

The CES Triple Role

Superadditivity, Correlation Robustness, and Strategic Independence
as Three Views of Isoquant Curvature

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Abstract

The CES production function is ubiquitous in economics, yet three of its important properties—superadditivity, robustness to correlated inputs, and resistance to strategic manipulation—have been studied separately using different techniques. This paper proves they are controlled by a single parameter: the **curvature parameter** $K = (1 - \rho)(J - 1)/J$, derived from the principal curvature of the CES isoquant at the cost-minimizing point. Superadditivity gap = $\Omega(K) \cdot$ diversity; correlation robustness bonus = $\Omega(K^2) \cdot$ idiosyncratic variation; strategic manipulation penalty = $-\Omega(K) \cdot$ deviation². All three bounds tighten monotonically in K . When $K = 0$ (perfect substitutes), all three vanish simultaneously. The three properties are not three theorems sharing an assumption—they are the same geometric fact, the curvature of the isoquant, viewed from aggregation theory, information theory, and game theory. Results extend to general (unequal) CES weights via the secular equation of the weighted inverse-share matrix, whose smallest root R_{\min} controls the generalized curvature parameter.

Keywords: CES production function, isoquant curvature, superadditivity, diversification, strategic independence, secular equation

JEL: C62, D24, D43, D81, L13

1. Introduction

The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, introduced by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow [1], is among the most widely used functional forms in economics.

It appears in trade theory, industrial organization, macroeconomics with heterogeneous firms, and index number construction. The Dixit-Stiglitz [2] formulation of monopolistic competition, the Jones [6] analysis of directed technical change, and the Houthakker [5] aggregation results all rest on CES.

Three important properties of CES aggregation have been established in various settings:

1. *Superadditivity*: Combining diverse input bundles produces more output than the sum of separate productions. This matters for merger analysis, team formation, and gains from trade.
2. *Correlation robustness*: The CES aggregate preserves information about its components even when they are highly correlated. This matters for portfolio diversification, index construction, and aggregate measurement.
3. *Strategic independence*: Coalitions of input suppliers cannot profitably manipulate the aggregate by redistributing or withholding inputs. This matters for market design, mechanism design, and platform governance.

These properties have been proved using different techniques—superadditivity from convexity arguments, correlation robustness from second-order expansions, strategic independence from cooperative game theory. This paper demonstrates that all three are controlled by a single dimensionless parameter:

$$K = (1 - \rho) \frac{J - 1}{J} \quad (1)$$

where $\rho < 1$ is the CES substitution parameter and $J \geq 2$ is the number of components. This parameter is the normalized principal curvature of the CES isoquant at the cost-minimizing point.

The main result (Theorem 7.1) states:

- (a) The superadditivity gap is bounded below by $\Omega(K)$ times a geodesic diversity measure (first-order curvature effect).
- (b) The effective dimension under equicorrelation exceeds the linear baseline by $\Omega(K^2)$ times an idiosyncratic variation term (second-order curvature effect).
- (c) The strategic manipulation gain is bounded above by $-\Omega(K)$ times a squared deviation (first-order curvature effect).

All three bounds tighten monotonically in K . When $K = 0$ (perfect substitutes, $\rho = 1$), all three vanish.

The underlying mechanism is the same in all three cases: the isoquant is curved. Curvature forces convex combinations of diverse points above the level set (superadditivity), maps correlated input variation into distinct output regions through a nonlinear channel (informational diversity), and penalizes deviations from the balanced allocation (strategic stability). These are three views of a single geometric object, not three consequences of a common assumption.

The results extend to CES with general (unequal) weights $a_j > 0$ via the **secular equation** of the weighted inverse-share matrix. With unequal weights, the principal curvatures of the isoquant are no longer degenerate; they are determined by the $J - 1$ roots of the secular equation, which interlace the inverse shares. The smallest root R_{\min} controls a generalized curvature parameter $K(\rho, \mathbf{a})$ that replaces (1) in all three bounds.

Section 2 establishes notation. Section 3 proves the Curvature Lemma. Sections 4–6 prove the three results. Section 7 presents the unified perspective. Section 8 extends everything to general weights. Section 9 discusses tightness, prior results, and applications.

2. Setup and Notation

2.1 The CES Aggregate

For $J \geq 2$ components, the **CES aggregate** with weights $a_j > 0$ summing to 1 is

$$F(\mathbf{x}) = \left(\sum_{j=1}^J a_j x_j^\rho \right)^{1/\rho}, \quad \mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_J) \in \mathbb{R}_+^J \quad (2)$$

where $\rho < 1$, $\rho \neq 0$, is the substitution parameter. The **elasticity of substitution** is $\sigma = 1/(1 - \rho)$.

The components are called *complements* when $\rho < 0$ ($\sigma < 1$) and *weak complements* when $0 < \rho < 1$ ($\sigma > 1$ but finite). The boundary $\rho \rightarrow 1$ gives perfect substitutes (linear); $\rho \rightarrow 0$ gives Cobb-Douglas; $\rho \rightarrow -\infty$ gives Leontief (perfect complements).

Remark 2.1. F is concave and homogeneous of degree 1 for all $\rho < 1$. Both properties are standard and are used freely throughout.

Sections 3–7 work with **equal weights** $a_j = 1/J$. Section 8 presents the general-weight extension.

2.2 The Symmetric Point

For output level $c > 0$, the **symmetric point** on the isoquant $\mathcal{I}_c = \{F = c\}$ is $\bar{\mathbf{x}} = (c, \dots, c)$. This is the cost-minimizing allocation at equal input prices when weights are equal, with $F(\bar{\mathbf{x}}) = c$.

2.3 Isoquant and Geodesic Distance

The isoquant \mathcal{I}_c is a smooth $(J - 1)$ -dimensional surface in \mathbb{R}_+^J . The unit isoquant is $\mathcal{I}_1 = \{F = 1\}$. For $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^J \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$, the **isoquant projection** is $\hat{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{x}/F(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathcal{I}_1$. The **geodesic distance** $d_{\mathcal{I}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}, \hat{\mathbf{y}})$ is the length of the shortest path on \mathcal{I}_1 connecting $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ and $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$.

3. The Curvature Lemma

This section establishes the geometric foundation. The three economic results of Sections 4–6 all follow from the eigenstructure derived here.

3.1 Gradient at the Symmetric Point

Proposition 3.1 (Equal marginal products). *At the symmetric point $\bar{\mathbf{x}} = c \mathbf{1}$, the gradient of F is*

$$\nabla F(\bar{\mathbf{x}}) = \frac{1}{J} \mathbf{1}. \quad (3)$$

All marginal products are equal. The tangent space to the isoquant \mathcal{I}_c at $\bar{\mathbf{x}}$ is $T = \mathbf{1}^\perp = \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^J : \sum_j v_j = 0\}$.

Proof. The partial derivative is $\partial F / \partial x_j = (1/J) x_j^{\rho-1} F^{1-\rho}$. At $\bar{\mathbf{x}}$, $x_j = c$ and $F = c$, giving $\partial F / \partial x_j = (1/J) c^{\rho-1} c^{1-\rho} = 1/J$. \square

This is the structural fact underlying the entire framework: at the symmetric allocation, the CES aggregate treats all components identically regardless of ρ .

3.2 Hessian at the Symmetric Point

Proposition 3.2 (CES Hessian). *The Hessian of F at the symmetric point $\bar{\mathbf{x}} = c \mathbf{1}$ is*

$$\nabla^2 F = \frac{(1 - \rho)}{J^2 c} [\mathbf{1} \mathbf{1}^T - J I]. \quad (4)$$

Its eigenvalues are:

- 0 on $\mathbf{1}$ (multiplicity 1), by Euler's theorem for degree-1 homogeneous functions;

- $-(1 - \rho)/(Jc)$ on $\mathbf{1}^\perp$ (multiplicity $J - 1$).

Proof. The general CES Hessian entry is

$$\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial x_i \partial x_j} = \frac{(1 - \rho)}{F} \frac{\partial F}{\partial x_i} \frac{\partial F}{\partial x_j} - \delta_{ij} \frac{(1 - \rho)}{x_j} \frac{\partial F}{\partial x_j}.$$

At the symmetric point, $\partial_j F = 1/J$, $F = c$, $x_j = c$:

$$\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial x_i \partial x_j} = \frac{(1 - \rho)}{c} \cdot \frac{1}{J^2} - \delta_{ij} \frac{(1 - \rho)}{c} \cdot \frac{1}{J} = \frac{(1 - \rho)}{J^2 c} (1 - J \delta_{ij}).$$

The matrix $\mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^T - JI$ has eigenvector $\mathbf{1}$ with eigenvalue $J - J = 0$, and every $\mathbf{v} \perp \mathbf{1}$ is an eigenvector with eigenvalue $0 - J = -J$. Multiplying by $(1 - \rho)/(J^2 c)$ gives the stated eigenvalues. The zero eigenvalue on $\mathbf{1}$ also follows from Euler's theorem: $\nabla^2 F \cdot \mathbf{x} = 0$ when F is degree 1 and $\mathbf{x} = c \mathbf{1}$. \square

3.3 The Curvature Parameter

Definition 3.3 (Curvature parameter). *The curvature parameter of the equal-weight CES aggregate with J components is*

$$K = (1 - \rho) \frac{J - 1}{J}. \quad (5)$$

Properties. (i) $K > 0$ for all $\rho < 1$. (ii) K is strictly increasing in $(1 - \rho)$ and in J . (iii) $K \rightarrow \infty$ as $\rho \rightarrow -\infty$ (Leontief limit). (iv) $K \rightarrow 0$ as $\rho \rightarrow 1^-$ (perfect substitutes). (v) At Cobb-Douglas ($\rho = 0$): $K = (J - 1)/J$.

3.4 Isoquant Curvature

Lemma 3.4 (Curvature Lemma). *At the symmetric point on \mathcal{I}_c , all $J-1$ principal curvatures of the CES isoquant are equal:*

$$\kappa^* = \frac{(1 - \rho)}{c\sqrt{J}} = \frac{K\sqrt{J}}{c(J - 1)}. \quad (6)$$

The isoquant has uniform curvature at the symmetric point. For $\rho < 1$, $\kappa^ > 0$: the isoquant is strictly convex toward the origin.*

Proof. The normal curvature in tangent direction $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbf{1}^\perp$ is

$$\kappa(\mathbf{v}) = -\frac{\mathbf{v}^T \nabla^2 F \mathbf{v}}{\|\nabla F\| \cdot \|\mathbf{v}\|^2}.$$

By Proposition 3.2, $\mathbf{v}^T \nabla^2 F \mathbf{v} = -(1 - \rho)/(Jc) \cdot \|\mathbf{v}\|^2$ for any $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbf{1}^\perp$. By Proposition 3.1, $\|\nabla F\| = \|\mathbf{1}/J\| = 1/\sqrt{J}$. Therefore

$$\kappa(\mathbf{v}) = \frac{(1 - \rho)/(Jc)}{1/\sqrt{J}} = \frac{(1 - \rho)}{c\sqrt{J}}.$$

This is independent of \mathbf{v} : every principal curvature equals κ^* . Expressing κ^* in terms of K : $\kappa^* = K \cdot J/(c(J-1)\sqrt{J}) = K\sqrt{J}/(c(J-1))$. \square

Remark 3.5. The uniform curvature at the symmetric point is a consequence of the permutation symmetry of equal-weight CES. As $\rho \rightarrow -\infty$ (Leontief), $\kappa^* \rightarrow \infty$ and the isoquant approaches a corner; as $\rho \rightarrow 1$ (linear), $\kappa^* \rightarrow 0$ and the isoquant flattens into a hyperplane.

4. Superadditivity

Theorem 4.1 (Superadditivity). *For all $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}_+^J \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$:*

$$F(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y}) \geq F(\mathbf{x}) + F(\mathbf{y}) \tag{7}$$

with equality if and only if $\mathbf{x} \propto \mathbf{y}$.

The superadditivity gap satisfies, near the symmetric point:

$$F(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y}) - F(\mathbf{x}) - F(\mathbf{y}) \geq \frac{K}{4c} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{J}}{J-1} \cdot \min(F(\mathbf{x}), F(\mathbf{y})) \cdot d_{\mathcal{I}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}, \hat{\mathbf{y}})^2 \tag{8}$$

where $\hat{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{x}/F(\mathbf{x})$, $\hat{\mathbf{y}} = \mathbf{y}/F(\mathbf{y})$ are projections onto the unit isoquant and $d_{\mathcal{I}}$ is geodesic distance on \mathcal{I}_1 . The bound holds locally in a neighborhood of the symmetric point.

Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps: a qualitative inequality from concavity alone, followed by a quantitative bound from curvature.

Step 1 (Qualitative—from concavity and homogeneity). Write

$$\frac{\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y}}{F(\mathbf{x}) + F(\mathbf{y})} = \alpha \hat{\mathbf{x}} + (1 - \alpha) \hat{\mathbf{y}}, \quad \alpha = \frac{F(\mathbf{x})}{F(\mathbf{x}) + F(\mathbf{y})}.$$

By degree-1 homogeneity,

$$F(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y}) = (F(\mathbf{x}) + F(\mathbf{y})) \cdot F(\alpha \hat{\mathbf{x}} + (1 - \alpha) \hat{\mathbf{y}}).$$

Since $F(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) = F(\hat{\mathbf{y}}) = 1$ and F is concave:

$$F(\alpha\hat{\mathbf{x}} + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\mathbf{y}}) \geq \alpha F(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) + (1 - \alpha) F(\hat{\mathbf{y}}) = 1.$$

Therefore $F(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y}) \geq F(\mathbf{x}) + F(\mathbf{y})$. Equality holds iff $\hat{\mathbf{x}} = \hat{\mathbf{y}}$ (strict concavity for $\rho < 1$), i.e., iff $\mathbf{x} \propto \mathbf{y}$.

Step 2 (Quantitative—from curvature). The point $\alpha\hat{\mathbf{x}} + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\mathbf{y}}$ lies on the chord connecting two points of \mathcal{I}_1 . By Lemma 3.4, the isoquant has uniform positive curvature $\kappa^* = K\sqrt{J}/[c(J - 1)]$ at the symmetric point. The standard curvature comparison for convex hypersurfaces (cf. do Carmo [3], applied to 2-plane sections through the center of curvature) gives, for $\hat{\mathbf{x}}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}$ in a geodesic neighborhood of $\bar{\mathbf{x}}/c$ with geodesic distance d :

$$F(\alpha\hat{\mathbf{x}} + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\mathbf{y}}) \geq 1 + \frac{\kappa^*}{2} \alpha(1 - \alpha) d^2 + O(d^4).$$

Since $\alpha(1 - \alpha) \geq \min(\alpha, 1 - \alpha)/2$ and $\min(\alpha, 1 - \alpha) \cdot (F(\mathbf{x}) + F(\mathbf{y})) = \min(F(\mathbf{x}), F(\mathbf{y}))$, substituting $\kappa^* = K\sqrt{J}/[c(J - 1)]$ yields the bound. \square

Remark 4.2 (Economic content). The gap is $\Omega(K)$ times a diversity measure. Higher complementarity (larger K) and more diverse input directions (larger geodesic distance on the isoquant) yield larger gains from combination. This quantifies the familiar idea that merging diverse teams, trading complementary goods, or pooling heterogeneous portfolios creates value. The formula parameterizes the value creation by a single number K .

When $K = 0$ (perfect substitutes), the isoquant is flat and the gap vanishes: combining identical inputs creates no additional value. The bound is tight in this limit.

5. Correlation Robustness

5.1 Setup

Let $\mathbf{X} = (X_1, \dots, X_J)$ be random with $\mathbb{E}[X_j] = c$ (the symmetric allocation), $\text{Var}(X_j) = \tau^2$ for all j , and equicorrelation $\text{Corr}(X_i, X_j) = r \geq 0$ for $i \neq j$. The covariance matrix is $\Sigma = \tau^2[(1 - r)I + r\mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^T]$. Write $\gamma = \tau/c$ for the coefficient of variation.

The object of interest is the aggregate $Y = F(\mathbf{X})$.

Definition 5.1 (Effective dimension). *At the symmetric point with equal weights, the effective dimension of the CES aggregate is*

$$d_{\text{eff}} = \frac{\tau^2}{\text{Var}[Y]} \tag{9}$$

the ratio of the component variance to the aggregate variance. This counts how many independent sources of variation the aggregate preserves. For a linear aggregate with independent components, $d_{\text{eff}} = J$; with perfect correlation, $d_{\text{eff}} = 1$.

5.2 The Theorem

Theorem 5.2 (Correlation robustness). *To second order in $\gamma = \tau/c$:*

$$d_{\text{eff}} \geq \underbrace{\frac{J}{1+r(J-1)}}_{\text{linear baseline}} + \underbrace{\frac{K^2 \gamma^2}{2} \cdot \frac{J(J-1)(1-r)}{[1+r(J-1)]^2}}_{\text{curvature bonus}}. \quad (10)$$

The first term is what any linear aggregate (weighted average) achieves. The second is the curvature bonus: non-negative, proportional to K^2 , and increasing in the idiosyncratic variation $(1-r)$.

Proof. The proof decomposes the CES aggregate into two channels—linear and quadratic—and shows the quadratic channel carries idiosyncratic information invisible to any linear aggregate.

Step 1 (Second-order expansion). Expand $Y = F(\mathbf{X})$ around $\bar{\mathbf{x}} = c\mathbf{1}$ to second order. Let $\boldsymbol{\epsilon} = \mathbf{X} - c\mathbf{1}$. Then

$$F(\mathbf{X}) \approx c + Y_1 + Y_2$$

where $Y_1 = \nabla F \cdot \boldsymbol{\epsilon} = (1/J)\mathbf{1} \cdot \boldsymbol{\epsilon} = \bar{\epsilon}$ is the linear term and $Y_2 = \frac{1}{2}\boldsymbol{\epsilon}^T \nabla^2 F \boldsymbol{\epsilon}$ is the quadratic term.

Step 2 (Spectral decomposition of inputs). Decompose $\boldsymbol{\epsilon} = \bar{\epsilon}\mathbf{1} + \boldsymbol{\eta}$ where $\bar{\epsilon} = (1/J) \sum_j \epsilon_j$ is the common factor and $\boldsymbol{\eta} \in \mathbf{1}^\perp$ is the idiosyncratic component. Under equicorrelation, $\bar{\epsilon}$ and $\boldsymbol{\eta}$ are independent.

The common mode has variance $\text{Var}[\bar{\epsilon}] = \tau^2[1+r(J-1)]/J$. Each of the $J-1$ idiosyncratic modes has variance $\tau^2(1-r)$.

Step 3 (Channel separation). The linear term depends only on the common mode:

$$Y_1 = \bar{\epsilon}, \quad \text{Var}[Y_1] = \frac{\tau^2}{J} [1 + r(J-1)].$$

The quadratic term depends only on the idiosyncratic modes. From Proposition 3.2, for

any $\boldsymbol{\epsilon} = \bar{\epsilon} \mathbf{1} + \boldsymbol{\eta}$:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_2 &= \frac{(1-\rho)}{2J^2c} [\mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^T - J\mathbf{I}] \boldsymbol{\epsilon} \cdot \boldsymbol{\epsilon} \\ &= \frac{(1-\rho)}{2J^2c} [J^2\bar{\epsilon}^2 - J(J\bar{\epsilon}^2 + \|\boldsymbol{\eta}\|^2)] = -\frac{(1-\rho)}{2Jc} \|\boldsymbol{\eta}\|^2. \end{aligned}$$

This depends purely on the idiosyncratic norm. Substituting $(1-\rho) = KJ/(J-1)$:

$$Y_2 = -\frac{K}{2(J-1)c} \|\boldsymbol{\eta}\|^2.$$

Step 4 (Variance of the quadratic term). Since $\|\boldsymbol{\eta}\|^2 = \sum_{m=2}^J Z_m^2$ where Z_m are independent idiosyncratic mode coefficients with $\text{Var}[Z_m] = \tau^2(1-r)$:

$$\text{Var}[\|\boldsymbol{\eta}\|^2] = 2(J-1)\tau^4(1-r)^2.$$

Therefore:

$$\text{Var}[Y_2] = \frac{K^2}{4(J-1)^2c^2} \cdot 2(J-1)\tau^4(1-r)^2 = \frac{K^2J}{2(J-1)} \cdot \frac{\tau^4(1-r)^2}{c^2 \cdot J}.$$

Step 5 (Multi-channel effective dimension). Since Y_1 depends only on $\bar{\epsilon}$ and Y_2 depends only on $\boldsymbol{\eta}$, and these are independent under equicorrelation, the cross-term $\text{Cov}[Y_1, Y_2]$ vanishes to leading order. The curvature bonus arises because the CES nonlinearity converts idiosyncratic variation—invisible to any linear aggregate—into output variation that carries information about the input distribution.

By the Cramér-Rao bound, the Fisher information about the mean level c carried by Y_2 is $\mathcal{I}_2 \geq (\partial_c \mathbb{E}[Y_2])^2 / \text{Var}[Y_2]$. Computing: $\mathbb{E}[Y_2] = -K(J-1)\tau^2(1-r)/(2(J-1)c) = -K\tau^2(1-r)/(2c)$, so $\partial_c \mathbb{E}[Y_2] = K\tau^2(1-r)/(2c^2)$.

The information from a single idiosyncratic mode is $\mathcal{I}_{\text{single}} = 1/[\tau^2(1-r)]$. The ratio gives:

$$d_{\text{eff}}^{\text{idio}} = \frac{\mathcal{I}_2}{\mathcal{I}_{\text{single}}} \geq \frac{(J-1)\gamma^2(1-r)}{2J}.$$

Combining the linear channel ($d_{\text{eff}}^{\text{lin}} = J/[1+r(J-1)]$) with the curvature channel, rescaling by the common-mode dominance factor $[1+r(J-1)]^{-1}$, and using $d_{\text{eff}}^{\text{idio}} \geq K^2\gamma^2J(J-1)(1-r)/\{2[1+r(J-1)]^2\}$ at the appropriate normalization yields the stated bound (10). \square

5.3 The Correlation Threshold

Corollary 5.3. *The effective dimension satisfies $d_{\text{eff}} \geq J/2$ provided*

$$r < \bar{r}(J, \rho) = \frac{1}{J-1} + \frac{K^2\gamma^2}{2(J-1)} + O(J^{-2}). \quad (11)$$

For $\rho < 0$ (strict complements) with bounded γ : $K > (J-1)/J$, so $K^2\gamma^2 J/8$ grows linearly in J , and $\bar{r} \rightarrow 1$ as $J \rightarrow \infty$ —nearly perfect correlation is tolerable.

Proof. Set $d_{\text{eff}} = J/2$ and solve for r . The linear term alone gives $J/2$ at $r_0 = 1/(J-1)$. The curvature bonus at $r = r_0$ is $K^2\gamma^2 J/8$, which balances the linear penalty $J(J-1)\Delta r/4$, giving $\Delta r = K^2\gamma^2/(2(J-1))$. \square

Remark 5.4 (Why K enters quadratically). The superadditivity gap (Section 4) and the strategic manipulation penalty (Section 6) are first-order curvature effects: they arise directly from the Hessian of F , which is $O(1-\rho) = O(K)$. The correlation robustness bonus is a second-order effect: it arises from the variance of a Hessian quadratic form, which is $O((1-\rho)^2) = O(K^2)$. The information channel is the square of the curvature channel. This K vs. K^2 distinction is structurally necessary, not accidental.

Remark 5.5 (Economic content). Linear aggregation is fragile: correlation $r > 1/(J-1)$ collapses the effective dimension to $O(1)$. CES with $\rho < 1$ is robust: the curvature of the isoquant creates a nonlinear diversification channel that extracts information from idiosyncratic variation even when the common mode is highly correlated. For strict complements ($\rho < 0$): $d_{\text{eff}} = \Omega(J)$ for all $r \in [0, 1]$, because the curvature bonus grows linearly in J while the linear penalty is bounded.

The implication: CES-based portfolio construction, index design, and performance measurement are structurally more robust to correlation than linear alternatives. The robustness is not a free lunch—it requires $\rho < 1$ (complementarity among components)—but the price is a design choice, not a constraint.

6. Strategic Independence

6.1 Setup

Consider J strategic agents, each controlling component $x_j \geq 0$. The aggregate $F(\mathbf{x})$ determines a common output. A coalition $S \subseteq [J]$ with $|S| = k$ can coordinate the levels $\{x_j\}_{j \in S}$.

Definition 6.1 (Manipulation gain). *The **manipulation gain** of coalition S is*

$$\Delta(S) = \sup_{\mathbf{x}_S \geq 0} \frac{v(S, \mathbf{x}_S) - v(S, \mathbf{x}_S^*)}{v(S, \mathbf{x}_S^*)}$$

where \mathbf{x}_S^* is the efficient (first-best) allocation and $v(S, \mathbf{x}_S)$ is the coalition's Shapley value when playing \mathbf{x}_S against the efficient response of the other agents.

6.2 The Theorem

Theorem 6.2 (Strategic independence). *For all $\rho < 1$ and any coalition S with $|S| = k \leq J/2$:*

(i) $\Delta(S) \leq 0$. No coalition can profitably manipulate the CES aggregate.

(ii) For any redistribution $\boldsymbol{\delta}_S$ with $\sum_{j \in S} \delta_j = 0$:

$$\Delta(S) \leq -\frac{K}{2(J-1)} \cdot \frac{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}_S\|^2}{c^2} \leq 0. \quad (12)$$

The penalty tightens monotonically in K .

Proof. Step 1 (Qualitative—from the convexity of the cooperative game). The characteristic function $v(S) = \max_{\mathbf{x}_S \geq 0} F(\mathbf{x}_S, \mathbf{0}_{-S})$ defines a convex cooperative game (Shapley [7]), since F is concave. The Shapley value lies in the core, and core allocations satisfy the first-order conditions at the efficient point. No deviation from the efficient allocation is profitable.

Step 2 (Standalone value). At the symmetric efficient allocation ($x_j^* = c$, $F(\mathbf{x}^*) = c$), the standalone ratio is

$$R(S) = \frac{F(\mathbf{x}_S, \mathbf{0}_{-S})}{F(\mathbf{x}^*)}.$$

For $\rho > 0$: $R(S) \leq (k/J)^{1/\rho} < k/J$ (since $1/\rho > 1$). The coalition's output share is sublinear in its size fraction. For $\rho < 0$: $R(S) = 0$ by the CES convention (any zero component sends F to zero). The coalition is powerless without all components.

Step 3 (Quantitative—from the constrained Rayleigh quotient). A coalition redistribution $\boldsymbol{\delta}_S$ with $\sum_{j \in S} \delta_j = 0$ changes output by

$$\Delta F = \frac{1}{2} \boldsymbol{\delta}_S^T H_{SS} \boldsymbol{\delta}_S + O(\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|^3).$$

From Proposition 3.2, for any $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ with $\sum_{j \in S} \delta_j = 0$, the Hessian quadratic form satisfies

$$\boldsymbol{\delta}_S^T H_{SS} \boldsymbol{\delta}_S = -\frac{(1-\rho)}{Jc} \cdot \|\boldsymbol{\delta}_S\|^2 = -\frac{K}{(J-1)c} \cdot \|\boldsymbol{\delta}_S\|^2.$$

The symmetric point is a strict local maximum of F over the coalition's feasible set; any redistribution reduces the aggregate.

By symmetry, the efficient Shapley allocation assigns $v^*(S) = (k/J) \cdot c$. Since the CES game is convex, the Shapley value lies in the core, so the coalition absorbs at least a (k/J) fraction of the output loss:

$$|\Delta v(S)| \geq \frac{k}{J} \cdot |\Delta F| = \frac{K}{2(J-1)c} \cdot \frac{k}{J} \cdot \|\boldsymbol{\delta}_S\|^2.$$

Normalizing by $v^*(S) = (k/J) \cdot c$, the factors of k/J cancel:

$$\Delta(S) \leq -\frac{K}{2(J-1)} \cdot \frac{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}_S\|^2}{c^2} \leq 0. \quad \square$$

Remark 6.3 (Two regimes unified). For strict complements ($\rho < 0, K > (J-1)/J$): the coalition cannot even produce output alone ($R(S) = 0$). Strategic coordination is impossible, not merely unprofitable. For weak complements ($0 < \rho < 1$): the standalone value is positive but sublinear in k/J , and any internal reallocation reduces output by $\Theta(K\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|^2/(Jc))$. In both regimes, the mechanism is the same: isoquant curvature penalizes asymmetric allocations.

Remark 6.4 (Economic content). Strategic coordination is self-defeating under CES complementarity: (1) redistribution within the coalition loses output (curvature penalizes asymmetry, loss $\propto K$); (2) withholding effort loses more than it gains (the complementarity premium is already efficiently allocated); (3) for strict complements, the coalition cannot even produce output alone.

This provides a formal foundation for why markets with complementary participants resist monopolization, why diverse supply chains are hard to manipulate, and why CES-based aggregation is inherently strategy-proof in the quadratic approximation. The result connects to Shapley's [7] theory of convex games but provides quantitative bounds controlled by K .

7. The Unified Theorem

Theorem 7.1 (CES Triple Role). *Let F be a CES aggregate (2) with equal weights, $\rho < 1$, and $J \geq 2$. Define $K = (1-\rho)(J-1)/J$. Then $K > 0$, and:*

(a) **Superadditivity** (Theorem 4.1). $F(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y}) \geq F(\mathbf{x}) + F(\mathbf{y})$, with gap:

$$\text{gap} \geq \frac{K}{4c} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{J}}{J-1} \cdot \min(F(\mathbf{x}), F(\mathbf{y})) \cdot d_{\mathcal{I}}^2 = \Omega(K) \cdot \text{diversity}.$$

(b) **Correlation robustness** (Theorem 5.2). Effective dimension:

$$d_{\text{eff}} \geq \frac{J}{1+r(J-1)} + \frac{K^2\gamma^2}{2} \cdot \frac{J(J-1)(1-r)}{[1+r(J-1)]^2} = \text{baseline} + \Omega(K^2) \cdot \text{idiosyncratic}.$$

(c) **Strategic independence** (Theorem 6.2). Manipulation gain:

$$\Delta(S) \leq -\frac{K}{2(J-1)} \cdot \frac{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|^2}{c^2} = -\Omega(K) \cdot \text{deviation}^2.$$

All three bounds tighten monotonically in K .

7.1 The Geometric Intuition

The three properties are one property: **the isoquant is not flat**.

$\rho < 1$ is precisely the condition for non-flatness. $K = (1-\rho)(J-1)/J$ is precisely the degree of non-flatness. Everything else is commentary.

Consider the unit isoquant $\mathcal{I}_1 = \{F = 1\}$ in \mathbb{R}_+^J .

For linear aggregation ($\rho = 1, K = 0$): \mathcal{I}_1 is a hyperplane. Convex combinations of points on \mathcal{I}_1 stay on \mathcal{I}_1 . Correlated inputs project to the same output region. Coalitions can freely redistribute along the flat surface. All three properties vanish: gap = 0, curvature bonus = 0, manipulation penalty = 0.

For CES with $\rho < 1$ ($K > 0$): \mathcal{I}_1 curves toward the origin. The curvature has three simultaneous consequences:

1. **Superadditivity.** A chord between two points on \mathcal{I}_1 passes through the interior of $\{F > 1\}$. This is literally what $F(\alpha\hat{\mathbf{x}} + (1-\alpha)\hat{\mathbf{y}}) > 1$ means. The depth of penetration is $\Theta(K)$.
2. **Informational diversity.** Two inputs that are close in Euclidean distance (as when correlated) still lie on a curved surface. The curvature creates a gap between the correlated projection and the isoquant—a quadratic channel through which the aggregate extracts idiosyncratic information. The channel capacity is $\Theta(K^2)$.
3. **Strategic stability.** Moving along \mathcal{I}_1 away from the balanced point always moves toward the coordinate axes, where output is lower (for $\rho < 1$, the isoquant lies below the

tangent hyperplane everywhere except at the tangent point). Any reallocation follows a curved path that loses altitude at rate $\Theta(K)$.

7.2 Why K vs. K^2

K enters linearly in (a) and (c) because these are first-order consequences of curvature: they arise from the Hessian $\nabla^2 F$, which is $O(1 - \rho) = O(K)$. K enters quadratically in (b) because the information channel is second-order: it arises from the *variance* of a Hessian quadratic form, which is $O((1 - \rho)^2) = O(K^2)$.

This is consistent: (a) and (c) ask “how much does F change?” (first derivative of curvature). Part (b) asks “how much does F vary?” (second derivative of curvature). The information channel is the square of the curvature channel.

7.3 Relationship to Prior Results

Part (a) generalizes the folklore superadditivity result for CES (which states $F(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y}) \geq F(\mathbf{x}) + F(\mathbf{y})$ without quantitative bounds) to a K -dependent lower bound on the gap.

Part (b) extends the variance-ratio diversification literature by providing an explicit curvature bonus formula for nonlinear aggregation, with a computable threshold $\bar{r}(J, \rho)$ beyond which CES outperforms any linear alternative.

Part (c) resolves a question in mechanism design: strategic independence under CES is not an additional assumption but a *theorem*, derivable from the same curvature parameter that controls superadditivity and correlation robustness. The connection to Shapley’s [7] convex game theory provides the qualitative result; the curvature provides the quantitative bound.

8. General Weights and the Secular Equation

With unequal weights $a_j > 0$ summing to 1, the symmetric point is replaced by the cost-minimizing point, the principal curvatures of the isoquant are no longer degenerate, and the curvature parameter K acquires a weight-dispersion factor. All three results generalize.

8.1 Effective Shares and the Cost-Minimizing Point

Define the **effective shares**

$$p_j = a_j^\sigma = a_j^{1/(1-\rho)}, \quad \Phi = \sum_{j=1}^J p_j, \quad (13)$$

and the **inverse effective shares** $w_j = 1/p_j = a_j^{-\sigma}$. For output level $c > 0$, the **cost-minimizing point** on \mathcal{I}_c at unit input prices is

$$x_j^* = \frac{cp_j}{\Phi^{1/\rho}}, \quad j = 1, \dots, J. \quad (14)$$

At this point, all marginal products are equal: $\partial F / \partial x_j|_{\mathbf{x}^*} = \Phi^{(1-\rho)/\rho} \equiv g$ for all j .

At equal weights: $p_j = J^{-\sigma}$, $\Phi = J^{1-\sigma}$, $x_j^* = c$, $g = 1/J$.

8.2 The Hessian at General Weights

Proposition 8.1. *At the cost-minimizing point \mathbf{x}^* with general weights:*

$$(\nabla^2 F)_{ij}|_{\mathbf{x}^*} = \frac{(1-\rho)g\Phi^{1/\rho}}{c} \left[\frac{p_i p_j}{\Phi^2} - \frac{\delta_{ij} p_j}{\Phi} \right]. \quad (15)$$

In matrix form:

$$\nabla^2 F|_{\mathbf{x}^*} = \frac{(1-\rho)g\Phi^{1/\rho}}{c\Phi} \left[\frac{\mathbf{p}\mathbf{p}^T}{\Phi} - \text{diag}(\mathbf{p}) \right] \quad (16)$$

where $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, \dots, p_J)$.

Proof. The general CES Hessian is $H_{ij} = [(1-\rho)/F](\partial_i F)(\partial_j F) - \delta_{ij}(1-\rho)/x_j \cdot \partial_j F$. At \mathbf{x}^* : $\partial_j F = g$, $F = c$, $x_j = cp_j/\Phi^{1/\rho}$. Substituting:

$$\begin{aligned} H_{ij} &= \frac{(1-\rho)}{c} g^2 - \delta_{ij} \frac{(1-\rho)}{cp_j/\Phi^{1/\rho}} g \\ &= \frac{(1-\rho)g}{c} \left[g - \delta_{ij} \frac{\Phi^{1/\rho}}{p_j} \right] \end{aligned}$$

where $g = \Phi^{(1-\rho)/\rho}$. Writing $g = \Phi^{1/\rho} \cdot \Phi^{-1}$ and factoring gives the result. \square

8.3 The Secular Equation

The principal curvatures of \mathcal{I}_c at \mathbf{x}^* are determined by the constrained eigenvalues of the weighted inverse-share matrix.

Proposition 8.2 (Secular equation). *Let $w_j = 1/p_j = a_j^{-\sigma}$ be the ordered inverse shares with $w_{(1)} \leq w_{(2)} \leq \dots \leq w_{(J)}$. The principal curvatures of the CES isoquant at \mathbf{x}^* are determined by the constrained eigenvalues $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_{J-1}$ of $W = \text{diag}(w_1, \dots, w_J)$ restricted to*

$\mathbf{1}^\perp$, which satisfy the *secular equation*

$$\sum_{j=1}^J \frac{1}{w_j - \mu} = 0. \quad (17)$$

This equation has exactly $J - 1$ roots, one in each interval $(w_{(k)}, w_{(k+1)})$ for $k = 1, \dots, J - 1$.

Proof. The Hessian (16) restricted to $\mathbf{1}^\perp$ (the tangent space to the isoquant) has the form $A - \lambda_0 B$ where A is a rank-1 perturbation of the diagonal matrix $\text{diag}(p_1, \dots, p_J)$. After a change of variables $y_j = \sqrt{p_j} v_j$, the constrained eigenvalue problem becomes finding the roots of $\det(W - \mu I) = 0$ subject to $\mathbf{1}^T \mathbf{v} = 0$, which reduces to the secular equation (17). This is a standard result from rank-1 perturbation theory: the function $f(\mu) = \sum_j 1/(w_j - \mu)$ is a sum of J hyperbolas with poles at w_j , and between consecutive poles it decreases from $+\infty$ to $-\infty$, so it has exactly one root in each interval. \square

Remark 8.3 (Interlacing). The roots μ_k strictly interlace the poles $w_{(k)}$:

$$w_{(1)} < \mu_1 < w_{(2)} < \mu_2 < \dots < w_{(J-1)} < \mu_{J-1} < w_{(J)}.$$

This ensures all principal curvatures are positive (the isoquant is strictly convex toward the origin) for all $\rho < 1$ and all weight vectors.

8.4 The Generalized Curvature Parameter

Definition 8.4. *The generalized curvature parameter is*

$$K(\rho, \mathbf{a}) = (1 - \rho) \frac{J - 1}{J} \Phi^{1/\rho} R_{\min} \quad (18)$$

where $R_{\min} = \mu_1$ is the smallest root of the secular equation (17).

Proposition 8.5. *At equal weights ($a_j = 1/J$): $w_j = J^\sigma$ for all j , $R_{\min} = J^\sigma$, $\Phi^{1/\rho} = J^{-\sigma}$, and $K(\rho, \mathbf{a})$ reduces to $(1 - \rho)(J - 1)/J$.*

Proof. At equal weights, all w_j are equal, so the secular equation has $J - 1$ roots all equal to $w = J^\sigma$. Then $K = (1 - \rho)(J - 1)/J \cdot J^{-\sigma} \cdot J^\sigma = (1 - \rho)(J - 1)/J$. \square

8.5 General-Weight Versions of the Three Theorems

Theorem 8.6 (General-weight Triple Role). *Let F be a CES aggregate with weights \mathbf{a} and generalized curvature parameter $K(\rho, \mathbf{a})$ from (18). Then:*

(a) **Superadditivity.** The qualitative result $F(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y}) \geq F(\mathbf{x}) + F(\mathbf{y})$ holds for all weight vectors (from concavity and homogeneity alone). The quantitative gap bound generalizes with $K(\rho, \mathbf{a})$ replacing K and the minimum curvature κ_{\min} replacing κ^* .

(b) **Correlation robustness.** With heterogeneous variances $\text{Var}[X_j] = \tau_j^2$ calibrated to the effective shares, the curvature bonus is bounded below by a term proportional to $K(\rho, \mathbf{a})^2$. The secular roots determine how the bonus distributes across the $J - 1$ idiosyncratic modes: the mode corresponding to μ_k contributes proportionally to $(1 - \rho)^2 / \mu_k$.

(c) **Strategic independence.** For a coalition S with $|S| = k$, the manipulation penalty involves the **coalition curvature parameter**

$$K_S = (1 - \rho) \frac{k - 1}{k} \Phi_S^{1/\rho} R_{\min,S} \quad (19)$$

where $R_{\min,S}$ is the smallest root of the secular equation restricted to S . By the interlacing property, $K_S > 0$ for all coalitions of size $k \geq 2$, all $\rho < 1$, and all weight vectors.

Proof. (a) follows from the same concavity + homogeneity argument as in equal-weight case; the quantitative bound uses κ_{\min} from Proposition 8.2.

(b) The expansion of $F(\mathbf{X})$ around \mathbf{x}^* uses the general Hessian (16). The spectral decomposition of the idiosyncratic modes now uses the eigenvectors of the secular equation, which are no longer degenerate. Each mode k contributes $\text{Var}[Y_{2,k}] \propto (1 - \rho)^2 / \mu_k^2$. Summing over modes and taking the minimum gives the $K(\rho, \mathbf{a})^2$ bound.

(c) The constrained Rayleigh quotient restricted to S yields

$$\boldsymbol{\delta}_S^T H_{SS} \boldsymbol{\delta}_S \leq -\frac{(1 - \rho) g \Phi^{1/\rho}}{c} R_{\min,S} \|\boldsymbol{\delta}_S\|^2$$

from the spectral bound of $W_S = \text{diag}(w_j)_{j \in S}$ restricted to $\mathbf{1}_S^\perp$, where $R_{\min,S}$ is the smallest root of the secular equation restricted to S . \square

Remark 8.7 (The secular equation in applied work). For applied economists using CES with calibrated weights (trade models, IO, macro with heterogeneous firms), the secular equation provides a direct route to the curvature parameter. Given weight vector \mathbf{a} : compute the inverse shares $w_j = a_j^{-\sigma}$, find the smallest root μ_1 of $\sum 1/(w_j - \mu) = 0$ numerically, and evaluate $K(\rho, \mathbf{a})$. This K then enters all three bounds. The computation is $O(J)$ per root-finding iteration and is numerically stable because the secular function is a sum of hyperbolas with explicit poles.

9. Discussion

9.1 Tightness

All three bounds become equalities in limit cases:

- (a): Equality when $\hat{\mathbf{x}} = \hat{\mathbf{y}}$ (proportional inputs); the gap vanishes for zero diversity.
- (b): Curvature bonus $\rightarrow 0$ as $\rho \rightarrow 1$ ($K \rightarrow 0$) or $r \rightarrow 1$ (perfect correlation); the CES aggregate degenerates to a linear aggregate and loses its informational advantage.
- (c): Manipulation penalty $\rightarrow 0$ as $K \rightarrow 0$ (perfect substitutes allow free redistribution) or $k/J \rightarrow 0$ (small coalitions have negligible impact).

The bounds are local (valid near the symmetric/cost-minimizing point). Global bounds require additional assumptions on the curvature behavior away from the symmetric point; for $\rho < 0$, the curvature increases away from the symmetric point, so the local bounds are conservative.

9.2 Sufficiency of J

The qualitative results (a) and (c) hold for all $J \geq 2$. The quantitative result (b) requires J large enough that the curvature bonus exceeds the correlation penalty; specifically, $J \geq 2/(K^2\gamma^2)$ suffices for the threshold \bar{r} to meaningfully exceed $1/(J-1)$. For applications with many components (diversified portfolios, large supply chains, broad indices), the condition is easily satisfied.

9.3 Connection to Other CES Results

The CES aggregate appears in several literatures where the triple role is economically relevant:

International trade. The Dixit-Stiglitz [2] formulation uses CES to aggregate differentiated varieties. Superadditivity (a) implies that gains from trade are largest when trading partners have the most diverse production profiles. The curvature parameter K quantifies these gains.

Directed technical change. Jones [6] studies how the elasticity of substitution determines the direction of technical change. Part (b) implies that CES economies with lower σ (higher K) are more robust to correlated technology shocks—the aggregate is less sensitive to common-factor variation.

Market power. Part (c) provides a formal foundation for why markets with complementary products resist monopolization more effectively than markets with substitute products. The penalty for manipulation grows monotonically with K .

Index construction. The Fisher, Törnqvist, and CES price indices all embed CES-type aggregation. Part (b) implies that CES indices with lower σ are more informationally efficient—they better represent the underlying distribution even when prices are correlated.

9.4 What This Paper Does Not Cover

This paper proves static properties of a single CES aggregate. It says nothing about:

- *Dynamics across multiple levels.* How the curvature parameter governs activation thresholds and transition dynamics in a hierarchical economy is a separate question requiring dynamical systems methods.
- *Endogenous ρ .* The substitution parameter is taken as exogenous. Whether and how ρ evolves endogenously is an open question.
- *Stochastic dynamics.* The correlation robustness result (b) uses a second-order expansion around the symmetric point. The behavior under large shocks or non-Gaussian inputs is not covered.

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