Improved Classical Cryptanalysis of SIKE in Practice

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PKC 2020

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 - → https://sike.org/
- ▶ Round-2 candidate in NIST standardization

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 - (1) Classical cryptanalysis by Adj et al.¹
 - (2) Quantum cryptanalysis by Jaques, Schanck and Schrottenloher²³

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²IS19.


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- ▶ **Today:** Further analysis of *classical* attacks on *SIKE*

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
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
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



Isom. classes of supersingular curves / \mathbb{F}_{p^2}


- (1) All classes of curves form a connected graph
- (2) $\approx p/12$ nodes, each has $\ell + 1$ outgoing isogenies for prime ℓ


























Brute-force


Time: $O(1 \cdot 2^{e_2-1})$


Mem: *O*(1)
































A set $S = \{0, ..., N-1\}$ and functions $h_0, h_1 : S \to T$

MitM problem

Find $x, y \in S$ such that $h_0(x) = h_1(y)$

⁴vOW99.

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▶ Define a family $\{f_n\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ of functions

$$f_n: S^* \to S^*, \quad S^* = S \times \{0, 1\}$$

 $(z, b) \mapsto g_n(h_b(z))$

► The $\{g_n\}_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ are "random" (e. g. SHA-3 domain sep. n)

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 \implies MitM reduces to golden collision search in any of the f_n

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Given f_n (for fixed n) find the golden collision

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van Oorschot-Wiener

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- 5. If not new, check for golden collision. If not, store and goto 2
- 6. If found 10w distinguished points, try next n

The set
$$S=\{0,\ldots,\sqrt{2^{e_2}}-1\}$$
 and (family of) random functions
$$f_n:z\in S^*\mapsto \text{AES-CBC}_n(j(E_i/\langle P_i+[z]Q_i\rangle))$$

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The set S=\{0,\ldots,\sqrt{2^{e_2}}-1\} and (family of) random functions f_n:z\in S^*\mapsto \mathrm{AES\text{-}CBC}_n(j(E_i/\langle P_i+[z]Q_i\rangle)) =\text{``Start from }E_i\text{'}, \text{compute isogeny walk corresponding to }z\text{'}, \text{apply AES with key }n\text{ to }j\text{-invariant.''}
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(Here E_0 is the *starting curve* and E_1 the *public key*.)

			$\log \#Queries \text{ to } f_n$		
e_2	$\log w$	Exp.			
<u></u>	10g w	SIDH			
32	9	23.20			
36	10	25.70			
40	11	28.20			
44	13	30.20			

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		$\log \#Queries$ to f_n			
e_2	$\log w$	Exp.	[canadians]		
	log w	SIDH	SIDH		
32	9	23.20	24.38		
36	10	25.70	27.25		
40	11	28.20	29.01		
44	13	30.20	30.91		

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			$\log \#Queries$ to f_n				
00	$\log w$	Exp.	[canadians]	Ours			
<i>e</i> ₂	log w	SIDH	SIDH	SIDH			
32	9	23.20	24.38	23.29			
36	10	25.70	27.25	25.74			
40	11	28.20	29.01	28.33			
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SIKE parameter choices + Equivalence classes

 \implies *N* decreases by factor 6

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e_2	$\log w$	Exp.		[canadians]	Ours	
	log w	SIDH	SIKE	SIDH	SIDH	
32	9	23.20	19.32	24.38	23.29	
36	10	25.70	21.82	27.25	25.74	
40	11	28.20	24.32	29.01	28.33	
44	13	30.20	26.32	30.91	30.37	

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			$\log \# \mathbf{Queries}$ to f_n				
00	$\log w$	Exp.		[canadians]	Οι	ırs	
e_2		SIDH	SIKE	SIDH	SIDH	SIKE	
32	9	23.20	19.32	24.38	23.29	19.58	
36	10	25.70	21.82	27.25	25.74	21.89	
40	11	28.20	24.32	29.01	28.33	24.40	
44	13	30.20	26.32	30.91	30.37	26.42	

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			$\log \# \mathbf{Queries}$ to f_n					
e ₂	$\log w$	Ex	æp.	[canadians]	Oı	ars		
6 <u>2</u> 10g	log w	SIDH	SIKE	SIDH	SIDH	SIKE		
32	9	23.20	19.32	24.38	23.29	19.58		
36	10	25.70	21.82	27.25	25.74	21.89		
40	11	28.20	24.32	29.01	28.33	24.40		
44	13	30.20	26.32	30.91	30.37	26.42		
56	17	37.20	33.32	_	_	33.38		

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 - \implies Speed-up oracle queries f_n

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 - \implies Complexity $O(2^{3(e_2-4)/4}/(m\sqrt{w}))$


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 - ⇒ Instances have (small) *local memory*, use this

Parallelized van Oorschot-Wiener



⁶Experiments run on 2x Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2690 v4 at 2.60 GHz with 14 cores each


Collision checking


- (z,\overline{z},d) $z \bullet$
- (y, \overline{z}, e)


y •

- $\bullet \bar{z}$
- ullet \overline{z}









Collision checking

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Additional assumption: can store all intermediate points locally

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 $z \bullet \bullet \bullet \cdots \bullet \overline{z}$ (y,\overline{z},e) $y \bullet \cdots \bullet \overline{z}$

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
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
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
Additional assumption: can store *t* intermediate points locally

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 $z \bullet \bullet \bullet \cdots \bullet \overline{z}$


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




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- ▶ Isogenies of degree $2^{2(e_2-1)-\Delta}$
- ► Table size of $2 \cdot 3 \cdot 2^{\Delta}$ elements in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}



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- ► Table size of $2 \cdot 3 \cdot 2^{\Delta}$ elements in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}
- ► Make sure to store the right basis of $2^{e_2-\Delta}$ -torsion..

Other optimizations

- ► Multi-target attacks
- ► Compressing distinguished points "leading bits are zero"

Thanks!

