (Page 4)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**




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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

SOUTH VIETNAM




There continue to be indicators of impending Communist attacks in many sectors of the country. A forward element of the Communist 320th Division now is only 14 miles from Kontum city in the central highlands, while farther north in Military Region 1, over 70 unidentified radio terminals associated with enemy units have been located in Quang Nam Province in the past several weeks.



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**

Vang Pao's new operation to harass Communist lines of communication south of the Plaine des Jarres has so far met little resistance, but there are indications that the North Vietnamese are preparing to counter his move. Yesterday, irregular positions northwest of Pha Dong--the jumping-off point for Vang Pao's 5,000-man task force--received mortar fire. Pha Dong itself took about 50 rounds of heavy weapons fire, including some 130-mm., but sustained little damage. Radio direction-finding now shows that at least two battalions and the command post of the North Vietnamese 148th Regiment are moving into position northeast of Pha Dong, and irregular patrols are beginning to report signs of enemy troop concentrations in this area.


*The 148th was involved in last month's intense fighting along Skyline Ridge. It took heavy casualties, but may have received replacements. Its current moves suggest an intention to block the irregular push northeast toward Route 4.*

To the west of Long Tieng, government forces are regrouping between Muong Kassy and Vang Vieng in an attempt to halt any further southward advances by Communist forces on Route 13. The government is bringing in a battalion from the Luang Prabang area to strengthen its defenses, and may also transfer a battalion from Savannakhet.

*Shifting units from southern Laos may be difficult, however, in view of renewed enemy attacks along Route 9 in the panhandle. On Monday, the North Vietnamese took the town of Dong Hene, a place they captured during last year's dry season campaign.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*


**VIETNAM-INDONESIA**



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SOUTH ASIA**

Prime Minister Gandhi's agreement with Sheik Mujibur Rahman to bring home Indian troops now in Bangladesh somewhat improves the chances for Pakistan to enter bilateral discussions with Bangladesh and with India. Officials in New Delhi also seem to be making a determined effort to show their readiness for talks. Last week Foreign Secretary Kaul twice told US Embassy officials that India is willing to talk with Pakistan without conditions on all outstanding differences at any time, level, or place.

There remain, nevertheless, fundamental problems to overcome before any meaningful settlement can be reached. Although the Indians now deny the existence of preconditions, their ultimate objectives--recognition of their claim to Indian-occupied Kashmir, a border agreement, and an end to Pakistan's policy of "confrontation"--almost certainly remain unchanged. Although there is growing pressure within Pakistan for the return of the 90,000 prisoners of war, Bhutto could face serious political consequences at home if he is too accommodating toward the Indians, particularly regarding Kashmir.

Bhutto will also be reluctant to deal directly with Dacca and New Delhi at the same time over the return of prisoners, as India is insisting. [redacted]

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

Israel: The army is developing a 280-mm. rocket that could alter Egypt's present two-to-one edge over Israel in artillery.

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At the farthest ranges in the tests, the rocket was more accurate than US-supplied 175-mm. artillery. [redacted]  
rocket salvos could be effective against SAM sites near the Suez Canal and against troop concentrations.

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Ecuador: [redacted]

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



# *The President's Daily Brief*

10 February 1972

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***FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY***

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

10 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The Greek Government is dismayed over Makarios' acquisition of Czech arms and is worried that the Turks will intervene unilaterally if Athens cannot control the Greek Cypriots. (Page 1)

An editorial in the Soviet publication Kommunist pinpoints Brezhnev as the principal Soviet advocate of detente and makes it clear he will be the chief participant in President Nixon's talks in Moscow this May. (Page 2)

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***FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY***

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CYPRUS**

Greek Foreign Minister Palamas told Ambassador Tasca on Tuesday of his government's dismay over the recent arrival of a shipment of Czech arms on Cyprus. Palamas said that Athens now regards President Makarios as an obstacle to any Greek-Turkish agreement on Cyprus, and implied that the Greek Government would like to see Makarios replaced. When asked how Athens proposed to get Makarios to turn over the arms, Palamas referred to the special rights of intervention that Greece and Turkey have under the London-Zurich accords. Palamas concluded by stating--without clarification--that the arms question "would be settled in a few days." A high-level Greek Government meeting yesterday dealt with the Czech arms problem and with ways to resume the intercommunal talks.

Mainland Greek officials have several reasons for their sharp reaction. Makarios did not consult Greece before importing the arms. He has refused to turn them over to the Greek-controlled National Guard. Athens suspects that the arms will be given to the Communists, who could become Makarios' allies in opposing any coup attempt by General Grivas.

The Greeks especially fear that Ankara will conclude that Athens cannot control the Greek Cypriots and so consider intervening unilaterally. [redacted]

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Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken told Ambassador Handley last Saturday that an arms shipment to the Turkish community "might have to be considered."

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR**

An editorial in the January issue of Kommunist unequivocally identifies Brezhnev as the Soviet Union's principal advocate of detente. The editorial makes it clear that he will be the chief participant in the President's talks in Moscow next May, citing his "very important" negotiations with Pompidou and Brandt last year. Brezhnev's name is not associated with passages critical of the US or its allies, whereas Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny are identified with Soviet support of North Vietnam and Egypt.

The editorial justifies Moscow's current peace offensive as entailing no sacrifice of Soviet positions. It defends the development of relations with the US, including SALT and President Nixon's visit to Moscow, and assures its readers that no "unstable foreign policy compromises" will result. At pains to explain the Presidential visit against the background of parallel US and Chinese policies during the recent crisis in the Indian subcontinent, the editorial stresses the "defeat" of the USSR's adversaries, thus implying that it is Washington, not Moscow, which requires the visit more.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

Chile-USSR: 

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Vietnam: The North Vietnamese are continuing to improve their logistic roadnet into northern South Vietnam. Photography of late January shows an extension of Route 102 apparently heading for storage sites just north and west of Fire Support Base Fuller near Route 9. The other two roads that cross the DMZ farther west are in the final stages of construction, and some segments in the Khe Sanh area and farther south are already in use.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

11 February 1972

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~~Top Secret~~<sup>25X1</sup>

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

11 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Athens plans to demand that President Makarios turn over his new Czech arms to the UN forces and form a government of national unity. (Page 1)

The North Vietnamese apparently have nearly completed preparations for a new assault on the Long Tieng complex, while Vang Pao's diversionary force moves deeper into their rear areas. (Page 2)

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[redacted] Vietnam. (Page 3)

25X1

The Soviets say they plan a new effort to reactivate the Jarring mission as a consequence of President Sadat's talks in Moscow last week. (Page 4)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CYPRUS**

Greek Foreign Minister Palamas has told Ambassador Tasca that Athens will deliver an ultimatum to President Makarios today concerning the recently acquired Czech arms. The Greeks will demand that he turn these arms over to the UN forces and that he form a government of national unity. Palamas said that Athens does not want violence and "will not make use of General Grivas," but added that if Makarios resists the ultimatum, the Greek Government will appeal directly to the Greek Cypriot people. He asserted that Athens is confident Greek Cypriots would choose Greece over Makarios. Palamas stressed that Greece will not sit idly by if fighting breaks out--presumably among the Greek Cypriots--and said that Athens is prepared to exercise its right of intervention under the London-Zurich agreements.

*These threats reflect the worry of mainland Greek officials that Makarios will precipitate an armed clash on the island. They also show Athens' desire to pre-empt strong Turkish action on the arms issue. Palamas said that Athens and Ankara are in constant communication and that the Turks have told him that unless the arms question is resolved, Turkey might have to send not only arms, but additional troops to Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority.*

*There are as yet no indications of the kind we have seen several times before that Ankara is making active preparations to intervene. A high Turkish Foreign Ministry official told Ambassador Handley last evening that Ankara's current position is that the matter should be resolved between the Greek and Cypriot governments.*

*Makarios will almost certainly reject the Greek ultimatum. A key factor behind his obtaining the arms was his desire to show Athens that he would not accept any Greek-imposed decisions on Cypriot matters. Now that he has the weapons with which to arm his own police force, he appears willing to stand on his own. Contrary to Palamas' contention, Greek Cypriots appear likely to support Makarios in his stand against Athens. Thus, a major crisis appears to be in the making.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**LAOS**

The North Vietnamese apparently have nearly completed preparations for new attacks against the Long Tieng - Sam Thong complex. Enemy reconnaissance and patrol activity have increased both at Sam Thong and along Skyline Ridge, and numerous messages refer to new "combat missions." The 141st Regiment has recently joined the 174th Regiment near Sam Thong. The new road from the southern edge of the Plaine des Jarres to Ban Hintang appears to be motorable, thus reducing supply difficulties and making it possible to move heavy artillery closer to the base. Intercepts refer to substantial deliveries of ammunition as well as food-stuffs to front-line units.

At the same time, Vang Pao's irregulars are moving deeper into the enemy's rear areas to the east and north of Long Tieng. Forward elements of one task force are now about three miles from the southern tip of the Plaine and other units are farther to the south and east. Little resistance has been encountered yet, presumably because the irregulars have not yet moved into any vital areas. Intercepts indicate that the North Vietnamese expect the irregulars to move toward the new road.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


**Communist Tank and Artillery Movements**



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

VIETNAM



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Recent North Vietnamese communications suggest that the 304th and 308th Infantry divisions have both been reinforced with an artillery regiment. The 304th--except for small elements in northern South Vietnam--and the 308th are still north of the DMZ. In addition, the 320th Division has just completed a move to the tri-border area, and 122-mm. pieces noted in the area presumably are part of the division.



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**USSR-EGYPT**

During President Sadat's visit to Moscow last week the Soviets and Egyptians explored ways of reactivating the Jarring mission, according to Y. D. Pyrlin, deputy chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near East Division. Pyrlin told a US Embassy officer on Wednesday that no specific ideas emerged, but that Moscow had agreed that Ambassador Malik would be sounding out his four-power colleagues in New York about Jarring.

*The Soviets appear to be playing for time; a Soviet diplomatic initiative in New York might help take the domestic heat off Sadat. They may also hope that the visit of President Nixon to Moscow will provide a breakthrough. Pyrlin noted that the Soviet leaders had told Sadat that the Middle East would be discussed with the President.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

Chile-China: Minister of Economy Vuskovic-- Chile's top economic official--will go to Peking in early April [redacted]. The visit follows Peking's recent extension of a \$65-million credit to Chile and demonstrates the importance President Allende attaches to the rapid development of economic relations with China. [redacted]

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Korea: In an attempt to end the three-month-old deadlock in the Red Cross talks, Seoul will soon invite the North Koreans [redacted] to [redacted] working-level sessions to iron out the agenda.

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[redacted] Seoul is prepared to agree to the North Korean suggestion that "free travel" by separated family members be discussed at the plenary talks. If Pyongyang accepts the proposal, as seems likely, agreement on the agenda could be made public next week and the plenary sessions could begin in March.

USSR: [redacted]

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*12 February 1972*



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~~Top Secret~~

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

12 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

President Makarios has flatly rejected the Greek demands but has hinted that a compromise is possible. (Page 1)

Egyptian officials are suggesting that a dramatic political gesture is needed to break the Arab-Israeli impasse. (Page 2)

[Redacted] 25X1

on Page 3.

Panama is willing to resume canal talks with the US but is sticking to its hard line. (Page 4)

A last-ditch effort to form an Italian government is under way but early elections seem increasingly likely. (Page 4)


Sudan has finally accepted the appointment of a new Soviet ambassador. (Page 4)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**CYPRUS**

President Makarios has flatly rejected the Greek demands that he turn over his recently acquired Czech arms to the UN peacekeeping force and form a government of national unity on the island. At the same time, however, he has tempered his action with hints that a compromise is possible. The Director General of the Cypriot Foreign Ministry has told US officials that Cyprus would seek to reassure Athens regarding the disposition of the Czech arms by allowing the UN force to inspect these weapons periodically. In return, Cyprus would demand that General Grivas leave the island and that the illegal groups supporting him be disbanded. The Cypriot official added that Makarios had been considering cabinet changes for a long time and would probably proceed with them if he could do so without appearing to act under pressure from Athens.



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

USSR-CHINA-US



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

Panama: President Lakas has indicated to Ambassador Sayre that Panama is willing to resume canal talks when the US negotiators visit Panama next week. Torrijos has held up the negotiations since mid-December in an effort to compel Washington to make additional concessions. To this end, Torrijos has begun using international forums to focus world attention on the canal issue.

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Italy: Premier-designate Andreotti is making a last-ditch effort to end Italy's long government crisis. His prospects of putting together a government are not good, however, and it is increasingly likely that President Leone will have to dissolve parliament, appoint a caretaker cabinet, and call for general elections this spring, a year early. Center-left leaders are already debating the party composition of an interim caretaker government. Although the Christian Democrats want to go it alone in a single-party government, the two Socialist parties are demanding to be included because participation in the government would enhance their electoral prospects.

Sudan-USSR: Khartoum has finally accepted the appointment of a new Soviet ambassador, sought by Moscow since last fall. Relations between the two countries have been strained ever since their respective ambassadors were withdrawn following the abortive Communist coup in Sudan last July. The Egyptians and Libyans have put considerable pressure on President Numayri to mend his fences with the USSR, but he has also had to deal with conflicting pro-Egyptian and nationalist factions at home. In making his decision, Numayri probably also had in mind the need for a resumption of Soviet aid; more than half his military equipment is of Soviet origin.

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*Sunday*

15 FEB 1972




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PDB CABLE  
SUNDAY 2/13/72

CYPRUS

President Makarios would prefer to settle the present imbroglio with Greece through negotiations, and there does appear to be some room for maneuver. Athens has publicly denied that its recommendations to Makarios represented an ultimatum.

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Greek-oriented national guardsmen are keeping a close watch on possible hiding places for the Czech arms, and the Guard is prepared to declare martial law and take over if Makarios moves toward an armed confrontation.

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The Greeks have the military strength to win in a showdown, especially with the Turks sitting on the sidelines, but a majority of the Greek Cypriots appears to be behind Makarios. Athens may have a difficult time finding an acceptable successor to the archbishop.

NORTH VIETNAM

Hanoi's number two man has singled out the Soviet Union and China for a special warning about the "duplicity" of US diplomatic strategy. In a speech delivered a month ago but made public only now, National Assembly President Truong Chinh claims that the main objective of US policy is to be "ready to negotiate with a number of countries, especially the Soviet Union and China" so as to "block" and "divide" them. He goes on to advise all Communists to join in countering US policy on three united fronts--Vietnam, Indochina, and the world.

*Although the speech echoes much of Hanoi's propaganda of last summer that warned of US efforts "to split the socialist camp," it is the first time Hanoi has mentioned both China and the Soviet Union in this context. As for its timing, while Hanoi often delays the publication of major statements, the belated release of this one suggests it is intended as a last-minute cautionary note to the Chinese as they begin talks with President Nixon next week.*

NOTES

Egypt-USSR:

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*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

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14 February 1972

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~~Top Secret~~

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

14 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The diplomatic and political maneuvering regarding the Cyprus situation is discussed on *Page 1*.

A recently published speech by Hanoi's number two man appears to be a last-minute cautionary note to China in advance of President Nixon's trip. The Soviet Union is also singled out for the warning.  
*(Page 2)*

The situation in northern Laos remains relatively quiet. *(Page 3)*

Soviet   
*(Page 3)*

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We present at Annex a brief background to Yugoslavia's Croatian problem.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CYPRUS**

The Greek-dominated Cypriot National Guard is keeping a close watch on possible hiding places for the Czech arms imported by President Makarios.

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There have been no signs of unusual military activity, either in Greece toward reinforcing the Guard on Cyprus or in Turkey, which continues its wait-and-see attitude as long as the Turkish Cypriots are in no danger.

According to [redacted] diplomatic sources, both Makarios and Athens would prefer to negotiate an end to the present imbroglio, and there does appear to be some room for maneuver. Athens has publicly denied that its recommendations to the President represented an ultimatum, although privately Greek Ambassador Panayotakos is insisting that the Archbishop must go. According to the Cypriot press, the ambassador is to return to Greece on Wednesday with Makarios' formal reply, which he is discussing with his cabinet today.

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Athens has been trying since 1969 to whitewash the prestige and power of President Makarios, and the Greeks concluded that his acquisition of new arms gave them the opportunity they were seeking. Nevertheless, the Archbishop is adept at turning an impasse to his advantage, and the Greek Government may have underestimated Makarios' popularity among the Greek Cypriot community. Athens has the military strength to win a showdown, but the uneasy truce among the island's inhabitants could quickly break down before a fresh solution to the communal problem is devised.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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
**NORTH VIETNAM**

Hanoi's number two man has singled out the Soviet Union and China for a special warning about the "duplicity" of US diplomatic strategy. In a speech delivered a month ago but made public only now, National Assembly President Truong Chinh claims that the main objective of US policy is to be "ready to negotiate with a number of countries, especially the Soviet Union and China" so as to "block" and "divide" them. He goes on to advise all Communists to join in countering US policy on three united fronts--Vietnam, Indochina, and the world.

*Although the speech echoes much of Hanoi's propaganda of last summer that warned of US efforts "to split the socialist camp," it is the first time Hanoi has mentioned both China and the Soviet Union in this context. As for its timing, while Hanoi often delays the publication of major statements, the belated release of this one suggests it is intended as a last-minute cautionary note to the Chinese as they begin talks with President Nixon next week.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA



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## NOTES

Laos: Irregular units just north of Sam Thong were heavily shelled on the night of 12 February, and they briefly abandoned two positions.

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East of Long Tieng, Vang Pao's 5,000 irregulars have advanced to the high ground south of Route 4. This operation--now a week old--has met little resistance and has neither uncovered any supply caches nor caused any damage to North Vietnamese rear support areas. The Communists are using Route 4 only to a moderate degree, and their main supply push continues to be along Route 5 on the Plaine des Jarres and its new extension south toward Long Tieng.

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Egypt-USSR:

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Yugoslavia: A large conference of senior officials will convene on 16-17 February to examine the extent of popular demoralization throughout the country following the political upheaval in Croatia in December and January. The gathering--the first of its kind--is billed as a look at Yugoslavia's political and psychological preparedness for defense. It will be the second major conference at the national level in three weeks as Belgrade continues to wrestle with the problem of how to ensure the survival of a unified, nonaligned Yugoslavia once Tito leaves the scene. (At Annex we include a brief background discussion of the Croatian problem.)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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## YUGOSLAVIA IN TROUBLE

In 1970 Tito set in motion a precedent-shattering decentralization of governmental power designed to create a federal structure of strong autonomous republics that would function smoothly after Tito's unifying influence is gone. Nothing like this had ever been tried in polyglot Yugoslavia, where ethnic and religious groups have always competed for power. Nothing like this had ever been tried in a Communist state.

The keystone to the success of the new system was to be a small, disciplined federal Communist party that would provide guidance from the center and hold the Yugoslav federation together. The modalities for the party's new role were to have been worked out at a party conference late in 1971. Preparations for the party conference were begun more than a year in advance; there were few in the Yugoslav establishment who questioned the basic premise, and what frictions arose centered about familiar problems, such as creating ethnic balances so that each nationality group could feel that its interests would be protected.

The complacency of the federal party was shattered last November and December. The Croatians, the second most powerful nationality group in the country, pressed too far with demands for changes that would, if successful, have guaranteed them virtual independence rather than a degree of autonomy. Among the things they wanted were permission to establish Croatian trade missions abroad and the possibility of retaining a greater share of their hard currency earnings. The Croatians also were seeking to avoid a repetition of the 1919-1941 period, when domination by the majority Serbs piled up Croatian grievances and later led to retributive massacres during World War II. Tito, and most of the non-Croatian leaders of the party, did not view Croatia's aspirations so simplistically; they saw the machinations in Zagreb last fall as a threat to the survival of the federation and brought strong pressure on Croatian leaders.

The Croats refused to compromise. An angry Tito publicly characterized the situation as the worst crisis of post-war Yugoslavia. After refusing to recant, the Croatian party leaders were purged on Tito's orders and replaced by more tractable people, including a party head who is of Slovenian origin.

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This alleviated the problem to a certain extent, but it also solidified the belief of Croatian nationalists that they had to defend themselves against further depredations by Belgrade.

The Yugoslavs were ill-prepared for such a development. There was considerable confusion among party leaders while they sought to assess whether or not the system they had so painstakingly created was irreparably damaged. In this situation, opponents of the federal system from the right and the left began to float ideas for a solution, ranging from calls for a return to the Stalinist methods of the late 1940s and early 1950s to schemes for a loose confederation. The party leaders met for weeks in nearly continuous session, obviously debating some of these propositions.

In the midst of such uncertainty about the future, the party conference--twice postponed--finally convened in late January. Tito, clearly worried about the lack of direction among the delegates, set the tone for the gathering by playing down the seriousness of the situation and pointing out that after all Yugoslavia had so far survived. He accused the Western press of overdramatizing the recent events and thus avoided needlessly antagonizing anyone. Tito was probably also moved to take this stance in order not to jeopardize Yugoslav efforts to gain economic credits and investments from the West.

The conference took its cue from Tito and made a basic, if not very spectacular, decision that the decentralized system and all of its democratizing reforms must be retained. The decision was clearly helped by the strong support for this proposition of two party presidium members, Marko Nikezic, a Serb, and Vidoje Zarkovic, a Montenegrin. Croatia's new leaders did not have to play a major part in the discussion, and thus the possibility of acrimonious debate, or even a breakdown of the conference, was avoided.

The depth of the party's disorientation, however, became apparent when the conference failed to agree on anything but Tito's original concept. It wrote no blueprint for the party's future guiding role. There was self-criticism on the part of some delegates, but little change of heart, and the resolution on unity does little more than paper over differences. Agreement to trim the party's bulky executive bureau and to reduce the size of basic party

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

bodies constituted no more than a half-hearted attempt to cut the bureaucracy. There is probably worry in Zagreb because three Serbs and only one Croat were put on the smaller executive bureau. The problem of nationalism in the republics was never directly attacked, and no new steps were taken to prevent its recurrence in Croatia or an outbreak in some other area, such as Kosovo, where a million disaffected Albanians live.

There has been one major change in power relationships, but this was the result of Tito's decisions during the crisis period rather than of the party conference. This was the assumption of a new political role by the Yugoslav armed forces, which have been consistently loyal to Tito. During the Croatian troubles, Tito publicly indicated that if need be he would use the army to defend the revolution. In fact, the Zagreb military commander provided the base for Tito's move against the Croatian party leadership, and the army is said to be still playing a role in putting down dissidence in the republic. Perhaps symbolic of the new status of the armed forces, the military emerged from the party conference with the right to participate in a non-voting capacity in the sessions of the federal party executive bureau.

If the party cannot pull itself together and create a cohesive organization for the effective management of the federation, the military are waiting in the wings to play a larger role. At the moment, the officer corps is content to serve Tito and takes pride in the application of its power to preserve the state. After Tito, however, it seems reasonable that, on the basis of their past contributions in times of crisis, the generals might wish to share power with political leaders. As a result of the Croatian eruption and the party's feeble response to its problems, the armed forces would be in a good position, once Tito leaves the scene, to make a bid for power.

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15 February 1972

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

15 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**



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The chief Soviet negotiator in the Sino-Soviet border talks now has remained in Moscow for three months; the Soviets, after claiming he is ill, are beginning to blame Chinese intransigence for the long recess. (Page 2)




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Tokyo has decided to seek formal diplomatic ties with Mongolia. (Page 4)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-CHINA**

A public lecturer in Moscow last week made the first open reference to the recess in the Sino-Soviet border talks. (Chief Soviet negotiator Leonid Illichev has remained in Moscow since mid-November, when he returned for consultations during a Central Committee plenum.) The lecturer said that the plenum approved Illichev's recall largely because of Peking's intransigence, noting that the Chinese insist on using "old maps" and claiming "all the Soviet Far East and half of Kazakhstan."

Soviet officials have avoided any suggestion that Moscow intends to break off the talks completely, and have explained that Illichev's return has been delayed by illness, according to Chinese officials in Moscow.

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Although Moscow has little hope of reaching a settlement, it finds the discussions useful as a channel of communication with Peking on the sensitive frontier issue and as a demonstration of Soviet efforts to ease frictions with the Chinese. The Soviets may be postponing a decision on resuming the talks until they can assess President Nixon's visit to Peking.

Despite some unconfirmed press accounts of border incidents in recent weeks, we have received no credible reports of armed conflict

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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NOTES

Japan-Mongolia: Tokyo has decided to seek formal diplomatic ties with Mongolia. Both countries have long been interested in taking this step, but in the past Japan has been reluctant to act ahead of the US and has been sensitive to Chinese Nationalist claims to Mongolia. Tokyo's decision to go ahead now stems from its belief that Peking will not object and from its reduced concern for Taiwan's likely protests. The initiative also reflects the conviction of Japanese leaders that they must assume a more innovative, independent foreign policy course. Tokyo anticipates a favorable response from Ulan Bator when talks open between the two countries' ambassadors in Moscow.

Indochina: [redacted]

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
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Cyprus: [redacted]

[redacted] that the National Guard and the Greek mainland contingent have made preliminary deployments and estimates that they are in a position to move quickly. President Makarios, for his part, appears prepared to resist forcibly any military move against him by Athens. He seems to be playing for time and does not plan to make his official response to the Greek demarche before tomorrow.

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

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16 February 1972

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

16 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Cypriot President Makarios is standing his ground against Greek demands amid indications that Athens may be considering more forceful action. (Page 1)

The military situation in northern Laos is discussed on Page 2.

[redacted]  
Cambodia

(Page 3)

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President Numayri's dismissal of his pro-Egyptian defense minister has further strained Sudan's relations with Egypt. (Page 4)

[redacted]

(Page 5)

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The military has seized power in Ecuador. (Page 6)

At Annex, we discuss Sudan's efforts to promote a settlement in the Middle East.

[redacted]

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

CYPRUS

Athens is still pressing its demands that President Makarios turn over the Czech arms to the UN peacekeeping forces and broaden his government. The Greeks apparently believed that political pressure would convince Makarios to capitulate. Makarios, however, is standing his ground and there are some indications that Athens may now be considering more forceful action.


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Makarios, for his part, has been active rallying support. A large pro-Makarios demonstration took place yesterday in Nicosia, apparently at his direction.

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

LAOS

Yesterday Vang Pao's irregular units advancing north from Pha Dong reported several clashes with enemy patrols as they attempted to move toward Route 4. Another irregular force holding a 105-mm. howitzer position at Phou Khe has been shelled for the past three days but has suffered little damage. The majority of the irregular force is located in the foothills at the southeastern tip of the Plaine. Vang Pao has also launched yet another diversionary operation from the Bouam Long area north of the Plaine south toward Route 7.

The North Vietnamese have shifted additional forces from Long Tieng to protect their rear areas. Last week elements of the 148th Regiment moved from Long Tieng to positions southeast of the Plaine. More recent intercepts indicate that much of the 174th Regiment, which had been active near Sam Thong, has been ordered to take up positions on high points near Route 4 and Phou Khe.

Five other North Vietnamese regiments remain in the Long Tieng - Sam Thong area, and recent messages indicate that they are continuing to prepare for new attacks. Rear service units are pushing supplies to front-line units, and [redacted] trucks are now using the new road from the southern Plaine to Ban Hintang.

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
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CAMBODIA




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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**SUDAN-EGYPT**

President Numayri's dismissal Sunday of his pro-Egyptian defense minister, Khalid Hassan Abbas, has brought a sharp reaction from Cairo. Claiming that an "atmosphere of crisis" prevails in Khartoum, President Sadat dispatched Foreign Minister Ghalib to Sudan on Monday to deliver an "urgent" message to Numayri. Ghalib's message included hints of Egyptian countermoves, according to press reports.

*Numayri's removal of Abbas is but the latest example of friction between Sudan and Egypt in recent months. Cairo is annoyed with Numayri's refusal to balance his overtures to the West with friendly gestures toward Moscow and with his postponement of Sudan's adherence to the Confederation of Arab Republics. Cairo views this behavior as a sign that Sudan is detaching itself from Arab affairs and problems.*

*The Egyptians are likely to continue their pressure tactics against Numayri. Cairo, for example, may have been behind the resignation yesterday of the head of the Sudan Socialist Union, an ally of the deposed Abbas.*

*Khartoum, meanwhile, remains calm and Numayri appears to be in full control. He apparently believes he has strong domestic support for his "Sudan first" policy.*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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**NOTES**

Bangladesh: Newsmen and a representative of the UN who visited the Bihari enclave of Mirpur near Dacca report hunger but no starvation there. The government is now letting in food supplies, and there have been no Bengali-Bihari clashes since the beginning of the month. The Biharis, nevertheless, remain depressed over their bleak prospects, and many of them would like to leave the country. Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul, however, has told Ambassador Keating that India will not accept the Biharis--who are Muslims--because of the possible conflicts with Hindus, and Islamabad has indicated it does not want them.

Ecuador: President Velasco has been ousted by the military led by Army Commander General Rodriguez. The move was taken to prevent populist politician Assad Bucaram from winning the June presidential election. The armed forces proclaimed a state of siege throughout the country and announced a curfew, but there have been no reports of bloodshed. According to a decree issued this morning General Rodriguez will be supported by a government council composed of a new army commander and the navy and air force commanders. The new regime is describing itself as "nationalist, military and revolutionary"--most likely in an effort to co-opt some of Bucaram's support among the younger officers. The military last ruled Ecuador from 1963 to 1966. Velasco, who successfully completed only one of his five presidential terms, has gone into exile in Panama. Bucaram may also be forced to leave the country.

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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## SUDAN-LIBYA-EGYPT

*One of the more unlikely proposals made in recent weeks has been Sudanese President Numayri's idea that the US enlist Libyan President Qadhafi's support for Egyptian-Israeli proximity talks. Qadhafi has rarely given even lip service to the idea of negotiating the unfinished Arab-Israeli war, and Numayri's suggestion seemed to be his own brainstorm rather than a product of his discussions with Qadhafi. However, a re-examination of Qadhafi's recent statements and published Libyan views suggests that his and Numayri's distrust of Soviet influence in Egypt may be leading both of them to revise their priorities.*

Numayri told Ambassador Bush on 5 February that he believed the US should use Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to persuade President Sadat to take Egypt into the interim agreement talks. Sadat cannot make the decision on his own, Numayri said, but could be given the necessary push if these three countries--the aid givers--indicated their support of proximity talks. Numayri offered Sudan's own support for any US initiative that did not embarrass or weaken Egypt and urged an immediate US contact with Qadhafi.

The Sudanese suggestion to Ambassador Bush came only a few days after Qadhafi's talks with Sadat and Numayri. The Sudanese minister of information, who had attended the Numayri-Qadhafi talks, later told Bush that Qadhafi was so worried about massive Soviet influence in Egypt that he would probably be willing to weigh in with Sadat.

While there may be considerable exaggeration in these Sudanese allegations about Qadhafi's views, they can be fitted into the trend of his recent statements. Addressing Egyptian troops at Aswan last month, Qadhafi repeated his customary line that the "battle" with Israel was inevitable but went on to insist that the timing must be left to the "political leadership." This argument, which supports Sadat's position, has been repeated in Libya's armed forces journal, which sometimes serves as Qadhafi's personal mouthpiece. Other themes he has struck in recent months include the inability of the Arab armies to defeat Israel now and the folly of starting hostilities without adequate planning and training. Over the same period, he has expressed concern about the spread of Soviet "imperialism" in the Middle East in several widely publicized speeches and interviews.

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

If Qadhafi now views the confrontation with Israel as a protracted struggle which needs careful preparation, he may also see some utility in proceeding with talks for an interim agreement. He may have come to believe that an Israeli withdrawal from the canal would permit the Egyptians to scale down considerably the Soviet personnel manning SAM sites in the canal sector, something Sadat has said he is anxious to do. Qadhafi appreciates Egypt's long-term need for Soviet military aid, but he may hope that the breathing space provided by an interim agreement would at least enable the Egyptians gradually to displace the sizable contingent of Soviet military advisers.

Apart from this, Ambassador Bush's conversation with Numayri tells a good deal about current Sudanese thinking on the war. Numayri is clearly anxious for rapid progress toward a settlement. He claims that the closure of the Suez Canal has imposed an economic burden on Sudan in the range of \$65-75 million annually.

The Sudanese President's interest in achieving an interim agreement and in involving the US in that effort also reflects his own concern about the Soviet presence in Egypt. Since the pro-Communist coup attempt last July, Numayri has been extremely suspicious of Soviet motives and is attempting to replace Moscow's military aid and technical assistance programs by developing contacts with the West, China, Yugoslavia, and Romania. He is well aware that any reduction of the Soviet presence in the Middle East hinges on a political solution of the Middle East conflict. Egypt's successful pressure on Sudan in the past few weeks to accept a Soviet ambassador--the latest reminder of the weight that the Soviets carry in Cairo--is likely to make Numayri even more resentful.

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Neither Sadat nor Qadhafi has been heard from directly since their meetings before and after Sadat's trip to Moscow. Nevertheless,

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[redacted] if he could now count on Qadhafi and Numayri to protect his rear from radical Arab critics and Soviet disapproval, he might find it politically easier to take another step with the United States and Israel in search of an interim agreement.

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*17 February 1972*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

17 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

We report on the most recent satellite photography of Soviet ICBM complexes on *Page 1*.

Egyptian President Sadat was unartfully vague when he made a public report on his recent trip to Moscow. (*Page 2*)

[redacted]  
Greece  
[redacted]  
Cyprus. (*Page 3*)

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
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(*Page 4*)

Castro may be preparing to provoke an incident this weekend at the US Guantanamo Naval Base. (*Page 5*)

**NOTE TO RECIPIENTS:** Beginning tomorrow and continuing through 28 February 1972, The President's Daily Brief will not be delivered at the customary time. Deliveries of the Brief in Washington will be made on the basis of new deadlines designed to meet the President's requirements while he is abroad.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

USSR

The most recent satellite photography, which covered portions of all 24 Soviet ICBM complexes, shows no additional new-type silos. Construction is progressing on the 25 large new silos previously detected at the SS-9 complexes, and some may be completed late this year. There is no new activity in areas at two complexes where we spotted survey work last August.

The 60 smaller new-type silos at the Pervomaysk and Derazhnya complexes also show signs of progress. Several are in a late stage of construction, and work on these could be completed later this year. The six large silos at Pervomaysk and Derazhnya (similar in size to those seen at the SS-9 complexes) are expected to serve a special role, probably command and control.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

EGYPT

President Sadat buried fleeting references to his most recent trip to Moscow deep toward the end of an hour-long speech yesterday. He declined to make public any details of his discussions with the Soviet leaders, saying only that he had an expansive exchange of "estimates of the changing circumstances" in the Middle East. Once again he characterized the Moscow meetings as highly successful, with a "common analysis of the meaning of developments."

Sadat was purposely vague about whether or not a new arms agreement had been reached. He hinted that new weapons might be available when he urged concerted efforts "to absorb sophisticated weapons," and later in his speech he threatened to strike Israel "deep in its territory" should the Israelis first attack Egypt's interior.

*Such references seem contrived to put the best face possible on Sadat's trip. They have a hollow ring in the larger context of his stress on the need for "patience and silence."*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

GREECE-CYPRUS



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
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
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


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


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CUBA-US




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*Since last November the Cuban Government  
has evinced unusual interest in the Guan-  
tanamo issue. Havana may have decided to  
create an incident at the base,*



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# *The President's Daily Brief*

*18 February 1972*



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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

18 February 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] China [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Pakistan [Redacted]  
(Page 2)

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The North Vietnamese are deeply worried over the possibility of new political alignments arising in Asia and among the three great powers as a result of big power summity. (Page 3)

Cambodia

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
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
The Indians may be willing to enter into informal talks with President Bhutto in advance of formal talks. (Page 5)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



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
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**CHINA-PAKISTAN**




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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NORTH VIETNAM**

Recent articles in both the party's newspaper and its theoretical journal have given vent to an apprehension over big-power summity muted since last August. The articles express a fear that the US will be able to exploit dissensions within the Communist world to bring about "a detente among various big countries while continuing to intimidate small nations." The Soviet Union and China are both named more than once in this connection. One article refers to a speech by President Nixon last July which allegedly envisaged five superpowers (including the USSR and China) determining the future of the world.

Hanoi even lectures Peking and Moscow directly. "Because these socialist countries have become increasingly strong in every respect, how can they accept the view that Nixon has a new concept and a practical, intelligent attitude," the theoretical journal demands. "It is certain that with all of its policies the United States will always consider the USSR, the PRC, and other socialist countries as its dangerous enemies."

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*These articles, together with other published warnings* [redacted]

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[redacted] suggest how deeply the North Vietnamese are worried over new political alignments they see developing in Asia and among the three great powers. While they may believe they still can play the Soviets and Chinese off against each other, their long-standing distrust of big power maneuvering obviously persists.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**


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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## INDIA-PAKISTAN

Indian Joint External Affairs Secretary Chib told US Embassy officers on 15 February that Islamabad must adopt a more conciliatory posture toward New Delhi before Indian public opinion would countenance a more forthcoming government attitude. He added that for peace talks to succeed, Bhutto must indicate a willingness to soft-pedal "confrontation" and agree to a comprehensive review of all outstanding problems--presumably including the Kashmir boundary issue. Chib stated that such a conciliatory Pakistani gesture need not be "wholly public."

*The Indians may be signaling a willingness to enter informal discussions with President Bhutto prior to formal peace talks. New Delhi seems to be trying to give an appearance of flexibility, partly to head off any movement for third-party mediation through the United Nations.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*19 February 1972*

*27*

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Top Secret*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

**19 February 1972**

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

A North Vietnamese division in Hanoi is planning to move, and may return to the Vinh area. (Page 1)

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NORTH VIETNAM**

On 13 February, the 325th Infantry Division in Hanoi activated a forward element, and since 15 February this element has been in daily communication with the Military High Command. Since a forward element's function is to facilitate communications during major relocations, its activation indicates the division is planning to move.



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


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
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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

Cuba:

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Cyprus: There have been no significant developments concerning Athens' demands on President Makarios.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*21 February 1972*



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

21 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The pattern of appearances at the opening ceremonies during President Nixon's trip to Peking suggests that Premier Chou En-lai is in a particularly strong position. (Page 1)

[Redacted] 25X1

Vang Pao's military operation toward the Plaine des Jarres has come under increasing Communist attack. (Page 2)

Moscow is continuing to try to interest Tokyo in helping develop Siberian oil fields. (Page 3)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CHINA**

Thus far, one striking aspect of the ceremonies and events connected with President Nixon's visit is the pattern of appearances of the Chinese leaders. The two Politburo members (other than Premier Chou himself) who have been present at the airport, the banquet and the first plenary talk--Li Hsien-nien, and Yeh Chien-ying--have long been close associates of the Premier. In contrast, Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and the two ranking leaders in Shanghai--Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan--have yet to make an appearance. This trio was closely associated with the more extreme aspects of the Cultural Revolution and does not have the ties to Chou evident in the case of Li, Yeh, and the members of the foreign ministry who have thus far been prominent.

*The "radical" trio has been in partial eclipse for some time; Yao and Chiang Ching have each made only one appearance, and Chang none at all, in the past six weeks. It is of course possible that these leaders are in effect boycotting the visit, but it is hard to see what this would gain them when Mao himself has set his seal on the trip by receiving the President during his first hours in Peking. One or all members of this trio may yet show up before the week is out--in Hangchow or Shanghai if not Peking--but the Premier seems to be in an especially strong position as the talks with the US begin.*


**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

LAOS



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Over the weekend the Communists launched a number of probes and attacks by fire against Vang Pao's forces moving toward the Plaine des Jarres. The irregulars' offensive has slowed, but their presence southeast of the Plaine has forced the Communists to divert troops from the Long Tieng area, where Vang Pao's tactical situation continues to improve.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-JAPAN**

The semi-official Soviet-Japanese economic co-operation committee will meet in Tokyo this week. The Soviets will primarily be trying to interest Japan in helping to finance and sharply expand production at West Siberian oil fields and to build a pipeline from Irkutsk, near Lake Baikal, to Nakhoda on the Sea of Japan. Soviet plans call for Japan eventually to receive nearly one million barrels of oil per day via the pipeline.

*Moscow attaches considerable political as well as economic importance to the talks; and hopes to build on the impetus provided by Gromyko's recent visit to Japan. Japanese firms are enthusiastic about the venture*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

***FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY***

**NOTES**

South Vietnam: Military activity increased somewhat over the weekend in scattered actions. Communist rocket and mortar attacks hit three US air bases and Kontum city in the western highlands. Other attacks, many of which were in response to intensified allied patrolling and artillery and air strikes, were directed at provincial security forces in northern coastal regions and small outposts in the delta, where two hamlet chiefs were killed.

Malta: [redacted]

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***FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY***

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# *The President's Daily Brief*

22 February 1972

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

22 February 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Soviet news media are casting President Nixon's visit in an unfavorable light, but no authoritative editorial comment has yet appeared. (Page 1)

UN envoy Jarring is visiting Near Eastern capitals on his way back to New York from Moscow; his stop in Cairo may have included discussion of his joining in "proximity talks" with the Israelis. (Page 2)

The Greek Government appears to be looking for a way of saving face for its failure to move against President Makarios. (Page 3)

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**USSR-US-CHINA**

*The Soviets are using their news media to cast President Nixon's visit to China in an unfavorable light, but they have not as yet made any authoritative editorial comment. The most common Soviet theme is that the visit is an example of Chinese perfidy on Vietnam. By taking this line, the Soviets clearly hope to score points against Peking in Moscow's struggle with China for the support of Hanoi and other "progressives."*

In playing up the Vietnam angle, the Soviets have primarily used selective quotes from the foreign press, noting stepped-up US bombing in Vietnam and China's absence from the recent "Versailles assembly" on Vietnam during the President's visit. Branching out from the Vietnam aspect, Pravda on 22 February quoted the French Communist Party organ L'Humanite to the effect that the President's visit is intended to extract benefits from the Chinese leaders' anti-Sovietism and will have "pernicious consequences" for the struggle in Indochina. The Communist Party newspaper also reported remarks from the CPUSA congress characterizing the trip as being predicated on common hatred for the Soviet Union.

Reporting on the specifics of the visit has been fairly straightforward. Pravda, without elaboration, carried TASS reports that the President was met by Chou En-lai and that he held a "serious and frank" discussion with Mao Tse-tung. Moscow television also carried brief scenes of the President's arrival but, like Pravda, juxtaposed the reporting with the highly critical L'Humanite item.


*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**UN - MIDDLE EAST**

UN envoy Jarring is making a tour of Near Eastern capitals on his way back to New York from Moscow. He spent three days in Cairo over the weekend and then flew to his nominal headquarters in Cyprus for talks with the Israeli ambassador there. King Husayn has told Ambassador Brown that Jarring has agreed to come to Amman on Wednesday, and Tel Aviv has announced he will visit Israel on Friday.

*Some Egyptian officials have indicated an interest in the US proposal for "proximity talks," but only if Jarring plays a role. The weekend visit provided an opportunity for Cairo to sound out Jarring on his plans and the possibility of his participation in such talks. Although Jarring apparently is willing, the Israelis almost certainly would oppose his participation.*



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES

Cyprus: The Greek Government appears to be looking for a way of saving face for its failure to move against President Makarios. Foreign Minister Palamas has warned in a press conference against "foreign intervention," and [redacted] Athens is blaming the US for frustrating Greek plans.

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[redacted] The semiannual rotation of Turkish troops scheduled for 23 February appears set to go off without complications.

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Laos: Preliminary field reporting indicates that one of Vang Pao's task forces operating south of the Plaine des Jarres abandoned its positions and pulled back following a heavy North Vietnamese shelling attack on the night of 21 February. This task force had been targeted against enemy 130-mm. field gun positions on the southern edge of the Plaine. The other three task forces south and east of the Plaine report no enemy contact during the same period.

Cuba: [redacted]

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

23 February 1972

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

23 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

President Nixon's trip to China has occasioned harsh Polish criticism of Communist China. (Page 1)

India and Pakistan are both giving increased publicity to possible early peace talks. (Page 2)

[redacted] (Page 3)

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Prime Ministers Heath and Mintoff have agreed to meet again on the issues still barring a Malta agreement. (Page 4)

Japanese comment on the President's trip reflects a mixture of hope for success and anxiety that Tokyo "is being left behind" in upgrading relations with China. (Page 5)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**POLAND**

One facet of the Soviet Union's carefully orchestrated indirect criticisms of the President's trip to China has been the change of the Polish regime into one of the most extreme Red China - baiters among Moscow's allies. On Sunday, party leader Gierek, usually a cautious and pragmatic man, lent his prestige to the campaign, becoming the first Communist leader anywhere in the last five years personally to call for the Chinese people to "reject Maoism." His remarks fell just short of an appeal for a Chinese revolution. He made no explicit tie between the attack on Mao and China's talks with the US.

*Under Gierek's predecessor Gomulka, Poland had taken a moderate line vis-a-vis China. Gradually, however, in proportion to Gierek's dependence on the Soviet Union for financial and political support, Warsaw's anti-Chinese position has become more shrill. The idea that Maoism must be overthrown is not a new one in Soviet or other Communist propaganda, but this is the first time in recent years that a leading politician has publicly embraced it.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**INDIA-PAKISTAN**

Both countries are giving increased publicity to the possibility of early peace talks. The Pakistani public was informed on 23 February that New Delhi had notified Islamabad that India was willing to open direct talks on outstanding issues without preconditions.

India first made known its willingness to talk with Pakistan in a recent letter to UN Secretary General Waldheim. President Bhutto, however, told the press on 21 February that India's offer was essentially a tactical move timed to coincide with the opening of Sino-American talks. He added that he would make no reply until after President Nixon completes his China visit.

*Bhutto has stated previously that he will seek direct talks with Mrs. Gandhi at the earliest opportunity. We doubt that he would be willing to see formal peace negotiations begin prior to 25 March, when all Indian troops are scheduled to have departed from Bangladesh.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

MALTA

Prime Minister Heath has agreed to meet with Prime Minister Mintoff once again but is unwilling to meet Mintoff's renewed demand for an additional, one-time payment of \$13 million over and above the UK-NATO offer of \$36.4 million annually. No date has been set for the talks

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*Mintoff so far remains in complete domestic control. He has effectively neutralized the opposition and the church and has demonstrated to his own party that his tactics have produced offers of more money at almost every stage of the negotiations.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

NOTES


Japan-US-China: President Nixon's visit to Pe-  
king is receiving heavy media coverage in Japan. Jap-  
anese comment thus far reflects a mixture of hope for  
the trip's success and anxiety that Tokyo is "being  
left behind" in upgrading relations with China. While  
there has been no official reaction from the Sato gov-  
ernment, the press in Tokyo has reported serious con-  
cern on the part of Japanese Foreign Ministry offi-  
cials. The atmosphere at the Foreign Ministry is de-  
scribed as "cold and gloomy," and there is uneasiness  
that the discussions, contrary to earlier Japanese  
predictions, may produce important results. Live  
television coverage of the meetings is having a major  
impact on the Japanese and will substantially increase  
pressure on Prime Minister Sato--and any successor--  
to normalize Sino-Japanese relations.

South Vietnam: Communist military action con-  
tinues at a level slightly above normal but has not  
increased significantly during the past few days.  
Aggressive South Vietnamese operations continue to  
flush out enemy forces near potential target areas.

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*24 February 1972*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

24 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

North Vietnam's new ambassador in Moscow has had several meetings with Soviet officials, and differences apparently surfaced on one of these occasions. (Page 1)

Vietnam

25X1 25X1

(Page 2)

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An impressive coterie of advisers accompanied Soviet Defense Minister Grechko to Egypt last weekend.  
(Page 3)

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(Page 4)

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The Communists in Cambodia have carried out a number of shellings and ground attacks against an isolated provincial capital north of Phnom Penh. (Page 5)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR - NORTH VIETNAM**


Since his arrival in Moscow last month, the new North Vietnamese ambassador, Vo Thuc Dong, has been meeting with senior Soviet officials with above-average frequency. During February, for example, Dong met three times with Premier Kosygin, once with politburo member Kirilenko, and once with Central Committee Secretary Katushev (the CPSU official responsible for relations with ruling Communist parties). All of these meetings have been characterized by the Soviet press as having taken place in an atmosphere of "friendship and cordiality," except the meeting with Kosygin on 11 February. That session, which the North Vietnamese never reported, was characterized by Moscow as having been marked by an atmosphere of "friendship and comradely frankness," which in Communist jargon is an indication that there were problems.

*Moscow does not generally acknowledge differences with the North Vietnamese, but the admission of "frankness" may have been connected with the Soviet Government statement on the Vietnam war also issued on 11 February. From the Vietnamese point of view, the statement was somewhat late in coming and lukewarm in its endorsement of the latest Communist negotiating proposals. Hanoi would probably have preferred that Moscow had explicitly condemned the President and his "eight-point plan." The North Vietnamese probably also wanted more specific Soviet endorsement of the newest version of the proposals presented by the Provisional Revolutionary Government.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

VIETNAM



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-EGYPT**

Soviet Defense Minister Grechko was accompanied in Egypt last weekend by an impressively high-level coterie of advisers. The delegation included the top political commissar of the armed forces, the commander of the air force, the first deputy commanders of the navy and air defense forces, the first deputy chief of staff, the head of the general staff's military assistance directorate, and several communications specialists.

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[Redacted]


*Grechko, whose swing through the Middle East was interrupted due to his illness in Iraq last December, was at that time accompanied by a lower ranking group of advisers than he ultimately took to Egypt. Their presence at the Cairo talks suggests that Grechko's visit was the occasion of an on-the-spot restudy of Egypt's military needs, as well as those of the USSR's own forces operating in the Middle East.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*



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
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

## Cambodia



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CAMBODIA**

The Communists have carried out a series of ground, mortar, and rocket attacks against government defenders of the isolated provincial capital of Kompong Thom, 75 miles north of Phnom Penh. One ground attack south of the town resulted in unusually heavy casualties on both sides.


*The Communist attacks may be intended to tie down government forces while major North Vietnamese units leave the area. A headquarters element from the 9th Division, which directed the counteroffensive against the Chenla II operation along Route 6, and the headquarters of the 95C Regiment recently moved east of the Mekong to the Chup plantation. This move apparently allowed the 7th Division, which had been responsible for base security in that area, to move closer to the South Vietnamese border. Only one 9th Division regiment is left west of the Mekong.*

Farther west in the Siem Reap area, government forces have gained some ground against well-fortified Communist positions near the temple ruins of Angkor Wat.

*Because of the temple ruins, Cambodian troops are unable to use artillery and mortar fire, but they appear determined to try to flush the Communists from the area.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*25 February 1972*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

25 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Israel's strong retaliation to the latest fedayeen raids along the Lebanese border creates problems for Beirut. (Page 1)

The Greeks and President Makarios continue to wait each other out. (Page 2)

The Argentine justice minister tells us there has been a major breakthrough in negotiations with Juan Peron. (Page 3)

[redacted] (Page 4)

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**ISRAEL-LEBANON**

Israel has retaliated promptly and vigorously for the killing of two Israeli civilians by fedayeen along the Lebanese border on Wednesday. On Friday

[redacted] Israeli troops, supported by armor and artillery, occupied three villages in southern Lebanon. Houses were destroyed, and some prisoners were taken. At the same time, Israeli aircraft attacked fedayeen bases on the slopes of Mount Hermon near the junction of the Lebanese, Syrian, and Israeli frontiers. Also, [redacted] Israeli aircraft overflew Beirut [redacted]

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All of the villages attacked by the Israelis are known to harbor fedayeen, and strikes of this kind follow a well-established Israeli pattern. Overflights of the Lebanese capital are unusual, however, and are intended to point up to the Lebanese their vulnerability and to stimulate greater Lebanese efforts to control the fedayeen.

The Israeli action comes at a bad time for Lebanon, where a parliamentary election campaign is just getting under way. Beirut again faces the dilemma of choosing between trying to limit fedayeen activities--and risking a clash with them--or allowing the fedayeen to operate across the border--and inviting Israeli reprisals.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CYPRUS**

The Greeks and President Makarios are waiting each other out. Greece's demands for Makarios' resignation and governmental changes still stand, but Prime Minister Papadopoulos seems to be shifting his tactical pressure to stress a need for quarantining the Archbishop's newly acquired Czech arms.

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Papadopoulos hinted that Greece was trying to get the support of Glafcos Clerides, the head of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, as part of its effort to force out Makarios.

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Clerides subsequently told a US diplomat [redacted] that there must be an "alternative" to Makarios, and that no man is "indispensable."

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Clerides is not yet making a bid for the presidency of Cyprus, but he clearly is keeping his options open for suggesting himself as an alternative to Makarios.

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**ARGENTINA**

Justice Minister Quijano has told Ambassador Lodge that there has been a major breakthrough in negotiations with Juan Peron. He said that the Argentine ambassador to Spain had carried a message to President Lanusse last weekend in which Peron renounced any desire for the presidency and stated that he would accept a military man as the next president. Quijano also reported that there was a strong likelihood that Lanusse would soon visit Spain at the invitation of President Franco so that he could personally conclude the agreement with Peron.

*Lanusse's tactic has been to try to divide the Peronist movement--the largest electoral bloc in the country--while keeping the door open for an arrangement with Peron. Peron has a reputation for double dealing, and the military is wary of him, but they draw confidence from his apparent inability to reunite his movement and his advanced age (78).*

*The military is firmly opposed to any Peronist resumption of power, but may be willing to provide financial assistance to the former dictator and to "rehabilitate his image" in exchange for his co-operation. Even if Peron agrees to renounce any personal ambition for the presidency, Lanusse and the Peronists must still find a mutually acceptable candidate before elections can be held.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

USSR: [redacted]

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
Japan-USSR: The semi-official Japan-Soviet Economic Committee has agreed to begin serious study for the joint development of West Siberian oil resources and the construction of a 2,670-mile pipeline to the Sea of Japan. In May the Japanese will send a mixed government and industry team for on-site inspection of the Tyumen oil field, the first time the Soviets will have permitted them a close look at the area.

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## The President's Daily Brief

~~(6 March 1972)~~

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January Date - Feb 26, 1972  
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26 FEBRUARY 72

CHINA-UK

London and Peking have agreed to raise their diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level. [redacted]


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
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NORTH VIETNAM - US



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CAMBODIA - SOUTH VIETNAM

We have detected the movement of additional Communist main force elements closer to the South Vietnamese border in eastern Cambodia. The intelligence unit of the Viet Cong 9th Division is now located within a few miles of the division's 272nd Infantry Regiment and about ten miles from the South Vietnam border. Since a division headquarters normally is close to its intelligence component, it is likely that the headquarters of the 9th Division is also in this area. A regiment of the Communist's 7th Division--the 209th--has relocated eastward to the Mimot area, indicating that the 7th is continuing its redeployment into the border area.

*If the movement of major elements from the two divisions is confirmed, this would mark the first time since just before the allied cross-border operations of May 1970 that parts of three main force divisions have been located this close to South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province.*

USSR-LIBYA

Libyan Deputy Premier Jallud arrived in Moscow on  
23 February for a five-day visit in quest of more So-  
viet arms.


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*The Soviets would like another arms agreement with the Libyans, who can pay in hard currency, but they would want the Libyans in return to curtail the anti-Soviet polemics that have emanated from Tripoli for the past year. Qadhafi, nevertheless, still shows little inclination to temper his criticism of the Soviets.*


CHILE-US-USSR



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NOTES

Israel-Lebanon: The Israelis again this morning struck fedayeen encampments in southern Lebanon, including air and ground attacks on villages near Mount Hermon. Beirut, still somewhat numbed by what it regards as overreaction by the Israelis, aired its protest to the UN Security Council Saturday morning.


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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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
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


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
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


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


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
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
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


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
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## *The President's Daily Brief*

Sunday, 27 Feb 1972

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SUNDAY CABLE  
27 FEBRUARY 1972

LAOS

Vang Pao's irregulars operating east of the Plaine des Jarres are encountering stiff enemy resistance. The North Vietnamese have reacted most strongly to one task force that had been moving toward the enemy's 130-mm. guns and supply caches on the southern edge of the Plaine. This force has been hit hard several times in the past few days and has retreated deeper into the foothills southeast and east of the Plaine. The other three task forces have also been under attack and have made little forward progress. One of these groups, however, has occupied high ground overlooking Route 4, an enemy supply artery east of the Plaine, and is directing air strikes on trucks and supply areas.

Military activity around Long Tieng and Sam Thong remains light. Intercepted messages indicate that troops of a third North Vietnamese regiment have moved north from Long Tieng, apparently to defend a major supply dump near the Plaine. Two other regiments had moved earlier in response to Vang Pao's operations. Three or four enemy regiments remain in the area of Long Tieng, however, and aerial observers report that the Communists are moving great quantities of supplies into depots south of the Plaine.

THAILAND

Bangkok is conducting its largest counterinsurgency operation to date. The Thai Army has committed over 12,000 troops against one of the largest Communist base complexes in northern Thailand. The Communists are putting up stiff resistance and have inflicted well over 200 casualties on the Thai forces.

Despite the strong resistance, the government is committed to a major effort to overrun the insurgent stronghold. Even if it does so, however, the army will have to establish a permanent presence in the area if the operation is to have lasting value.

NOTE

South Vietnam: Military activity has dropped off in South Vietnam in recent days, although Communist harassing attacks continue. Intercepts [redacted] indicate that enemy forces in a number of provinces are encountering difficulties from allied bombings and ground sweeps, but they are continuing to prepare for future attacks.

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


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
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
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# *The President's Daily Brief*

*28 February 1972*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

28 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

London and Peking have agreed to raise their diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level.  
*(Page 1)*

North Vietnam [redacted]  
[redacted] US [redacted] (Page 2)

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In the Laos fighting, Vang Pao's irregulars operating east of the Plaine des Jarres are encountering stiff enemy resistance. *(Page 3)*

Israel is continuing its air and ground attacks against fedayeen bases in Lebanon. *(Page 4)*

Additional Communist main-force units in eastern Cambodia are moving closer to the South Vietnamese border. *(Page 5)*

The Thai Army is conducting its largest operation to date against a major insurgent stronghold in northern Thailand. *(Page 6)*

Libyan Deputy Premier Jallud is in Moscow in quest of more Soviet arms. *(Page 7)*

Chile [redacted]  
[redacted] US [redacted] (Page 8)

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
**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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
**CHINA-UK**

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
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
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NORTH VIETNAM - US



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
**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**ISRAEL-LEBANON**

Israel is continuing its air and ground attacks against fedayeen bases in Lebanon. Israeli aircraft repeatedly attacked the town of Nabatiyah, the site of a Palestinian refugee camp and a fedayeen regional headquarters. The Israelis also launched air-supported infantry and armored strikes against the village of Habbariyah near Mt. Hermon where Israeli bulldozers are clearing an assault road. Israeli aircraft ranged over central Lebanon as far north as Bayt ad-Din, about 20 miles southeast of Beirut, apparently providing air cover. Both fedayeen and Israeli reports noted exchanges of fire across the Syrian frontier in the Golan Heights area over the weekend. Syrian military officials, however, would not confirm fedayeen reports that Syrian anti-aircraft units had fired on Israeli planes, according to Damascus radio.

Reports available to the US Embassy in Beirut indicated that at least 17 persons died in the air attacks on Nabatiyah and that another 50 were injured. Some 20,000 refugees from the border areas were expected to reach coastal cities by Monday morning.

Israeli officials stated Sunday night that their forces would withdraw from Lebanon Monday night when they had completed building access roads into the border area.

Meanwhile, the Security Council has unanimously approved a resolution demanding that Israel refrain from further military ground and air actions against Lebanon and immediately withdraw its military forces from Lebanese territory.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CAMBODIA - SOUTH VIETNAM**

Additional Communist main-force units in eastern Cambodia are moving closer to the South Vietnamese border. An infantry regiment from both the 7th and 9th divisions has relocated to the Mimot area, close to Viet Cong 5th Division elements normally operating there. The intelligence unit of the 7th Division, as well as headquarters and intelligence elements from the 9th, have been detected close to the border, indicating that the headquarters from both divisions may already be located there. In addition, radio direction-finding indicates that the last 9th Division unit west of the Mekong River--the 271st Regiment--has returned to its base area in the Chup plantation east of the river.

*This is the closest that parts of three main-force Communist divisions in eastern Cambodia have been to South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province since just before the allied cross-border operations of May 1970.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THAILAND**

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
**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**USSR-LIBYA**

Libyan Deputy Premier Jallud arrived in Moscow on 23 February for a five-day visit in quest of more Soviet arms.

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
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The Soviets would like another arms agreement with the Libyans, who can pay in hard currency, but they would want the Libyans in return to curtail the anti-Soviet polemics that have emanated from Tripoli for the past year. Qadhafi, nonetheless, still shows little inclination to temper his criticism of the Soviets.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

CHILE-US-USSR



*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTES**

South Vietnam: Military activity has dropped off in South Vietnam in recent days, although Communist harassing attacks continue. Intercepts and reports from other sources indicate that enemy forces in a number of provinces are encountering difficulties from allied bombings and ground sweeps, but they are continuing to prepare for future attacks.

Malta-UK: Prime Minister Mintoff postponed at the last minute talks in London this weekend with Prime Minister Heath. Mintoff called off his trip after receiving a message from Heath that London refuses to make further concessions. In reply, Mintoff renewed a demand that London stand by its offer to the previous Maltese government of \$7.8 million for improving Malta's drydocks. The UK told Malta last summer that this offer had been withdrawn because of its new and more generous over-all proposal for a settlement.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

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## *The President's Daily Brief*

*29 February 1972*

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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

29 February 1972

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

The Israeli aim in attacking Lebanon was to end fedayeen terrorism for some time to come. (Page 1)

The weak enemy offensive in South Vietnam has so far failed to achieve the kind of military successes that pay political dividends. (Page 2)

[Redacted] Soviets [Redacted] Laotian [Redacted]


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The West Germans wish to achieve more normal relations with Communist China. (Page 5)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**



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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**ISRAEL-LEBANON**

[redacted] was undertaken with the intention of ending fedayeen terrorism for some time to come. The Israeli aim is now closer to realization, for as their troops withdrew across the border yesterday, the Lebanese Army had been issued orders to replace the fedayeen in the Arqoub area which abuts Lebanon's frontier with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

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The Israelis will not be able to relax their guard, however, because it is doubtful that the Lebanese are capable of interdicting all fedayeen activity in this mountainous region. The Lebanese Army has been relatively successful in controlling the fedayeen along the western part of the frontier with Israel, but for some time had abandoned the eastern portion to the guerrillas. The Israelis apparently expect some terrorists to remain active in the east, and during their foray into Lebanon built three roads along the slopes of Mount Hermon to facilitate future operations against the fedayeen.

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[redacted]

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## SOUTH VIETNAM

The anticipated Communist offensive around Tet has so far been small and unimpressive. The evidence of enemy battle directives and major combat preparations was so extensive and convincing that it does not seem possible the allies were victims of a hoax. Many battle directives emphasized the need for a show of military muscle during President Nixon's trip to China. Moreover, Hanoi's propaganda tirade against the President's journey, plus its willingness to have the Communist walkout at the Paris talks interpreted as a slap against the President's visit, indicate that the enemy intended to hit as hard as it could.

Communist military action in and around populated areas following Tet did increase above levels of the preceding months. When all the statistics are recorded, the incident rate, if not the intensity of the action, will probably show a significant increase. The rise in enemy action, primarily involving raids by local forces and sappers, began on the eve of the President's departure and continued to sputter along with scattered strikes against pacification projects and military strongpoints. The Communists struck many targets which had not been hit for a long time, including a number which had been mentioned in enemy battle orders. It thus appears that the Communists did try to mount a substantial offensive near populated areas. Many of their plans for action by local forces flopped, however, and main force units apparently were not ready to kick off major attacks.

One problem was lack of surprise. The allies,

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were ready with extensive counteraction. Enemy communications [redacted] make it clear that heavy allied counteroperations, both from the air and on the ground, significantly disrupted enemy plans.

Another problem was that, for all the exhortations to the Communist troops to go all out, the enemy still seemed bent on exercising economy of force. At no point did he commit the kind of forces that, regardless of superior allied combat support, might have turned the tide.

(continued)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

The Populated Lowlands and Delta

In the coming weeks, we expect a few hard strikes here and there and a slight increase in the pace of operations at one point or another. So far, however, it does not appear that the Communists have the organization or strength near populated areas to take advantage of US withdrawals to pose a threat which remaining friendly forces cannot contain. There is considerable evidence, nevertheless, that the Communists are still working hard to improve their position near population centers.


The Highlands and Western Border Areas

Throughout the past few months, the Communist buildup in the central highlands and in northwestern Military Region 1 has proceeded rapidly. The Communists gave every indication of wanting to launch significant attacks in this area during Tet to support intended operations elsewhere. The evidence, however, suggests that the Communists were unable to complete preparations for major operations in time. First-line main force units in these areas or en route to them have been hit hard by allied counteractions, particularly air attacks, and their plans have been thrown off schedule. It thus seems likely that the biggest share of the Communist campaign in the west and north is still to come. Climatic conditions will support a Communist ground campaign in these areas any time over the next several months. Furthermore, the recent movement of other main force units from positions in Cambodia to areas opposite the South Vietnamese border in Military Region 3 suggests that the enemy still hopes to increase the military pressure on the allies in this area as well.


In assessing the dry season campaign so far, Hanoi can hardly be happy with the results. The Communists have clearly failed to achieve the kind of military successes that pay immediate political dividends with the small-unit actions of the past couple of weeks. Although Communist operations have probably diverted a good many South Vietnamese troops from the pacification program, even this achievement is likely to be short-lived unless the enemy can achieve a bigger impact on the battlefield.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

LAOS-USSR



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**WEST GERMANY - COMMUNIST CHINA**

The President's visit has whetted West German interest in normalizing relations with Communist China. Reports from our embassy in Bonn [redacted]

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[redacted] indicate the Brandt government and the opposition parties agree on the desirability of establishing relations but differ on timing. The government would seek preliminary discussions in a third country capital, possibly Paris, but only after ratification of Bonn's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. The opposition, which opposes ratification of the treaties, has called for negotiations without delay.

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*The Brandt government is concerned lest approaches to Peking jeopardize its rapprochement with the USSR. The opposition, on the other hand, sees relations with Peking as possibly providing Bonn with leverage in its relations with Moscow.*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

**NOTE**

Cuba: We now estimate that the sugar harvest this year will be less than five million tons, mainly as a result of unseasonably heavy rains over the past few weeks which followed a severe drought. This compares with nearly six million tons last year and 8.5 million tons the year before. In order to help meet export commitments, the government has reduced individual monthly sugar rations from six pounds to four. Sugar normally accounts for about 80 percent of Cuba's exports, and it will be difficult this year to maintain imports of food-stuffs, raw materials, and capital goods at current levels.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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