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# **The Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia: 2005**

by:

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
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## Preface

For the Political Science Department of the Universidad de los Andes, it has been especially important to work with Vanderbilt University on the Colombian component of the Latin American Public Opinion Project. The academy, politicians, policy makers and policy implementators, the media and even the public need well-designed and responsibly-implemented surveys that regularly, and with consistent methodology, measure Colombians' perceptions of their institutions, the quality of their democracy, political parties, and how well they represent citizen interests. Such efforts are important because the above mentioned actors –academics, politicians, government officials, public opinion-shapers, and even the general public– we all tend to resort to “public opinion” as the basis of our political values and statements without having any good indicators of what the public really thinks.

In the 1960s and 70s, for example, the thesis that the country's institutions faced a crisis of legitimacy found widespread acceptance in the Colombian academy. According to this view, Colombians neither identified with their political parties, all the more so with the traditional ones, nor with the electoral process. The empirical indicators most often pointed to in order to sustain this claim were: low electoral turnout; a few interviews and life-histories, sometimes of rather anecdotal character; and the growth of collective action by peasants, unions and urban movements which, by means of social protest, interposed new demands and claims in the public sphere. Despite the weak empirical proof behind the ‘crisis of institutional legitimacy’ claim, the thesis spread and became one of the principal justifications of those opting for armed struggle. According to these views, partly because Colombians did not feel represented by their institutions and did not trust their political parties, Congress, nor other decision-making organs, they needed other forms of expression, particularly political protest, incarnated, according to one's preferences, in one of the groups engaged in armed struggle. There were no public opinion polls during this period that could validate or invalidate the thesis regarding citizen disaffection with their institutions. (Note, for example, that low turnout is not automatically symptomatic of alienation from the whole complex framework of institutions and rules that constitute the political system.) Surely for this reason, with the passage of time, the idea of the crisis of legitimacy of our political regime has become a fixed truth that very few dare to contradict.

In fact, well-done public opinion surveys allow us to fill such ‘black holes’ that open the door to theses with strong political resonance but often erroneous assumptions. Through such surveys we will realize that the political perceptions of Colombians are much more complex than we supposed. These perceptions can, for example, combine great disaffection for political parties and Congress with support for and trust in the President as well as security agencies and the high courts. Additionally, such exercises allow us to detect regional differences and to investigate the relationships between political positions and party affiliation, social class, generation or gender. The value of such surveys, furthermore, is even greater when they are repeated annually, as is the case with the LAPOP, since that allows us, after some years, to see how public opinion moves relative to the cycles of the electoral system, political party dynamics, and, of course in Colombia, the dynamics of the war. The academy, with these results in hand, can open a whole new area of profound and rigorous investigation into a diversity of issues of great importance to the country.

In addition, the diffusion of the results of such surveys through the media, fora, and seminars is also useful because it provides us with empirical data with which to confirm or reject the ideas of political actors regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of our political system. Another of the contributions of these type of studies, therefore, is that they enable us to judge and qualify political actors' statements when they claim to talk 'in the name of all Colombians.' In this sense, these studies give politicians an image of the real political beliefs and opinions of Colombians, not ones blinkered beforehand by their own preferences. And they provide those who formulate and implement public policies with solid bases of how to prioritize and distribute resources.

Obviously, surveys do not replace other mechanisms of democracy which confer democracy with legitimacy. They do not replace the public debate that should accompany the competition between candidates nor the accountability, both horizontal (between the branches of government) and vertical (from authorities to citizens), that is fundamental for healthy democracies. But besides contributing and providing feedback to these processes, theoretically-solid and methodologically-careful public opinion studies, like those of LAPOP, seek to go beyond our commonplace beliefs about what 'Colombians feel and think' of their institutions in order to, from this empirical base, start to suggest questions more tied to what really happens and not in what we would like to happen.

For all the above reasons, the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Los Andes is committed to this project. And the Department further underwrites it through the creation, in association with Vanderbilt University, of the *Observatorio de la Democracia*. This academic center will instruct students in theoretical and methodological issues related to the analysis of the information obtained from the surveys; it will generate a continuing dynamic of investigation around different important themes to come out of the survey-work; and it will disseminate the results to the public. We have no doubt that this *Observatorio* will soon become an academic and political reference point for all those interested in thoroughly knowing the perceptions, beliefs, values, and experiences of Colombian citizens.

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**Chair, Department of Political Science**  
**Universidad de los Andes**  
**Bogotá**

## Colombia and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

The publication you have before you is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University with the support of Vanderbilt's Center for the Americas (CFA), and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in almost all countries in the region.

The present studies focuses on Colombia, and makes comparisons between LAPOP's 2004 study and the new study from 2005. The sample design and many of the questions in the survey were identical in 2004 and 2005, which allows direct comparisons between them.

Surveys of public opinion in Latin America have become very popular in recent years. Unfortunately, all too few of those studies follow the rigorous scientific procedures that have become accepted as the norm in academic public opinion research in the United States and Europe. Those studies often suffer from poorly designed questionnaires, unrepresentative and non-random samples, poor fieldwork supervision, sloppy data entry, and data analysis that rarely goes beyond univariate presentation of percentages. As a result, such studies are often dismissed by academics and policy-makers alike.

The LAPOP project has attempted, with considerable success, to deviate from the prevailing Latin American norm to produce quality survey data that matches the highest standards of academic research in the United States and Europe. The surveys on which the present study is based, because it was designed from the outset for cross-national comparisons, were carried out with special rigor and attention to methodological detail, as is described in this prologue and in the methodology section of this report. We recognized from the outset that all survey research, by its very nature, contains errors (derived from many sources, including errors from probability sampling, respondent inattention, coding mistakes, and data entry failures). Our goal was to reduce to the absolute minimum each of those errors, and to do so in a cost-effective manner.<sup>1</sup>

We also sought, from the outset, to make our methodology transparent and replicable. The essence of scientific research is that it can be replicated. Excitement about the prospects for "cold fusion" quickly faded when physicists were unable to replicate the initial "discovery." All too many surveys published in Latin America contain no information whatsoever about the sample design, and when such information is provided it is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine with any degree of detail how the sample was carried out. Equally serious, it is rare for

<sup>1</sup> Seligson, Mitchell A. "Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries." *PS, Political Science & Politics* (2005): 51-56; Seligson, Mitchell A. "Encuestas y democratización." *Este País*, no. 168 (2005): 4-13.

the data base itself to be made available to the public; almost without exception the raw data are closely guarded, making it impossible for social scientists and policy makers alike to reanalyze the data looking for new insights, or to attempt to replicate the original findings. Publicly funded data bases should be available to the public. Failure to do so results in privatization of public goods. Of course, in the dissemination of data, all human subjects protection policies, as governed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) must be followed scrupulously so that the rights of subjects to protect their identities are respected.

When readers examine the findings presented in this volume and find that the results are those that coincide with their expectations, they might well say, "That is just what I had expected, so the survey tells me nothing new." On the other hand, when the results are at variance from expectations, readers might say, "This does not make any sense; the data must be wrong." These reactions to survey data are common, and for some surveys emerging from the developing world, the data may in fact be "wrong." We cannot guarantee that our results are "right," but we have made every effort, as described below, to try to minimize the error. Given that we are working with a sample of the population of the country rather than interviews with all voting-aged adults, there is always a one-in-twenty chance that our results are not within the approximately  $\pm 2.6\%$  sampling error found in the national sample. Indeed, as we point out in the methodological section of the report, these confidence intervals can be wider for some variables as a result of the "design effects," i.e., we used a stratified and clustered sample, which is standard practice in modern survey samples, the impact of which is to affect the precision of our estimates while keeping fieldwork costs within reasonable limits (as a result of clustering). Rarely does anyone doing surveys today use simple random sampling, and we have not done so either. In short, if some readers find some results inconsistent with expectation, that may be because we are working with probability samples, and the odds are, from time-to-time, our results will be wide of the mark. But, 95 times out of 100, our results should be reasonably close to what we would have obtained if we had interviewed the millions of voting-aged adults in the country (an obvious impossibility). Moreover, since we have taken special pains to deal with the problem of "non-coverage," something that we have rarely seen done anywhere in Latin America, we believe that our results are about as good as they can be.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intense labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, and field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the 1,487 Colombian respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Colombia.

### Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Margaret Sarles, Bruce Kay and Eric Kite in the Office of Democracy and Governance of USAID, supported by Maria Barrón in the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, secured funding and made possible the entire project thanks to their unceasing support. Support for the 2005 study came from Jaime Arteaga, Ramona Hamzaoui, Tom Johnson and Tanya Urquieta of USAID Colombia. We are grateful to Carlos Lemoine of



the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) for his efficient data-collection work. Polibio Córdova of CEDATOS, Ecuador, provided excellent guidance throughout on sample design. The team of graduate students at Vanderbilt University worked very hard in numerous aspects of the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Fernanda Boidi (Uruguay), Abby Córdova (El Salvador), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Daniel Moreno (Bolivia), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), y Vivian Schwarz-Blum (Bolivia). Dr. Clemente Quiñones, in his capacity of LAPOP's Research Coordinator, organized the work of the assistants. Various of these people participated directly in the analysis of the 2005 data, and their names are on the coversheet of this report. Professor John Booth of the University of North Texas, and Miguel Gómez, formerly at the Universidad de Costa Rica, provided excellent pro bono advice on the questionnaire design. Profound gratitude is owed to all these fine people for their excellent work on this study. Finally, we wish to thank the 1,487 Colombians who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

**Mitchell A. Seligson**  
**Nashville, Tennessee, USA.**  
**November, 2005**

# I. Overview of the Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Sample, 2005 vs. 2004

## Basic Distributions

It is necessary to first go over some of the important, basic characteristics of the sample used in this study before turning to more complex analyses. In the 2004 report, we went over the sample in detail. Here, we will limit ourselves to comparisons between the 2004 and the 2005 samples. These comparisons include the distribution of respondents by gender, age, education level, income and wealth.

As Figure I-1 shows, the sample is evenly distributed by gender in both years.




Figure I-1. Distribution of the Sample by Gender

Figure I-2 shows the distribution of the sample by age. Around three-quarters of the respondents fall into the three youngest age groups, ranging from 18 to 45 years old. There is no change between the samples.




Figure I-2. Distribution of the Sample by Age

In turn, Figure I-3 shows the distribution of the sample by education level. There is no variation between the two samples here either.




Figure I-3. Distribution of the Sample by Education Level

The sample is distributed by monthly family income levels, as Figure I-4 shows. The figures are in current pesos. The samples are almost identical.




Figure I-4. Distribution of the Sample by Income

It is also possible to create a wealth index based on the ownership of capital goods. To do this, we determined whether respondents own a television, freezer, telephone line, vehicle, washing machine, microwave oven, and/or computer, and whether the home has running water and a bathroom. This wealth index, ranging from 0 to 9, is an alternative way to measure material well-being. Figure I-5 shows the distribution of the sample by wealth. There is no significant difference between the samples.




Figure I-5. Distribution of the Sample by Wealth

## Conclusion

As we mentioned at the beginning of this report, as well as in Appendix A, the sample used in this study reflects the population of non-institutionalized adults in Colombia. This chapter contains a preliminary look at the basic characteristics of the respondents before turning to more detailed and sophisticated analyses around different issues, including democracy, corruption, crime, participation, voting behavior, and human rights. It is important to note that the 2005 sample is almost identical to the 2004 sample, which greatly facilitates the comparisons made in subsequent chapters.

## II. Trust in Institutions


This chapter explores the trust that Colombian citizens have in their state political institutions as well as in other politically-related institutions in the country.

Political institutions, both public and in civil society, are instruments through which the State implements policies. They are the means by which citizens and public agencies communicate, and a channel to ensure that the rules of the game and constitutional norms are followed. Political institutions are, therefore, the image and structure of the State. When civil society interacts with the State, it always does so through state or civil institutions. Thus, when we study or evaluate the performance of “democracy,” or the performance of the State, we are really evaluating the performance of its political institutions.

The aim of this audit of Colombian political institutions is to uncover to what extent do citizens trust these institutions, and to study how that level of trust in, and satisfaction with the performance of their public and private political institutions translates into Colombians’ support for the political system and democratic stability.

### General Levels of Trust in Institutions

The LAPOP included 20 Colombian political institutions in this year’s study of democracy. Most of them are state political institutions –that is, they are part of the structure and dependent on the State apparatus; some of them are civil or “private” –which means they are and function as part of civil society but perform duties and have ends within the political realm. For all institutions, we asked all citizens surveyed to rate each one on a scale of 1 to 7 (see below), in which 1 means that they have no trust in the institution and 7 signifies that they have much trust in it. To make the measurement and analysis of the data easier, we converted the 1-to-7 scale into a scale of 0 to 100, in which 0 signifies no trust and 100 signifies much trust.



The institutions included in this year’s study also formed part of the 2004 study of Colombian democracy, allowing us to compare the levels of trust in institutions in 2005 to the previous year, and to analyze the reasons behind any important changes that might appear.

In a political system with a long history of stability like the Colombian, it is rare to observe dramatic changes in the trust that citizens express toward their political institutions over the course of a year. Instead, we expect such levels of trust to remain almost as stable as the democratic system itself. For example, changes of one percentage point (1%) in public opinion should not be considered important or worrisome under normal circumstances.

Below is a list of the questions regarding trust in institutions included in this study. These questions are part of the B series of the study and are presented with their corresponding codes.

**Table II-1. List of Institutions Included in the 2005 Study**

<b>B10A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?
<b>B12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Fuerza Armadas?
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso Nacional?
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?
<b>B16.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la Nación?
<b>B17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Defensoría del Pueblo?
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía?
<b>B19.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría?
<b>B20.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?
<b>B21.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?
<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?
<b>COLB32A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?
<b>B37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?
<b>B47.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?
<b>B52.</b> [No aplica a Bogotá] ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Gobernación de su departamento?
<b>B50.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?
<b>B23.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?

We start by analyzing the general trust levels in Colombian political institutions using the data obtained in the 2005 study. Figure II-1, below, shows the 20 institutions included in the LAPOP study, listed in descending order of average citizen level of trust on a scale from 0 to 100.

The figure includes a line that shows the average general level of trust in all institutions combined, allowing us to see which institutions rise above this average and which fall below it.







Figure II-1. General Level of Trust in Institutions, Colombia 2005

As the above figure shows, the general level of trust in Colombian institutions depends on the kind of institution. Nonetheless, the combined trust level in all institutions is relatively high. In 2005, this level was 56.8 points on a scale of 0 to 100, an average above the halfway point on the scale, indicating a relatively healthy general level of institutional trust. Compared to other Latin American nations, the levels of institutional trust in Colombia are higher than in countries like Bolivia and Ecuador.

The institution in which Colombians most confide is the Catholic Church, with 73.4 points out of 100, followed by the Armed Forces and the Human Rights Ombudsman. The institutions that register the lowest levels of trust are political parties and unions, barely scoring above one-third on the scale. Still, the levels of trust shown in Colombian institutions tend to be greater than those present in other Latin American countries.

The above figure also demonstrates that there are no dramatic differences across the various institutions. Only four of the 20 institutions included in this study scored below the halfway point on the scale (i.e., below 50 out of 100 points) and the bulk of institutions (ten of them) scored between 50 and 60 points. This could be interpreted as reflecting the historic stability of Colombian democracy.

At first sight, our data seems to indicate that the levels of trust Colombians have in their institutions does not vary in terms of whether the institutions are public or civil. Furthermore, if we compare the levels of institutional trust expressed in 2005 with those demonstrated in 2004, we see that there have not been substantial changes, as Figure II-2 shows. This figure includes two horizontal lines: a solid line that depicts the average general level of trust in the 20 institutions in the 2005 sample, and a dotted line that shows the average general level of trust in institutions in the 2004 sample. Both lines will be included in all bar graphs in this chapter.



**Figure II-2. Comparative Levels of Trust in Institutions, 2004 – 2005**

Figure II-2 compares levels of trust in institutions between the years 2004 and 2005. It should be mentioned, however, that of the 20 institutions included in the study, we do not have information from 2004 for unions and municipal councils, and therefore no comparison can be made with these.

From the data of the 2005 survey, we see a small general rise in the levels of trust in institutions compared to 2004 levels. The only case that did not show such a tendency was the

level of trust expressed toward municipal governments, which fell half a point. In all other cases, the rise in institutional trust was about one point on the scale.

The general public's trust appears to have risen significantly over the year in the following cases: the media, which registered a rise of almost five points on the trust scale; the Catholic Church, which rose 3.5 points; the justice system, which rose three points on the scale; and elections, which rose 2.5 points. The level of trust in Congress also registered a rise which could turn out to be important.

We statistically verified the main differences between the 2004 and 2005 averages, and they turned out to be significant, with a 95 percent degree of certainty. In other words, the differences in the levels of trust between 2004 and 2005 are accurate in 95 out of 100 cases. This is true for the rise in the levels of trust in the media, the Catholic Church, and the system of justice.

Later on, we will undertake a more detailed analysis of these cases to determine the causes of the important rise in levels of trust registered by these institutions.

## Trust in Institutions by Type of Institution

The general analysis of trust in institutions does not tell us much about why there are such differences between institutions, or what motivations the public might have to confide more in one institution than another. To undertake a more detailed and revealing analysis regarding this issue, we have divided the 20 institutions included in this study into five groups according to their character and area of specialty. This subdivision allows us to identify strong and weak areas within the system of institutions of Colombian democracy, as reflected by public perceptions.

The groups of institutions on which this section is based are described below:


1. **Executive** Institutions: those that depend on, represent or are part of this branch of power. This group is composed of the Armed Forces, the Police, and the national government.
2. **Representative** institutions: those whose functions are to represent interests of citizens in the political arena. The group includes Congress, the Electoral Court, the political parties, and elections.
3. **Judicial** Institutions and agencies of control and oversight: those that perform normative and oversight functions within the structure of the State. This group includes the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the Prosecutor General, the Inspector General, the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Comptroller General, and a variable that evaluates the trust in the overall system of justice.
4. **Civil** institutions: those that have been created within civil society and maintain primarily a civil character even when they pursue and fulfill political roles within society. This group is composed of the Catholic Church, the media and labor unions.

5. **Local** institutions: those that manage local or regional affairs, including the municipal governments, municipal councils, and department governments.

The analysis of trust in this part of the study concentrates on identifying significant differences or patterns that determine the differences in institutional trust across the different groups, and between 2004 and 2005.

### ***Executive Institutions***

Below we present the results of the study of trust levels for three institutions: the Armed Forces, the Police, and a variable that evaluates the national government generally. The first two institutions are dependent on the Executive branch. And the third variable is included among the Executive institutions because we use the president and the cabinet of ministers as a proxy for the national government. Again, the figure includes two horizontal lines: one that shows the average general level of trust in all the 20 institutions combined for the 2005 sample, and a dotted line that shows the average general level of trust in institutions for the 2004 sample. Both lines will be included in all the bar graphs in this chapter.



**Figure II-3. Trust in Executive Institutions. Comparison Between 2004 – 2005**

As we can clearly see in Figure II-3, the levels of trust that Colombians have in the three Executive institutions included in this study surpasses the general average of all institutions. The three institutions of this group score near or above 60 points on a 100-point scale. This group, therefore, obtains a higher average trust level than all other groups of institutions studied. The general mean of trust in Executive institutions is 63.4 points on a scale of 100.

The Armed Forces are one of the three institutions that register the highest degrees of trust. And although neither the Police nor the national government are among these leading institutions, there is no doubt that the Colombians interviewed for this study consider that they are doing a good job compared to the other groups of institutions.

In the three cases, the levels of trust in Executive-branch institutions rose moderately over the 2004-2005 period. This rise, however, is not statistically significant, so we cannot be certain, with a sufficient degree of confidence, that this apparent rise accurately reflects reality.

## Representative Institutions

In this section we present the results for four institutions that carry out representative functions or are functional to the Colombian representative system. Political parties, elections, and the Electoral Court are closely tied and are the basis of the system of electing political representatives. Congress is the means through which the interests of distinct social sectors are channeled and represented before the central government.




Figure II-4. Trust in Representative Institutions. Comparison Between 2004 – 2005

The levels of trust in this group of institutions are consistently lower than any other group of institutions in the study. The average trust level for each one is lower than the general mean of Colombian political institutions, and the average general trust level for this group is lower than all other groups, earning only 46.9 points on a scale of 100 in 2005. In fact, political parties are the institution with the lowest levels of public trust.

These results suggest some degree of dissatisfaction with the electoral system and with the manner in which the interests of Colombians are represented in Congress by elected representatives through an electoral system. One should not lose sight, however, that the low

levels of trust registered by political parties pulls down this average, and that, in general terms, the level of trust in this group of institutions rose in 2005 compared to 2004.

Over this period, the growth of trust in Congress and in elections is statistically significant with a 95 percent degree of certainty, which suggests a real and positive change in both cases over the course of a year.


### ***Judicial Institutions and Oversight Agencies***

In this group we have included a series of institutions of normative and oversight character, all very important within any political system. When these institutions operate well, it is a proxy for a well-functioning rule of law and trust that the country's laws are observed and enforced. Trust in oversight agencies is an important proxy for the autonomy of the institutions tied to the different branches of government and to the transparency with which they operate.

Figure II-5, below, shows the results for the levels of trust that Colombian citizens have in this group of institutions. In it we can see a tendency for the levels of trust to rise over the period 2004 – 2005 for institutions such as the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Inspector General, the Comptroller General, and for the variable that evaluates the judicial system in general. For the Prosecutor General, the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Court, levels of trust tend to remain stable, only showing slight rises.

Within this group of institutions, the only ones that register levels of trust above the general mean for all institutions are the the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Prosecutor General, and the Inspector General. All the other institutions scored below the mean. The average general level of trust for this group of institutions is 57.8 points out of 100.





**Figure II-5. Trust in Judicial Institutions and Oversight Agencies: Comparison Between 2004 – 2005**

For the group of institutions of the judicial system and oversight agencies, the only statistically significant increase in public levels of trust was for the system of justice in general. The general level of trust in the system of justice rose three points on a scale of 100 over the course of a year, a considerable increase in such a short period of time.

A rise of this magnitude in the level of trust in the system of justice suggests that the public perceives the system of justice to be working better, or the public's image of this system has improved, even though, individually, the specific institutions of the legal system do not receive such positive evaluations.

### Civil Institutions

The institutions grouped under this heading are especially interesting for their eminently civil character (Figure II-6). The Catholic Church is an institution that fulfills specific functions in the social and cultural realms of Latin American societies, and in many countries it also plays a political role.

The media are also a special case in that they have an eminently civil character, are politically neutral, and have a mission to impartially disseminate information. In reality, the media have been playing an increasingly important and biased role in the political sphere across the globe.

Finally, trade unions are eminently political institutions but with a civil character. Even when they act as channels for political and class interests, they are institutions that do not participate in the electoral process at the national level, and cannot present candidates for office without the intermediation of, or association with, some party or political movement.




Figure II-6. Trust in Civil Institutions. Comparison Between 2004 – 2005

The LAPOP study does not have data on trust levels for trade unions in 2004. In 2005, the level of trust expressed by respondents for unions are generally among the lowest of all institutions, greater only than that of political parties.

By contrast, trust in the Catholic Church surpasses the averages of all other 19 institutions, and trust in the media is also one of the highest. The averages of the Church and the media are well above the general mean for all institutions. The Colombian civil institutions included in this study achieve a general level of trust of 59.7 points on a 100-point scale.

For both the Church and the media, the growth in trust levels over the 2004 – 2005 period are statistically significant with a 95 percent degree of certainty. Also, in both cases, the average levels of trust rose more than in any other institution.

The media experienced the most dramatic change, rising five points on the trust scale over the one year period. This growth suggests that the Colombian public both approves of and is grateful for the media's performance.

A rise of this magnitude in such a short period of time is theoretically unexpected and requires deeper study of its possible causes. We will undertake such an analysis in a subsequent section of this chapter for both the media and the Catholic Church.

### ***Local Institutions***

The last group of institutions in the study are those that carry out functions at a local and regional level: municipal governments, municipal councils, and department governments (Figure II-7). Generally, these institutions all register levels of public trust below the mean for all institutions, although they are not the lowest among all institutions. The average level of trust for these institutions is 54.8 points on a scale of 100.

The municipal councils were first included in the study of institutions only in 2005, so there is no information about them for 2004.

The case of municipal governments is special since it is the only one of the 20 institutions whose average level of trust in 2005 is lower than in 2004 and, therefore, the only one that breaks the general pattern of rising levels of trust between the 2004 and 2005 surveys. The difference between the averages of the two samples, however, is not statistically significant, and we cannot be sure that the level of public trust in municipal governments has actually fallen.




Figure II-7. Trust in Local Institutions: Comparison Between 2004 – 2005

### Predictors of Trust in the Five Institutions that Showed Improvement

In this section of the chapter we study each of the five institutions for which we found there had been a real and statistically significant change in levels of trust between 2004 and 2005. The five institutions are: the media, the Catholic Church, Congress, the system of justice, and elections.

The assumption guiding the analysis in this section is that the levels of trust which citizens have in institutions do not vary arbitrarily. These variations are, instead, the result of a series of factors: for example, education level (which can influence one's understanding of how institutions work) or gender (which can influence the frequency of contact with public institutions).

With this assumption in mind, in this section we will analyze, from the 2005 sample, the factors that influence the trust that Colombians have in their institutions. Because the analysis covers a range of very different kinds of institutions, both in terms of character and in the extent of their mandate, it is difficult to believe that there are fixed explanatory factors of change. This

is particularly the case since trust is so subjective, and tends to be specific to each institution; that is, the public does not usually have a fixed degree of trust in a whole package of different institutions, but tends to treat each institution individually.

To undertake this analysis, we statistically studied all the variables which represent the five institutions and constructed a linear regression model for each of them. The linear regression model allows us to identify which of the variables or factors exercises a greater degree of influence, provoking changes in the levels of trust in the institutions analyzed.

In all cases, we used socio-demographic variables as control variables. In other words, we included in the model the following factors: age and gender of the respondent, area of residence (urban or rural), income level, marital status, education level, and self-identified ethnicity.


Despite the fact that all these variables exert a certain degree of influence on the levels of trust that Colombians have in their institutions –since they indicate differences in class, wealth, and so on– we did not find, in our analysis, that any one of these control variables played a determining role in the changes in trust levels of the five institutions analyzed. This means that between 2004 and 2005, there was no stark or important change in the respondents living conditions that might have significantly influenced their evaluation of the institutions.

### ***Economic Factors***

With these results in mind, we can next think of what other kinds of factors might affect or improve the levels of trust in these institutions. Again, with a simple analytical model, we can explore the suggestion that perceptions of the country's recent and future economic situation may play a determining role in the evaluation of how well the political system is working and, therefore, of its institutions.

Theoretical discussions regarding the mechanisms that determine voting patterns or the approval of policies, regimes, and the reelection of candidates suggest that the public's perception of the country's economic situation is a central factor in the process by which citizens determine how they will vote. These discussions are as applicable to the democracies of Latin America as they are, for example, to the new democracies of Eastern Europe.

Below is a figure which shows how the perception of the country's economic situation influences the levels of trust in the institutions analyzed in this section of the chapter:



**Figure II-8. Trust in Institutions by Current Economic Perceptions. Colombia 2005**

The above figure shows the influence that perceptions of the country's current economic situation have on the levels of trust in institutions. This variable is determinant for the four institutions analyzed when we control for the following factors: respondent's education level, age, gender, income, and residence (urban or rural). In the figure, we can see that as economic perceptions improve, the levels of trust in institutions also consistently rise, since improvements in the economy can reduce uncertainty and promote greater satisfaction in the system in general.

Only in the case of trust in elections does this tendency not appear to hold: when there is greater satisfaction with the country's economic situation, public trust in elections tends to decrease. When we use future economic perceptions as a variable, the four variables analyzed show consistent results, as shown in Figure II-9. In all cases, a positive perception of the future leads to rising degrees of trust in these institutions.




Figure II-9. Trust in Institutions by Future Economic Perceptions. Colombia 2005

As the following figure shows, the government's ability clean up state finances is also important to Colombians. According to our results, we see that the degree of satisfaction with the management of state finances influences the way citizens see the country's institutions as a whole. This factor might be related to criteria like efficiency and reduction of corruption.

The question shown in Figure II-10, based on a 7-point scale, evaluates the current government's performance in terms of keeping healthy state finances. On the scale, 1 signifies that the respondent thinks that the current government is doing nothing to clean up state finances, and 7 signifies that the respondent thinks that it is doing a great deal. The lines in the figure clearly indicate that as the evaluation of the current government's fiscal performance improves, the levels of trust that respondents have in institutions also rises.




Figure II-10. Trust in Institutions by Clean Up of State Finances: Colombia 2005



Among other economic factors analyzed that do not exercise significant influence on levels of trust are the following: whether or not one is unemployed; non-participation in the labor market; working as a housewife.

### ***Social and Political Factors***

In this section of the chapter, we will analyze other factors that might have an important influence on the evaluations that Colombians make of their institutions. To do so, we have constructed models, for each of the five variables analyzed (the system of justice, Congress, the Catholic Church, the media, and elections), that analyze factors such as the perception of municipal services, the overall perception of corruption in the country, personal experiences with corruption, the perception of the armed conflict and the search for solutions to it, the performance of the national government in various areas, participation in political activities at the community and municipal level as well as in public protests, the value attached to democracy, and the perception regarding the possibility of a coup d'état, among others.

These models try, above all, to capture the complexity of Colombian reality; and try to combine the different dimensions of citizens' daily experiences that influence their attitudes and political values. These models also make use of statistical techniques and technological tools that permit analyses with satisfactory levels of confidence in the accuracy of the results.

Thus, the models analyzed in this section combine the economic variables we studied above with the social and political variables we now include to improve our analysis and bring it closer to reality.

The first result which jumps out in this analysis is that the economic variables, which we found to play an important role in the degree of institutional trust, see their significance decline when other variables are included; although their influence does not disappear entirely, it is no longer as overwhelming as when analyzed alone.


Taking social and political factors into account in the determination of trust in institutions, we find that the evaluation of current government performance is an important factor, and present in all the cases we analyzed. The most important elements in this evaluation are the performance of the current government in promoting and protecting democratic principles and in improving citizen security.

### **Government Performance**

The figure below shows the relationship between the performance of President Uribe's administration in terms of protecting democratic principles in Colombia and the trust that Colombians have in their political institutions.

The variable that evaluates the government's performance (Figure II-11) in terms of protecting and promoting democratic principles in Colombia is measured on a scale of one to

seven points, in which 1 signifies that the government does *nothing* to promote or protect democratic principles, and 7 signifies that it does *much* to promote and protect them.



**Figure II-11. Trust in Institutions by Perception of Current Government Performance: Colombia 2005**

The above figure clearly shows that as the perception that the government is doing a good job promoting and protecting democratic principles rises, the level of institutional trust increases. This relationship is significant for all the institutions analyzed in this chapter, except for the Catholic Church.

Figure II-12, in the same way, shows that governmental efforts to improve citizen security appear to have increased over the 2004 – 2005 period. At least, there was an improvement in the perception of respondents regarding such an effort over 2004 opinions.




Figure II-12. Trust in Institutions by Perception of Improvement in Citizen Security: Colombia 2005

How Colombians evaluate the current administration's efforts to improve citizen security directly and consistently influences, though in varying degrees, their trust in the institutions analyzed. As citizens perceive that the government increases its efforts to guarantee citizen security, their trust in political institutions also rises. In our cases, we can detect a logical connection between growing trust in the system of justice and in Congress if the public believes that the government is working to improve citizen security. It will also lead to greater trust in clean elections and in safer conditions for those working in the media.

Our analytical models show that the levels of trust in the Church are related to the performance of the government in terms of citizen security, probably because of the role that the Church can play as an intermediary in negotiation processes in this area.

We also included other measures of the good performance of the current Colombian government in our analytical model, but the results were not significant enough to satisfactorily explain the rise in trust in the institutions we analyzed.

## Corruption

The LAPOP study has many different measures of corruption in Latin American countries, from the perception of corruption to victimization by corruption, since it is such a common and also so conflictive an element in democracies of the region. We will more thoroughly analyze the problem of corruption later in this study. In this section, however, we cannot completely skip the influence that the perception of corruption has on trust in institutions.

Of all the available measures of corruption in our survey, only one, which we analyze here, appears to have a significant influence on trust in institutions: the question of how widespread corruption is among government officials; an exception, however, is trust in elections, which does not appear to be impacted by this factor.

Figure II-13, below, shows the negative effect that the perception of corruption has on trust in institutions:




Figure II-13. Trust in Institutions by Perception of the Extent of Corruption: Colombia 2005


Corruption perception has a negative effect on trust in the system of justice, Congress, the media, and the Church. In other words, to the extent that citizens perceive corruption to be widening and becoming more common among government officials, they tend to confide less in political institutions, regardless of whether they are state or civil institutions.

Other measures of perception of, and victimization by, corruption do not give significant results and do not appear to influence levels of trust in institutions. Again, trust in institutions appears to be tied to perceptions of widespread corruption rather than to personal or exceptional experiences of it.

### **Other Important Social and Political Factors**

Until now we have analyzed political, economic, and social factors that consistently influence the level of trust in all or at least four out of the five of the institutions we analyze in detail, and which show a real increase in their levels of trust over the 2004 – 2005 period.

Below, we analyze more specific factors that have a significant influence on levels of trust in some of the specific institutions studied.



**Figure II-14. Trust in Institutions by Evaluation of the Quality of Municipal Services: Colombia 2005**

In Figure II-14 we see that the quality of municipal services influences, in different ways, the levels of trust in the electoral process and in the work carried out by Congress. Although in both cases we see a tendency for levels of trust to rise as municipal services improve, we also see, in the case of elections, a tendency for levels of trust to fall when the quality of municipal services is perceived as good. This variable is not significant for any of the other institutions.

Other variables that influence some of the institutions are: the respondent's level of wealth, measured as the ownership of material goods; his/her education level; whether he or she is Afro-Colombian or white; and being a victim of the armed conflict, among others.

Finally, in the case of the Catholic Church, the variables that predict the levels of trust tends to be different from the rest of the group of institutions, precisely because of the unique character of the Church as an institution. The factors that have greater influence on the levels of trust in this institution are those related to the success or failure of the peace process (whether there is a turn toward the use of military force or toward negotiation, as Figure II-15 shows); and the prospect of a possible demobilization and reinsertion of either the guerrilla or the

paramilitary. It is not surprising to find this relationship, since the Church can play an important role as intermediary in these processes so vital to the future of Colombia.




Figure II-15. Trust in the Church by Perception on the Solution to the Conflict with the Guerrilla: Colombia 2005





### III. The State of Democracy in Colombia

After having analyzed citizens' trust in political institutions and having examined the changes between the 2004 and 2005 studies, we turn in this chapter to explore different aspects of democracy in Colombia. We start with a general overview of the perception that Colombians have of their democracy. Then we will analyze the degree of support for a stable democracy, examining separately and together the two dimensions of this concept: support for the political system and political tolerance. At the end of the chapter, we will examine the existence of some characteristics and beliefs that could make Colombians inclined to back non-democratic solutions for the country.

#### General Outlook of Democracy

In Figure III-1 we can appreciate to what extent Colombians perceive their country is democratic. Close to 70 percent of the respondents think that the system is somewhat or very democratic. And only four percent think that they live in a regime which is not at all democratic.




Figure III-1. How Democratic is Colombia? National Sample 2005

In terms of perceptions about the evolution of democracy in Colombia, 30 percent of respondents believe that the country has become more democratic over the last few years, while 22 percent believe that the degree of democracy has diminished, as shown in Figure III-2.




Figure III-2. Evolution of Democracy in Colombia – National Sample 2005

Colombians are fairly satisfied with their democracy. Figure III-3 shows that slightly over 56 percent of respondents declared themselves satisfied or very satisfied with the way democracy functions in Colombia. The 2004 study showed, however, that the level of satisfaction in the country is barely above that of Panama, Mexico, and Nicaragua, and is lower than that in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica (see *The Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2004*).




Figure III-3. Satisfaction with Democracy – National Sample 2005

These levels have not varied in the country between 2004 and 2005, as can be appreciated in Figure III-4. The figure shows the average level of satisfaction with democracy (on a scale of 0 to 100), as well as error bars corresponding to confidence intervals of 95 percent, which demonstrate that the seemingly difference is not statistically significant.




Figure III-4. Satisfaction with Democracy – National Samples 2004 and 2005

Respondents were asked what would be the best way to strengthen democracy in Colombia. As Figure III-5 shows, most of them mentioned the need to create more jobs (39.5%) and combat corruption (20.8%), and only 14.4 percent of citizens considered that resolving the armed conflict would be the best way to strengthen the country's democratic system.





Figure III-5. The Best Way to Strengthen Democracy in Colombia – National Sample 2005

In the 2005 study, we introduced a new question aimed at evaluating how much legitimacy the Constitution has among the country's citizens. The question, on a scale of one to seven, is the following:

**COLCONS1.** La Constitución expresa los valores y las aspiraciones de los colombianos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Once converted to a scale of 0-100, the average for this year's national survey is 70.5. Is this level of approval uniform throughout the country? Figure III-6 shows the index of constitutional legitimacy by region. We can see that the inhabitants of the Pacific region identify less with the constitution than those who live in other regions.



**Figure III-6. Constitutional Legitimacy by Region – National Sample 2005**

As is well known, the Pacific is the region with the highest proportion of blacks in the country. Does the level of constitutional legitimacy vary by ethnic self-identification? As Figure III-7 shows, respondents who identify themselves as Afro-Colombians express lower levels of approval of the Constitution than do other citizens, although the difference is barely significant.




Figure III-7. Constitutional Legitimacy by Ethnic Self-Identification – National Sample 2005

## System Support

The legitimacy of a political system is central to its survival. Citizens should recognize the minimum right of a government to rule. The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items in order to create an index of support for the political system as a measure of the its legitimacy. This index is the average of the following items:

- B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.
- B2.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?
- B3.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?
- B4.** ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?
- B6.** ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político colombiano?

When we compare the levels of each one of these components from one year to the next (Figure III-8), we see a rise in the belief that courts guarantee a fair trial and that citizens' rights are well protected, as well as an increase in the level of pride in the Colombian political system.




Figure III-8. of System Support – National Samples 2004 and 2005



In a similar way, the general system support (the average of the above mentioned components) has risen slightly but significantly between 2004 and 2005, as we can see in Figure III-9.




Figure III-9. System Support – National Samples 2004 and 2005

In the 2004 study, system support was discussed along two dimensions: the so-called *specific support*, a short-term indicator primarily related to the level of approval of the incumbent administration; and *diffuse support*, which is a more conservative evaluation of the legitimacy of the system in general, in that it does not depend on the approval, generally volatile, of the government in power.


Although last year the level of system support in Colombia was relatively high compared to other countries in the region, the 2004 study showed how this support was related to the great of popularity for President Uribe. The question then arose whether it was possible for specific

support, over time, to turn into diffuse support; in other words, whether a leader's approval can slowly build a climate of trust which generates a base of legitimacy for the political system in the long term.

To evaluate the empirical plausibility of this hypothesis, we first created a presidential approval index using the average of the responses to the following series of questions:

Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual, o sea el gobierno del Presidente Álvaro Uribe (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)
N1. Combate la pobreza.
N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.
N9. Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.
N10 Protege los derechos humanos
COLN11. Resuelve el conflicto armado
COLN12. Sanea las finanzas estatales
N11. Mejora la seguridad ciudadana
N12 Combate el desempleo

Next we compared the level of system support in 2004 with that for 2005, keeping President Uribe's approval ratings *constant* (that is, controlling for the above mentioned index). In this way, it is possible to isolate the effect of the government's popularity and capture the diffuse support. The result of this comparison appears in Figure III-10.



**Figure III-10. Support– National Samples 2004 and 2005**

As shown in Figure III-10, diffuse support has increased independently of the president's popularity (the difference between 2004 and 2005 is statistically significant), which can provide some evidence that it is possible to construct legitimacy in the medium term based on a government enjoying high approval rates.<sup>2</sup>

## Political Tolerance

Support for the political system is only one side of democratic stability, that related to stability. To foster democracy, citizens should also be tolerant of the political opinions and expressions of

<sup>2</sup> In fact, taking the 2004 and 2005 samples together, and creating a regression model of system support – including among the predictors, socio-demographic variables at the individual and municipal levels; evaluations of the economy; the degree of satisfaction with municipal services; the amount of participation in civil society organizations; of victimization by crime, corruption, and the armed conflict; and approval ratings for the president – the variable corresponding to the fixed effect of the year is statistically significant (at the .05 level), which demonstrates that, independently of the mentioned factors, there is an effective rise in support for the system from one year to the next.

others. To measure Colombians' political tolerance, LAPOP developed an index comprised of the following questions:

- D1.** Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: *[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]*
- D2.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.
- D3.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?
- D4.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

The average responses to these questions, for 2004 and 2005, appear in Figure III-11.





Figure III-11. Components of Political Tolerance – National Samples 2004 and 2005

As we can see in the above figure, there are no differences between one year and the next for these items. The same is true for the combined political tolerance index, as seen in Figure III-12.



**Figure III-12. Tolerance – National Samples 2004 and 2005**

In addition to the components of the tolerance index, respondents were asked the following question:

**D5.** Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los **homosexuales**, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

The degree of tolerance for the political rights of homosexuals is precarious. The average of this index, recalculated to a scale of 0 to 100, is barely 51.2, which means that close to half of the population disapproves, with different levels of intensity, of homosexuals running for public office.

Tolerance for the rights of homosexuals is related to education, as Figure III-13 shows. Respondents with higher levels of education exhibited greater degrees of tolerance.




Figure III-13. Tolerance of Homosexuals' Political Rights by Education Level – National Sample 2005

This type of tolerance also appears associated with respondents' ideology. As we can see in Figure III-14, people who consider themselves more to the right also show less tolerance for homosexuals than those who consider themselves to be on the left, although the differences do not reach statistical significance.




Figure III-14. Tolerance of Homosexuals' Political Rights by Ideological Position – National Sample 2005

Despite this outlook, there has been a slight increase in the level of tolerance for homosexuals since 2004, as Figure III-15 shows.




Figure III-15. Tolerance of Homosexuals' Political Rights – National Samples 2004 and 2005

Besides the questions described above, we also formulated the following questions regarding the degree to which citizens are accepting of certain practices:

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.
E8. Que las personas participen en un grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.



E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales

The responses for 2004 and 2005, recodified on a scale of 0 to 100, appear in Figure III-16. It is concerning that the average citizen is more willing to accept that people take justice into their own hands than to accept the invasion of private property or the occupation of buildings. It is also worth noting that the level of approval of legal demonstrations is significantly lower in 2005 than the previous year.




Figure III-16. Approval of Political Practices – National Samples 2004 and 2005


Support for a Stable Democracy

We believe that democracy is more stable when citizens combine support for the system with political tolerance. In other words, legitimacy and tolerance are both necessary conditions for democratic stability. We posit a typology of citizens based on different combinations of these two dimensions (Table III-1). When an important part the public demonstrates broad support for the political system and, at the same time, professes high levels of tolerance for the political expressions of others, stable democracy is favored. High legitimacy but low levels of tolerance can lead to a stable, but not very democratic regime. By contrast, high levels of tolerance but low levels of system support can lead to an unstable democracy. Finally, when a large percentage of the population shows little support for the system and little tolerance, democracy is more likely to fail.

System Support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Table III-1. Relationship between Support for the System and Tolerance

Where do Colombians fit among these four categories? Figure III-17 shows the percentage of respondents, for both 2004 and 2005, who fit into each.



**Figure III-17. Support for a Stable Democracy. Classification of Respondents – National Samples 2004 and 2005**

Around one-third of the respondents demonstrate high levels of system support and tolerance, while one-fifth exhibit low levels in both categories (columns on the far right). It is notable that the group which favors stable democracy grew significantly from one year to the next – from 32 to 37 percent – while the group prone to foster democratic failure fell from 22 to 17 percent. The other two groups remained stable.

There are important regional variations in the distribution of respondents among these four types. As seen in Figure III-18, residents of the Atlantic and Central regions fall primarily into the category of “stable democracy,” that is, they demonstrate both strong support for the system and high political tolerance (45.5% and 41.5% respectively); this group is considerably smaller, however, among residents of Bogotá (27.4%), the old National Territories (28%), and the Pacific region (28.9%).




Figure III-18. Support for a Stable Democracy. Respondent Classification by Region – National Sample 2005

## Threats to Democracy

The public can harbor attitudes and beliefs with the potential to threaten democracy. In the face of economic difficulties or problems of public order, citizens may be willing to sacrifice civil liberties and guarantees, as well as the bases of the liberal democratic state. The Latin American Public Opinion Project has designed a series of questions that seeks to evaluate and analyze the strength of respondents' democratic values.

First, in 2005, we introduced a series of variables to measure the degree of respondents' approval of certain state practices related to the restriction of civil and political rights, as well as media censorship. The questions are the following:

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Por favor vea la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 10 significa que aprueba firmemente y 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y usted puede decirme cualquier número en esta escala dependiendo de con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba estas acciones.

<b>D32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?
<b>D33.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político colombiano?
<b>D34.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?
<b>D36.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?
<b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?

Figure III-19 shows the average of the responses for each of the questions, once converted to a scale of 0 to 100.




Figure III-19. Approval of Restrictions on Civil Liberties and Censorship – National Sample 2005

With the responses to these questions, we built a censorship-acceptance index,<sup>3</sup> whose average for the population is 34.7 out of 100. We also explored the factors that can predict variations in this index. To do this, we developed a linear regression model for the index of approval of censorship and restriction of civil liberties.<sup>4</sup> We included the following predictors:

- Individual socio-demographic variables: gender, age, education level,<sup>5</sup> income/wealth level,<sup>6</sup> residence (urban/rural), marital status,<sup>7</sup> and number of children.

<sup>3</sup> This scale is reliable, with an Cronbach's alpha of 0.764.

<sup>4</sup> Given the use municipal level predictors, we grouped the observations by municipality according to Stata's *cluster* option, and estimated robust standard errors.

<sup>5</sup> This is an index of years of education, which ranges from 0 to 18.

<sup>6</sup> Respondents responded better to questions regarding the level of wealth (ownership of material goods) than to income level, which was more often left blank.

- Municipal socio-demographic variables: municipal population,<sup>8</sup> percentage of population that is rural, poverty level,<sup>9</sup> and the average homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants between 1999 and 2003.<sup>10</sup>
- The ideological position of the respondent.
- The level of approval for President Uribe.
- Variables for victimization by corruption, common crime, and the armed conflict.

The results of this econometric model appear in Table III-2.

Variable dependiente: Índice de aceptación a la censura			
Predictores	Coefficiente (error est. robusto)	Significancia	
Hombre	-2.57 (1.072)	0.020	*
Edad	-.04 (.072)	0.540	
Educación	-.28 (.194)	0.162	
Riqueza	-1.22 (.389)	0.003	**
Urbano	2.73 (2.159)	0.211	
Casado/unión libre	2.01 (1.624)	0.221	
No. de hijos	.34 (.515)	0.512	
Aprobación al presidente	.19 (.028)	0.000	***
Ideología	-.12 (.354)	0.739	
Victimización por crimen	.35 (1.768)	0.844	
Victimización por corrupción	2.30 (1.675)	0.176	
Victimización por el conflicto	-1.66 (1.793)	0.360	
Población (log)	-957.55 (624.250)	0.131	
% población rural	-6.69 (7.889)	0.400	
Pobreza	.03 (.080)	0.683	
Tasa de homicidios (99-03)	-.04 (.019)	0.052	
Constante	46.79 (10.140)	0.000	
N	1101		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09		

Table III-2. Predictors of the Censorship-Approval Index


<sup>7</sup> We grouped married couples and those in civil union within the same category of this dichotomous variable.

<sup>8</sup> For this variable, we took the natural logarithm of the municipal population, in thousands of inhabitants. Taking the natural log is a common practice, with the understanding that the marginal effect at high populations levels is decreasing.

<sup>9</sup> This is the indicator of unmet basic needs from the DANE for 1993.

<sup>10</sup> Data from the National Police.

Although the model explains a modest fraction of the variation in the censorship-approval index, there do exist some factors that play a significant role. In the first place, men tend to approve of restricting civil liberties less than women. Figure III-20 shows the average indices by gender when all other factors included in this model are held constant.



**Figure III-20. Censorship-Approval Index by Gender – National Sample 2005**



The second significant predictor is the respondent's level of wealth. Wealthier people are less willing to accept censorship and the restriction of civil liberties that poorer people, as can be appreciated in Figure III-21. This figure shows the average of this index for changing levels of wealth, controlling for all other factors.




Figure III-21. Censorship-Approval Index by Level of Wealth – National Sample 2005

Finally, approval for President Uribe is also a statistically significant predictor of the level of censorship approval. Those who think that the current government is doing a better job are also more willing to accept the restriction of civil liberties, as seen in Figure III-22. This figure shows the averages of the censorship-approval index for different degrees of presidential approval (on a scale of 0 to 100), when all other factors are held constant.





Figure III-22. Censorship-Approval Index by Degree of Presidential Approval – National Sample 2005

Are Colombians willing to look for and support a strong, charismatic leader, even at the expense of democratic values? To respond to this question, we initially included the following question in the study:

.... **DEM2.** Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo:


- A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo  
un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.....1  
La democracia es preferible a cualquier  
otra forma de gobierno.....2  
En algunas circunstancias un gobierno  
autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.....3  
NS/NR.....8

Figure III-23 contains the responses. Nineteen percent of respondents consider that certain circumstances justify an authoritarian government taking power.



**Figure III-23. Democracy Is Always Preferable or an Authoritarian Government Is Preferable Under Certain Circumstances – National Sample 2005**

How do the responses from 2004 and 2005 compare? Figure III-24 shows that those who would accept an authoritarian government under certain circumstances grew from 16.5 percent to 19 percent, while the portion of respondents who consider democracy preferable to any other form of government fell close to three percentage points. The differences, however, are not significant.



**Figure III-24. Democracy Is Always Preferable or an Authoritarian Government Is Preferable Under Certain Circumstances – National Samples 2004 and 2005**

We also asked the following question for the respondents:

**AUT1.** Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen bien, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa?

Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido.....1  
La democracia electoral es lo mejor.....2  
NS/NR.....8

Figure III-25 shows that more than 16 percent of respondents consider that the country could sacrifice its electoral democracy for a strong leader who does not need to be elected by popular vote.




Figure III-25. We Need a Strong, Non-Elected Leader or Electoral Democracy Is Best – National Sample 2005

Figure III-26 shows that although the group who clamors for a leader who does not need to be elected appears to have grown, the differences from one year to the next are not significant.




Figure III-26. We Need a Strong, Non-Elected Leader or Electoral Democracy Is Best – National Samples 2004 and 2005

We also presented the respondents with different scenarios, asking them if these scenarios would justify a military coup d'état. The questions were the following:

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares.

	Se justificaría	No se justificaría	NS
JC1. Frente al Desempleo muy alto	1	2	8
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales	1	2	8
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia	1	2	8
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	1	2	8
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción	1	2	8
COLJC14. Frente a un agravamiento del conflicto armado	1	2	8
COLJC15. Frente a una seria amenaza terrorista	1	2	8

Figure III-27 shows the percentage of those who answered Yes to these questions. It is troubling that around half of the respondents would justify a coup d'état in the face of high levels of crime (46.5%), a serious terrorist threat (49.1%), a deterioration of the armed conflict (50.7%), and high levels of corruption (51.9%).





Figure III-27. Justifications for a Military Coup d'État – National Sample 2005



To the simple question, “Do you believe that sometimes there are sufficient reasons for a coup d’état or do you believe that there are never sufficient reasons?”, close to 51% of respondents answered that they believed reasons do exist which could justify a coup d’état, as Figure III-28 shows. Although the group who believed this fell by two percentage points between 2004 and 2005, this difference is not statistically significant.



**Figure III-28. Is There a Reason that Justifies a Coup d’État? – National Samples 2004 and 2005**

Despite the above results, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the probability of military coups in Latin America is remote. There are, however, other ways in which power concentrated in one branch of government, especially the Executive, can subvert the democratic system of checks and balances and break the principle of the separation of powers.

In some countries of the region there have been so-called “self-coups” (“*autogolpes*”) that often result in the closure of Congress and the concentration of power in the hands of the president who, in this way, manages to introduce constitutional reforms or even in some cases to write a new constitution which contains provisions that institutionalize excessive powers in the Executive.

In other cases, in the face of judicial decisions unfavorable to the government or in circumstances of political crisis, the president has opted to reduce the powers of the high courts and sometimes to shut them down in order to, among other objectives, replace justices “hostile” to the government.

For this reason, this year’s study included two questions that seek to analyze the perceptions of citizens regarding these new scenarios. The questions are:

	Sí podría haber	Nunca habría razón
<b>COLJC14A</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un cierre del Congreso por parte del presidente o cree que nunca hay razón suficiente para eso?	1	2
<b>COLJC14B</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un cierre de la Corte Constitucional por parte del presidente o cree que nunca hay razón suficiente para eso?	1	2

Figure III-29 shows the percentages of respondents who answered the questions affirmatively. The data indicates that, for Colombians, Congress clearly enjoys less legitimacy than the Constitutional Court. While close to 40 percent of respondents consider that there could be circumstances which warranted the president closing Congress, less than 30 percent could find sufficient reasons for the closure of the Constitutional Court.




Figure III-29. to Separation of Powers – National Sample 2005

As stated above, we believe that, notwithstanding the perceptions of citizens regarding a military coup d'état, the chances of such an event are remote given internal conditions and international safeguards. We do need, however, to pay attention to the responses given by the respondents to the situations described in the last two questions, which constitute the real threat to the system of liberal democracy in our times.



## **IV. Corruption and Democracy**

Corruption has been a serious problem in Colombia over the years. Transparency International has developed a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) that ranks countries according to their levels of corruption. The index is generated from surveys of risk analysts, businessmen, and experts in each country. They then rate each country on a scale of 0 (high levels of corruption) to 10 (the country is free from corruption). In 2004, Colombia scored 3.8. According to the new CPI, released on October 18, 2005, Colombia's score was 4.0, which placed it in 55<sup>th</sup> place out of 156 countries. Over the last six years, Colombia has been one of the countries with the highest rates of improvement in the CPI.

While this CPI has been taken as a reliable reference point to measure corruption levels in recent years, we have to remember that this index reflects the opinions of businessmen and investors and not the direct experiences of the Colombian people. It is also worth noting that acts of corruption do not only occur at high levels of government. The practice of corruption has disseminated to institutions at various levels; citizens point to Congress, the Police, the Army, as well as different branches of regional and local government as hotspots of corruption.

Finally, it should also be said that this Corruption Perception Index does not measure the real level of corruption in a country. When they talk about high level spheres, it is very difficult to get a real measurement of corruption in those areas. Corruption, however, is a problem that affects common citizens in their daily activities; and whether it be in the workplace or in some government office where required procedures and paperwork are carried out, those who are victims of corruption lose faith in people, institutions, and the entire democratic system in general. This chapter seeks to examine both people's experiences with corruption in Colombia and their perceptions of it, and to point out its effects on support for democracy.

### Individual Acts of Corruption

In 2004, Colombians did not perceive corruption to be one the country’s most serious problems. It is well known that Colombia has endured a serious crisis of political violence for some years, and the choice of this as the most serious problem facing the country is not surprising. Figure IV-1 shows how Colombians perceive corruption compared to other problems that trouble the country, and how this perception has changed over the last year.




Figure IV-1. Colombia’s Most Serious Problem in the Years 2004 – 2005

Figure IV-1 shows that, in 2005, only three percent of Colombians surveyed mentioned corruption as the most serious problem facing the country. This percentage is less than that for the preceding year, when four percent of respondents answered this way. This makes us wonder, was the decrease in the perception of corruption by Colombians in fact prompted by a reduction in the actual levels of corruption? This section analyzes data regarding acts of corruption from 2005, comparing them with data from 2004, in order to try to answer this question.


To examine real experiences of corruption, we formulated a series of questions in order to determine whether respondents have been victims of corruption in different aspects of their daily lives, including contact with police officers, while fulfilling the requirements of public administration procedures and paperwork, and experiences in the workplace. The questions are the following:

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...

	No	Sí	NS	INAP		
<b>EXC1.</b> ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?	0	1	8		<b>EXC1</b>	
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en el último año?	0	1	8		<b>EXC2</b>	
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?	0	1	8		<b>EXC6</b>	
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a EXC13, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC11</b>	
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿UD. trabaja? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a EXC14, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC13</b>	
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a EXC15, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC14</b>	
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos <i>públicos</i> en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a EXC16, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC15</b>	
<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a EXC7, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC16</b>	

Note that in questions from EXC11 to EXC16 we used a filter which discards all those respondents who answer negatively to the first part of the question. For example, in question EXC13, only the experiences of people with children enrolled in schools and who experienced corruption in the schools over the last year are tabulated. This means that the percentages in these questions are calculated based on those who have really had experiences of corruption while dealing with the above mentioned institutions.

Figure IV-2 shows what types of victimization by corruption were most common in Colombia during the last two years. It is worth mentioning, as we said before, that the last five items contain less responses than the first three due to the filter included in these five questions. This means that the percentage of citizens who answered positively to having been unjustly accused by the police was based on all 1,487 respondents in 2005, but for the question regarding experiences of corruption in the courts, the percentage is based only on the 857 people who said that they had to deal with the courts during that year.



**Figure IV-2. Experiences of Corruption in Colombia**

The figure shows that, in 2004, the three most common types of victimization were those which had to do with health services, the workplace, and schools. In 2005, we observe a considerable reduction in the experience of corruption in the schools. This, however, contrasts with the increase in requests for bribes from the police and court employees. In general, the figure shows that there were not dramatic changes during the last year and that the levels of victimization in Colombia remain relatively low, especially when compared to other countries in the region.



## Who Are the Victims of Corruption in Colombia?

To create a victimization-by-corruption index, we constructed a general scale of victimization. This scale is the sum of variables EXC2, EXC6, EXC11, EXC13, EXC14, EXC15, and EXC16. All the items in the scale measure the responses to questions about demands for bribes. That is why we decided to exclude the variable EXC1, which asks about false accusations by the police. Figure IV-3 represents the dichotomous version of the general scale of victimization, in which the responses were divided into two groups: those who were victims of acts of corruption (regardless of the number of acts experienced), and those who were not. As can be seen, only a small number of respondents reported having been victims of corruption in the last year.




Figure IV-3. Percentage of Respondents Victimized by Corruption in the Last Year

Figure IV-3 shows that less than 12 percent of Colombians reported being victims of acts of corruption. Let us take a look, then, at this group of people to see if they are uniformly distributed by gender, race, region, income, or education.




Figure IV-4. Corruption Victimization by Gender

Figure IV-4 tells us that men have been slightly more affected by acts of corruption than women. This phenomenon is understandable if we consider that perhaps men may deal with the paperwork and procedures in various institutions more frequently than women and, therefore, they may be more exposed to the demands for bribes in such situations.




Figure IV-5. Corruption Victimization by Education Level

It is also the case that people with higher levels of education are more likely to be victims of corruption. One explanation of this phenomenon could be that people with less education do not discriminate between acts of corruption and common practices in some institutions, like schools and health centers, where the need to bribe is viewed as a natural part of the required procedures and paperwork, although this hypothesis requires more careful study.




Figure IV-6. Corruption Victimization by Income Level

The high correlation between education and income levels is also reflected in Figure IV-6, which shows that people with higher income levels are more frequently victims of corruption. It is important to note that one-out-of-four persons reporting a monthly income between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 pesos have been the victim of an act of corruption. This figure is rather high and, once again, it leads us to ask what factors determine that people with lower education and income levels are less frequently victims of corruption.




Figure IV-7. Corruption Victimization by Region

Corruption victimization shows some regional variation, as Figure IV-7 demonstrates. These differences, however, are not statistically significant. This means that the variations in the figure might be due to characteristics of the sample and do not necessarily apply to the population at large, or that they are simply normal measurement errors. This leads us to examine the variation of corruption victimization between urban and rural areas. The data shows that there is a statistically significant difference between them.




Figure IV-8. Corruption Victimization by Age

Finally, Figure IV-8 describes the distribution of victims of corruption by age groups. As the figure shows, people between 26 and 35 years old are the most frequent victims of corruption, while those older than 66 are least exposed to these kinds of acts.

To sum up, the data shows that people with higher levels of education and income are more often victims of corruption. In terms of gender, men are more frequently victims of corruption than women. This difference is especially notorious between men and women with high levels of education. Finally, we observe that regional variations of corruption are not significant, but that such variations are important between urban and rural areas, with urban residents more commonly victims of acts of corruption.

### Perception of Corruption in Colombia

As we saw above, Colombians do not perceive corruption to be one of the most serious problems confronting the country. Under no circumstances, however, does this mean that corruption is not a real problem in Colombia. In fact, as we saw in a previous chapter, corruption is the principal reason given that could justify a coup d'état, above the presence of a serious terrorist threat or a deterioration of the armed conflict. To measure Colombians' perceptions of corruption we asked respondents the following question:

Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia, ¿la corrupción de	Muy generalizada	Algo generalizada	Poco generalizada	Nada generalizada	NS/ NR	
EXC7. los funcionarios públicos está...?	1	2	3	4	8	EXC7

The following figure summarizes the results:




Figure IV-9. Perception that Government Officials Are Corrupt

As the figure shows, more than 30 percent of respondents believe that corruption among government officials is widespread. This figure is worrisome and allows us to glimpse how little trust Colombians have in public sector employees. It must also be said that the results presented in this figure are very similar to those from 2004. We should also point out that more than ten percent of respondents responded “no answer” or declined to answer the question. In the following section, we will analyze which factors determine Colombians’ perception of corruption.

**Factors that Determine the Perception of Corruption**

To determine what factors contribute to the perception of corruption, we developed a linear regression model in which the dependent variable is a recodified version of the variable EXC7. This recoding uses a scale of 0 to 100. The independent variables used include the usual demographic and socio-economic factors as well as other variables which we will explain below. We should mention that, among all these variables, only age, income and education had a significant impact on the perception of corruption.




Figure IV-10. Corruption Perception by Age

Figure IV-10 shows the relationship between age and the perception of corruption. It is clear that older people tend to have higher corruption-perception levels. This seems paradoxical considering Figure IV-8, which indicates that older people actually report the lowest levels of corruption victimization.







Figure IV-11. Perception of Corruption by Income

Figure IV-11 represents the relationship between income and the perception of corruption. It can be seen that people with the highest income levels have the highest averages of corruption-perception. In this case, there is a tie between the perception of corruption and being a victim of corruption.



**Figure IV-12. Perception of Corruption by Education Level**

The results of the regression also show that the greater the amount of education, the higher the corruption-perception average, as Figure IV-12 shows.

## The Impact of the Media on the Perception of Corruption

One of the predictors we included in the regression model is the impact of the media on the public's perception of corruption. To measure this impact we used questions that measure exposure to news on the radio (A1), television (A2), and newspapers (A3), in addition to a question regarding the degree of trust in the media (B37). The results of running the regression model indicate that variables for trust in the media and exposure to news via the radio are not statistically significant, while exposure to news via the television or newspapers does have a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable. This means that people who read newspapers and watch television news tend to have a higher perception of corruption than those who do not get their news from these sources with such frequency. Figure IV-13 shows the bivariate relation between exposure to news from newspapers and the perception of corruption.




Figure IV-13. Perception of Corruption by Exposure to News in Newspapers

To continue the analysis of the impact of the media on perceptions of corruption, we introduced an interaction term between exposure to and trust in the media. The results of the regression show that when people have a high degree of trust in the media, and are frequently exposed to television and newspaper news, their perception of corruption decreases instead of rising.

Figure IV-14 shows the effect of a high level of exposure to news from the newspaper and the perception of corruption, conditioned by the level of trust in the media. We see that as trust in the media rises, the perception of corruption falls slightly.




Figure IV-14. Perception of Corruption by Exposure to News in Newspapers, Conditioned by Trust in the Media

### Veedurías Ciudadanas and its Impact on Corruption Perception.

Although this form of citizen oversight existed before the 1990s, the 1991 Constitution gave the citizen *veedurías* constitutional status. What’s more, in 2002 the Constitutional Court ruled that citizens can solicit, from any public entity, any kind of information that, by constitutional mandate, is considered public, in order to oversee State management. These *veedurías* can be organized to supervise the concession of public contracts, municipal or department planning, public investment projects, or the provision of services. To measure citizen participation in *veedurías* in Colombia, we devised a question that examines citizen participation in these oversight committees. The question is the following:

Ahora vamos a hablar de eficiencia y rendición de cuentas

	Si	No	NS
<b>COLCP15A</b> ¿Ha participado usted, alguna vez, en algún comité de control ciudadano o de veeduría ciudadana?	1 [Siga]	2 [Pase a COLCP16A]	8 [Pase a COLCP16A]

Nine percent of respondents, almost one-in-ten, said they had participated in an oversight committee or citizen *veeduría*, a relatively high degree of public participation in this type of oversight activity. Three-out-of-four people who participated in them responded that the public entity they audited was cooperative. There does not exist a significant correlation between participation in a *veeduría* and the perception of corruption. In any case, the causal relationship between these two factors is ambiguous and can go in both directions; that is, it is possible that people participate in a *veeduría* because they perceive high levels of corruption, and/or the corruption-perception level of a person varies after participating in one of those oversight committees.

### The Effect of Corruption on System Support

Up to this point, we have examined the indices of corruption victimization in Colombia and who are most affected. We have also analyzed which are the best predictors to explain the perception of corruption, and how its effects compare with victimization. Finally, we will take a quick look at the impact of both corruption perception and victimization on support for the political system generally. The data shows that, while few people were victims of corruption last year, a good number of respondents consider corruption to be widespread among government officials in Colombia. Which of these two factors has a larger impact on support for the democratic system? To try and answer this question, we created a linear regression model in which, besides including the usual demographic and socio-economic variables, we also used the indices of corruption victimization and corruption perception as independent variables. As the dependent variable in

this model, we used a recodified version (on a scale of 0 to 100) of the variable PSA5, which measure support for the democratic system.

The results of the regression were not surprising. The data shows that the impact of corruption-perception is statistically significant, and when it increases system support declines.





Figure IV-15. System Support by Corruption Perception

Figure IV-15. System Support by Corruption Perception.

With respect to the variable for corruption victimization, the data shows us the same tendency: with greater indices of victimization, support for the system drops. This effect is also statistically significant. Figure IV-16 shows how dramatic the drop in support for the system can be as the index of corruption victimization rises.



**Figure IV-16. System Support by Corruption Victimization**

To highlight even more the importance that Colombian society attaches to corruption, we will mention that when asked about motivations that could justify a coup d'état, more than half of the respondents said that high levels of corruption would be a sufficient cause to support an event of this type, as Figure IV-17 shows.




Figure IV-17. Justifications for a Coup d'État

## Conclusions

Colombia is a country in which, in recent years, the armed conflict and political violence have monopolized the attention of academics and the public in general. This, perhaps, has contributed to diminish the primacy of corruption among the country's most pressing problems, a role it plays in many other Latin American countries. This fact, however, does not diminish the importance of corruption in Colombia. We have seen that the majority of respondents consider high levels of corruption to be sufficient reason to justify a coup d'état. It is also concerning to observe the high levels of corruption victimization in the country's health service sector and the courts.

Corruption will always have a negative impact on support for democracy. It will also affect other factors like political tolerance and trust in institutions and other people. In Colombia, given the centrality of the armed conflict, corruption has become a secondary factor, but it still contributes to weaken support for the democratic system. For this reason, as in other countries in the region, the problem of corruption should always be examined by those who follow the behavior of Colombian democracy.



## V. Rule of Law and Crime: 2004 - 2005

*“For a country, the probability of achieving sustainable development increases if its adhesion to the rule of law is strong.”*

(Koh, Tommy 2005)

**Comentado [jcrr1]:** This is not included in the list of references at the end of the chapter. It should be taken from the original, which is probably in English.

Colombia is probably the Latin American country that has most lived under a constant state of social insecurity. On the one hand, Colombians have to live with the permanent fear caused by the virulent attacks of guerrilla groups. On the other hand, the violence unleashed by the paramilitaries is no less threatening than the guerrilla attacks. Finally, the acts of the drug cartels are also loaded with a high dose of terror. All this could suggest that the State has simply lost control and with it the security of the society is severely threatened. The most serious consequence of the State's loss of authority, however, would be for Colombians to also see the protection of their most basic rights eroded. It is precisely in the performance of those institutions in charge of imparting justice that Colombians can best see and evaluate the protection of their basic rights, because it is here where justice comes to life, has a name, and is embodied. That is, these are the institutions in which citizens receive rulings in or against their favor, from which they are sent to jail or released into liberty, and which punish abusive police officers or fail to slap them on the wrist.

If citizens hold that these institutions, which are charged with justice, are not acting according to the law (that is, they are unjust, partial, and allow authorities to pass above them) they could withdraw their trust in them. Almost immediately, this could cause democracy to function poorly (or democratic instability). For example, widespread distrust can create problems of political legitimacy, which can be expressed through declining voter participation (Setälä and Grönlund 2005).

In *The Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2004*, the LAPOP (2004) included an analysis of the rule of law in Colombia. In this chapter we follow up that analysis. That is, in this chapter we discuss the changes between 2004 and 2005 of the perceptions that Colombians have regarding the supremacy of the law (rule of law) in the country.

According to Grazyna Skapska (1990), the definition of the supremacy of law, or rule of law as it is also commonly known, implies (1) that we are all equal before the law and (2) that juridical norms oblige and are obeyed (or should be obeyed) by the government and the governed equally. In this sense, for some scholars, the rule of law is an institution destined to protect basic individual rights, such as free speech, the freedom to associate, and freedom of movement, but it is also destined to limit the power of the State (Mathews 1986). In the conception of the rule of law, however, for Carter and Beth (1978) this idea of universal equality before the law is not more important than the constant search for (and practice of) justice. For Krygier (1990), in contrast, we may have laws characterized by universal equality and the procurement of justice, but more important is that there is a culture of the rule of law.

We can thus conclude that the rule of law has three dimensions: universal equality before the law, procurement of justice, and cultural roots. Mohammed (1989) concretizes these three elements through five (5) components:

- Sovereignty: that is, the government and citizens stand equally before the law.
- Clarity and certainty of content: the contents of the law should be sufficiently clear so that all subjects can understand them; they should also be certain and accessible to the subject.
- Universality: the law, by virtue of being the law, should be general in its application.
- Autonomous administration: to enforce the law, there should be an independent judicial power in charge of its interpretation and application, and one to which all aggrieved citizens have access.
- Legal ethics: the law should have an ethical content and procedure.

This concept of the rule of law is precisely the theoretical framework of reference used to analyze the evolution, between 2004 and 2005, of Colombians' perceptions of the rule of law in the country. To do this, we have divided the chapter as follows: in the first part, we compare perceptions of criminality from 2004 with those from 2005. In the second part, we present the differences in levels of trust in institutions of justice between 2004 and 2005. In the analysis of this trust, we will touch the issue of equality before the law and the procurement of justice. In the third sections, we analyze the evolution from 2004 to 2005 of *being a victim of some crime* and access to institutions of justice.

Generally, drastic changes in public opinion from one study to the next are rare or simply do not happen, especially if the distance between them is short and nothing extraordinary occurred in the intervening period. This is precisely our case. The distance between both studies is one year, and between 2004 and 2005 nothing extraordinary occurred, at least nothing that would lead us to believe that, because of such an event the public opinion of Colombians in 2005 should be drastically different from issues addressed in 2004. We will report and explain any differences, however, no matter how small.

## Crime as a Problem in 2005 Compared to 2004

We started by identifying what respondents thought was the principal problem facing the country. To do this, we asked the following question: "What is the most serious problem facing the country?" (question A4). Just as in 2004, we did not offer the respondents any response-options; it was an open question. This allowed us to obtain more revealing answers than we otherwise could have if we had presented respondents with a number of options to choose from. Figure V-1 shows us two important aspects. First, of the Colombians surveyed in 2005, the largest group (34 percent) believe that the most serious problem facing the country is "delinquency, crime and violence." This result is similar to that from 2004 (32 percent). The difference of two percentage points that we see in Figure V-1 is not significant, as indicated by the overlap of the error bars at the top of the blue bars.

However, the fact that respondents indicate that, in 2005, the principal problem remains related to the rule of law, clearly shows the need to do a comparative study between 2004 and 2005 regarding the rule of law.




Figure V-1. The Country's Most Serious Problem

If the country's most serious problem does not represent a threat to its wellbeing, there would not be much to worry about; but if the problem does represent such a threat, we will then face a delicate situation in terms how well the society functions. To detect this situation, we asked respondents if the current delinquency rates represented a threat to society. We present the results in Figure V-2. In 2005, as in 2004, most (between 67 and 69 percent) indicated that delinquency did represent a threat to society. The minimal difference of two percentage points is not statistically significant.




Figure V-2. Delinquency as a Threat to the Country

## Trust in the Protection of Rights, 2004-2005

We have seen that, for Colombians, the main problem facing the country is common crime (delinquency, crime, violence). Given this problem, how much do Colombians trust their institutions of justice? To obtain information about this, we proposed a series of questions whose responses were based on scale of 1 (no trust) to 7 (much trust). The questions and instructions appear in the following table:

**Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta...Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1-que significa NADA hasta 7-que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta que punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión, si usted no confía nada escogería el puntaje 1; si, por el contrario, confía mucho, escogería el puntaje 7. Si su opinión esta entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. Entonces ¿Hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión?**

<b>B1</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de Colombia garantiza un juicio justo? Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el numero 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el numero 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.	<b>B1</b>
<b>B15</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?	<b>B15</b>
<b>B16</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en Procuraduría de la Nación?	<b>B16</b>
<b>B17</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Defensoría del Pueblo?	<b>B17</b>
<b>B18</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía?	<b>B17</b>
<b>B31</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	<b>B31</b>
<b>B50</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?	<b>B50</b>

Figure V-3 shows us two fundamental aspects: first, in 2005 compared to 2004, the justice institutions with the highest levels of trust remained the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Prosecutor General, and the Inspector General; while the courts remained among the institutions least trusted. In 2005, however, the courts did show a rise in the level of trust (three percentage points) compared to 2004 (the second set of bars on the graph going from left to right). This difference is significant, as the non-overlapping of the error bars in the upper part of the blue bars in Figure V-3 indicates.




Figure V-3. Trust in Institutions

From these questions, we selected those which mention the institutions of justice. With these selected questions, we created a index (of trust) which summarizes the degree of trust in the institutions mentioned in the questions: the courts, the Prosecutor General, the Inspector General, the Police, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court. In general, as Figure V-4 shows, institutional support (57-58) is relatively high (although it does not reach an average of 60-65, which would represent *much trust*). What is relevant here is that this trust level did not change from 2004 to 2005. The minimal change of one percentage point is not significant.




Figure V-4. Trust in Institutions in Charge of Protecting Rights

Using this trust index as a dependent variable, we already found in 2004 that the main factors which determine this institutional trust are age, the probability of being a victim of robbery or assault, trust in the judicial system to punish the guilty, and having a family member displaced by the armed conflict. Relating these four variables to the trust index, we compared the results from 2005 with those from 2004. First, as Figure V-5 indicates, both in 2004 and 2005, as age increases so does the level of trust in institutions of justice. We note that for respondents between the ages of 46 to 55 and 56 to 65, trust levels were greater in 2005 than in 2004. This difference is not statistically significant, however.





Figure V-5. Trust in Institutions in Charge of Protecting Rights by Age




Turning now to the next factor, Figure V-6 tells us that there was no significant difference between 2004 and 2005 regarding the perception of the probability of being of victim of a robbery or assault. However, the percentages shown in the figure, which represent those respondents who said they felt unsafe or very unsafe regarding the possibility of being of victim of this crime, are extremely high.



**Figure V-6. Probability of Being a Victim of Robbery or Assault, 2004-2005**

In 2005, as in 2004, there is an inverse relationship between the level of trust in institutions that protect rights and the probability of being a victim of robbery (Figure V-7); that is, as the perception of the probability of being a victim of robbery or assault grows, the trust in institutions of justice declines. Although there are variations between 2004 and 2005, at no level of insecurity is this difference significant.



**Figure V-7. Trust in Institutions in Charge of Protecting Rights by the Probability of Being a Victim of Robbery or Assault, 2004-2005**

We now turn to the trust that the judicial system will punish those guilty of a crime. First, as Figure V-8 shows, we again find no difference in this variable between 2004 and 2005.




Figure V-8. Trust in the Judicial System to Punish the Guilty, 2004-2005

Second, as was expected, the relationship between the trust in institutions that protect rights and the trust in the judicial system in 2005 was positive, as it was in 2004 (see Figure V-9): greater trust in the judicial system corresponds to a greater level of trust in judicial institutions.<sup>11</sup> A level of trust of more or less 67 in the judicial system corresponded to a higher level of trust in 2005 than in 2004. The difference, however, is not significant.





Figure V-9. Trust in Institutions in Charge of Protecting Rights by Trust in the Judicial System

<sup>11</sup> In reality, both the index and the variable are probably measuring the same underlying concept.

Lastly, we pass to the variable, “Having a family member displaced by the armed conflict.” First, Figure V-10 shows us that, between 2004 and 2005, there was no difference in the percentage of people who had a family member displaced by the conflict. The minimal difference observed in Figure V-10 is not significant. Second, in 2005, as in the 2004, the majority of Colombians (between almost 81 and 83 percent) did not have a family member displaced by the conflict.



**Figure V-10. Displacement of a Family Member by the Armed Conflict, 2004-2005**

Third, as Figure V-11 shows, in both 2005 and 2004, the level of trust in institutions of justice was lower for people who said they had had a family member displaced by the conflict. In 2005, however, having or not having a family member displaced did not significantly lower the level of trust in the institutions of justice.




Figure V-11. Trust in Institutions in Charge of Protecting Rights by Number of Persons who Indicate Having (or Not Having) a Family Member Displaced by the Conflict

## Victimization, 2004-2005

Possibly, being (or not being) a victim of some crime is the most efficient thermometer through which Colombians can say (or feel) whether or not their state law institutions are functioning well. In this section, we focus precisely on comparatively analyzing the different aspects of victimization of some crime, including being the victim of crime, reporting the crime, who are most vulnerable to being a victim, and access to the institutions of justice.

We start by inquiring whether there has been some change in the percentage of Colombians who have been victims of some crime from 2004 to 2005. The question was, “Have you been a victim of some crime in the last 12 months?” We present the results in Figure V-12. The differences from one year to the next are not significant.




Figure V-12. Victim of a Crime in the Last 12 Months, 2004-2005

As Figure V-13 shows, the most common crime was “robbery without aggression or physical threat.” In 2005, we observe an upward tendency of almost nine percentage points of those who said that they had been the victim of this crime, with respect to those who responded similarly in 2004.




Figure V-13. Type of Crime Suffered by Respondent



When a person suffers from a crime, the most logical is to think that this person will report it. In both 2004 and 2005, we asked respondents who had suffered from some crime whether or not they reported it. Figure V-14 shows us the results. Between 59 (2004) and 58.5 (2005) percent of respondents (who suffered a crime) did not report it, while approximately 41 percent (in both 2004 and 2005) did report it.




Figure V-14. Report of a Crime, 2004-2005

The frequency of reporting a crime before an institution of justice provides us with a guide to the most common kind of crime. We know that the most frequent crime in Colombia (at least in 2004 and 2005) is “robbery without aggression or physical threat,” according to what we already noted in Figure V-13. Precisely for this reason, the institution mostly frequently turned to, in both 2004 and 2005, is the Police (Figure V-15). Again, we find no significant difference between 2004 and 2005.




Figure V-15. Institution where Crime Was Reported, 2004-2005

Previously we observed that a low percentage of people who suffered a crime reported it. We wanted to know why they did not report the crime. So we asked aggrieved respondents and present the responses in Figure V-16. In 2005, as in 2004, the respondents did not report the act because “it serves no purpose,” according to their own responses: 47% in 2004 and 57% in 2005; the difference is not significant. It should also be pointed out that the proportion of respondents who said that they did not report a crime out of fear fell from 19 percent to a little less than 10 percent, although the difference is not statistically significant.




Figure V-16. for Not Reporting a Crime, 2004-2005

### Who are victims of crime, 2004-2005

We know that 14 percent of respondents were the victims of some crime in the previous twelve (12) months, in both 2004 and 2005 (see Figure V-12). But who are these victims? As Figures V-17, V-18 and V-19 show, the more rather than less educated (those with secondary education), men more than women, and urban residents more than rural ones, were more likely to suffer a criminal act, both in 2004 and 2005.




Figure V-17. Victim of a Crime in the Last 12 Months by Education Level




Figure V-18. Victim of a Crime in the Last 12 Months by Gender




Figure V-19. Victim of a Crime in the Last 12 Months by Area (rural/urban)

## Access to System of Justice Institutions, 2004-2005

Finally, we analyze here the perceptions of Colombians regarding the universality of the law in terms of accessibility to the distinct institutions of justice. First, we asked our respondents (as we did in 2004) what they do when confronted with some legal, civil or interpersonal dispute. We show the responses in Figure V-20. Most indicate that when confronted with a crime of this kind, they work things out with their counterpart. The difference observed between 2004 and 2005 are not significant. It's noteworthy that it is Colombians' second option when confronted with a dispute is to call on some judicial authority. The observed difference of almost four points between 2004 and 2005 is not significant. That is, in general terms, when faced with a legal, personal or civil kind of dispute, Colombians prefer reconciliation and institutional legal channels. It should also be pointed out that more Colombians call on a *Casa de Justicia* than those who do not, although the difference is not significant.




Figure V-20. What Do You Do When Faced with a Legal Dispute?

Finally, regarding access to institutions of justice, we see in Figure V-21 that the quality of access to the *comisarias de familia* has increased significantly since 2004. Among the other institutions, the courts remain the best rated, with no differences from one year to the next. This consistency through time also holds true for the other institutions.




Figure V-21. Access to the Institutions of Justice, 2004-2005

## Conclusion

In general terms, we did not find any differences regarding the state or rule of in 2005 compared with 2004. The only significant differences between 2005 and 2004 were those related to the system of justice in general and with the courts. In both cases, Colombians showed a greater amount of trust in these two institutions in 2005 than in 2004. This is important, given that in the case of the courts, they are the judicial institution that Colombians least trust. Finally, despite so many years of armed conflict, it is surprising that Colombians continue to opt for reconciliation and/or turn to the appropriate justice institutions to settle legal, personal or civil kinds of disputes. In other words, the armed conflict has not generally had a contagious effect which leads them to try and take justice into their own hands.

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## VI. Local Governments

We are aware of the importance that local democracy has for the political stability of a country. In fact, we have found, both for Colombia and other countries in the region, that satisfaction with municipal government performance is consistently a significant predictor of support for the political system at large. Even when we control for other factors – in particular, specific support (the popularity of the president) or the evaluation of the country's current economic situation – the satisfaction of citizens with municipal-provided public services has a distinctively significant impact on the legitimacy that they provide for the national political system.

In this chapter, we explore various issues related to local dynamics, including comparisons with results from 2004 and adding some new analytical dimensions. In the first place, we analyze various aspects related to the evaluations that citizens make of their municipal governments, including trust in the municipal government (alcaldía), accountability, and the transparency of local administrations. In the second place, we detail the levels of respondents' satisfaction with different public services that the municipality provides. Finally, we explore citizen action in two complementary dimensions: participation in municipal affairs and the ways in which they call on local authorities in search of help to solve their problems.

### Evaluating Municipal Governments

Three central dimensions comprise our measure of respondents' evaluations of municipal governments: trust, accountability, and transparency. In the first place, we evaluate the trust that Colombians have in municipal governments. We also add a measure of public trust in municipal councils. The questions are the following:

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 - que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO.

<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?
<b>COLB32A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?

The average of these measures in the 2005 national sample, once converted into a scale of 0 to 100, appear in Figure VI-1. As can be appreciated, thanks to confidence intervals of 95 percent, there exists a significant difference in the trust between the executive and legislative branches at the local level, although this difference, is not as sharp as that at the national level (that is, between the national government and Congress), as can be inferred from the analysis of Chapter II.





Figure VI-1. Trust in Municipal Governments and Municipal Councils – National Sample 2005

In 2004, we did not investigate trust in municipal councils. Figure VI-2 shows, however, that there were no variations from one year to the next in trust in municipal governments.



**Figure VI-2. Trust in Municipal Governments – National Samples 2004 and 2005**

There exist, nonetheless, significant regional differences. As can be seen in Figure VI-3, and corroborated with analysis of variance analysis between groups of observations, there are two groups of regions with considerably different levels of trust. Residents of Bogotá trust in their mayor much less than do residents of the Central, Atlantic, and Pacific regions. For its part, the Pacific region shows an average level of trust substantially lower than that of the Central region. The region of the Old National Territories lies at an intermediate point, and is indistinguishable from the two above-mentioned groups.




Figure VI-3. Trust in Municipal Governments by Region – National Sample 2005

There are also differences between those who live in the urban seat of a municipality and those who live in the rural area. Figure VI-4 shows that the former confide less in their municipal government than the latter.





Figure VI-4. Trust in Municipal Governments by Area (rural/urban) – National Sample 2005

Trust can also be influenced by the political party of the mayor or, more concretely, party affiliation differences between the respondent and the mayor. To examine this hypothesis, for each respondent we codified a variable, indicating whether the respondent belongs to the same political party as the mayor of their municipality. As can be seen in Figure VI-5, and corroborated with a t-test for difference of means, there is a significant difference in the level of trust in a mayor depending on whether or not he or she and the respondent share party affiliation. In a country where party affiliation has decayed in recent years, this evidence is noteworthy and should be explored in greater detail than we can do here.



**Figure VI-5. Trust in Municipal Governments by Whether or Not the Respondent Belongs to the Same Party as the Mayor – National Sample 2005**

The second dimension in this evaluation of municipal authorities is based on respondents' perceptions of how well those authorities account for the actions of their administrations. The question, concretely, is the following:

....

	Sí	No	NS	Inap
<b>COLCP16A</b> ¿Usted considera que su <b>Municipio</b> rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	1	2	8	

Figure VI-6 shows the percentage of those who responded “yes” to this question, in 2004 and 2005. Although we can argue that 41 percent is a rather low level of credibility in municipal government accountability, we should also emphasize the notable increase in this proportion of citizens since the 2004 study.




Figure VI-6. Municipality Is Accountable for Resources. Percentage Who Say Yes – National Samples 2004 and 2005

We also find certain notable differences by region. As can be seen in Figure VI-7, and explored in more detail with tests for difference of means, considerably fewer respondents from the Old National Territories consider that the municipality is accountable for its administration than those who do so in the Pacific, Central, Eastern and Bogota regions.




Figure VI-7. Municipal Government Accountability by Region – National Sample 2005



Nevertheless, as Figure VI-8 shows, there are no substantial differences between respondents from urban and rural areas.




Figure VI-8. Municipal Government Accountability by Area (rural/urban) – National Sample 2005

Contrary to trust in municipal governments, there do not appear to be a relationship between party affiliations and the perception of accountability.

The third and last central dimension of this evaluation of local governments is constituted by our measure of transparency. This has three components, whose corresponding questions are the following:

	Siempre	Casi siempre	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS
<b>COLAC1A</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>municipio</b> consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...	1	2	3	4	5	8
<b>COLAC1B</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>municipio</b> hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...	1	2	3	4	5	8
<b>COLAC1C</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>municipio</b> comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...	1	2	3	4	5	8

The responses to these questions in 2005 appear in the following figures. In Figure VI-9, we see that more than three-fifths of the respondents consider that the municipality never or almost never consults with citizens.




Figure VI-9. The Municipality Consults with Citizens Before Making a Decision...?  
National Sample 2005

As Figure VI-10 shows, close to half of the respondents consider that their municipality never or almost never makes its plans and decisions public, while a quarter believe that it always or almost always does so.




Figure VI-10. The Municipality Makes its Plans and Decisions Public...? National Sample 2005

Finally, we see in Figure VI-11, that more than half of the respondents consider that the municipality never or almost never openly shares information. Only a little more than 20 percent believe that it always or almost always does so.




Figure VI-11. The Municipality Shares Information in an Open and Timely Way...? National Sample 2005

With these last three variables we constructed a transparency-perception scale of municipal governments.<sup>12</sup>

This index, which we already used in the 2004 study, has not changed much from one year to the next, as Figure VI-12 shows. Although there is a slight increase in the transparency-perception index, this difference is not statistically significant.




Figure VI-12. Municipal Government Transparency - National Samples 2004 and 2005

<sup>12</sup> This scale is reliable (Cronbach's alpha = 0.843).

There do exist regional differences, however. Figure VI-13 shows the averages for the 2005 sample. It can be appreciated that respondents from the Old National Territories perceive their municipal governments to be significantly less transparent than do respondents from other regions. Furthermore, the Atlantic region appears below the Central and Pacific regions and Bogota. These last three have the highest levels of transparency-perception of their municipal governments.




Figure VI-13. Municipal Government Transparency by Region - National Sample 2005

As is the case of accountability, perceived transparency does not differ between urban and rural residents, as Figure VI-14 shows.




Figure VI-14. Municipal Government Transparency by Area (rural/urban) - National Sample 2005

Once again, there is no relationship between transparency-perception and the political party of mayors and respondents.

# Provision of Public Services

To explore how citizens evaluate the quality of public services provided by municipalities, we formulated a general question as well as specific questions for each of the services, just as we did in 2004.

The first question is the following:

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	No sabe
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son...?	1	2	3	4	5	8

After the conversion of responses to a scale from 0 to 100, we can see in Figure VI-15 that this general evaluation did not vary from the previous year.




Figure VI-15. Evaluation of Municipal Public Services - National Samples 2004 and 2005



In 2005, there were variations by region, as can be appreciated in Figure VI-16. Services in municipalities from the Old National Territories were evaluated less favorably than those from other regions. The same is true in the Pacific and Atlantic regions compared to the remaining ones. The Central region, for its part, receives evaluations that, on average, are significantly higher than those of other regions.




Figure VI-16. Evaluation of Municipal Public Services by Region - National Sample 2005

In Figure VI-17 we see the averages for rural and urban areas of municipalities. Urban residents evaluate municipal services better than their rural counterparts. A t-test for difference of means indicates that the difference is statistically significant.




Figure VI-17. Evaluation of Municipal Public Services by Area (rural/urban) - National Sample 2005

We formulated equivalent questions for the following services: potable water, health, electricity, garbage collection and education. The comparison between 2004 and 2005 appears in Figure VI-18. The error bars show substantial improvement in citizen evaluation in all services from one year to the next. We see a particularly notorious rise regarding the provision of electric energy.




Figure VI-18. Evaluation of Different Public Services - National Samples 2004 and 2005

Figure VI-19 shows these averages by region for the 2005 sample. It is worth noting two things about the evidence that this figure brings out. First, although respondents residing in the Old National Territories evaluate their health, garbage collection, water, and electric energy services rather poorly, on average they evaluate their education services more favorably than do residents in other regions. Second, continuing with education, Bogotá appears poorly evaluated by its residents, compared to other regions. The Central region, for its part, generally shows relatively high levels of satisfaction in all public services.





Figure VI-19. Evaluation of Different Public Services by Region - National Sample 2005

Making the comparison between rural and urban areas of municipalities, there also appear notable results, as can be appreciated in Figure VI-20. While inhabitants of rural areas qualify the services of garbage collection, potable water, and electricity worse than those living in a municipality's urban seat, the opposite occurs in terms of education. This result is surprising and intriguing, and deserves an explication, and a deeper one than we can provide here.



**Figure VI-20. Evaluation of Different Public Services by Area (rural/urban) - National Sample 2005**

To close this section on the evaluation of public services, we include three generic questions which complement the picture presented up to now. The first question is related to the capacity and/or willingness of municipal governments to respond to citizens' needs. The question is the following:

	Casi siempre	La mayoría de las veces	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/ NR
<b>COLLG1.</b> ¿Cree usted que el municipio responde a lo que quiere el pueblo?	1	2	3	4	5	8

The responses are summarized in Figure VI-21. Three-out-of-four respondents consider that municipalities never or almost never responds to what the people want.




Figure VI-21. The Municipality Responds to What the People Want... - National Sample 2005

The second question is related to the disposition of municipal governments toward citizen participation. The question reads as follows:

	Casi siempre	La mayoría de las veces	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/ NR
<b>COLLG2.</b> ¿Considera usted que el municipio permite la participación ciudadana en la gestión municipal?	1	2	3	4	5	8

Figure VI-22 shows that the proportion of those who believe that the municipal government allows participation almost always or most of the time is almost equal to those who believe that this never or almost never happens.




Figure VI-22. The Municipality Allows Citizen Participation... - National Sample 2005

Finally, we investigated the disposition of citizens to contribute solutions to problems and the provision of services. The question is:


**LGL3. [COLG3]** ¿Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que éste pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más?

Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos.....1

NO estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos.....2

NS.....8


Despite the obvious collective action problem that this question raises, Figure VI-23 shows that not a depreciable 15 percent of respondents manifested that they would pay more taxes to contribute to an improvement in the public services of their municipality.



**Figure VI-23. Are You Willing to Pay More Taxes to Improve the Quality of Municipal Services?**  
 – National Sample 2005



In fact, the people who consider that municipal governments are responsive to citizens' needs are those who would be willing to pay more taxes to improve public services, as can be appreciated in Figure VI-24.



**Figure VI-24. Relationship Between the Perception of Municipality Responsiveness and Willingness to Pay More Taxes - National Sample 2005**

Participating Citizens and Demanding Demand-Making Citizens

In this section we explore two dimensions of citizen life in municipalities: on the one hand, the participation of citizens in municipal affairs and, on the other, their efforts in search of assistance or help.

Participating Citizens

To analyze the area of citizen participation in the municipality we relied on three questions.

	Sí	No	No sabe/ No recuerda
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunión convocada por el alcalde durante los últimos 12 meses?	1	2	8
NP1A. ¿Ha asistido a una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?	1	2	8
NP4 [CONP1A] ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir o planificar el presupuesto o el plan anual de su municipio?	1	2	8

The percentage of respondents who responded affirmatively to each of these questions appears in Figure VI-25.





Figure VI-25. Indicators of Participation in Municipal Affairs - National Sample 2005

By averaging these three indicators, it is possible to create a participation scale in municipal affairs.<sup>13</sup> From this scale we created a dichotomous variable, with a value of 1 when the average has a value greater than zero, and a value of 0 if the average of the three before-mentioned indicators is zero. This variable describes, therefore, those respondents who we consider to be participants in municipal affairs.

Figure VI-26 shows how the percentages of participants vary by region. The error bars and a variance analysis indicate that there are three groups of regions. Bogotá and the Central Region have the lowest rates of participation. The Atlantic and Pacific regions have intermediate levels. Finally, the highest levels are in the Old National Territories and the Eastern region.



**Figure VI-26. Participants in Municipal Affairs by Region - National Sample 2005**

<sup>13</sup> This scale is acceptably reliable (Cronbach's alpha = 0.655).

Consistent with the analysis presented up to now in this chapter, Figure VI-27 shows that inhabitants of rural areas participate more than those living in the urban seats of their municipalities.




Figure VI-27. Participants in Municipal Affairs by Area (rural/urban) - National Sample 2005


***Demand-Making Citizens***

We now turn to the area of petitions and demands through the following three questions:

<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal del municipio durante los últimos 12 meses?	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>
	1	2

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ?	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>
<b>CP4A</b> Al Alcalde de su municipio			
<b>COLCP1</b> A algún concejal de su municipio			


The percentage of those who responded affirmatively to each of these questions can be seen in Figure VI-28.



**Figure VI-28. Indicators of Demands on Municipality - National Sample 2005**

As in the case of those we called participants in municipal affairs, we can average these three indicators to construct a scale<sup>14</sup> and afterwards create a variable that identifies “demanding” citizens or those who have the courage to seek help from the municipal authorities.

Although in less pronounced form than in the case of citizen participants, the percentage of those who request help from or formulate petitions for the municipality varies according to region, as can be appreciated in Figure VI-29.



**Figure VI-29. . Indicators of Demands on Municipality by Region - National Sample 2005**

<sup>14</sup> With an Cronbach's alpha = 0.661.

As in the case of participants, rural respondents also tend to be more active in the formulation of demands on local authorities than those who live in the municipal seats, as Figure VI-30 shows.




Figure VI-30. Indicators of Demands on Municipality by Area (rural/urban)- National Sample 2005

### Channels of Participation and Demands

In most democracies, political parties are one of the principal institutions that channel citizen action in the public sphere. We wanted to explore the role of the parties regarding participation in municipal affairs and in the formulation of demands on local authorities.

To do so, we first analyzed the relationship between participation and party affiliation in respondents. Figure VI-31, and a variance analysis of the percentage of participants, indicate that those who are considered to be sympathizers of the Liberal, Conservative or Polo Democrático parties (the most identifiable parties in the country) participate significantly more than those who consider themselves independents or without party affiliation. Numerous analysts have pointed out the weaknesses of the political parties. The evidence suggests, however, that despite this weakness the parties fulfill a role of channeling participation in those local affairs that most directly concern citizens in their daily lives.





Figure VI-31. Participants and Political Party Affiliation - National Sample 2005




In terms of demands and petitions to municipal authorities for assistance, Figure VI-32 and the statistical tests carried out, suggest that it is the traditional parties who constitute the channels for demand-making, when we compare the percentage of “demand-makers” affiliated to these parties with those who consider themselves independent or without a party. The Polo Democrático, however, does not show significant differences with the other political groups.<sup>15</sup>



**Figure VI-32. Demand-Makers and Party Affiliation - National Sample 2005**

<sup>15</sup> One could speculate that these demand indicators in some way constitute evidence of clientelistic activities, although to arrive at more convincing conclusions in this direction would require a more detailed and deeper analysis than we can do here.

Figure VI-33 and tests of analysis of variance also indicate that those who are of the same party as the mayor of their municipality participate more in municipal affairs and, especially, are more active formulating demands on municipal authorities. Interpreting this evidence as a form of representation or a form of clientelism requires additional evidence not available right now. Nevertheless, this discovery itself is significant in that it shows the political nature of relationships between elites and citizens in local affairs.



**Figure VI-33. Participants and Demand-Making According to Mayor's and Respondent's Party - National Sample 2005**

Finally, Table VI-1 shows the typology that we constructed from the dimensions of participation and demand-making, as well as the percentage of respondents who fall into each of the types of this crossed tabulation.

	Not demand-making	Demand-making	Total
Not participating	60.2%	20.9%	81.0%
Participating	6.2%	12.8%	19.0%
Total	66.4%	33.6%	100.0%

Table VI-1. Participation and Demand-making - National Sample 2005



## VII. Elections and Political Parties

One of the most preoccupying results of the 2004 study was the verification that electoral institutions enjoy very low levels of trust. In fact, compared to all the other countries of that study (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), trust in elections and the Electoral Court in Colombia turned out to be significantly lower than the average of those other countries. Also notable were the low levels of trust in political parties and in Congress, although this phenomenon is common in the majority of countries in the region.


The electoral situation of the country is especially delicate, and to a certain extent is entering uncharted waters. The approval of a constitutional reform in 2003 lifted the prohibition of immediate reelection of the president (which was recently approved by the Constitutional Court), and the elections will see President Uribe competing with the other candidates. Critics, and those opposed to that reform and the government, maintain that the elections will be profoundly unequal and demand electoral guarantees to compensate for the obvious advantage of the president.

Additionally, recently there have been reports of intimidation by the illegal armed groups, particularly the paramilitaries, against certain candidates and political movements. The electoral atmosphere, consequently, promises to be murky because of the enormous influence of these groups in certain regions, which threatens to delegitimize the electoral institutions.

For these and other reasons, it is very important to follow and thoroughly analyze the behavior of these indicators and related information. This chapter, therefore, pays special attention to the perceptions and experiences of citizens regarding elections, the political parties, and the political juncture of the country.

## Elections

As already mentioned, trust in elections and the Electoral Court is particularly low in comparative terms. Has there been some change between 2004 and 2005? Figure VII-1 shows the average level of trust in the mentioned institutions for these years. As already mentioned in another chapter, trust in elections has increased slightly (in a statistically significant way) while trust in the Electoral Court remains the same.



**Figure VII-1. Trust in Electoral Institutions – National Samples 2004 and 2005**

How does the trust in elections vary by region? As Figure VII-2 indicates, and contrary to what one might think, the Atlantic region shows significantly higher levels of trust than all other regions (except the Eastern).<sup>16</sup>




Figure VII-2. Trust in Electoral Institutions by Region – National Sample 2005

<sup>16</sup> As a reference, the horizontal line shows the national average.

We observe the same pattern in the case of the Electoral Court, as can be appreciated in Figure VII-3, in which the difference between the Atlantic region and the rest is much clearer.




Figure VII-3. Trust in the Electoral Court – National Sample 2005



However, not all departments of the Atlantic region share this high degree of trust. As Figure VII-4 shows, the Department of Atlántico shows a significantly lower level of trust in elections than the other departments of the region (although these results should be taken cautiously since the sample was not designed to investigate information at the department level). The same pattern exists in these departments in terms of the Electoral Court (which we do not show here for reasons of space).




Figure VII-4. Trust in Elections in Departments of the Atlantic Region – National Sample 2005

The perception of voting effectiveness is an issue related to trust in electoral institutions. To analyze this, the study included the following question:

**ABS5.** ¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar?

El voto puede mejorar las cosas.....1

Las cosas no van a mejorar.....2

NS/NR.....8

Figure VII-5 shows the percentage of respondents who consider the vote to be effective for the years 2004 and 2005. Contrary to trust in elections, the proportion of citizens who see the vote as a way to improve things in the country fell significantly in 2005 in relation to the previous year.




Figure VII-5. Perception of Vote Effectiveness – National Samples 2004 and 2005

The percentage of people who, in 2005, consider their vote could be useful varied considerably by region of the country. Surprisingly, more than 80 percent of residents of the Old National Territories (which in the sample included the departments of Caquetá, Putumayo and Vaupés) consider that their vote has the potential to “change things.” This percentage contrasts with all other regions, especially with the 46 percent of residents of the Pacific region (Figure VII-6).




Figure VII-6. Perception of Vote Effectiveness by Region – National Sample 2005

This regional variation is perhaps explainable, at least in part, by the ethnic identity of the respondents. As can be seen in Figure VII-7, those who consider themselves Afro-Colombians are the most skeptical about the effectiveness of voting, while indigenous people generally trust much more that their vote can change things. In effect, the Pacific is the region which contains a greater proportion of Afro-Colombian respondents (19.4%) while 40.7 percent of the respondents residing in the Old National Territories consider themselves indigenous.




Figure VII-7. Perception of Vote Effectiveness by Ethnic Self-Identification – National Sample 2005

### Political Parties

Political parties are one of the least prestigious institutions in Colombia. Of the institutions studied (see Chapter II), it is the one that generates the least amount of public trust. This situation has not changed from 2004 to 2005, as Figure VII-8 shows.




Figure VII-8. Trust in Political Parties – National Samples 2004 and 2005

As in other cases, there is important regional variation in the trust in political parties. Figure VII-9 shows that the residents of the Atlantic region trust the parties more than those living in all other regions; this difference is particularly significant in relation to residents of the Old National Territories and Bogota.




Figure VII-9. Trust in Political Parties by Region – National Sample 2005

These low levels of trust in parties reflects low party-affiliation rates. The 2005 study included the following question:

**COLVB8.** Se considera Usted miembro o simpatizante del Partido Conservador, del Polo Democrático, del Partido Liberal, de otro movimiento político, o se considera usted independiente o sin partido?"  
**[SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

Partido Conservador .....1  
 Polo Democrático.....2  
 Partido Liberal.....3  
 Otro.....4  
 Independiente/sin partido.....5  
 NS.....8

Figure VII-10 shows the distribution of the responses. Barely more than half of Colombians consider themselves to be a supporters of some party. The Liberal Party continues to be the majority party, followed by the Conservative Party. But the traditional parties, which in other eras monopolized political space, now can barely claim 47 percent of the total population.




Figure VII-10. Party Affiliation – National Sample 2005

To those who consider themselves independents or without party affiliation, we asked the following question:

**COLVB9. [SÓLO SI CONTESTÓ “(5) Independiente/sin partido” EN LA PREGUNTA ANTERIOR]**

Considera usted que se inclina más hacia los Liberales, hacia los Conservadores o hacia el Polo Democrático? **[SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

- Liberales.....1
- Conservadores.....2
- Polo Democrático.....3
- Otro.....4
- Ninguno.....5
- NS.....8
- INAP.....9

As can be seen in Figure VII-11, among independents close to 40 percent feel inclined toward some party. It should be mentioned that more independents feel inclined toward the Polo Democrático than toward the Conservative Party.




Figure VII-11. Party Inclination of Independents or Those Without a Party – National Sample 2005



Does party affiliation vary regionally? Figure VII-12 shows that party affiliation is strongest in the Old National Territories and in the Atlantic region, where the Liberal Party is especially strong; and that Bogota has the largest number of independents or those without a party. The greatest proportion of supporters of the Polo Democrático are found in Bogota (where the current mayor belongs to this party) and the Pacific region (where the governor of Valle del Cauca represents the Polo Democrático).




Figure VII-12. Party Affiliation by Region – National Sample 2005

Are there ideological differences between the supporters of the different parties? Figure VII-13 shows the ideological location of the average supporter of each of the parties (and the independents), as well as the confidence interval of 95 percent around this average. As can be seen, the supporters of the Polo Democrático are clearly located to the left of those of the two traditional parties, while there are no statistically significant ideological differences between Liberals and Conservatives.




Figure VII-13. Ideological Position by Party Affiliation – National Sample 2005

Besides expressing their sympathies, citizens can actively work in the political activities of the parties. To explore this party activism, we formulated a series of questions. We first wanted to find out with what frequency Colombians attend political party meetings. The question is the following:

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS
CP13. ¿Asiste a reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? ¿Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8

Figure VII-14 shows the percentage of respondents who said that they attend, by party affiliation, a political party meeting at least once a year. The followers of the Polo Democrático and the Conservative Party are the most active, considerably more so than supporters of the Liberal Party.




Figure VII-14. Attendance at Political Party Meetings by Party Affiliation – National Sample 2005

We also wanted to inquire about the proselytizing activities of Colombians. For this, we asked the following:

**PP1.** Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? [*lea las alternativas*]

- Frecuentemente.....1
- De vez en cuando.....2
- Rara vez.....3
- Nunca.....4
- NS/NR.....8

Once again, as Figure VII-15 shows, the followers of the Polo Democrático are those who most frequently undertake this type of activity (the frequency index was converted into a scale of 0 to 100).




Figure VII-15. Trying to Convince Others to Vote for a Party or Candidate – National Sample 2005

Finally, we asked respondents if they had worked on the campaign of some candidate or party in the past 2002 presidential elections. Figure VII-16 shows that the supporters of the three principal parties were equally active in the campaigns of their respective candidates.




Figure VII-16. Worked on the Last Electoral Campaign by Party Affiliation – National Sample 2005

## The Current Juncture

It is well known that President Uribe enjoys high levels of popularity and is the leader with the highest approval ratings in Latin America. This is especially notable if we take into account that he is in the third year of his mandate, when the so-called “honey moon” period of governments has faded and their popularity often erodes considerably.

We asked respondents to evaluate the performance of the government on different issues, including the fight against poverty, unemployment (only in 2005) and corruption, the protection of democratic principles and human rights, the management of the armed conflict and citizen security (only in 2005), and the management of state finances. Figure VII-17 shows the evaluation index of these items for the years 2004 and 2005. As we have already pointed out in other ways, the current government is generally better evaluated on issues of security than on social issues. Also, there are no significant differences over the course of a year, except for a brief drop on issues related to the fight against corruption.




Figure VII-17. Evaluation of Government Performance – National Samples 2004 and 2005

One of the central issues of current political debate revolves around the constitutional reform put forth by the administration and approved by Congress, which removes the prohibition against immediate reelection of the incumbent president. Although many analysts consider that the purpose of this reform was to reelect President Uribe, we wanted to find out what citizens thought about the passage of the reelection norm in general. We formulated the following question:

... **COLVB10A**. Ahora, vamos a usar otra tarjeta. El punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la siguiente afirmación.

Es bueno para el país que exista en general la posibilidad de la reelección presidencial  
 \_\_\_\_ (ANOTAR 1 a 7). (8) NS

Converting responses to a scale of 0 to 100, the national average was 68.3. Figure VII-18 shows the Pacific region to have significantly lower indices than the other regions.




Figure VII-18. Presidential Reelection Approval by Region – National Sample 2005

Figure VII-19, which shows the approval of the reelection by party affiliation, suggests that supporters of the Polo Democrático have on average a significantly lower level of approval than the forces of other parties, and that supporters of the Conservative Party show substantially higher levels than the rest.




Figure VII-19. Presidential Reelection Approval by Party Affiliation – National Sample 2005



Finally, the ideological position is also related to the approval of presidential reelection, as can be appreciated in Figure VII-20.




Figure VII-20. Presidential Reelection Approval by Ideological Position – National Sample 2005

These results, however, can be influenced simply by the popularity of President Uribe. In order to try to discern citizen opinion in terms of the reelection in general, independently of the person of the president, it is necessary to first isolate the effect of President Uribe's own popularity, and then analyze the effect of variables like party affiliation and ideology against approval for presidential reelection. To do this we constructed a linear regression model of the level of approval for reelection; we included party affiliation and ideology as predictors, and controlled for approval of the current government's job performance. We also included socio-demographic controls like gender, age, and marital status. The results of this regression model, which appear in Table VII-1, raise several points.

First, as is obvious, those who better evaluate the president's job performance also show a higher level of approval of presidential reelection. No socio-demographic variable, though, has a significant effect.

Second, party affiliation also significantly impacts the level of approval for reelection, independently of the degree of support for President Uribe. On average, supporters of the Polo Democrático approve of the reelection almost 13 points less than do people who consider themselves supporters of the Conservative Party (which is the base category against which one should compare these effects); Liberals showed more than ten points less than Conservatives, even when the level of popularity for the current government is kept constant. This suggests that there are "philosophical" differences between the parties in relation to the reelection, and that these differences go beyond the issues related to the current administration.

Finally, contrary to the results analyzed above, ideological position ceases to be a significant factor in the approval of the presidential reelection when we control for the degree of support for the president.

Variable dependiente: Índice de aprobación a la reelección	Coefficiente (error est.)	Significancia	
Evaluación al presidente	.75 (.043)	0.000	***
Ideología	.82 (.422)	0.052	
Polo	-12.95 (4.477)	0.004	**
Liberal	-10.65 (3.047)	0.000	***
Otro partido	-2.60 (8.179)	0.751	
Independiente/sin partido	-5.54 (3.051)	0.070	
Hombre	2.32 (1.982)	0.242	
Educación	.01 (.291)	0.973	
Edad	-.07 (.078)	0.372	
Nivel de riqueza	.58 (.624)	0.356	
Urbano	.86 (2.599)	0.742	
Casado/unión libre	.75 (2.087)	0.719	
Constante	20.04 (6.505)	0.002	
N	1122		
R <sup>2</sup> ajustado	0.26		

Table VII-1. Predictors of Approval for Presidential Reelection

In the face of the electoral juncture, we wanted to find out how respondents perceived the possible candidates and current national political figures. The people included in the analysis are President Álvaro Uribe, Antonio Navarro Wolf (the pre-candidate of the Polo Democrático),

Horacio Serpa (the Liberal pre-candidate), and César Gaviria (the director of the Liberal Party and ex-president).

In the first place, we asked them to locate these figures on an ideological spectrum. Figure VII-21 shows the average location that respondents made for each of them, along with the location of the average respondent, on an ideological scale of 1 to 10.




Figure VII-21. Ideological Location – National Sample 2005

The evidence in this figure suggests various issues: first, contrary to those who theoretically or practically minimize the importance of ideology, it is clear that for most Colombians the notions of right and left are not distant or irrelevant. Although perhaps obvious, it is important to check whether the candidate of a party which considers itself on the left, like the Polo Democrático, is effectively perceived to be located on the left of the ideological spectrum, whether or not this placement, by respondents, is the result of the party's platform. In other words, beyond causal connections, there is a congruence in ideological terms between the platform of the Polo Democrático, Navarro, its candidate, and the perception that citizens have of him.

By contrast, the efforts that the government has made to try to prevent itself from being viewed as on the right do not appear to have had an effect on public perception. In fact, as can be appreciated in the figure, Colombians locate President Uribe on the right side of the spectrum, with clear and statistically significant ideological distance from the rest of the figures analyzed.

In the center of the spectrum appear the members of the Liberal Party. As can be seen from the corresponding overlapping confidence intervals of 95 percent, Colombians do not ideologically distinguish between César Gaviria and Horacio Serpa, despite the fact that some analysts locate Serpa to the left of Gaviria, especially in terms of economic policies.

Finally, the figure suggests that the popularity of President Uribe is based, at least in part, on his ideological proximity to the average citizen. In fact, the ideological position of the average citizen is closer to Uribe than to any of the other figures included in this analysis.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> One could also argue that the ideological proximity on this scale is the *effect* (and not the *cause*) of the popularity of the president, in that those who support Uribe for other reasons tend to "move" their own ideological position closer to their perception of the president's position. However, other associations encountered above, in particular that which exists between the approval of the restriction of civil liberties (a position generally attributed to the right) and the level of support for the president, suggest the opposite.

To conclude this chapter, we include a series of questions which posit a hypothetical scenario of a second round in the presidential elections between two of each of these four figures (in all possible combinations). The results of this voting-intention exercise, in which once again the strength of president/candidate Álvaro Uribe is evident, are shown in the following figures.




Figure VII-22. Voting Intention: Álvaro Uribe vs. Horacio Serpa – National Sample 2005




Figure VII-23. Voting Intention: Álvaro Uribe vs. Antonio Navarro – National Sample 2005




Figure VII-24. Voting Intention: Álvaro Uribe vs. César Gaviria – National Sample 2005




Figure VII-25. Voting Intention: Horacio Serpa vs. Antonio Navarro – National Sample 2005






Figure VII-26. Voting Intention: Horacio Serpa vs. César Gaviria – National Sample 2005




Figure VII-27. Voting Intention: Antonio Navarro vs. César Gaviria – National Sample 2005

## VIII. Civil Society Participation

We now turn to the very important issue of civil society participation. Political scientists have been focused on this topic since the publication of Robert Putnam's (1993) *Making Democracy Work*, which explored the implications for the efficacy of democracy in Italy based on regional variation in civil society participation. Putnam and others have argued that the key to building democracies is through the development of "social capital." Countries with high levels of social capital are countries in which citizens trust each other and trust their governments. This trust largely emerges from their active participation in civil society organizations.<sup>18</sup> Putnam and other researchers believe that the process of building social capital is a long one, but cannot prosper without an active civil society.

Not all political scientists agree with Putnam's contention that civil society is crucial for democracy. Indeed, some scholars, led by the recent work of Ariel Armony (2004) have begun to worry (and wonder) about "negative social capital." Their concern is that many authoritarian movements, such as that of Mussolini and Hitler, drew on widespread civil society support. In Latin America, populist movements such as Perón in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil also cultivated civil society participation.

Recent events in several Latin American countries have highlighted concern over the role of civil society in democracy. Citizens in Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela, have organized to press for their demands, but in a number of instances, the results have challenged normal democratic processes, and elected presidents have been forced to resign.

Colombia is a very important case in the study of civil society because its longstanding democracy has co-existed with a longstanding insurgency. Does civil society help promote democracy in Colombia or does it lead to support for guerrilla movements that have attempted to overthrow a constitutionally elected regime?

This chapter begins by comparing the data from the 2004 survey with that of the 2005 to see if there are any important shifts. It then goes on to examine a component of civil society participation not explored in the 2004 study, namely local resource creation. We then examine the relationship between civil society participation and support for democracy.

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<sup>18</sup> Mondak (1998); Edwards and Foley (1997); Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000).

## Levels of Participation

Comparisons of the key items of civil society participation (CP6 series) that were studied in the 2004 survey reveals that the patterns are nearly identical, as shown in Figure VIII-1. The reader should take note of the error bars in the chart, which show that with the exception of political party participation, there is no significant difference between 2004 and 2005. In 2005 three new civil society organizations were added, namely “community meetings,” meetings of a cooperative and meetings of a union. The overall pattern remains clear: in Colombia, as in many other countries in Latin America, religious organizations garner the highest level of civil society participation, followed by meetings related to public schools (e.g., parent-teacher organizations).




Figure VIII-1. Percent of respondents, 2004 and 2005 participating in civil society organizations

In the 2004 survey, we did not explore completely regional variation in participation among Colombians. As shown in Figure VIII-2, such participation in 2005 varies strikingly and significantly. Participation in the highest region, the Old National Territories is nearly twice as high as it is in the Central region.




Figure VIII-2. Combined index of communal participation by region, 2005

Urbanization tends to reduce communal participation in most countries around the world, and does so in Colombia as well. Therefore, it is important to examine the impact of this variable on participation rates shown above. As can be seen in Figure VIII-3, in each of the regions (except Bogotá, which is entirely urban in our sample), rural participation rates are higher than urban, although only in the Pacific and Oriental regions is the difference significant, as shown by the error bars. Note that even among the relatively small sample of urban dwellers in the Old National Territories communal participation is very high. However, the term “urban” is a relative concept, and areas defined as such by the census bureau, which is the definition we use in this study, can vary from relatively small towns to the sprawling urban area of Bogotá.




Figure VIII-3. Index of communal participation by region, 2005

One concern that researchers have over the use of attendance at meetings as a means to measure civil society participation is that it is difficult to distinguish participation that is purely social from that which involves direct efforts to contribute to solving some community problem. For this reason the survey contained a series of questions that asked directly about voluntary donations of various sorts (CP5 series). As this series was not analyzed in 2004, we include its text here. Take note that the first question serves as a “filter” for the remaining items. It asks if the respondent has attempted to contribute to solving a community problem.

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...					CP5	
CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio?						
Sí.....1 [Seguir con CP5A]						
No.....2 [Pasará a COLEMP]						
NS.....8 [Pasará a COLEMP]						
	Sí	No	NS	Inap		
CP5A. ¿Ha donado Dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	1	2	8	9	CP5A	
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9	CP5B	
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5C	
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5D	

The analysis of this question is shown in Figure VIII-4. As can be seen, nearly one-third of Colombians participate in this form of civil society activism. There was a slight downturn in 2005, but the difference is not statistically significant, as shown by the error bars.




Figure VIII-4. Percent participating in community problem solving activity, 2004 vs. 2005



There is some variation among the major strata of the sample, as shown in Figure VIII-5. However, careful observation of the error bars demonstrates the differences are not significant. Thus, while we did find variation in participation in organizations, we did not find such variation among the regions of the country in community problem-solving. This suggests that in Colombia problem solving rates are generalized, and one can expect to find similar levels spread throughout the country.




Figure VIII-5. Regional variation in community problem solving

Among the nearly one-third of Colombians who attempted to solve a community problem in the year prior to the interviews (for 2005), we asked a series of questions about the specific actions they took, as shown above in the questionnaire series. The most popular form of such participation is voluntary contribution of labor. The reader needs to be careful in interpreting this figure, however, since it shows only those respondents who did at least one act, as noted above.




Figure VIII-6. Percent participating in specific voluntary acts among the 30.8% who did at least one act

## Civil Society Participation and Democracy

As noted at the outset of this chapter, there is considerable debate over the relevance of civil society participation for democracy. In the 2004 report, an extensive treatment was presented of the socio-economic and demographic factors that help explain why some Colombians participate and others do not, or, to be more accurate, why some participate more than others. In this chapter, the focus will instead be on the links between participation and democratic values.

### *Participation and Political Tolerance*

We first want to know if those who participate more in civil society are more politically tolerant. We use the index of communal participation described above as an overall measure. When we calculate a simple correlation coefficient between the index and the tolerance measure discussed in both the 2004 study and in other chapters of this report, we find that the relationship is not significant. Probing further, we examined each of the forms of civil society participation examined above but we only found one with a significant relationship. Those who participate in unions in Colombia are significantly more tolerant of the rights of minorities. This relationship holds even after a control for education is introduced (using OLS regression).


### *Participation and System Support*

An examination of the diverse forms of civil society participation and support for the political system, a variable examined in 2004 and in other chapters of this study, also did not show a significant relationship. System support was measured on the PSA5 scale of five items discussed already in Chapter III.

When we take a closer look at system support, examining the individual components of the “B” series of items in the questionnaire, we do find positive and significant relationships for B2 (respect for political institutions), B19 (trust in the Controller General), B43 (pride in being a Colombian) and B50 (trust in the Constitutional Court). These findings do suggest that there is at least some connection between participation in civil society organizations and key democracy variables. Of course, we do not know if it was the process of participating that increased support, or if those with higher support are more likely to participate.

The link between civil society participation and democracy becomes clearer when we examine the series of questions that explicitly use the term “democracy.” The items ING4 (“democracy is the best form of government”) and COLCONST (“the constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the citizens”) both have a positive and statistically significant relation with the community participation index.

Nonetheless, there appears to exist a tension between party democracy and community participation since, as Figure VIII-7 shows (where the community participation index was recalculated into six categories of approximately the same size), those who more frequently participate in civil society organizations are those who most support the idea of a democracy without political parties. This appears to point to an apparent dichotomy between representative democracy and participative democracy in the perception of citizens.



**Figure VIII-7. Community Participation and Belief that Democracy Cannot Function Without Political Parties**

## Fear of Participation

In the 2004 survey, the series of items measuring fear of participation reported that, compared to other countries in the region, fear was rather high in Colombia. We wish to explore the fear issue in more detail in this year's study since Colombia has long been burdened with a high level of political and criminal violence, and, as shown in other sections of this report, the population considers violence to be a major problem, as shown elsewhere in this study. The items included in the series are as follows

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted <b>sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor?</b> [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS	
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	DER1
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección política?	1	2	3	8	DER2
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	DER3
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	DER4

In Figure VIII-8 below, there is a comparison of the level of fear expressed in 2004 with that of 2005. Although there were increases in fear, the differences are not significant except for a small increase in those fearing participation in running for office.




Figure VIII-8. Fear of participation, 2004 vs. 2005

Fear varies considerably by geographic region. In the case of voting, which has the lowest fear level associated with it, the differences are shown in Figure VIII-9.




Figure VIII-9. Fear of voting by geographic region

Fear of participation has its cost. Consider the results shown in Figure VIII-10. Those who respond that they have more fear, participate in local community development improvement committees at lower rates than those who do not express such fear.




Figure VIII-10. Impact of fear on participation in community development



Fear also impacts voting turnout, as is shown in Figure VIII-11.




Figure VIII-11. Impact of fear of voting on voting turnout

## Participation and Trust

One of the main contentions of the Putnam thesis is that civil society participation increases interpersonal trust. Latin American countries have been shown, in surveys, to reveal relatively low levels of such trust, and the Colombia 2004 LAPOP survey examined trust levels in that country. Here we examine the thesis to determine if trust increases with more civil society participation.

The results shown in Figure VIII-12 reveal a powerful, positive impact of civil society participation on trust. In this chart, we consider only one form of civil society participation, namely that of attending community development association meetings. Prior research in Central America (Seligson 1999) has shown that such associations have a particularly important effect on democratic values. As can be seen in the chart, the impact is strong in Colombia as well.




Figure VIII-12. Community development association meeting attendance and interpersonal trust

### Citizen Demands

Participation in organizations reaches its most active level when citizens make demands on public officials. In the survey a battery of items measures this form of activism (CP2-COLCP6). The results of the comparison between 2004 and 2005 are shown in Figure VIII-13. Most of the activities show no significant change from 2004, but there is a sharp decline in requests to professors, which was a category that was among the highest in 2004. This decline is puzzling and needs to be explored. There was also a significant decline in request made to the *consejal*, but in absolute terms the decline is not great, and requests to the *consejal* remain among the highest in the study.




Figure VIII-13. Demand-making: comparisons of 2004 with 2005

Once again, however, fear of participation takes its toll. For example, examine the fear of running for office on the various forms of demand-making, as shown in Figure VIII-14. Fear has its greatest impact on making demand on local government and the police.




Figure VIII-14. Impact of fear of running for office on demand-making, 2004 and 2005 samples combined

There is considerable regional variation in contacting public officials to make demands. As shown in Figure VIII-15 below, the lowest levels of contacting the municipal *concejal* are found in Bogotá. This is a common finding, however, in urban areas, where citizens are less like to seek out their local governments. One explanation for this is that the need is lower; in large cities, basic municipal services are usually adequate for many citizens (outside of slum areas), whereas in rural areas, those services often need to be requested and even then they are often not forthcoming.




Figure VIII-15. Citizen Demand-Making on Council Members by Region

The regional variation found for the council, is also found for the mayor, as would be expected, as is shown in Figure VIII-16.




Figure VIII-16. Citizen demand-making on the mayor by region

The relationship does not depend entirely on population size, however. Consider the results in Figure VIII-17. The major difference in contacting the mayor is between Colombia's small cities and the other areas.




Figure VIII-17. Demand-Making on mayor by size of town

## Conclusions

This chapter has explored civil society participation in Colombia. It has compared levels of such participation from the 2004 survey to the new survey of 2005. It has found minor changes from one year to the next. The focus of the chapter, however, has been to examine important regional differences in Colombia, and to also connect civil society participation to democracy. Finally, the chapter has looked at the corrosive effect of fear on civil society participation.

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## IX. Armed Conflict and Human Rights

This chapter explores citizens' experiences and perceptions of the armed conflict and the protection of human rights. First, it analyzes different forms of victimization by the armed conflict. Second, it analyzes the perceptions of citizens regarding the actors of the conflict. Then, it examines the perspectives of negotiating [negociación] with the different actors. Finally, it presents respondents' evaluations of state and government efforts to protect human rights.

### Victimization

As a way to explore respondents' experiences of the armed conflict, we formulated a series of questions in relation to different forms of victimization that might have affected their family members. The questions are:

	Sí	No	NS/NR
<b>WC1.</b> ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? (o tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?)	1	2	8
<b>WC2.</b> ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país?	1	2	8
<b>WC3.</b> ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?	1	2	8

This question was part of the questionnaire in the 2004 study. Figure IX-1 compares the percentages of those who responded affirmatively to each of the questions. As can be seen in the figure, and confirmed with statistical tests for differences of means, the proportion of respondents did not differ significantly from one year to the next.




Figure IX-1. Victimization by the Conflict. National Samples 2004 and 2005

For each of these forms of victimization, though, there exist considerable regional variation. Figure IX-2 shows the percentages, in each region, of those reporting to have lost a family member as a consequence of the armed conflict. The Old National Territories register a significantly higher percentage of victims than all other regions. By contrast, Bogotá and the Eastern region have significantly less victims than the Pacific and Atlantic regions.




Figure IX-2. Death or Disappearance of Family Member by Region. National Sample 2005

Figure IX-3 shows, by region, the percentage of respondents who report the forced displacement of a family member because of the conflict. Once again, the Old National Territories shows the highest indices of this form of victimization, significantly higher than all other regions except the Atlantic.




Figure IX-3. Displacement of Family Member by Region. National Sample 2005

The regional situation regarding the exile of respondents' family members is very different. It affects principally residents of Bogotá, where the percentage reported is significantly higher than in the Central and Eastern regions.




Figure IX-4. Exile of Family Member by Region. National Sample 2005

There also exist some differences, though small, between the percentages of urban and rural respondents whose family members have been victims of the conflict. Figure IX-5 shows that there is a significant difference (marked with a \*) in the case of the death or disappearance of a family member. This form of victimization is considerably more common among those who currently reside in rural areas than in the urban municipal seats. For other forms of victimization by the conflict, there are not significant differences by area.<sup>19</sup>




Figure IX-5. Victimization by the Conflict by Area (rural/urban). National Sample 2005

<sup>19</sup> Despite the results shown in Figure IX-5. National Sample 2005), intuition says that forced displacement is primarily a rural phenomenon. The absence of statistically significant differences between urban and rural areas for the case of displacement might be because many respondents who responded affirmatively to the question were themselves displaced from rural to urban areas, where they were interviewed. The data from the survey does not allow us to determine who have been victims of displacement in rural areas and today live in urban areas.

We also wanted to find out if there were important socio-economic differences, especially by income and education, between victims and non-victims of the conflict.

First, Figure IX-6 and corresponding statistical tests, show that those who reported having a family member die or disappear as a consequence of the conflict are, on average, slightly less educated than those who have not been victims (measured in years of schooling, from 0 to 18; the difference is statistically significant).




Figure IX-6. Education Level and Victimization: Loss of Family Member. National Sample 2005

This difference disappears in the case of the forced displacement of a family member, as can be appreciated in Figure IX-7.




Figure IX-7. Education Level and Victimization: Displacement of Family Member. National Sample 2005



The difference in education level is significant between victims and non-victims of conflict-related exile. However, as seen in Figure IX-8, the difference is in the opposite direction of the cases of the death or disappearance of a family member. Those who say they have a family member forced to leave the country because of the conflict have, on average, a higher level of education than those who have not suffered from this form of victimization.




Figure IX-8. Education Level and Victimization: Exile of Family Member. National Sample 2005

This also suggests differences by socio-economic strata or income level. To evaluate this hypothesis, we used our wealth scale (measured in ownership of goods) which is traditionally more reliable and obtains a better rate of response than the simple question regarding income level. In this scale, standardized from 0 to 100, those who have lost a family member in the Figure IX-9.




Figure IX-9. Wealth and Victimization: Loss of Family Member. National Sample 2005

Once again, there is no significant difference in the level of wealth of those who have had family members displaced in relation to those who have not suffered from this form of victimization, as Figure IX-10 shows.




Figure IX-10. Wealth and Victimization: Displacement of Family Member. National Sample 2005

However, consistent with the results for education level, those who report having a family member be forced to flee the country because of the conflict show significantly higher levels of wealth than those who say they have not suffered the exile of a family member, as shown by Figure IX-11.




Figure IX-11. Wealth and Victimization: Exile of Family Member. National Sample 2005

Among those who report some of these forms of victimization within their family, we wanted to find out who caused these acts, so we formulated a series of questions to this end. These questions are not exclusive, that is, the acts of assassination, disappearance, displacement, or exile can, according to the victims, have had more than one kind of author. The questions for the victims of the conflict were the following:

**PREGUNTAR SÓLO SI LA RESPUESTA A WC1, WC2 o WC3 FUE “SÍ”. DE LO CONTRARIO, SALTAR A COLPAZ1A.**

**¿Qué grupo, o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? [NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS. EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (8) NS ]**

	Sí	No	NS	Inap. (no fue víctima)
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	8	9
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	8	9
COLWC4D. El Ejército	1	2	8	9
COLWC4E. La Policía	1	2	8	9
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	8	9

As can be seen in the following three figures, which show the percentage of affirmative responses for each of the questions for each kind of victimization, the principal perpetrators of these acts were the guerrilla, followed by the paramilitary groups.




Figure IX-12. Loss of a Family Member: Perpetrators. National Sample 2005




Figure IX-13. Displacement of a Family Member: Perpetrators. National Sample 2005




Figure IX-14. Exile of a Family Member: Perpetrators. National Sample 2005


### The Illegal Armed Actors

As an innovation with respect to last year's study, we included in the this study's questionnaire questions related to the trust that citizens have been able to develop for the guerrilla and paramilitary groups. The hypothesis that we wanted to explore revolved around the possibility that these groups have developed some kind of legitimacy among the residents in their areas of influence. The questions are equivalent to those formulated in relation to legal political institutions such as Congress, the government, etc. (see Chapter II). They are the following:

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 - que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO.

COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las FARC?
COLB61. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el ELN?
COLB62. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Autodefensas?

Figure IX-15 shows that the national levels of trust in these actors is relatively low when compared to the levels of trust in the three branches of political power: the national government, Congress and the Constitutional Court.<sup>20</sup> However, it can be appreciated that, at a national level, the paramilitary groups enjoy a level of trust significantly higher than the guerrilla.



**Figure IX-15. Trust in the Three Branches of Power and the Illegal Armed Actors. National Sample 2005**

<sup>20</sup> We recognize that the responses to these questions can have a relatively high level of measurement error since they deal with sensitive issues. It is possible that respondents, despite being assured that their anonymity would be rigorously preserved, are reluctant and fearful of providing sincere opinions. The nature of this error, however, is difficult to estimate in general since, depending on the circumstances and context, the respondents might strategically raise or lower the level of trust they report with respect to the real level. Without spoiling the results presented here, this is a note of warning that care should be taken when interpreting them.



As Figure IX-16 shows, the difference in trust between the paramilitary groups and the guerrilla is maintained in all regions (and especially in the Central region where the difference is considerable), except in the Pacific and especially in the Old National Territories.<sup>21</sup>




Figure IX-16. Trust in the Illegal Armed Actors by Region. National Sample 2005

<sup>21</sup> The regions for which the difference in trust between the paramilitaries and the FARC is statistically significant are marked with an asterisk (\*). In the Pacific region there exists a significant difference in the trust in paramilitaries in relation to the ELN, but not in relation to the FARC.

Now, for each one of the illegal armed groups there also exist regional variations. Figure IX-17 shows that the Pacific region has the highest average level of trust in the FARC, significantly higher than that in the Central and Eastern regions and Bogota. The level of trust in this armed group in the Atlantic region, in turn, is greater than in the Central and Eastern regions.




Figure IX-17. Trust in the FARC by Region. National Sample 2005

In the case of the ELN, the region with the highest level of trust is the Atlantic, significantly above the Central and Eastern regions and Bogota, as can be seen in Figure IX-18. The Pacific region also has a level of trust in this group above that of the Central and Eastern regions.




Figure IX-18. Trust in the ELN by Region. National Sample 2005

Finally, in the case of the paramilitaries, Figure IX-19 shows that once again the highest levels are found in the Atlantic and Pacific regions. The average for the former is significantly greater than that in the Old National Territories and in the Eastern and Central regions.




Figure IX-19. Trust in the Paramilitaries by Region. National Sample 2005

Trust in the FARC, the ELN, and the paramilitary groups is significantly higher in the urban seats of municipalities than in rural areas, as Figure IX-20 shows.





Figure IX-20. Trust in the Armed Actors by Area (rural/urban). National Sample 2005


Is the trust in each one of these actors greater in their areas of influence? To examine this question, we took information of the National Planning Department regarding the presence of each one of these actors during the 1990s. With the assumption that not only the individual presence of these groups, but also their interaction in the same zone of the country, can have an impact on the level of citizen trust, we classified municipalities into four categories: (a) municipalities where there was no presence of FARC, ELN, or paramilitaries; (b) municipalities where there was only FARC or ELN presence; (c) municipalities where there was only the presence of paramilitaries; and (d) municipalities where there was the presence of both the paramilitaries and one or both of the guerrilla groups. Finally, we examined the average level of trust in each of the illegal armed actors for each one of these groups of municipalities.

As can be appreciated in Figure IX-21, and confirmed with corresponding statistical tests, trust in the FARC in municipalities where guerrillas groups alone have had a presence is significantly greater than in those municipalities where no armed group has had a presence or where both guerrillas and paramilitaries have had a presence (although it is indistinguishable from the trust in municipalities in which only paramilitaries have been present).



**Figure IX-21. Trust in the FARC According to Presence of Armed Actors in Municipality. National Sample 2005**

This same pattern is observed in the case the ELN, as shown in Figure IX-22. Both for the FARC and the ELN, this evidence suggests the relative success of the guerrilla groups creating legitimacy for themselves in their areas of influence, although it can also reflect the coercive effect that their presence can have on the responses of the respondents.



**Figure IX-22. Trust in the ELN According to Presence of Armed Actors in Municipality.**  
National Sample 2005

Contrary to that in guerrilla groups, trust in paramilitary groups is relatively constant, and independent of the presence of different armed actors in the municipalities, as Figure IX-23 shows. The differences that appear in the figure are not statistically significant.




Figure IX-23. Trust in the Paramilitaries According to Presence of Armed Actors in Municipality. National Sample 2005

The results here suggest the need to carry out more thorough investigations on the effects that the presence of the armed actors in certain areas of the country have on attitudes and perceptions of residents in those areas.

### Perspectives on Solutions to the Conflict

In the 2004 study, as in this year's, we included a series of questions related to citizens' perceptions, expectations and appreciations of how to solve the conflict with the different armed groups, and on the perspectives of the reinsertion of their members back into civilian life.



We initially inquired about the best way to solve the conflict in the opinion of the respondents. The questions were as follows:

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	No sabe
<b>COLPAZ1A.</b> De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor?	1	2	3	8
<b>COLPAZ1B.</b> Y con los grupos paramilitares, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución?	1	2	3	8

Figure IX-24 summarizes the responses for both years. The percentage of respondents who believe that the best solution is through negotiations with the guerrilla increased significantly between 2004 and 2005, at the expense of the group who thinks that the best method is a combination of negotiation and military force.




Figure IX-24. Solution to the Conflict with the Guerrilla. National Samples 2004 and 2005

Something similar occurred in the case of the conflict with the paramilitary groups. The group which favored negotiation with them increased significantly. In this case, both those who favor the use of military force and those who would rather see a combination of force and negotiation are considerably less, as Figure IX-25 shows. Quite likely, this change has to do to the development of negotiations with these groups in the north of the country.




Figure IX-25. Solution to the Conflict with the Paramilitaries. National Samples 2004 and 2005

In order to deepen this line of inquiry, we wanted to evaluate the optimism that Colombians have with respect to the possibilities of negotiations with the guerrilla and the paramilitary. The questions related to this are as follows:

Qué tanto cree que es posible una solución negociada en un plazo razonable, diga usted de 4 años, con:

	Muy posible	Posible	Poco posible	Imposible	No sabe
COLPAZ2A. Las FARC	1	2	3	4	8
COLPAZ2B. El ELN	1	2	3	4	8
COLPAZ2C. Los paramilitares	1	2	3	4	8

The responses for 2004 and 2005, once converted onto a scale of 0 to 100, appear in Figure IX-26. The optimism has increased significantly in terms of negotiations with the paramilitaries and the ELN, while there were no variations from one year to the next in terms of the perception of a successful negotiation with the FARC.




Figure IX-26. . Likelihood of Conflict Negotiation. National Samples 2004 and 2005

To analyze citizen support for the demobilization of the members of the illegal armed groups, we formulated the following questions:

¿Estaría de acuerdo con la desmovilización y reinserción de:

	Sí	No	NS
COLPAZ3A. La guerrilla	1	2	8
COLPAZ3B. Los paramilitares	1	2	8

As can be seen in Figure IX-27, the high level of support for the demobilizations and reinsertions has not varied between 2004 and 2005.




Figure IX-27. Support for Demobilization and Reinsertion of the Armed Groups.  
National Samples 2004 and 2005

In terms of the possibilities of pardon and reconciliation with members of these groups, we formulated the following questions:

¿Usted ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con miembros desmovilizados de:

	Sí	No	NS
<b>COLPAZ6A.</b> La guerrilla	1	2	8
<b>COLPAZ6B.</b> Los paramilitares	1	2	8

Figure IX-28 shows that there was no variation in citizen perception in this regard between 2004 and 2005. The figure also shows that the percentage of people who believe that reconciliation with the paramilitaries is possible is significantly greater than those who are optimistic in terms of being able to pardon the guerrilla. The statistical tests conducted show that neither victimization by the conflict nor the presence of the armed groups in the municipality influence the perceptions of the respondents in terms of pardon and reconciliation of the members of demobilized guerrilla and paramilitary groups.




Figure IX-28. Possibilities of Pardon and Reconciliation with the Guerrillas and Paramilitaries.  
National Samples 2004 and 2005

## The Human Rights Situation

In this section we examine the attitudes and perceptions of citizens in terms of human rights and their protection by the State and current government.

Initially we confronted the respondents with a scenario of the violation of human rights. The question is the following:

**COLDH2.** ¿En caso de tener conocimiento o ser objeto de una violación a los derechos humanos, a cuál de las siguientes instituciones acudiría usted para denunciar el hecho? **Por favor, elija la más importante**

- Defensoría del Pueblo.....1
- Policía.....2
- Procuraduría General de la Nación.....3
- Fiscalía General.....4
- Personería municipal.....5
- Ministerio del Interior y la Justicia.....6
- Ninguna de las anteriores.....7
- NS.....8

The responses for 2005 (which do not differ significantly from those of 2004) are summarized in Figure IX-29, and show that the entity most respondents would call is the Human Rights Ombudsman, followed by the police.




Figure IX-29. Where Would You Report a Human Rights Violation? National Sample 2005

There exist important regional variations in terms of the entities most likely to receive reports of human rights violations, as Figure IX-30 shows. While the proportion of people who would call on the Human Rights Ombudsman is particularly high in the Old National Territories, it is considerably lower in the Atlantic region, where the Prosecutor General is the agency that would most frequently receive these reports.<sup>22</sup> The preference of citizens in the Central region for the police is particularly strong. This evidence suggests the need for more detailed and deeper studies of the factors that could be causing these marked regional differences.




Figure IX-30. Reporting Human Rights Violations by Region. National Sample 2005

<sup>22</sup> It is worth emphasizing that respondents from the Old National Territories did not include the Prosecutor General among those entities where they would report of human rights violations.

The two following figures are presented as illustrations of these regional variations for the Human Rights Ombudsman and the police.




Figure IX-31. Reporting to the Human Rights Ombudsman by Region. National Sample 2005




Figure IX-32. Reporting to the Police by Region. National Sample 2005



We asked the 3.1 percent of respondents who manifested that they would not report a violation of human rights before any of the mentioned entities why they would not. The responses are summarized in Figure IX-33. In this figure we can see that a little more than one-third express fear or distrust, while more than half consider that reporting is useless.





Figure IX-33. Why Would You Not Report a Human Rights Violation? National Sample 2005

Finally, we asked them how well the Colombian State protects human rights. On a scale of 0 to 100, the national average is 48.2 (which does not differ from the result of 2004). Figure IX-34, and the statistical tests performed, show that this perception of efficiency is significantly lower in the Pacific region and Bogotá than in all other regions.



**Figure IX-34. . Perception of State Efficiency in the Protection of Human Rights by Region.  
National Sample 2005**

This perception of efficiency in the protection of human rights is significantly less among those who have been victims of the conflict (whether for death, displacement or exile of a family member) than for those who have not been.




Figure IX-35. Perception of State Efficiency in the Protection of Human Rights and Victimization by the Conflict. National Sample 2005



## Appendix A: Technical Description of the Sample

### Sample Design<sup>23</sup>

The sample in Colombia was designed to include all non-institutionalized adults (i.e., it excludes people living in the country's jails, schools, hospitals and military bases). It is a random stratified sample. The stratification ensures the inclusion of the most important geographic regions in the country: Pacific, Atlantic, Central, Eastern, the Old National Territories (*Antiguos Territorios Nacionales*), and Bogota. The sample was sub-stratified to include cities with more and with less than 300,000 inhabitants. Finally, the sample was further sub-stratified into urban and rural areas.

We used 2004 population projections for the 1993 Census, the most recent in Colombia. According to the census, 22 percent of the population inhabits the Atlantic region, 18 percent the Pacific, 24 percent the Central, 18 percent the Eastern, three percent in the Old National Territories, and 15 percent in Bogota.

Sample selection was also multistage. The first step was the municipality, then the census sector, followed by the census section, and finally the block, housing unit, and household. We used a quota system by gender and age to select the respondent inside each household.

We interviewed 1,487 respondents. Technically, our sampling error was  $\pm 2.6$  percent. This means that if we drew repeated samples in Colombia, 95 percent of them would reflect the views of the population with no lesser accuracy than  $\pm 2.6$  percent. Our sample, however, was stratified and clustered. This means that, although we increased the precision of the sample through stratification, the clusters we used to control fieldwork costs somewhat reduced it. Of course, other factors beyond sampling can also reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the questions, among others. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of  $\pm 2.6$  percent is very good.

Table A-1 summarizes the standard errors and design effects for some variables and indexes in the survey. The design effect (DEF) indicate the efficiency of a cluster design compared to a simple random design. A DEF of 1 indicates that the variances obtained in both designs are the same, meaning that the cluster design was as efficient as a simple random design. If the DEF is greater than 1, it means that the clustered design had a greater variance than that produced by a simple random design. And if the DEF is less than 1, it means that the variance of the cluster design is even smaller than that produced by the random design.

<sup>23</sup> This section and the following were adapted from the Costa Rica 2004 report, "*Democratic Culture, Citizen Security and Social Capital in Costa Rica*," by Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell.

**Table A-1. Standard Errors and Design Effects for Selected Variables**

```
pweight:  <none>      Number of obs(*) =    1487
Strata:   estrapri     Number of strata =         6
PSU:      upm          Number of PSUs  =    165
                        Population size =   1487
```

Mean	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Deff
q2	36.94956	.2429573	36.46972	37.42994	.4218436
ed	8.653432	.1987666	8.260869	9.045995	3.111623
wealth	4.749159	.1148371	4.522357	4.975962	5.038581
psa5	59.86464	.7575729	58.36844	61.36085	1.803944
tol	52.47252	.9958056	50.50581	54.43923	1.871466
exctot	.1509817	.0132412	.1248304	.1771331	1.16062
vb2r	.6452268	.0141062	.6173672	.6730864	1.283041
itlr	62.14689	.9869107	60.19775	64.09604	1.57537
mlr	67.37145	.6988318	65.99126	68.75164	1.52385
ls3r	78.68557	.781379	77.14235	80.22879	1.431366
ing4r	69.97636	.9332012	68.13329	71.81943	1.46954
coups	36.07397	1.329585	33.44804	38.69989	1.899064

(\*) Algunas variables contienen valores de omisión.

According to the above table, the cluster design for this survey was very efficient. In fact, with the exception of education, wealth, and tolerance, all the DEF were close to 1. The standard errors for most variables were also very moderate. Table A-2 shows the standard errors and DEF for the variable q2 (age) by cluster (region).

Table A-3, in turn, does the same for the Tolerance index. The DEF, as well as the standard errors, indicate that the cluster design by for the regions was more efficient than a simple random design.

**Table A-2 Standard Errors and Design Effects for Age by Region**

pweight:	<none>	Number of obs =	1487
Strata:	estrapri	Number of strata =	6
PSU:	upm	Number of PSUs =	165
		Population size =	1487

Mean	Subpop.	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Deff
q2						
	Atlántica	36.96129	.4678184	36.03735	37.88523	.3278206
	Bogotá	37.50862	.6836278	36.15846	38.85878	.501808
	Central	37.04469	.5383934	35.98137	38.10802	.4674513
	Oriental	36.21111	.533673	35.15711	37.26511	.4008669
	Pacífica	36.58935	.4313391	35.73746	37.44125	.2390172
Ant. Tr. Nales		39.2963	1.892138	35.55933	43.03326	1.103853

**Table A-3 Standard Errors and Design Effects for Tolerance by Region**

pweight:	<none>	Number of obs	=	1459
Strata:	estrapri	Number of strata	=	6
PSU:	upm	Number of PSUs	=	165
		Population size	=	1459

Mean	Subpop.	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Deff
tol						
	Atlántica	57.2374	2.587109	52.12787	62.34693	2.62035
	Bogotá	50.87382	1.865198	47.19006	54.55758	1.000855
	Central	53.1689	2.169709	48.88373	57.45407	2.065211
	Oriental	52.01894	2.075452	47.91993	56.11794	1.531916
	Pacífica	49.29745	2.001495	45.3445	53.25039	1.459799
	Ant. Tr. Nales	44.97863	6.783489	31.58127	58.376	3.524574

## Sample Results and Description of the Respondents

The probabilistic design of the sample, as well as the availability of a good sampling frame, are fair conditions to expect that the interviewed group is representative of the Colombian population. However, due to the effects of random errors and inevitable distortions of the sample design, the sample could deviate from the characteristics of the population it represents. It could include biases that should be reported. Table A-4 allows us to answer the question: how representative is the sample of the population? Below we compare some characteristics of the sample with the 1993 census.<sup>24</sup>

**Table A-4 Sample vs. 1993 Census (18 years or older)**

Características	Censo de 1993	Encuesta en Colombia
(N)	26,735,000	1,487
% de hombres	49	49
% > 30 años	42	60
% soltero	40	32
% casado o en unión libre	50	59
% con primaria	44	27
% con secundaria	34	52
% con educación post-secundaria	11	17
% en Región Atlántica	22	21
% en Bogotá	15	16
% en Región Central	24	24
% en Región Oriental	18	18
% en Región Pacífica	18	18
% en Antiguos Territorios Nacionales	3	4

<sup>24</sup> Projections for more recent years are not available for most indicators analyzed here.

We observe that there is congruity between the sample of this survey and the 1993 Census. Some characteristics such as age, gender, and regional residence are virtually identical. There is a slight deviation in the percentages of married and single people. And finally, there is a gap in the three education variables, where the widest is for people with secondary education, rising from 34 percent in the 1993 census to 52 percent in the 2004 survey. The explanation for the gaps in marriage and education variables may lie in the fact that the census is 12 years old. This is a long enough period for vast changes to occur in these variables. Unfortunately, there are no reliable projections for the education variables of the 1993 census for the adult population. There are some education projections which include current students, but this makes them a non-comparable statistic for this survey.

Because in general, the sample is representative of the population, there is no need to use weights. Therefore, the sample is self-weighted.

Table A-5 compares sample characteristics between men and women.

**Table A-5. Sample Characteristics by Gender**

Característica	Total	Hombres	Mujeres
(N)	1,487 (100%)	49.2%	50.8%
Edad promedio	36.9	37.3	36.6
% casado o en unión libre	59.5	60.1	58.8
Ingresos familiares (Moda)			
% entre 181,000 y 360,000 pesos	25.9	25.0	24.0

We used gender and age quotas to select respondents. Therefore, our percentages of men and women are very similar to each other. Their ages are also very similar, differing by only one year. There is a slight difference with respect to the percentage of married or in civil union, where men have a slightly higher percentage (56.7%) than women. In terms of family income, there is a higher percentage of women in the 181,000 to 360,000 pesos bracket, which corresponds to the family income mode, although the margin is very slim (2.6 percentage points).

Because of its 20-year experience as well as its leadership in complex, country-wide operations, the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), was chosen to develop the sampling process, the field interviews, and data entry, verification, and processing.

## Technical Description of the Sample Design

### *Universe*

The survey universe has national coverage of adults living in all the country's six regions: Bogota, Atlantic, Pacific, Central, and Eastern regions, and the Old National Territories. The universe is also comprised of adults living in urban and rural areas.



The universe was divided in two sectors: one of cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants, and the other of cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants.

### ***Population***

The sample was circumscribed to all non-institutionalized adults; in other words, it excludes people living in jails, schools, hospitals, and military bases. Private households in these areas were contemplated.

### ***Final Selection Unit***

Because the questionnaire included questions not limited to the respondent but also to other household members, the statistical unit of observation was the household. The respondent could only live in one household.

Because each household belongs to a housing unit, sometimes shared by more than one household (often relatively stable over time), each housing unit was selected as the final selection unit.

### ***Sampling Method***

We chose the probabilistic, stratified, multistage method with randomized selection of units at each stage. First, the sample is stratified by town size (cities with more and less than 300,000 inhabitants), then by region and area (rural and urban).

It is multistage sampling because within each urban area, it starts with Primary Sampling Units (sectors), followed by Secondary Units (sections), then Third Units (blocks) and Final Sampling Units (clusters of housing units) of 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each housing unit, the interviewer selected only one household as an Observation Unit.

The respondent was selected according to the age and gender quotas. In each block, the surveyor had to include at least one man and one woman in the following age groups:

- 18 to 27 years old
- 28 to 40 years old
- Over 40 years old

Each interviewer was assigned one specific block. Once in the area, interviewers listed the first 20 housing units they encountered. They had instructions to do a minimum of 8 surveys of the 20 housing units listed, balancing the gender and age quotas.

The selection method was chosen according to the following considerations:

We needed Representative samples at the following levels:

Nationally

First Stage Strata:

Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants

Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

Second State Strata:

Bogota

Atlantic Region

Pacific Region

Eastern Region

Central Region

Old National Territories

Third State Strata:

Urban Area

Rural Area

Study Domains:

Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants (obliged selection)

Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

- a) For each stage, we calculated margins of error that corresponded to minimum quality standards
- b) We sought to facilitate the operability of the interviews
- c) We worked with the best and most up to date sampling frame available for each municipality (population census, cartography, current housing unit listings, among others)

### ***Sampling Frame***

The sampling frame is constituted by the updated cartographic inventory and housing unit lists obtained from the 1993 census. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría obtained the 2003 versions from the Departamento Nacional de Estadística (DANE; National Statistics Department).

### *Calculations by Strata*

The sample is composed of 138 sampling points: 103 urban and 35 rural, distributed over 53 municipalities in 26 out of the 32 departments of Colombia.

### *Sample Sizes, Confidence Level, and Margins of Error*

The confidence levels anticipated for the national sample was 95 percent, with a margin of error of 2.6 percent, assuming a 50/50 proportion in the dichotomous variables.

The margins of error for a confidence level of 95 percent are:

**TAMAÑO DE MUESTRA Y MARGENES DE ERROR**  
Nivel de Confianza del 95%

<b>Estratos</b>	<b>Tamaño de Muestra</b>	<b>Margen de error</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Regiones</b>		<b>M.A.S.</b>	<b>M.P.C.</b>
Atlántica	323	5,45	5,58
Bogotá	231	6,45	6,59
Central	358	5,18	5,29
Oriental	274	5,92	6,05
Pacífica	263	6,04	6,18
Territorios Nacionales	54	13,34	13,63
<b>Áreas</b>			
Urbana	1107	2,96	3,01
Rural	396	4,92	5,03
<b>Total País</b>	1503	2,53	2,58

### *Non-Coverage Adjustment*

To ensure the efficiency, sufficiency, and coverage of the sample, we adopted an Non-Coverage Adjustment system which guarantees a maximum level of error and a minimum confidence level. In addition, the system eliminates biases resulting from the replacement of household units.

The system applies to the sample size (n) of each stratum a non-coverage factor defined by:

$$N^* = (1+t) n$$

Where:

T = rate of non-coverage

N\* = final sample size

We chose an average t of 0.18.

Thus,

$$N^* = (1 + 0.18) 1,500 = 1,770 \text{ adults}$$

By the end of the field interviews, we ended up with a real sample size of 1,487 respondents, 21 less than expected due to law and order issues (see “Final Comments on Survey Fieldwork”).

**Survey Team**

The CNC involved its five branches (Bogota, Cali, Medellin, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga) to ensure a high quality survey in the least possible time. Due to the country’s current security situation, we were advised to remain as little time as possible in most areas visited, which complicated the operations.

Due to the complexity of the questionnaire, we used our most experienced surveyors, many of which have more than 15 years of field experience.

The CNC involved a total of 101 staff members, distributed as follows:

**Table A-6. Universe, Total Population by Region and Area (rural/urban)**

Actividad	Total de personal
Coordinadores de campo	15
Supervisores	8
Encuestadores	45
Supervisores de calidad en campo	12
Codificadores	7
Digitadores	7
Verificadores de datos	7
Subtotal campo y digitación	101
Personal directivo y profesional	5
Personal administrativo	3
<b>Total personal del equipo</b>	<b>109</b>

## COLOMBIA: POBLACION TOTAL, PROYECCION AÑO 2004

Region	Area		
	Urbano	Rural	Total
Atlantica	6.912.796	2.843.894	9.756.690
Bogota	7.014.111	1.517	7.015.628
Central	7.659.319	3.093.365	10.752.684
Oriental	5.207.407	3.106.566	8.313.973
Pacifica	5.322.949	2.644.004	7.966.953
Territorios Nacionales	583.895	890.830	1.474.725
Total	32.700.477	12.580.176	45.280.653

## Distribucion Porcentual (%)

Region	Area		
	Urbano	Rural	Total
Atlantica	70,9	29,1	100
Bogota	100,0	0,0	100
Central	71,2	28,8	100
Oriental	62,6	37,4	100
Pacifica	66,8	33,2	100
Territorios Nacionales	39,6	60,4	100
Total	72,2	27,8	100

**Table A-7 Size and Distribution of the Sample by Strata**  
**TAMAÑOS Y DISTRIBUCION DE LA MUESTRA POR ESTRATOS**  
**RESUMEN GENERAL**

	Urbano	Rural	Total
<b>Atlantica</b>			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	127		127
- de 300,000 habitantes	112	84	196
Total Atlantica	239	84	323
<b>Bogota</b>			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	231		231
Total Bogota	231		231
<b>Central</b>			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	150		150
- de 300,000 habitantes	112	96	208
Total Central	262	96	358
<b>Oriental</b>			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	66		66
- de 300,000 habitantes	112	96	208
Total Oriental	178	96	274
<b>Pacifica</b>			
+ de 300,000 habitantes	91		91
- de 300,000 habitantes	88	84	172
Total Pacifica	179	84	263
<b>Territorios Nacionales</b>			
- de 300,000 habitantes	18	36	54
Total Territorios Nacionales	18	36	54
<b>Total</b>	1.107	396	1.503

**RESUMEN GENERAL**


Regiones	MUESTRA	UPM	PUNTOS DE MUESTREO
Atlantica	323	20	40
Bogota	231	1	33
Central	358	23	46
Oriental	274	20	34
Pacifica	263	16	34
Territorios Nacionales	54	6	6
<b>Total</b>	1.503	86	193




Table A-8. Selection of the Sample by Strata, Area and Municipality

Distribución de la Muestra ciudades con 300.000 o mas habitantes															
Region	Departamento	Municipio	Poblacion año 2004						Puntos de muestreo	Tamaño Punto de muestreo	Muestra				
			Total	Urbana	Rural	% Poblacion Total	% Urbano del Municipio	% Rural del Municipio			Total	Urbana	Rural	% de la Muestra	
ATLANTICA	ATLANTICO	BARRANQUILLA	1.359.700	1.356.873	2.827	3,0	99,8	0,2	6	7	42	42		2,8	
	ATLANTICO	SOLEDAD	336.190	334.135	2.055	0,7	99,4	0,6	2	6	12	12		0,8	
	BOLIVAR	CARTAGENA	1.004.074	927.657	76.417	2,2	92,4	7,6	5	7	36	35		2,3	
	CEESAR	VALLEDUPAR	371.763	300.500	71.213	0,8	80,8	19,2	2	6	12	12		0,8	
	CORDOBA	MONTERIA	343.607	289.340	54.267	0,8	78,1	21,9	2	6	12	12		0,8	
	MAGDALENA	SANTA MARTA	434.037	418.630	15.407	1,0	96,3	3,7	2	7	14	14		0,9	
SUBTOTAL			3.850.271	3.686.190	244.081	8,5	93,7	6,3	19		127	127		8,4	
BOGOTA	BOGOTA	BOGOTA	7.029.928	7.014.111	15.817	15,5	99,8	0,2	33	7	231	231		15,4	
			7.029.928	7.014.111	15.817	15,5	99,8	0,2	33		231	231		15,4	
CENTRAL	ANTIOQUIA	MEDELLIN	2.071.391	1.878.967	192.424	4,6	95,5	4,5	10	7	70	70		4,7	
	ANTIOQUIA	BELLO	390.012	383.144	6.868	0,9	98,2	1,8	2	6	12	12		0,8	
	CALDAS	MANIZALES	378.965	355.368	23.597	0,8	93,8	6,2	2	7	14	14		0,9	
	HUILA	NEIVA	367.811	344.544	23.267	0,8	93,7	6,3	2	6	12	12		0,8	
	QUINDIO	ARMENIA	316.301	309.391	6.910	0,7	97,8	2,2	2	6	12	12		0,8	
	RISARALDA	PEREIRA	510.739	430.355	80.384	1,1	84,3	15,7	2	8	16	16		1,1	
SUBTOTAL			4.446.460	4.177.658	268.802	1,0	94,0	6,0	2	7	14	14		0,9	
ORIENTAL	CUNDINAMARCA	SOACHA	310.036	304.343	5.695	0,7	98,3	1,7	2	6	12	12		0,8	
	META	VILLAVICENCIO	358.621	314.016	44.606	0,8	87,6	12,4	2	6	12	12		0,8	
	NORTE DE SANTANDER	CUCUTA	722.485	702.213	20.272	1,6	97,2	2,8	3	8	24	24		1,6	
	SANTANDER	BUCARAMANGA	568.136	562.340	5.796	1,3	99,0	1,0	3	6	18	18		1,2	
	SUBTOTAL			1.959.280	1.882.911	76.369	4,3	381,9	18,1	10		66	66		4,4
	PACIFICA	NARIÑO	PASTO	422.360	373.405	48.945	0,9	88,4	11,6	2	7	14	14		0,9
VALLE		CALI	2.369.696	2.342.141	27.555	5,2	98,8	1,2	11	7	77	77		5,1	
SUBTOTAL			2.792.046	2.715.546	76.500	6,2	97,3	2,7	13		91	91		6,1	
TOTAL			20.111.284	19.438.185	673.019	44,4	96,7	3,3	97		665	665		44,2	

Geographic Location of the Sample







## Final Comments on Survey Fieldwork

**About the questionnaire:** the questionnaire was long, 50 minutes on average, but in general the respondents were willing to answer the questions and we had very few uncompleted interviews.

Due to Colombia's internal conflict, some questions were especially delicate. Some interviewers mentioned that the series on page 8 of the questionnaire generated certain discomfort among some respondents. But to our surprise, we encountered very few refusals to answer those questions.

**About the fieldwork:** For security reasons, it was not possible to do 12 surveys in Chalán (Sucre) and 4 in Muzo (Boyacá).

In the rest of the country, some of our interviewers were stopped and interrogated by the illegal armed groups, who finally permitted them to continue their work.

Despite the fact that some respondents were located in areas with a strong presence of illegal armed groups, there was no reports of any kind of pressure to induce answers from respondents. On the contrary, the interviewers emphasized the free will of those who agreed to be part of the study.

The CNC would like to extend its gratitude to every staff members involved in this study, especially the brave men and women who defied security warnings and assumed great risk to accomplish very good work.



## **Appendix B: Questionnaire used in 2005 (in Spanish)**





## Centro Nacional de Consultoría.com

Versión # 30 28/07/2005 09:31 p.m. , Vanderbilt University IRB Approval: #050525

### AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: COLOMBIA, 2005

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<b>País:</b> México...1 Guatemala...2 El Salvador...3 Honduras...4 Nicaragua...5 Costa Rica...6 Panamá...7 Colombia...8 Ecuador...9 Bolivia...10	<b>PAIS</b>	8
<b>IDNUM.</b> Número de entrevista [asignado en la oficina no en campo]: _____	<b>IDNUM</b>	
<b>DOMINIO.</b> Muestra nacional.....1 Muestra especial.....2	<b>DOMINIO</b>	
<b>ESTRAPRI</b> <b>[COESTRA].</b> Estrato primario de la muestra:  <b>[Si DOMINIO = 1 (Muestra nacional), elija una de las siguientes regiones]</b> Región Atlántica.....11 Bogotá.....12 Central.....13 Oriental.....14 Pacífica.....15 Territorios Nal.....16  <b>[Si DOMINIO = 2 (Muestra especial), elija una de las siguientes regiones]</b> Southwest.....21 Urabá.....22 Macizo/Putumayo.....23 Magdalena Medio.....24	<b>ESTRAPRI</b>	

<b>COLDEPA.</b> Departamento: _____	<b>COLDEPA</b>	_ _
<b>ESTRASEC</b> [COLMUNI]. _____ Municipio: _____	<b>ESTRASEC</b>	_   _
<b>ESTRATER [UR].</b> Zona Urbano.....1 Rural.....2	<b>ESTRATER</b>	
<b>COLCENTRO.</b> Lugar: Corregimiento/Inspección.....1 _____ Vereda.....2 _____ Cabecera municipal.....3	<b>COLCENTRO</b>	
<b>COLCENPOB. [=PSU rural]</b> Centro poblado _____	<b>COLCENPOB.</b>	_   _
<b>COLESTSOC.</b> Estrato Socioeconómico: Urbano: 1 ____ 2 ____ 3 ____ 4 ____ 5 ____ 6 ____ Rural: 7 ____	<b>COLESTSOC</b>	
<b>COLSECT.</b> Sector: _____ Inap (rural, no hay sectores).... 9999	<b>COLSECT</b>	_ _ _
<b>COLSECC.</b> Sección: _____ Inap (rural, no hay secciones).... 9999	<b>COLSECC</b>	
<b>COLMANZ.</b> Manzana _____ Inap (rural, no hay manzanas).... 9999	<b>COLMANZ</b>	
<b>TAMANO.</b> Tamaño del lugar: Capital nacional (área metropolitana)....1 Ciudad grande.....2 Ciudad mediana.....3 Ciudad pequeña.....4 Área rural..... 5	<b>TAMANO</b>	
<b>COLIDIOMA.</b> Idioma del cuestionario (1) Español	<b>COLIDIOMA</b>	1

Hora de inicio: \_\_\_\_\_ :

<b>ANOTE: Sexo:</b> Hombre.....1      Mujer.....2	<b>Q1</b>	
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**A4 [COA4].** Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país?  
**[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

**A4**

Agua	19
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18
Conflicto armado	30
Corrupción	13
Crédito, falta de	09
Delincuencia, crimen, violencia	05
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56
Desempleo	03
Desigualdad	58
Desnutrición	23
Desplazamiento Forzado	32
Deuda Externa	26
Discriminación	25
Drogadicción	11
Economía	01
Educación	21
Electricidad, falta de	24
Explosión Demográfica	20
Guerra contra terrorismo	17
Inflación, altos precios	02
Mal gobierno	15
Medio ambiente	10
Migración	16
Narcotráfico	12
Pandillas	14
Pobreza	04
Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Salud	22
Secuestro	31
Seguridad (falta de)	27
Terrorismo	33
Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Violencia	57
Vivienda	55

Otro \_\_\_\_\_

NS.....88

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
<b>A1.</b> Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A1</b>	
<b>A2.</b> Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A2</b>	
<b>A3.</b> Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A3</b>	

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
<b>A4i.</b> Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A4i</b>	

<b>SOCT1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? Muy buena.....1 Buena.....2 Ni buena, ni mala.....3 Mala.....4 Muy mala.....5 No sabe.....8	<b>SOCT1</b>	
<b>SOCT3.</b> ¿Cree Ud. Que en los <b>próximos doce meses</b> la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? Mejor.....1 Igual.....2 Peor.....3 No sabe.....8	<b>SOCT3</b>	

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...	<b>CP5</b>	
<b>CP5.</b> ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Sí.....1 <b>[Seguir con CP5A]</b> No.....2 <b>[Pasará a COLEMP]</b> NS.....8 <b>[Pasará a COLEMP]</b>		

	Sí	No	NS	Inap		
<b>CP5A.</b> ¿Ha donado Dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5A</b>	
<b>CP5B.</b> ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5B</b>	
<b>CP5C.</b> ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5C</b>	
<b>CP5D.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5D</b>	
<b>COLEMP.</b> ¿Usted diría que hoy las oportunidades de trabajo en su comunidad son mejores, iguales o peores que el año pasado? Mejores.....1 Igual.....2 Peores.....3 No sabe.....8					<b>COLEMP</b>	



Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS		
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Asiste a reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>	
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Asiste a reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>	
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Asiste a reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? ¿Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP8</b>	
<b>COLCP8A.</b> ¿Asiste a reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal? ¿Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>COLCP8A</b>	
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Asiste a reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores? ¿Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP9</b>	
<b>CP10.</b> ¿Asiste a reuniones de un sindicato? ¿Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP10</b>	
<b>CP11.</b> ¿Asiste a reuniones de una cooperativa? ¿Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP11</b>	
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Asiste a reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? ¿Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP13</b>	

<b>COLSISBEN.</b> ¿Está usted afiliado al SISBEN? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....3	<b>COLSISBEN</b>	
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Ahora vamos a hablar de eficiencia y rendición de cuentas

	Si	No	NS		
<b>COLCP15A</b> ¿Ha participado usted, alguna vez, en algún comité de control ciudadano o de veeduría ciudadana?	1 [Siga]	2 [Pase a COLCP16A]	8 [Pase a COLCP16A]	<b>COLCP15A</b>	

<b>COLCP15A1</b> ¿Considera que la información sobre la administración municipal fue?	Accesible 1	Poco accesible 2	Reservada 3	NS 8	Inap. 9	<b>COLCP15A1</b>	
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	Sí	No	NS	Inap		
<b>COLCP15B</b> ¿Considera que la entidad pública a la que usted hizo control ciudadano cooperó con la veeduría?	1	2	8	9	<b>COLCP15B</b>	

	Si	No	NS	Inap		
<b>COLCP16A</b> ¿Usted considera que su <b>Municipio</b> rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	1	2	8		<b>COLCP16A</b>	
<b>COLCP16B [No aplica para Bogotá]</b> ¿Usted considera que su <b>Departamento</b> rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	1	2	8	9	<b>COLCP16B</b>	
<b>COLCP16C</b> ¿Usted Considera que el <b>Gobierno Nacional</b> rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	1	2	8		<b>COLCP16C</b>	

	Siempre	Casi siempre	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS	Inap		
<b>COLAC1A</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>municipio</b> consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...	1	2	3	4	5	8		<b>COLAC1A</b>	
<b>COLAC1B</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>municipio</b> hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...	1	2	3	4	5	8		<b>COLAC1B</b>	
<b>COLAC1C</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>municipio</b> comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...	1	2	3	4	5	8		<b>COLAC1C</b>	
<b>COLAC2A [No aplica para Bogotá]</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>departamento</b> consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	<b>COLAC2A</b>	
<b>COLAC2B [No aplica para Bogotá]</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>departamento</b> hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	<b>COLAC2B</b>	
<b>COLAC2C [No aplica para Bogotá]</b> ¿En su opinión, su <b>departamento</b> comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	<b>COLAC2C</b>	
<b>COLAC3A</b> ¿En su opinión, el <b>gobierno nacional</b> consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...	1	2	3	4	5	8		<b>COLAC3A</b>	
<b>COLAC3B</b> ¿En su opinión, el <b>gobierno nacional</b> hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...	1	2	3	4	5	8		<b>COLAC3B</b>	

<b>COLAC3C</b> ¿En su opinión, el <b>gobierno nacional</b> comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...	1	2	3	4	5	8	<b>COLAC3C</b>
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	<b>Algunas veces</b>	<b>Casi nunca</b>	<b>Nunca</b>	<b>NS</b>	
<b>PROT1.</b> ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	1	2	3	8	<b>PROT1</b>

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

<i>¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ?</i>	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>	
<b>CP2.</b> A algún Congresista	1	2	8	<b>CP2</b>
<b>CP4A</b> Al Alcalde de su municipio	1	2	8	<b>CP4A</b>
<b>COLCP1</b> A algún concejal de su municipio	1	2	8	<b>COLCP1</b>
<b>COLCP2</b> A algún Conciliador o Juez de paz	1	2	8	<b>COLCP2</b>
<b>COLCP3</b> A la Policía	1	2	8	<b>COLCP3</b>
<b>COLCP4</b> En alguna casa de justicia	1	2	8	<b>COLCP4</b>
<b>COLCP5</b> Al Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar	1	2	8	<b>COLCP5</b>
<b>COLCP6</b> A algún profesor	1	2	8	<b>COLCP6</b>

<b>LS3.</b> Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría que se encuentra ..?	<b>LS3</b>
Muy satisfecho.....1	
Algo satisfecho.....2	
Algo <b>insatisfecho</b> .....3	
Muy <b>insatisfecho</b> .....4	
NS.....8	

<b>IT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..?	<b>IT1</b>
Muy confiable.....1	
Algo confiable.....2	
Poco confiable.....3	
Nada confiable.....4	
NS.....8	
<b>IT2.</b> ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo?	<b>IT2</b>
Se preocupa de sí misma.....1      Trata de ayudar al prójimo.....2	
NS.....8	
<b>IT3.</b> ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, <b>trataría</b> de aprovecharse de Usted, o cree que no se aprovecharía de Usted?	<b>IT3</b>
Sí, se aprovecharían.....1      No se aprovecharían.....2	
NS.....8	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

	Sí	No	No sabe/ No recuerda		
<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunión convocada por el alcalde durante los últimos 12 meses?	1	2	8	<b>NP1</b>	
<b>NP1A.</b> ¿Ha asistido a una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?	1	2	8	<b>NP1A</b>	
<b>NP4 [CONP1A]</b> ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir o planificar el presupuesto o el plan anual de su municipio?	1	2	8	<b>NP4</b>	

	Mucho	Algo	Poco	Nada	NS		
<b>NP1B.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. Que los funcionarios del municipio hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>NP1B</b>	
<b>NP1C.</b> Si Ud. Tuviera una queja sobre algún problema local y lo llevara a algún miembro del concejo municipal, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. Que le haría caso?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>NP1C</b>	

	Sí	No	No sabe/ No recuerda	NP2	
<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal del municipio durante los últimos 12 meses?	1	2	8		

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	No sabe	Inap., no hay servicio		
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son...?	1	2	3	4	5	8		<b>SGL1</b>	
<b>SGL1A</b> y hablando del servicio municipal de agua potable ¿Diría que el servicio es...?	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	<b>SGL1A</b>	
<b>COLSGL1B.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Salud que el municipio está dando a la gente son...?	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	<b>COLSGL1B</b>	

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	No sabe	Inap., no hay servicio		
<b>COLSGL1C.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Energía Eléctrica que el municipio está dando a la gente son...?	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	<b>COLSGL1C</b>	
<b>SGL1D.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Recolección de Basura que el municipio está dando a la gente son...?	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	<b>SGL1D</b>	
<b>COLSGL1E.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Educación que el municipio está dando a la gente son...?	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	<b>COLSGL1E</b>	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares.

	Se justificaría	No se justificaría	NS		
<b>JC1.</b> Frente al Desempleo muy alto	1	2	8	<b>JC1</b>	
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales	1	2	8	<b>JC4</b>	
<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia	1	2	8	<b>JC10</b>	
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	1	2	8	<b>JC12</b>	
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción	1	2	8	<b>JC13</b>	
<b>COLJC14 [JC14].</b> Frente a un agravamiento del conflicto armado	1	2	8	<b>COLJC14</b>	
<b>COLJC15 [JC15].</b> Frente a una seria amenaza terrorista	1	2	8	<b>COLJC15</b>	

	Si podría haber	Nunca habría razón	NS		
<b>COLJC14A</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un cierre del Congreso por parte del presidente o cree que nunca hay razón suficiente para eso?	1	2	8	<b>COLJC14A</b>	
<b>COLJC14B</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un cierre de la Corte Constitucional por parte del presidente o cree que nunca hay razón suficiente para eso?	1	2	8	<b>COLJC14B</b>	
<b>JC13A</b> ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un golpe de estado o cree que nunca hay razón suficiente para eso?	1	2	8	<b>JC13A</b>	

<b>VIC1.</b> ¿Ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Sí.....1 <b>[siga]</b> No.....2 <b>[Pasar a ST1]</b> NS/NR..... 8 <b>[Pasar a ST1]</b>		<b>VIC1</b>	
<b>VIC2.</b> ¿Qué tipo de acto delictual sufrió? <b>[No lea las alternativas; una sola respuesta; Si más de uno, indicar el más grave]</b>  Robo sin agresión o amenaza física.....01 Robo con agresión o amenaza física.....02 Agresión física sin robo.....03 Violación o asalto sexual.....04 Secuestro.....05 Daño a la propiedad.....06 Robo de la casa.....07  Otro _____ (especifique)  NS.....88 Inap (no víctima).....99		<b>VIC2</b>	



	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR		
<b>ST4.</b> La alcaldía	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST4</b>	

<b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? Deben respetar las leyes siempre.....1 En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley.....2 NS.....8	<b>AOJ8</b>	
<b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? Muy seguro.....1 Algo seguro.....2 Algo inseguro.....3 Muy inseguro.....4 NS.....8	<b>AOJ11</b>	

	Mucho	Algo	Poco	Nada	NS/ NR		
<b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>AOJ11A</b>	
<b>AOJ12.</b> Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>AOJ12</b>	
<b>AOJ16.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto teme Ud. violencia por parte de miembros de su propia familia? ¿Diría que tiene mucho, algo, poco o nada de miedo?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>AOJ16</b>	
<b>AOJ17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>AOJ17</b>	

	Sí	No	NS/NR		
<b>WC1.</b> ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? (o tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?)	1	2	8	<b>WC1</b>	
<b>WC2.</b> ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país?	1	2	8	<b>WC2</b>	
<b>WC3.</b> ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?	1	2	8	<b>WC3</b>	



PREGUNTAR SÓLO SI LA RESPUESTA A WC1, WC2 o WC3 FUE “SÍ”. DE LO CONTRARIO, SALTAR A COLPAZ1A.

¿Qué grupo, o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? [NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS.  
EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES  
MENCIONADAS  
O (8) NS ]

	Sí	No	NS	Inap. (no fue víctima)		
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	8	9	COLWC4A	
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	8	9	COLWC4B	
COLWC4D. El Ejército	1	2	8	9	COLWC4D	
COLWC4E. La Policía	1	2	8	9	COLWC4E	
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	8	9	COLWC4F	

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	No sabe		
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor?	1	2	3	8	COLPAZ1A	
COLPAZ1B. Y con los grupos paramilitares, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución?	1	2	3	8	COLPAZ1B	

¿Qué tanto cree que es posible una solución negociada en un plazo razonable, diga usted de 4 años, con:

	Muy posible	Posible	Poco posible	Imposible	No sabe		
COLPAZ2A. Las FARC	1	2	3	4	8	COLPAZ2A	
COLPAZ2B. El ELN	1	2	3	4	8	COLPAZ2B	
COLPAZ2C. Los paramilitares	1	2	3	4	8	COLPAZ2C	

¿Estaría de acuerdo con la desmovilización y reinserción de:

	Sí	No	NS		
COLPAZ3A. La guerrilla	1	2	8	COLPAZ3A	
COLPAZ3B. Los paramilitares	1	2	8	COLPAZ3B	

COLPAZ4. ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de grupos guerrilleros mejoraría o empeoraría la seguridad de su región? [No leer #3]		
Mejoraría.....1		
Empeoraría.....2		
Se mantendría igual.....3		
NS.....8		
	COLPAZ4	

<b>COLPAZ5.</b> ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de grupos paramilitares mejoraría o empeoraría la seguridad de su región? <b>[No leer #3]</b>		
Mejoraría.....1		
Empeoraría.....2		
Se mantendría igual.....3		
NS.....8		
	<b>COLPAZ5</b>	

¿Usted ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con miembros desmovilizados de:

	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS</b>		
<b>COLPAZ6A.</b> La guerrilla	1	2	8	<b>COLPAZ6A</b>	
<b>COLPAZ6B.</b> Los paramilitares	1	2	8	<b>COLPAZ6B</b>	

**[Dele la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]**

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 - que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión, si usted no confía nada escogería el puntaje 1, y si, por el contrario, confía mucho, escogería el puntaje 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<b>Nada</b>						<b>Mucho</b>	<b>(8) No sabe</b>

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS 9=Inap.		
<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.		<b>B1</b>	
<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?		<b>B2</b>	
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?		<b>B3</b>	
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?		<b>B4</b>	
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político colombiano?		<b>B6</b>	
<b>B10A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		<b>B10A</b>	
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?		<b>B11</b>	
<b>B12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Fuerza Armadas?		<b>B12</b>	
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso Nacional?		<b>B13</b>	
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?		<b>B14</b>	
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?		<b>B15</b>	

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS 9=Inap.		
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la Nación?		B16	
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Defensoría del Pueblo?		B17	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía?		B18	
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría?		B19	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?		B20	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?		B21	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?		B32	
COLB32A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?		COLB32A	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser colombiano?		B43	
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47	
B52 [COB48]. [No aplica a Bogotá] ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Gobernación de su departamento?		B52	
B50 [B49]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?		B50	
B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?		B23	
COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las FARC?		COLB60	
COLB61. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el ELN?		COLB61	
COLB62. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Autodefensas?		COLB62	

**[NO RECOJER TARJETA “A”]**

Ahora, en una escala diferente

COLB50. ¿Usted diría que las decisiones de las autoridades Judiciales son:		
Muy lentas.....1		
Lentas.....2		
Razonables en tiempo.....3		
Rápidas.....4		
Muy rápidas.....5		
NS.....8		
	COLB50	

Cómo considera usted el **acceso** a los siguientes servicios de justicia: Muy Bueno, Bueno, Regular, Malo, Muy Malo

	Muy bueno	Bueno	Regular	Malo	Muy malo	NS	
COLB51A En las Comisarias de familia	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51A
COLB51B En la Fiscalía	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51B
COLB51C En las Inspecciones de Policía	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51C
COLB51D En los Consultorios Jurídicos	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51D
COLB51E En la Defensoría del Pueblo	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51E
COLB51F En los Juzgados	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51F

	Muy bueno	Bueno	Regular	Malo	Muy malo	NS		
COLB51G En la casa de justicia	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51G	

<b>COLB52.</b> Cuando usted enfrenta un conflicto legal, civil, interpersonal, etc., Usted: <b>[Sólo una opción; si más de uno, indicar lo que haría <u>principalmente.</u>]</b> No hace nada.....1 Concilia con la contraparte.....2 Lo resuelve a su manera.....3 Acude a una autoridad judicial.....4 Consigue un abogado.....5 Acude a una Casa de Justicia.....6 NS.....8		COLB52	
<b>COLB53.</b> ¿Usted ha participado en alguna conciliación? Sí.....1 <b>[Siga]</b> No.....2 <b>[Pase a COLB54]</b> NS.....8 <b>[Pase a COLB54]</b>		COLB53	
<b>COLB53B.</b> ¿Qué tan satisfecho quedó usted con la forma en que se llevó a cabo el proceso de conciliación? Totalmente satisfecho.....1 Satisfecho.....2 Ni satisfecho ni Insatisfecho.....3 Insatisfecho.....4 Totalmente insatisfecho.....5 NS.....8 Inap.....9		COLB53B	
<b>COLB54.</b> ¿Cree usted que el hecho de que las audiencias en los procesos penales sean públicas, dentro de un tribunal abierto al público, contribuye a disminuir la impunidad? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS.....8		COLB54	

<b>COLB55.</b> ¿Cuando usted oye el término Defensa Pública, usted cree que es: La defensa en un proceso penal contra el Gobierno.....1 La defensa gratuita que provee el Estado a los ciudadanos que no pueden pagar un abogado.....2 Cuando una persona expone sus argumentos en los medios de comunicación.....3 NS.....8		COLB55	
<b>COLB55A.</b> ¿Sabía Usted que en caso de no tener dinero para pagar un abogado en un proceso penal, usted tiene el derecho a un abogado pagado por el Estado para su defensa? Sí.....1 No.....2		COLB55A	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Nada						Mucho	(8) No sabe

Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual, o sea el gobierno del Presidente Álvaro Uribe (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS		
N1. Combate la pobreza.		N1	
N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.		N3	
N9. Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.		N9	
N10 [CON10] Protege los derechos humanos		N10	
COLN11. Resuelve el conflicto armado		COLN11	
COLN12. Sanea las finanzas estatales		COLN12	
N11. Mejora la seguridad ciudadana		N11	
N12 [CON14] Combate el desempleo		N12	

[Recoja tarjeta "A"]

**[Entregue al entrevistado tarjeta "B"]**

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo			(8) No sabe

	Anotar 1-7, NS=8		
<b>ING4.</b> Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		<b>ING4</b>	
<b>PN2.</b> A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los colombianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		<b>PN2</b>	
<b>COLCONST1.</b> La Constitución expresa los valores y las aspiraciones de los colombianos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		<b>COLCONST 1</b>	
<b>DEM23.</b> Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		<b>DEM23</b>	
<b>COLADAM1.</b> Los cultivos de coca y amapola son perjudiciales para su región. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		<b>COLADAM1</b>	

**[RECOGER TARJETA B]**

<b>COLADAM2.</b> ¿Usted considera que la gente cultiva coca o amapola <b>principalmente</b> por motivos económicos, por presión de algún grupo armado ilegal o por falta de oportunidades? <b>[SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]</b> Motivos económicos.....1 Presión de algún grupo armado.....2 Falta de oportunidades.....3 NS.....8	<b>COLADAM2</b>	
<b>COLADAM3.</b> ¿Usted cree que la razón <b>principal</b> para la reducción de cultivos de coca en el país es la fumigación, los programas de desarrollo alternativo o la erradicación manual voluntaria? <b>[SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]</b> Fumigación.....1 Desarrollo alternativo.....2 Erradicación manual voluntaria.....3 Ninguna.....4 NS.....8	<b>COLADAM3</b>	

**[Entregue al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora le voy a entregar otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 10 indicando que **aprueba firmemente** y el 1 indicando que **desaprueba firmemente**. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus

	Anotar 1-10, 88 NS		
<b>E5.</b> Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.		<b>E5</b>	
<b>E8.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.		<b>E8</b>	
<b>E11.</b> Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.		<b>E11</b>	
<b>E15.</b> Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.		<b>E15</b>	
<b>E14.</b> Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.		<b>E14</b>	
<b>E2.</b> Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.		<b>E2</b>	
<b>E3.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.		<b>E3</b>	
<b>E16.</b> Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales		<b>E16</b>	

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Por favor vea la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 10 significa que aprueba firmemente y 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y usted puede decirme cualquier número en esta escala dependiendo de con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba estas acciones.

	Anotar 1- 10,88= NS	
<b>D32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?		<b>D32</b>
<b>D33.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político colombiano?		<b>D33</b>
<b>D34.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?		<b>D34</b>
<b>D36.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?		<b>D36</b>
<b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		<b>D37</b>

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Colombia. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos **[sigue tarjeta C]**.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)		(88)
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe	

	Anotar 1-10, NS=88			
<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]</b>		<b>D1</b>		
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		<b>D2</b>		
<b>D3.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D3</b>		
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?		<b>D4</b>		
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los <b>homosexuales</b> , ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D5</b>		

**[Recoja tarjeta "C"]**

Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos:	Muy poca	Suficiente	Demasiada	NS		
<b>LIB1.</b> Libertad de prensa	1	2	3	8	<b>LIB1</b>	
<b>LIB2.</b> Libertad de opinión	1	2	3	8	<b>LIB2</b>	
<b>LIB3.</b> Participación política	1	2	3	8	<b>LIB3</b>	
<b>LIB4.</b> Protección a derechos humanos	1	2	3	8	<b>LIB4</b>	



<b>ACR1.</b> Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cuál de las tres describe mejor su opinión: La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o.....1 Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o.....2 Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios.....3 NS.....8	<b>ACR1</b>	
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<b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia? Muy satisfecho.....1 Satisfecho.....2 Insatisfecho.....3 Muy insatisfecho.....4 NS/NR.....8	<b>PN4</b>	
<b>PN5.</b> En su opinión Colombia es ¿muy democrática, algo democrática, poco democrática, o nada democrática? Muy democrática.....1 Algo democrática.....2 Poco democrática.....3 Nada democrática.....4 NS/NR.....8	<b>PN5</b>	
<b>PN6.</b> ¿Basado en su experiencia en los últimos años, Colombia se ha vuelto más democrática, igual de democrática o menos democrática? Más democrática.....1 Igual de democrática.....2 Menos democrática.....3 NS/NR.....8	<b>PN6</b>	

<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.....1 La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.....2 En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.....3 NS/NR.....8	<b>DEM2</b>	
<b>DEM14 [CODEM14]</b> ¿Cuál es la mejor forma para fortalecer la democracia en Colombia? [Por favor, lea cada una de estas opciones. Sólo UNA alternativa.] Fortaleciendo la justicia.....1 Fortaleciendo la Policía.....2 Mejorando los servicios que ofrece el Estado.....3 Combatiendo la corrupción.....4 Desarrollando fuentes de empleo.....5 Resolviendo el conflicto armado.....7 [No leer] Ninguna de las anteriores... ..6 NS.....8	<b>DEM14</b>	

<b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen bien, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa? Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido.....1 La democracia electoral es lo mejor.....2 NS/NR.....8	<b>AUT1</b>	
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Ahora vamos a hablar sobre derechos humanos

<b>COLDH1.</b> ¿Qué tan eficiente ha sido el Estado Colombiano en prevenir las violaciones masivas a los Derechos Humanos (Masacres y Desplazamiento Forzado)? Muy eficiente.....1 Eficiente.....2 Ineficiente.....3 Muy ineficiente.....4 NS.....8	<b>COLDH1</b>	
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<p><b>COLDH2.</b> ¿En caso de tener conocimiento o ser objeto de una violación a los derechos humanos, a cuál de las siguientes instituciones acudiría usted para denunciar el hecho?  <b>Por favor, elija la más importante</b></p> <p>Defensoría del Pueblo.....1  Policía.....2  Procuraduría General de la Nación.....3  Fiscalía General.....4  Personería municipal.....5  Ministerio del Interior y la Justicia.....6  Ninguna de las anteriores.....7  NS.....8</p> <p><b>[Si eligió “(7) ninguna de las anteriores” continúe, de lo contrario pase a COLDH3]</b></p>	<b>COLDH2</b>	
<p><b>COLDH2A.</b> ¿Por qué eligió “ninguna de las anteriores”? <b>[Leer alternativas; marcar solo una opción]</b></p> <p>Por temor.....1  Por falta de confianza.....2  Porque no es su función.....3  Por ineficiente.....4  Porque no sirve de nada.....5  NS.....8  INAP.....9</p>	<b>COLDH2A</b>	
<p><b>COLDH3.</b> Hay gente que dice que la política de seguridad democrática del presidente Álvaro Uribe ha incrementado, y otros dicen que ha disminuido violaciones a los derechos humanos como el desplazamiento forzoso, las masacres, los secuestros, y otras. ¿Usted cree que la política de Seguridad Ciudadana del presidente Álvaro Uribe, ha incrementado o disminuido las violaciones a los Derechos Humanos?</p> <p>Incrementado.....1  Disminuido.....2  Algunos tipos de violaciones a los derechos humanos han disminuido y otros aumentado.....3 [No leer]  NS.....8</p>	<b>COLDH3</b>	
<p><b>PP1.</b> Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? <i>[lea las alternativas]</i></p> <p>Frecuentemente.....1  De vez en cuando.....2  Rara vez.....3  Nunca.....4  NS/NR.....8</p>	<b>PP1</b>	



	No	Si	NS	INAP		
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿UD. trabaja? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a EXC14, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente]	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC13</b>	
En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?						
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a EXC15, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente]	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC14</b>	
¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?						
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos <i>públicos</i> en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a EXC16, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente]	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC15</b>	
Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida?						
<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a EXC7, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente]	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC16</b>	
En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?						

Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia, ¿la corrupción de	Muy generalizada	Algo generalizada	Poco generalizada	Nada generalizada	NS/ NR		
<b>EXC7.</b> los funcionarios públicos está...?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>EXC7</b>	
<b>COLEXC7.</b> Los funcionarios municipales está...?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>COLEXC7</b>	
<b>COLEXC8.</b> Los funcionarios de la personería municipal está...?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>COLEXC8</b>	
<b>COLEXC10.</b> Los funcionarios departamentales está...?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>COLEXC10</b>	
<b>COLEXC11.</b> Los jueces está...?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>COLEXC11</b>	

Ahora me puede decir...	Correcto	Incorrecto (no sabe)		
<b>GI1.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [No leer, George W. Bush]	1	2	<b>GI1</b>	
<b>GI3 [GI2].</b> ¿Recuerda usted cuantos departamentos tiene Colombia? [No leer, 32]	1	2	<b>GI3</b>	
<b>GI4 [GI3].</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Colombia? [No leer, cuatro años]	1	2	<b>GI4</b>	
<b>GI5 [GI4].</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [No leer, Lula]	1	2	<b>GI5</b>	

**L1. MOSTRAR TARJETA "D":** Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría en esta escala?

01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	<b>L1</b>	
<b>Izquierda</b>					<b>Derecha</b>					(NS=88)	

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted <b>sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor?</b> [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	<b>SIN TEMOR</b>	<b>UN POCO DE TEMOR</b>	<b>MUCHO TEMOR</b>	<b>NS</b>		
<b>DER1.</b> ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER1</b>	
<b>DER2.</b> ¿Votar en una elección política?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER2</b>	
<b>DER3.</b> ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER3</b>	
<b>DER4.</b> ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER4</b>	

<b>VB1.</b> ¿Tiene cédula de ciudadanía?	<b>VB1</b>	
Sí.....1                      No.....2                      En trámite.....3 NS.....8		
<b>VB2.</b> ¿Votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2002?	<b>VB2</b>	
Sí votó.....1                      No votó.....2                      NS.....8		
<b>VB5 [COVB5].</b> Ahora dígame ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones para Alcalde en el 2003?	<b>VB5</b>	
Sí votó.....1                      No votó.....2                      NS.....8		

<b>VB7. [COVB6].</b> Ahora dígame ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones para Congreso en el 2002? Sí votó.....1      No votó.....2      NS.....8	<b>VB7</b>	
<b>COLVB8.</b> Se considera Usted miembro o simpatizante del Partido Conservador, del Polo Democrático, del Partido Liberal, de otro movimiento político, o se considera usted independiente o sin partido?" <b>[SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]</b> Partido Conservador .....1 <b>[PASA A COLVB10A]</b> Polo Democrático.....2 <b>[PASA A COLVB10A]</b> Partido Liberal.....3 <b>[PASA A COLVB10A]</b> Otro.....4 <b>[PASA A COLVB10A]</b> Independiente/sin partido.....5 <i>[Sigue con COLVB9]</i> NS.....8 <b>[PASA A COLVB10A]</b>	<b>COLVB8</b>	
<b>COLVB9. [SÓLO SI CONTESTÓ "(5) Independiente/sin partido" EN LA PREGUNTA ANTERIOR]</b> Considera usted que se inclina más hacia los Liberales, hacia los Conservadores o hacia el Polo Democrático? <b>[SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]</b> Liberales.....1 Conservadores.....2 Polo Democrático.....3 Otro.....4 Ninguno.....5 NS.....8 INAP.....9	<b>COLVB9</b>	
<b>[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "B"]</b> <b>COLVB10A.</b> Ahora, vamos a usar otra tarjeta. El punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la siguiente afirmación.  Es bueno para el país que exista en general la posibilidad de la reelección presidencial ____ (ANOTAR 1 a 7). (8) NS	<b>COLVB10A</b>	
<b>[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "D"]</b> En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10, que va de izquierda a derecha. En esta escala de tendencias políticas, ¿Dónde ubicaría los siguientes personajes de la vida nacional?  <b>COLVB10B.</b> Horacio      Serpa      Uribe____ (ANOTAR 1 a 10) NS/NR.....88	<b>COLVB10B</b>	
<b>COLVB10C.</b> Alvaro      Uribe      Vélez      ____ (ANOTAR 1 a 10) NS/NR.....88	<b>COLVB10C</b>	
<b>COLVB10D.</b> Antonio      Navarro      Wolf      ____ (ANOTAR 1 a 10) NS/NR.....88	<b>COLVB10D</b>	
<b>COLVB10E.</b> César      Gaviria      Trujillo____ (ANOTAR 1 A 10) NS/NR.....88	<b>COLVB10E</b>	

<b>COLVB10F.</b> Si las elecciones presidenciales fueran mañana y los candidatos en segunda vuelta fueran Álvaro Uribe Vélez y César Gaviria Trujillo, ¿por quién votaría? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> Álvaro Uribe.....1 César Gaviria.....2 Le da lo mismo.....3 No votaría/votaría en blanco.....4 NS/NR.....8	<b>COLVB10F</b>	
<b>COLVB10F1.</b> Si las elecciones presidenciales fueran mañana y los candidatos en segunda vuelta fueran Álvaro Uribe Vélez y Antonio Navarro Wolf, ¿por quién votaría? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> Álvaro Uribe.....1 Antonio Navarro.....2 Le da lo mismo.....3 No votaría/votaría en blanco.....4 NS/NR.....8	<b>COLVB10F1</b>	
<b>COLVB10G.</b> Si las elecciones presidenciales fueran mañana y los candidatos en segunda vuelta fueran Álvaro Uribe Vélez y Horacio Serpa Uribe, ¿por quién votaría? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> Álvaro Uribe.....1 Horacio Serpa.....2 Le da lo mismo.....3 No votaría/votaría en blanco.....4 NS/NR.....8	<b>COLVB10G</b>	
<b>COLVB10H.</b> Y entre César Gaviria Trujillo y Antonio Navarro Wolf, ¿por quién votaría? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> César Gaviria.....1 Antonio Navarro.....2 Le da lo mismo.....3 No votaría/votaría en blanco.....4 NS/NR.....8	<b>COLVB10H</b>	
<b>COLVB10J.</b> Y entre César Gaviria Trujillo y Horacio Serpa Uribe, ¿por quién votaría? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> César Gaviria.....1 Horacio Serpa.....2 Le da lo mismo.....3 No votaría/votaría en blanco.....4 NS/NR.....8	<b>COLVB10J</b>	
<b>COLVB10K.</b> Y entre Horacio Serpa Uribe y Antonio Navarro Wolf, ¿por quién votaría? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> Horacio Serpa.....1 Antonio Navarro.....2 Le da lo mismo.....3 No votaría/votaría en blanco.....4 NS/NR.....8	<b>COLVB10K</b>	



Ahora vamos a hablar sobre el gobierno municipal

	Casi siempre	La mayoría de las veces	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/ NR		
<b>COLLG1.</b> ¿Cree usted que el municipio responde a lo que quiere el pueblo?	1	2	3	4	5	8	<b>COLLG1</b>	
<b>COLLG2.</b> ¿Considera usted que el municipio permite la participación ciudadana en la gestión municipal?	1	2	3	4	5	8	<b>COLLG2</b>	

<b>LGL3. [COLG3]</b> ¿Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que éste pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más?		
Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos.....1		
NO estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos.....2		
NS.....8		

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

[Encuestador: llenar:] \_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código y poner un circulo alrededor del número que corresponde]

Ninguno = 00	Primer año de...	Segundo año de...	Tercer año de...	Cuarto año de..	Quinto año de...	Sexto año de...	Séptimo año de	ED	
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	--	--		
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11	--		
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18		
No sabe/no responde	88								

<b>Q2.</b> ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	<b>Q2</b>	_ _
<b>Q3.</b> ¿Cuál es su religión? [no leer alternativas]	<b>Q3</b>	
Católica.....1		
Cristiana no católica.....2		
Otra no cristiana.....3		
Evangélica ..... 5		
Ninguna.....4		
O		
No sabe o no quiere mencionar.....8		

<b>Q4.</b> ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido Ud. a la iglesia (culto, templo) durante el mes pasado? Todas las semanas.....1      De vez en cuando.....2      Rara vez.....3      Nunca.....4 NS.....8	<b>Q4</b>	
<b>Q10.</b> ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares <i>mensuales</i> de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? <b>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E]</b> Ningún ingreso.....0 Menos de \$90.000.....1 Entre \$91.000-\$180.000.....2 \$181.000 - \$360.000.....3 \$361.000 - \$720.000.....4 \$721.000 - \$1.000.000.....5 \$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000.....6 \$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000.....7 \$2.000.001 - \$3'000.000.....8 \$3.000.001 - \$4.000.000.....9 \$4.000.001 – o más.....10 NS (o no quiere decir).....88	<b>Q10</b>	
<b>Q10A.</b> ¿Recibe su familia remesas o giros del exterior? Sí.....1 No.....2 <b>[saltar a Q11]</b> NS/NR.....8 <b>[saltar a Q11]</b>	<b>Q10A</b>	
<b>Q10B.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? Mucho.....1      Algo.....2      Poco.....3      Nada.....4 NS/NR.....8      Inap.....9	<b>Q10B</b>	
<b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? <b>[no leer alternativas]</b> Soltero.....1 Casado.....2 Unión libre (acompañado).....3 Divorciado.....4 Separado.....5 Viudo.....6 NS/NR.....8	<b>Q11</b>	
<b>Q12.</b> ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno) NS.....88	<b>Q12</b>	
<b>Q13.</b> ¿Cuántos hijos debería tener una persona como usted en toda la vida? _____ NS.....88	<b>Q13</b>	
<b>Q14.</b> ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? Sí.....1      No.....2      NS.....8	<b>Q14</b>	

<b>COLETID.</b> ¿Se considera blanco(a), mestizo(a), indígena o Afrocolombiano(a)/negro(a)? Blanco(a).....1 Mestizo(a).....2 Indígena.....3 Afrocolombiano(a)/negro(a).....4 Otro _____ NS/NR.....8	<b>COLETID</b>	
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[leer todos]**

<b>R1.</b> Televisor	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R1</b>	
<b>R3.</b> Nevera	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R3</b>	
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono convencional (no celular)	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R4</b>	
<b>R4A.</b> Teléfono celular	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R4A</b>	
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo [no moto]	No 0	Uno 1	Dos 2	Tres o más 3	<b>R5</b>	
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R6</b>	
<b>R7.</b> Microondas	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R7</b>	
<b>R8.</b> Motocicleta	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R8</b>	
<b>R12.</b> Agua potable dentro de la casa	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R12</b>	
<b>R14.</b> Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R14</b>	
<b>R15.</b> Computador	No....0			Sí.....1	<b>R15</b>	

<b>DESOC1.</b> ¿Ha estado desocupado (desempleado) durante el último año? Sí.....1 No.....2 Pensionado/rentista.....3 NS.....8	<b>DESOC1</b>	
<b>OCUP1.</b> Cuál es su ocupación principal? <i>[Mostrar lista de ocupaciones Tarjeta F]</i>  Profesional, directivo.....01 Oficinista.....02 Vendedor.....03 Empresario agrícola.....44 Campesino.....04 Jornalero o peón agrícola.....05 Servicio Domestico.....06 Otros servicios.....07 Obrero especializado.....10 Obrero no especializado.....11 Estudiante .....12 <b>[Salte al Final]</b> Ama de casa.....13 <b>[Salte al Final]</b> Pensionado rentista.....14 <b>[Salte al Final]</b> NS.....88 <i>(Ojo: esta respuesta no está en la tarjeta; únicamente úsala si no contesta la pregunta)</i>	<b>OCUP1</b>	
<b>OCUP1A</b> En esta ocupación por lo general Usted es: Asalariado del gobierno?.....1 Asalariado sector privado?.....2 Patrono o socio de empresa con menos de 5 empleados?.....3 Patrono o socio de empresa con 5 o más empleados?.....4 Trabajador por cuenta propia?.....5 Trabajador no remunerado?.....6 NS.....8 Inap.....9	<b>OCUP1A</b>	
<b>[SI OCUP1 es campesino (código 4) o jornalero/peón agrícola (código 5) o empresario agrícola (código 44) SIGA. DE LO CONTRARIO, VAYA AL FINAL ("Hora terminada la entrevista")]</b>		

<b>COLADAM4.</b> ¿Usted es el propietario de alguna finca? Sí.....1 No.....2 <b>[pase a COLADAM10A]</b> NS.....8 <b>[pase a COLADAM10A]</b> Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]	<b>COLADAM4</b>	
<b>COLADAM5.</b> ¿Tiene producción animal en su finca? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS.....8 Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]	<b>COLADAM5</b>	
<b>COLADAM6.</b> ¿Tiene cultivos de pancoger? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS.....8 Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]	<b>COLADAM6</b>	
<b>COLADAM7.</b> ¿Usted comercializa la mayoría de sus productos en... Su finca.....1 En el mercado local o de su municipio.....2 En mercados fuera de su región.....3 No comercializa productos.....4 [No leer] Otro.....5 NS.....8 Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]	<b>COLADAM7</b>	
<b>COLADAM8.</b> ¿Ha recibido algún apoyo del gobierno para el desarrollo de su producción agrícola? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS.....8 Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]	<b>COLADAM8</b>	

<p><b>COLADAM9.</b> De los siguientes aspectos, ¿cuál cree usted que es el mayor obstáculo para la comercialización de sus productos?  <b>[Leer todas; marcar una sola opción]</b>          La falta de vías, carreteras y comunicaciones.....1          Los costos del transporte de sus productos .....2          El empaque o el embalaje de los productos.....3          Las formas de pago de los compradores.....4          La falta de centros de acopio.....5          NS.....8          Inap.....9          [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]</p>	<p><b>COLADAM9</b></p>	
<p><b>COLADAM10.</b> ¿Cuál es el tamaño de sus tierras?          [ANOTAR AQUÍ LA CIFRA MENCIONADA.          SALTAR A <b>COLADAM10B</b> Y MARCAR LA UNIDAD DE MEDIDA UTILIZADA POR EL ENCUESTADO]          _____ [8888= NS; 9999= Inap]</p>	<p><b>COLADAM10</b></p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; display: flex; justify-content: space-between; padding: 2px;"> <span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span> </div>
<p><b>COLADAM10A.</b> ¿Cuál es el tamaño de la finca donde trabaja?          [ANOTAR LA CIFRA MENCIONADA Y MARCAR EN <b>COLADAM10B</b> LA UNIDAD DE MEDIDA UTILIZADA POR EL ENCUESTADO]          _____ [8888= NS; 9999= Inap]</p>	<p><b>COLADAM10A</b></p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; display: flex; justify-content: space-between; padding: 2px;"> <span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span> </div>
<p><b>COLADAM10B.</b> [SELECCIONAR LA UNIDAD DE MEDIDA UTILIZADA EN COLADAM10 o COLADAM10A]          Hectáreas.....1          Fanegadas.....2          Kilómetros cuadrados.....3          Otra unidad _____          NS.....8          Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p><b>COLADAM10B</b></p>	
<p><b>COLADAM11.</b> ¿Alguna vez alguien lo ha presionado para cultivar coca o amapola?          Sí.....1          No.....2          NS.....8          Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p><b>COLADAM11</b></p>	
<p><b>COLADAM12.</b> ¿Alguna vez ha cultivado coca o amapola?          Sí.....1          No.....2 [Pase al FINAL]          NS.....8 [Pase al FINAL]          Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p><b>COLADAM12</b></p>	

<p><b>COLADAM13.</b> ¿Ha participado en algún proyecto de desarrollo alternativo o de promoción de cultivos lícitos?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2 [Pase a COLADAM14]</p> <p>NS.....8 [Pase a COLADAM14]</p> <p>Inap.....9</p> <p>[respuesta 2 o 8 en COLADAM12, o no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<b>COLADAM13</b>	
<p><b>COLADAM13A.</b> ¿Qué tan satisfecho está con el proyecto de desarrollo alternativo? (Leer todas)</p> <p>Totalmente satisfecho.....1</p> <p>Satisfecho.....2</p> <p>Ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho.....3</p> <p>Insatisfecho.....4</p> <p>Totalmente insatisfecho.....5</p> <p>NS.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9</p> <p>[respuesta 2 o 8 en COLADAM13 o COLADAM12, o no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<b>COLADAM13A</b>	
<p><b>COLADAM14.</b> ¿Alguna vez ha sustituido cultivos de coca o amapola por cultivos lícitos?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2 [Pase al FINAL]</p> <p>NS.....8 [Pase al FINAL]</p> <p>Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<b>COLADAM14</b>	
<p><b>COLADAM15.</b> ¿Ha vuelto a cultivar coca o amapola?</p> <p>Sí.....1 [Pase al FINAL]</p> <p>No.....2</p> <p>NS.....3</p> <p>Inap.....9</p> <p>[respuesta 2 o 8 en COLADAM14 o COLADAM12, o no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<b>COLADAM15</b>	
<p><b>COLADAM16.</b> ¿Ha pensado en volver a cultivar coca o amapola?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2</p> <p>NS.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9</p> <p>[respuesta 2 o 8 en COLADAM14 o COLADAM12, o no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<b>COLADAM16</b>	

<b>FINAL</b> <b>Hora terminada la entrevista</b> _____ : _____ <b>TI. Duración de la entrevista</b> <i>[minutos, ver página # 1]</i> _____	<b>TI</b>	
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*Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.*

*Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.*

*Firma del entrevistador* \_\_\_\_\_ *Fecha* \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / 05 *Firma del supervisor de campo*  
 \_\_\_\_\_

*Firma del codificador* \_\_\_\_\_

*Comentarios:*


\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

*Firma de la persona que digitó los datos* \_\_\_\_\_

*Firma de la persona que verificó los datos* \_\_\_\_\_



Tarjeta A



**Tarjeta B**

<b>Muy de Acuerdo</b>	<b>7</b>
	<b>6</b>
	<b>5</b>
	<b>4</b>
	<b>3</b>
	<b>2</b>
<b>Muy en Desacuerdo</b>	<b>1</b>

**Tarjeta C**

<b>Aprueba Firmemente</b>	10
	9
	8
	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
<b>Desaprueba Firmemente</b>	1

Tarjeta D

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda									Derecha

**Tarjeta E**

**Los ingresos familiares *mensuales* de esta casa:**

- (0) Ningún ingreso**
- (1) Menos de \$90.000**
- (2) Entre \$91.000-\$180000**
- (3) \$181.000 - \$360.000**
- (4) \$361.000 - \$720.000**
- (5) \$721.000 - \$1.000.000**
- (6) \$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000**
- (7) \$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000**
- (8) \$2.000.001 - \$3'000.000**
- (9) \$3.000.001 - \$4'000.000**
- (10) \$4.000.001 – o más**

## **Tarjeta F**

**¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? Por favor léame el número.**

- 1. Profesional, directivo**
- 2. Oficinista**
- 3. Vendedor**
- 44. Empresario agrícola**
- 4. Campesino**
- 5. Jornalero o Peón agrícola**
- 6. Servicio Domestico**
- 7. Otros servicios**
- 10. Obrero especializado**
- 11. Obrero no especializado**
- 12. Estudiante**
- 13. Ama de casa**
- 14. Pensionado rentista**