
Implementation of Machine Learning Algorithms on CICIDS-2017 Dataset for Intrusion Detection using WEKA



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Shailesh Singh Panwar, Pritam Singh Negi, Lokesh Singh Panwar, Y. P. Raiwani

Abstract: For protecting and securing the network, with Intrusion Detection Systems through hidden intrusion has become a popular and important issue in the network security domain. Detection of attacks is the first step to secure any system. In this paper, the main focus is on seven different attacks, including Brute Force attack, Heartbleed/Denial-of-service (DoS), Web Attack, Infiltration, Botnet, Port Scan and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). We rely on features derived from CICIDS-2017 Dataset for these attacks. By using various subset based feature selection techniques performance of attack has been identified for many features. Using these techniques, it has been determined the appropriate group of attributes for finding every attack with related classification algorithms. Simulations of these techniques present that unwanted feature can be removed from attack detection techniques and find the most valuable set of attributes for a definite classification algorithm with discretization and without discretization, which improve the performance of IDS.

Keywords: IDS, CICIDS-2017, Classification Algorithms, Features Selection, WEKA.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the era of the continuously growing internet, securing the network becomes an important issue and challenge in our life. The role of intrusion detection techniques for network security is important for detecting any intrusion. Intrusion detection techniques are not only used to detect the attacks but also take an alarm on any unusual behaviour in a network. The behaviour of the intruded network is uncommon in general; it can be attack or deviation [1].

There are three ways for detecting any intrusion: - (i) Misuse-based or Signature Based Method; which detects familiar attacks, using their signatures without producing a huge number of false alarms. (ii) Anomaly based methods analyses the conventional system and network performance and recognize inconsistency as deviations from general network behaviour. New or fresh (zero-day) attacks can be recognized by this method. (iii) Hybrid methods are the combination of Signature and Anomaly Based methods. This

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method is used to enhance the familiar intrusion detection rate and for hidden attacks to decrease the false positive rate [2].

The feature selection techniques focus and maintain the significant attributes and enhance the entire performance of IDS. For this, an effective model has been developed with the help of the WEKA tool [3, 4] Different selected attributes and classification algorithms on the WEKA tool are used to create a useful and powerful framework to detect intrusion. WEKA is defined as a collection of machine learning and a group of data mining algorithms [5]. Section-II of this paper describes the CICIDS-2017 dataset; the section-III describes the outline of feature selection and classifier algorithms and section-IV introduces performance evaluation. Simulation results are analyses in section-V followed by conclusion and future scope in section-VI.

II. RELATED WORKS

Previous research efforts for providing a detailed analysis of the supervised machine learning techniques used for intrusion detection are summarized in Table 1. These studies focused on training and testing different machine learning approaches using standard intrusion detection on datasets. Therefore, we have two possible choices: either using a subset of these standard datasets or extracting new features based on network traces of standard datasets or statistics provided by the controller. In this study, we have used subset of features selection from the CICIDS-2017 dataset based on Correlation Feature Selection and Classifier Subset Evaluator approach and have considered J48, decision trees (DTs) and Naive Bayes (NB) with discretization and supervised machine without discretization learning approaches. For performance measurement, we are computing accuracy, precision, recall, F-measure and time taken to build a model (i.e. 90% training dataset and 10 % testing dataset).

Table 1: Previous Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Based
On Machine Learning Algorithms

| On Machine Learning Argorumis | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Author/ Year | Algorithms/ Methods | Dataset | | | | | | | |
| Belavagi 2016 [6] | LR, Gaussian NB, | NSL-KDD | | | | | | | |
| - | SVM and RF | | | | | | | | |
| Yin et al. 2017 [7] | J48, ANN, RF,SVM, | NSL-KDD | | | | | | | |
| | RNN-IDS | | | | | | | | |
| Khaled et al. 2017 [8] | RBM together with the | KDDCUP'99 | | | | | | | |
| | DBNs | | | | | | | | |
| Zhao et al.2017 [9] | DBNs with PNN | KDDCUP'99 | | | | | | | |
| Roy et al. 2017[10] | DNN | KDDCUP'99 | | | | | | | |
| Xu et al. 2018 [11] | GRU and LSTM | KDD99 and | | | | | | | |
| | | NSL-KDD | | | | | | | |
| Wu et al.2018 [12] | NB, NBT, J48, RF, | NSL-KDD | | | | | | | |
| | RFT,MLP, | | | | | | | | |
| | SVM,RNN,CNN on and | Enginee | | | | | | | |

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| Wang et al.2018 [13] | FGSM, JSMA | NSL-KDD |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| Shone et al. 2018 [14] | DBN, S-NDAE | KDD99 and |
| Shone et al. 2016 [14] | DDII, D IIDAL | NSL-KDD |
| Lia et al.2018 [15] | C4.5, RF, k-NN, | NSL-KDD |
| Lia et al.2018 [13] | | NSL-KDD |
| T + 1 + 12010 F161 | BPNN, NB, | NGL KDD |
| Latah et al.2018 [16] | DT, NB, LDA, NN, | NSL-KDD |
| | SVM, RF, k-NN, | |
| | AdaBoost, RUSBoost, | |
| | LogitBoost and BT | |
| Kamarudin et al2017 [17]. | NB, SVM, MLP, DT, | NSL-KDD |
| Jia et al.2019 [18] | NDNN | KDD99 and |
| | | NSL-KDD |
| Gogoi et al. 2013 [19] | Multi-level hybrid | KDD99, |
| | intrusion detection | NSL-KDD and |
| | method that | TUIDS |
| Gao et al. 2018 [20] | J48, NB, NBT, RF, RT, | NSL-KDD |
| | MLP, SVM etc. | |
| Ambusaidi et al2016 [21] | LSSVM + FMIFS, | KDD Cup 99, |
| | LSSVM + MIFS | NSL-KDD and |
| | | Kyoto 2006+ |
| Panwar et al. 2014 [22] | NB, J48 | NSL-KDD |
| Raiwani et al. 2015 [23] | MLP, SGD, VP, LR | NSL-KDD |
| Raiwani et al. 2014 [24] | KM, EM, DB, | NSL-KDD |
| | COBWEB | |
| Panwar et al. 2019 [25] | OneR, REPTree | CICIDS-2017 |
| Baluni et al. 2014[26] | FFNN | UKD Road |
| . , | | Accident |

III. DATASET

Since the inception of CICIDS-2017 dataset, the dataset started attracting researchers for analysis and developments of new models and algorithms [27, 28, 29]. According to the author ^[29] of CICIDS-2017, the dataset spanned over eight different files containing five days normal and attacks traffic data of the Canadian Institute of Cyber security. A short description of all those files is presented in the Table 2.

Table 2: Description of files containing CICIDS-2017 dataset

| Name of Files | Day | Attacks Found |
|--------------------------|-----------|----------------------|
| | Activity | |
| Monday-WorkingHours.pc | Monday | Benign |
| ap_ISCX.csv | | (Normal human |
| | | activities) |
| Tuesday-WorkingHours.pc | Tuesday | Benign, FTP-Patator, |
| ap_ISCX.csv | | SSH-Patator |
| Wednesday-workingHours. | Wednesday | Benign, |
| pcap_ISCX.csv | | DoS GoldenEye, |
| | | DoS Hulk, |
| | | DoS Slowhttptest, |
| | | DoS slowloris, |
| | | Heartbleed |
| Thursday-WorkingHours- | Thursday | Benign, |
| Morning- | | Web Attack - Brute |
| WebAttacks.pcap_ | | Force, |
| ISCX.csv | | Web Attack - Sql |
| | | Injection, |
| | | Web Attack – XSS |
| Thursday-WorkingHours-A | Thursday | Benign, |
| fternoon- | | Infiltration |
| Infilteration.pcap_ | | |
| ISCX.csv | | |
| Friday-WorkingHours- | Friday | Benign, |
| Morning.pcap_ISCX.csv | | Bot |
| Friday-WorkingHours-Afte | Friday | Benign, |
| rnoon-PortScan.pcap_ISCX | | PortScan |
| .csv | | |
| Friday-WorkingHours-Afte | Friday | Benign, |
| rnoon- | | DDoS |
| DDos.pcap_ISCX.csv | | |

It can be seen from Table 2 that the dataset contains attack information as five days traffic data. Thursday working hour afternoon and Friday data are well suited for binary

classification. Similarly, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday morning data are best for designing the multi-class detection model. However, it should be noted that a best detection model should be able to detect attacks of any type. Therefore, to design such a typical IDS, the traffic data of all the day should be merged together to form a single dataset to be used by IDS. This is exactly followed to merge these files in this paper.

By merging the files presented in Table 2, found the whole shape of a dataset that contains 3119345 instances and 79 features containing 15 class labels (1 normal + 14 attack labels). Further, examining the instances of the combined files, it has been found that the dataset contains 288602 instances having the missing class label and 203 instances having missing information. By removing such missing instances, found a combined dataset of CICIDS-2017 having 2830540 instances. At this moment checked for any possible redundant instances. Surprisingly, no redundant instances were found. The characteristics of the combined dataset and the detailed class wise occurrence have been presented in the Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 respectively.

Table 3: Records in the CICIDS-2017 Dataset

| Type of Attack | Day | Total Records |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Benign | Monday | 529918 |
| Brute Force Attack | Tuesday | 445909 |
| Heartbleed Attack/ DoS Attack | Wednesday | 692703 |
| Web Attack | Thursday (Morning) | 170366 |
| Infiltration Attack | Thursday(Afternoon) | 288602 |
| Botnet Attack | Friday(Morning) | 191033 |
| Port Scan Attack | Friday(Afternoon) | 286467 |
| DDoS Attack | Friday(Afternoon) | 225745 |

Table 4: Overall characteristics of CICIDS-2017 dataset

| Dataset Name | CICIDS2018 |
|--|-------------|
| Dataset Type | Multi class |
| Year of release | 2017 |
| Total number of distinct instances(After | 2830540 |
| removing missing instances) | |
| Number of features | 79 |
| Number of distinct classes | 15 |

Table 5: The Class wise instance occurrence of CICIDS-2017

| Class Labels | Number of instances |
|----------------------------|---------------------|
| BENIGN | 2359087 |
| DoS Hulk | 231072 |
| PortScan | 158930 |
| DDoS | 41835 |
| DoS GoldenEye | 10293 |
| FTP-Patator | 7938 |
| SSH-Patator | 5897 |
| DoS slowloris | 5796 |
| DoS Slowhttptest | 5499 |
| Botnet | 1966 |
| Web Attack – Brute Force | 1507 |
| Web Attack – XSS | 652 |
| Infiltration | 36 |
| Web Attack – Sql Injection | 21 |
| Heartbleed | 11 |

Another interesting point we observed that the dataset fulfils all the criteria[30, 31] of a true intrusion detection dataset,

such as complete network configuration, complete traffic, labeled dataset, complete



interaction, complete capture, available protocols, attack diversity, heterogeneity, the feature set and meta data.

Table 6: Features of CICIDS-2017 Dataset

| | Features | | Features |
|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| ď | 10000105 | · | 10000105 |
| e n | | e ne | |
| Feature no. | | Feature no. | |
| eat | | eat | |
| Ŧ | | H | |
| 1. | Destination Port | 41. | Packet Length Mean |
| 2. | Flow Duration | 42. | Packet Length Std |
| 3. | Total Fwd Packets | 43. | Packet Length Variance |
| 4. | Total Backward Packets | 44. | FIN Flag Count |
| 5. | Total Length of Fwd Packets | 45. | SYN Flag Count |
| 6. | Total Length of Bwd Packets | 46. | RST Flag Count |
| 7. | Fwd Packet Length Max | 47. | PSH Flag Count |
| 8. | Fwd Packet Length Min | 48. | ACK Flag Count |
| 9. | Fwd Packet Length Mean | 49. | URG Flag Count |
| 10. | Fwd Packet Length Std | 50. | CWE Flag Count |
| 11. | Bwd Packet Length Max | 51. | ECE Flag Count |
| 12. | Bwd Packet Length Min | 52. | Down/Up Ratio |
| 13. | Bwd Packet Length Mean | 53. | Average Packet Size |
| 14. | Bwd Packet Length Std | 54. | AvgFwd Segment Size |
| 15. | Flow Bytes/s | 55. | AvgBwd Segment Size |
| 16. | Flow Packets/s | 56. | Fwd Header Length |
| 17. | Flow IAT Mean | 57. | FwdAvg Bytes/Bulk |
| 18. | Flow IAT Std | 58. | FwdAvg Packets/Bulk |
| 19. | Flow IAT Max | 59. | FwdAvg Bulk Rate |
| 20. | Flow IAT Min | 60. | BwdAvg Bytes/Bulk |
| 21. | Fwd IAT Total | 61. | BwdAvg Packets/Bulk |
| 22. | Fwd IAT Mean | 62. | BwdAvg Bulk Rate |
| 23. | Fwd IAT Std | 63. | SubflowFwd Packets |
| 24. | Fwd IAT Max | 64. | SubflowFwd Bytes |
| 25. | Fwd IAT Min | 65. | SubflowBwd Packets |
| 26. | Bwd IAT Total | 66. | SubflowBwd Bytes |
| 27. | Bwd IAT Mean | 67. | Init_Win_bytes_forward |
| 28. | Bwd IAT Std | 68. | Init_Win_bytes_backward |
| 29. | Bwd IAT Max | 69. | act_data_pkt_fwd |
| 30. | Bwd IAT Min | 70. | min_seg_size_forward |
| 31. | Fwd PSH Flags | 71. | Active Mean |
| 32. | Bwd PSH Flags | 72. | Active Std |
| 33. | Fwd URG Flags | 73. | Active Max |
| 34. | Bwd URG Flags | 74. | Active Min |
| 35. | Fwd Header Len | 75. | Idle Mean |
| 36. | Bwd Header Length | 76. | Idle Std |
| 37. | Fwd Packets/s | 77. | Idle Max |
| 38. | Bwd Packets/s | 78. | Idle Min |
| 39. | Min Packet Length | 79. | Label |
| 40. | Max Packet Length | | |

Table 7: Confusion Matrix

| Tuest / Communication Planting | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Type of Class | Predicted Class | | | | | | | |
| | Benign | Attack | | | | | | |
| Benign | True Positive | False Negative | | | | | | |
| Attack | False Positive | True Negative | | | | | | |

IV. METHODOLOGY AND PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

A. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

This work aims to propose an intrusion detection model in which the collected dataset will be analysed using machine learning algorithms. The key emphasis will be given on data pre-processing, feature selection, discretization, Machine learning algorithms and CICIDS-2017 Dataset. Steps for the proposed model are as follows:

STEP 1: [Data Pre-processing]. This step adjusts the initial data format (CSV file).

STEP 2: [Feature Selection]. We select the optimal feature for classification. This reciprocal information based on

feature selection algorithm can handle linearly and non-linearly dependent data features. Its effectiveness is analysed in instances of network intrusion detection.

STEP 3: [Analyse the results without discretization and with discretization]. In order to enhance the performance of machine learning algorithms, discretization converts, continuous data attribute values into the finite set of intervals with minimal loss of information. Then apply the machine learning algorithms on CICIDS-2017 dataset and analyse the performance of CICIDS-2017 dataset.

STEP 4: [Check Measures]. If the results are as per measures, consider the classification algorithms for further processing. For example, if the accuracy could satisfy the requirement (e.g. accuracy > 95%), consider the classification algorithms for further processing, otherwise, the model would repeat the STEP 3.

STEP 5: [Evaluation]. This step is used to evaluate the model performance. Evaluation metrics include the Time to build a model, Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F- Measure.




Fig.1. Proposed Framework

B. Pre-Processing

Data pre-processing is preparing the data in a particular way or format that is suitable for actually doing the

data mining algorithms. Data pre-processing is one of the major step of data mining i.e.



what has been done before the data mining.

In pre-processing sometime data is not always present in a single place. It might have to be gathered form different places and converted into a single & suitable format, followed by data cleaning and Normalization/ Discretization, before Data Mining.

C. Discretization

Discretization is a method for execution, which changes dataset record or properties for some machine learning calculations. The basic advantage of discretization is that some classification techniques can only work on ostensible properties, not on numerical characteristics. Further favourable position is that it will increment the order exactness of the tree and decide calculations that rely upon ostensible information.

D. Feature Selection Classification Algorithms

If one considers correlations between network traffic records to be linear associations, then a linear measure of dependence such as linear correlation coefficient can be used to measure the dependence between two random variables. However, considering the real world communication, the correlation between variables can be nonlinear as well. Apparently, a linear measure cannot reveal the relation between two nonlinearly dependent variables. Thus, measure the capability of analysing the relation between two variables no matter whether they are linearly or nonlinearly dependent. For these reasons, this work intends to explore a means of selecting optimal features from a feature space regardless of the type of correlation between them.

D.1 CFS (Correlation Feature Selection):

Feature selection is a process of selecting a subset of the relevant attribute selected from the large number of basic attributes of a particular dataset by applying unique assessment standards to enhance the pleasant of classification, while the dimension of the data reduces. It is used to evaluate the subset of features based on the well-suited subsets, which have highly correlated facilities with classification, are still unrelated to each other [32].

D.2 Classifier Subset Evaluator (CSE):

- It evaluates the specialty subset on training data or a separate hold-out test set.
- It uses a classification to estimate the eligibility of a set of attributes.

E. Classification Algorithms

E.1 Naive Bayes:

Naive Bayes Classifiers is a family of "probabilistic classification", which implements with the powerful independence hypothesis between the features [33]. It is particularly scalable; require a number of linear parameters inside the wide variety of irregular capabilities in a learning hassle. Naive Bayes is an easy technique for building classifiers: sample and pattern that gives magnificence labels to difficult situation time, which are shown as feature value vectors, where the labels are exhausted from some limited set. This is not the only algorithm for such classification, but the group of algorithm is entirely based on a general preaching. All Naive Bayes classifiers anticipate that the significance of a specific attribute is independent of the significance of any other attribute, given the class variable [34].

Bayes theorem is stated as the probability of the event B given A is equal to the probability of the event A given B multiplied by the probability of A upon the probability of B.

P(A/B) = P(B/A) P(A) / P(A)

Where A is called proposition, B is called evidence, P(A) is the prior probability of proposition, and P(B) is prior evidence of proposition.

E.2 J48:

The J48 is a type of C4.5 decision tree deployed for classification purposes in WEKA [35]. It has been produced by greedy top-down construction technique and uses reduced-error pruning. A detail hypothesis measure is used to determine attributes, which gives an indication of the classification power of each attribute. Once an attribute is selected, the training data are split into subsets, according to different values of the selected attribute and the procedure is repeated for each subset, unless a huge proportion of instances in each subset are related to a single class [36, 37].

E.3 Decision Tree:

Decision Tree is basically a technique or the data structure that builds or helps classification models in the form of a tree. It is a graphical representation of all the possible solution to a decision. Decisions are based on some condition and can be easily explained. There are two types of nodes: (i) Decision nodes, which specify the choice and test. (ii) Leaf nodes, indicates the classification of an example or the value of an example [38].

The decision table of algorithm is generated using classifiers under rules. Most commonly used algorithms in this category are DT, ID3, C4.5 (the extension of ID3) [35, 39] and CART [40].

V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

All classifiers are performed on the basis of Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F- Measure and Time to build a model. The performance was calculated by True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN) and True Negative (TN) (Table 7). All above values are calculated from the confusion matrices.

- Accuracy is defined as accurately prediction of positive and negative instances and is calculated as:
 - Accuracy = (TP + TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN)
- Precision calculates the probability of accurate positive prediction.

Precision = TP/(TP + FP)

- The recall measures the number of correct classifications penalized by the number of missed entries.
 - Recall = (TP/TP + FN)
- The harmonic mean of precision and recall calculates the F-measures, which serves as a derived effectiveness
- F- Measure= 2* (Precision * Recall)/ (Precision + Recall)
- Time to build is the time to build a model by a classification algorithm on the dataset.

VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Our experiments were implemented under the following hardware and software platforms:

Hardware:

Intel Xeon E5-2650 v4 (12 core, 2.2 GHz, 30MB L3 cache, 16 GB RAM, NVIDIA Quadro P400 2GB)
Software:

Windows 10 Professional, WEKA 3.8.2 (64bit).



To evaluate the system performance objectively, the following experiments were performed 10-fold for cross-validation on CICIDS-2017 dataset. CICIDS-2017 dataset has both benign and attack information data for network link. Each linked data is composed of 79 different attributes which are listed in the Table 6. In feature selection, the proposed methods are used for various matters of the selected feature.

We are checking the feature selection algorithms (i.e., correlation feature selection and classifier subset evaluator) and classification algorithms with feature subset algorithms using discretization and without discretization on the WEKA tool [41]. Table 8 expresses the predefined selected feature numbers for individual attacks and their numbers for each attack. Fig 2 shows that the number of selected feature when using different feature selection algorithm.

Table 8: Predefined selected feature numbers for individual attack using CfsSubset Attribute Evaluator, Classifier Subset Evaluator with Naive Bayes, Classifier Subset Evaluator with J48 Algorithms and Classifier Subset Evaluator with Decision Tree

| Attacks | Algorithms | Predefined Selected Feature no. | Total Selected Features |
|---------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | CFS | 1,10,70 | 3 |
| Brute Force Attack | CSE With Naive Bayes | 1,10,18,38,49,67 | 6 |
| | CSE With J48 | 1,35,38,49,67 | 5 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 68 | 1 |
| | CFS | 1,6,67,77 | 4 |
| DoS/ Heartbleed | CSE With Naive Bayes | 1,2,6,14,24,35,41,67,68,70,74 | 11 |
| Attack | CSE With J48 | 1,3,6,7,20,24,40,67 | 8 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 1 | 1 |
| | CFS | 9,25,68 | 3 |
| Web Attack | CSE With Naive Bayes | 25,67,68 | 3 |
| | CSE With J48 | 1,2,4,16,21,25,67,68 | 8 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 68 | 1 |
| | CFS | 5,72,74,76 | 4 |
| T 017 1 1 | CSE With Naive Bayes | 1,13,25,67,68,70 | 6 |
| Infiltration Attack | CSE With J48 | 1,8,68 | 3 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 68 | 1 |
| | CFS | 1, 13, 14, 70 | 4 |
| . | CSE With Naive Bayes | 1, 6, 31, 35, 44, 67 | 6 |
| Botnet Attack | CSE With J48 | 1, 53, 67, 68 | 4 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 1 | 1 |
| | CFS | 13,47,68, 69, 70 | 5 |
| . | CSE With Naive Bayes | 5,7,8,10,23,41,47,67,68 | 9 |
| Port Scan Attack | CSE With J48 | 25,35,38,41,68,71 | 6 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 68 | 1 |
| | CFS | 1, 7, 46, 72 | 4 |
| DD G 1 1 | CSE With Naive Bayes | 5, 8, 26, 67, 68, 75, 77 | 7 |
| DDoS Attack | CSE With J48 | 1, 5, 6, 8, 48, 67, 68, 78 | 8 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 1 | 1 |




Fig. 2. Predefined selected feature numbers for individual attack using Feature Selection Algorithms



Table 9: Performance evaluation for *Brute Force* Attack using classifier with the selected feature

| C1 101 | T | Without Discretization | | | | | With Discretization | | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|---------------------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|
| Classifier | Features Selection Algorithm | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure |
| | CFS | 0.39 | 99.2696 | 1.000 | 0.993 | 0.996 | 0.09 | 99.8058 | 1.000 | 0.998 | 0.999 |
| Naïve | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.48 | 99.2770 | 1.000 | 0.993 | 0.996 | 0.05 | 99.9899 | 1.000 | 0.993 | 0.996 |
| Bayes | CSE With J48 | 0.52 | 98.5596 | 1.000 | 0.993 | 0.996 | 0.06 | 99.9670 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.11 | 90.5985 | 0.990 | 0.921 | 0.995 | 0.04 | 98.8670 | 0.990 | 0.998 | 0.994 |
| | CFS | 1.14 | 99.8706 | 1.000 | 0.999 | 0.999 | 0.27 | 99.8695 | 1.000 | 0.999 | 0.999 |
| J48 | CSE With Naive Bayes | 2.84 | 99.9951 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.04 | 99.9937 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With J48 | 2.00 | 99.9919 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.39 | 99.9973 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 1.05 | 98.8670 | 0.990 | 0.998 | 0.994 | 0.16 | 98.8670 | 0.990 | 0.998 | 0.994 |
| | CFS | 0.31 | 97.8899 | 1.000 | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.09 | 97.8899 | 1.000 | 0.992 | 0.996 |
| Decision | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.98 | 97.8899 | 1.000 | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.11 | 97.8899 | 1.000 | 0.992 | 0.996 |
| Tree | CSE With J48 | 0.73 | 97.8899 | 1.000 | 0.992 | 0.996 | 1.50 | 97.8899 | 1.000 | 0.992 | 0.996 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.13 | 96.8973 | 0.969 | 1.000 | 0.984 | 0.03 | 98.1140 | 0.981 | 1.000 | 0.990 |

Table 10: Performance evaluation for Heartbleed Attack/ DoS Attack using classifier with the selected features

| | | | | ut Discretiz | | | With Discretization | | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------|-------|----------|--------------|--------|-----------|---------------------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|
| Classifier | Features Selection Algorithm | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure |
| | CFS | 0.59 | 88.8262 | 1.000 | 0.889 | 0.941 | 0.11 | 98.7126 | 0.999 | 0.987 | 0.993 |
| Naïve | CSE With Naive Bayes | 1.24 | 90.3751 | 1.000 | 0.899 | 0.947 | 0.11 | 99.8145 | 0.999 | 0.999 | 0.999 |
| Bayes | CSE With J48 | 1.84 | 91.3872 | 1.000 | 0.893 | 0.943 | 0.04 | 99.2516 | 0.999 | 0.990 | 0.994 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.14 | 89.8427 | 1.000 | 0.889 | 0.941 | 0.09 | 89.8427 | 1.000 | 0.889 | 0.941 |
| | CFS | 8.91 | 99.4422 | 0.995 | 0.998 | 0.997 | 0.47 | 99.4347 | 0.995 | 0.998 | 0.997 |
| J48 | CSE With Naive Bayes | 29.60 | 99.9554 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.94 | 99.9373 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With J48 | 34.58 | 99.9568 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.86 | 99.9460 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.59 | 89.8427 | 1.000 | 0.889 | 0.941 | 0.14 | 89.8427 | 1.000 | 0.889 | 0.941 |
| | CFS | 0.73 | 83.5489 | 0.821 | 0.963 | 0.886 | 0.09 | 89.8427 | 1.000 | .889 | 0.941 |
| Decision | CSE With Naive Bayes | 3.02 | 85.7092 | 0.828 | 0.999 | 0.905 | 0.15 | 89.8427 | 0.828 | 0.999 | 0.905 |
| Tree | CSE With J48 | 1.95 | 84.3523 | 0.821 | 0.980 | 0.893 | 0.23 | 89.8427 | 1.000 | 0.889 | 0.941 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.11 | 63.5238 | 0.635 | 1.000 | 0.777 | 0.06 | 89.8427 | 1.000 | 0.889 | 0.941 |

Table 11: Performance evaluation for Web Attack using classifier with the selected features

| Classifier | Ford or Galactic | Without Discretization | | | | With Discretization | | | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------|--------|---------------------|------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|
| | Features Selection Algorithm | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure |
| | CFS | 0.20 | 13.4264 | 0.996 | 0.130 | 0.230 | 0.03 | 99.4981 | 0.999 | 0.999 | 0.999 |
| Naïve | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.08 | 83.4996 | 0.999 | 0.842 | 0.914 | 0.01 | 99.4066 | 1.000 | 0.998 | 0.999 |
| Bayes | CSE With J48 | 0.17 | 94.9614 | 1.000 | 0.954 | 0.976 | 0.02 | 98.9094 | 1.000 | 0.995 | 0.997 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.03 | 96.4165 | 0.987 | 0.977 | 0.982 | 0.02 | 99.2469 | 0.999 | 0.997 | 0.998 |
| | CFS | 1.01 | 99.5833 | 0.999 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.11 | 99.5821 | 0.999 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| J48 | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.77 | 99.5985 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.08 | 99.5985 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With J48 | 2.86 | 99.6138 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.09 | 99.6243 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.20 | 99.2463 | 0.999 | 0.997 | 0.998 | 0.03 | 99.2469 | 0.999 | 0.997 | 0.998 |
| | CFS | 0.16 | 98.7204 | 0.987 | 1.000 | 0.994 | 0.02 | 99.1319 | 0.998 | 0.997 | 0.997 |
| Decision | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.09 | 98.7204 | 0.987 | 1.000 | 0.994 | 0.01 | 99.1319 | 0.998 | 0.997 | 0.997 |
| Tree | CSE With J48 | 0.41 | 98.7204 | 0.987 | 1.000 | 0.994 | 0.05 | 99.1319 | 0.998 | 0.997 | 0.997 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.04 | 98.7204 | 0.987 | 1.000 | 0.994 | 0.02 | 99.1319 | 0.998 | 0.997 | 0.997 |



Table 12: Performance evaluation for Infiltration Attack using classifier with the selected features

| | | | Witho | ut Discreti | | With Discretization | | | | | |
|------------------|---------------------------------|------|----------|-------------|--------|---------------------|------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|
| Classifier | Features Selection Algorithm | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure |
| Naïve | CFS | 0.30 | 99.0440 | 1.000 | 0.990 | 0.995 | 0.08 | 99.9598 | 1.000 | 0.990 | 0.995 |
| | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.30 | 97.5603 | 1.000 | 0.976 | 0.988 | 0.01 | 99.9993 | 1.000 | 0.976 | 0.988 |
| Bayes | CSE With J48 | 0.17 | 84.9606 | 1.000 | 0.850 | 0.919 | 0.02 | 99.9965 | 1.000 | 0.850 | 0.919 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.08 | 99.9875 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.02 | 99.9938 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| J48 | CFS | 1.61 | 99.9900 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.25 | 99.9913 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With Naive Bayes | 2.03 | 99.9958 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.20 | 99.9945 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With J48 | 0.67 | 99.9955 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.19 | 99.9972 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.17 | 99.9931 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.03 | 99.9938 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CFS | 0.27 | 99.9875 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.11 | 99.9875 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Decision Tree | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.53 | 99.9875 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.05 | 99.9875 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With J48 | 0.20 | 99.9875 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.03 | 99.9875 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.05 | 99.9875 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.05 | 99.9900 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |

Table 13: Performance evaluation for Botnet Attack using classifier with the selected features

| | | | | ut Discreti | | | With Discretization | | | | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------|------|----------|-------------|--------|-----------|---------------------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|--|--|
| Classifier | Features Selection Algorithm | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | | |
| Naïve | CFS | 0.22 | 86.7180 | 0.993 | 0.872 | 0.929 | 0.06 | 99.5095 | 0.998 | 0.997 | 0.998 | | |
| | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.16 | 14.899 | 1.000 | 0.140 | 0.246 | 0.01 | 99.9717 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | | |
| Bayes | CSE With J48 | 0.14 | 98.4704 | 0.990 | 0.995 | 0.992 | 0.03 | 99.9707 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | | |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.03 | 98.9709 | 0.990 | 1.000 | 0.995 | 0.02 | 99.6304 | 0.996 | 1.000 | 0.998 | | |
| | CFS | 0.80 | 99.6357 | 0.997 | 0.999 | 0.998 | 0.09 | 99.6362 | 0.997 | 1.000 | 0.998 | | |
| J48 | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.64 | 99.9639 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.05 | 99.9602 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | | |
| | CSE With J48 | 0.55 | 99.9817 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.05 | 99.9628 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | | |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.17 | 99.6283 | 0.996 | 1.000 | 0.998 | 0.03 | 99.6304 | 0.996 | 1.000 | 0.998 | | |
| | CFS | 0.20 | 98.9709 | 0.990 | 1.000 | 0.995 | 0.06 | 99.6310 | 0.996 | 1.000 | 0.998 | | |
| | CSE With Naive | 0.27 | 98.9709 | 0.990 | 1.000 | 0.995 | 0.02 | 99.6310 | 0.996 | 1.000 | 0.998 | | |
| Decision | Bayes | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tree | CSE With J48 | 0.16 | 98.9709 | 0.990 | 1.000 | 0.995 | 0.02 | 99.6310 | 0.996 | 1.000 | 0.998 | | |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.04 | 98.9709 | 0.990 | 1.000 | 0.995 | 0.02 | 99.6310 | 0.996 | 1.000 | 0.998 | | |

Table 14: Performance evaluation for PortScan Attack using classifier with the selected features

| C1 101 | T . G | | Witho | ut Discreti | zation | | With Discretization | | | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------|------|----------|-------------|--------|-----------|---------------------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|--|
| Classifier | Features Selection Algorithm | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | |
| Naïve | CFS | 0.28 | 97.0974 | 0.991 | 0.943 | 0.967 | 0.06 | 99.3165 | 0.991 | 0.994 | 0.992 | |
| | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.31 | 90.6733 | 0.989 | 0.799 | 0.884 | 0.03 | 99.9417 | 0.999 | 0.999 | 0.999 | |
| Bayes | CSE With J48 | 0.25 | 69.674 | 0.968 | 0.330 | 0.492 | 0.03 | 99.5839 | 0.992 | 0.999 | 0.995 | |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.06 | 58.5160 | 0.909 | 0.076 | 0.140 | 0.02 | 98.4243 | 0.994 | 0.971 | 0.982 | |
| | CFS | 2.55 | 99.8265 | 0.999 | 0.997 | 0.998 | 0.28 | 99.8391 | 0.999 | 0.997 | 0.998 | |
| J48 | CSE With Naive Bayes | 5.30 | 99.9623 | 1.000 | 0.999 | 1.000 | 0.39 | 99.9623 | 1.000 | 0.999 | 1.000 | |
| | CSE With J48 | 4.22 | 99.9853 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.30 | 99.9822 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.42 | 98.4239 | 0.994 | 0.971 | 0.982 | 0.05 | 98.4243 | 0.994 | 0.971 | 0.982 | |
| | CFS | 0.31 | 89.3625 | 0.999 | 0.762 | 0.864 | 0.06 | 98.3680 | 0.990 | 0.973 | 0.982 | |
| | CSE With Naive | 0.55 | 95.7744 | 0.995 | 0.910 | 0.950 | 0.06 | 98.3680 | 0.990 | 0.973 | 0.982 | |
| Decision | Bayes | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tree | CSE With J48 | 0.38 | 95.0870 | 0.999 | 0.891 | 0.942 | 0.05 | 98.3680 | 0.990 | 0.973 | 0.982 | |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.04 | 82.2936 | 0.999 | 0.603 | 0.752 | 0.03 | 98.3680 | 0.990 | 0.973 | 0.982 | |



Table 15: Performance evaluation for *DDoS Attack* using classifier with the selected features

| Classifier | Features Selection Algorithm | Without Discretization | | | | | | With Discretization | | | | | |
|------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|------|---------------------|-----------|--------|-----------|--|--|
| | | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | Time | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F-Measure | | |
| | CFS | 0.19 | 84.6030 | 1.000 | 0.644 | 0.784 | 0.06 | 98.9125 | 1.000 | 0.975 | 0.987 | | |
| Naïve | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.20 | 86.9990 | 0.999 | 0.700 | 0.823 | 0.02 | 99.9699 | 0.999 | 1.000 | 1.000 | | |
| Bayes | CSE With J48 | 0.22 | 92.1199 | 1.000 | 0.818 | 0.900 | 0.03 | 99.7572 | 1.000 | 0.995 | 0.997 | | |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.05 | 75.0285 | 1.000 | 0.423 | 0.595 | 0.02 | 96.0442 | 1.000 | 0.909 | 0.952 | | |
| | CFS | 1.58 | 98.9125 | 1.000 | 0.975 | 0.987 | 0.20 | 98.9125 | 1.000 | 0.975 | 0.987 | | |
| J48 | CSE With Naive Bayes | 2.83 | 99.9553 | 0.999 | 1.000 | 0.999 | 0.47 | 99.9685 | 0.999 | 1.000 | 1.000 | | |
| | CSE With J48 | 3.08 | 99.9836 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.23 | 99.9849 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | | |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.14 | 96.0442 | 1.000 | 0.909 | 0.952 | 0.03 | 96.0442 | 1.000 | 0.909 | 0.952 | | |
| | CFS | 0.16 | 87.1519 | 1.000 | 0.703 | 0.826 | 0.06 | 96.0442 | 1.000 | 0.909 | 0.952 | | |
| Decision | CSE With Naive Bayes | 0.30 | 85.9851 | 0.999 | 0.677 | 0.807 | 0.05 | 79.2049 | 0.676 | 0.996 | 0.806 | | |
| Tree | CSE With J48 | 0.36 | 85.9851 | 0.999 | 0.677 | 0.807 | 0.03 | 96.0442 | 1.000 | 0.909 | 0.952 | | |
| | CSE With Decision Tree | 0.03 | 81.6403 | 1.000 | 0.576 | 0.731 | 0.01 | 96.0442 | 1.000 | 0.909 | 0.952 | | |




Fig.3. Time Comparison without Discretization




Fig.4. Time Comparison with Discretization






Fig.5. Accuracy Comparison without Discretization




Fig.6. Accuracy Comparison with Discretization




Fig.7.Precision Comparison without Discretization






Fig.8.Precision Comparison with Discretization




Fig.9.Recall Comparison without Discretization




Fig.10.Recall Comparison with Discretization






Fig.11. F- Measure Comparison without Discretization




Fig.12. F- Measure Comparison with Discretization

We have applied three separate classified algorithms (i.e. Naïve Bayes, J48 and Decision Tree) selected from the WEKA-Tool using discretization and without discretization. Then compared the performance in terms of accuracy, precision, recall, F1-measure and time taken to build a model. Table 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 and fig 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 shows the results obtained for both with discretization and without discretization.

Comparison in different tables exhibits the usage of the selected classification algorithms with entire features and the predefined selected feature for the individual attack by CFS and Classifier Subset Evaluator with Naive Bayes, J48 and Decision Tree are given as following:

Accuracy analysis from different tables and Fig 5, 6 shows that:

- Without discretization the most accurate classifiers are
 J48 classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes features
 selection technique for Brute Force Attack and the J48
 classifier using CSE with J48 features selection
 technique for Web attack, Heartbleed Attack/ DoS,
 Infiltration, Port Scan, Botnet and DDoS Attack. (CSE:Classifier Subset Evaluator)
- With discretization, the J48 classifier using CSE with J48 features selection technique for Brute Force, Heartbleed Attack/ DoS, Web, Port Scan and DDoS and Naive Bayes using CSE with Naive Bayes features selection

technique for Botnet and Infiltration Attack provides the *best performance* in the term of accuracy.

It is clear from various tables and Fig.3, 4 that time to build a model without discretization is:

• Naive Bayes classifier using CSE with Decision Tree techniques for Brute Force, Port Scan and Botnet Attack, Decision Tree classifier using CSE with Decision Tree techniques for DoS and Infiltration Attack, Naive Bayes classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes techniques for Web Attack and the J48 classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes for DDOS attack takes less time to build a model.

It is also clear that:

With discretization Decision Tree classifier using CSE with Decision Tree techniques for Brute Force, DoS, Port Scan and DDoS Attack, Decision Tree classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes techniques for Web Attack and Naive Bayes classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes techniques for Infiltration and Botnet Attack takes less time to build a model.

Interpretation of precision from different tables and Fig 7, 8 indicates that:

 Without discretization, the J48 classifier using CSE with J48 and Naive Bayes techniques for Port Scan and Web Attack, all classifier for

Brut Force Attack, the J48 and Naive Bayes classifier



for DoS Attack, J48 and Naive Bayes Classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes and CSE with J48 techniques for Botnet Attack, all classifier for Infiltration Attack and Decision Tree classifier using CSE with Decision Tree techniques for DDoS Attack provides the *best performance* in the term of precision.

• With discretization, Most of classifier has the same precision for Brute Force Attack, the J48 and Naive Bayes Classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes and CSE with J48 techniques for Web and Botnet Attack, all classifier for Infiltration and DDoS Attack, J48 classifier for DoS Attack, J48 and Decision Tree classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes and Decision Tree techniques for Port Scan Attack provides the best performance in the term of precision.

Recall from different tables and Fig 9, 10 shows that:

- Without discretization, the J48 classifier using CSE with J48 and Naive Bayes techniques for Brute Force and DoS Attack, Decision Tree and the J48 classifier for Web, Infiltration, Botnet and Web Attack, the J48 classifier using CSE with J48 techniques for Port Scan Attack and All classifier for DDoS Attack provide the best performance in the term of Recall.
- With discretization, the J48 classifier using CSE with J48 and Naive Bayes techniques for Brute Force and DoS Attack, the J48 classifier for Web Attack, the J48 and Decision Tree classifier for Infiltration Attack, all classifier for Botnet Attack, the J48 and Naive Bayes classifier using CSE with naive Bayes classifier for DDoS Attack and J48 classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes techniques for DoS Attack provide the best performance in the term of Recall.
- F- Measure calculation from various tables and Fig 11, 12 indicates that:
- Without discretization, the J48 classifier using CSE with J48 and Naive Bayes techniques for Brute Force, DoS, Botnet and Port Scan Attack, the J48 classifier for Web Attack, J48 and Decision Tree for Infiltration Attack and the J48 classifier using CSE with J48 technique for DDoS Attack provide the *best performance* in the term of F- Measure.
- With discretization, the J48 classifier using CSE with J48 and Naive Bayes techniques for Brute Force, DoS, Botnet and Web Attack, J48 and Decision Tree for Infiltration Attack, the J48 classifier using CSE with J48 technique for Port Scan and the J48 classifier using CSE with Naive Bayes techniques for DDoS Attack provide the *best performance* in the term of F- Measure.

VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have examined various classification algorithms and feature selection algorithms with discretization and without discretization for detecting network intrusion and anomaly with the help of WEKA on CICIDS-2017 dataset and have shown the best performance in terms of accuracy, precision, Recall, F-measure and time to build a model. Simulation results shows that the use of feature selection algorithms with discretization reduces the dimension of dataset, time to build a model, false alarms and induces high performance results.

The results also show that classifier with filtered supervised discretization can decrease time taken by algorithms and increase the predicted accuracy, F- Measure, recall and Precision (Table 9 to 15). It also shows that the filtering supervised discretization has a larger effect in the execution of the classification algorithms.

In the future work, we will consider the idea of advanced machine learning, deep learning and hybrid algorithms to detect network intrusion and anomaly with WEKA on CICIDS-2017 dataset to achieve a higher level of performance.

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