


Jorael Jamison
CSIA320
Professor Eric Robinson
10/18/2022


Exam – Capture the Flags 1

/FLAG1/

Used the Wget -r command and saved the results in a .txt file. Nothing found within this file of use for this step.




Next, I opened the Web site [http://\[redacted\]](http://[redacted]) and viewed the source code using Chrome. I searched for the keyword “email” and found a line showing:
[http://\[redacted\]/dlp/email.txt](http://[redacted]/dlp/email.txt) is where we keep our email list... -->



```
140 </tbody>
141 </table>
142 </div>
143 </div>
144 </article>
145
146 <!-- Contact -->
147 <!-- http://[redacted].info/dlp/email.txt is where we keep our email list... -->
148 <article id="contact">
149 <h2 class="major">Contact</h2>
150 <span class="image_main"></span>
151 <p>[redacted] is headquartered somewhere in southeast Washington, with consulting,
152 <ul class="alt">
153
154 <li>
155 <b>Email</b></li>
156 <a href="mailto:info@[redacted].info">info@[redacted].info</a>
157 </li>
158
159 </ul>
160 </article>
161
```

I accessed that website, and it displayed the page below listing the usernames for [redacted] and /FLAG1/.



/FLAG1/

DOMAIN = [redacted]

USERNAMES


1. eric.robinson
2. support
3. info
4. gandalf
5. frodo

I took those usernames and added the “@domainName” at the end of each to make a full email address:

[eric.robinson](#) [redacted]
[support@](#) [redacted]
[info@](#) [redacted]
[gandalf@](#) [redacted]
[frodo@](#) [redacted]

/FLAG2/

I created a phishing Amazon email asking the victim to click yes or no to confirm a recent high-valued purchase was legitimate or not. This was individually sent to the five email addresses above. It gives them a sense of urgency that this high-valued purchase may be approved that they did not make, while concerned their account has been compromised. The email looks to be from a trusting source – Amazon. It has only two options both requiring a response yes or no which when clicked can re-direct to the Amazon site for login credentials or even have malware downloaded on their computer.




Above is the response back I received in my inbox and /FLAG2/.

/FLAG3/


User: 592367 from Legal Department.

On [REDACTED] under the DLP tab I selected "Read Me!". It directed me to a page saying the requested file is a secure.zip file on the website - secured by a 3-digit pin. I typed the following into the browser and a secure.zip file was downloaded (password protected.)

[REDACTED] [/dlp/secure.zip](#)



I ran a series of cracking tools in Kali Linux from Hashcat, John the Ripper and fcrackzip until I was able to successfully crack the the secure.zip file. The program that worked easiest for me was *fcrackzip* and the Password = 773.





	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
592351	User592350	Legal	0									
592352	User592351	Operations	0									
592353	User592352	Legal	0									
592354	User592353	HR	0									
592355	User592354	Operations	0									
592356	User592355	IT	0									
592357	User592356	Claims	0									
592358	User592357	Claims	0									
592359	User592358	Call Center	0									
592360	User592359	Operations	0									
592361	User592360	Operations	0									
592362	User592361	Claims	0									
592363	User592362	Operations	0									
592364	User592363	IT	0									
592365	User592364	Operations	0									
592366	User592365	Legal	0									
592367	User592366	Call Center	0									
592368	User592367	Legal	1	FLAG3								
592369	User592368	Claims	0									
592370	User592369	HR	0									
592371	User592370	Operations	0									
592372	User592371	IT	0									
592373	User592372	Legal	0									
592374	User592373	Legal	0									
592375	User592374	Claims	0									
592376	User592375	HR	0									
592377	User592376	Claims	0									
592378	User592377	Operations	0									
592379	User592378	Operations	0									
592380	User592379	Legal	0									
592381	User592380	Call Center	0									
592382	User592381	Operations	0									
592383	User592382	HR	0									
592384	User592383	Call Center	0									
592385	User592384	Legal	0									

Extracted the file dlp_user_list and did a word search for “flag” and found /FLAG3/.

/FLAG4/

Under the [REDACTED] Web site, I selected DLP, then “master password hash” tab which directed me to the page below showing the users (master) hash password and /FLAG4/. I ran the hash on a hash identifier website to figure out the type and saw DA18E45060D15A10458DECE5A6C503703E75259B was a SHA1 HASH.





I tried my best to crack the hash using John or Hashcat on Kali through watching videos and tutorials online but could not get it to generate. I changed the Hash from uppercase to lowercase hex and ran that through John or Hashcat, but still no results. I played around with various attack methods and type codes etc. I finally ran the hash using some online tools and found the website *hashes.com*, where I was finally able to crack the password – **Fall2022**. I verified it was correct through a Hash generator website by typing that password in and the SHA1 matched. I am still stumped and think it would be interesting if you could do a quick walk through on the next video chat on how to crack this hash using John or Hashcat, so I can see if was doing something wrong? Appreciate it!

Proceeded!

1 hashes were checked: 1 found 0 not found

Found:

da18e45060d15a10458dece5a6c503703e75259b:Fall2022

SEARCH AGAIN

Generate All Hashes - MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512, MD4, MD6, RipeMD, NTLM, SHA3

browserling.com/tools/all-hashes

Fall2022

Calculate Hashes

Copy to clipboard (undo)

NTLM	63CCDC735B27AE079D5956FA2F471AEA	MD2	da9f42975257f88ff9bfaf897555fa7f
MD4	52cc29916b3f7e05e744bc1e2d1a67b8	MD5	6b2f1781838315e085549e1e07b56da3
MD6-128	e436fdc7e42024901f38348d249de75d	MD6-256	398703f15a85a42c6392fc4a4aac6752083002652
MD6-512	d94258767b5c8e2dbc9a495cde6286b6cd726f9c	RipeMD-128	e03040ad6e4b53750d86029b7da441c4
RipeMD-160	a57aadf8354130c68b0a021f75bcbfe8ffd19c37	RipeMD-256	42ef0b9192c9cba724b8d0e9fe181b8b65cea5261
RipeMD-320	099ca9cdf2538b9dc51ab91e6340bd808c37ae9	SHA1	da18e45060d15a10458dece5a6c503703e75259b
SHA3-224	af559ded2482d9e87e38e214c7eca7d54cbbd890	SHA3-256	56c33f57c1c594c24b5842cce3209ba0ce0ccaf42
SHA3-384	dccef6d6ad1a1269860f51d3b523be97c2a4ac2b0	SHA3-512	69bb17a19fd30d56ab732346469fdb035b6bcfe5e

/FLAG5/

On the [REDACTED] training page it referenced an image file "narnia.jpg". Adding the following to the end of the URL "/train/narnia.jpg" displayed a hidden image. The source code was displayed on my browser, and I inspected the metadata within. Doing a search for "flag" found /FLAG5/ along with the DLP root password: !\$33rdday\$!.

