Lecture 8 CSE 138 this time: V- fault classification and fault models V - the two generals problem
V - "common knowledge"
V - idempotence and "exactly-once" message
delines. S-forms of fault tolerance - reliable broadcast Faults

("x?"

[M2]

x=5 - request could get lost } omission - response could get lost } fault - Mz could crash 3 crash fault - request could be slow } timing familt
- mz could be slow } - Mz could lie, - messages could be corrupted Byzantine (say, by an attacker!) } fault Fault classification a process fails
by halting.
(stops sending/receiving
messages) in a crash fault in an omission fault a message is lost.

(a process fails

to send or receive
a message) in a timing fault something happens "too late" of \_\_\_\_\_ in a Byzantine fault a process behaves an arbitrary or malicious way. Protocol Y Protocol X tolerates omission faults tolerates crash faults Byzantine faults. \* omission faults classes \* crash faults faul ts Protocol U Protocol Z tolerates timing tolerates Byzantine Faults faults crash - fault - tolerant closses SF 45tops Byzantine fault tolerant systems Note: timing faults aren't a thing in the asynchronous network model. authentication-detectable message with surong checksum Byzantine faults omission faults crash faults a fault model - is a set of assumptions about what kinds of faults an environment may exhibit, and therefore, what kinds of faults ought to be tolerated by a system in that environment \* crash model crash faults may occur \* omission model - omission faults and crash faults Byzantine model all the faults " Classic thought experiment: the two generals problem Alice Bob 2 % X enemy / Aice Bob \* attack tomorrow dawn. "OK, i'm in! u in?"
u pm 7 pm
n ok, 7:15pm At this moment, Bob doesn't know that his acknowledgement got to Alice. in the omission fault model, it's impossible for Alice and Bob to ever attack and know that the other one will attack. two participants cannot reach agreement and know that they've reached agreement. we say that there is "common knowledge" of some piece of information p if: - everyone knows P, - everyone knows that everyone knows p, infinite # of "everyone knows that" Bob Ali ce attack at down X attack at dawn attack at dawn attack at down in Hus scenario, Bob becomes increasingly sure that Alice received his acknowledgment, but he coult know for sure. Reliable delivery: (in the omission model) let 1, be a process that sends a message in to a process Pz. If not all messages are lost, Pz evantually delivers m. Implementing reliable delivery: To send a message: - put it in a send buffer. expires, sound what's in the buffer. - whenever an ack is received for a sent message, de lete it from the send buffer. To receive & deliver a message: Ack the sender. Alice Bob \* X ack Bob could get Alicés message twice. In agneral, in reliable delivery, a message may be delivered more than once! So, another word for reliable delivery is at-least-once delivery. Client KVS Set x:=3 increment x incoment x := 3x := 3x:=3 1 some side effect X ++; X + + ; X++; 7 different Side effects An idempotent nessage is one that can be delivered multiple times and have the same effect on the delivering process as if it had been delivered just once.

Forms of fault tolerance A system has safety and liveness properties that should hold. e.g. C-L snapshot algorithm - safety: any supplies you take are consistent snapshots
- liveness: actually terminates Say that a marker message ogets lost. liveness is compromised. but safety is not! the best form of fault tolerance preserves both safety and liveness but sometimes we have to make a choice.