



Information Security and Privacy (COM-402) Part 4: Privacy enhancing technologies

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PETs for Data anonymization

Scenario:

You have a set of data that contains personal data and you would like to anonymize it to:

- not be subject to data protection while processing
- make it public for profit
- make it public for researchers

Goal:

Produce a dataset that **preserves the utility** of the original dataset **without leaking information** about individuals

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Part of Original AOL Dataset

User-ID	Date	Query
Thelma Arnold	2006-03-09	landscapers in Lilburn, Ga
Kristian Alfonso	2006-03-09	infant seat
Thelma Arnold	2006-03-10	school supplies for Iraq children
John Doe	2006-03-10	transfer money to china
Thelma Arnold	2006-03-11	homes sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia
John Doe	2006-03-11	capital gains on sale of house

Remove User-names

Usefulness

User-Name	Date	Query	
*	2006-03-09	landscapers in Lilburn, Ga	
*	2006-03-09	infant seat	
*	2006-03-10	school supplies for Iraq children	
*	2006-03-10	transfer money to china	
*	2006-03-11	homes sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia	
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Remove Date

Usefulness



User-Name	Date	Query
Thelma Arnold	*	landscapers in Lilburn, Ga
Kristian Alfonso	*	infant seat
Thelma Arnold	*	school supplies for Iraq children
John Doe	*	transfer money to china
Thelma Arnold	*	homes sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia
John Doe	*	capital gains on sale of house

Anonymity

Remove Query

Usefulness

User-Name	Date	Query
Thelma Arnold	2006-03-09	*
Kristian Alfonso	2006-03-09	*
Thelma Arnold	2006-03-10	*
John Doe	2006-03-10	*
Thelma Arnold	2006-03-11	*
John Doe	2006-03-11	*

Replace User-Names with Random ID

Usefulness

User-Name	Date	Query	
4417749	2006-03-09	landscapers in Lilburn, Ga	
491577	2006-03-09	infant seat	
4417749	2006-03-10	school supplies for Iraq children	
<u>545605</u>	2006-03-10	transfer money to china	
4417749	2006-03-11	homes sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia	
<u>545605</u>	2006-03-11	capital gains on sale of house	

Anonymity



Is this enough to say the dataset is anonymized?

A. Yes

B. No



Anonymity

AOL Proudly Releases Massive Amounts of Private Data

Posted Aug 6, 2006 by Michael Arrington (@arrington)

















Yet Another Update: AOL: "This was a screw up"

Further Update: Sometime after 7 pm the download link went down as well, but there is at least one mirror site. AOL is in damage control mode – the fact that they took the data down shows that someone there had the sense to realize how destructive this was, but it is also an admission of wrongdoing of sorts. Either way, the data is now out there for anyone that wants to use (or abuse) it.

Update: Sometime around 7 pm PST on Sunday, the AOL site referred to below was taken down. The direct link to the data is still live. A cached copy of the page is here.

AOL must have missed the uproar over the DOJ's demand for "anonymized" search data last year that caused all sorts of pain for Microsoft and Google. That's the only way to explain their release of data that includes 20 million web gueries from 650,000 AOL users.

The data includes all searches from those users for a three month period this year, as well as whether they clicked on a result, what that result was and where it appeared on the result page. It's a 439 MB compressed download, expanded to just over 2 gigs. The data is available here (this link is directly to the file) and the output is in ten text files, tab delineated.

The utter stupidity of this is staggering. AOL has released very private data about its users without their permission. While the AOL username has been changed to a random ID number, the ability to analyze all searches by a single user will often lead people to easily determine who the user is, and what they are up to. The data includes personal names, addresses, social security numbers and everything else someone might type into a search box.

Crunchbase

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NEWSLETTER SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Daily Crunch

Naive anonymization can easily be broken

In 2006, AOL released search queries of 500,000 pseudonymous users

- Days later, New York Times reveals the identity of user 4417749
- CTO and researchers responsible of sharing data fired

The same year, Netflix revealed over 100 million movie ratings made by 500,000 users after removing personal details

 Researchers de-anonymize dataset by comparing it with publicly available ratings on Internet Movie Database (IMDB)



[Credit: New York Times]

Re-identification by Linking

Medical Data

I	ID	QID		SA	
	Name	Zipcode	Age	Sex	Disease
I	Alice	47677	29) F	Ovarian Cancer
I	Betty	47602	22	F	Ovarian Cancer
	Charles	47678	27	М	Prostate Cancer
I	David	47905	43	М	Flu
	Emily	47909	52	F	Heart Disease
	Fred	47906	47	М	Heart Disease

Voter registration data

Name	Zipcode	Age	Sex
Alice	47677	29	F
Bob	47983	65	М
Carol	47677	22	F
Dan	47532	23	М
Ellen	46789	43	F

Re-identification by Linking

Medical Data

QID			SA	
Zipcode	Age	Sex	Disease	
47677	29	F	Ovarian Cancer	
47602	22	F	Ovarian Cancer	
47678	27	М	Prostate Cancer	
47905	43	М	Flu	
47909	52	F	Heart Disease	
47906	47	М	Heart Disease	

Voter registration data

Name	Zipcode	Age	Sex
Alice	47677	29	F
Bob	47983	65	M
Carol	47677	22	F
Dan	47532	23	М
Ellen	46789	43	F

Takeaways

Naïve anonymization does NOT work



Attributes themselves are a pseudo-identifier



Pseudo-identifiers allow to link databases



Linking allows to break anonymity