On the Right of Majesty

Majesty is the highest power over citizens and subjects, and it is freed from the laws, which the Greeks call ἄκραν έξουσίαν, [or] sometimes κυρίαν ἀρχλω³ and κύριον ωολέτευμα, the Italians Segnoria, [and] the Hebrews ΔΣΨ ΓΩΓΩ, Foundation of the Comthat is, fuller authority. For majesty, says Festus, is named from 'magnitude'. monwealth Majesty should have been defined from the start, which none of the philoso-_{179A} phers or jurists did define, since it seems that there is yet nothing greater or more necessary for understanding the nature of the Republic. And since we defined Republic above as a proper (rectam) guiding of several families and things common among them with the highest and perpetual power, it should be explained why it comes from the appellation of 'highest and perpetual power'. We said it must be perpetual because that a highest power over (in) citizens can come to be for one [person] or many; and yet it may not be allotted as perpetual, but [only] for a brief time: at the end of which, they relinquish (abdicant) the highest power. Therefore, they cannot be called the highest princes, but rather guardians of the highest power and imperium for so as long as the highest prince or people reclaims the entrusted (depositum) imperium of which they 179B| themselves are the truest possessors and lords—not differently than those who gave their things for a loan or as a pledge: * or, [for as long as] they permitted their jurisdiction or imperium to be enjoyed by another (whether for a certain cap.; l. quod meo, de actime or for a precarium⁷), they do not cease to be the arbiters and possessors of quir. posess.⁶ their power and jurisdiction.* Thus the Jurisconsult9 said that a prefect of Augustus is to return the entrusted imperium once his magistracy has come to an quia eod.8

^{*} l. qui pignori, de usu-

^{*} l. more. de iurisdic., l. et

^{1.} Cf. Dig. 1.3.31. 2. Unlimited power? 3. TODO 4. TODO 5. Signoira may be translated as lordship or dominion. 6. Dig. 41.3.33.4(!); 41.2.18 7. Dig. 43.26.1 pr.: Precarium is what is granted to one for him who seeks it with prayers to use for as long as he who granted it allows it. 8. Dig. 2.1.5; 2.1.6. 9. This epithet usually refers to Ulpian in the same way Aristotle was known as 'the Philosopher'.

2

gustalis10

17.11

Iudic. l. solet de Iurisdic. * Alexand. in l. ult. iurisdict.; Pano. in cap. Pastoralis, de offi. ord.; Innocentius & Felin. in cap. cum ecclesiarum, eod.12

lege. Plutar. in quaestion. Rom. 14

* 9 lib. 7¹⁵

* l. 1, de offi. praefecti Au- end.* Nor does it matter if a greater or lesser power be assigned: otherwise, if the highest power, granted as a precarious bequest of the prince were called majesty, he would be able to use that power by his own right (suo iure) against a prince to whom nothing would remain beyond the empty name prince: a servant, moreover, would command his lord. Nothing more absurd than that can be thought, for the person of the prince is always excepted in * l. ult., qui satisdate; cor. every concession of imperium to magistrates or private individuals: * however ser., de pot. regia. 9. much imperium there be that is assigned to another, it is still less than what he [790] has reserved to himself by his right majesty. Nor is it ever supposed that he has been despoiled of his highest power; rather, it is supposed that he can take * l. Iudicium soluitur, de cognizance* of those things which he assigned to the magistrates or superintendents, either by anticipation, joint exercise, or summons, and to take [back] by force* all power granted to the magistrates.

From these [reasons], it happens that none have the rights of majesty: not the Dictator of the Romans, not the Harmost of Spartans, not the Esymnete of the Salonikans, not the Archus of Maltese, not the Balia of the Florentines (when they enjoyed [uterentur] popular power), nor those who are called regents of a kingdom by men today, nor any other magistrates or supervisors who have highest power (though it be not allotted perpetually by concession of the prince or people). Nor, even, did those ancient dicators have the highest right— [790] even if they were appointed (dicebantur) by the noblest law13-from whom one * Festus in verbo optima could not appeal,* and on whose creation all magistrates resign [their offices] until, by the sacred measure proposed [one] June, the Tribunes of the people (plebs) were made sacred guardians of popular liberty, who, on the creation of the Dictator, had the free right of intercession so that, if it were appealled from the Dictator, the Tribunes could convene the people (plebs), among whom there was contention about the appeal. For the Dictator Papirius condemned to death Fabium Maximus I, and Fabius Maximus II also condemned to death Minutius, [both] masters of the light cavalry (minutium equitum), because they had fought against the command of the Dictators. Even so, they were freed on appeal (ex provocatione) by judgment of the people. For, as Livy says:* 'First, Fabius' father said, I call upon the Tribues, and I appeal to the people, who are more able than your dictatorship, to whom the king Tullus Hostilius yielded.' It should be clear from these words that he was neither prince nor chief magistrate (as many have thought), but a supervisor whom they call our commissioner; nor that anything else was assigned to him beyond taking charge of

10. Dig. 1.17.1. 11. Dig. 2.8.16. 12. TODO 13. TODO 14. TODO 15. TODO

war-making (curationem belli gerendi), curbing sedition, fixing the Republic (Reipublicae constituendae), creating magistrates, or helming the tiller (clavi figendi). Majesty, on the other hand, is not delimited by a greater power, any other laws, or time. But not even the decemvirs had a right of majesty for the promulgation of laws (legum ferendarum), even though they had the highest power, freed also from the laws, and even though all magistrates resign [their office] at the creation of the *decemvirs*, since their *imperium* takes its limit from the laws of the Twelve Tables, which were promulgated for the people—a thing common to all commissions. For Cincinatus made dictator for the sake of waging war abdicated his dictatorship immediately once he had broken the enemy's [80B] forces and finished the war in less than fifteen days. Servilius Priscus [did the same] by the eighth day; Mamercus on the very same day he was named dictator. And he was named dictator by neither Senate nor people, nor likewise by the magistrates, or by proposal for the people, or by any laws, which were always necessary for the creation of magistrates, but by an interim king, who had but recently arisen from patrician blood: for it was not enough to be a noble senator to name him dictator.* But if someone objects that Sulla was named *Novus qui primus hona dictator for eighty years by the lex Valeria, I shall repeat that argument of Ci- orem in republica adeptus cero's:* it was neither dictatorship nor a law, but the most cruel tyranny, which erat: nobilis noui hominis he nevertheless renounced in the fourth year after he was made dictator—sc., filius: patricius qui a pawhen he had extinguished the flames of the civil wars with the blood of the cit- tribus et conscriptis a Ro-And although Caesar had invaded the perpetual dictatorship forty years later *In lib. 1 de legibus.17 with the liberty of the people (plebs), he nonetheless left the Tribunes of the people (plebs) the power to veto (intercessio).18 However, before this, during the solitary consulship of Pompey, when the name of dictatorship had been removed from the republic, and, against the law of Pompey, Caesar had undertaken to be made dictator by the lex Servia¹⁹ he was slain in the middle of the Senate by a conspriacy of senators (principes). But let us grant that the highest power, and one freed from the laws, outside of (extra) a power to veto or appeal is given by the people to one person or many: should we say that he [or they] have a right of majesty? For he has majesty who, after God immortal, sees no one greater than himself. Still, I firmly believe (statuo) that there is no

^{16.} TODO 17. TODO 18. An intercessio was a veto by a magistrate against some official act; the plebeian tribunes had such a veto in order to protect the 'interests of the plebs against abuses by magistrates', though it could be (and was) used for less lofty purposes. Normally, this veto was unavailable against a dictator. See [berger1953]. 19. TODO: actio Serviana? Servian constitution?

majesty in them, but that they are bound to yield (*deponere*) the *imperium* to the people from whom they have the precarious power when the fixed time has run its course. Nor is the people thought to have deprived itself of its power, even if it allots the highest *imperium*—and one freed from the laws—to one or several persons; and even one not precarious for a fixed time. In either way, he who had that highest *imperium* is bound to render an account for the things he has done to the prince or the people. But the prince or the people in whom lives (*inest*) majesty is not compelled to render to anyone an account of his [or its] deeds beyond God immortal. What, therefore, if that highest *imperium* be granted to one or many people for ten years, as once there was one *archon* among the Athenians, whom they even called Judge? He was in charge of the republic with the highest power. Yet, majesty of the republic was not within his control (*penes eum*), since rather it was within the control of the supervisor or procurator of the people, and he was bound to render an account of the deeds of his rule (*imperii gesti*).

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