



# Protocol Audit Report

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## Protocol Summary

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PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a user's passwords. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users. Only the owner should be able to set and access this password.

## Disclaimer

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The Oluwatobi team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

## Risk Classification

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Impact			
	High	Medium	Low
High	H	H/M	M

Impact				
Likelihood	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the [CodeHawks](#) severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

## Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

7d55682ddc4301a7b13ae9413095feffd9924566

## Scope

```
./src/  
└─ PasswordStore.sol
```

## Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password.
- Outsiders: No one else should be able to set or read the password.

## Executive Summary

Add some notes about how the audit went, types of things you found, etc.

We spent X hours with Z auditors using Y tools, etc.

## Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

## Findings

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## High

[H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to anyone and no longer private

**Description:** All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone and can be read directly from the blockchain. The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable and only accessed through the `PasswordStore::getPassword` function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

We show one such method of reading any data off chain below

**Impact:** Anyone can read the private password, severely breaking the functionality of the protocol.

**Proof of Concept:** (Proof of Code)

The below test case shows how anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain.

1. Create a locally running chain

```
make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract to the chain

```
make deploy
```

3. Run the storage tool

We use `1` because that's the storage slot of `s_password` in the contract.

```
cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

You will get an output that looks like this:

```
0x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

You can then parse that hex to a string with:

```
cast parse-bytes32-string  
0x6d7950617373776f7264000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

And get an output of:

```
myPassword
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the password. However, you'd also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with the password that decrypts your password.

[H-2] `PasswordStore::setPassword` has no access controls, meaning a non-owner could change the password

**Description:** The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however, the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that `This function allows only thhe owner to set a new password.`

```
function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {  
    @>    // @audit - There are no access controls  
    s_password = newPassword;  
    emit SetNetPassword();  
}
```

**Impact:** Anyone can set/change the password of the contract, severely breaking the contract intended functionality.

**Proof of Concept:** Add the following to the `PasswordStore.t.sol` test file.

► Code

```
function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public {  
    vm.assume(randomAddress != owner);  
    vm.prank(randomAddress);  
    string memory expectedPassword = "myPassword";  
    passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);  
  
    vm.prank(owner);  
    string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();  
    assertEq(actualPassword, expectedPassword);  
}
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Add an access control conditional to the `setPassword` function.

```
if (msg.sender != s_owner) {  
    revert PasswordStore_NotOwner();  
}
```

Medium

## Low

### Informational

[I-1] The `PasswordStore::getPassword` natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec to be correct.

#### Description:

```
/*  
    * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.  
    // @audit there is no newPassword parameter!  
    * @param newPassword The new password to set.  
    */  
function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
```

**Impact:** The natspec is incorrect

The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function signature is `getPassword()` which the natspec says it should be `getPassword(string)`.

**Recommended Mitigation:** Remove the incorrect natspec line.

```
-    * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```