

The Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2011

Democratic Attitudes Post-Uribe

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Prologue: Background to the study

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This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2011 study completes eight years of uninterrupted analysis of the attitudes, experiences, values, and beliefs of the Colombian people about their political institutions, and is part of the largest survey of democratic values undertaken in the Americas. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, field personnel, donors, and, of course, the hundreds of Colombian citizens who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website www.LAPOPSurveys.org. In Colombia, the website of the **Observatorio de la Democracia**, www.ObsDemocracia.org, hosts the results and documents related to the studies undertaken in Colombia. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors for the 2010 comparative study included the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); York University in Canada; and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2011 **AmericasBarometer** study in Colombia in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviors are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. In this study on political culture in Colombia, we included the same core set of questions used in the surveys conducted in the other countries participating in the study. Likewise, in order to maintain a time series, we retained many of the questions used in previous studies in the country.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household

level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.¹ A detailed description of the 2011 sample is attached as an appendix to this report.

For the 2011 Colombia study, we incorporated the common framework for analysis as well as presentation of the results that was agreed upon in meetings held for the 2010 comparative study. To construct the indexes, we established a minimum alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain kind of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, and many exceeded .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, involved the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there was missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assigned the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to laypeople, which is why we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also maintain that those graphs should always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically-informed reader is assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 12. The project’s lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs that presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This approach represents a major advance in the presentation of our survey results, as we now have a higher level of precision in the data analysis.² In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses, as well as the regression analyses, in the study now take the design effect of the sample into account. Using this methodology has increased our level of certainty regarding whether or not the differences between the averages and coefficients of variables are statistically significant.³ Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, an “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N = 3,000), Brazil (N=2500), Chile (N=1965), and Ecuador (N = 3,000).

² The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then either increase or decrease the confidence intervals. Because of this, it was necessary to take the complex nature of our surveys into account in order to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking the design effect into account has been demonstrated, this practice has not been widely adopted by public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements it implies. In this sense, LAPOP is at the vanguard: by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of its survey results, it is breaking ground in its mission to produce high quality research.

³ All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” that weights each country file; in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no country would count more than any other in a comparative analysis.

passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right to anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix to the study.

From the outset, we strove to minimize error and maximize the quality of the data set. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all closed-ended questions. Second, all data sets were verified by LAPOP after the files had been sent to Vanderbilt for review.

In 2011, we expanded the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data. This technological advance was introduced in the country in 2009 and generalized to 17 out of the 26 countries for the 2010 round. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector, and formatted it for use in the 2011 round of surveys in Colombia. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires.

The final phase was the production of this report. The team from the Observatorio de la Democracia, of the Universidad de los Andes, began the task of writing the reports along the lines indicated above. The draft reports were read and revised by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and subsequently sent to the local USAID mission for comments. The final report is, therefore, the product of a tremendous amount of work by highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, and, of course, more than 1,500 respondents. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens, and academics to help strengthen democracy in Colombia.

With the aim of examining specific programs of the USAID mission in Colombia, in 2011 we undertook a special sample of around 800 respondents representative of the Afro-Colombian population. The details and results of this special study appear in a separate report prepared by the Observatorio de la Democracia, of the Universidad de los Andes, and supervised by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt.

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Finally, we would like to thank the more than 1,500 respondents to the national survey, and the some 800 respondents to the special survey, who offered us their time in order to answer our questions. This study would not have been possible without their cooperation.

Nashville, Tennessee
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Executive summary

This report, *The Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2011: Democratic Attitudes Post-Uribe*, completes eight years (from 2004 to 2011) of AmericasBarometer studies in Colombia. The significance of this study, however, is that it is the first to be carried out under an administration different than that of Álvaro Uribe Vélez. (The 2010 study was conducted prior to the presidential election that year.) The research question guiding this report asks about the possible shifts that have occurred due to the change of government. More specifically, we wanted to determine how the character of a government influences the attitudes and values of its citizens. Are these attitudes and values structural features of a society? Or, instead, do attitudes and values related to democratic institutions and principals vary with the governing style of the president in office? The recent change of government, as well as access to a relatively long time series, present an ideal opportunity to try and answer these questions.

The first chapter notes that economic conditions in recent months have not changed significantly. It should be emphasized that despite rising levels of (especially foreign) investment, the country's unemployment rate remains high, above that of other economies in the region. Additionally, since the global economic crisis of 2008, the economy, which was not significantly affected by the crisis, has experienced rates of growth below the regional average. There also have not been substantial improvements in the levels of poverty and inequality. In fact, a recent UNDP *Human Development Report* identified Colombia as the third most unequal country in the world, after Haiti and Angola, and the first among countries with a high or very high level of human development.

Nonetheless, public perceptions about the economy's performance are somewhat more optimistic. Some 16% of the population believes that the economy is doing well or very well, compared to just 12% in 2010. This favorable perception is primarily evident in Bogotá and, generally, in urban centers; rural areas show more dissatisfaction with the state of the country's economy. At the individual level, people with the most education rate the economic situation better. There has also been a rise in the proportion of people who think that the economic outlook will improve over the next 12 months, from 31% in 2010 to 37% in 2011. Similarly, although to a lesser degree, there has been a rise in the percentage of people who say that their personal finances are good or very good, from 30% in 2010 to 35% in 2011. This is especially true in urban areas, among the most educated, and, naturally, among people in the upper wealth quintiles. The proportion of people who believe that their personal finances were going to improve has not varied since the previous year. Nonetheless, in 2011 the data shows that people from the Pacific region and, to a lesser degree, from Bogotá tend to be more optimistic than respondents from other parts of the country.

The chapter includes a brief description of the political context, emphasizing the contrasts that have become apparent between incoming President Santos and the previous Uribe administration in terms of their policies and governing style. The invitation by Santos for the opposition to Uribe to join his so-called "national unity" coalition did much to soften the political animosities between different groups, though it did generate some resentment towards the new government among Uribe's old allies as well as hostile statements from the ex-president himself. Regarding how the armed conflict has been handled, there seems to be a growing perception that the situation in the country has deteriorated, although the army has managed to make a number of important strikes against the FARC leadership. Finally, in terms of international relations, not only has the Santos administration prioritized the improvement of ties with countries and multilateral organizations in the region, but it also managed to quickly normalize relations with the Correa government, in Ecuador, and especially with Chávez, in Venezuela. This stands in marked contrast to the state of almost permanently chilled relations with these countries, driven by aggressive public statements from both sides, during the previous administration.

The chapter closes with a description of the sociodemographic characteristics of survey respondents, showing distributions by sex (or gender), education, age, area of residence (urban or rural), income, and family composition.

The second chapter addresses the issue of democratic and anti-democratic attitudes following the transition from the Uribe to the Santos administration. The indicators that we analyzed focus on three values and attitudes central to political culture: support for democracy as a form of government, satisfaction with how well democracy is working, and support for the political system. The first finding is that these values and attitudes have not shift importantly over time, even during the change of government between 2010 and 2011.

Beyond this description, the chapter offers an initial response to the research question formulated above. To do so, it employs a measure of the personal allegiance that a person might feel directly for the president as an individual indicator of the personality cult around a leader. This measure is constructed by comparing the level of trust that a person places in the government as an abstract entity and the trust that he or she expresses for the president as an individual. People who trust the president much more than they trust the government are considered to idolize the ruler's personality. In some ways, this indicator is a measure of a leader's personal charisma in the eye's of the public.

Our analysis finds that this level of personal allegiance to the president has, on average, fallen considerably and consistently since 2008, when it was the highest in the region (among the countries included in the comparative study that year). Even more importantly, the econometric models – which seek to explain the levels of the above-described democratic values and attitudes that individuals show – find that people who have greater personal allegiance to the president tend to show less support for democracy as a system of government, less satisfaction with democracy, and less support for the political system. This holds true even when controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and factors such as evaluations of the national economy (sociotropic evaluation) and personal finances (egotropic evaluation), ideology, political party affinity, and approval of the administration's performance. This finding is significant from a theoretical point of view in that it confirms the pernicious effects of a personality cult on a country's democratic culture. In substantive terms, the analysis gives rise to some optimism in that this presidential personality cult has been shrinking.

The chapter continues with an analysis of what we might call “anti-democratic attitudes,” or attitudes against the central tenants of liberal democracy, such as respect for minorities and the opposition, and a belief in the separation of powers. The first finding that we discuss is the general decrease in such attitudes in 2011, confirming a trend that began the year before. Comparative studies from previous years had shown Colombian political culture to have certain authoritarian features. Since 2010, and especially in 2011, these authoritarian characteristics have receded significantly. The econometric analysis confirms the above findings by providing solid evidence that a personality cult around a leader tends to foment anti-democratic attitudes.

The chapter concludes with a reflection about the relationship between the type of ruler and a country's political culture. The evidence from this Colombian case suggests that attitudes against democratic principles, which previous studies had shown to be characteristic of Colombians, are less structural than one might think. This is good news. But the same evidence also suggests that these attitudes are shaped by circumstances and the governing style of leaders, which is not so encouraging.

The third chapter examines the classic topics of AmericasBarometer studies: the two dimensions of stable democracy (support for the system and political tolerance) and trust in the institutions central to the political system and society in Colombia. Our analysis finds that the percentage of people in the category called “stable democracy” – those who exhibit high levels of support for the system and are highly tolerant of others exercising their political rights – has fallen from about 36% in 2010 to about 31% in 2011. A similar proportion of the Colombian population has fallen into the “democracy at risk,” category – the group of people showing low tolerance and low support for the political system – which has increased from 15% to 19%. While this might be something to be concerned about, we still need to

confirm the finding in future studies. It is also possible that 2010 was an atypical year, since 2011 levels returned to those of 2008 and 2009.

As in previous years, the institution with the lowest standing in 2011 is the Protestant Church, with a score half that of the Catholic Church, the institution most trusted by Colombians. Perhaps most surprisingly, the second most prestigious institution is the National Civil Registry (*Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil*) which enjoys a level of trust even slightly above that of the President. In an election year, this finding is undoubtedly a good sign.

Nonetheless, we also found that the institutions experiencing the greatest loss in public confidence between 2010 and 2011 were mayorships (which dropped from 52 to 45 points on a scale of 0 to 100) and municipal councils (which fell from 50 to 44 on the same scale). This finding is not very promising since it occurred in an election year for local and regional officials. Although the degree change was not as great, the institution exhibiting the greatest rise in its level of public trust was Congress.

In line with the description of the country's political context, the area of the administration's performance that Colombians best evaluate is, by far, the way it has managed relations with neighboring countries. The change in the evaluation between 2010 and 2011 is impressive, rising from 54 to 69 points on a scale of 0 to 100. As in previous years, the government's social policies, specifically its efforts to reduce unemployment and poverty, received the worst evaluations by the public. These policies have been the lowest ranked for practically every year that the AmericasBarometer's study have been conducted, showing no variation following the change of government. In the public's mind, however, the transition did represent a deterioration in the management of the armed conflict and public security (or safety), both flagship policies of the Álvaro Uribe administration during its two terms in office. In summary, while Colombians' overall evaluation of the administration's performance remains relatively high, between 2010 and 2011 it fell from 68 to 64 points on a scale of 0 to 100.

The chapter continues with an analysis of the factors that influence the evaluation of the administration's performance. This analysis was conducted separately for the 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 samples. As expected, it shows that ideology is consistently a significant predictor of presidential approval. Given the political orientation represented by both Uribe and Santos, people who identify themselves more on the right tend to be more satisfied with the administration's performance. However, this effect shrank considerably in 2011. In other words, a right-wing ideological orientation was a stronger predictor of presidential approval during the Uribe administration than it was during Santos' first year in office. Similarly, an affinity for the *Partido de la U* (Party of the U) is a factor that consistently and significantly influences presidential approval ratings, although this effect was larger in 2009 and 2010 and smaller in 2008 and 2011. Finally, in line with economic voting theory, the sociotropic evaluation of the economy is a significant predictor of presidential approval for all years studied.

This chapter ends with an analysis of the factors that influence how citizens have evaluated the performance of Congress between 2008 and 2011. We find that ideology is a significant predictor of Congressional approval ratings: people who lean toward the right are more satisfied with the job it is doing, except in 2009. By contrast, an affinity for the *Partido de la U* does not have an impact on Congressional approval except in the Santos administration, that is in 2011. Finally, how people assess the national economy (the sociotropic evaluation) has a significant impact on their evaluation of Congress. Surprisingly, how they perceive their personal finances (the egotropic evaluation) also has an impact on their satisfaction with Congress in all years except 2010.

Chapter four covers the topics of public safety, corruption, and the armed conflict. First, we find that the issue of safety has become the country's biggest problem for a considerably larger share of Colombians. The percentage of people who mention safety-related topics grew from 7% in 2010 to 12% in 2011. The increasing mention of safety as the country's main problem was particularly important in two regions last year: in Bogotá (where the percentage rose from 8% to 17% between 2010 and 2011), and in the Pacific region (where it grew from 6% to 16%). Concern with safety is also greater in urban centers.

By contrast, individual perceptions of public safety have neither varied nor deteriorated significantly in recent years. In any case, people feel less safe in Bogotá than in any other region of the country. Similarly, the threat of gangs is perceived to be greater the larger the city of residence. Finally, close to nine out of ten people think that crime levels represent *some* or *much* threat to the future well-being of Colombians.

Despite the sensation of insecurity, confidence in the system of justice in Colombia has been relatively high, as comparative AmericasBarometer studies from previous years have shown. This has not varied in recent years, just as the perception of the efficacy of justice in the country has also remained constant and, compared to other countries, does not fare poorly.

Without noticeable changes from the previous year, close to one out of five Colombians say they were the victim of a crime within the last year. There was, however, a significant increase in the reports of armed robbery. While armed robbery made up 34% of reported crimes in 2010, it rose to 41% in 2011. Although at the aggregate level men and women experienced criminal acts at the same rate, there is a gender-based difference when the place of the crime is taken into account: half the women were victimized in their home or neighborhood while the same was true for only a third of the men.

The chapter continues with an analysis of the complex phenomenon of corruption. What first stands out is that, just as with the issue of safety, Colombians' concern about corruption grew noticeably between 2010 and 2011. While just about 4% mentioned this as the most serious problem facing the country in the previous year, the percentage climbed to 12% in 2011; and in Bogotá it stands at some 20%. In fact, in 2011 the perception of corruption reached its highest recorded level – 81 points on a scale of 0 to 100, going from a lower to a higher perception of corruption – since AmericasBarometer began conducting studies.

These results are consistent with the finding that the percentage of people who justify paying a bribe under various circumstances fell from 25% in 2009 to 19% in 2010 to 15% in 2011. This growing intolerance for corruption is confirmed by the analysis of different hypothetical scenarios involving the payment of a bribe. The percentage of people who believe that the behavior described in these hypothetical situations is corrupt and should be punished rose. However, a little more than one out of ten respondents said that they had personally been the victim of corruption, specifically a public official who requests a bribe. This proportion has not varied in recent years.

In terms of the armed conflict, Colombians considered this to be the principal problem facing the country until 2008. Since 2009, economic issues have been their main concern. Currently, three out of ten respondents mention the armed conflict as the country's most serious problem. Contrasting the data from 2008, when concern for the armed conflict peaked, and 2011, we also see a change in attitude regarding how to resolve the conflict: the percentage of people who prefer a negotiated solution to the conflict with both the guerrilla and the paramilitaries has fallen (though it still remains the majority option); by contrast, the percentages of people who think there should be a military resolution, or at least a combination of the two, has risen.

The level of public trust in the illegal armed actors is very low. In 2011, confidence in these actors did not rise above 5 points on a scale of 0 to 100, an extremely small percentage considering that trust in political parties, the most discredited institution in the country, was over 30 points on the scale.

The chapter ends with an examination of perceptions about transitional justice in Colombia. We find that Colombians do not seem very supportive that a pardon be granted to the members of the illegal armed groups for their crimes. Even though people who self-identify on the left tend to show more support for such a pardon, the differences with people in the center or on the right side of the ideological spectrum are not statistically significant. Additionally, just one out of three respondents say they were familiar with the Law of Justice and Peace, the legal instrument implemented to administer transitional justice with demobilized members of the armed groups, especially the paramilitaries. Those familiar with the law believe it has done a better job at providing truth than at administering justice or offering reparations to victims.

The fifth and final chapter of this report deals with political participation and voting behavior among Colombians. By way of introduction, it analyzes public attitudes toward different kinds of participation. While people approve of acts such as community organizing to resolve problems, participating in peaceful demonstrations, and working on election campaigns, they tend to disapprove of perhaps more extreme forms of participation, such as blocking roads and invading private property.

The chapter then focuses on describing and explaining the experience of respondents with five kinds of participation: (i) participating in spaces of local discussion (municipal and city council meetings); (ii) soliciting the assistance of local authorities; (iii) participating in demonstrations or protests; (iv) actively participating in election campaigns; and (v) electoral participation or voting.

The analysis tries to determine how a series of factors impact each of the above kinds of political participation. These factors include interpersonal trust, participating in civil society organizations (as a measure of an individual's social capital), ideology, political party affinity, presidential approval, as well as sociodemographic characteristics such as sex, age, education, the level of wealth (in quintiles), self-identified class position, civil state, ethnic self-identification, the size of the city of residence, and region.

In the description of the data related to each one of these factors, it is worth noting the small but significant shift of the average Colombian toward the left side of the ideological spectrum over the last year. Although Colombia remains a right-leaning country comparatively, in 2011 average ideology reached its most left-leaning position since these studies began in 2004, with 6.0 points on a scale of 1 to 10 from left to right, and contrasting with the score of 6.3 in 2010.

The second phenomenon worth highlighting is the fluidity of political party affinity in recent years. In 2011, just one out of four Colombians said they were partial to a political party, a decline to levels of previous years, with the exception of the atypical peak of 37% in 2010, the result of the election campaign. In terms of specific party affinities, although support for the *Partido de la U* had been slowly growing since 2008, reaching a level of 42% among people who said they were partial to a party in 2010, this proportion fell to 35% in 2011. The most surprising change is probably the rebound of the Liberal Party. While support for the Liberal Party reached its nadir in 2010, when it garnered only 19% of the people partial to a political party, in 2011 this level rose to 31%. Regarding the relationship between party affinity and ideology, Conservative, Liberal, and *Partido de la U* sympathizers identify themselves more towards the right, while people who feel an affinity for the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* (Alternative Democratic Pole, or *Polo* as it is commonly known) locate themselves more towards the left. Our analysis also shows that the ideological position of the sympathizers of a number of political parties has shifted considerably over time, especially in the last year. People who sympathize with the *Polo*, for example, have moved slightly toward the right, while those who feel an affinity for *Cambio Radical* (Radical Change) have swung in the opposite direction. The increasingly right-wing position of Conservatives is also of interest, as is the small drift by *Partido de la U* sympathizers toward the left.

The analysis of how these factors impact the kinds of political participation described above reveals interesting results. In the first place, we find that participating in civil society organizations (particularly on community-improvement committees or boards, or in professional, merchant, or producer associations) not only foments participation in municipal meetings and soliciting assistance from authorities, but it also encourages participation in demonstrations and election campaigns.

Political party affinity also constitutes an incentive to participate, although the type of participation is related to the kind party to which one is partial. Affinity for *Cambio Radical*, the *Partido de la U*, and the Liberal and Conservative parties, tends to encourage attending municipal meetings, requesting local authorities for assistance, and working on election campaigns. By contrast, an affinity for the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* is associated with participating in protests, which is also the kind of participation that people who consider themselves to be on the left get involved in most frequently.

Finally, the chapter includes an analysis of Colombians' voting behavior. In April of 2011, 78% of Colombians said they were going to vote in the local elections scheduled for the following October, an

intention that clearly did not materialize at the time of the election. Just a third of those who said that they intended to vote knew, at the time, who they would support. Among this latter group, 30% intended to vote for the candidates of the Liberal Party, 25% for those of the *Partido de la U*, and 19% for Conservative Party nominees.

To conclude, the perception of threats to the electoral process declined slightly compared to 2007, the last time local elections were held. As in previous years, less than 4% of respondents said they had received or witnessed pressure or threats to vote for a candidate or party, and a still smaller percentage said they were pressured to abstain from voting.

I. Context and description of the sample

Economic context

As mentioned in the 2010 comparative report, which was dedicated to the subject, Colombia appears, in principal, to have dodged the global economic crisis. Similar to what has occurred in previous regional or global crises, and in contrast to the experience of many countries, the Colombian economy was not dramatically affected.

The Uribe administration made a concerted effort to make the country attractive to investors during its two terms. The slogan, “investor confidence,” took off in the media during this period. Looking at foreign direct investment, for example, the 2005 figures were atypically high, probably due to the sale of Bavaria, the national brewery, to the multinational, SAB-Miller. After more modest levels in 2006, foreign direct investment grew again through 2008, but then shrank noticeably in 2009 and 2010, probably because of the global crisis. Nonetheless, in the first quarter of 2011 this kind of investment not only showed a gain of 132% over the first quarter of 2010, but it also became more diversified as the previous concentration in the mining and petroleum sectors declined noticeably.⁴

Some of the country’s macroeconomic indicators have not fared so well, however. As we reviewed in the 2010 AmericasBarometer report for Colombia, the country has one of the highest unemployment rates in the region, as can be seen in Figure I.1.




Figure I.1 – Unemployment rate in various Latin American countries, 2000-2010

Similarly, GDP growth has been below the regional average. Figure I.2 shows that although Colombia did not experience the drop in growth that other countries did in 2009, its GDP growth rate in the subsequent recovery was again below that of the other countries.

⁴ See http://www.inviertaencolombia.com.co/Adjuntos/246_Reporte%20de%20Inversion.pdf, a ProExport Colombia report.




Figure I.2 – GDP growth rate in various Latin American countries, 2000-2010

Meanwhile, the government's economic policies have not been entirely effective at combating Colombia's two main socioeconomic problems: poverty and inequality. Although the methodologies used to measure these two phenomena in the country have changed, making comparisons over time difficult, the National Administrative Department of Statistics (*Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística*, or DANE) coordinated the Board on Reconciling the Series on Employment, Poverty, and Inequality (*Mesa para el Empalme de las Series de Empleo, Pobreza y Desigualdad*, or MESEP), which has tried to produce consistent figures.

Figure I.3 shows poverty levels in the country since 2002. The data for 2006 and 2007 were not included due to the changes in methodology. In fact, the methodology used to calculate poverty levels changed again in 2010, although the DANE also produced a figure based on the old methodology, allowing comparisons. As we can see, while the poverty rate has fallen, the change is only slight. The same holds true for the rates of extreme poverty, as shown in Figure I.4.




Figure I.3 – Poverty rates in Colombia, 2002-2010




Figure I.4 – Extreme poverty rates in Colombia, 2002-2010

In terms of inequality, we were unable to obtain GINI coefficients that were comparable over time, again, due to the methodological changes in how this figure is calculated. Nonetheless, the UNDP recently produced a *Human Development Report* that identifies Colombia as the third-most unequal country in the world, after Haiti and Angola.⁵

⁵ As can be seen in this report (http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_ES_Complete.pdf), Colombia is the most unequal country among those with a high or very high level of human development.

Perceptions of the economic situation

Perceptions of the country's economic situation have varied over the eight years that the AmericasBarometer study in Colombia has been carried out, as Figure I.5 shows. While barely 10% of respondents stated that the nation's economy was doing well or very well in 2004, this percentage rose to 18% in 2008, dropped for the next two years, and rebounded to 16% in 2011.⁶




Figure I.5 – Percentage of people who think the national economy is doing well or very well, 2004-2011

Figure I.6, which shows the results for 2011, indicates that people living in Bogotá tend to evaluate national economic conditions more favorably than people who live in other regions. Likewise, residents of urban centers are more satisfied with the national economy than people living in rural areas. Additionally, people who have finished or are enrolled in higher education of some kind (have completed more than 11 years of schooling) tend to have a more favorable sociotropic evaluation of the economy than people with 5 to 11 years of education (secondary) or those who have only completed between 0 and 5 years (primary). Curiously, there does not appear to be a clear relation between a respondent's wealth quintile and their sociotropic evaluation of the economy. These differential patterns have appeared in previous years, although the disparities between regions and between urban and rural areas sharpened in 2011.

⁶ The survey question is the following: **SOCT1**. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?




Figure I.6 – Perception of the national economy by region, area of residence, educational level, and wealth quintile, 2011

In terms of the perception that respondents have of their own economic situation, that is, their egotropic evaluation of the economy, there has been a rising trend since 2004, with a larger increase at the end of the period. In 2011, more than one out of three Colombians consider their personal finances to be good or very good, as Figure I.7 shows.⁷

⁷ The question is the following: **IDIO1.**¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?




Figure I.7 – Percentage of people who believe that their personal economic situation is good or very good, 2004-2011

For 2011, as can be seen in Figure I.8, the differences between areas of residence and level of education are similar to those of the sociotropic evaluation of the economy, although the regional differences are somewhat smaller. As expected, there is a relation between a respondent's wealth quintile and his or her egotropic evaluation of the economy.




Figure I.8 – Perception of one's personal economic situation by region, area of residence, educational level, and wealth quintile, 2011

Nearly one out of three Colombians believe that the economy will improve over the twelve months subsequent to the survey.⁸ In 2011, this proportion is even a little higher, reaching 37%, as Figure I.9 shows. Residents of the Caribbean region are the most optimistic in 2011, as can be seen in Figure I.10; more than half believe that the nation's economy will improve over the following year, a higher percentage than in other regions. Similarly, optimism is slightly greater among people with the most amount of education. Furthermore, people with less resources appear to be more optimistic than people in higher wealth quintiles, although these differences are not very pronounced.

⁸ The following question measures evaluations of nation's economic outlook: **SOCT3**. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica **del país** será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?




Figure I.9 – Evaluation of the national economic outlook, 2009-2011




Figure I.10 – Evaluation of the national economic outlook by region, area of residence, educational level, and wealth quintile, 2011




Figure I.11 – Evaluation of one's personal economic prospects, 2009-2011




Figure I.12 – Evaluation of one's personal economic prospects by region, area of residence, educational level, and wealth quintile, 2011

Colombians are much more optimistic about the future of their personal finances. Figure I.11 shows that around three out of every five respondents believe that their own economic situation will improve over the subsequent year.⁹ Figure I.12, in turn, shows that in 2011 this optimism is greater in the Caribbean and Pacific regions than elsewhere in the country. Likewise, we see that people with the most education tend to be more optimistic about their economic future than people with less schooling. There is no relation between wealth quintiles and evaluations of one's personal economic prospects.

Political context

Although the transfer of power between Álvaro Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos occurred in August 2010, the surveys for the AmericasBarometer study that year were conducted in March and April, that is, between the congressional elections and the first round of the presidential election, which took place in May 2010. The obvious result is that the people surveyed for the 2010 study still refer to the Uribe government in their responses; they also did not yet know who would be the next president.

This 2011 study, therefore, is the first to be done under a president different than Uribe since we began our annual analyses in 2004. This is why the subtitle to this report refers to democratic attitudes "Post-Uribe." Since the transition, the political context in Colombia has been characterized by what we might call surprising moves in the way that Santos has governed. This new style of governing can be divided along two dimensions: a domestic and an international.

In the domestic sphere, the president elect's first decision in 2010 involved building a broader government coalition than that of ex-president Uribe. Besides the *Partido de la U*, on whose ticket he was elected, and the Conservative Party, which had accompanied Uribe during his two terms, President Santos successfully invited *Cambio Radical*, led by Germán Vargas Lleras, who had substantially distanced himself from Uribe during the latter's last years in office and was himself a candidate in the 2010 presidential elections, into the coalition. And if this weren't enough, the government coalition also included the Liberal Party, which had openly and categorically declared its opposition to the Uribe administration.

The move by Santos to organize this so-called "national unity" coalition immediately changed the tone of domestic politics. The mood shifted from a state of permanent tension and confrontation between the opposition and the Uribe administration (as well as the latter's dismissal of the former) to an atmosphere of consultation and less animosity. In strategic terms, of course, this oversized coalition (in that it includes more support than Santos needs to ensure passage of his legislative agenda) gives him ample room for maneuver by reducing his dependence on specific groups within the coalition.

The formation of this coalition has not been without costs for the president, however. For one, some elements within the *Partido de la U* and the Conservative Party mistrust and resent what they see as the excessively benevolent treatment of groups who so vehemently opposed Uribe during his time in office. It also provoked strong criticism by ex-president Uribe, who even denounced Santos' appointment of several ministers – Germán Vargas Lleras (in the Ministry of the Interior), Juan Camilo Restrepo (in the Ministry of Agriculture), and Rafael Pardo (in the newly created Ministry of Labor), all of whom were harsh critics of Uribe's presidency – as treasonous.

The move by Santos to distance himself from Uribe has also occurred in the field of international relations. The Santos administration and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, María Ángela Holguín, have promoted a rapprochement with the governments of Correa in Ecuador and, especially, Chávez in

⁹ The following question measures evaluations of the outlook for one's personal finances: **ID103**. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?

Venezuela. This could not contrast more with the way that Uribe managed relations with these two countries: while Uribe was in office, constant public denunciations of these governments, based on what he believed to be their clear complicity with or at least tolerance of the illegal armed actors, especially the FARC, were the norm. The new administration's agenda regarding international relations is not limited to new ties with its neighbors but can also be seen in its effort to become more involved in regional multilateral initiatives, particularly UNASUR (Union of South American Nations).

With regard to the armed conflict, the perception has grown that the struggle against the guerrillas, which have conducted strikes against the Armed Forces and civilians in recent months, has lost ground. Nonetheless, under Santos' command the army has scored a number of important hits against the FARC's high command, including operations that killed key guerrilla leaders, such as alias 'Mono Jojoy' and, more recently, alias 'Alfonso Cano.'

In summary, despite the fact that Santos is the political heir of Uribism, and even though he was elected president under the banner of the *Partido de la U*, which was created to support Uribe during his time in office, the political context has been marked by the contrasts and distance between Santos and Uribe. For this reason, it is important to analyze the effects of this divergence on Colombians' attitudes and values regarding the country's democratic institutions.

Description of the sample

As always, in this section we describe the distribution of the sample in terms of the most important sociodemographic characteristics, including sex (or gender), educational level, age, wealth, and area of residence. We also show the distribution of respondents among the sample's primary strata corresponding to the different regions. Besides showing the behavior of some of these indicators, which are organized by region or sex, among other divisions, this section demonstrates how stable the AmericasBarometer-LAPOP sample in Colombia has been over all these years.

First, Figure I.13 shows how, between 2004 and 2011, the sample has been equally divided between men and women, reflecting the distribution of the Colombian population. Likewise, the average age of respondents in the different rounds of the AmericasBarometer in Colombia has hovered around 37 years, as seen in Figure I.14.




Figure I.13 – Distribution of the sample by sex, 2004-2011




Figure I.14 – Average age of the sample, 2004-2011

There has been a slightly larger variation in the educational level of respondents between 2004 and 2011, though it is not statistically significant. As can be seen in Figure I.15, the average number of years of education has oscillated between 8.6 in 2006 and 9.9 over the last two years. Although Figure I.16 shows that the level of education among men is, on average, higher than that of women, this difference

has not been statistically significant in any of the years the study have been conducted in Colombia. There are, however, greater differences between the regions into which the sample has been divided, especially between Bogotá and all other regions, as Figure I.17 shows.




Figure I.15 – Average years of education, 2004-2011




Figure I.16 – Educational level by sex, 2004-2011




Figure I.17 – Educational level by region, 2004-2011

In terms of area of residence, and reflecting the real distribution of the national population, Figure I.18 shows that around three out of four people surveyed for the study live in urban centers. This proportion has remained consistent over the eight years that AmericasBarometer has worked in Colombia. In fact, as demonstrated in Figure I.19, a little more than half the respondents live in rural areas or in small municipalities, while around 28% live in large cities or the capital's metropolitan area. On a slightly different note, there is considerable inequality between urban and rural residents in terms of their level of education. Figure I.20 shows that, on average, rural inhabitants have completed fewer years of schooling than their urban counterparts.




Figure I.18 – Distribution of the sample by area of residence, 2004-2011




Figure I.19 – Distribution of the sample by size of the place of residence, 2004-2011




Figure I.20 – Years of education by area of residence, 2011

We used various questions to capture the economic situation of people surveyed. One of the first asks respondents to identify the bracket into which their monthly household income falls. For 2011, the distribution of respondents is shown in Table I.1. What stands out is the large number of respondents who did not answer this question. This is a widespread phenomenon and common to studies conducted in other countries. In Colombia, the “no response” percentage has varied between 9% (in 2009) and a little more than 15% (in 2007).

Table I.1 – Distribution of the sample by monthly household income brackets, 2011

Income range	# of respondents	Percentage
No income	6	0.4%
Less than \$90,000	36	2.4%
From \$90,001 to \$180,000	108	7.2%
From \$180,001 to \$360,000	230	15.3%
From \$360,001 to \$720,000	438	29.1%
From \$720,001 to \$1,000,000	195	13.0%
From \$1,000,001 to \$1,500,000	140	9.3%
From \$1,500,001 to \$2,000,000	86	5.7%
From \$2,000,001 to \$3,000,000	46	3.1%
From \$3,000,001 to \$4,000,000	19	1.3%
More than \$4,000,000	23	1.5%
No response	176	11.7%
Total	1503	100.0%

For this reason, in order to obtain an alternative measure of respondents’ economic situation, we included a battery of questions that try to determine whether a respondent’s household has a number of goods or assets. These include having a conventional or a flat-screen television, a refrigerator, a fixed line or a cellular telephone, a motor vehicle, a washing machine, a microwave oven, a motorcycle, potable water inside the residence, a bathroom inside the house, a computer, and internet service. In

previous studies, we calculated a non-weighted average of these variables. But starting last year, we created a measure based on a principal components analysis to obtain a measure of relative wealth, classifying respondents into wealth quintiles. This measure exists for each person in the sample, representing an advantage over the measure based on household income.

As can be seen in Figure I.21, there is a clear relation between income level (here grouped into larger brackets for purposes of clarity) and wealth quintiles. Figure I.22 shows that there is also a relation between a respondent's wealth quintile and their educational level, the latter of which are grouped into 0-to-5 years (primary), 6-to-11 years (secondary), and 12-or-more years (higher). This relation is corroborated in Figure I.23, which shows the average number of years of education for each wealth quintile.




Figure I.21 – Correspondence between household income and wealth quintiles, 2011




Figure I.22 – Educational level by wealth quintiles, 2011




Figure I.23 – Years of education by wealth quintiles, 2011

We can also see that the distribution of respondents by civil state has remained rather stable during the eight years of the study. The percentage of people who say that they are married or part of a civil union has varied between 54 and 59%, as Figure I.24 shows.




Figure I.24 – Distribution of the sample by civil state, 2004-2011

There is, however, greater variation according to the region of the country. As can be seen in Figure I.25, which shows the data from 2011, the percentage of people who are married or part of a civil union is highest in the Former National Territories (69%) and lowest in Bogotá (48%).




Figure I.25 – Civil state by region, 2011

Finally, to end this description of the sample, we find that the average respondent reports having around two children. As can be seen in Figure I.26, however, the average number of children is greater for women than for men. This difference is even more noticeable in the 2011 sample. Additionally, this sample shows a clear relation between the number of children and a respondent's socioeconomic situation: the average number of children falls as the wealth quintile rises, as can be seen in Figure I.27. Similarly, Figure I.28 shows that the average number of children reported by respondents living in urban areas is significantly less than it is for inhabitants of rural areas.




Figure I.26 – Number of children by sex, 2004-2011





Figure I.27 – Number of children by wealth quintile, 2011

**Figure I.28 – Number of children by area of residence, 2011**

II. Democratic and anti-democratic attitudes

Introduction

This chapter has multiple objectives. First, we present descriptive statistics showing the evolution of three values central to democratic political culture: support for democracy as a system of government, satisfaction with democracy, and support for the system. This description shows that these values and attitudes have not varied substantially over time. As previous comparative reports have shown, Colombia tends to place relatively well in these measures of democratic culture. It is interesting to note that the average adherence to these principals and values did not change in the transition between the Uribe and the post-Uribe era.

Second, we would like to explore the individual factors that influence these values and attitudes. Last year, after two four-year terms, Uribe's presidency came to an end. During his administration, Uribe's approval ratings and popularity remained so surprisingly high that, in some cases, they suggested a cult for the president himself. For these reasons, we wanted to examine the possible theoretical and empirical implications of such a strong direct tie between citizens and president, as well as its effects on a country's political culture. Thus, using the transition between the Uribe and Santos governments as a point of reference, we tested the hypothesis that a citizen's personal allegiance to the leader negatively impacts democratic attitudes and values. We develop this analysis in the chapter's second section.

Democratic attitudes and values

The 2010 comparative study showed that, despite the global economic crisis of 2008, support for democracy in the Americas did not diminish. In Colombia, support for democracy as a system of government has remained stable and relatively high, as can be seen in Figure II.1.¹⁰

¹⁰ We use the following question to measure support for democracy: ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? (en una escala de 1 a 7). Esta pregunta, como la mayoría de preguntas utilizadas en los informes LAPOP, fue recodificada a una escala de 0 a 100 para facilitar las comparaciones y la comprensión.




Figure II.1 – Support for democracy as a system of government, 2004-2011

Likewise, satisfaction with how well the democratic system is working has not varied over the last eight years; it has remained at moderate levels, as Figure II.2 shows.¹¹




Figure II.2 – Satisfaction with democracy, 2004-2011

¹¹ The question is the following: **PN4.** En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **insatisfecho(a)** o muy **insatisfecho(a)** con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia? La escala original fue convertida en una escala de 0 a 100.

Finally, as is customary in AmericasBarometer reports, we constructed a support-for-the-system index based on the following questions:¹²

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? (*Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio*)

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?

As can be seen in Figure II.3, the level of support for the political system, which is an indicator of the system's legitimacy, has remained relatively stable, although with larger variations than has been the case for the indicators related to abstract support for democracy and satisfaction with how well that democracy has functioned.




Figure II.3 – Support for the political system, 2004-2011

The descriptive analysis presented in this section has shown the stability of values and attitudes central to the country's democratic political culture. It is worth highlighting that the change of government does not seem to have had any effect on the average level of these indicators. Contrary to what has occurred in other countries, there is no evidence that support for the out-going administration had eroded markedly despite having been in power for eight years. Likewise, the transition from the

¹² The Cronbach alpha reliability for this scale is .8 for 2011. The indicators and the scale were recodified from 0 to 100.

very popular Uribe administration to a new government has not precipitated a decline in the credibility of the regime or the legitimacy of the system.

Factors that influence democratic attitudes

In this section, we present the results of multivariate linear regression analyses that sought to determine the degree to which a series of individual factors influence the democratic values and attitudes described in the previous section. In particular, we wanted to examine the empirical validity of the hypothesis that personal allegiance between citizen and leader tends to negatively impact democratic attitudes and values. These analyses were carried out using data from 2008 to 2011 that was consolidated into a single data set in order to capture broader and more structural patterns less dependent on circumstances particular to each year. Below we introduce the group of independent variables considered in these analyses.

Direct ties between citizen and leader

According to theory, there are two types of support for a political system and democratic regime. On the one hand, there is diffuse support, which tends to be more abstract, long-lasting, and less subject to the ups and downs of the moment. On the other, there is specific support, which depends more on the government's actual performance and thus tends to be more volatile.

Along these lines, Latin America has witnessed the emergence of charismatic leaders who establish direct ties with their subjects and tend to inject a personalistic spirit to their rule. Such leaders generate feelings of allegiance and even devotion among wide segments of the population. We could point to Fujimori in Peru and Chávez in Venezuela as examples of this type of president. In at least these two cases, this style of government has the disadvantage of tending to weaken democratic institutionalism, which is, by nature, more abstract and less dependent on the personality of political leaders. Some analysts have suggested that, to some degree, president Uribe established such a style of government. Qualitative evidence supporting this claim include his micromanagement of all aspects of government, the frequent community councils in which he personally resolved the problems of common citizens by going over the heads of the authorities and officials supposedly in charge of such issues, as well as his outward appearance of being a simple man close to the people.

Empirically measuring the magnitude of a leader's charisma is no easy task, however. It is even harder to obtain indicators that can be used to classify governments as personalistic or led by a *caudillo* (political boss). Nonetheless, with data from AmericasBarometer, we can create a proxy that allows us to measure the degree to which a respondent has developed personal ties toward a charismatic leader. We can do this thanks to the following two survey questions:

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?

[...]

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?

These two questions allow us to distinguish between the trust that a person has in the government generally and the trust they place in the president personally. What's more, the difference between

these two indicators, that is, trust in the president *minus* trust in the government, constitutes a measure of the degree to which a citizen is personally attached to the figure of the president.

Figure II.4 illustrates the average level of this indicator since 2008 (the year we introduced the question about trust in the president apart from that which measures trust in the government). The figure clearly shows that, during the last years of Uribe's second term in office (2008-2010), the ties between citizen and leader were stronger than during the first year of the Santos administration.¹³ In fact, between 2008 and 2011, this average fell by half, to some degree capturing the charismatic character of the Uribe government compared to the Santos administration.




Figure II.4 – Personal allegiance to the president, 2008-2011

Additionally, when the data from the 2008 comparative study is analyzed, we see how the average level of allegiance to the person of the president is greater in Colombia than in any other country included in the survey that year, as Figure II.5 shows.

¹³ The data for the 2010 study was collected in March and April of that year, that is, before knowing that Juan Manuel Santos would win the second round of the presidential elections in May. This is why the 2010 data still corresponds to the Uribe government.




Figure II.5 – Personal allegiance to the president in comparative perspective, 2008

Furthermore, in order to control for idiosyncratic characteristics particular to the different administrations, we included a dichotomous variable codified as 1 if it refers to the year 2011 (post-Uribe) and 0 if it does not.

Other factors included in the models

Ideology and political party affinity

To be sure that the effect of personal allegiance to the president is not the result of ideological or political party affinities, we included two additional variables. The first is a measure of a respondent's self-identified ideological location on a scale of 1 to 10 moving from left to right. We also included a dichotomous variable codified as 1 if a respondent expressed sympathy for the *Partido Social de Unidad Nacional* (Social Party of National Unity), also known as the *Partido de la U*, created to channel political support for President Uribe and in whose name Santos was elected president in 2010. We will analyze Colombians' ideological positions and party identities more thoroughly in a later chapter.

Evaluating the administration's performance

The literature has found that favorable attitudes toward a political system and democratic regime are shaped by satisfaction with the current administration's performance. For this reason, we included a measure of the approval of such performance through the following question:

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente [...] es...?: **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo
 (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR

In the regression model, we included a recodified version on a scale of 0 to 100, going from very bad to very good.

Evaluating the economy

It is also possible that the greater or lesser degree to which people believe in democracy is conditioned by how they evaluate the current economic situation. To control for these effects, we included the measure of the sociotropic evaluation of the economy (or how well a respondent thinks the nation's economy is doing) as well as the egotropic evaluation (the indicator of how a respondent perceives his or her personal financial situation). Both indicators were codified from 0 to 100.

Sociodemographic characteristics

The models include the usual controls for sex, age, educational level, and a respondent's area of residence (urban or rural). We also included the wealth quintile to which each informant belongs. Given that people who belong to an ethnic minority might feel less commitment to a political system that excludes them, we included an additional indicator codified as 1 if a respondent does not identify as white or mixed race (*mestizo*) (that is, if they self-identify as an ethnic minority), and 0 for the opposite. Finally, dummy variables for the regions of the country corresponding to the primary strata of the sample were included to control for the regional diversity that exists in the country. Bogotá is the region of reference in these models.

Results

Below we present the results of the analysis regarding the factors that influence the democratic attitudes described above, that is, support for democracy as a form of government, satisfaction with the performance of democracy, and support for the political system. Table II.1, in the annex of this chapter, provides the coefficients and standard errors of these models.

Support for democracy

As is customary in AmericasBarometer reports, we illustrate the results of the regression models in graphical form. For each one of the independent variables included in a model, we present the estimate of its standardized coefficient as well as the confidence interval of 95% of this estimate (the horizontal bars around the point that appear in the figures). As a reference, we highlight the value 0 with a vertical line. When both ends of the confidence interval are on the same side of the vertical line, the coefficient is considered statistically significant (to a level of .05). To the contrary, if the confidence interval crosses the zero line, the impact of the variable in question is not significant in the explication of the dependent variable.




Figure II.6 - Determinants of support for democracy as a form of government, 2008-2011

Figure II.6 shows the results of the econometric model on the determinants of support for democracy. The first notable finding is a confirmation of our hypothesis that people who feel greater personal allegiance to the president tend to be less supportive of the idea that democracy is the best form of government. This effect is apparent even when factors such as ideology, political party affinity, and approval of the president's performance are held constant.

In other words, take two people who equally approve of the job that the administration is doing, have the same ideological position, and are both partial to the *Partido de la U* (in addition to keeping all other characteristics and factors constant). Of these two, the person who shows a greater difference between their trust in the president and their trust in the government (that is, they are higher on the scale of personal allegiance to the president) will tend to have a lower level of support for democracy than the other. In fact, moving from the minimum to the maximum level of allegiance represents a reduction of around 9 points on the scale of support. Figure II.7 illustrates this relation.




Figure II.7 – Support for democracy by personal attachment to the president, 2008-2011

Additionally, people who locate themselves further toward the right on the ideological spectrum tend to show greater support for democracy as a form of government, keeping all other factors constant. Figure II.8, which groups the ideology values into left (1-4), center (5-6), and right (7-10), illustrates this relation.




Figure II.8 - Support for democracy by ideological position, 2008-2011

Support for democracy also depends on the administration's performance, or at least the public perception of its performance. Figure II.9 illustrates how people who are more satisfied with the administration tend to show more support for the democratic regime.




Figure II.9 - Support for democracy by presidential approval, 2008-2011

Among the sociodemographic characteristics, we find that women tend to support democracy less than men. By contrast, people with the most education, older people, or people who are better off economically profess a stronger commitment to the democratic regime. Comparing the primary strata of the sample, we also see that people from the Central region tend to have a higher level of support for democracy than people from Bogotá.

Finally, it is also important to point out the “non-findings.” First, there are no differences between the Uribe and post-Uribe eras in terms of support for democracy, even when controlling for all other factors. Additionally, how citizens evaluate the economy, either national economy or their personal finances, has no impact on their support for democracy.

Satisfaction with democracy

It is one thing to support democratic forms of government in the abstract, and another to be satisfied with their performance. In fact, as we showed before, the average level of satisfaction has been consistently lower than that of support. The results of the analysis of the determinants of satisfaction with democracy, which appear in Figure II.10, show similarities and differences with the analysis presented in the above sub-section.




Figure II.10 – Determinants of satisfaction with democracy, 2008-2011

First, as in the previous case, greater personal allegiance to the president produces less satisfaction with the performance of democracy even when controlling for all other factors. In this case, going from the minimum to the maximum level of allegiance to the president represents a reduction of 10 points on the scale of satisfaction with democracy. This effect is independent of both the Uribe and Santos administrations; the variable indicating this change of government does not have a significant impact.

Again, people who identify themselves more toward the right show a greater degree of satisfaction. Likewise, those who are more content with the job that the president has been doing also express greater satisfaction with the general performance of democracy.

It is important to emphasize that the way citizens evaluate the economy has an influence on their satisfaction with democracy. This occurs with both the sociotropic (the national economy) and egotropic (personal finances) evaluations. Figure II.11 shows this relation.




Figure II.11 - Satisfaction with democracy by sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the economy, 2008-2011

Among the sociodemographic characteristics, we found that the most educated people are more skeptical and critical in their evaluations of how well the country's democratic system is working. We also see that the regions of the Caribbean, the Center, and the Former National Territories have a higher average level of satisfaction than Bogotá when controlling for all other factors.

Support for the political system

As can be seen in Figure II.12, the results of the model that tries to explain support for the political system do not greatly differ from those of the previous models, at least in terms of the main hypothesis we propose here: that people who express personal allegiance to the figure of the president tend support the political system less.




Figure II.12 - Determinants of support for the political system, 2008-2011

In fact, as Figure II.13 illustrates, people who express a stronger tie toward the leader tend to show less support for the political system, controlling for all other factors. In this case, the impact is almost double that which appeared in the analyses of support for democracy and satisfaction with its performance.




Figure II.13 – Support for the political system by personal allegiance to the president, 2008-2011

Again, ideology and the evaluation of the government's performance have the expected effects, which were also found in the previous analyses. Likewise, in both this and the other analyses, party affiliation has no effect.

How citizens evaluate both the national economy and their own financial situation also has an effect on their support for the system: it is higher among people who better evaluate the economy and their personal finances.

Women and older people support the system more, while those who have more years of education, and people who live in urban centers, support it less. All regions, with the exception of the Eastern, show a higher level of support than Bogotá.

Anti-democratic attitudes

In addition to examining democratic values, the AmericasBarometer also been analyzing a series of questions related to what we might call anti-democratic attitudes, that is, attitudes against the central tenants of liberal democracy. We can divide the questions related to this issue along two dimensions: those that measure attitudes opposing the separation of powers, and those that examine attitudes hostile to the opposition and minority groups.

Attitudes against separation of powers and checks & balances

Since the 2008 study, we have included the following questions to see to what degree people express attitudes against the separation of powers, a fundamental principle of liberal democracy:

POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

POP103. Cuando la Corte Constitucional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Constitucional debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

In Figure II.14, we see how the average level of these attitudes has been falling since 2010. The 2011 data confirms this decline. This and the other figures show versions of these variables that have been recodified to the customary 0-to-100 point scale.




Figure II.14 – Attitudes against Congress, 2008-2011

The case of attitudes against the Constitutional Court follows this same pattern, as Figure II.15 shows.




Figure II.15 - Attitudes against the Constitutional Court, 2008-2011

By combining these two variables, we created an index of attitudes against the separation of powers.¹⁴ Figure II.16 shows the evolution of this index.




Figure II.16 - Attitudes against the separations of powers, 2008-2011

¹⁴ The Cronbach alpha reliability for this index is .79 for the years 2008 to 2011.

Attitudes against the opposition and minorities

Since 2008, we have included the following questions to examine the degree to which the public does not want the president to respect the opposition and minorities:

POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(88) NS (98) NR

POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(88) NS (98) NR

In the case of attitudes showing a lack of respect for the political rights of the opposition, again there is a decline in the average level, but this time it is even greater between 2010 and 2011, as Figure II.17 shows.




Figure II.17 - Attitudes against the opposition, 2008-2011

A similar pattern can be observed in terms of attitudes that distrust and marginalize minorities. In this case, though, the tension characteristic of those years seems to recede a little earlier, between 2008 and 2009, as can be seen in Figure II.18.




Figure II.18 - Attitudes against minorities, 2008-2011

With the above two questions, we constructed an index of attitudes against the opposition and minorities. This constitutes a second dimension of attitudes against liberal democracy.¹⁵ The positive (i.e., declining) evolution of this index appears in Figure II.19.




Figure II.19 - Attitudes against the opposition and minorities, 2008-2011

¹⁵ In this case, the Cronbach alpha, at .44, is considerably less.

The 2010 comparative study included a graphical depiction of how Colombia compared to other countries in the region along these two dimensions of anti-democratic attitudes. We reproduce this figure here as Figure II.20. The dotted lines show the hemispheric averages in both dimensions. We can see how Colombia appears among the countries with lower levels of respect for the principles of liberal democracy.




Figure II.20 - Attitudes against liberal democracy in the Americas, 2010

Figure II.21, in turn, shows the change over time in both dimensions. In 2008 and 2009, there is evidence of an illiberal political culture that has been improving since then.




Figure II.21 – Two dimensions of attitudes against liberal democracy, 2008-2011

Finally, we used the four variables that comprise these two dimensions to construct an index of attitudes against liberal democracy.¹⁶ The evolution of this index appears in Figure II.22.




Figure II.22 - Attitudes against liberal democracy, 2008-2011

¹⁶ The Cronbach alpha is .72.

Factors that influence anti-democratic attitudes

In order to examine the factors that have an impact on attitudes against liberal democracy, we carried out a linear regression analysis using, as the dependent variable, the aggregated indicator that combines the four questions discussed in the preceding section. As independent variables, we used the same ones employed in the analyses of democratic attitudes and values presented in a previous section of this chapter.

The results of this exercise appear in Figure II.23.¹⁷




Figure II.23 - Determinants of attitudes against liberal democracy, 2008-2011

Before proceeding, it is important to note that there is a significant difference in illiberal attitudes between the two periods studied. In the post-Uribe era, attitudes against liberal democracy have declined substantially. We had already found evidence of this in the descriptive figures presented in the previous section. The negative regression coefficient for the post-Uribe variable indicates that if we take two individuals with identical sociodemographic characteristics, and equal in terms of personal allegiance to the president, ideology, political party affinity, presidential approval, and evaluations of the economic situation, then attitudes against liberal democracy will be higher for the person living under the Uribe administration than under the Santos government.

Additionally, personal allegiance to the figure of the president tends to increase illiberal attitudes among the public, controlling for all other factors. Figure II.24 shows this relation for the two eras studied.

¹⁷ The results of this regression model, as well as the separate models for the dimensions regarding the separation of powers, on the one hand, and the opposition and minorities, on the other, appear in Table II.2 in the annex to this chapter.




Figure II.24 - Attitudes against liberal democracy by personal allegiance to the president during the Uribe and post-Uribe eras

When controlling for these and other factors, neither ideology nor political party affiliation have an impact on anti-democratic attitudes. The level of presidential approval does negatively influence these attitudes. People who are more satisfied with the administration's performance tend to be willing to grant the president more power even though this violates key principles of liberal democracy. Figure II.25 shows that this relation was sharper during the Álvaro Uribe's administrations, which is an additional piece of evidence of the personalistic style with which he ruled for two terms.




Figure II.25 - Attitudes against liberal democracy by presidential approval during the Uribe and post-Uribe eras

The most educated, and older people, have more respect for liberal principals, while, *ceteris paribus*, women show slightly less respect. Finally, the Caribbean region has a political culture that adheres less to liberal democracy than Bogotá, holding all other factors constant.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the evolution of Colombians' democratic attitudes since 2004, when the AmericasBarometer study in Colombia began. The resulting pattern is one of continuity. There have been neither big rises nor falls in these indicators over the course of these eight years. This denotes stability. The values and attitudes are also relatively high, as comparative AmericasBarometer studies from previous years have shown.

On the other side of the coin, though, are attitudes against the principles of liberal democracy. The survey questions used to measure these attitudes constitute different dimensions of democratic political culture from support for democracy as a form of government, satisfaction with its performance, and support for the political system. In some ways, these more concrete aspects of democracy permit a finer analysis and provide more substance to the abstract notion of democracy. In other words, while some people might believe that democracy is the best form of government, they can also maintain that it does not necessarily require respect for the opposition or adherence to the principle of the separation of powers. This perspective on political culture is not very encouraging for Colombia: comparative AmericasBarometer studies from previous years have shown it to be among the countries with the strongest attitudes against liberal democracy. As we showed in this chapter, these negative attributes of Colombians' political culture started to cede in 2010; and in 2011 this improvement began to consolidate.

This break coincides with the end of the two terms of ex-president Uribe. What predominated during his administration was an atmosphere of confrontation with the opposition and other branches of government, especially the Supreme Court. This led to widespread tension and polarization in the country's political scene during those years.

In this context, the descriptive data mentioned above – especially the fact that the post-Uribe era seems to have been accompanied by a significant shift to more favorable attitudes toward the principles of liberal democracy – motivated the analysis of the factors that influence these attitudes undertaken in this chapter. More concretely, we tried to explore the relationship, rarely studied empirically, between these attitudes and the magnitude of the personal ties that people establish with their leader.

The theoretical object of the analysis was to try and understand the relationship between a country's political culture and the ruler in office. Concretely, the question was: to what degree do democratic/anti-democratic attitudes held by citizens depend on the president's style of governing?

The evidence provided in this chapter seems to show that governments with *caudillista* (or political-boss like) tendencies are not favorable for democratic political culture. Trusting a leader more than institutions undermines support for democracy and the political system; it also foments anti-democratic traits among citizens. From a more substantive perspective, the evidence suggests that Colombians' attitudes against democratic principles, which previous studies found to be characteristic, are less structural than one might imagine. This is good news. What is perhaps not such good news is that these attitudes are shaped by circumstances and the governing style of leaders. In the future, it would be worth investigating whether this characteristic is peculiar to Colombia or whether it is a widespread pattern, at least throughout the region. In the latter case, it would be necessary to explore what other factors influence, to a greater or lesser extent, the stability of the traits of political culture.

Appendix

Table II.1 - Determinants of democratic values and attitudes, 2008-2011

Determinants	Support for democracy		Satisfaction with democracy		Support for the system	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Personal allegiance to the president	-0.043*	0.02	-0.050***	0.01	-0.089***	0.01
Post-Uribe	-1,909	1.28	0.344	0.68	-1,428	0.96
Ideology	0.817***	0.18	0.955***	0.14	1.277***	0.13
<i>Partido de la U</i>	2,344	1.26	1,480	1.07	-1,476	0.90
Approval of the president's job	0.109***	0.02	0.274***	0.02	0.236***	0.02
Evaluation of the national economy	0.039	0.02	0.132***	0.02	0.096***	0.01
Evaluation of the personal economy	0.004	0.02	0.073***	0.02	0.051**	0.02
Woman	-2.357**	0.74	-0.086	0.63	1.933***	0.57
Years of education	0.747***	0.10	-0.353***	0.10	-0.239**	0.08
Age	0.278***	0.03	-0.007	0.02	0.074***	0.02
Wealth quintiles	1.083**	0.35	-0.254	0.28	-0.019	0.23
Urban	-0.569	0.92	-1,117	0.89	-1.612*	0.70
Ethnic minority	1,162	1.20	-1,515	0.89	0.491	0.87
Caribbean region	1,847	1.60	3.675**	1.20	6.183***	0.98
Pacific region	-1,311	1.50	-1,465	1.26	3.174**	1.09
Eastern region	0.981	1.67	1,979	1.55	1,505	0.99
Central region	5.884***	1.52	2.408*	1.15	4.510***	0.93
Former National Territories	-0.577	1.80	6.003***	1.56	6.695**	2.27
Constant	36.795***	2.57	21.307***	2.70	26.874***	2.00
R-squared	0.073		0.154		0.174	
N	4410		4385		4488	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table II.2 - Determinants of anti-democratic attitudes, 2008-2011

Determinants	Illiberal attitudes		Attitudes against the separation of powers		Attitudes against the opposition and minorities	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Personal allegiance to the president	0.050**	0.02	0.081***	0.02	0.023	0.02
Post-Uribe	-7.610***	1.05	-7.346***	1.48	-7.995***	0.96
Ideology	-0.122	0.15	-0.178	0.19	-0.084	0.16
<i>Partido de la U</i>	1.185	1.13	2.150	1.39	1.145	1.23
Approval of the president's job	0.221***	0.02	0.234***	0.03	0.216***	0.02
Evaluation of the national economy	0.000	0.02	0.007	0.02	-0.003	0.02
Evaluation of the personal economy	0.005	0.02	0.001	0.03	0.006	0.03
Woman	1.526*	0.62	1.017	0.79	2.294**	0.73
Years of education	-1.368***	0.11	-1.397***	0.14	-1.368***	0.12
Age	-0.066**	0.02	-0.044	0.03	-0.081**	0.03
Wealth quintiles	-0.432	0.30	-0.245	0.35	-0.615	0.36
Urban	0.975	0.99	1.418	1.17	-0.004	1.05
Ethnic minority	0.905	1.07	0.727	1.41	1.219	1.06
Caribbean region	3.692*	1.7	3.140	2.00	4.280*	1.65
Pacific region	2.638	1.69	2.302	1.89	2.901	1.71
Eastern region	2.686	1.61	2.442	1.82	2.752	1.52
Central region	1.494	1.68	-0.809	2.10	3.356*	1.61
Former National Territories	1.424	1.79	0.009	2.51	4.747*	2.29
Constant	43.579***	2.82	40.640***	3.51	46.495***	2.84
R-squared	0.157		0.117		0.140	
N	4398		4260		4171	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

III. Stable democracy and trust in institutions

Introduction

After analyzing the evolution of Colombians' democratic and anti-democratic attitudes, in this chapter we return to one of the classic themes of AmericasBarometer studies. Since 2004, we have been postulating the importance of two fundamental dimensions of stable democracy: support for the political system as a measure of its legitimacy, on the one hand, and political tolerance, on the other. We contend that a country needs to show favorable signs in both dimensions in order to advance toward a stable democracy. In this chapter, therefore, we discuss these two dimensions and the usual typology based on them.

The chapter also includes information about public trust in key institutions of the political system and Colombian society. For some of these institutions, we show their evolution over the eight years in which the AmericasBarometer study has been conducted, emphasizing the continuities and changes. Finally, we analyze how the public evaluates the performance of both the Executive branch and Congress, as well as the individual factors that have an impact on their evaluations.

Stable democracy

As mentioned above, the studies by the AmericasBarometer have suggested the importance of examining political legitimacy, defined in terms of “support for the system” and tolerance of the political opposition. It has been demonstrated how a combination of these two factors constitutes a warning sign about the possible fragility of democracy in a country

In the previous chapter, we described how the indicator of support for the system, a measure of a country's political legitimacy, is constructed. In Figure II.3, we showed that support for Colombia's political system has not varied widely between 2004 and 2011 despite the wide-ranging events that the country has experienced. More importantly, the levels of support for the system were not altered by the change of government in August, 2010.

Since it began, the study has also included a series of questions that ask respondents to imagine a hypothetical group of people with minimal allegiance to the political system. The aim is to explore how much a respondent is willing to accept that this hypothetical group freely exercises its political rights. The questions are the following:

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas?

D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista?

D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?

The combination of these questions allows us to construct an indicator of political tolerance.¹⁸ Figure III.1 shows that, despite a statistically significant decline between 2007 and 2008, tolerance has climbed slightly since 2010. On average, there is the same amount of political tolerance in 2011 as in 2004. Studies from previous years have demonstrated that this level is relatively low compared to other countries in the hemisphere.




Figure III.1 – Political tolerance, 2004-2011

As mentioned before, we constructed a typology based on support for the system and political legitimacy, the different combinations of which appear in Table III.1.

Table III.1 – Theoretical relationship between support for the system and political tolerance

Support for the system	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low	Unstable democracy	Democracy at risk

¹⁸ The Cronbach alpha of reliability for this scale, for the years 2004 to 2011, is .85.

Political systems in which much of the public views the system as highly legitimate (support), and shows a great deal of tolerance for the rights of others, will tend not only to be the most stable but will have a *stable democracy*.

When support for the system remains high but public tolerance is low, we get *authoritarian stability*. The system tends to remain stable (public support will minimize the threats to its existence), but restrictions on democratic rights and the authoritarianism that this generates could put the democratic system at risk in the medium term.

The two boxes in the lower part of the table describe situations of low support for the system that could lead directly to conditions of instability. In cases where there is greater tolerance, this instability could be a temporary stage in a process of democratic deepening. How long this period of instability lasts, however, makes the future uncertain. For this reason, we deem this scenario to be one of democratic instability.

Finally, a democratic rupture is most likely in situation of low support and low tolerance. Naturally, the causes of such breaks in democracy cannot be found in the characteristics of the public alone; elites play a decisive role in such processes. But the combination of these two attitudes can make a democratic regime vulnerable. This is why we call this scenario *democracy at risk*.

As seen in the upper panel of Figure III.2, the averages for these two dimensions have remained within a limited area of the range of possible values, falling along an imagined border between situations of *authoritarian stability* and *stable democracy*. A closer look, like that in the figure's lower panel, details the country's evolution in these two dimensions.

It is worth emphasizing that during the years in which tolerance averages were lower (2008 and 2009), levels of support for the system were also high. We cannot generalize this pattern, of course, but it does suggest the need to better understand the relationship between support and tolerance, and to explore the factors that cause these dimensions to operate with a kind of zero-sum logic. Such questions, however, lie beyond the scope of this report.




Figure III.2 – Support for the system and tolerance, 2004-2011
(overview and in detail)

We operationalize this typology by dichotomizing the indicators of support for the system and political tolerance, and classifying them as *low* when they go from 0 to 50, and *high* when they are above 50 points on a scale of 0 to 100. The proportion of the public in each box of the typology appears in Table III.2.

Table III.2 – Empirical relationship between support for the system and political tolerance, Colombia 2011

Support for the system	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy 31.2%	Authoritarian stability 33.9%
Low	Unstable democracy 15.9%	Democracy at risk 19.0%

Figure III.3 shows that the proportion of people who show high support for the system and high tolerance, after rising considerably in 2010, fell in 2011 to levels similar to previous years.




Figure III.3 – People with high support and high tolerance, 2004-2011

The percentage of respondents who can be classified as having a propensity for situations of unstable democracy (that is, low support for the system and high tolerance) did not change from the previous year, as can be seen in Figure III.4.




Figure III.4 – People with low support and high tolerance, 2004-2011

Figure III.5 shows that the decline registered in 2010, so that one out of three people are in the category of authoritarian stability, held constant in 2011.




Figure III.5 – People with high support and low tolerance, 2004-2011

Finally, there was a significant rise in the proportion of people expressing low support for the system and low political tolerance, as can be appreciated in Figure III.6. This might be a worrying development, although the finding still needs to be confirmed in studies over the next few years. In fact, 2011 saw a return to the levels that existed in 2008 and 2009.




Figure III.6 – People with low support and low tolerance, 2004-2011

Trust in institutions

As customary in AmericasBarometer studies, we asked our respondents to what degree they trusted a series of political and social institutions in the country. The questions were the following:

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?

B51. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Protestante?
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?
COLB32A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la Nación?
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?

Figure III.7 shows the average level of trust in the country's institutions in 2011. Table III.3, in turn, shows the difference between the level of trust that each institution received in 2010 and 2011. The institutions are arranged in order of most trust lost to most trust gained.

Table III.3 – Trust in institutions: losses and gains, 2010-2011

Institution	2010	2011	Difference
Mayorship	51.60	44.65	-6.95
City Council	49.46	43.91	-5.56
President	66.26	62.37	-3.90
Government	61.37	58.76	-2.61
Constitutional Court	56.43	54.35	-2.07
Ombudsman's Office	62.54	60.74	-1.79
Political Parties	36.51	35.08	-1.42
Police	55.97	55.01	-0.96
System of Justice	52.77	51.82	-0.95
Supreme Court	55.68	55.15	-0.53
Attorney General	61.91	61.67	-0.24
Elections	46.94	46.79	-0.15
Armed Forces	64.45	64.42	-0.04
Protestant Church	32.81	32.88	0.07
News Media	61.48	61.58	0.10
Catholic Church	67.11	67.24	0.13
National Electoral Council	47.29	47.53	0.24
Inspector General's Office	58.94	59.52	0.58
Congress	49.39	50.61	1.22




Figure III.7 – Trust in institutions, 2011

As in previous years, the most prestigious institution in 2011 is the Catholic Church, whose rating doubled that of the Protestant Church, the institution in which Colombians have the least confidence. As previous studies have found, the Armed Forces also enjoy great prestige.

Perhaps to the surprise of many, the next most prestigious institution is the National Civil Registry (*Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil*). Despite a few incidents in managing the latest congressional elections, this institution – which, among other things, is responsible for registering people to vote, maintaining voter registration lists, and counting the votes in an election – is slightly more trusted than even the President. This finding contrasts dramatically with the very low level of trust in the National Electoral Council (*Consejo Nacional Electoral*) and other electoral institutions. Unfortunately, this is the

first year that the sample included a question about the National Civil Registry, so we do not know whether its prestige is conjunctural or has been building for some years.

It is important to note that local government institutions (mayorships and municipal councils) experienced the sharpest drop in trust between 2010 and 2011. This decline is particularly striking given that it occurred in an election year for local authorities. Despite the fact that, as can be seen in Figure III.8, on previous occasions this level rebounded in the post-election year (such as between 2007 and 2008), the decline this year was particularly steep.




Figure III.8 – Trust in mayorships, 2004-2011

This same pattern was repeated in terms of municipal councils, as Figure III.9 shows.




Figure III.9 – Trust in municipal councils, 2005-2011

There was also a decline between 2010 and 2011 in the level of trust in the President. This decline, however, was not statistically significant, as can be seen in Figure III.10.




Figure III.10 – Trust in the president, 2008-2011

Evaluating the administration and Congress

Evaluating the performance of the administration

In addition to the general evaluation of the administration's performance, which we will analyze later in this chapter, the AmericasBarometer survey includes a series of questions designed to see how much the public approves of its performance in specific areas. The series of questions are the following:

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Usando esta escalera...
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?
COLN11. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual resuelve el conflicto armado?
COLN12. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual sana las finanzas estatales?
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?
COLN16. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien las relaciones con los países vecinos?

The new Santos administration took office on August 7, 2010. Field work for the AmericasBarometer study that year was carried out in April, or between the congressional elections and the first round of the presidential election. As a result, this 2011 study is the first to evaluate the new government.

Figure III.11 shows the 2011 scores to these questions recodified to the usual scale of 0 to 100. As can be seen, the best-evaluated area is, by far, its management of relations with neighboring countries. After various incidents, and the state of constant tension and serious mutual accusations that characterized these relations during the Uribe administration, President Santos promoted a radical change of course: a policy of rapprochement with Colombia's neighbors that, in addition to generating positive results in diplomatic terms, ended up making a big and positive impression on public opinion. The results shown in the figure provide evidence of this.




Figure III.11 – Evaluation of the administration in different dimensions, 2011

The question about the management of international relations was first asked only in 2010. However, the large jump shown by Figure III.12 leaves no doubt about how this change of course in international relations has been perceived.




Figure III.12 – Evaluation of the management of relations with neighboring countries, 2010-2011

As in previous years, the public gave the administration's social policy, specifically the fight against unemployment and poverty, its lowest grade. Except for somewhat higher scores in 2004 and 2005, the government's social policy has been the most wanting, with no modifications following the change of government.




Figure III.13 – Evaluation of the fight against unemployment and poverty, 2004-2011

For the public, however, the change of government did represent a deterioration in the handling of the armed conflict and public security (or safety), both flagship policies of the Álvaro Uribe administration. Despite the fact that the election of Juan Manuel Santos supposedly represented a continuation of his predecessor's policy of "Democratic Security," the perception seems to be that the fight against the guerrillas has weakened and public safety has deteriorated. Accompanying and occasionally provoking these perceptions have been real acts of terrorism by the insurgent groups. Figure III.14 reflects this deteriorating perception in the administration's management of these long-central issues to the national agenda. The perception of how the conflict has been handled declined to the level of 2007, while that regarding public safety obtained its worst score since we began asking about the topic in 2005.




Figure III.14 – Evaluation of the management of the armed conflict and public safety, 2004-2011

In addition to these specific aspects of how the president and his administration have governed, the survey included a general question asking respondents to rate the job that the president has been doing. This question, already mentioned in the previous chapter, is the following:

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Juan Manuel Santos es...?: **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo
 (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR

The evolution shown in Figure III.15 demonstrates that, despite the high levels of popularity enjoyed by President Santos in other public opinion surveys¹⁹, there was a significant decline in the president's approval rating between 2010 and 2011. Nonetheless, his approval rating is still among the highest on the continent, judging by the results of the 2010 comparative study.

¹⁹ For example, on June 30, 2011 *El Espectador* reported that a Gallup poll found the popularity of President Santos to have reached 76% (<http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-281097-gallup-dice-popularidad-de-santos-del-76-ciento>).




Figure III.15 – Presidential approval, 2004-2011

To investigate which factors, in recent years, have influenced the public's perception of the president's job in office, we constructed linear regression models for this indicator. We ran four models, one for each year between 2008 and 2011, in order to evaluate how these impacts have changed. The models included the following factors:

- Respondent's ideological position (scale of 1 to 10, moving from left to right).
- Ideological affinity with the *Partido de la U* (dichotomous).
- Evaluation of the national economy (scale of 0 to 100).
- Evaluation of one's personal economy (scale of 0 to 100).

The control variables included the following:

- Sex (1=Male, 0=Female).
- Education (years completed).
- Age (in years).
- Wealth quintile (from 1 to 5, moving from less to greater wealth).
- Area of residence (1=urban, 0=rural).
- Ethnic minority (0=white or *mestizo*, 1= any other ethnic identity).
- Caribbean region (dichotomous).
- Pacific region (dichotomous).
- Eastern region (dichotomous).
- Central region (dichotomous).
- Region of the Former National Territories (dichotomous).

The results appear in Table III.4 in the annex to this chapter. One of the most consistent findings, as expected, is that ideology is a significant predictor of presidential approval. Given the political tendency represented by both Uribe and Santos, people who locate themselves more on the right tend to be more

satisfied with the government's performance. It is important to note, however, that this effect shrank considerably in 2011. In other words, during the Uribe administration, a right-wing ideological orientation was a stronger predictor of presidential approval than it was during the first year of the Santos administration. When we analyze the relation between ideology and presidential approval for each one of the four years studied, we find that there have been no shifts over time for people on the left or in the center. The change in 2011 only occurs among people who consider themselves to be on the right. Their approval rating of President Santos is considerably less than it was for President Uribe. Figure III.16 illustrates this relation.




Figure III.16 – Presidential approval by ideological orientation, 2008-2011

Likewise, affinity for the *Partido de la U* is a factor that consistently and significantly influences presidential approval ratings. This is not surprising given that this party was created to provide political support for President Uribe, and that Santos was its candidate in the 2010 presidential elections. As can be seen in the table of results in the annex to this chapter, the effect of affinity with the *Partido de la U* is greater in 2009 and 2010, and less in 2008 and 2011. This variation is readily apparent in Figure III.17, which shows the average approval rating of the president for people partial to the *Partido de la U* or “another” (or no) party for each of the four years analyzed.




Figure III.17 – Presidential approval by political party affinity, 2008-2011

Consistent with theories of the economic vote, the sociotropic evaluation of the economy is a significant predictor of presidential approval for all years studied. What's more, even though this effect shrank in 2011, the decline was less pronounced than it was for the above-mentioned variables. By comparison, the egotropic evaluation of the economy only has a significant impact in 2009 and 2011.

Evaluating the performance of Congress

To study congressional approval ratings, we included the following question in the AmericasBarometer questionnaire:

M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los congresistas en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los congresistas del Congreso colombiano están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?

(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal
(88) NS (98)NR

Figure III.18 shows the average approval ratings from 2008 (when we began asking this question) through 2011. It is clear that, in contrast to presidential approval ratings, there are no significant changes over time. In particular, we can not see any variations between 2010 and 2011 following the change of government.




Figure III.18 – Approval of the performance of Congress, 2008-2011

To explore the factors that influence congressional approval ratings, we ran regression models on this indicator for each year between 2008 and 2011, using the same factors included in the models on presidential approval. The results appear in Table III.5 in the annex to this chapter.

In these models, we found that ideology is a significant predictor for congressional approval ratings: people more to the right are more satisfied with the job Congress is doing, except in 2009. Nonetheless, an affinity for the *Partido de la U* had no impact on congressional approval ratings, except during the Santos administration, that is, in 2011.

Finally, how respondents evaluated the national economy (the sociotropic evaluation) had a significant impact on their evaluation of Congress' performance. People who believe that the economy is doing well tend to rate the legislature better. Surprisingly, how people evaluated their personal finances (the egotropic evaluation) also influenced their level of satisfaction with Congress in all years except 2010.

The resulting patterns from an examination of congressional approval ratings between 2008 to 2011 in terms of both sociotropic and egotropic evaluations appear in Figure III.19.




Figure III.19 – Approval of Congress by sociotropic y egotropic evaluations of the economy, 2008-2011

Conclusion

In this chapter we analyzed the typology, customary in AmericasBarometer studies, that combines the two dimensions of stable democracy: support for the political system and tolerance for the rights of others. In 2011, we found that the proportion of Colombians who expressed both low support for the system and low tolerance, what we denominate as the *democracy-at-risk* group or box, has grown slightly but significantly. This rise, however, is especially noticeable because the percentage of people with these characteristics was atypically low the year before.

We also analyzed trust in institutions. In this analysis we found the perhaps surprisingly high level of trust enjoyed by the National Civil Registry, and the significant decline of trust in local authorities, that is, in mayors and municipal councils, in 2011.

Finally, we investigated the evolution of presidential and congressional approval ratings over the years that the study has been conducted. We found that the public appreciates the effort of the Santos administration to normalize relations with Colombia's neighbors. We also analyzed the factors that influence public perception of the executive and the legislature. We found that ideology and political party affinity are key to explaining presidential approval ratings, although this relationship weakened some in 2011 with the Santos administration. The patterns are similar in terms of the legislature, although we found evidence that Colombians blame Congress somewhat more than the President for the state of their personal finances.

Appendix

Table III.4 - Determinants of presidential approval, 2008-2011

	2008		2009		2010		2011	
Determinants	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Ideology	1.605***	0.27	1.843***	0.34	1.699***	0.24	0.794***	0.22
<i>Partido de la U</i>	8.873***	1.92	12.679***	2.08	13.841***	1.29	6.609**	1.98
Evaluation of the national economy	0.280***	0.03	0.241***	0.04	0.218***	0.04	0.162***	0.03
Evaluation of one's personal economy	0.037	0.04	0.091*	0.05	0.015	0.04	0.094**	0.03
Women	-1.243	1.15	2.830*	1.13	0.424	1.27	-1.112	1.03
Education	0.147	0.18	-0.352	0.18	-0.460*	0.18	0.062	0.15
Age	-0.005	0.05	-0.011	0.05	-0.077	0.04	0.041	0.04
Wealth quintiles	-0.273	0.52	-0.508	0.55	-0.058	0.56	-1.102*	0.42
Urban	-2.649	1.53	-0.750	1.66	1.092	1.34	-1.432	1.35
Ethnic minority	-1.241	2.22	-1.677	1.86	-3.604*	1.58	0.332	1.29
Caribbean region	-4.095	2.48	0.599	2.33	1.574	1.73	4.421*	2.02
Pacific region	-6.896**	2.19	-3.123	2.68	-4.349	2.27	2.453	1.61
Eastern region	-2.535	2.03	0.972	2.34	-2.210	2.15	1.081	1.53
Central region	-1.682	2.03	-0.615	2.38	-1.603	2.03	1.254	1.45
Former National Territories	0.205	5.14	-1.444	5.26	-6.137	3.82	4.231	2.69
Constant	49.635***	4.13	45.978***	4.58	54.114***	4.14	47.630***	4.29
R-squared	0.153		0.159		0.185		0.099	
N	1163		1217		1126		1091	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table III.5 - Determinants of approval of the performance of Congress, 2008-2011

	2008		2009		2010		2011	
Determinants	Coef.	Est. error	Coef.	Est. error	Coef.	Est. error	Coef.	Est. error
Ideology	0.621**	0.22	0.126	0.27	0.786**	0.26	0.822**	0.28
<i>Partido de la U</i>	-2,011	2.00	-0.205	2.01	3,074	1.56	4.897**	1.44
Evaluation of the national economy	0.122***	0.03	0.173***	0.03	0.115**	0.03	0.164***	0.03
Evaluation of one's personal economy	0.075*	0.04	0.127***	0.03	0.076	0.04	0.106**	0.03
Women	-1,238	1.19	3.200**	1.05	1.974	1.21	0.796	1.28
Education	-0.429*	0.20	-0.450*	0.18	-0.787***	0.16	-0.130	0.12
Age	-0.103*	0.04	-0.047	0.03	-0.163***	0.04	-0.022	0.04
Wealth quintiles	-1.107*	0.51	-0.263	0.52	0.004	0.48	-1.253**	0.43
Urban	-2.380	1.67	1.424	1.21	0.267	1.20	-4.148*	1.57
Ethnic minority	2.992	1.70	1.085	1.69	-0.640	1.76	1,630	2.00
Caribbean region	0.537	2.11	4.037	2.57	5.945***	1.71	5.558**	1.80
Pacific region	-0.428	2.07	3.275	2.25	3.048	2.01	6.724**	2.47
Eastern region	0.747	1.51	6.514***	1.88	3.521	2.13	1.561	1.83
Central region	2.262	1.79	3.52	1.83	3.135	2.24	2.901	2.24
Former National Territories	-1.004	1.77	1.10	2.43	8.547**	2.5	3.771	4.58
Constant	50.519***	3.92	36.306***	3.84	45.941***	3.25	39.522***	4.77
R-squared	0.066		0.083		0.084		0.109	
N	1096		1182		1073		1054	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

IV. Public safety, corruption, and the armed conflict

Public safety

The problem of safety

As is typical in AmericasBarometer studies, we included a semi-open question in the survey about what respondents believe to be the most serious problem currently facing the country. The question is the following:

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]			<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Políticos, los	59
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98

We grouped the possible responses into four categories – safety, conflict, economy, and other – in the following manner:

Safety	Conflict	Economy	Other
Crime Gangs Safety (lack of)	Armed conflict War against terrorism Kidnapping Terrorism Violence	Credit, lack of Unemployment/lack of jobs External debt Economy, problems with, crisis of Inflation, high prices Poverty Land to farm, lack of	All others

Figure IV.1 shows the distribution of responses within this classificatory scheme between 2005 and 2011.²⁰ From 2005 to 2008, problems related to safety and the armed conflict most preoccupied Colombians. In 2009 and 2010, economic problems displaced these worries. In 2011, however, safety and the armed conflict (together) again became the public's prime concern.




Figure IV.1 – Country's biggest problem (safety, conflict, economy, other), 2005-2011

If we exclude topics related to the armed conflict and focus solely on the issue of public safety, we find that even though Colombians do not consider it to be the country's biggest problem, its ranking among their preoccupations rose considerably between 2010 and 2011, as can be seen in Figure IV.2.

²⁰ The way the responses were codified in 2004 makes them incomparable with other years.

This pattern seems to confirm the perception detected by other public opinion studies that the level of insecurity on the streets has worsened recently.




Figure IV.2 – Safety as the country’s biggest problem, 2005-2011

The increasing mention of safety as the country’s main problem over the previous year has been particularly important in two regions: in Bogotá, where the percentage rose from 7.8% to 17.3% between 2010 and 2011, and in the Pacific region, where it increased from 5.6% to 16.3%.




Figure IV.3 – Safety as the biggest problem by area of residence, 2011

Although the rise between 2010 and 2011 occurred in both urban centers and rural areas, the increase was more pronounced and significant in the former (Figure IV.4).




Figure IV.4 - Safety as the biggest problem in urban and rural areas, 2005-2011

National surveys are a widely accepted way of measuring crime. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer includes a series of questions not only designed to measure perceptions of public safety (or lack thereof) but also to explain the cases of victimization by different type of crime, including asking respondents about their own experiences or those of members of their household.

Perceptions of safety and justice

To explore the perception of insecurity that citizens have, we included the following question:

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo **inseguro(a)** o muy **inseguro(a)**?

Figure IV.5 shows the percentage of respondents who answered that they felt *safe* or *very safe* to the above question for each year. As can be seen, despite the fact that public safety has become a more prominent concern among Colombians, there has not been a corresponding decline in the perception of personal safety. In fact, after declining in 2009, the perception of public safety has returned to previous levels since 2010.




Figure IV.5 – Perceptions of safety, 2004-2011

Just as in nearly every year since this study in Colombia began, the perception of public safety is lowest in Bogotá. Figure IV.6 shows the regional differences for 2011.




Figure IV.6 - Perceptions of safety by region, 2011

The perception of public safety is also significantly worse in medium and large cities, as well as the capital, than in small cities and rural areas, as can be seen in Figure IV.7.




Figure IV.7 - Perceptions of safety by size of place of residence, 2011

The following survey question also measures perceptions of public safety:

AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

In this case as well, cities with larger populations are most affected, as shown by Figure IV.8, which represents the percentage of respondents who answered *some* or *much* to this question. It is worth noting that more than three out of five respondents from Bogotá believe that their neighborhood is affected by gangs. Although the comparative AmericasBarometer study from 2010 shows that Colombia is not one of the countries most affected by gangs, the percentage of people who feel threatened by them in Bogotá in 2011 is undoubtedly considerable.




Figure IV.8 – Gang threat by size of place of residence, 2011

To these questions we added the following:

AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

Figure IV.9 shows the percentage of people who believe that crime represents *much* or *some* threat to future well-being from 2004 to 2011. In line with references to safety as the country's most pressing problem, the perception of such a threat rose between 2010 and 2011, although this increase is not statistically significant.




Figure IV.9 – Perception of the threat of crime, 2004-2011

It is in large cities and the capital, as Figure IV.10 shows, where the perception of the crime threat is the greatest.




Figure IV.10 - Perception of the threat of crime by size of the place of residence, 2011

Beyond concerns with public safety, Colombians have a relatively high level of trust in the system of justice, as the 2010 comparative study showed. As can be seen in Figure IV.11, which shows the level of trust in the system of justice on a scale of 0 to 100, in South America only Surinam and Uruguay have a higher average than Colombia. Countries such as Argentina and Venezuela appear rather far behind. The level of trust in Colombia is even slightly above that of the United States.




Figure IV.11 – Trust in the system of justice in comparative perspective, 2010

This trust has not varied over the study's eight years, as Figure IV.12 shows. The protagonism of the system of justice in events of recent years in Colombia has neither positively nor negatively affected public trust.




Figure IV.12 – Trust in the system of justice, 2004-2011

The following question is a more concrete measure of trust in the efficacy of justice :

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría...

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR




Figure IV.13 – Trust in the efficacy of justice, 2004-2011

Figure IV.13 shows the percentage of people who, during the study's eight years, have *much* or *some* trust in the efficacy of justice. As can be seen, there are no substantial variations: trust in the efficacy of justice has remained stable over time in Colombia. But is this percentage high or low? One way to find out is by comparing the results to those of other countries. The 2010 AmericasBarometer study provides the answer. Figure IV.14 shows that, among South American countries in 2010, Colombia was in third place, trailing behind Guyana and slightly ahead of Uruguay.




Figure IV.14 - Trust in the efficacy of justice in comparative perspective, 2010

Crime

Measuring crime rates in a country is no easy task. The problems of underreporting constantly affect such efforts. One of the accepted methodologies to overcome this issue is to use national surveys. For this reason, AmericasBarometer includes a comprehensive battery of questions aimed at exploring this aspect of people's daily lives. The questions are the following:

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]			
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número]_____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP			
VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencia sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa (10) Extorsión (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)			
VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas] (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP			
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR			

Figure IV.15 shows that around one out of five respondents said they had been the victim of some kind of crime, which, according to the 2010 comparative study, is a similar proportion to that of Uruguay. There appears to have been a jump between 2009 and subsequent years, but it is possible that this is primarily because the wording of the question was changed in 2010. This new wording was also used in the 2011 study. It was, in fact, expected that the change in wording would raise the percentages of people who reported being the victim of a crime.




Figure IV.15 – Victimization by crime, 2004-2011

In 2010, we also included a question regarding the number of times that a person was the victim of a crime. Taking only those people who said they had been victimized, the average number of reported cases is similar in both 2010 and 2011: around 1.9.

The distribution of victims by type of crime for the last two years appears in Table IV.1.

Table IV.1 – Types of crime experienced by victims, 2010-2011

Crime	2010		2011	
	#	%	#	%
Armed robbery	106	34.5%	118	41.4%
Unarmed robbery WITHOUT battery, assault, or physical threat	82	26.7%	92	32.3%
Unarmed robbery WITH battery, assault, or physical threat	43	14.0%	25	8.8%
Burglary	24	7.8%	12	4.2%
Extortion	11	3.6%	11	3.9%
Assault	9	2.9%	7	2.5%
Vandalism	9	2.9%	6	2.1%
Kidnapping	1	0.3%	1	0.4%
Sexual assault or rape	2	0.7%	0	0.0%
Other	20	6.5%	13	4.6%
Total	307	100.0%	285	100.0%

There were no substantial variations from one year to the next. The only crime that seems to have increased is unarmed robbery without aggression. In general, armed robbery is the most common type of crime.

Figure IV.16 shows that the greatest number of cases (around 40%) occur inside the municipality where a respondent lives but not in his or her home or neighborhood. Around 15% of the crimes were

committed in a different municipality than that of the respondent. While the percentage of crimes committed in the home fell between 2010 (21%) and 2011 (14%), the percentage that occurred in the victim's neighborhood increased from 23% to 30%.




Figure IV.16 – Place of the victimization by crime, 2010-2011

Figure IV.17 shows that although slightly more men than women were victims of a crime in 2010, in 2011 the proportion between male and female victims was the same.




Figure IV.17 – Victimization by crime by sex, 2010-2011

When the data for 2011 is examined, however, we see that victimization patterns differ between men and women. As Figure IV.18 shows, half the female victims experienced the criminal act in their home or neighborhood, while this was true for only a third of the men, who were primarily victimized in their own or another municipality.




Figure IV.18 – Place of the victimization by crime by sex, 2011

Corruption

In previous AmericasBarometer studies in Colombia, corruption was clearly a secondary concern. In 2011, however, the percentage of Colombians who identified corruption as the country's biggest problem grew dramatically. Figure IV.19 shows that between 2010 and 2011, this figure jumped from 4% to 12%. Among the optional responses to this question shown at the beginning of this chapter (p. 95), in 2011 corruption appears in third place, only surpassed by violence (21%) and unemployment (20%).




Figure IV.19 – Corruption as the country's biggest problem, 2005-2011

This new concern for corruption is undoubtedly related to the various scandals that have come to light thanks to the work of judicial entities and investigative reporting by the news media. One of these scandals involves Andrés Felipe Arias, the Minister of Agriculture during the Uribe administration. He is now in jail awaiting trial for acts related to the illicit distribution of credit originally intended to foment agricultural projects but that, according to the indictment, ended up in the hands of large landlords who, additionally, contributed to his campaign to become the presidential candidate for the Conservative Party. Another widely-reverberating scandal involves the intelligence agency (the *Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad*, DAS, or Administrative Department of Security), which, during the previous administration, was engaged in illegal eavesdropping on, stalking, and harassment of politicians, judges, activists, and journalists who opposed the Uribe government. On top of these scandals, over the last few years there has also been court cases brought against politicians, mostly in the coalition that supported President Uribe, who have been accused of having ties to paramilitary groups.

Undoubtedly, Colombians' growing concern for corruption can also be explained by events involving the mayor of Bogotá. The mayor's office of the capital found itself facing serious accusations of illegal contracting that led to the ouster the mayor, Samuel Moreno, of the *Polo Democrático Alternativo*

party, and who, at the moment this report was written, was in prison awaiting trial for these acts. This is reflected in the percentage of people from Bogotá who identify corruption as the country's biggest problem, as Figure IV.20 shows. This proportion is significantly higher than it is for the country's other regions, except the Eastern. It must be emphasized, however, that the rising concern for corruption is neither a phenomenon exclusive to Bogotá nor is it only a consequence of its mayoral scandals: the percentages in the other regions also greatly surpass the national average from previous years.




Figure IV.20 – Corruption as the country's biggest problem by region, 2011

Perceptions of corruption

The fact that corruption has moved up the list of Colombians' concerns does not mean that their perception of it has increased to the same degree. It could simply mean that respondents' other concerns are no longer as significant as they once were. To examine this possibility, we examined the responses to the following question:

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: **[LEER]**

- | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| (1) Muy generalizada | (2) Algo generalizada | (3) Poco generalizada |
| (4) Nada generalizada | (88) NS | (98) NR |

The responses were re-ordered from “Not widespread” to “Very widespread” and converted to a scale of 0 to 100. Figure IV.21 shows that, even though there was an increase in the perception of corruption compared to the previous year, and even though the 2011 level was the highest recorded since AmericasBarometer began conducting studies in Colombia, this increase is not significant and is not nearly so big as the rise in the percentage of people who identify corruption as the country's biggest problem.




Figure IV.21 – Perceptions of corruption, 2004-2011

In fact, the increase in the perception of corruption in Bogotá did not occur in 2011 but a couple of years before, as can be seen in Figure IV.22.




Figure IV.22 – Perceptions of corruption in Bogotá, 2004-2011

Attitudes toward corruption

Does the increasing concern about corruption translate into less tolerance for it? To answer this question, we first asked the following question:

EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?	No=0	Sí=1
--	------	------

As can be seen in Figure IV.23, the percentage of people who justify paying a bribe has fallen considerably from its peak of 25% in 2009 to less than 15% in 2011. According to the 2010 AmericasBarometer study, however, this percentage is still high in comparative terms.




Figure IV.23 – Justifying a bribe, 2008-2011

To examine Colombians' attitudes toward corruption in more detail, we included the following group of questions that ask respondents to judge a number of hypothetical situations:

Me gustaría que me indicara si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.	
DC1. Por ejemplo: Un congresista acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagado por una empresa. ¿Considera usted que lo que hizo el congresista es [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....	1
Corrupto pero justificado.....	2
No corrupto.....	3
NS [no leer]	88
NR [no leer]	98
COLDC1A. ¿Y lo que hizo la empresa que pagó los diez mil dólares? ¿Considera usted que es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....	1
Corrupto pero justificado.....	2
No corrupto.....	3
NS [no leer]	88
NR [no leer]	98
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella le paga diez mil pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada.....	1
Corrupto pero se justifica	2
No es corrupto	3
NS [no leer]	88
NR [no leer]	98
DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo el político es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y él debe ser castigado.....	1
Corrupto pero justificado.....	2
No corrupto.....	3
NS [no leer]	88
NR [no leer]	98
COLDC14. Un policía de tránsito detiene a un conductor por hacer un cruce indebido, y éste le ofrece 50.000 pesos al policía para que no le ponga el parte y lo deje ir. ¿Usted cree que lo que hizo el conductor es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....	1
Corrupto pero justificado.....	2
No corrupto.....	3
NS [no leer]	88
NR [no leer]	98
COLDC15. El policía recibe los 50.000 pesos y deja ir al conductor sin ponerle el parte. ¿Usted cree que el policía de tránsito es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....	1
Corrupto pero justificado.....	2
No corrupto.....	3
NS [no leer]	88
NR [no leer]	98

Figure IV.24 shows the percentage of people who, for each of the above questions, deemed the described behavior to be corrupt and worthy of punishment for each year that these questions were

included in the survey. In the case of a company that offers a bribe to a congressperson to obtain a contract, it can be seen that vast majority of Colombians consider that both the congressperson and the company should be punished for corruption, without significant variations over time. They view the incident between the driver and the transit police officer similarly, although in 2011 a slightly higher percentage condemned this exchange.

A different pattern occurs in situations that are seemingly more ambiguous in the eyes of respondents. In the case of the woman at a government office with her children, they are much more permissive, though significantly less so in 2011 compared to the year before. Something similar occurs with the politician who uses his or her influence to get a job for a family member. A large proportion of Colombians seem to assume that this is, in fact, a legitimate endeavor for politicians. The rejection of such behavior, however, is considerably greater in 2011 than in previous years, which could be evidence of a growing consciousness about practices that could be considered clientelistic.




Figure IV.24 – Attitudes of intolerance with corruption, 2006-2011

Victimization by corruption

Beyond examining Colombians' perceptions and attitudes toward corruption, it is also important to investigate the concrete acts of corruption that they might have experienced. To do so, we included the following questions:

	INAP No trató ni tuvo contacto	No	Sí
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...			
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?		0	1

We found that a little more than one out of ten respondents said that they had been the victim of at least one of situations described in the above questions, as Figure IV.25 shows.




Figure IV.25 – Victimization by corruption, 2004-2011

This proportion has not varied widely over time. And according to the 2010 AmericasBarometer study, this percentage is also relatively low compared to other countries in the region.

Clearly, there is no direct link between the level of corruption that Colombians perceive and the concrete acts of corruption that they have personally experienced. In fact, as can be seen in Figure IV.26, although the perception of corruption seems to be greater among victims of corruption (V) than non-victims (NV), this difference is not significant in any of the years covered by the AmericasBarometer. This seems to suggest that corruption in Colombia does not directly affect people's daily lives, at least in their dealings with the state. Instead, it involves large-scale acts corruption mainly occurring in the high spheres of power.




Figure IV.26 – Perceptions of corruption by victimization, 2004-2011

The armed conflict

Perceptions of the conflict

As can be seen in Figure IV.1, at the beginning of this chapter, Colombians considered the armed conflict to be the country's biggest problem until 2008. Since 2009, economic issues have been front and center in the mind of the country's citizens. This evolution in Colombians' preoccupation with the armed conflict is clearly seen in Figure IV.27. The rising percentage of people who mention some issue related to terrorism and conflict, among others, jumped between 2007 and 2008, reaching a peak of 64%. Since then, the percentage has fallen by half. This decline can be explained by a combination of factors, including the perceived effectiveness of Uribe's security policies (although this explication is not completely consistent with the increase through 2008) and the global economic crisis of 2008. Currently, three out of ten respondents mention the armed conflict as the most important problem facing the country.




Figure IV.27 – The armed conflict as the country's biggest problem, 2004-2011

To examine Colombians' attitudes about the conflict more closely, we formulated questions about the different possible ways to end the conflict with the guerrillas as well as the paramilitaries. The following questions were included in the AmericasBarometer survey :

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3
COLPAZ1B. Y con los grupos paramilitares , ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3

Comparing the data from 2008, at the peak of the perception that the armed conflict was the country's main problem, with that from 2011, we also see a change in attitude of how to end the conflict. Figure IV.28 shows the drop in the percentage of people who prefer a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrilla as well as the paramilitaries (though it still remains the majority option), and the rise in the percentage of people who believe that the conflict needs a military solution or at least a combination of the two.




Figure IV.28 – Perceptions of solutions to the conflict, 2008 y 2011

Attitudes toward the conflict and the armed actors

We can examine Colombians' attitudes toward the armed actors through our trust indicators. The questions are:

COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las FARC?

COLB61. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el ELN?

COLB62. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Autodefensas o paramilitares?

After converting the original 1-to-7 point scale to a metric of 0 to 100, and considering that trust in political parties, the least-respected institution in the country, exceeds 30 points on the scale, we can see in Figure IV.29 that, generally, trust in the illegal armed actors is relatively low.

What's more, trust in these actors has fallen considerably since 2005 when we started asking these questions, with a more pronounced drop over the last three years. The contrast between the first and last year of this series is most dramatic in the case of trust in paramilitaries, which was above that of the FARC and ELN in 2005 but is now at the same level.




Figure IV.29 – Trust in the illegal armed actors, 2005-2011

This year we included the following series of specific questions to study Colombians' attitudes toward the actors in the armed conflict more closely:

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto usted apoya estas afirmaciones, usando esta escala de 5 puntos, donde 1 significa <i>me opongo firmemente</i> y 5 significa <i>lo apoyo firmemente</i>	Marcar 1 a 5 88=NS, 98=NR
COLAFARC. Algunas personas creen que las FARC deberían ganar más influencia política. ¿Qué tanto Usted apoya esta idea?	
COLAPARAS. Algunas personas creen que los paramilitares o bandas emergentes deberían ganar más influencia política. ¿Qué tanto Usted apoya esta idea?	
COLAGUETACT. Algunas personas creen en atacar violentamente a la policía o las fuerzas militares por las injusticias que existen en este país. ¿Qué tanto Usted apoya esta idea?	
COLAMILIT. Algunas personas creen que las fuerzas militares colombianas deberían tener mayor libertad para defender la nación de la manera en que ellas lo consideren adecuado. ¿Qué tanto Usted apoya esta idea?	

By converting the responses to a more intuitive scale of 0 to 100, we obtained the results seen in Figure IV.30. Colombians do not want the illegal armed actors to gain any more influence and, generally, do not condone violent attacks on the military and police. Additionally, an important percentage of respondents believe that fewer restrictions should be imposed on how the military conducts the war.




Figure IV.30 – Attitudes toward the actors of the conflict, 2011

Attitudes toward transitional justice

To examine the public's attitude toward the processes of transitional justice, we included the following questions:

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones

COLJP5. Los miembros de grupos guerrilleros que han confesado sus crímenes **no** deben ser castigados. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

COLJP6. Los miembros de grupos paramilitares que han confesado sus crímenes **no** deben ser castigados. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

Colombians do not appear to be very supportive of the prospect that the members of the illegal armed groups be pardoned for their crimes. Additionally, despite the fact that people who consider themselves to be on the left of the ideological spectrum tend to show more support for such a pardon, the differences with people who identify themselves in the center or on the right are not statistically significant, as can be seen in Figure IV.31, which shows the responses to these questions converted to a scale of 0 to 100.




Figure IV.31 – Support for pardoning members of the illegal armed groups, 2011

When respondents were asked if they were familiar with the Law of Justice and Peace, which was introduced to administer transitional justice to demobilized members of the armed groups, especially the paramilitaries, less than one out of three respondents answered affirmatively (Figure IV.32).




Figure IV.32 – Familiarity with the Law of Justice and Peace, 2011

Additionally, we asked people who said they were familiar with the Law of Justice and Peace the following questions in order to examine their perceptions of the law's effectiveness in terms of truth, justice, and reparations respectively:

Ahora me gustaría conocer su opinión acerca de algunos asuntos más específicos.
 ¿Cómo ubicaría su propia posición en la siguiente escala en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO?

COLJP3C ¿Hasta qué punto cree que la Ley de Justicia y Paz ha contribuido al destape de los crímenes cometidos por los paramilitares?

COLJP3B ¿Hasta qué punto cree que la Ley de Justicia y Paz ha contribuido al juzgamiento de los comandantes paramilitares?

COLJP3A ¿Hasta qué punto cree que la Ley de Justicia y Paz ha contribuido a fomentar la reparación de las víctimas de la violencia?

On average, Colombians familiar with the Law of Justice and Peace (who, as we saw, are a minority) give it a middling grade in these three areas, as Figure IV.33 shows. In fact, they perceive the law to have been more effective at eliciting the truth about acts committed by paramilitary groups than punishing those acts or making reparations to the victims.




Figure IV.33 – Perception of the effectiveness of the Law of Justice and Peace in terms of truth, justice, and reparations, 2011

Victimization by the conflict

A sizeable proportion of citizens have been victimized by the conflict. We included the following questions to examine this phenomenon:

	Sí	No
WC1. ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? ¿o tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?	1	2
WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país?	1	2
WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?	1	2




Figure IV.34 – Three forms of victimization by the conflict, 2011

Figure IV.34 shows that a fifth of the respondents say they have lost a family member to the armed conflict. It should be kept in mind that the questions do not have a time limit and, therefore, do not specifically refer to the recent past; this percentage includes any period that respondents consider to be a part of the conflict. This explains why, when we group together the different forms of victimization mentioned above, there is no significant variation in the percentage of people who has been victimized in some way over the eight years of the AmericasBarometer studies in Colombia, as Figure IV.35 shows.




Figure IV.35 – Victimization by the conflict, 2004-2011

Finally, we see that the Former National Territories is the region with the highest percentage of victims to the armed conflict, while Bogotá has the lowest percentage (Figure IV.36).




Figure IV.36 – Victimization by the conflict by region, 2011

V. Political participation and voting behavior

Public attitudes toward different kinds of participation

In this chapter, we examine different kinds of political participation that citizens avail themselves of in their interaction with the public realm. These vary in terms of the level of involvement and the spectrum of action. The kinds of political participation analyzed are: (a) participating in meetings convened by local governments; (b) petitioning or soliciting assistance from local officials; (c) participating in peaceful and legally authorized protests; (d) working on political campaigns; and (e) exercising the right to vote.

For each one of these forms of participation, we show their evolution over the years that the AmericasBarometer study in Colombia has been conducted. Additionally, we examine which factors influence a person's decision to become involved in each one of these forms of political participation. Among the factors analyzed are interpersonal trust, participating in civil society organizations, ideological position, sympathy for different political parties, presidential approval rating, as well as sociodemographic characteristics such as sex, age, educational level, economic position, civil state, ethnic identity, size of the area of residence, as well as region.

Before undertaking this analysis, however, we included the following questions in order to see how much citizens approve or disapprove of different kinds of expression:

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

The evolution of these answers, on a scale of 0 to 100, appears in Figure V.1.




Figure V.1 – Approval for different kinds and expressions of political participation, 2004-2011

In this figure, the different kinds of political participation are arranged from greater to lesser approval by Colombians. In the first panel, we see that there is widespread support for people to organize themselves in order to resolve problems in their communities. This level of approval has not varied since 2004 when these studies began. The same is largely true regarding participation in legal

demonstrations (panel 2). For Colombians, this type of demonstration enjoys legitimacy and, although there was a slight increase in 2011, it is not statistically significant. Respondents similarly approve of working on election campaigns, the levels of which have also not varied over time, as can be seen in panel 3 of Figure V.1. Public legitimacy for these three forms of political participation contrasts with the next three kinds. Panel 4 shows that the public is much willing to condone the blocking of public roads by people to achieve their political aims. It is important to note, however, that approval levels began to rise in 2010. This might be an additional piece of evidence of what we might call a process of opening subsequent to the change of government, and which we discussed in previous chapters. The last row of Figure V.1, panels 5 and 6, show that Colombians most disapprove of invading private property and, even more so, collective action to overthrow the government. Their disapproval for these types of political expression has not changed greatly over time.

Explaining political participation

As we stated at the beginning of this chapter, we did not want to limit ourselves to showing the tendencies of the different kinds of participation examined. Instead, the main aim of our analysis is to explore the different factors that foment or inhibit participation by people.

The different kinds of participation analyzed in the subsequent sections are:

- Participating in spaces of local discussion such as municipal and city hall meetings.
- Petitioning local authorities for assistance in resolving community problems.
- Participating in demonstrations or protests.
- Actively participating on a political campaign for a candidate or political party.
- Electoral participation.

In order to find the factors related to different kinds of participation, we created logistical regression models that indicate to what degree these factors influence the probability that a person would become involved in each kind of participation analyzed. Below we provide details on the different factors that we included in these models.

Interpersonal trust

The first factor that might influence political participation is the level of trust that respondents have in the people around them. To measure this interpersonal trust, we included the following question:

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS
 (98) NR

In the econometric models, we included a version of this variable recodified to a scale of 0 to 100, from none to much trust. Our hypothesis is that people with greater trust in their community tend to participate more.

Participating in civil society organizations

People who establish ties with civil society organizations tend to accumulate social capital that might facilitate or stimulate their involvement in direct kinds of political participation. The following questions are related to civil society:

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]							
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	

We recodified the answers to this question into dichotomous variables with the value of 1 when respondents answered that, for each one of these organizations, they attended meetings at least one or two times per year, and 0 if they did not.

Figure V.2 shows that people attend meetings of a religious nature most frequently. By contrast, professional and trade group meetings have the lowest levels of participation.




Figure V.2 – Participating in civil society organizations, 2011

Ideology

Some kinds of participation might be associated with an individual's ideological position. In a country like Colombia, it is possible that more institutional manifestations (like voting, for example) are more common among people on the right, while people who consider themselves to be on the left tend to participate more in protests. To evaluate this hypothesis, we included respondents' answers to the following question as a variable in the model:

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

Prior AmericasBarometer studies have shown that, on average, Colombians locate themselves toward the right, especially compared to other countries. Figure V.3 charts the national averages on a scale of 1 to 10, moving from left to right, between 2004 and 2011. It shows that Colombians moved slightly to the left in 2011, reaching their furthest leftward-leaning point over the time period analyzed. This slide toward the left is part of the "liberalization" process mentioned earlier in this report.




Figure V.3 – Ideological position, 2004-2011

Political party affinities

Certain kinds of participation might be stimulated by or channeled through political parties. People who feel an affinity for a party could have the resources or contacts that might facilitate their access to the political sphere. For this reason, we included this factor as a predictor of the different kinds of political participation analyzed in this chapter.

To identify political party affinities we asked the following questions:

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?
 (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a POL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a POL1]**
 (98) NR **[Pase a POL1]**

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO LEER LISTA]**
 (801) Partido Liberal
 (802) Partido Conservador
 (803) Polo Democrático Alternativo
 (804) *Partido de la U* (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional)
 (805) Cambio Radical
 (806) Convergencia Ciudadana
 (808) Colombia Democrática
 (809) Colombia Viva
 (810) Movimiento MIRA
 (817) Alianza Social Indígena (ASI)
 (819) Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA)
 (821) Partido Verde
 (822) Partido de Integración Social (PAIS)
 (823) Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN)
 (826) Movimiento Afrovides –La Esperanza de un Pueblo
 (827) Movimiento Interétnico de Opción Participativa “Mio”
 (77) Otro
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

In 2010, the percentage of people who said they felt partial to a political party felt rose considerably, a consequence of the reactivation of electoral competition at the end of Uribe’s two terms in office. Figure V.4 shows, however, that this percentage fell again in 2011 to a level similar to those of previous years. One out of four Colombians now say that they feel an affinity for a political party.




Figure V.4 – Sympathy for some political party, 2004-2011

People who said they were partial to political party were asked to identify which one, as shown above. The results, shown in Figure V.5 for the 2008-2011 period (when the partisan options are most comparable), are evidence of the relative fluidity of party sympathies in Colombia. Besides the significant loss of ground by the *Partido Verde* (Green Party), the most notable phenomenon of the last year was the recovery of the Liberal Party and the decline of the *Partido de la U*. Even if the latter is still the majority party, it seems clear that the new configuration of party sympathies echoes the arrival of a new administration and its “national unity” coalition that, in addition to the *Partido de la U* and the Conservative Party (which were in the governing coalition during the Uribe administration), also includes parties previously in the opposition, such as *Cambio Radical* and especially the Liberal Party.




Figure V.5 – Political party affinities, 2008-2011

In turn, Figure V.6 shows the average ideological position for each one set of people expressing affinity for a specific political party, as well as people who say they are not partial to any party. While the sympathizers of the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, and the *Partido de la U* claim to be more on the right, to the left are people who feel an affinity for the *Polo Democrático Alternativo*.




Figure V.6 – Ideology by political party affinity, 2011

The self-identified ideological position of some political party sympathizers have shown remarkable stability over time, as is the case for Liberal partisans. However, Table V.1 shows that some political party sympathizers have changed their ideological position considerably, especially over the last year. This is the case for people partial to the *Polo*, who have moved somewhat to the right, and to sympathizers of *Cambio Radical*, who have moved in the opposite direction. The intensification of a right-wing position among Conservatives is also notable, as is the slight leftward turn by *Partido de la U* sympathizers. These shifts reinforce the image instability in the Colombian party system.

Table V.1 – Ideological positions by political party affinity, 2008-2011

Party	2008	2009	2010	2011
Liberal	7.07	6.67	7.11	7.10
Conservative	6.65	6.61	6.94	7.31
<i>Polo</i>	3.62	3.62	3.04	4.36
<i>Partido de la U</i>	7.21	7.28	7.40	7.01
<i>Cambio Radical</i>	7.71	7.44	6.85	5.54
<i>Verde</i>	N/A	N/A	5.63	6.39
Other	7.58	6.81	6.14	5.79
None	6.06	6.10	6.08	5.67
Average	6.21	6.18	6.34	5.97

Presidential approval

An additional factor, included as a possible predictor of the different kinds of participation analyzed, is the administration's approval rating by respondents. We showed how this variable is constructed in Chapter II, and described it in Chapter III. In the latter, Figure III.15 showed the

presidential approval ratings from 2004 until 2011; Figure III.16, in turn, showed the relation between the ideology of respondents and the degree to which they approved of the president's performance; and finally, Figure III.17 showed presidential approval according to the political party to which respondents felt affinity. We expect that people who express a greater degree of approval for the job that the president is doing will participate less in demonstrations and protests and perhaps more in less contentious forms of participation.

Sociodemographic factors

Some sociodemographic characteristics might be associated with the ways in which people interact with the public sphere. For example, some studies have found a gender gap in terms of political participation. Members of minority ethnic groups might also be more isolated from institutionalized spaces of political discussion. Or, while people with higher socioeconomic status might have access to more resources and avenues of political expression, they could also have less incentive to use them. For this reason, the explanatory models of the different kinds of participation presented in the following sections include a series of independent variables that operationalize sociodemographic factors.

Sex

We included a dichotomous variable that was codified 1 if the respondent is a woman and 0 if he is a man.

Age

This variable measures how old a respondent is in years.

Education

The variable measures the number of years of schooling that a respondent has completed.

Wealth quintiles

This variable identifies the wealth quintile in which a respondent falls. As explained in previous chapters, these quintiles are calculated according to the ownership of material goods as determined by the R* series of questions (see the questionnaire in the appendices to this report).

Self-identified social class

In addition to a measure of economic position based on household ownership of goods and assets, we included a question that explores how respondents self-perceive their class position. The question is the following:

COLMOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? [LEER OPCIONES]	
Alta.....	1
Media alta.....	2
Media.....	3
Media baja.....	4
Baja.....	5
NS.....	88
NR.....	98

Table V.2 shows the distribution of respondents into these social classes since the question was included in the AmericasBarometer surveys in Colombia.

Table V.2 – Perceptions of class, 2007-2011

Class	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Low	28.3%	29.8%	22.7%	26.3%	20.8%
Lower middle	27.0%	28.5%	31.9%	28.2%	29.1%
Middle	37.0%	35.6%	38.5%	38.6%	42.6%
Upper middle	6.3%	4.9%	5.6%	5.4%	5.9%
High	1.5%	1.2%	1.3%	1.5%	1.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Civil state

The following question was used to construct this variable:

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]

(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR

Based on the responses to this question, we created a variable indicating whether a respondent is married or part of a civil union (value of 1) or he or she had some other civil state (value of 0). Figure V.7 shows the distribution of this variable over the years in which the AmericasBarometer study has been conducted in Colombia.




Figure V.7 – Respondents' civil state, 2004-2011

Ethnic self-identification

The questionnaire included the following question:

ETID. Para comenzar ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata u otra? **[Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-colombiana, codificar como (4) Negra]**

(1) Blanca	(2) Mestiza	(3) Indígena	(4) Negra	(5) Mulata	(6) Rom
(7) Palenquero	(8) Raizal	(9) Otra	(88) NS	(98) NR	

Based on this question, we created a variable that indicates whether people identify themselves with an ethnic minority group. The variable uses the value of 0 if they consider themselves to be white or *mestizo* (mixed race), and 0 if they answer something else. In 2011, 18.3% of respondents self-identified as part of some ethnic minority group.

Size of the area of residence

The way the sample was designed provides information about whether respondents live in rural areas, small municipalities, medium-sized cities, large cities, or the capital. We included this variable as one of the predictors of the different kinds of political participation.

Region

To capture the regional diversity that exists in the country, we included dummy variables for each region. They are the following:

- Caribbean
- Pacific
- Eastern
- Central
- Former National Territories
- Bogotá (reference category)

Participating in local meetings

Now that we have examined the factors included in the explanatory econometric models, we turn to analyze each of the different kinds of participation in detail. In this section we study the degree to which Colombians participate in spaces of local discussion convened by municipal officials. To do so, we used the following question:

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) No Sabe	(98) No Responde
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Figure V.8 shows the percentage of respondents who said they had participated in these town hall meetings between 2005 and 2011. Less than one out of ten people attended this kind of meeting. Although there are some variations between the different years (a rise in 2008, for example), they are not statistically significant.




Figure V.8 – Participation in local meetings, 2005-2011

To examine which factors influence the probability that a person will attend a meeting to discuss local affairs, we ran a logistical model with the factors described in the previous section. The results of this model appear in Figure V.9. These results, and those of the models that follow, appear in Table V.5 in the annex to this chapter.




Figure V.9 - Determinants of participation in municipal meetings, 2011

As expected, the accumulation of social capital, in terms of belonging to civil society organizations, favors participation in these discussions. People who attended the meetings of either community-improvement committees or professional or merchant groups are more likely to attend municipal meetings, keeping all other factors constant. Figure V.10 illustrates this relation.




Figure V.10 – Participation in municipal meetings by attendance at improvement board and professional association meetings, 2011

Feeling partial to certain political parties also encourages attendance at meetings convened by local officials. Specifically, people who say they sympathize with *Cambio Radical* or “other” party (other, that is, than those specifically named in the model) tend to participate more frequently in municipal meetings than people who claim to feel no affinity for any party, as can be seen in Figure V.11.

Finally, *ceteris paribus*, people with higher educational levels tend to participate more frequently in meetings to discuss municipal affairs. Figure V.12 illustrates this relation, showing that people acquire this type of empowerment after finishing high school.




Figure V.11 – Participation in municipal meetings by political party affinity, 2011




Figure V.12 – Participation in municipal meetings by educational level, 2011

Soliciting assistance from the local government

The second kind of political participation that we analyze in this chapter involves soliciting assistance from the local government. To examine this issue, the survey contains the following question:

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.				
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, funcionario de la alcaldía, concejal o edil?	1	2	88	98

Elsewhere in the questionnaire there is a slightly more specific question:

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal del municipio durante los últimos 12 meses?	
(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1]	
(98) No responde [Pase a SGL1] (99) INAP	

Based on the responses to these two questions, we constructed a variable that uses the value of 1 when a respondent answers affirmatively to one (or both) of these questions, and 0 if they answer negatively to both. Figure V.13 shows that around one out of five Colombians requested assistance from a local official in the preceding year.




Figure V.13 – Soliciting assistance from local authorities, 2006-2011

The econometric model tries to determine which factors influence the probability that a person will petition local authorities for assistance. The factors included in the model, which are the same as those used in all the models related to different kinds of political participation, were described in a previous section of this chapter. The results of this model can be seen in Figure V.14; they are also shown in more detail in Table V.5 in the annex to this chapter.




Figure V.14 - Determinants of soliciting assistance from local authorities, 2011

We found that, once again, the accumulation of social capital appears to be a factor that promotes political participation. As in the case of attending municipal meetings, people who attend the meetings of either community-improvement committees or professional, merchant, or producer associations more frequently approach mayors, city or municipal council members, or members of local boards with petitions or requests for assistance. Figure V.15 illustrates this relation.




Figure V.15 - Soliciting assistance from local authorities by attendance at improvement board and professional association meetings, 2011

Just as in the case of participating in municipal meetings, soliciting assistance from local authorities does not occur in a vacuum. Political parties can serve as channels of expression for people's needs. In fact, our econometric model finds that affinity for a number of parties increases the likelihood of petitioning local authorities for assistance. People partial to the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the *Partido de la U*, *Cambio Radical*, the *Partido Verde*, and some "other" party more frequently approach mayors, city council members, or local board members than people who feel no affinity for any party. Only the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* does not have this effect.

Finally, the size of the area of residence affects the frequency with which people request local authorities for assistance. The larger the city in which a person lives, the less likelihood that they will turn to this kind of participation. Figure V.16 illustrates this relation.




Figure V.16 - Soliciting assistance from local authorities by size of the place of residence, 2011

Participating in protests

Up until this point, we have seen more or less institutionalized ways of participating in politics. But there are other ways of expressing one's point of view or making demands. One of them is participating in demonstrations or public protests. We included the following question in the survey to examine this phenomenon:

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?
 (1) Sí ha participado [**Siga**] (2) No ha participado [**Pase a JC1**]
 (88) NS [**Pase a JC1**] (98) NR [**Pase a JC1**]

In 2011, we found that close to 7% of respondents stated that they had participated in at least one protest in the previous twelve months. In fact, on average this subgroup of respondents reported that they had participated in two protests during the previous year. To examine what drives people to protest, we included the following question:

Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? [NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]

- (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades)
- (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa)
- (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción)
- (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas)
- (5) Derechos humanos
- (6) Temas ambientales
- (7) Falta de Servicios públicos
- (8) Otros
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)

Table V.3 shows the distribution of the responses to this question in 2010 and 2011. The table shows that protests related to the educational system became considerably more frequent in 2011. The same is true, though to a lesser degree, for safety-related problems.

Table V.3 – Reasons for protesting, 2010-2011

Reasons for protesting	2010	2011
Economic issues	10.8%	12.6%
Education	21.6%	37.9%
Political issues	13.7%	6.8%
Safety	2.9%	7.8%
Human rights	13.7%	4.9%
Environmental issues	6.9%	6.8%
Public services	13.7%	7.8%
Others	18.7%	15.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

The econometric model that we ran tries to determine the factors that influence the probability that a person will join a public protest. The factors are the same ones described in previous sections of this chapter. The results of this statistical exercise are illustrated in Figure V.17 and shown in detail in Table V.5 in the annex to this chapter.




Figure V.17 – Determinants of participating in protests, 2011

Perhaps surprisingly, civil society associations are again found to be an explanatory factor in terms of participating in public protests. Once more, people who have attended the meetings of either community-improvements committees, or professional or merchant associations, are more likely to participate in public protests than people without such ties to civil society groups. This relation appears in Figure V.18.

The model also demonstrates that there is an ideological component to participating in public protests. Effectively, people who consider themselves to be on the left of the ideological scale get involved in these activities more frequently than people who identify themselves more toward the right, as Figure V.19 illustrates.




Figure V.18 – Participating in protests by attendance at improvement board and professional association meetings, 2011




Figure V.19 - Participating in protests by ideological position, 2011

In fact, political parties affinities complements this relation between ideology and participating in protests. The model says that, keeping all other factors constant, people partial to the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* also take part in public protests more frequently than people who feel no affinity for any

party. The same is true for people who are partial to some “other” party, that is, one not specifically mentioned in the model. It is also worth noting that none of the respondents who said they felt partial to the Conservative Party participated in a protest during the previous year.²¹ Figure V.20 illustrates the relation between political party affinity and participating in public protests.




Figure V.20 - Participating in protests by political party affinity, 2011

Finally, as can be seen in Figure V.21, more educated people, as well as those who are unmarried, tend to participate more frequently in protests.

²¹ For this reason, as can be seen in Table V.5 in the annex to this chapter, the model does not run a corresponding dummy variable for people partial to the Conservative Party.




Figure V.21 - Participating in protests by educational level and civil state, 2011

Election campaigns

Working on an election campaign is a more direct way of participating in politics. We included the following questions in the survey to examine this phenomenon:

PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2010? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR

COLPP2. ¿Está trabajando actualmente para algún partido o candidato en la campaña electoral de este año? (1) Sí está trabajando (2) No está trabajando (88) NS (98) NR

Based on the responses to these two questions, we constructed a variable of participating in campaigns that uses the value of 1 when respondents answered affirmatively to one (or both) of the two questions, and 0 in case they answered negatively to both. Around 12% of respondents said that they had participated either in the last presidential campaign of 2010 or in a campaign for local elections in 2011. A little less than 4% said that they had participated in both election cycles.

With this variable, we ran a logistical regression model that included the factors also contained in previous models. Figure V.22 illustrates the results of this model, and which are detailed in Table V.5 in the annex to this chapter.




Figure V.22 - Determinants of participating in an election campaign, 2011

Again, we found that ties to community-improvement committees or boards, and to professional associations, increases the probability that a person will get involved in a political campaign, as Figure V.23 shows.

Likewise, as expected, an affinity for a political party is also associated with this kind of political participation. People who are partial to any party, with the exception of the *Polo* and the *Partido Verde*, participate in campaigns more frequently than people who feel no affinity for any party, as Figure V.24 shows.

Finally, people who live in the Eastern region tend to get involved in political campaigns more frequently than residents of Bogotá.




Figure V.23 – Participating in campaigns by attending meetings of improvement boards or professional associations, 2011




Figure V.24 – Participating in campaigns by political party affinity, 2011

Electoral participation

Voting behavior has been a recurrent topic in the AmericasBarometer Colombian studies. It was a particularly important issue in 2011. In fact, the fieldwork for this study was carried out just a few months before elections for local authorities (governors, mayors, representatives to Congress, city council members, and local board members) were held.

For this reason, we used the following question to ask respondents if they intended to vote in the elections of October 2011:

COLVBLOC1. ¿Piensa votar en las elecciones para alcaldías de octubre próximo?
(1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a COLVBLOC2]** (88) NS (98) NR

Some 78% of respondents said they planned to vote in these elections. Clearly, this reported intention to vote was much higher than the actual voter turnout. We also asked the following:

COLVBLOC1A. ¿Ya sabe por quién votaría para alcalde de su municipio?
(1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a COLVBLOC2]** (98) NR

Just 36% of the people who said were going to vote in the October elections had decided, at the time, who they would vote for. To the people who had already decided for whom they were going to vote, we asked the following question:

COLVBLOC1B ¿Por cuál partido piensa votar en las elecciones de alcaldías?
[NO LEER LISTA]
(801) Partido Liberal
(802) Partido Conservador
(803) Polo Democrático Alternativo
(804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional)
(805) Cambio Radical
(806) Convergencia Ciudadana
(808) Colombia Democrática
(809) Colombia Viva
(810) Movimiento MIRA
(817) Alianza Social Indígena (ASI)
(819) Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA)
(821) Partido Verde
(822) Partido de Integración Social (PAIS)
(823) Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN)
(826) Movimiento Afrovides –La Esperanza de un Pueblo
(827) Movimiento Interétnico de Opción Participativa “Mio”
(77) Otro
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP

Table V.4 shows the distribution of the responses to this question.

Table V.4 – Voting intention for mayorships by political party, 2011

Party	%
Liberal	29.6%
<i>Partido de la U</i>	24.7%
Conservative	19.4%
<i>Cambio Radical</i>	7.2%
<i>Partido Verde Opción Centro</i>	4.6%
<i>Polo Democrático Alternativo</i>	4.3%
Other	10.2%
Total	100.0%

Since the October elections were only a few months away, we wanted to ask people how they perceived the possible risks and threats that might be present during the elections. To do so, we formulated the following questions:

[Entregue la tarjeta “D”] En esta escala del 1 al 7, donde 1 significa “muy en desacuerdo” y 7 significa “muy de acuerdo”, ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?
COLVBLOC3. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por la acción de grupos paramilitares.
COLVBLOC3A. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por la acción de bandas emergentes.
COLVBLOC4. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por la acción de grupos guerrilleros.
COLVBLOC5. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por la acción de narcotraficantes.
COLVBLOC6. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por el clientelismo.

The same questions (except the one related to emerging paramilitary gangs) were asked in 2007 during the local election process that year. Figure V.25, which shows the averages of the responses to these questions once converted to a 0-to-100 point scale, provides evidence that the perceived threat by armed groups, such as paramilitaries and guerrillas, fell slightly between these two electoral cycles, although the differences are not statistically significant. In the same figure, we see that Colombians consider clientelism to be the main threat looming over clean and fair elections.




Figure V.25 – Perception of threats to the electoral process, 2007-2011

In addition to people's perceptions, we also wanted to explore their experience with electoral anomalies such as threats by armed groups. To do so, we formulated the following questions:

COLVB25A. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?			
(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR
COLVB25B. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?			
(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR
COLVB25C. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote?			
(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR
COLVB25D. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote?			
(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR

Figure V.26 shows the percentage of people who responded affirmatively to these four questions. Although the percentages appear to be very small, they are indicative of the obstacles caused by the conflict and the armed actors to the functioning of democracy in Colombia. The results shown in this figure constitute one of the few cases in which we have empirical evidence of this influence. In general, the trends peak in 2009, though the differences between the years are not significant.




Figure V.26 - Electoral pressures and threats, 2007-2011

Finally, after describing the results related to electoral processes, we turn to our last form of political participation: having voted in the previous presidential elections. The question is the following:

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2010?

(1) Sí votó **[Siga]**

(2) No votó **[Pasar a VB4]**

(88) NS **[Pasar a VB10]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VB10]**

Based on the responses to this variable, we ran a logistical regression model with the factors repeated throughout this chapter. Figure V.27 illustrates the results of this model; they can be seen in detail in Table V.5 in the annex to this chapter.

The first thing that we found is that, contrary to what happened with the other kinds of participation analyzed in previous sections of this chapter, ties to civil society organizations does not influence the likelihood that a person will exercise their right to vote.




Figure V.27 - Determinants of electoral participation, 2011

Affinity for a political party has an influence only in the case of people partial to the *Partido de la U* and the Conservative Party. They appear significantly more motivated to vote than people who feel no affinity for any party.

But the strongest determinant of electoral participation is age. Younger people tend to get involved in politics, at least in terms of voting, less than older people. As Figure V.28 shows, low voter turnout principally occurs in the 18-to-25 year old age group.

Likewise, a respondent's educational level is also a significant predictor of electoral participation. People with the most education tend to vote more than people with less education. Additionally, controlling for all other factors, people who live in larger cities tend to be more cynical about elections than people who live in small municipalities or rural areas.

Finally, residents of the Pacific region and the Former National Territories vote less than people who live in Bogotá.




Figure V.28 – Electoral participation by age, 2011

Appendix

Table V.5 – Determinants of different kinds of political participation

Determinants	Municipal meeting		Assistance from local authority		Peaceful protest		Election campaigns		Voting	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Interpersonal trust	0.037	0.15	-0.037	0.09	-0.213	0.12	0.086	0.12	0.063	-0.1
Religious organization	0.088	0.24	-0.022	0.15	0.160	0.26	0.321	0.22	0.082	-0.1
Parents associations	-0.231	0.28	0.375	0.19	0.240	0.29	0.198	0.23	0.236	-0.2
Improvement board	1.363***	0.28	0.699**	0.23	1.411***	0.28	0.735**	0.23	0.102	-0.2
Professional association	0.797*	0.32	0.554*	0.23	0.799*	0.36	1.434***	0.25	0.141	-0.3
Ideology	-0.010	0.05	0.060	0.03	-0.187**	0.07	-0.008	0.05	0.003	0.0
Liberal Party	0.279	0.56	0.642*	0.26	0.786	0.51	1.098***	0.29	0.531	-0.3
Conservative Party	0.582	0.69	1.271**	0.38	0.000	(.)	1.316**	0.39	1.350*	-0.7
<i>Partido de la U</i>	0.623	0.39	1.047***	0.24	0.196	0.29	1.696***	0.27	0.789**	-0.2
<i>Polo Democrático</i>	0.365	0.95	0.812	0.82	2.226**	0.68	1.503	0.86	1.244	-1.0
<i>Cambio Radical</i>	1.942*	0.78	2.266***	0.57	-0.159	1.19	3.327***	0.65	1.326	-1.2
<i>Partido Verde</i>	0.199	0.65	1.695*	0.66	-0.681	1.26	0.866	0.76	1.031	-0.7
Other party	2.036***	0.56	1.083*	0.49	2.099***	0.60	1.549**	0.52	1.035	-0.6
Presidential approval	0.007	0.01	-0.009	0.00	-0.001	0.01	-0.006	0.01	0.007	0.0
Woman	-0.030	0.25	0.019	0.17	-0.232	0.27	0.065	0.25	0.295	-0.2
Age	0.004	0.01	0.012	0.01	-0.023	0.01	0.000	0.01	0.064***	0.0
Years of education	0.116**	0.04	0.018	0.02	0.075*	0.03	0.026	0.03	0.113***	0.0
Wealth quintiles	-0.116	0.11	-0.023	0.06	0.170	0.10	-0.047	0.08	0.012	-0.1
Social class	0.076	0.13	-0.094	0.10	0.126	0.15	-0.168	0.13	-0.045	-0.1
Married or in civil union	-0.225	0.29	-0.009	0.19	-0.896**	0.26	-0.286	0.24	0.309	-0.2
Ethnic minority	0.067	0.35	0.067	0.23	0.134	0.38	-0.035	0.29	-0.203	-0.2
Size of area	-0.158	0.14	-0.205*	0.08	0.050	0.14	0.075	0.12	-0.269**	-0.1
Caribbean region	0.177	0.50	-0.022	0.34	-0.066	0.44	0.591	0.48	-0.367	-0.3
Pacific region	0.110	0.57	-0.255	0.36	-0.711	0.54	0.707	0.50	-0.791**	-0.3
Eastern region	0.307	0.60	-0.082	0.41	0.702	0.63	1.170*	0.55	-0.416	-0.3
Central region	-0.063	0.53	0.003	0.36	-0.800	0.63	0.888	0.51	-0.572	-0.3
Former National Territories	-0.190	0.72	-0.310	0.79	0.735	0.83	1.083	0.67	-1.224**	-0.5
Constant	-4.831***	1.03	-1.632*	0.66	-2.193	1.11	-3.440***	0.74	-2.786***	0.6
F	2.081		4.184		5.042		3.554		5.413	
N	1043		1058		1023		1060		1055	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Appendixes

Appendix A. Technical description of the sample design

Sample design²²

The sample designed for Colombia included all non-institutionalized adults; that is, it excluded people in jail, schools, hospitals, and military bases. It was a stratified random sample. Stratification ensured that the country's most important geographical areas were included: Pacific, Caribbean, Central, Eastern, the Former National Territories, and Bogotá. The sample was sub-stratified to include cities with more and with less than 300,000 inhabitants. Finally, the sample was also sub-stratified into urban and rural areas.

We used projections for 2011 from the 2005 census, Colombia's most recent. According to this census, 20% of the population lives in the Caribbean region, 17% in the Pacific region, 25% in the Central region, 18% in the Eastern region, 2% in the Former National Territories, and 18% in Bogotá.

The sample's selection was multi-staged. The first stage was the municipality, then the census sector, then the section, and finally the block, dwelling, and the household. We used a system of quotas by sex and age to select the respondent within each household.

In all, we interviewed 1,503 people. Technically, our margin of error was $\pm 2.5\%$. This means that if we were to take multiple samples in Colombia, 95% of them would reflect the opinions of the population with a precision of no less than $\pm 2.5\%$. However, our sample was stratified and clustered. Thus, while stratification has the effect of increasing the sample's precision, the use of clusters, which we included to control the costs of field work, somewhat reduced its precision. Of course, factors beyond the sample itself can reduce its precision, such as the rate of non-replies, errors in selecting respondents, misunderstanding the questions, among others. In terms of our sample's technique, however, a confidence interval of $\pm 2.5\%$ is very good.

Table A.1 summarizes the standard errors and the design effects for the variables of age and the evaluation of the national economic situation. The design effects (DEF) indicate the efficiency of the design by clusters compared to a simple random design. A DEF of 1 indicates that the same variances are obtained in both designs. If the DEF is greater than 1, this means that the design by clusters produced a result with greater variance than that produced by a simple random design. If the DEF is less than 1, this means that there is even less variance in the cluster design than in a simple random design.

²² This section and the one that follows were adapted from the 2004 Costa Rica report, "Cultura democrática, seguridad ciudadana y capital social en Costa Rica", by Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell.

Table A.1 – Standard errors and design effects for some variables

Mean	Estimated	Standard error	Confidence interval of 95%		DEF
q2 (age)	37.03	.233	36.57	37.49	.355
soct1 “¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país?”					
Very good	1%	.003	0%	1%	1.131
Good	16%	.010	14%	18%	1.142
Neither good nor bad	53%	.019	50%	57%	2.100
Bad	26%	.015	23%	29%	1.682
Very bad	4%	.006	3%	6%	1.282

The above table shows that the design by clusters for this survey was efficient: the DEF was less than 1, except in the case of how a respondent would evaluate the country's economic situation, in which the DEF was higher. The standard errors were also very moderate. Table A.2 shows the standard errors and DEF for the q2 variable (age) by cluster (region). The DEF's, as well as the standard errors, indicate that the design by clusters for the regions was more efficient than a simple random design.

Table A.2 - Standard errors and design effects for age, by region

Mean Subpopulation	Estimated	Standard error	Confidence interval 95%		DEF
q2 (age)					
Caribbean	36.41	.428	35.56	37.25	.270
Bogotá	37.21	.569	36.09	38.33	.383
Central	37.94	.493	36.96	38.91	.350
Eastern	36.86	.590	35.70	38.03	.410
Pacific	36.62	.557	35.52	37.72	.365
Former National Territories	35.11	1.085	32.97	37.25	.167

Results of the sample and description of survey respondents

The probabilistic design of the sample, as well as the availability of a good sampling frame, are sufficient conditions to expect that the group of people interviewed are representative of the Colombian population. However, due to the effects of random errors and inevitable distortions of sample design, the sample could deviate from the population it represents in some characteristics. The possible biases should be specified. Table A.3 allows us to answer the question: how representative is the sample of the population? Below we compare some characteristics of the sample to the 2005 census.

Table A.3 – Sample vs. 2005 census (for people at least 18 years of age)

Characteristics	2005 census	Survey in Colombia
N	27,184,228	1,503
% of men	48	49.5
% > 30 years old	68	60
% unmarried	30	36.1
% married or in civil union	56	55.4
% with primary education	38	40.3
% with secondary education	37	18
% with higher education	25	7.3
% in Caribbean region	21	28.1
% in Bogotá	16	13.9
% in Central region	25	19.8
% in Eastern region	18	11.8
% in Pacific region	17	21.9
% in Former National Territories	3	2.3

We can see that there is congruity between the survey's sample and the 2005 census. Some characteristics, such as age, sex, and regional residence are practically identical. There is a slight deviation in the percentages of married and unmarried people. And finally, there is a gap in the three education variables. The widest is for the percentage of people with secondary education: from 37% in the 2005 census it jumps to 50% in the 2011 survey. With primary education, the figure in the 2005 census is 38% compared to 25% in the 2011 survey.

Given that the sample is generally representative of the population, there is no need to use weights. This study's sample is, therefore, self-weighted.

Table A.4 compares the characteristics of the sample between men and women.

Table A.4 – Characteristics of the sample, by sex

Characteristics	Total	Men	Women
%	100%	49.5%	50.5%
Average age	36.6	35.8	37.3
% married or part of a civil union	53%	49.5%	56.5%

We used gender and age quotas to select respondents. Therefore, our percentages of men and women are very close. Their ages are also very similar, with a difference of about two years. There is a small difference with respect to the percentage of respondents married or part of a civil union, where women have a slightly higher percentage (56.5%) than men.

Technical description of the sample design

Universe

The universe of the survey has national coverage of all adults living in the six regions of the country: Bogotá, the Caribbean, Pacific, Central, and Eastern regions, and the Former National Territories. The universe is also comprised of all adults living in urban and rural areas.

The universe is divided in two sectors: one of cities with greater than 300,000 inhabitants, and the other of cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants.

Population

The sample was circumscribed to all non-institutionalized adults; in other words, it excludes people living in jails, schools, hospitals, and military bases. Private households in these areas were contemplated.

Final selection unit

Because the questionnaire included questions not were not limited to the respondent but also referred to other household members, the statistical unit of observation was the household. Each respondent could only live in one household.

Because each household belongs to one housing unit, which is sometimes shared with other households in a relatively stable manner over time, each housing unit was selected as the final selection unit.

Sampling method

We chose a probabilistic, stratified, multistage method with randomized selection of units at each stage. First, the sample was stratified by the size of the municipality (cities with more and with less than 300,000 inhabitants), then by region, and then by area (rural and urban).

It is a multistage sampling because within each urban area, we started with primary sampling units (sectors), followed by secondary units (sections), then tertiary units (blocks), and then final sampling units (clusters of housing units) of 6 to 8 in urban areas and from 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each housing unit, the surveyor selected a single household as the observation unit.

The respondent was selected according to age and gender quotas. In each block, the surveyor had to include at least one man and one woman in the following age groups:

18 to 27 years old
28 to 40 years old
Over 40 years old

Each surveyor was assigned one specific block. Once in the area, surveyors listed the first 20 housing units they encountered. They had instructions to do a minimum of 8 surveys of the 20 housing units listed, balancing the gender and age quotas. The selection method was chosen according to the following considerations:

We needed representative samples at the following levels:

- National
- First Stage Strata:
 - o Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants
 - o Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

- Second Stage Strata:
 - Bogotá
 - Caribbean region
 - Pacific region
 - Eastern region
 - Central region
 - Former National Territories
- Third Stage Strata:
 - Urban area
 - Rural area
- Study Domains:
 - Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants (obliged selection)
 - Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

The following criteria were satisfied:

- For each stage, we calculated margins of error that correspond to minimum quality standards.
- We sought to facilitate the operability of the field work.
- We worked with the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available for each municipality (population census, cartography, current housing unit listings, among others).

Sampling frame

The sampling frame is constituted by the updated cartographic inventory and housing unit lists obtained from the 2005 census. The *Centro Nacional de Consultoría* (CNC) obtained the 2005 versions from the *Departamento Nacional de Estadística* (DANE, National Statistics Department).

Calculations by strata

The sample is composed of 193 sampling points: 160 urban and 33 rural, distributed over 53 municipalities in 26 out of the 32 departments of Colombia.

Sample sizes, confidence intervals, and margins of error

The anticipated confidence interval for the national survey was 95%, with a margin of error of 2.5%, assuming a 50/50 proportion in the dichotomous variables.

The margins of error for a confidence interval of 95% appear in Table A.5.

Table A.5 – Sample size and margins of error – confidence interval of 95%

Strata	Sample size	Margin of error	%
Regions		M.A.S.	M.P.C.
Caribbean	323	5.45	5.97
Bogotá	231	6.45	7.06
Central	358	5.18	5.67
Eastern	274	5.92	6.49
Pacific	263	6.04	6.62
Former National Territories	54	13.34	14.61
Areas			
Urban	1,107	2.95	3.23
Rural	396	4.92	5.39
Total country	1,503	2.53	2.77

Survey team

The CNC involved its five branches (Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla, and Bucaramanga) to ensure a high quality survey in the least possible time. Due to the country's current security situation, we were advised to remain as little time as possible in most areas visited, which complicated the operations.

Due to the complexities of the questionnaire, we used our most experienced surveyors, many of whom have more than 15 years of field experience.

The CNC involved a total of 113 staff members, distributed as follows:

Table A.6 - Personnel involved in the project

Activity	Total personnel
Field coordinators	5
Supervisors	10
Surveyors	58
Supervisors of field work quality	11
Codifiers	7
Digitators	7
Data verifiers	7
Subtotal field and digitation	105
Directors and professional staff	5
Administrative personnel	3
Total team personnel	113

Additional information about the sample

Table A.7 - Universe, total population by region and by urban and rural areas


Colombia: total population, projected for 2010			
Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Caribbean	7,218,498	2,643,616	9,862,114
Bogotá	7,434,256	16,175	7,450,431
Central	8,513,022	3,059,063	11,572,085
Eastern	5,926,211	2,670,663	8,596,874
Pacific	5,406,400	2,503,254	7,909,654
Former National Territories	293,475	359,063	652,538
Total	34,791,861	11,251,835	46,043,696

Distribution (%)			
Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Caribbean	73%	27%	100%
Bogotá	100%	0%	100%
Central	74%	26%	100%
Eastern	69%	31%	100%
Pacific	68%	32%	100%
Former National Territories	45%	55%	100%
Total	76%	24%	100%

Table A.8 – Size and distribution of the sample by sampling strata

	Urban	Rural	Total
Caribbean	239	84	323
- than 300,000 inhabitants	112	84	196
+ than 300,000 inhabitants	127	0	127
Bogotá	231	0	231
+ than 300,000 inhabitants	231	0	231
Central	262	96	358
- than 300,000 inhabitants	108	96	204
+ than 300,000 inhabitants	154	0	154
Eastern	178	96	274
- than 300,000 inhabitants	110	96	206
+ than 300,000 inhabitants	68		68
Pacific	179	84	263
- than 300,000 inhabitants	76	84	160
+ than 300,000 inhabitants	103	0	103
Former National Territories	18	36	54
- than 300,000 inhabitants	18	36	54
Total	1107	396	1503

Geographical location of the sample



Final comments about the survey work

About the questionnaire

The questionnaire was long, 60 minutes on average. But in general the respondents were willing to answer the questions and we had very few uncompleted interviews.

About the field work

The team met with no serious problems related to public order, so that we were able to complete all the interviews from every municipality originally included in the survey.

As in previous years, the CNC would like to extend its gratitude to the entire team involved in this study, especially the brave men and women who defied security warnings and assumed great risk to accomplish very good work.

Appendix B. Informed Consent Form

Letter of informed consent

Dear Sir or Madam,

You have been selected at random to participate in a public opinion study financed by Vanderbilt University. I am here on behalf of the Centro Nacional de Consultoría to request an interview with you that will take a little less than one hour of your time.

The principal aim of the study is to learn about people's opinions regarding different aspects of the country's social and political situation.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may refrain from answering some of the questions or terminate the interview at any moment. Your replies to our questions will be totally confidential and anonymous.

If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact the Centro Nacional de Consultoría, at the following telephone number in Bogotá, 339-4888, and ask to speak to Alexandra Rubio; or contact the Universidad de los Andes, at the following telephone number, 339-4949 ext. 2612, and ask to speak to Miguel García. These people are responsible for the project.

Would you like to participate?

Appendix C. The questionnaire (in Spanish)

Colombia, Versión # 1 IRB Approval: #110443

MAESTRO

 Centro Nacional de Consultoría.com		
		

El Barómetro de las Américas: Colombia, 2011

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01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua																															
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24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá																															
27. Surinam																																			
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____					□□□□																														
YEAR. Año de la entrevista 2011					2011																														
DOMINIO. (1) Muestra nacional (2) Muestra especial					□																														
ESTRATOPRI [COESTRA]: Estrato primario de la muestra [Si DOMINIO = 1 (Muestra nacional), elija una de las siguientes regiones] (811) Atlántica (812) Bogotá (813) Central (814) Oriental (815) Pacífica (816) Antiguos Territorios nacionales [Si DOMINIO = 2 (Muestra especial), elija una de las siguientes regiones] (811) Atlántica (812) Bogotá (815) Pacífica					8□□																														
PROV [COLDEPA]. Departamento : _____					8□□																														
UPM. [ESTRASEC] [MUNICIPIO] (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					□□□																														
UR [ESTRATER]. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					□□																														

COLCENTRO. Lugar:		
(1) Corregimiento/Inspección _____ (2) Vereda _____ (3) Cabecera municipal		
COLCENPOB. [=PSU rural] Centro poblado _____		<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
COLESTSOC. Estrato Socioeconómico: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rural sin estratificación7		
COLSEC. Sector _____ Inap (rural, no hay sectores) 9999		<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
COLSECC. Sección: _____ Inap (rural, no hay secciones) 9999		
CLUSTER [COLMANZ]. Manzana (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales] Manzana: _____ Inap (rural, no hay manzanas) 9999		<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural		<input type="checkbox"/>
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español		<input type="checkbox"/>
Hora de inicio: ____:____		<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes: ____ año: 2011		<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA		

Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
---	--

ETID. Para comenzar ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-colombiana, codificar como (4) Negra] [SÓLO PARA MUESTRA ESPECIAL: Si el entrevistado responde las alternativas 4, 5, 7 u 8 realizar la entrevista, de lo contrario no hacerla] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (6) Rom (7) Palenquero (8) Raizal (9) Otra (88) NS (98) NR		
---	--	--

LS3. ¿En general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho (a) (4) Muy insatisfecho (a) (88) NS (98) NR		
---	--	--

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]				<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad		61	
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios		02	
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno		15	
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente		10	
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración		16	
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Narcotráfico		12	
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas		14	
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza		04	
Desigualdad	58	Políticos, los		59	
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)		06	
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio		22	
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro		31	
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)		27	
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo		33	
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de		07	
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el		60	
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia		57	
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda		55	
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro		70	
NS	88	NR		98	

A4LOC. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando su municipio/comunidad? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]				<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61		
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02		
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15		
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10		
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16		
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Narcotráfico	12		
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14		
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04		
Desigualdad	58	Políticos, los	59		
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06		
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22		
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31		
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27		
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33		
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07		
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60		
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57		
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55		
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70		
NS	88	NR	98		

[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días o casi todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	NR	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	88	98	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	88	98	
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	88	98	
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	88	98	

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país ? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR					
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR					
SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR					
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR					

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?				
(1) Mejor	(2) Igual	(3) Peor	(88) NS	(98) NR
IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?				
(1) Mejor	(2) Igual	(3) Peor	(88) NS	(98) NR

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.				
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR
CP2. ¿A algún Congresista?	1	2	88	98
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, funcionario de la alcaldía, concejal o edil?	1	2	88	98
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	88	98

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?	
(1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal del municipio durante los últimos 12 meses?	
(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1] (98) No responde [Pase a SGL1] (99) INAP	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP.	

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	NS	NR	Inap., no hay servicio	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98		
SGL1A y hablando del servicio municipal de agua potable ¿Diría que el servicio es...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99	
COLSGL1B. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Salud que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99	
COLSGL1C. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Energía Eléctrica que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99	
SGL1D. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Recolección de Basura que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99	

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	NS	NR	Inap., no hay servicio
COLSGL1E. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Educación que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98
Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]						
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP20. ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP21. ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de afrocolombianos? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del cero al diez. El cero es el escalón más bajo y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es el escalón más alto y representa la mejor vida posible para usted.

¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja el escalón que mejor represente su opinión.**

[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la “peor vida posible” y el que representa “la mejor vida posible”. Indíquele a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98		
La peor vida posible						La mejor vida posible						NS	NR	

LS6A. ¿En qué escalón diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2009?

[RECOGER TARJETA “A”]

COLSISBEN. ¿Está usted afiliado al SISBEN?

Sí.....1
No.....2
NS.....88
NR.....98

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(NS=88) (NR=98)	
Izquierda										Derecha	

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado **[Siga]** (2) No ha participado **[Pase a JC1]** (88) NS **[Pase a JC1]** (98) NR **[Pase a JC1]**

PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses?
_____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? **[NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]**

- (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades)
- (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa)
- (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción)
- (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas)
- (5) Derechos humanos
- (6) Temas ambientales
- (7) Falta de Servicios públicos
- (8) Otros
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Constitucional y gobierne sin la Corte Constitucional?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]	
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencia sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa (10) Extorsión (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	

VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincucional del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas] (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincucional en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a) ? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR	

AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	

	Sí	No	NS	NR	
WC1. ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? ¿o tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?	1	2	88	98	
WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país?	1	2	88	98	
WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?	1	2	88	98	

PREGUNTAR SÓLO SI LA RESPUESTA A WC1, WC2 o WC3 FUE “SÍ”. DE LO CONTRARIO, SALTAR A COLPAZ1A.

¿Qué grupo, o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? **[NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS.**

EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (88) NS (98) NR]

	Sí	No	NS	NR	Inap. (no fue víctima)	
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4C. Exparamilitares que se han reagrupado	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4D. El ejército	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4E. La policía	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	88	98	99	

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	NS	NR
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	88	98
COLPAZ1B. Y con los grupos paramilitares , ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	88	98

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada							Mucho	
							NS	NR

Anotar el número 1-7 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? *(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)*

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?

B51. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Protestante?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?

B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?

B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?

COLB32A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?

B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser colombiano(a)?

B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?

B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la Nación?

B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?

B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?

B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?

WOM2. Los maridos deben compartir el cuidado de los niños y las tareas domésticas con sus mujeres. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
WOM3. En general, por su naturaleza, las mujeres son menos capaces de contribuir a la economía nacional que los hombres. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
WOM4. Cuando no hay suficientes trabajos, los hombres deben tener más derecho a los trabajos que las mujeres. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación, según la escala que tiene en su mano?	
WOM5. Una educación universitaria es más importante para un niño que para una niña. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
WOM6. Cuando no hay suficiente dinero y la familia no puede mandar a todos los hijos a la escuela, deben mandar a los niños antes que a las niñas. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
WOM7. A veces se justifica que el hombre le pegue a su mujer. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RECOGER TARJETA "D"	

W14A. Ahora vamos a cambiar un poco de tema. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando pelagra la salud de la madre? (1) Sí, de acuerdo cuando pelagra la salud de la madre (2) No está de acuerdo (88) NS (98) NR	
W14B. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo en caso de incesto o violación sexual? (1) Sí, de acuerdo en caso de incesto o violación (2) No está de acuerdo (88) NS (98) NR	
W14C. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, en cualquier caso por opción de la mujer, siempre que esté en los primeros meses del embarazo? (1) Sí, de acuerdo con el aborto en cualquier caso (2) No está de acuerdo (88) NS (98) NR	

AUT10ctrl. (1) Niños	
Aunque hay muchas cualidades que la gente piensa que los niños varones deben tener, todo el mundo cree que algunas cualidades son más importantes que otras. Le voy a leer unos grupos de dos palabras y quisiera que me diga cuál es más importante para un varón :	
AUT10A. (1) Independencia; o (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR	(2) Respeto a los mayores
AUT10B. (1) Obediencia; o (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR	(2) Autonomía
AUT10C. (1) Curiosidad; o (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR	(2) Buenos modales
AUT10D. (1) Disciplina; o (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR	(2) Creatividad

AUT10ctrl. (2) Niñas	
Aunque hay muchas cualidades que la gente piensa que las niñas deben tener, todo el mundo cree que algunas cualidades son más importantes que otras. Le voy a leer unos grupos de dos palabras y quisiera que me diga cuál es más importante para una niña :	

AUT10A. (1) Independencia; o (2) Respeto a los mayores (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR	
AUT10B. (1) Obediencia; o (2) Autonomía (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR	
AUT10C. (1) Curiosidad; o (2) Buenos modales (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR	
AUT10D. (1) Disciplina; o (2) Creatividad (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR	

AUT10ctrl. (3) Ambos
Aunque hay muchas cualidades que la gente piensa que los niños y niñas deben tener, todo el mundo cree que algunas cualidades son más importantes que otras. Le voy a leer unos grupos de dos palabras y quisiera que me diga cuál es más importante para los niños y las niñas en general:
AUT10A. (1) Independencia; o (2) Respeto a los mayores (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR
AUT10B. (1) Obediencia; o (2) Autonomía (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR
AUT10C. (1) Curiosidad; o (2) Buenos modales (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR
AUT10D. (1) Disciplina; o (2) Creatividad (3) [No leer] Ambos (4) NS/NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “D”]								
Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS	NR
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		
						88		98
						Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR		

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones	
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP103. Cuando la Corte Constitucional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Constitucional debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLPOP103A. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	

POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLJP5. Los miembros de grupos guerrilleros que han confesado sus crímenes no deben ser castigados. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
COLJP6. Los miembros de grupos paramilitares que han confesado sus crímenes no deben ser castigados. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.

NS = 88, NR = 98

ROS1. El Estado colombiano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS2. El Estado colombiano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS3. El Estado colombiano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado colombiano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS5. El Estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLROS7. El Estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer educación para los colombianos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

CONTINUAR USANDO TARJETA "D"

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

	Anotar 1-7 88=NS, 98=NR
RAC3A. La mezcla de razas es buena para Colombia. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3B. Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona negra. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	

[No recoja tarjeta “E”]

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Colombia. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente								Aprueba firmemente		88	98

	1-10, 88, 98
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <i>[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]</i>	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	

[Recoger tarjeta “E”]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, O (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, O (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR	
COLDH1. ¿Qué tan eficiente ha sido el Estado Colombiano en prevenir las violaciones masivas a los Derechos Humanos (como masacres o desplazamiento forzado)? [Leer alternativas] Muy eficiente.....(1) Eficiente.....(2) Ineficiente.....(3) Muy ineficiente.....(4) NS.....(88) NR.....(98)	
PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	

PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2010? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	
COLPP2. ¿Está trabajando actualmente para algún partido o candidato en la campaña electoral de este año? (1) Sí está trabajando (2) No está trabajando ... (88) NS (98) NR	
Me gustaría que me indicara si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.	
DC1. Por ejemplo: Un congresista acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagado por una empresa. ¿Considera usted que lo que hizo el congresista es [Leer alternativas] : Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer]88 NR [no leer]98	
COLD1A. ¿Y lo que hizo la empresa que pagó los diez mil dólares? ¿Considera usted que es... [Leer alternativas] : Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer]88 NR [no leer]98	
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella le paga diez mil pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es... [Leer alternativas] : Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada.....1 Corrupto pero se justifica2 No es corrupto3 NS [no leer]88 NR [no leer]98	
DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo el político es... [Leer alternativas] : Corrupto y él debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer]88 NR [no leer]98	
COLD14. Un policía de tránsito detiene a un conductor por hacer un cruce indebido, y éste le ofrece 50.000 pesos al policía para que no le ponga el parte y lo deje ir. ¿Usted cree que lo que hizo el conductor es... [Leer alternativas] : Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer]88 NR [no leer]98	
COLD15. El policía recibe los 50.000 pesos y deja ir al conductor sin ponerle el parte. ¿Usted cree que el policía de tránsito es... [Leer alternativas] : Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS [no leer]88 NR [no leer]98	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?		0	1	88	98
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR					

[Entregar Tarjeta "D"]

Ahora me gustaría conocer su opinión acerca de algunos asuntos más específicos. ¿Cómo ubicaría su propia posición en la siguiente escala dónde 1 indica que usted se encuentra 'muy en desacuerdo' con la afirmación y 7 que usted se encuentra 'muy de acuerdo' con la afirmación? **[LEER]**

	Anotar 1 a 7 NS=88 NR=98
COLIDEOL3A. Los ingresos de las personas deberían hacerse más iguales	
COLIDEOL3C. Es necesario aumentar los impuestos para mejorar los planes sociales del gobierno	
COLIDEOL3D. Debería incrementarse la propiedad estatal de las empresas	
COLIDEOL3E. El estado debería ocuparse de que todas las personas tengan sus necesidades básicas satisfechas	

[Recoger Tarjeta "D"]

[Entregar Tarjeta “E”]

Ahora, utilizando también una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba las siguientes situaciones. En este caso, 1 indica que usted desaprueba firmemente la situación, y 10 indica que usted aprueba firmemente la situación. Entonces,...

	Anotar 1 a 10 NS=88 NR=98
COLIDEOL4A El Aborto	
COLIDEOL4B La Homosexualidad	
COLIDEOL4C La Eutanasia	
COLIDEOL4D El Divorcio	
COLIDEOL4E El Matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo	
COLIDEOL4F Fumar Marihuana	
COLIDEOL4G El Sexo antes del matrimonio	

[Recoger Tarjeta “E”]

VB1. ¿Tiene su cédula inscrita para votar? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (4) No tiene cédula (88) NS (98) NR	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2010? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB4] (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10]	
VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2010? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Votó en blanco (01) Anuló el voto (801) Rafael Pardo (802) Germán Vargas Lleras (803) Gustavo Petro (804) Juan Manuel Santos (805) Noemí Sanín (806) Antanas Mockus (807) Jaime Araújo Rentería (808) Jairo Calderón (809) Robinson Alexander Devia (77) Otro (88) NS/NR (99) INAP (No votó)	
VB4. ¿Por qué no votó usted en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales [No leer alternativas; Anotar una sola respuesta] (01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de cédula de identidad (24) No inscribió su cédula (07) No se encontró en el registro electoral (10) No tiene la edad necesaria (11) Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado (12) Tener que trabajar/Falta de tiempo (13) Incapacidad física o discapacidad (15) Por temor a represalias (16) La política no le trae beneficios personales (17) No entiende de política (18) Los partidos no representan a los ciudadanos (19) La política es corrupta (20) Ya no hay ideales políticos (21) No hubo candidatos con buenas ideas/programas	

(22) Los candidatos prometen pero no cumplen (23) Su candidato favorito no iba a ganar (25) No tiene derecho a votar (policía, militar) (14) Otra razón _____ NS/NR.....88 Inap (sí votó).....99	
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1] (98) NR [Pase a POL1]	
VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA] (801) Partido Liberal (802) Partido Conservador (803) Polo Democrático Alternativo (804) <i>Partido de la U</i> (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) (805) Cambio Radical (806) Convergencia Ciudadana (808) Colombia Democrática (809) Colombia Viva (810) Movimiento MIRA (817) Alianza Social Indígena (ASI) (819) Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA) (821) Partido Verde (822) Partido de Integración Social (PAIS) (823) Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN) (826) Movimiento Afrovides –La Esperanza de un Pueblo (827) Movimiento Interétnico de Opción Participativa “Mio” (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVB25A. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVB25B. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVB25C. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVB25D. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
Ahora vamos a hablar de las próximas elecciones locales de octubre.	
COLVBLOC1. ¿Piensa votar en las elecciones para alcaldías de octubre próximo? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a COLVBLOC2] (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVBLOC1A. ¿Ya sabe por quién votaría para alcalde de su municipio? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a COLVBLOC2] (98) NR	

COLVBLOC1B ¿Por cuál partido piensa votar en las elecciones de alcaldías? [NO LEER LISTA] (801) Partido Liberal (802) Partido Conservador (803) Polo Democrático Alternativo (804) <i>Partido de la U</i> (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) (805) Cambio Radical (806) Convergencia Ciudadana (808) Colombia Democrática (809) Colombia Viva (810) Movimiento MIRA (817) Alianza Social Indígena (ASI) (819) Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA) (821) Partido Verde (822) Partido de Integración Social (PAIS) (823) Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN) (826) Movimiento Afrovides –La Esperanza de un Pueblo (827) Movimiento Interétnico de Opción Participativa “Mio” (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
[Entregue la tarjeta “D”] En esta escala del 1 al 7, donde 1 significa “muy en desacuerdo” y 7 significa “muy de acuerdo”, ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?	Anotar 1 a 7 NS/NR=8
COLVBLOC2. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio serán libres y justas.	
COLVBLOC3. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por la acción de grupos paramilitares.	
COLVBLOC3A. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por la acción de bandas emergentes.	
COLVBLOC4. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por la acción de grupos guerrilleros.	
COLVBLOC5. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por la acción de narcotraficantes.	
COLVBLOC6. Las elecciones de octubre próximo en su municipio se ven amenazadas por el clientelismo.	

De los siguientes medios de comunicación, ¿qué tan importante es para usted la información ofrecida por ellos para decidir cómo votar? [leer alternativas cada vez]									
	Nada importante	Poco importante	Ni poco ni muy importante	Importante	Muy importante	No consume el medio [NO LEER]	NS	NR	
COLVB21A. Noticieros de TV	1	2	3	4	5	0	88	98	
COLVB21B. Programas de radio	1	2	3	4	5	0	88	98	
COLVB21C. Periódicos	1	2	3	4	5	0	88	98	

De los siguientes medios de comunicación, ¿qué tan importante es para usted la información ofrecida por ellos para decidir cómo votar? [leer alternativas cada vez]									
	Nada importante	Poco importante	Ni poco ni muy importante	Importante	Muy importante	No consume el medio [NO LEER]	NS	NR	
COLVB21D. Revistas de actualidad y de noticias	1	2	3	4	5	0	88	98	
COLVB21E. Sitios de Internet	1	2	3	4	5	0	88	98	

CLIEN1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca? (1) Frecuentemente [SIGA con CLIEN2] (2) Rara vez [SIGA con CLIEN2] (3) Nunca [Pase a RAC1C] (88) NS [Pase a RAC1C] (98) NR [Pase a RAC1C]		
CLIEN2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien? (1) Más inclinado (2) Menos inclinado (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP		

RAC1C. Según los datos del Censo de Población las personas negras son más pobres, en general, que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? [Leer opciones] [Permitir sólo una respuesta] (1) Porque las personas negras no trabajan lo suficiente (2) Porque las personas negras son menos inteligentes (3) Porque las personas negras son tratadas de manera injusta (4) Porque las personas negras tienen bajo nivel educativo (5) Porque las personas negras no quieren cambiar su cultura (88) NS (98) NR		
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COLMOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? [LEER OPCIONES] Alta.....1 Media alta.....2 Media.....3 Media baja.....4 Baja.....5 NS.....88 NR.....98		
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Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su condición económica, su apariencia física o su forma de hablar, en alguno de los siguientes lugares:	Sí	No	NS	NR	Inap	
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS3. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales	1	2	88	98		
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)	1	2	88	98		
DIS6. ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado/a por algún partido político?	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS7. [Sólo Mujeres] ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminada por ser mujer?	1	2	88	98	99	

[ENTREGAR Tarjeta “D”]

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa *muy en desacuerdo* y 7 significa *muy de acuerdo*.

	Anotar 1-7 88=NS 98=NR	
TD1. Siempre ha habido ricos y pobres y eso no se puede cambiar. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?		
TD2. Es bueno que exista desigualdad para que las personas más pobres se esfuercen más. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		
TD3. Estar muy cerca de alguien que tiene mucho <i>más</i> dinero que usted (por ejemplo en la calle o en un espectáculo) lo/a hace sentir incómodo/a. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		
TD4. Estar muy cerca de alguien que tiene mucho <i>menos</i> dinero que usted (por ejemplo en la calle o en un espectáculo) lo/a hace sentir incómodo/a. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		
TD5. Estaría dispuesto/a a pagar más impuestos si éstos se usaran para darle más a quien tiene menos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		
RAC2A. En Colombia no hay racismo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?		

[RECOGER Tarjeta “D”]

RAC4. ¿Ud. cree que las personas negras son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas?	
(1) Mucho mejor	
(2) Mejor	
(3) Igual	
(4) Peor	
(5) Mucho peor	
(88) NS	(98)NR

Y ahora, cambiando de tema...

y pensando en los últimos **cinco** años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta: **[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]**

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
DIS11. Por su color de piel? ¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS13. Por su condición económica?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS12. Por su género o sexo?	1	2	3	4	88	98

Ahora pensando en lo que le pudo haber sucedido a otra persona, ¿Usted ha vivido o presenciado situaciones en las que otra persona ha sido discriminada, tratada mal o injustamente: **[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]**

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
RAC1A. Por su color de piel? Muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1D. Por su condición económica?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1E. Por su género o sexo?	1	2	3	4	88	98

COLRAC5 ¿Usted cree que en Colombia existe discriminación racial?

(1) Sí **[SIGA]** (2) No **[PASE A COLAFARC]** (88) NS (98) NR

COLRAC5A. ¿En cual lugar/sitio o contexto usted cree que existe mayor discriminación racial contra la población negra en Colombia? **[Leer opciones seleccionar UNA respuesta]**

- (1) Hospitales y centros de salud
- (2) Escuelas, colegios y universidades
- (3) Transporte público
- (4) Trámites administrativos y oficinas públicas
- (5) Por la policía
- (6) Barrio o vereda
- (7) Lugares públicos de las ciudades
- (8) Lugares de entretenimiento (bares, discotecas)
- (88) NS **[Pase a COLAFARC]**
- (98) NR **[Pase a COLAFARC]**

COLRAC5B. ¿En algún otro lugar/sitio o contexto? **[Leer opciones seleccionar UNA respuesta]**

- (1) Hospitales y centros de salud
- (2) Escuelas, colegios y universidades
- (3) Transporte público
- (4) Trámites administrativos y oficinas públicas
- (5) Por la policía
- (6) Barrio o vereda
- (7) Lugares públicos de las ciudades
- (8) Lugares de entretenimiento (bares, discotecas)
- (9) No, en ningún otro lugar.
- (88) NS
- (98) NR

[ENTREGAR AL ENTREVISTADO TARJETA "J"]

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto usted apoya estas afirmaciones, usando esta escala de 5 puntos, donde 1 significa *me opongo firmemente* y 5 significa *lo apoyo firmemente*.

	Marcar 1 a 5 88=NS, 98=NR
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ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó? ____ Año de ____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = ____ años total [Usar tabla a continuación para el código]							
	1º	2º	3º	4º	5º	6º	7º
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5		
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15			
NS	88						
NR	98						

EDPADRE. ¿Hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su padre? [no leer opciones] (00) Ninguno (01) Primaria incompleta (02) Primaria completa (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa (07) Universitaria incompleta (08) Universitaria completa (88) NS (98) NR	
EDMADRE. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? [no leer opciones] (00) Ninguno (01) Primaria incompleta (02) Primaria completa (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa (07) Universitaria incompleta (08) Universitaria completa (88) NS (98) NR	
Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? ____ años (888 = NS 988 = NR)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] [Si la persona entrevistada es mayor de 25 años pasar a Q3C_control] Y1. Dentro de cinco años, ¿se ve usted desempeñando algún papel en la política del país, como por ejemplo... [Leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] (1) Participando en una asociación civil (ONG), comunitaria o un partido político (2) Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones (3) Participando en un movimiento revolucionario (4) Ninguna de estas (5) [NO LEER] Otra (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
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<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] Y2. ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia? [NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] [Si dice “el futuro” preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?] (1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral (2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos (3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras) (4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación (5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas (6) Relacionamento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros) (7) Salud (8) Medio ambiente (9) Situación del país (10) Nada, no le preocupa nada (11) Otra respuesta (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada? (1) Correcta (2) Equivocada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] HAICR1. Podría decirme, ¿cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país? [NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] (01) TV (02) Diario (periódicos) (03) Radio (04) Iglesia (05) Centro comunitario (06) Escuela (07) Familiares (08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio (09) Amigos (10) Vecinos (11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

Q3C_control. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]**
[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 5 u 11.]

[Si dice que es católico, sondee más para ubicar si es católico tradicional o católico renovado/carismático/pentecostal (alternativas 01 y 02). Si no sabe, escoja “tradicional”.]

(01) Católico (católico tradicional)

(02) Católico carismático/Católico de la Renovación Carismática Católica/Católico pentecostal

(03) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).

(04) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha’i).

(05) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)

(06) Evangélica Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).

(07) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).

(08) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lanza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).

(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)

(12) Testigos de Jehová.

(88) NS

(98) NR

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes

(4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR

Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “F”]

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

(00) Ningún ingreso

(01) Menos de \$90.000

(02) Entre \$91.000-\$180.000

(03) \$181.000 - \$360.000

(04) \$361.000 - \$720.000

(05) \$721.000 - \$1.000.000

(06) \$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000

(07) \$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000

(08) \$2.000.001 - \$3'000.000

(09) \$3.000.001 - \$4.000.000

(10) \$4.000.001 – o más

(88) NS

(98) NR

[RECOGER TARJETA “F”]

<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar ¿en dónde?]</p> <p>[No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente [Siga]</p> <p>(2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países [Siga]</p> <p>(3) Sí, otros países (no en estados Unidos) [Siga]</p> <p>(4) No [Pase a Q14]</p> <p>(88) NS [Pase a Q14]</p> <p>(98) NR [Pase a Q14]</p>	
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Todos los días</p> <p>(2) Una o dos veces por semana</p> <p>(3) Una o dos veces por mes</p> <p>(4) Rara vez</p> <p>(5) Nunca</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar</p> <p>(2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades</p> <p>(3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades</p> <p>(4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades</p> <p>(88) [No leer] NS</p> <p>(98) [No leer] NR</p>	
<p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) ¿Aumentó? [Pase a Q11]</p> <p>(2) ¿Permaneció igual? [Pase a Q11]</p> <p>(3) ¿Disminuyó? [Pase a Q10F]</p> <p>(88) NS [Pase a Q11]</p> <p>(98) NR [Pase a Q11]</p>	
<p>Q10F. ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(1) Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario</p> <p>(2) Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo</p> <p>(3) Bajaron las ventas/El negocio no anduvo bien</p> <p>(4) El negocio familiar se quebró</p> <p>(5) Las remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse</p> <p>(6) Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó, murió o se fue del hogar</p> <p>(7) Desastre natural/ pérdida de cultivo</p> <p>(9) Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos</p> <p>(10) Tuvo que abandonar su lugar de residencia a causa del conflicto armado</p> <p>(8) Otra razón</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR (99) INAP (“Aumentó”, “Permaneció igual” o NS/NR en Q10E)</p>	
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado</p> <p>(6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a COLETIDA) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____</p> <p>00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)</p>	

COLETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR	
LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] (801) Castellano/Español (802) Wayú (803) Paez (804) Embera (805) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR	
IND1. ¿Cree usted que los grupos indígenas están ayudando a que nuestro país sea más democrático, menos democrático o ellos no están teniendo ningún impacto en nuestra democracia? (1) Más democrático (2) Menos democrático (3) No tienen impacto (88) NS (98) NR	
IND2. ¿Cuánta influencia cree usted que los grupos indígenas han tenido en la promulgación o aprobación de nuevas leyes en este país? [Leer Alternativas] (1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca [Pasar a IND4] (4) Ninguna [Pasar a IND4] (88) NS [Pasar a IND4] (98) NR [Pasar a IND4]	
[Preguntar sólo a los que respondieron "Mucha" o "Algo" a IND2] IND3. En su opinión, ¿por qué algunos grupos indígenas han sido efectivos en tener influencia sobre los debates políticos en este país? [Leer alternativas] (1) Porque tienen más dinero/recursos (2) Porque pueden trabajar bien con grupos no-indígenas (3) Porque ellos representan a la población indígena (4) Porque tienen buenas ideas (5) Porque tienen buenos líderes (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap	
[Preguntar a Todos] IND4. ¿Qué tan efectivos son los grupos indígenas para convencer a la gente de que los temas indígenas son importantes? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy efectivos (2) Algo efectivos (3) Poco efectivos (4) Nada efectivos (88) NS (98) NR	
WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS [No leer] (98) NR [No leer]	
Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente... G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el Internet? [Leer opciones]: (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No responde	
G13. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Colombia? [NO LEER: 32] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde	
G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Colombia? [NO LEER: 4 años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde	
Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: [Leer todos]	
R1. Televisor	(0) No (1) Sí
R3. Nevera	(0) No (1) Sí

R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R5. Vehículo (no moto). ¿Cuántos?	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R15. Computador	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No	(1) Sí	

<p>OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Trabajando? [Siga]</p> <p>(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga]</p> <p>(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a OCUP1B1]</p> <p>(4) Es estudiante? [Pase a OCUP1B1]</p> <p>(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a OCUP1B1]</p> <p>(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a OCUP1B1]</p> <p>(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a OCUP1B1]</p> <p>(88) NS [Pase a OCUP1B1]</p> <p>(98) NR [Pase a OCUP1B1]</p>	
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<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado en el sector privado?</p> <p>(3) Patrono o socio de empresa?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	
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<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? (Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)</p> <p>(2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)</p> <p>(3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)</p> <p>(4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)</p> <p>(5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)</p> <p>(6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)</p> <p>(7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)</p> <p>(8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados</p> <p>(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)</p> <p>(10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)</p> <p>(11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)</p> <p>(12) Artesano</p> <p>(13) Servicio doméstico</p>	
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(14) Obrero (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.) (88) NS (98) NR	(99) INAP
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OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? [Leer alternativas] (1) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo. (2) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo. (3) No, no perdió su trabajo (4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo (88) NS (98) NR	
OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

OCUP1ANC. ¿Cuál era la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realizaba el jefe de su hogar cuando usted tenía 15 años? [No leer alternativas] (1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.) (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor) (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.) (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.) (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública) (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.) (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.) (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) (12) Artesano (13) Servicio doméstico (14) Obrero (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
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PEN1. ¿Se encuentra usted afiliado a un sistema de pensiones? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SAL1] (88) NS [Pase a SAL1] (98) NR [Pase a SAL1]	
PEN3. ¿A qué sistema de pensiones está usted afiliado? [Leer alternativas] (1) Fondo privado de pensiones (2) Seguro Social (Instituto de Seguros Sociales) (7) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

PEN4. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, usted cotizó a su fondo de pensión? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los meses (2) Por lo menos una o dos veces al año, o (3) No cotizó/contribuyó (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
[Preguntar a todos]	
SAL1. ¿Está usted afiliado al POS (Plan Obligatorio de Salud) o está afiliado a una EPS (Empresa Prestadora de Salud)? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a DEPNAC] (88) NS [Pasar a DEPNAC] (98) NR [Pasar a DEPNAC]	
SAL1A. ¿Tiene usted algún servicio de salud adicional al POS? [Leer opciones; aceptar sólo una opción] (0) [No leer] No tiene (1) Plan complementario (2) Póliza de hospitalización y cirugía (3) Medicina prepagada (4) Emergencia médica (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap (no tiene seguro médico)	
SAL4. ¿En su POS o EPS, es usted cotizante o beneficiario? (1) Cotizante (titular) (2) Beneficiario (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap	
¿Dónde nació usted? [Anotar municipio y departamento] [Si tiene dudas sobre el lugar que menciona el informante, pregunte en qué departamento está el municipio donde nació]	
DEPNAC. Departamento (o País si nació en el extranjero; "DC" si es Bogotá): _____ NS.....88888 [Si NS o nació en el extranjero, pasar a COLORR] NR.....98888 [Si NR o nació en el extranjero, pasar a COLORR]	
MUNNAC. Municipio (99999 si nació en el extranjero): _____ NS.....88888 [pasar a COLORR] NR.....98888 [pasar a COLORR]	
AREANAC. ¿Nació en área urbana o rural? Urbana.....1 Rural.....2 NS.....88 NR.....98	

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado]	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
(97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]	
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ *Fecha* ____/____/____


Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:

[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?




Tarjeta “B”

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda								Derecha	


Tarjeta “C”



Tarjeta “D”



Tarjeta “E”



Tarjeta “F”

- (0) Ningún ingreso**
- (1) Menos de \$90.000**
- (2) Entre \$91.000-\$180000**
- (3) *\$181.000 - \$360.000***
- (4) *\$361.000 - \$720.000***
- (5) *\$721.000 - \$1.000.000***
- (6) *\$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000***
- (7) *\$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000***
- (8) *\$2.000.001 - \$3'000.000***
- (9) *\$3.000.001 - \$4'000.000***
- (10) *\$4.000.001 – o más***

Tarjeta “J”

1	2	3	4	5
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**Me opongo
firmemente**

**Lo apoyo
firmemente**

Paleta de colores

