





Post-Conflict Rural Colombia

2017 Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation



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Design

Toquica. Estudio de Diseño

ISSN: 2539-046

PointImages XXXXXXX

July, Edition 01







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Presentation

The Observatorio de la Democracia (Democracy Observatory) is the academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behaviour of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes. For more than a decade it has been responsible for carrying out in Colombia the main public opinion study of the American continent: the Americas Barometer.

Through this rigorous study of public opinion in Colombia, with historical comparability of the last 12 years and comparability between countries of the continent, the Democracy Observatory interprets and analyzes the opinions, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of Colombians with regard to structural and current issues, informing government, authorities, academia and the population in general, in order to contribute in this way to the creation of public policies, initiatives, actions and debates with regard to key issues for the development of Colombia.

The Americas Barometer is a public opinion survey conducted in 27 countries of the Americas under the coordination of Vanderbilt University. Currently, the Democracy Observatory of the University of the Andes is carrying out this study with the support and financing of USAID, which allows the country to have annual updated information, through national surveys in even years and special surveys in odd-numbered years


In the case of the 2017 study, a special sample was developed called Rural Post-Conflict Colombia in municipalities in four regions affected by the armed conflict, with the historical presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP, its acronym in Spanish) and in which the Agency for Territorial Renewal (Agencia para la Renovación del Territorio, ART) is currently developing Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, PDET). The regions are Macarena-Caguán, Andén Pacífico, Bajo Cauca and Cordillera Central.

The general report, as well as some segmented reports, addressing specific topics such as peace, post-conflict and reconciliation, democracy and institutions, and rural women in post-conflict

regions, will be accessible. All of them will be available in printed and digital versions on the Democracy Observatory website: http://www.obsdemocracia.org.

The completion of the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study was made possible thanks to the collaboration of several institutions. The joint work of the Democracy Observatory, the University of the Andes and the international community is of note, as well as the support of the company IPSOS and the Vanderbilt University with the fieldwork. All of this was complemented by the work of the team of facilitators and graduate assistants of the Democracy Observatory, composed of Juan Camilo Plata, Martín Rodríguez Rocha, Adriana Gaviria Dugand, Mariana Saldarriaga Osorio, Ana Villalba Castro, Carlos Arturo Avila García, Diana Alejandra Rivera Rivera and Fanny Melissa Medina Ariza.

Sample Description



The 2017 special sample of the Democracy Observatory aims to study the political opinions of Colombians in "post-conflict" zones. To this end, the sample universe has been defined as 170 municipalities in 16 zones where the national government, through the ART, will develop PDET.

The selected sample aims to have geographical variation as well as that of patterns of FARC-EP presence. Regarding this last aspect, the Observatory has identified at least three patterns of presence: (i) the FARC-EP established an organic connection with the population, (ii) the FARC developed relationships with social organizations present in the area, but did not control them, (iii) the FARC-EP was one of several illegal armed groups present in a disputed territory.

Ultimately, the sample is composed of 35 municipalities in the following regions: (i) Macarena - Caguán, (ii) Cordillera Central, (iii) Andén Pacífico and (iv) Bajo Cauca. Each of these regions constitutes a stratum of the sample, guaranteeing the representativeness of the

sample universe and of each region. This sample coincides with 28 of the municipalities included in the 2015 sample.

The method of selection of individuals was probabilistic, stratified and multi-stage. Each of these elements is detailed below:

The sample is **probabilistic** to the extent that each individual in the population had the same probability of being selected through the process of random selection of sample units.

Stratified because in addition to being representative of the total population of municipalities in "conflict zones", the study seeks to be representative of the population in four regions: Macarena-Caguán, Cordillera Central, Andén Pacífico, and Bajo Cauca. For this purpose, 35 municipalities in these four regions were selected.

Multi-stage insofar as the selection of the houses where the individuals lived was carried out in a sequential process:

- First stage. We randomly selected the rural districts and governmental seats of each municipality where interviews are conducted. 166 rural districts were selected, although due to different fieldwork contingencies, interviews were conducted in only 163 sidewalks. Given that development plans with a territorial approach have a rural emphasis, the sample prioritizes the rural population over the population in the municipal capitals.
- Second stage. Within each rural districts or urban area, housing conglomerates are selected for interviews.
- *Third stage*. The interview is conducted within the homes visited, subject to compliance with quotas by age and gender to avoid imbalance of the sample.

The fieldwork was carried out by Ipsos between October 31st and December 29th 2017. A total of 1391 interviews were collected, exceeding the number of initially planned interviews by 59. These interviews are evenly distributed among the sample strata, so they do not significantly affect the representativeness of the sample. The data were collected using electronic devices, via the SurveyToGo® application, which allowed a strict control of the fieldwork, as well as the introduction of experiments within the survey.

The questionnaire included 308 questions divided into two large thematic groups. The first is composed of common questions from previous Americas Barometers relevant to the area of study, in order to compare the attitudes and opinions of the inhabitants of post-conflict zones with national samples from previous years in Colombia. The second set of questions, specific to this study in Colombia, gathers questions formulated in previous studies and includes others on agreements with the FARC-EP, as well as opinions and attitudes about the most relevant actors and institutions for a post-conflict Colombia.

This report compares the 2015 sample with the 2017 sample on several occasions with the intention of indicating changes over time in the attitudes and opinions of the inhabitants of post-conflict rural areas. As indicated above, these two samples only coincide in 28 of the 35 municipalities surveyed in 2017. Despite this limitation, we have tried to make the two samples comparable using the following procedure: firstly, for the 2015 sample we have discarded the municipalities that were not interviewed in 2017 and the interviews in the remaining municipalities have been weighted in such a way that the 2015 weighted sample has the same number of interviews by region and by rural/urban area. This procedure leads to each interview in the rural area of Tumaco (the only municipality in the Andén-Pacífico region that is in both surveys) having a weight of 7.85, while in the urban area each interview has a weight of 4.49. At the other extreme. interviews conducted in 2015 in the urban areas of Cartagena del Chairá or San Vicente del Caguán have a weight of 0.6.

Although this procedure involves extrapolating the attitudes of the inhabitants of one municipality from the opinions of those who inhabit another town within the same region and in the same zone (urban/rural), the answers to most of the guestions vary very little between municipalities, and even between regions. In this way, we take advantage of this uniformity, while reducing the differences between the two samples by excluding municipalities with different expectations in a post-conflict context. On the other hand, this procedure reduces the more urban bias of the 2015 special sample by reducing the weight of interviews in municipal capitals and giving greater weight to those conducted in rural areas. We are aware of the limitations of this methodology and in no case are the 2015 data used to make inferences disaggregated by region or other demographic characteristics. However, this procedure makes it possible to identify with greater certainty the background of the average attitudes and opinions of the inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.

Glossary

Democracy Observatory: an academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes, based in Bogotá (Colombia).

Americas Barometer-LAPOP: a public opinion study conducted in the Americas that explores the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and experiences of people in the Americas regarding democracy, institutions and political and economic processes in each country. This study is coordinated by the Vanderbilt University, based in Nashville. Tennessee.

Population (sample universe): a group of subjects to be studied or understood. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the population is made up of all non-institutionalized adults residing in Colombia

Sample: a group of people within the sample universe, from which inferences are made about the characteristics of that universe.

Observation unit (analysis unit): units that make up the sample universe and on which inferences will be made. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the unit of analysis is the non-institutionalized adult resident in Colombia.

Sampling unit: a group containing the people being interviewed. These may include one person, when individual sampling. However, when sampling is done from agglomerations, each sampling unit may include several people. For example, in the survey used in this study, different sampling units are used, hierarchically ordered, where municipalities contain rural districts, within which households are located.

Stratification: A process that consists of defining populations groups with common characteristics within each of which the random selection of respondents is carried out. This procedure seeks to guarantee the representativeness of each of these population groups. For example: urban and rural areas, the six main regions of the country, etc.

Parameter: A calculation obtained from the measurement made on all individuals in a population. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the 2005 DANE general census.

Estimator (sample value): A calculation obtained from the measurement made on individuals of a representative sample of the sample population. The estimator is used to obtain an approximate measurement of the parameters. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the DANE's Large Integrated Household Survey.

Margin of error of the survey: It represents the degree of accuracy with which the survey includes the population values on which inferences are to be made. For example, a survey may estimate that 28% of the population sympathizes with candidate A. However, although the estimate would be different if we conducted the survey with a new sample, it is expected that the difference between those estimates and candidate A's true level of support will not be greater than the margin of error (e.g., ±2.0%).

Confidence interval: is the range of values within which the estimated parameter is expected to be if the survey is repeated. Thus, this value reflects the level of *dispersion* with which a population value is estimated. For example, if on a scale of 1 to 7 people rate the level of approval of abortion, there will be greater dispersion (a greater confidence interval) over the population average if almost the same number of people select each of the response alternatives than if the majority selects one of the options. In this second case, we will have greater consistency (although the true value is not necessarily identified) in estimating the level of approval of abortion in the population.

Variable: An attribute or characteristic that was measured by the survey. Examples of variables are: age, ethnic origin, gender, socioeconomic level, educational level, among others.

Introduction

2017 marked a year since the signing of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP and significant steps were taken towards its implementation. According to the first report on the effectiveness of the implementation of the peace agreement, in the first nine months of implementation there was progress in disarmament, ceasefire and hostilities, and in the establishment of verification and dispute resolution mechanisms. Compared to 34 peace agreements from other countries, Colombia exceeds the pace of implementation in six main areas: constitutional reform, demobilization, disarmament, donor support, transitional power-sharing arrangements, and judicial reform. For example, demobilization and weapons disposal were completed at a good pace, even when compared to other cases such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Mozambique, which are often considered successful models of demobilization. In Colombia, the ratio of weapons to combatants was one weapon per combatant, which is greater than any known process.

However, 2017 also showed important challenges for the building of a stable and lasting peace. The Kroc Institute's report on the effectiveness of the implementation of the peace agreement warned that less progress has been made in activities related to objectives and commitments that require medium- and long-term achievements, such as the implementation of mechanisms for public participation and political inclusion measures, development and land issues, guarantees of respect for human rights and the fight against drug trafficking and transitional justice, among others. In particular, obstacles were identified with respect to the Special Justice for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP) and the protection and security measures for social leaders and former FARC-EP combatants in the territories. In this regard, the UN Verification Mission noted that while overall national security figures showed improvements over previous years, increased insecurity in several conflict-affected areas is the most worrisome aspect of the implementation of the peace agreement. This situation is reflected in the growing number of murders and threats against social leaders, land restitution

^{1.} See: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. 2017. "Executive Summary: State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement, Report One". University of Notre Dame, November 2017. https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/258961/171127_english_version_of_kroc_institute_report_executive_summary.pdf

advocates, promoters of coca substitution programs and human rights defenders. 2

In this context, the country faces a panorama of uncertainty, in which short-term progress in peace agreement implementation contrasts with challenges that call into question its effective implementation in the medium and long term. This uncertainty exacerbates the climate of political polarization that characterizes Colombians' opinions regarding peace. The clearest manifestation of this being was the result of the 2016 plebiscite about the agreement, in which the 'No' vote won with 50.21% of the votes. Another factor that could reinforce the country's uncertainty and political polarization is the 2018 presidential election, which could be a turning point for or against the implementation of the peace agreement. Given the current situation in the country, it is essential to study and understand the opinions and attitudes of citizens towards peace and post-conflict.

Since 2013, the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, carried out in Colombia by the Democracy Observatory of the University de los Andes, has included a module of questions related to the peace process, transitional justice and post-conflict. In addition, the Democracy Observatory has conducted some special studies, which emphasize specific regions or populations, in order to complement national surveys and to contrast their opinions and political attitudes with those of the country in general. In 2015, a study was carried out on democratic attitudes in areas affected by the conflict, based on a representative sample of a subset of the municipalities that were part of the territorial consolidation program. In total, 40 municipalities were visited and 1390 people were interviewed. The study investigated the victimization situation of those surveyed and their opinions and attitudes regarding the peace process, FARC-EP political participation, transitional justice and post-conflict.

In order to give continuity to the 2015 study, a special study was carried out between October and December 2017 in a sample of municipalities prioritized for Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (its acronym in Spanish, PDET). 1391 surveys were conducted in four macroregions in which the FARC-EP has a historical presence: Andén Pacífico, Bajo Cauca, Cordillera Central, and Macarena-Caguán. Taking as a baseline the 2015 special study on Territorial

^{2.} See: United Nations Security Council. 2017. "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Colombia". 26 September 2017. https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/last_sq_report_on_the_un_mission_in_colombia_enq_0.pdf

Consolidation Zones,³ this study analyzed trends in the opinions and attitudes of the population in post-conflict zones and identified the interests, needs, and expectations of Colombians living in those zones.

Following this introduction, a brief context of each of the macroregions analyzed in this study is presented and the results of the report are presented in seven chapters. In the first chapter, information on victimization due to armed conflict is presented. The second chapter deals with everything related to the negotiated solution to the war and perceptions of the peace agreement with the FARC-EP. The third chapter analyzes the expectations of Colombians regarding the impact of the peace agreement. The fourth and fifth chapters explore public attitudes towards reconciliation and cohabitation with the FARC-EP, respectively. Chapter six presents public perceptions of state capacity. Finally, the last chapter is devoted to the conclusions of the study.

Between October and December 2017, a special study was conducted in a sample of municipalities prioritized for the Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET).

^{3.} As explained in the sample description at the beginning of the report, a reweighting exercise was conducted for the 2015 and 2017 samples in order to make them comparable. The exercise consisted in the selection of municipalities that coincide in both samples and in the weighting of the interviews in such a way that the same number of interviews per region and per rural/urban area were carried out in both samples.

General Context of the Macroregions Included in the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia Study In the regions historically affected by the conflict, the presence of the FARC-EP had different effects due to the geographical, sociocultural and economic conditions that characterize each of them. While in some territories the FARC-EP was a near-monopoly agent, in others, they configured themselves as just one more actor in an area of conflict. Likewise, the relationships between the state, the armed groups and the public have been varied. These relationships can be located in different scenarios. In one of them there is a situation of state absence and where the guerrilla was in charge of regulating the social order. In the other scenario, there are cases of intense military confrontation between different groups, including the military forces. In a third scenario, we find contexts of less confrontation, where the state has control and the FARC-EP are relegated to the peripheries. The conditions faced by each region during the confrontation between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP have important implications for the post-conflict in terms of the relationship between citizens and the state, on the impact that the peace agreement with the FARC-EP can have in reducing violence and favoring local development, and on the opinions, attitudes and expectations of the inhabitants about the state and its institutions.

The most outstanding characteristics of the regions included in the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study in relation to the presence of the FARC-EP and the predominant social dynamics in each of them are presented below. After the signing of the peace agreement with the FARC-EP, the challenge in the regions where the guerrillas were present is to ensure that the state is strengthened at the local level and recovers the legitimacy lost during decades of armed conflict.⁴

While in some territories the FARC-EP was a near-monopoly agent, in others they were just another actor in the conflict.

^{4.} See: García M. & Revelo J. 2018. "La construcción del estado local en Colombia". Análisis político nº 92, Bogotá, enero-abril, 2018: pp. 69-95.

Cordillera Central

For the 2017 sample, this region, which includes municipalities in northern Cauca, southeastern Valle del Cauca and southern Tolima,⁵ historically experienced the presence of multiple guerrilla and paramilitary groups, including the FARC-EP, the Quintín Lame, the M-19 and the Bloque Calima of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, Auc). The continued presence of armed groups in the region is explained by the fact that it is a transportation corridor between different parts of the country, which makes it attractive for armed groups and for the development of illicit activities. Thus, with the growth of drug trafficking since the 1980s, the FARC-EP and paramilitary groups, who protected illicit crops, fought during the 1990s to control the mountainous areas of Tolima, which resulted in the expulsion of the paramilitaries from southern Tolima, along with thousands of its inhabitants.⁶ The strategic value of the region meant that the conflict followed the pace of confrontation at the national level and that a situation of uncertainty was maintained for several years, so that those who were displaced avoided returning to that region for fear of being accused of collaborating with the paramilitaries.7 The 21st front of the FARC-EP, which took refuge in the Chaparral mountains and exerted control over other municipalities in southern Tolima, such as Rioblanco, was one of the initial nuclei of this guerrilla. Known popularly as the "juzgado 21", this front played for many years the role of social life regulator in this region, intervening in issues as diverse as infidelity, drug consumption, delinquency, and entry into the area. Their control became so strong that even the local authorities obeyed them to maintain their own security.8 This dynamic of confrontation between the FARC-EP and the paramilitaries was later rEPLicated in northern Cauca between 1999 and 2000, when the Calima and Farallones paramilitary bloques launched an offensive

^{5.} The municipalities in this macroregion included in the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia sample are: Santander de Quilichao, Corinto, Caloto and Miranda (Cauca); Florida and Pradera (Valle del Cauca); Chaparral, Planadas and Rioblanco (Tolima).

See: Las dos caras del despojo en el Tolima. https://verdadabierta.com/las-doscaras-del-despojo-en-el-tolima/

^{7.} See: Fundación Ideas para la Paz. 2013. "Dinámicas del conflicto armado en el sur del Valle y norte del Cauca y su impacto humanitario". Available at: http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/53b5910826062.pdf

^{8.} See: Puentes, J. 2017. "¿Qué piden los *campesinos* en la región donde nacieron las FARC?". Semana Rural. Available at: https://semanarural.com/web/articulo/que-piden-los-*campesinos*-en-la-region-donde-nacieron-las-FARC/119

that resulted in numerous massacres and the withdrawal of the FARC-EP to the more mountainous areas

A particular characteristic of this macroregion is that its population is composed of campesinos, Afro-descendants and indigenous people, who have organized themselves to resist the effects of the war, mainly in the north of Cauca. The Indigenous Regional Council of Cauca (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca, CRIC) and the indigenous Minga stand out as expressions of resistance and democratic mobilization. These organizations have been a driving force for social movements in other sectors, including rural campesino and Afro-descendant communities, and urban student and women's organizations. Indigenous communities have demanded that all armed actors, including the armed forces, withdraw their military installations in collective territories, stop bombing, stop planting anti-personnel mines and stop recruiting young people, and halt illegal activities. As part of these mobilizations, the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Colombia (Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Colombia, ONIC) appointed a delegation to establish direct dialogue with the FARC-EP, which was received by Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (known as Timochenko) who authorized for guerrilla negotiators in Havana to meet with indigenous representatives regarding the peace negotiations.9

Following the demobilization of the FARC-EP, farm robberies, homicides and drug use have increased in both rural and urban areas of the municipalities of southern Tolima. In the north of Cauca, since the signing of the peace agreement, murders and death threats against social leaders have skyrocketed. The persistence of armed groups and violence against communities and social leaders in this area is linked to the dispute over the income from the marijuana, coca leaf and cocaine production businesses. In One year after the signing of the peace agreement, in the municipality of Corinto (Cauca) the presence of both FARC-EP dissidents and criminal gangs has been reported, and in Miranda (Cauca) the presence of FARC-EP dissidents has been reported.

^{9.} See: UNDP. 2014. "Cauca. Análisis de conflictividades y construcción de paz". Available at: http://www.co.undp.org/content/dam/colombia/docs/Paz/undp-co-caucaconflictividades-2015.pdf

^{10.} See: Villegas, V & Canchila, A. 2017. "Desde las regiones: así fue el primer año del fin del conflicto con las FARC". Semana Rural. Available at: https://semanarural.com/web/articulo/desde-las-regiones-asi-fue-el-primer-ano-del-fin-del-conflicto-con-las-FARC/304

^{11.} See: González, C. 2018. "Cauca: reacomodos territoriales violentos en el post-acuerdo". Razón Pública (16 July 2018). Available at: https://www.razonpublica.com/index.php/conflicto-drogas-y-paz-temas-30/11262-cauca-reacomodos-territoriales-violentos-en-el-post-acuerdo.html

^{12.} Prepared from the RUSICST (Ministry of the Interior). Available at: https://rusicst.mininterior.gov.co/#!/home/login

unarmed *campesino* guards have been established to rEPLace the army and police, who do not have a permanent presence and are barely trusted by the community. ¹³

The population of this macroregion is made up of campesinos,
Afro-descendants and indigenous people, who have organized to fight the effects of the war.

^{13.} See: Villegas, V & Canchila, A. 2017. "Desde las regiones: así fue el primer año del fin del conflicto con las FARC". Semana Rural. Available at: https://semanarural.com/web/articulo/desde-las-regiones-asi-fue-el-primer-ano-del-fin-del-conflicto-con-las-FARC/304

Bajo Cauca

The region we call Bajo Cauca in the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study includes municipalities in the northeast of Antioquia and the south of Córdoba.14 This region has been central to the armed conflict in recent years for two reasons. Firstly, it is a territory with great mining potential, mainly gold, and with a large presence of illicit crops. Secondly, its location serves as a corridor for drug trafficking between the Catatumbo and Urabá regions of Antioquia. Although these two factors have led to the presence of multiple armed groups in recent years, their arrival in the area has been a gradual process. The first group to be present in the region was the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) at the end of the 1960s, while the FARC-EP arrived in the area in 1973 to occupy the space left by the ELN's weakening after a harsh military offensive. In the 1980s, the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL) entered the area and formed a common front with the FARC-EP and the ELN. the latter militarily recovered. Finally, in the 1990s, the Auc of Córdoba and Urabá, led by the Castaño brothers, appeared in the area.

The presence of paramilitaries and guerrillas led to an increase in violence during the 1990s, although neither party prevailed over the other. Moreover, the presence of armed groups, rather than being reduced with the demobilization of the Auc in 2003, increased with the organization of new armed structures, whose purpose was to control coca cultivation and gold mining. This process resulted in criminal gangs such as "Los Rastrojos", "Los Urabeños" and "Los Paisas"

After the period of confrontation between guerrillas and paramilitaries, FARC-EP fronts 18 and 36 established alliances with the "Los Urabeños" for the control of the illegal economies. In the case of drug trafficking, there was a division of labor, the FARC-EP cultivated and processed the drug and the gangs were in charge of its commercialization. At the same time, the ELN concentrated its influence on illegal mining.¹⁵

^{14.} The municipalities in this macroregion included in the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia sample are: Puerto Libertador (Córdoba); El Bagre, Tarazá, Zaragoza, Ituango, Nechí, Valdivia, Anorí and Briceño (Antioquia).

^{15.} See: Dinámicas del conflicto armado en el Bajo Cauca antioqueño y su impacto humanitario. http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/52efd828c4cbe.pdf

In short, the municipalities of Bajo Cauca have for many years experienced the simultaneous presence of several armed groups. As a result, the demobilization of the FARC-EP would not significantly change living conditions in the region. The information provided by the territorial entities on the implementation of policies on prevention, assistance, care and integral reparation for victims¹⁶ shows an intense presence of criminal gangs in Bajo Cauca. In 2017, the presence of criminal gangs was reported in all the municipalities that make up this macroregion, and a little less than half reported the presence of FARC-EP dissidents. In particular, dissidents were present at the same time as criminal gangs in the municipalities of Ituango, Nechí and Zaragoza, in Antioquia and Puerto Libertador in Córdoba ¹⁷

The presence of armed groups was not reduced with the demobilization of the AUC in 2003.

New armed structures emerged with the purpose of controlling coca cultivation and gold mining.

^{16.} This information is collected through the Unified System of Information, Coordination and Territorial Follow-up of the Public Policy of Victims of the Internal Armed Conflict Report (Reporte Unificado del sistema de Información, Coordinación y Seguimiento Territorial de la Política Pública de Víctimas del Conflicto Armado Interno, RUSICST).

^{17.} Figures taken from RUSICST (Ministry of the Interior). Available from: https://rusicst.mininterior.gov.co/#!/home/login

Macarena-Caquán

The region we call Macarena-Caguán includes municipalities in the north of the department of Caquetá and in the south of the department of Meta. While in many municipalities of the Andean foothills in southern Colombia the FARC-EP was unable to control social dynamics and competed with other groups for control of the population, in the municipalities furthest from the mountain range, where colonization is recent, the influence of the guerrillas on social life has been strong. The region of Macarena-Caguán is one of those areas of recent colonization and the coexistence of the inhabitants with the FARC-EP was more intense and hence the conflict marked the daily life of the population.

This region was where the FARC-EP grew, where the persecution of the liberal guerrillas of Pato and Guayabero caused these groups to move to the south, which gave rise to the expansion of the FARC-EP to the Llanos del Yarí and the Caguán River. During the 1980s, the colonizing expansion and the growth of the coca economy converged in this region, which fostered the strengthening of the military and the social influence of this guerrilla in the area. Additionally, paramilitary groups did not achieve here the influence they had in other parts of the country.

Since the signing of the peace agreement, crime has skyrocketed, especially in places where fronts 14 and 43 of the FARC-EP's Teófilo Forero column used to be in the department of Caquetá. The presence of groups such as the Águilas Negras or the Nuevo Renacer of the Self-Defence Forces has also been reported. Due to the slow implementation of the peace agreement, in the urban area of San Vicente del Caguán crime rates have increased and, in the rural area, there are places where FARC-EP dissidents continue to be active, extorting, controlling territories, imposing their rules and pressuring campesinos to continue to grow coca.¹⁹

^{18.} The municipalities of this macroregion included in the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia sample are: San Vicente del Caguán, Cartagena del Chairá, El Doncello, Puerto Rico, La Montañita and El Paujil (Caquetá); Vista Hermosa, La Uribe, Puerto Rico, Mesetas, and La Macarena (Meta).

^{19.} See: Valenzuela, S. (2017). "Malas noticias: en 5 regiones de Colombia hoy la guerra le gana a la paz". Available from: http://pacifista.co/regiones-guerra-paz-ano-firma-acuerdo-fundacion-paz-reconciliacion-informe/

In 2017, in all the municipalities that make up the Macarena-Caguán region, there was a reported presence of FARC-EP dissidents, while in two municipalities in Meta (Puerto Rico and Vista Hermosa) there are reports of criminal gangs.²⁰

This region faces the challenge of effectively articulating the capacity for civic participation in the processes promoted by the central government.

^{20.} Figures taken from RUSICST (Ministry of the Interior). Available from: https://rusicst.mininterior.gov.co/#!/home/login

Andén Pacífico

The macroregion of the Andén Pacífico comprises municipalities in the centre and south of the Colombian Pacific coast, from Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca) to Tumaco (Nariño).²¹ This region is characterized by clashes between different armed actors, coupled with a weak state presence. In this part of the country, given the limited presence of the police outside the urban centres of the municipalities, illegal armed groups have exercised control over the territory. The interest of these organizations in the region lies in their strategic location for the transport of drugs, weapons and supplies for cocaine production.²²

Unlike the other macroregions of the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia special sample, where violence has been part of the history of these areas for several decades, the Andén Pacífico region remained outside the dynamics of armed conflict until the early 1990s. Although since the late 1970s, the FARC-EP guerrilla used this region as a transit and rest point, the different manifestations of violence were not a concern for its inhabitants until the early 1990s, when the increase in coca cultivation in the southern part of the region intensified FARC-EP's presence, as well as its influence on the population. This change in the strategy of territorial occupation made the armed conflict to be felt in the region as the FARC-EP and other armed actors began to dispute control of the territory.²³

This dispute over territory occurred particularly between 2012 and 2013, and involved the FARC-EP and other criminal structures, such as the *Rastrojos* and the *Águilas Negras*. With the signing of the peace agreement in 2016, new actors seeking to seize the space left free after the demobilization of the FARC-EP have appeared. Among the new actors are a FARC-EP dissident group led by "Don Y"; the self-proclaimed "Nuevo Orden", which operates in the urban

^{21.} The municipalities in this macroregion included in the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia sample are: Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca); Tumaco and El Charco (Nariño); Guapi, Timbiquí and López (Cauca).

^{22.} See: Bermúdez A. (2017). "Tumaco, capital mundial de la coca: 5 razones del problema". Pacifista. http://pacifista.co/tumaco-capital-mundial-de-la-coca-5-razones-del-problema/

^{23.} See: Agudelo, C. (2012). El Pacífico colombiano: de "remanso de paz" a escenario estratégico del conflicto armado: Las transformaciones de la región y algunas respuestas de sus poblaciones frente a la violencia. Cuadernos De Desarrollo Rural, (46). Retrieved from http://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/desarrolloRural/article/view/2312

area; and a group with a presence in the north of the region, which would belong to the criminal structure of the *Clan del Golfo*.²⁴

Thus, in 2017, in a significant percentage of municipalities of the Andén Pacífico there have been both FARC-EP dissidents and criminal gangs. The municipalities that have reported their presence are Guapi, El Charco and Tumaco. Buenaventura has been characterized by an exclusive presence of criminal gangs, while the municipality of López has been characterized by the presence of FARC-EP dissidents. It should be noted that Timbiquí did not report a presence of either of the two armed groups during 2017.²⁵ Thus, the Andén Pacífico combines a context of military confrontation that does not allow the consolidation of social order or agreements with the FARC-EP.

In 2017,

FARC-EP dissidents and criminal gangs were present in a significant percentage of municipalities in the Andén Pacífico.

^{24.} See: Valencia, L; Ávila A.; Montoya C. & Medina D. (2017). En qué están los territorios que dejan las FARC; estado de las zonas de concentración y las agresiones a líderes sociales. Fundación Paz & Reconciliación. Bogotá, 31 January 2017.

^{25.} Figures taken from RUSICST (Ministry of Interior). Available from: https://rusicst.mininterior.gov.co/#!/home/login

Notas

1. Victimization

1.1. Introduction

Building a stable and lasting peace depends on the capacity of the state to guarantee the rights of the population and, in the post-conflict context, this means recognizing victims and planning and implementing effective reparation strategies. The recognition and reparation of victims are measures that not only protect this population from future violence, but also contribute to guaranteeing an effective and equitable justice system in the country, and to fostering reconciliation in Colombian society.²⁶

This chapter presents information on the levels of victimization caused by the armed conflict in Colombia and the difference between victimizing events that took place throughout the conflict (historical victimization) and cases that occurred in the year immediately following the signing of the peace agreement (victimization in the last year).

The data reveal that the levels of victimization reported have remained stable since 2015, both for historical victimization and for that which occurred in the last year. This suggests that, in the short term, the signing of the peace agreement in 2016 did not translate into a reduction in the reporting of armed conflict victimization in the PDET regions. Notably, the Andén Pacífico recorded a higher proportion of victimization compared to the other macroregions of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.

This chapter also describes the actors responsible for the reported crimes. It is evident that the guerrilla is responsible for about half of the victimizing events reported in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, followed by paramilitary groups and criminal and emerging gangs both in 2015 and 2017. Guerrilla victimization is significantly higher in the Macarena-Caguán macroregion compared to the other regions of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.

^{26.} Comisión Colombiana de Juristas. 2007. Principios internacionales sobre impunidad y reparaciones. Bogotá: Opciones Gráficas Editores Ltda.

Finally, this chapter analyzes the levels of victim recognition and reparation by the state in the context of the armed conflict. There are clear challenges in this area: less than half of those interviewed in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia who said they belonged to the National Registry of Victims (*Registro Nacional de Víctimas*, RNV) have received some type of reparation.

The guerrilla is responsible for about half of the victimizing events reported in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia followed by paramilitary groups and criminal or emerging gangs, both in 2015 and 2017

1.2. Victimization due to the Armed Conflict

In order to analyze the dynamics of victimization due to the armed conflict, since 2004 the Democracy Observatory has asked respondents whether their families have experienced cases of victimization due to the conflict, such as: loss and/or disappearance of a family member, kidnapping, forced displacement, abandonment of the place of housing and exile from the country.²⁷ These questions have no time scale, so they capture what might be called historical victimization.

The Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study shows that the levels of victimization due to the armed conflict remain stable between 2015 and 2017, that is, before and after the signing of the peace agreement with the FARC-EP (Figure 1). It demonstrates that the levels of victimization due to the armed conflict have remained stable between 2015 and 2017, that is, before and after the signing of the peace agreement with the FARC-EP.

Between 62.5% and 68% of those surveyed said they were victims of one of the events for which the survey investigated. Additionally, in the areas analyzed by the 2015 and 2017 surveys, there is a significantly higher level of victimization than that identified by the national sample in 2016. Undoubtedly, this difference is due to the greater intensity with which the armed conflict was felt in those regions. It is worth noting that stability in victimization is not due to a change in the modality of violence used, since there are no differences in the type of victimizing events reported in 2015 and 2017. Before and after the signing of the peace agreement, the most reported forms of victimization are forced displacement, the loss or disappearance of relatives and abadonment of housing. Compared to the 2016 national sample, Rural Post-Conflict Colombia presents significantly higher figures for each of the forms of victimization listed above.

^{27.} The presentation of the level of victimization is done through the composition of an additive index that codes as 1 the person who reports any of the following five forms of victimization by the armed conflict: (1) kidnapping, (2) in exile, (3) abandonment of housing, (4) forced displacement and (5) loss of a family member. It is important to note that the five forms of victimization on which the study focuses do not exhaust the possible effects of the conflict.

At the regional level, Figure 2 shows that the Andén Pacífico is the region with the highest percentage of respondents who have been victims of the armed conflict (77.4%). The Cordillera Central has a significantly lower proportion of victimization, although it remains high, as most of those interviewed in this region also reported being victims of the conflict (60.1%).

Before and after the signing of the peace agreement, the most reported forms of victimization are forced displacement, the loss or disappearance of relatives and the abandonment of housing of relatives.





Figure 1. Historical Victimization due to Armed Conflict

- Have you lost any family members or close relatives as a result of the country's armed conflict? Or has a relative been disappeared due to the conflict?
- Did any member of your family have to leave the country because of the conflict?
- Did any member of your family have to leave their place of residence because of the ongoing conflict in the country?
- Was a member of your family abducted?
- Because of the armed conflict, was any member of your family dispossessed of their land?

Figure 2. Historical Victimization due to the Armed Conflict by Macroregion




^{95%} Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

- Have you lost any family members or close relatives as a result of the country's armed conflict? Or has a relative been disappeared due to the conflict?
- Did any member of your family have to leave the country because of the conflict?
- Did any member of your family have to leave their place of residence because of the ongoing conflict in the country?
- Was a member of your family abducted?
- Because of the armed conflict, was any member of your family dispossessed of their land?

member. It is important to note that the five forms of victimization on which the study focuses do not exhaust the possible effects of the conflict.

Figure 3 shows the percentage of respondents who reported being a victim during the past year. We can observe that during the 12 months prior to the survey, approximately 16% of respondents experienced a victimizing event. This proportion does not present a statistically significant variation between 2015 and 2017, which demonstrates that the signing of the peace agreement in 2016 did not translate into a lower report of the incidents that were investigated.

Figure 3. Victimization due to the Armed Conflict in the Last Year




- Have you lost any family members or close relatives as a result of the country's armed conflict? Or has a relative been disappeared due to the conflict? Did this happen in the last 12 months?
- Did any member of your family have to leave the country because of the conflict? Did this happen in the last 12 months?
- Did any member of your family have to leave their place of residence because of the ongoing conflict in the country? Did this happen in the last 12 months?
- Was a member of your family abducted? Did this happen in the last 12 months?
- Because of the armed conflict, was any member of your family dispossessed of their land? Did this happen in the last 12 months?

From a regional point of view, in the Andén Pacífico the level of victimization is twice of that observed in the other macroregions during the last year. While in this region 3 out of 10 respondents reported being victims of the conflict during the last year (30.4%), in the regions of Bajo Cauca, Cordillera Central and Macarena-Caguán it barely reaches 15%, 12.8% and 8.5%, respectively (Figure 4).

In the Andén Pacífico, the level of victimization was twice of that observed in the other macroregions during the year immediately following the signing of the peace agreement.


Figure 4. Victimization due to the Armed Conflict in the Last Year by Macroregion



- 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)
- Have you lost any family members or close relatives as a result of the country's armed conflict? Or has a relative been disappeared due to the conflict? Did this happen in the last 12 months?
- Did any member of your family have to leave the country because of the conflict? Did this happen in the last 12 months?
- Did any member of your family have to leave their place of residence because of the ongoing conflict in the country? Did this happen in the last 12 months?
- Was a member of your family abducted? Did this happen in the last 12 months?
- Because of the armed conflict, was any member of your family dispossessed of their land? Did this happen in the last 12 months?


With respect to the actors responsible for the victimizing acts, the guerrilla emerges as the main victimizer, both in 2015 and in 2017; it is responsible for approximately half of the acts for which the study investigated (Figure 5). As Figure 6 shows, the region with the highest percentage of inhabitants that blames the guerrillas for committing victimizing acts is Macarena-Caguán (66%). This figure contrasts with what was observed in the Andén Pacífico and Bajo Cauca, regions where respectively 39% and 33% of those interviewed reported being victims of the guerrilla.

Figure 5. The Guerrilla Groups Responsible for Victimizing Acts



Which group or groups were responsible for these acts?

Figure 6. The Guerrilla Groups Responsible for Victimizing Acts by Macroregion



Which group or groups were responsible for these acts?

After the guerrilla, the paramilitaries emerge as the second actor responsible for victimizing acts. There has been a significant drop in those who report paramilitary groups as perpetrators between 2015 and 2017; from 38.7% of those interviewed in 2015 to 24.6% in 2017 (Figure 7). Bajo Cauca and Andén Pacífico are the regions where the highest percentage of respondents identified paramilitaries as responsable for violent acts. In these regions, 3 out of 10 respondents hold paramilitary groups as responsible for the acts of which they were victims. This proportion is significantly higher than that observed in Macarena-Caguán (15.7%) (Figure 8). Patterns of guerrilla and paramilitary activity explain in part in which regions the peace agreement with the FARC-EP had the greatest impact on the security of the inhabitants. Where the guerrillas were most present with violent actions (e.g., Macarena-Caguán) the impact is stronger. In areas where this armed group was not as active - and it was the paramilitaries who committed violent acts, often perpetrated by criminal gangs (e.g., Andén-Pacífico) - the impact is less.

Patterns of guerrilla and paramilitary

activity explain in part in which regions the peace agreement with the FARC-EP had the greatest impact on the security of the local population.

Figure 7. Paramilitaries Responsible for Victimizing Acts






Figure 8. Paramilitaries Responsible for Victimizing Acts by Macroregion



Which group or groups were responsible for these acts?

Figure 9 shows the proportion of respondents in the Rural Post Conflict Colombia study that identified the criminal or emerging gangs as responsible for victimizing acts. There is a clear decrease in the percentage of people who declare them responsible for these acts, from 12.6% in 2015 to 5.2% in 2017. The Macarena-Caguán region has the lowest percentage of inhabitants surveyed who hold criminal gangs responsible for committing victimizing acts (1.0%). This proportion is significantly lower than that reported in Bajo Cauca (6.4%) and Cordillera Central (7.6%) (Figure 10).

Figure 9. Criminal or Emerging Gangs Responsible for Victimizing Acts




Which group or groups were responsible for these acts?

Promedio
2016: 19.6%

95% Intervalo
de confianza
(Efecto de diseño
incorporado)

Figure 10. Criminal or Emerging Gangs Responsible for Victimizing Acts by Macroregion



The percentage of inhabitants of these regions who identify the army and the police as committing victimizing acts does not exceed 5% and 1% respectively (Figure 11 and Figure 12). There are no significant differences between the macroregions in the percentage of respondents who blame the army or police for victimizing acts.

Figure 11. The Army as Responsible for Victimizing Acts





Figure 12. The Police as Responsible for Victimizing Acts



Which group or groups were responsible for these acts?

1.3. Recognition and Reparation of Victims

One of the most relevant post-conflict aspects is the process of identification and reparation of the victims of the armed conflict. This is why the Democracy Observatory investigated the percentage of respondents who are part of the Colombian National Registry of Victims (*Registro Nacional de Victimas*, RNV)²⁸ and the percentage of respondents who, being part of the Registry, said they had received some kind of reparation from the national government.

In contrast to the national average (10.8%), 33.6% of those surveyed in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia stated that they were part of the RNV (Figure 13). This result reflects the fact that these regions have been the most affected by armed conflict over the last 50 years.

Figure 13. Part of the National Registry of Victims



- Are you part of the National Registry of the Victims of Armed Conflict?
- · Yes, No, Didn't Know, No response


The Andén Pacífico is the region with the highest percentage of respondents belonging to the National Registry of Victims. In this region, half of those interviewed reported being registered, a pro-

^{28.} The question has been included since 2012 for national samples and was included in the 2017 special study.

portion that is significantly higher than that observed in the other three macroregions, where the proportion of people belonging to the RNV is close to 30% (Figure 14).

The Andén Pacífico is the region with the highest percentage of respondents belonging to the National Registry of Victims (51.4%).

Figure 14. Part of the National Registry of Victims by Macroregion




^{95%} Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Are you part of the National Registry of the Victims of Armed Conflict?

[·] Yes, No, Didn't Know, No response


In terms of reparations to those who are part of the RNV, less than half of the Colombians in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia registered in the RNV have received some form of reparation (Figure 15). Disaggregating the information by macroregions shows a greater application of the reparation policy by the national government in the Andén Pacífico as it represents 58% of the total number of registered victims. This proportion is significantly higher than that observed in Macarena-Caguán (41.1%) and Cordillera Central (35%) (Figure 16). The prioritization of this region may be due to the fact that the highest number of victims is found there.

Figure 15. Victims Registered in the RNV Who Have Received Some Type of Reparation from the Government



- Have you received any kind of reparation from the national government?
- · Yes, No, Did not know, Did not respond, Inapplicable

Figure 16. Victims Registered in the RNV Who Have Received Some Type of Reparation from the Government by Macroregion



- Have you received any kind of reparation from the national government?
- Yes, No, Did not know, Did not respond, Inapplicable

^{95%} Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

1.4. Conclusion

This section showed that victimization levels have remained stable since 2015 in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. From the perspective of historical victimization, the stability in the percentage of victims is not surprising, since this indicator captures events occurring over several decades of war, so that the percentage of victimization will not be directly affected by the peace agreement. A decrease in the percentage of people recently victimized by violence is expected in the future. In the year between the signing of the peace agreement and the Rural Colombia Post-Conflict study, approximately 2 out of 10 citizens interviewed in the PDET areas suffered some form of victimization. with the Andén Pacífico being the most affected region (three out of ten). Although on average the guerrillas are responsible for around half of the victimizing events, both in 2015 and 2017, their presence is significantly more intense in Macarena-Caguán. It is followed by paramilitary groups, whose presence was significantly stronger in the Andén Pacífico and in Bajo Cauca. This history creates propitious conditions for the continuation of violence in the Andén Pacífico, often in the form of criminal gangs, as compared to the regions where the guerrillas were the protagonists of the victimizing acts.

As for the recognition and reparation of the victims of the armed conflict by the state, the study reveals obvious challenges in this area, as less than half of Colombians registered in the RNV have received some form of reparation. However, in the midst of the challenges involved in implementing a reparation policy, there is evidence that the victims of the Andén Pacífico have been given priority over the other regions of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.

In the year between the signing of the peace agreement and the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study, approximately 2 out of 10 citizens in the PDET areas suffered some form of victimization.

Notas

2. Negotiated Solution and Peace Agreement

2.1 Introduction

Support from Colombians for the peace agreement is a determining factor for its implementation. The situation in Colombia faces obvious challenges in this regard, following the victory of the 'No' vote in the 2016 plebiscite concering the peace agreement and the beginning of its implementation in a polarized political scenario.

The Democracy Observatory study investigated the opinions and attitudes of the public towards the peace agreement and its implications. Specifically, issues such as popular support for a negotiated solution to the conflict and the peace agreement, opinions on FARC-EP political participation, the Special Justice for Peace (Justicia Especial para la Paz, JEP), the different components of the signed agreement and public's perceptions of the actors (individual or collective) who contributed to ending the war and reaching the peace agreement were explored. It also inquired about the public's perception of compliance with the agreement, general knowledge of it and trust in the FARC-EP. The general objective of this chapter is to analyze how much the opinions of Colombians living in post-conflict zones have changed since the signing of the Havana agreement and the beginning of its implementation.

In general, it is observed that most Colombians support a negotiated solution to the conflict, especially in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. However, public support is lower when asked about the Peace Process (2015) and decreases even more when compared to the agreement signed between the government and the FARC-EP (2017). This situation can be explained by the public's rejection of specific aspects of the agreement, such as the FARC-EP's political participation and the lowering of sentences for military and former guerrilla members. However, it is important to qualify these figures, bearing in mind that the study found that Colombians' knowledge of the agreement's content is low. In any case, compared to the national average, Colombians in post-conflict areas are more willing to support the peace agreement.

It is also identified that the citizens of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia perceive that those who contributed most to ending the war and achieving peace are the international community and former President Juan Manuel Santos. With respect to compliance with


what was agreed in Havana, respondents in the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study have low expectations that the government and the FARC-EP will comply with what was agreed upon.

Rural Post-Conflict
Colombia perceives
that those who
contributed most to
ending the war and
achieving peace
are the international
community and
former president Juan
Manuel Santos.

2.2. Support for a Negotiated Solution to the Conflict

Support from those surveyed for the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study for a negotiated solution with the guerrillas remains at around 80% (Figure 17), a percentage that is higher than the national average, which is close to 70%. This greater support for a negotiated solution, as opposed to the option of the use of force, reflects the need felt by these communities to put an end to the permanent risk of being victims of violence. At the same time, generally speaking, support is almost universal, but once more specific details are considered, greater dissent becomes evident.

Figure 17. Support for a Negotiated Solution to the Conflict





Of the following options for resolving the conflict with the guerrillas, which do you think is the best?

Negotiation, Use of military force, Both, Doesn't know / No response

2.3. Support for the Peace Agreement and its Components

In addition to investigating support for a negotiated solution, the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study inquired about support for the peace agreement, signed in 2016 between the national government and the FARC-EP. In this regard, Figure 18 presents a comparison between support for the Peace Process in 2015 and support for the peace agreement in 2017. What is most striking is that the percentage of support for the peace agreement is significantly lower (53%), compared to the percentage registered for negotiation (63%). This difference can be explained by the fact that, once the agreement was reached, public opinion became familiar with the elements of it, many of which were controversial (e.g., special justice, political participation of ex-combatants). Added to this is a polarized political environment, in which 'Uribismo' attacked the agreement, spreading interpretations of it that in many cases had nothing to do with what had been agreed.²⁹ Moreover, in this process in which the public form an opinion on the agreement, this set of general information seems to have prevailed over the differentiated experiences of each region, since support for the agreement does not reflect significant

29. A director of the 'No' campaign for the 2016 Plebiscite regarding the peace agreement acknowledged in an interview that their strategy consisted of not explaining the content of the agreement's in order to focus their message on the indignation of Colombians (Ramírez, 2016; Dinero, 2016). For example, messages were disseminated on social networks and on WhatsApp stating that the government would offer guerrillas a monthly salary of \$1,600,000 Colombian pesos; that pensioners would pay taxes to finance peace costs; and that a "gender ideology" which would go against Christian family values was being included within the agreement, (Semana, 2016). However, the concept of "gender ideology" is not present in the Agreement but rather, it proposes the elimination of any form of discrimination and values women as political subjects (González, 2017).

See: Ramírez, Juliana. (4 October 2016). "El No ha sido la campaña más barata y más efectiva de la historia". *La República*. Accessible from: https://www.asuntoslegales.com.co/actualidad/el-no-ha-sido-la-campana-mas-barata-y-mas-efectiva-de-la-historia-2427891

See: Ideología de género: una estrategia para ganar adeptos por el "No" al plebiscito. (17 August 2016). Semana. Accessible from: https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ideologia-de-genero-una-estrategia-para-ganar-adeptos-por-el-no-al-plebiscito/488260


See: Juan Carlos Vélez renunció a su partido y rectificó sus declaraciones. (6 October 2016). Revista Dinero. Acessible from: https://www.dinero.com/pais/articulo/juan-carlos-velez-renuncio-a-su-partido-v-rectifico-sus-declaraciones/234668

See: González, María Fernanda. 2017. "La 'posverdad' en el plebiscito por la paz en Colombia". *Nueva Sociedad* (269): 114-126. Accessible from: http://nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/10.TC_Gonzalez_269.pdf

differences between the regions of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia (Figure 19).

The percentage of support for the peace Agreement is significantly lower [53%], compared to the percentage recorded during the negotiations with the FARC-EP [63%].

Figure 18. Support for the Peace Process (2015) and the Peace Agreement (2017) with the FARC-EP




----- Promedio 2016: 40.8%

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

The government of President Juan Manuel Santos is currently advancing a peace process with the FARC. To what extent do you support the peace process?

The government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC signed a peace agreement. To what extent do you support this peace agreement?

Figure 19. Support for the 2017 Peace Agreement with the FARCEP by Macroregion



The government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC signed a peace agreement. To what extent do you support this peace agreement?

However, as is evident in Figure 18, in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, the level of support for the agreement is higher in 2017 (53%) than that recorded at the national level in 2016 (40.8%). This result could be explained by how important ending the conflict is for Colombians most exposed to violence, compared to citizens living in safer areas, whose political preferences may be influenced by a broader set of priorities. This has been proved by studies, both in the Colombian case³⁰ and those of other countries. ³¹

Using data from the Democracy Observatory for the period 2013-2015, political scientist Juan Fernando Téllez compares the attitudes of Colombians living in conflict zones with those throughout the rest of the country. He finds evidence that support for the Peace Process

^{30.} See: Téllez, J.F., 2018. "Worlds Apart: Conflict, Exposure and Preferences for Peace". Journal of Conflict Resolution 20 (10): 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718775825 Krause, D., 2017. Who wants peace? - The role of exposure to violence in explaining public support for negotiated agreements. A quantitative analysis of the Colombian peace agreement referendum in 2016. Uppsala University.

^{31.} An example for the case of Sudan can be found at: Beber, B., Roessler, P., Scacco, A., 2014. "Intergroup Violence and Political Attitudes: Evidence from a Dividing Sudan". *The Journal of Politics* 76, 649–665. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381614000103

is greater in the areas most affected by the conflict.³² The author interprets this result as a reflection of the urgency felt by individuals in conflict zones to reduce their exposure to violence, an urgency that marks their preferences and attitudes towards policies that end the war. It should be noted that, according to the author, this effect is not attributed to the public's experiences of victimization, but to the fact of residing in a conflict zone.

The Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study confirms the permanence over time of this effect. In a regression analysis of the determinants of support for the peace agreement, it was found that, compared to national sample 2016, Colombians living in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia have higher levels of support for the peace agreement. In addition to this variable, other characteristics that are positively associated with support for the peace agreement are: sex (men support the peace agreement more than women), age, trust in the president and approval of the president's work (Table 1).

As with Téllez, it was found that this effect is not associated with the direct experience of victimization.³³


Table 1. Determinants of Support for the Peace Agreement

Urban area	
Woman	-
Age	+
Level of education	
Household income	
PDET Zones	+
Trust in the president	+
Presidental approval	+
Ideology (left/right)	

^{32.} See: Téllez, J.F., 2018. "Worlds Apart: Conflict, Exposure and Preferences for Peace". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20 (10): 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718775825 33. The regression presented in the table compares the population of the 2016 national sample with those of the 2017 special sample in PDET Zones. It is assumed that the latter have a higher level of exposure to violence than those in the national sample. An exercise was done to replace this variable with one that captures the victimization reported by the respondents and it was found that this is not statistically significant at 95%. However, further analysis is required to accurately identify the mechanism that causes exposure to the conflict to have the identified effect (for example, trust in the guerrillas). A model identical to the one presented in the table was followed, but with trust in the FARC-EP as an additional independent variable, and it was found that trust in the FARC-EP is significant, but the variable that identifies the samples loses statistical significance.

In an attempt to be a little more specific about the peace agreement's content, the Democracy Observatory in its Post Conflict Rural Colombia study explored the opinions of Colombians on the different components of the agreement and its possible implications. One of the components that has been measured over time is the acceptance (or rejection) of FARC-EP ex-combatants' participation in politics. In general, it was found that only 18% of those surveyed approve of these ex-combatants forming a political party. This number is identical to that reported in the 2015 special study and in the 2016 national sample (Figure 20). There are no significant differences between regions on this issue.

Figure 20. Support for FARC-EP's Political Participation



How strongly do you approve or disapprove of demobilized FARC ex-combatants forming a political party? To what extent do you approve or disapprove?


Only **18%** of those surveyed approve of former FARC-EP combatants forming a political party.

The level of support for other components of the peace agreement was also explored. In this case, a comparison is made between the results of the 2016 national sample and the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study in 2017. As Figure 21, only in the area of special peace constituencies is there a significant difference in the levels of support reported in the two samples. In post-conflict areas this component of the agreement is supported by almost 68% of respondents, while in the 2016 national study it was supported by 54%. This difference may be associated with the fact that this component of the agreement grants seats in Congress to the territories most affected by the war, which are part of special sample 2017.34 Unfortunately, the Colombian Congress turned its back on these regions by not approving the special peace constituencies. In addition, it is evident that the levels of support for the different components of the peace agreement vary greatly in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. The greatest support was for issues related to the countryside, such as agrarian reform (81.8%) and campesino reserve zones (68.6%); and the least support was for guarantees for the FARC-EP political party (35.1%) and amnesty for rank and file guerrillas (24.7%). The aspects of the agreement that imply a concession for the members of the former querrilla group are those that are least accepted by the public. There are no significant differences between the macroregions on this issue.

The aspects of the peace agreement that involve some concession for the members of the former guerrilla group are those that have the least acceptance among the public.

^{34.} In the 2015 special study they did not ask these questions because they did not know all the details of what had been agreed on.

Figure 21. Support for Components of the Peace Agreement



At the negotiating table in Havana, the government and the FARC reached several agreements. I would like to ask your opinion on some of them.


It was agreed that ordinary members of the FARC (not commanders) who demobilize will not go to jail. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

The 2017 study sought to investigate in greater depth the opinions of those surveyed on some elements of the Special Justice for Peace. In particular, two issues were explored: reduced sentences and deprivation of liberty in places other than prisons, in both cases, in exchange for confession of crimes. For each of these issues, the opinions of those surveyed differed markedly depending on whether the beneficiary is a former FARC-EP combatant or a member of the armed forces. In general, the answers given indicate a greater acceptance of the benefits offered by the Special Justice for Peace if they apply to military personnel. Not so if it benefits members of the FARC-EP (Figure 22 and Figure 23). In the case of reduced sentences, while 46% of those surveyed support them for military personnel who confess their crimes, this support is significantly lower (36%) in the case of FARC-EP members (Figure 22).

A comparison of attitudes between the macroregions shows that in Macarena-Caguán and the Cordillera Central, support for reduced sentences for military personnel is 42% and 36%, respectively, which is significantly lower than in Bajo Cauca, where 56% of those surveyed support this aspect of the Special Justice for Peace. In contrast, there are no significant differences between the macro-regions in the level of support for penalty reductions for FARC-EP members who confess their crimes (Figure 23).

Rural Post-Conflict Colombia accepts more of the benefits offered by the Special Justice for Peace if they apply to military than if they apply to FARC-EP members.

Figure 22. Opinions on the Reduction of Penalties for the Armed Forces of Colombia and the FARC-EP




95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

The Special Justice for Peace contemplates reduced sentences for demobilized FARC members who confess their crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The Special Justice for Peace contemplates reduced sentences for members of the armed forces who confess their crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 23. Opinions on the Reduction of Penalties for the Armed Forces of Colombia and the FARC-EP by Marcoregion



The Special Justice for Peace contemplates reduced sentences for demobilized FARC members who confess their crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The Special Justice for Peace contemplates reduced sentences for members of the armed forces who confess their crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

In regard to the deprivation of liberty without prison for soldiers and guerrillas who confess the crimes for which they were responsible, 36% of those surveyed accept it if it benefits the military. The level of acceptance of this benefit by the Special Justice for Peace is 28% when the beneficiary is a former FARC-EP member (Figure 24). From a regional point of view, almost half of those interviewed in Bajo Cauca supported this benefit for military personnel who confess their crimes. In the other regions, support drops significantly to about 30%. There are no regional differences in support of this concession (around 3 out of 10 respondents) if the beneficiary is a former guerrilla combatant (Figure 25).

Figure 24. Opinions on the deprivation of liberty without prison for the Armed Forces of Colombia and the FARC-EP




95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

The Special Justice for Peace contemplates the deprivation of liberty without imprisonment of members of the armed forces who confess their crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

The Special Justice for Peace contemplates depriving demobilized FARC members who confess their crimes of liberty without prison. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 25. Opinions on the deprivation of liberty without prison for the Armed Forces of Colombia and the FARC-EP by Marcoregion



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

The Special Justice for Peace contemplates the deprivation of liberty without imprisonment of members of the armed forces who confess their crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree?


The Special Justice for Peace contemplates depriving demobilized FARC members who confess their crimes of liberty without prison. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

2.4. Actors who Contributed to Ending the War and Achieving Peace

Another aspect explored by the Democracy Observatory's 2017 survey has to do with the public's perceptions of the actors (individual or collective) who contributed to ending the war and achieving peace. Specifically, we wanted to assess whether by asking about the "end of the war" the public would give more credit to different actors than when the question was asked talking about "achieving the peace agreement". In both cases the same actors (international community, guerrilla negotiators, government negotiators, armed forces, Juan Manuel Santos and Álvaro Uribe) were investigated. In order to prevent the answer to one question from affecting the answer to the other, and to avoid confusion among the respondents, given the similarity of the two questions, half of the respondents received the question about "ending the war" and the rest received the question about "obtaining the peace agreement". The allocation of the questions was done randomly.


As Figure 26 shows, the answers to the two questions are very similar. For more than 60% of the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia respondents, the international community and President Juan Manuel Santos contributed to ending the war and reaching the peace agreement. They are followed by the national government negotiators, the FARC-EP negotiators and the armed forces. Less than 30 per cent of those interviewed in post-conflict areas believe that ex-president Álvaro Uribe contributed to ending the war or achieving peace. The latter result is interesting because the military weakening suffered by the guerrillas during the Uribe administration paved the way for the Peace Process between the Santos government and the FARC-EP. However, it is possible that in the areas that were included in the 2017 sample, the Democratic Security policy has meant an increase in violence. Another way of interpreting this result is that the harsh criticism of 'Uribismo' in regard to the Peace Process led public opinion to disassociate the former president from the process of de-escalation of the war. In other words, his role in peacebuilding in Colombia was blurred by his opposition to the Santos government.

Figure 26. Contribution to Ending the War and Reaching a Peace Agreement



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

I would like you to tell me how much the following actors contributed to ending the war between the Colombian State and the ${\tt FARC}...$



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)


I would like you to tell me how much the following actors contributed to reaching the peace agreement between the government and the FARC.

There are some significant differences between the Cordillera Central and other macroregions in respondents' perceptions of the actors who contributed to ending the war. In the Cordillera Central, fewer people perceived that the national government negotiators (54%) and the FARC-EP negotiators (51.5%) contributed to ending the war, in contrast to what was perceived by the people of Andén Pacífico and Bajo Cauca. In the former, 69% of those interviewed said that the national government negotiators helped end the war; and in the latter, Bajo Cauca, 66% indicated that the FARC-EP negotiators did so. There are no significant differences between regions in the public perception of the contribution of other actors to ending the war (international community, Juan Manuel Santos, armed forces, and Álvaro Uribe) (Figure 27).

As for the alternative wording of the question on the contribution of these actors to achieving the peace agreement, there were only significant differences in the perception of Juan Manuel Santos' contribution. As Figure 28 shows, while in the Andén Pacífico 8 out of 10 respondents perceived that the former president contributed to attaining the peace agreement, in the Macarena-Caguán and Bajo Cauca regions, only 6 out of 10 people considered that Santos contributed to accomplishing the peace agreement.

In the Cordillera Central, fewer people perceived that the national government negotiators (54%) and the FARC-EP negotiators (51.5%) contributed to ending the war, in contrast to the people of the Andén Pacífico and Bajo Cauca.

Figure 27. Contribution to Ending the War by Macroregion




I would like you to tell me how much the following actors contributed to ending the war between the Colombian state and the FARC...

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Colombia Rural

Figure 28. Contribution to Achieving the Peace Agreement by Macroregion



I would like you to tell me how much the following actors contributed to achieving the peace agreement between the government and the FARC...


2.5. Expectations on Compliance with the Agreement and Trust in the FARC-EP

The peace agreement with the FARC-EP has generated great expectations among the population. However, there continues to be much uncertainty about the implementation of what has been agreed upon between the national government and the FARC-EP. The 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study identified that a significantly higher percentage of respondents believe the government will deliver (41%), compared to the percentage of those who believe the guerrilla will honor what was agreed (32%) (Figure 29). There are no significant differences as to whether people in each region believe that the national government and the FARC-EP will comply with the peace agreement.

The low expectation of respondents in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia regarding the FARC-EP's adherence to the agreement could be explained by public distrust of the group. As Figure 30 shows, trust in the FARC-EP was very low in 2017 (12.8%). In any case, the proportion of people who trust this organization tripled with respect to 2015 (3.8%). In addition, compared to the average of the 2016 national sample (6.2%), trust in the FARC-EP is significantly higher in the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study. This increase in trust in the FARC-EP could be explained by the signing of the peace agreement and the subsequent fulfillment of commitments by this organization, such as the surrender of arms and the demobilization of most of its members. It is also possible that this increase in trust is due to the fact that, after the signing of the peace agreement and the transformation of the FARC-EP into a political party, a greater number of Colombians dare to say that they trust this organization.

Trust in the FARC-EP was very low in 2017 (12.8%). However, the proportion of people who trust this organization tripled with respect to 2015 (3.8%).

Figure 29. Perception of Compliance with the Agreement (FARC-EP - Government), 2017




Will the FARC comply with what was agreed upon in the peace agreement signed in Havana? To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase?

The government will comply with what was agreed upon in the peace agreement signed in Havana. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase?


Figure 30. Trust in the FARC-EP

To what extent do you trust the FARC?



To complement the previous question, the 2017 survey asked whether their trust in the FARC-EP was less, equal or greater than twelve months ago. 17.1% trust the FARC-EP more; 40.5% trust them the same amount and 42.3% trust them less (Figure 31). Of those interviewed who now trust the FARC-EP more than 12 months ago, the highest percentage (23.9%) was in the Andén Pacífico and the lowest in the Macarena-Caguán region (12.2%). In the Macarena-Caguán region, one out of every two interviewed trust the FARC-EP less now than 12 months ago (Figure 32). This result could be due to the greater intensity of the guerrilla presence there, compared to the other macroregions of the study, as evidenced in the victimization section of this report.

Figure 31. Change in Trust in the FARC-EP




Do you trust the FARC today: more, the same or less than twelve months ago?

Confía menos **42.3** %
Confía lo mismo **40.5** %

Confía más 17.1 %

Figure 32. Change in Trust in the FARC-EP by Macroregion



Do you trust the FARC today: more, the same or less than twelve months ago?


Of those interviewed who now trust the FARC-EP more than 12 months ago, the highest percentage (23.9%) was in the Andén Pacífico and the lowest in the Macarena-Caguán (12.2%).

2.6. Knowledge About the Peace Agreement

The Democracy Observatory also explored the knowledge of Colombians living in post-conflict zones about the content of the peace agreement and found that most respondents have little knowledge of it. Only 14.4% of those surveyed correctly answered the question about the duration, in years, of the maximum sentence that the Special Justice for Peace can impose on ex-combatants who take advantage of it (Figure 33). If approximate answers are accepted, i.e. between 6 and 10 years of maximum penalty (8 years is the correct answer), the percentage of correct answers is higher, but is still lower than a fifth of those surveyed (19.7%). No significant differences were found between the macroregions.

Only 14.4% of the respondents answered correctly the question about the duration of the maximum sentence that the Special Justice for Peace can impose on ex-combatants who take part in it.

Figure 33. Knowledge of the 2017 Peace Agreement



Respuesta incorrecta o no sabe 85.6%

What is the maximum sentence in years for a demobilized FARC ex-combatant who avails themselves of the Special Justice for Peace?

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter concludes that the majority of Colombians support a negotiated solution to the conflict, but public support diminishes when asked about its most concrete aspects: the Peace Process (2015) and the peace agreement signed between the government and the FARC-EP (2017). This result can be explained by public rejection of components of the peace agreement that involve making concessions to the FARC-EP, such as the opening of political spaces in Congress and the lowering of penalties, in comparison with the components of the peace agreement associated with rural development, which the public perceives as benefiting the community in general.

It is important to note that public support for both the negotiated solution and the peace agreement is higher in post-conflict areas than the national average. Although more detailed analysis is required to confirm this hypothesis, it is likely that Colombians' preferences for the peace agreement are influenced by the need to reduce their exposure to violence, a need that is more urgent in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia than in the rest of the country. In any case, the challenge will be that expectations around the peace agreement will not be frustrated, particularly when the majority of those interviewed in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia believe that neither the government nor the FARC-EP will fulfill what has been agreed and the population lacks the necessary knowledge to exercise effective social control over the agreement.

In post-conflict zones, public support for both the negotiated solution and the peace agreement is higher than the national average.

Notas

3. Post-Conflict Expectations

3.1. Introduction

One year after the signing of the peace agreement between the government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP guerrillas, the 2017 study by the Democracy Observatory de la wished to explore the expectations of the residents of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia on the implementation of what was agreed upon in Havana. The extent to which Colombians believe there would be improvements in the following seven aspects was investigated: access to land, access to technical advice for *campesinos*, quality of roads, economic situation, security, effectiveness of justice and strengthening of democracy. These issues were defined according to the content of the agreement and the effects on the political regime of a negotiated solution to an armed conflict (institutional capacity building and strengthening of democracy).

The study finds that the higher expectations from the respondents of the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study regarding the implementation of the peace agreement are associated with *campesinos'* access to land and technical advice. On the other hand, respondents from Rural Post-Conflict Colombia have less expectations that the implementation of the agreement will bring improvements in the country's justice and democracy. In the Macarena-Caguán macroregion, the lowest proportion of respondents consider that the implementation of the agreement will have a positive impact on the economic situation and democracy.


The higher expectations of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia regarding the implementation of the peace agreement are associated with *campesinos*' access to land and technical advice.

3.2. Perceptions of the Impact of the Peace Agreement

As Figure 34, shows, more than half of those surveyed believe that the implementation of the peace agreement will improve *campesinos*' access to land (59%) and technical advice (53%). In terms of safety, road quality and the economic situation, between 45% and 48% of respondents believe that the implementation of the peace agreement will improve these aspects. Finally, only 41.1% believe that the implementation of the agreement will improve justice and 38.4% that it will strengthen democracy. These results reflect the core issues of the agreement, particularly those related to rural reform and improvements in the quality of physical infrastructure in post-conflict regions. The possible modifications that the government of Ivan Duque will make to the agreement or to its implementation, particularly regarding land, could generate new frustrations for thousands of *campesinos* who today expect improved conditions to access land.

Only 41.1% of those surveyed believe that the implementation of the peace agreement will improve justice and 38.4% that it will strengthen democracy.

Figure 34. Perceptions of the Impact of the Havana Peace Agreement




95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Now, thinking about the implementation of the peace agreement signed between the government and the FARC, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?


When comparing the expectations of Colombians across the macroregions of the study, significant differences are found with respect to the impact of the peace agreement on the economic situation and democracy. The inhabitants of Macarena-Caguán are the most sceptical about the impact of the agreement on these two dimensions. In this region, 39% of those interviewed perceive that the agreement will improve the economic situation, while in the Andén Pacífico and Bajo Cauca the percentage of people who expect the agreement to improve the economic situation is close to 50% (Figure 35). Similarly, only 32% of those interviewed in Macarena-Caguán perceive that the implementation of the agreement will improve democracy, a percentage that is significantly lower than those registered in the Andén Pacífico (45%) and Bajo Cauca (44%) (Figure 36).

Figure 35. Perceptions of the Impact of the Havana Peace Agreement (Economic Situation to Improve) by Macroregion



Now, thinking about the implementation of the peace agreement signed between the government and the FARC, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? The agreement will improve the economic situation.

Figure 36. Perceptions of the Impact of the Havana Agreement (Will Improve Democracy) by Macroregion





Now, thinking about the implementation of the peace agreement signed between the government and the FARC, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? The agreement will improve democracy.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter showed that most of the respondents of the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study expect the implementation of the peace agreement to have a positive impact on *campesinos*' access to land and technical assistance. This result represents a major challenge for the incoming government, as failure to meet the expectations of *campesinos*, particularly on land issues, may further erode public confidence in the PDET zones towards the national government and the peace agreement.

These results reveal that the peace agreement is seen as an opportunity for the national government to address the most pressing needs of the inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. In contrast, on more general issues such as safety, the quality of roads and the economic situation, expectations are lower, as only half of the respondents believe that the peace agreement will improve these aspects. Moreover, expectations are lower when talking about abstract issues such as improving the effectiveness of justice and Colombian democracy.

The peace agreement is seen as an opportunity for the national government to address the most pressing needs of the inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia.

Notas

4. Reconciliation

4.1. Introduction

Considering the current context of Colombia and with the beginning of the implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC-EP, it is important to take into account local attitudes towards the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation. The Democracy Observatory therefore asked respondents in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia about forgiveness and reconciliation using a broad conceptualization of the notion of reconciliation from the field of social psychology. According to Arie Nadler, 35 a reconciled society is characterized by the existence of positive and trustworthy relationships between former adversaries, who enjoy secure social identities and interact in an equitable social environment. To reach this state it is necessary for a society to advance in three areas that are interdependent: structural, relational and identity-related. The structural dimension refers to the transformation of conditions towards a social structure based on equity. This dimension is especially relevant in situations where the conflict stakeholders belong to the same society, as in the case of Colombia. The relational dimension focuses on interpersonal trust and positive relations among the people, as a key element for reconciliation. Finally, the dimension of reconciliation associated with identity has to do with overcoming labels and population stigmas derived from war, such as the condition of victim or victimizer.

This section of the report explores the general disposition of the inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia towards forgiveness and reconciliation. It also focuses on the structural dimension of reconciliation, starting from the analysis of public perception of actions that contribute to reconciliation. In particular, the opinions of the respondents of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia about the contribution of different components of the peace agreement to reconciliation are studied. These include the establishment of the truth, the reparation of communities affected by the conflict, the compensation of victims, the deprivation of liberty, among others. The next chapter of the report delves into the relational dimension of reconciliation, particularly in the willingness of the population to live with demobilized FARC-EP members. The identity dimension is not addressed in this report, but those interested can look into

^{35.} Arie Nadler & Nurit Shnabel. 2015. "Intergroup Reconciliation: Instrumental and socio-emotional processes and the needs-based model". European Review of Social Psychology (26) 1: 93-125. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2015.1106712.

the positive and negative labels that the public attributes to former combatants of armed groups in past reports. 36

This chapter notes that Colombians' willingness to forgive and reconcile has increased since 2015, and that reparation for affected communities and state-funded victims are the most important for reconciliation factors that Colombians identify, both in the 2016 national sample and in the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study. It is noteworthy that aspects associated with guerrilla behavior, such as asking for forgiveness, confessing crimes or redressing communities and compensating victims, are considered important for reconciliation by more people surveyed in the 2016 national sample than by those interviewed in the PDET regions.


Colombians'
willingness to
forgive and reconcile
in 2017 has increased
compared to 2015.

4.2. Citizens' Willingness Towards Forgiveness and Reconciliation

The percentage of Colombians in post-conflict areas who see forgiveness and reconciliation between FARC-EP ex-combatants and ordinary citizens as possible increased significantly, from 50% in 2015 to 66.8% in 2017 (Figure 37). Compared to the 2016 national sample average in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, a greater proportion of Colombians see forgiveness and reconciliation between FARC-EP ex-combatants and ordinary citizens as possible. On average, in the 2016 national sample, 50% of Colombians see forgiveness and reconciliation as possible, while in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, 67% of those interviewed responded positively to this question. Moreover, this difference is the result of the growth in the proportion of people who see reconciliation as possible in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. It is possible that people in these areas perceive the signing of the peace agreement as a positive sign from the FARC-EP because their intention to disarm and demobilize is materialized in an official document. In response to this sign, the citizens' willingness to forgive and reconcile could be increased. This interpretation coincides with the significant increase in trust in the FARC-EP in post-conflict zones which, as explained in the previous section, tripled between 2015 (3.8%) and 2017 (12.8%) (Figure 30). From a regional point of view, the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC-EP is possible is expressed by the same proportion of people in each region, despite differences in their interaction with the FARC-EP (Figure 38).


In Rural Post-Conflict
Colombia, a greater proportion
of Colombians see forgiveness
and reconciliation between FARCEP ex-combatants and ordinary
citizens as possible [67%].

Figure 37. Forgiveness and Reconciliation with the FARC-EP



Do you think it is possible, yes or no, for citizens to forgive and reconcile with demobilized FARC ex-combatants? Yes or No

Figure 38. Forgiveness and Reconciliation with the FARC-EP by Marcoregions



Do you think it is possible, yes or no, for citizens to forgive and reconcile with demobilized FARC ex-combatants? Yes or No


4.3. Perception About the Contribution of Peace Agreement Components to Reconciliation

In order to have a clearer idea about the structural dimension of reconciliation according to the perception of Colombians in post-conflict zones, the Democracy Observatory asked respondents' opinions regarding the peace agreement's contribution to reconciliation. According to those interviewed, the actions that contribute most to reconciliation are: reparation of the affected communities by the state (84.8%) and the victimizers (78.6%); the establishment of the truth about the events that occurred in the conflict (68.2%) and the years in prison punishment (66%). The respondents believe less in the contribution that a rememberance museum will make to reconciliation (49.6%) (Figure 39).

In post-conflict regions, there is more skepticism than in the rest of the country about some of the steps that the Colombian State should take to generate reconciliation between the victims of the conflict and the perpetrators. Figure 39 shows a comparison between the results of the 2017 Rural Post-Conflict Colombia sample and the 2016 national sample. In terms of establishing the truth, 85.5% of Colombians surveyed in the national sample believe that this will contribute greatly to reconciliation; in contrast, in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, 68.2% believe that knowing the truth will contribute to reconciliation. Similarly, while at the national level 80% of those interviewed believe that the fact that a victimizer who does not confess their crimes will spend more than 8 years in prison will contribute to reconciliation, in the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study this proportion is 66%. With respect to victimizers asking for forgiveness from their victims, in the 2016 national sample the proportion of Colombians who consider that this will contribute to reconciliation is 73.9%, while in post-conflict areas it is 63.7%. In synthesis, reconciliation actions referring to the victimizers tend to be more important in the country in general than in the areas most affected by the conflict.

85.5% of Colombians surveyed in the 2016 national sample believe that knowing the truth will contribute to reconciliation. In Rural Post-Conflict Colombia 68.2% believe so.

Figure 39. Actions that Would Contribute to Reconciliation 2016, 2017



Now I am going to read you a series of actions and I want you to tell me if you believe that they would contribute nothing or would contribute a lot to the reconciliation between the victims of the armed conflict and their victimizers.

The Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study found some differences between macroregions in respondents' perceptions of measures that contribute to reconciliation. Regarding the issue of reparation for communities affected by the conflict, 86% of the residents of Bajo Cauca responded that it would greatly contribute to reconciliation if reparation was the victimizers' responsibility. This proportion is significantly higher than in the Cordillera Central (73%). In contrast, in the Cordillera Central, 90% of those interviewed believe that it would contribute to reconciliation if the State were to repair communities affected by the armed conflict, while in the Andén Pacífico, 81% believe so (Figure 40).

There is also a regional contrast with the perception that the truth about events that occurred during the armed conflict would contribute to reconciliation. As Figure 41 shows, 76% of those interviewed in the Bajo Cauca region believe that the truth would contribute to reconciliation. This percentage is significantly higher than that recorded in the Macarena-Caguán region (63%). Finally, with regard to the construction of a museum that commemorates the events that occurred during the armed conflict, the majority of those interviewed in the Andén Pacífico (58%) consider that it would contribute to reconciliation, while in the Cordillera Central less than half believe so (43%) (Figure 42).

Figure 40. Actions that Would Contribute to Reconciliation (Reparation of Affected Communities) by Macroregion




95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Now I am going to read you a series of actions and I want you to tell me if you believe that they would contribute nothing or would contribute a lot towards reconciliation between the victims of the armed conflict and their victimizers

That the victimizers reparate the communities that were affected by the armed conflict.

That the state reparate the communities that were affected by the armed conflict.


Figure 41. Actions that Would Contribute to Reconciliation (Truth About Events Occurring in the Conflict) by Macroregion



Now I am going to read you a series of actions and I want you to tell me if you believe that they would contribute nothing or would contribute a lot towards reconciliation between the victims of the armed conflict and their victimizers.

That the truth be established about the events that took place during the armed conflict.

Figure 42. Actions that Would Contribute to Reconciliation (Museum Commemorating the Events of the Armed Conflict) by Macroregion



[%] de acuerdo construir un museo para recordar hechos ocurridos

Now I am going to read you a series of actions and I want you to tell me if you believe that they would contribute nothing or would contribute a lot towards reconciliation between the victims of the armed conflict and their victimizers.

That a museum be built in which the events that occurred in the framework of the armed conflict are commemorated.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter showed that the willingness of Colombians towards forgiveness and reconciliation has increased since 2015. It is evident that reparation by the state of the affected communities and victims are the factors that the people of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia identify as the most important for reconciliation: more than 80% consider that this would contribute to reconciliation, both in the national sample and in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. This result suggests that the structural dimension of reconciliation carries a lot of weight in public perception, considering that reparation of affected communities is a key aspect in the transformation of the country's social conditions towards a social structure based on equity.

It is striking that actions that depend on the guerrilla, such as asking for forgiveness, confessing crimes, or that community reparations and compensation for victims are their responsibility, are considered important for reconciliation by a greater proportion of respondents in the 2016 national sample than by those interviewed in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. More detailed analysis, ideally with qualitative information, is needed to understand why there are differences between the national average and Rural Post-Conflict Colombia in opinions about the actions that victimizers can take to contribute to reconciliation.

State reparation of affected communities and victims are the factors that Rural Post-Conflict Colombia identifies as the most important for reconciliation.

Notas

5. Post-Conflict Attitudes and Living with Ex-Combatants

5.1 Introduction

Drawing from the academic literature in the field of social psychology, according to which a reconciled society is characterized by the existence of positive and trustworthy relations between former adversaries,³⁷ the Democracy Observatory collected citizens' opinions on the reintergration³⁸ of ex-combatants into civil life. The willingness to share spaces with demobilized combatants was also examined, as well as the opinions about the consequences of sharing the same space with former FARC-EP combatants.

The number of individuals in post-conflict areas willing to receive ex-combatants in their neighbourhoods has increased significantly, although resistance to the idea of sharing different areas of life with ex-combatants, such as the working environment or children's schools, remains evident. This willingness is even lower when it comes to respondents' children befriending a demobilized person. In any case, the proportion of citizens who believe that sharing spaces with demobilized ex-combatants will have negative consequences for society has been significantly reduced. Today, only a minority of Colombians believe that such coexistence will increase criminality, reduce job opportunities and corrupt social values. Paradoxically, fewer Colombians also believe that sharing spaces with demobilized combatants will build a more inclusive society.

^{37.} See: Arie Nadler & Nurit Shnabel. 2015. "Intergroup Reconciliation: Instrumental and Socio-Emotional Processes and the Needs-Based Model". *European Review of Social Psychology* (26) 1: 93-125. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2015.1106712.

^{38.} The terms "reintegration" and "reincorporation" refer to the process by which members of illegal armed groups demobilize, surrender their weapons and begin a new life in lawfulness (a process called Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, DDR). In Colombia, the Agencia Colombiana para la Reincorporación y la Normalización (Colombian Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization), formerly called the Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (Colombian Agency for Reintegration), has been responsible for this process since 2003. The change in the name of the entity, in 2016, is due to some modifications made to the DDR process for the collective demobilization of the FARC-EP, which was part of the points negotiated between the FARC-EP and the national government in Havana. In any case, considering that for Colombians the distinction between the two terms can be confusing, in the Colombia Rural Post-Conflict survey, the Democracy Observatory used the term 'reintegration'. For this reason, this term is used in the titles of the graphs in this report to maintain consistency with the survey questions.

The proportion of individuals who believe that living with demobilized ex-combatants will bring negative consequences for society has been significantly reduced.

5.2. Approval of the Reintergration of Former FARC-EP Combatants

The study reveals that in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia 71% of respondents agree with demobilized FARC-EP ex-combatants' reintegration into society. This proportion is significantly higher than that recorded in the 2016 national sample (59%). However, the level of support for the reintegration of FARC-EP ex-combatants is lower (71%) than that recorded in 2015, when the level of approval for the reintergration of demobilized combatants was examined (almost 8 out of 10 agreed) (Figure 43). The change in the formulation of the guestion may be behind this difference. It is also possible that the decrease in approval is associated with the perception of some people that the conditions of the peace agreement for the FARC-EP's reintegration into civilian life are not fair. As already explained in the Negotiated Solution and Peace Agreement chapter of this report, the level of citizen support for the Peace Process in 2015 (63%) is significantly higher than that recorded for the peace agreement in 2017 (53%). This decrease could be due to the controversy aroused by some aspects of the peace agreement, in addition to the diffusion of erroneous interpretations of it on social networks and through WhatsApp. One of the messages that circulated was that the demobilized FARC-EP members would receive a monthly salary of \$1,600,000 Colombian pesos (approximately 550 US dollars).39 This assertion is false, since in Havana it was agreed that the basic monthly income available to FARC-EP members is equivalent to 90% of a minimum wage, i.e. \$620,000 Colombian pesos in 2016 (approximately 213 US dollars) and \$664,000 Colombian pesos in 2017 (approximately 228 US dollars). In addition, the economic support to be received by former FARC-EP combatants is similar to that received by the more than 58,000 demobilized combatants who took part in the national government's reintergration route between 2003 and 2015, including the collective demobilization of

^{39.} See: González, María Fernanda. 2017. "La «posverdad» en el plebiscito por la paz en Colombia". *Nueva Sociedad* (269): 114-126. Accessible from http://nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/10.TC_Gonzalez_269.pdf

the AuC in 2003 and the voluntary demobilization of members of other armed groups.40

However, even knowing the actual amount received by FARC-EP demobilized combatants, Colombians may perceive the reintergration policy as unjust. Research by Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan⁴¹ on the reintergration of ex-combatants in Uganda suggests that targeting ex-combatants as beneficiaries of social policies can generate resentment in receptor communities. The latter is because this type of public intervention is perceived to "reward" people who have committed crimes with a monthly income, while other civilians without criminal records and in vulnerable conditions, including victims, do not have access to this benefit.


In Rural Post-Conflict
Colombia 71% of respondents
agree with demobilized
FARC-EP ex-combatants'
reintergration into society.

^{40.} See: Agencia Colombiana para la Reincorporación y la Normalización (ARN). 2018. La Reincorporación. Beneficios económicos. Accessible from:

http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/reincorporacion/Paginas/Beneficios-economicos-y-sociales.aspx

^{41.} See: Blattman, C., Annan, J., 2008. "Child combatants in northern Uganda: Reintegration myths and realities", in: Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. Routledge, pp. 103–126.

Figure 43. FARC-EP Approval Regarding Reinsertion (2015-16) - Reintergration (2017) of Former FARC-EP Combatants






Would you agree with the reinsertion of the FARC demobilized ex-combatants?

Do you agree with the reintegration into society of the demobilized ex-combatants of the FARC?

From the regional point of view, there is a contrast between the Bajo Cauca region, where the highest percentage of the population agrees with the reintergration of ex-combatants (76%), and the Cordillera Central, where this proportion is significantly lower, at 62.6% (Figure 44).

Figure 44. FARC-EP Approval Regarding Reinsertion (2015-16) - Reintergration (2017) of Former FARC-EP Combatants by Macroregion



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)


Do you agree with the reintergration into society of demobilized FARC ex-combatants?

5.3. Willingness to Share Spaces with Demobilized Combatants

The reintergration of FARC-EP ex-combatants can be thought of in several ways, ranging from simple coexistence in the same area to interaction in more intimate spaces. In proposing these diverse possibilities of cohabitation with demobilized combatants, we find important differences in the willingness of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia to coexist with ex-combatants. In general terms, the willingness of Colombians living in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia to receive ex-combatants in their communities and to share with them everyday spaces, such as in the neighborhood, has increased significantly since 2015. In 2015, 60% of those surveyed said they had no problem with having an ex-combatant as a neighbour; this percentage reached 83% in 2017. The attitude of Colombians in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia towards living with demobilized combatants in the same neighborhood also contrasts with the 2016 national average. In general, only one out of two Colombians is willing to have an ex-combatant as a neighbor (Figure 45). Although in all macroregions the acceptance of ex-combatants as neighbors is over 70%, there are some significant differences. In Macarena-Caguán and Bajo Cauca there is greater acceptance of ex-combatants as neighbors, with 89% and 87%, respectively. In the Andén Pacífico, the percentage of respondents who have no problem with having an ex-combatant as a neighbor is the lowest (71%), significantly lower than in Macarena-Caguán and Bajo Cauca (Figure 46).

In all macroregions the acceptance of ex-combatants as neighbors is over 70%. Macarena-Caguán and Bajo Cauca are the regions with the greatest acceptance.

Figure 45. Acceptance of Ex-Combatants as Neighbors






Thinking of armed groups' demobilized ex-combatants, please tell me if...

You don't want them as neighbors, You don't have a problem with having them as neighbors, You don't know, No response

Figure 46. Acceptance of Ex-Combatants as Neighbors by Macroregion




95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Thinking of armed groups' demobilized ex-combatants, please tell me if...

You don't want them as neighbors, You don't have a problem with having them as neighbors, You don't know, No response


However, when asked about there being a demobilized combatant in the workplace, there is much less willingness to accept it. In contrast to the majority who would accept having a demobilized neighbor, only half of those interviewed agree to share the space where they work with a demobilized FARC-EP man. This figure has remained stable in both the 2016 national sample and the 2015 and 2017 special samples (Figure 47). Similarly, the percentage of respondents who agree to share the work space with a former FARC-EP woman is barely over 50% and has also remained stable in the 2015, 2016 and 2017 samples (Figure 48).

Figure 47. Approval to Share Workspace with a Demobilized Man



That in the company or place where you work a demobilized FARC man was employed. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation?

Figure 48. Approval to Share Workspace with a Demobilized Woman




That in the company or place where you work, a demobilized FARC woman is employed. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of this situation?

The Rural Colombia Post-Conflict study also asked about respondents' acceptance of a son or daughter as a friend of a former FARC-EP combatant. Between 2015 and 2017 there was a significant increase in this indicator, from 20% in 2015 to 39% in 2017 (Figure 49). But despite this increase, few would accept that demobilized combatants come into contact with their children. No significant differences between macroregions were observed in this question.

Few citizens of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia would accept that their children make friends with demobilized ex-combatants [39%].

Figure 49. Approval for Child to Befriend a Demobilized Ex-Combatant



Through a regression analysis, the Democracy Observatory studied the factors associated with the willingness to live with former FARC-EP combatants. This model replicates the analysis made by Téllez. 42 who argues that, in response to the need to reduce exposure to violence, Colombians in conflict zones are less willing to live with demobilized combatants compared to those living in relatively safer areas. Using data from the Democracy Observatory for the 2013-2015 period, the author estimated a model that uses the willingness of the population to live with demobilized comparants and compares it with people with different levels of exposure to violence. The result variable is an index that reflects the willingness of the population to, work with demobilized men and women, and to have their son or daughter to be a friend of a former FARC-EP combatant. In addition to the study's variable of interest (exposure to the conflict), this model includes as controls the area of residence (urban/rural), sex, age, educational level, household income, trust in and approval of the president, and a variable that captures the political spectrum of individuals (left, center, or right).

As Table 2 shows, the Colombians most willing to accept these situations possess the following characteristics: they are men, young people, have a higher level of education, have a higher level of household income, approve of the work of President Juan Manuel Santos and reside in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia. It is noteworthy that this result contrasts with Téllez's analysis of public attitudes in conflict zones. Using data from the Democracy Observatory for the 2013-2015 period, the author finds that, compared to people who live in relatively safer areas, Colombians in conflict zones are

^{42.} See: Téllez, J.F., 2018. "Worlds Apart: Conflict Exposure and Preferences for Peace". Journal of Conflict Resolution 20 (10): 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718775825

less willing to live with demobilized combatants.⁴³ The difference found between the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study and Téllez's research could be a reflection of the change between 2015 and 2017 in the acceptance in the areas most affected by the conflict of the respondents' children being friends of a demobilized person (Figure 49). This could be explained by the signing of the peace agreement in 2016, which would seem to have diminished the public perception of demobilized combatants as dangerous actors.

Table 2. Determinants of Willingness to Share Spaces with Ex-Combatants

Urban zone	
Woman	-
Age	-
Educational level	+
Household income	+
PDET Zones	+
Trust in the President	
Presidential Approval	+
Ideology (left/right)	

^{43.} The Democracy Observatory replicated the model used by Téllez, using the same control variables, except for the percentage of votes for the current president, which was replaced by the level of trust in the president. This change in the control variable is due to modifications in the questionnaire of the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study, which prevent having information on the percentage of votes for the president in 2017. On the other hand, the question regarding the level of trust in the president is present in all the questionnaires and allows for comparisons over time.

5.4. Perceptions of the Consequences of Sharing Spaces with Demobilized Combatants

In order to delve deeper into the fears of the population in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia about the possibility of sharing spaces with demobilized combatants, the Democracy Observatory asked respondents' opinion on several statements related to the possible consequences of sharing the same space with ex-combatants. As seen in Figure 50, in 2017 only 38.5% of respondents in post-conflict areas believe that sharing the same space with ex-combatants will generate a more inclusive society. In 2015 the percentage of respondents who agreed with this statement was significantly higher (48.2%). Again, this result may be corroborating Blattman and Annan's⁴⁴ analysis of public resentment derived from ex-combatants receiving benefits, while the rest of the population does not have access to these types of state funding.

When comparing the macroregions, a contrast is observed between the Bajo Cauca and the Macarena-Caguán. In the first region, those who believe that living with ex-combatants will generate a more inclusive society represent 46%, while in the second region this percentage is only 32.5% (Figure 51).

In 2017, only 38.5%

of respondents in post-conflict areas believe that sharing the same space with ex-combatants will generate a more inclusive society.

^{44.} See: Blattman, C., Annan, J., 2008. "Child combatants in northern Uganda: Reintegration myths and realities", in: Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. Routledge, pp. 103–126.

Figure 50. Consequences of Sharing Spaces with Ex-Combatants - A More Inclusive Society Will Be Built




Promedio
2016: 48.2%

95% Intervalo
de confianza
(Efecto de diseño
incorporado)

To what extent do you agree that sharing the same space with and interacting with demobilized ex-combatants would build a more inclusive society?

Figure 51. Consequences of Sharing Spaces with Ex-Combatants - A More Inclusive Society Will Be Built by Macroregion



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

To what extent do you agree that sharing the same space with and interacting with demobilized ex-combatants would build a more inclusive society?


The proportion of Colombians in post-conflict areas who believe that sharing the same space with ex-combatants will increase crime rates has fallen considerably, from 44.7% in 2015 to 25.8% in 2017 (Figure 52). There are no significant differences between regions in this guestion. This finding is consistent with literature that has studied the effectiveness of the Colombian reintegration program and that shows low recidivism of demobilized combatants in criminal activities. Although there is no single indicator on the recidivism of demobilized persons, the available information indicates that between 76% and 92% of demobilized persons in Colombia do not relapse into criminal activities after their disarmament. 45 In addition. it has been shown that the contribution of ex-combatants to overall crime levels in Colombia is marginal. For example, in the department of Antioquia, where more than 12,000 ex-combatants have been demobilized, corresponding to one-fifth of the total demobilized in the country between 2003 and 2018, the contribution of ex-combatants to crime in the department between 2011 and 2013 was 0.13%.46 On the other hand, a study on the determinants of the recidivism of ex-combatants in illegal activities in Colombia⁴⁷ showed that demobilized guerrilla groups are 50% less likely to recidivism in illegal activities than demobilized paramilitary groups.

^{45.} In 2014, the Fundación Ideas para la Paz reported a rate of 24%. Estimates by the Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración indicate that in the period 2003-2015, the recidivism rate was 8.3%. The Colombian agency's report is significantly lower because it only takes into account demobilized combatants who took part in the government's reintegration program and who have been sentenced by a court. Retrieved from: Nussio, E., 2017. "Ex-combatants and violence in Colombia: are yesterday's villains today's principal threat?" Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/2380201 4.2018.1396911.

^{46.} Agencia Colombiana para la Reincorporación y la Normalización (arn), 2018a. Histórico de personas desmovilizadas 2001-2018, Sistema de información para la reintegración.

^{47.} See: Kaplan, O., Nussio, E., 2018. "Explaining Recidivism of Ex-combatants in Colombia". Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, 64–93. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716644326. The study is based on official police information, combined with a 2008 survey of 1485 ex-combatants belonging to the Colombian reintegration program.

Figure 52. Consequences of Sharing Spaces with Ex-Combatants - Crime Rates Will Increase






To what extent do you agree that sharing the same space with and interacting with demobilized ex-combatants would increase crime rates?

Regarding the impact of sharing the labor market with ex-combatants, only 27.9% of those surveyed in 2017 believe that sharing the same space with ex-combatants will reduce job opportunities. In 2015, 41% of those interviewed believed so (Figure 53). There are also no significant differences between the macroregions on this issue.

Only 27.9% of those surveyed in 2017 believe that sharing the same space with ex-combatants will reduce job opportunities.


Figure 53. Consequences of Sharing Spaces with Ex-Combatants - Job Opportunities Will Be Reduced



To what extent do you agree that sharing the same space with and interacting with demobilized ex-combatants would reduce job opportunities?

Similarly, as Figure 54 shows, only 3 out of 10 respondents in 2017 believe that sharing the same space with ex-combatants will corrupt social values. In 2015 this was believed by 38.2% of those interviewed. There are also no significant differences between regions.

Figure 54. Consequences of Sharing Spaces with Ex-Combatants - Social Values Will Be Corrupted



To what extent do you agree that sharing the same space with demobilized ex-combatants and interacting with them would corrupt social values?

5.5. Conclusion

People in post-conflict areas who are willing to receive ex-combatants in their neighborhoods have increased significantly, although there is still resistance to the idea of sharing with ex-combatants in different spheres of life; on average, one in two Colombians prefers not to share their working environment or the school of their children with demobilized combatants. This figure is even lower when it comes to their children befriending a demobilized person (39%). However, although there are low levels of acceptance of sharing with demobilized persons in more intimate spaces, this level of acceptance is higher than that of the country as a whole in 2016. Part of the explanation for this better receptivity to demobilized persons in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia lies in the consistent fall in the perception that sharing spaces with demobilized ex-combatants will bring negative consequences for society. Today, only a minority of inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia (about 3 out of 10) believe that such cohabitation will increase criminality, reduce job opportunities and corrupt social values. Paradoxically, fewer Colombians also believe that sharing spaces with demobilized combatants will build a more inclusive society.

Only a minority of people in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia believe that living with ex-combatants will increase criminality, reduce job opportunities and corrupt social values.

6. Perceptions of State Capacity

6.1. Introduction

With the end of an armed conflict, one of the government's priorities should be to increase the institutional presence in areas where it has been weak or non-existent. The Colombian case is no exception. After five decades of confrontation between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP, in many war-affected areas the presence of public institutions is very scarce. Given this situation, the implementation of the Havana Peace Agreement contemplates increasing the presence of public institutions and improving the provision of goods and services in areas traditionally affected by the conflict. These efforts should increase the legitimacy of the state. This section presents the results of a series of questions that capture public perceptions of the state's capacity and presence in post-conflict areas. Specifically, the following issues were investigated: the presence of the police, the agents who guarantee security, the use of state institutions to resolve disputes, and satisfaction with public services.

The study found that the presence of the police in the neighborhoods of those interviewed is low and that a significant proportion of citizens perceives this actor as ineffective. It is worrisome that when asked about the effect that the permanent presence of the police would have on the security of the neighborhood, more respondents consider that security would decrease than those who believe that the neighborhood would be safer. As for the agents who provide security, it can be observed that after the signing of the peace agreement, the percentage of Colombians who consider that the police or the military guarantee security in the place where they live increased, especially in the regions of Bajo Cauca and Macarena-Caguán. However, this proportion remains relatively low, close to 60%. In these macroregions it is also evident that the signing of the agreement diminished the public perception of the guerrilla as an actor that provides security.

As for the satisfaction of those interviewed with public services in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, there is a significant decrease in the percentages of satisfaction with education services and with the state of the roads, with respect to 2015. This situation is probably due to the rapid increase in public expectations of these services as a result of the peace agreement. There is however a contrast between the Andén Pacífico and the other macroregions of the


study in public satisfaction with aqueduct and sewerage services, as satisfaction in the Colombian Pacific with this public service is significantly lower.

In the macroregions of Macarena-Caguán and Bajo Cauca, it is evident that the signing of the peace agreement diminished the public perception of the guerrilla as an actor that provides security.

6.2. Institutionality

With regard to the public's perception of the presence of the police, only 16% of those interviewed reported that there is permanent police presence in their neighborhood. The rest of those surveyed perceive that the police presence is sporadic (51.4%) or non-existent (32%) (Figure 55). No significant differences were found between the macroregions with respect to police presence.

Figure 55. Perceived Level of Presence Police 2017



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Thinking of the rural district where you live, the national police is present...


Permanently, Occasionally, Never, Don't know, No response

It is striking that a third of the population of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia does not have the protection of the police. However, efforts to improve the state's presence with the police are perceived by some as a risk to their security. The Democracy Observatory asked Colombians living in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia about the impact that the permanent presence of the police would have on the security of their neighborhood or rural district and found that approximately 4 out of 10 respondents believe that security would decrease; 3 out of 10 believe that it would remain the same and 3 out of 10 believe

that security would increase (Figure 56). No significant differences were found between the macroregions. This finding is of concern, as it reflects the fact that in post-conflict zones people perceive the police as an actor that is not only ineffective in maintaining security, but can also be counterproductive, and hence a source of insecurity.

Four out of ten people in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia believe that security would diminish if the police had a permanent presence in their neighborhood or rural district.

Figure 56. Impact of Permanent Police Presence



What if there was a permanent presence of the national police, do you think that the security of the neighborhood (rural district) where you live...

Would it decrease? Would it stay the same? Would it increase? Don't know, No response

In addition to the scarce presence of the police in these areas, there is a low capacity to respond to calls from the public. For approximately half of those surveyed, the police would take from 30 minutes to six hours to arrive and 23% considered that it would take more than six hours to arrive. For 13% of those surveyed, the police would not answer the call, either because they would never arrive or because they are simply not present (Figure 57). Only 29.3% of those surveyed responded that it would take the police less than 30 minutes to reach their residence if they called them regarding a robbery.

Figure 57. Perception of the Time it Would Take for the Police to Arrive




95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

> Given this deficiency in police presence, the Democracy Observatory asked which agents provided security before the signing of the peace agreement ("12 months ago") and which ones currently provide it. There has been a significant change in public perceptions of the agents who provided security before and after the signing of the peace agreement. The percentage of residents of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia who consider that the police or army provide security went from 46.5% to 56.3% (Figure 58 and Figure 59). It is interesting to note the reduction in the percentage of people who believe that the guerrilla provides security: while 18% of those interviewed responded that twelve months ago the guerrilla provided security, placing this actor as the second most important contributor to security after the police and the military, only 5% consider that the guerrilla currently provides security. This proportion is significantly lower than those interviewed who consider that security is guaranteed today by their neighbors (11%) or no particular actor (11%).

The percentage of residents of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia who consider that the police or military provide security went from 46.5% to 56.3%, before and after the signing of the peace agreement.

Figure 58. Agents who Provided Security 12 months ago



Now I'm going to mention some groups and I'm going to ask you to tell me which of them provided security 12 months ago in the place where you live.

Figure 59. Agents who Provide Security Today



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)


Now I'm going to mention some groups and I'm going to ask you to tell me which of them provides security in the place where you live.

When comparing between the macroregions of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia the perception of Colombians about the actors who provide security before and after the signing of the peace agreement, the change in perceptions in Bajo Cauca and Macarena-Caguán is striking. After the signing of the agreement, there was a significant increase in the perception of the residents of Bajo Cauca about the role of the police and the military in providing security in the region, from 36% to 59.4% (Figure 60). Similarly, after the signing of the peace agreement, a lower proportion of respondents in Macarena-Caguán and Bajo Cauca perceive the guerrilla as the agent that provides security. While in Macarena-Caguán 23% of those interviewed responded that the guerrillas ensured security twelve months ago, today only 5% consider that this actor provides security in the place where they live. In the Bajo Cauca, the perception that the guerrilla provides security went from 16.2% of those surveyed before the signing of the agreement to less than 2% today (Figure 61). Although it is evident that the signing of the peace agreement strengthened the public perception of the police and the military as agents that provide security, the percentage of Colombians living in post-conflict zones who perceive that today the state's institutional framework provides security is still less than 60%. These figures demonstrate the need for the Colombian government to expand its efforts to fill institutional gaps in regions where the presence of the state is weak

and where guerrillas represented an agent that regulated order in the local context. On the other hand, although the perception of police and military presence increases, efforts must also be made to make its benefits visible and, in the long term, to build a relationship of greater trust with the public.


In Bajo Cauca, the perception that the guerrilla provides security went from 16.2% of those interviewed before the signing of the peace agreement to less than 2% today.

Figure 60. The Police/Military as Security Providers by Macroregion



Now I'm going to mention some groups and I'm going to ask you to tell me which one provides security in the place where you live and which one provided security 12 months ago.

Figure 61. The Guerrilla as Security Providers by Macroregion




95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Now I'm going to mention some groups and I'm going to ask you to tell me which one provides security in the place where you live and which one provided security 12 months ago.

The national government's efforts to increase its presence in the areas most affected by the conflict will not be effective if people do not perceive state actors as legitimate mediators to resolve daily conflicts. Following the FARC-EP's departure from many areas of the country, more citizens would be expected to turn to state agents to manage their differences with others. Figure 62 shows that 46.3% of those interviewed believe that people today turn more frequently to the state to resolve disputes with their neighbors. However, a third believe that state institutions are less used to manage such conflicts. No significant differences were found between macroregions in this indicator.

Figure 62. Compared to 12 months ago, people today more often go to state institutions to resolve a dispute with a neighbor. To what extent do you...?




Compared to 12 months ago, people today more often go to state institutions to resolve a dispute with a neighbor. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Part of the explanation for the public's skepticism in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia to approach public institutions when dealing with their conflicts may be the perception that they are ineffective. Figure 63 shows the percentage of respondents who have high confidence in the effectiveness of the judicial system in punishing the perpetrator of a robbery or assault. The percentage of people confident in the capacity of the justice system fell from 22.6% in 2015 to 17.1% in 2017. The Andén Pacífico region has the highest percentage of people who have confidence in the justice system's capacity to punish the culprit of a robbery (27.2%), a proportion that is significantly higher than that recorded in Macarena-Caguán (13%) (Figure 64).

The percentage of people who have confidence in the capacity of the justice system fell from 22.6% in 2015 to 17.1% in 2017.

Figure 63. Confidence in the Effectiveness of the Justice System



2016: 14.4%


95% Intervalo
de confianza
(Efecto de diseño
incorporado)

Promedio

If you were the victim of a robbery or assault, how much would you expect the court system to punish the culprit?

A lot, somewhat, a little, nothing.

Figure 64. Confidence in the Effectiveness of the Justice System by Macroregion



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

If you were the victim of a robbery or assault, how much would you expect the court system to punish the culprit? A lot, somewhat, a little, nothing.

6.3. Public Services

The other dimension related to state capacity, included in the 2017 Democracy Observatory study, has to do with satisfaction with public services. This aspect is critical to establish the starting point for one of the expectations of the implementation of the peace agreement. In other words, the provision of basic services to communities affected by the conflict should be improved.


Using the data from the 2015 study as a point of reference, it was found that despite the low quality of health, aqueduct or education services. Colombians residing in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia had levels of satisfaction with public services very similar to those of the general population (national sample 2016). However, when comparing the data from the 2015 study with those from the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia sample, a significant decrease in the percentages of satisfaction with education services and with the state of the roads is evident. It is possible that this change has little to do with a decrease in the quality of these services and that, on the other hand, it is due to the rapid increase in public expectations of these services, as a result of the peace agreement. Indeed, the Colombian National Government has announced that after the FARC-EP's departure from many areas of the country, the Colombian State will increase its presence, improve roads and take schools to many areas. The first report on the effective state of implementation of the peace agreement notes that within a year of signing the peace agreement there has been no improvement in these services: "little or no progress has been observed in many of the important medium- and long-term provisions dealing with land reform and rural development". 48

Figure 65 shows the percentage of people who are satisfied with the quality of public schools. This has decreased significantly, from 57.9% in 2015 to 45.3% in 2017. No statistically significant differences were found among the macroregions in terms of public satisfaction with the quality of public schools (Figure 66).

^{48.} See: Instituto Kroc de Estudios Internacionales de Paz. 2017. "Informe sobre el estado efectivo de implementación del Acuerdo de Paz en Colombia". Universidad de Notre Dame, noviembre 2017. Accessed from: http://kroc.nd.edu/assets/257593/informe_kroc.pdf, p. 113.

Despite the low quality of health, aqueduct or education services, Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, in 2015, had levels of satisfaction with public services very similar to those of the general population, in 2016.

Figure 65. Satisfaction with the Quality of Public Schools




Promedio
2016: 54.6%

95% Intervalo
de confianza
(Efecto de diseño
incorporado)

What about the quality of public schools? Are you... Very satisfied, Satisfied, Unsatisfied, Very dissatisfied

Figure 66. Satisfaction with the Quality of Public Schools by Macroregion



What about the quality of public schools? Are you... Very satisfied, Satisfied, Unsatisfied, Very dissatisfied

The satisfaction of people living in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia with water and sewerage services has not changed between 2015 and 2017 (Figure 67). The Andén Pacífico has the lowest level of satisfaction with water and sewerage services. Only 14% of those surveyed are satisfied (Figure 68). This marks a clear contrast with the other regions studied, in which the percentage of satisfaction with this service is around 38%. This contrast shows the precarious access to drinking water and sewerage that afflicts the inhabitants of the Colombian Pacific, which according to official information from DANE is among the lowest levels in the country. The percentage of inhabitants with access to sewerage in the Pacific (45%) only surpasses San Andrés, where only 31% of the population has access to this public service.

Figure 67. Satisfaction with the Quality of Aqueduct and Sewerage Services



Promedio 2016: 55.4%


95% Intervalo de confianza

(Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Are you satisfied with the quality of the aqueduct and sewer services?

Very satisfied, Satisfied, Unsatisfied, Very dissatisfied

Figure 68. Satisfaction with the Quality of Aqueduct and Sewerage Services by Macroregion



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Are you satisfied with the quality of the aqueduct and sewer services?


Very satisfied, Satisfied, Unsatisfied, Very dissatisfied

In terms of medical and health services, the perception has remained constant between 2015 and 2017. About a quarter of those surveyed said they were satisfied with this service (Figure 69). However, at the regional level, those surveyed on the Andén Pacífico and Macarena-Caguán are the least satisfied with medical services: 16.8% and 20.5%, respectively, while the inhabitants of Bajo Cauca and the Cordillera Central have a higher level of satisfaction with health services, ranging from 28% to 32%, which represents a significant difference with the inhabitants of the Pacific (Figure 70).

Respondents from Andén Pacífico and Macarena-Caguán are the least satisfied with medical services:

16.8% and 20.5%, respectively.


Figure 69. Satisfaction with Public Health and Medical Services



What about the quality of public health and medical services? Are you...

Very satisfied, Satisfied, Unsatisfied, Very dissatisfied

Figure 70. Satisfaction with Public Health and Medical Services by Macroregion




95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

What about the quality of public health and medical services? Are you...

Very satisfied, Satisfied, Unsatisfied, Very dissatisfied


Finally, in terms of the state of the roads and highways, the satisfaction of the residents of the areas most affected by the armed conflict has decreased significantly compared to 2015, when it went from 38.9% in that year to 25.5% in 2017 (Figure 71). From a regional point of view, there are no significant differences in the percentage of people who said they were satisfied with the state of the roads (Figure 72).

Figure 71. Satisfaction with the Condition of Roads, Highways and Freeways



Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of roads, highways, and freeways?

Figure 72. Satisfaction with the Condition of Roads, Highways and Freeways by Macroregion



Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of roads, highways, and freeways?

6.4. Conclusion

Rural Post-Conflict Colombia shows quite low levels of institutional presence as far as the police are concerned. Furthermore, there is a low capacity to respond to citizens' needs in these regions. Despite the fact that a significant percentage of those surveyed believe that the public resort more to state institutions to resolve their differences, confidence in the effectiveness of the judicial system continues to be very low. This is undoubtedly a reflection of the low state presence and the limited institutional capacity of the Colombian State to mediate in public relations at the local level. This panorama shows the urgency to re-establish the legitimacy of the state in post-conflict zones, in particular, filling institutional gaps in regions where the presence of the State has been weak and where the guerrilla represented a regulating agent of social order.

On the other hand, satisfaction with public services confirms the need to make efforts, in compliance with what was agreed to in Havana, to bring the institutional structure to areas where, due to the war, the state presence has been weak or non-existent. The satisfaction of respondents in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia with public services, especially public education and the state of the roads, has decreased significantly with respect to 2015. This situation poses an even greater challenge for the Colombian State in the post-conflict period, as the decrease in satisfaction with public services is probably due to the rapid increase in public expectations of these services as a result of the peace agreement. The weak state presence is particularly acute in the Andén Pacífico macroregion, where less than 15% of those surveyed reported being satisfied with water and sewerage services.

The decrease in satisfaction with public services is probably due to the rapid increase in public expectations of these services as a result of the peace agreement.

7. General Conclusions

The findings that the Democracy Observatory have presented in this report lead to various conclusions regarding the opinions, attitudes and expectations of the population in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia regarding peace. In general terms, while the majority of Colombians continue to support a negotiated solution to the armed conflict, both in post-conflict zones and at the national level, it is also clear that the country faces significant challenges in building a stable and lasting peace.

The report shows that much remains to be done for the Colombian state to guarantee the rights of the population in post-conflict areas, particularly in terms of reparation for victims, maintaining security and provision of public services. It is discouraging that victimization levels remain stable: approximately 15% of those interviewed in PDET areas suffered some victimization in the year between the signing of the peace agreement and the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study, with the Andén Pacífico as the most affected region (three out of ten). In addition, less than half of Colombians belonging to the National Registry of Victims have received some form of reparation.

Also clear are the challenges regarding the presence of public institutions and the provision of goods and services in areas traditionally affected by the conflict. Although after the signing of the peace agreement the perception that the police or the military provide security in the PDET zones increased – and the image of the guerrilla as a provider of security diminished especially in Bajo Cauca and Macarena-Caguán – the proportion of people who perceive that state institutions provide security remains low (barely six out of ten). It is worrying that the presence of the police in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia is so low, since only 16% of those interviewed reported that there is a permanent presence of this institution in their neighborhood. In addition, a significant proportion of the public perceives this actor as ineffective and there are high levels of skepticism about the impact that a greater presence of this agent would have on the security of the macro regions of the study.

On the other hand, the satisfaction of respondents in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia with public services, especially with public education and the state of the roads, has decreased significantly with respect to 2015. This situation represents an even greater chal-

lenge for the Colombian State in the post-conflict period, since this decrease in satisfaction with public services is probably due to the rapid increase in public expectations of these services, as a result of the peace agreement.

Secondly, although public support for the peace agreement is higher in post-conflict areas than in the country as a whole, a decrease in public support for the agreement is evident compared to support for the Peace Process of 2015. This result can be explained by public opinions regarding aspects of the agreement that involve making concessions - such as the FARC-EP's political participation and the reduction of penalties for military personnel and ex-combatants of the guerrilla – have low levels of support, compared to the components of the agreement associated with rural development, that the public tends to support more.

Moreover, most of those surveyed in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia have low expectations that the government and the FARC-EP will comply with the implementation of the agreement, and there is a high degree of skepticism about the positive impacts of the agreement, especially in terms of the effectiveness of justice and the quality of democracy. However, the interpretation of the results of the Rural Post-Conflict Colombia study on public opinions and expectations of the peace agreement should be done with caution, bearing in mind that the study found that public knowledge of its content is low.

Thirdly, it is clear that the willingness of Colombians towards for-giveness and reconciliation has increased since 2015, but in order to promote reconciliation it is necessary to make progress in repairing the communities affected by the conflict. In both the national sample and Rural Post-Conflict Colombia, more than 80% of Colombians identify reparation for affected communities and victims as the most important factor for reconciliation. This result suggests that for Colombians reconciliation has much to do with structural aspects associated with the social conditions of the populations most affected by violence. It is striking that guerrilla behavior, such as asking for forgiveness, confessing crimes or repairing communities and compensating victims are considered important for reconciliation by more respondents in the 2016 national sample than by those surveyed in Rural Post Conflict Colombia.

Regarding the willingness of the population to share spaces with ex-combatants, the number of citizens in post-conflict areas who are willing to receive ex-combatants in their neighborhoods has increased significantly. In 2017, eight out of ten Colombians in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia would agree to have an ex-combatant as

a neighbor. However, there is still evident resistance to the idea of sharing with ex-combatants in different spheres of life: on average, one in two Colombians prefers not to share their working environment or the school of their children with demobilized combatants. This figure is even lower when it comes to their children befriending a demobilized person (39%). Nonetheless, although there are low levels of acceptance regarding cohabitation with demobilized persons in more intimate spaces, this level of acceptance is higher than that of the country as a whole, reported in 2016.

Part of the explanation for this better receptivity to demobilized combatants in Rural Post-Conflict Colombia has to do with the fall in the perception that cohabitation with demobilized combatants will bring negative consequences for society. Today, only a minority of inhabitants of Rural Post-Conflict Colombia (about one in three) believe that such cohabitation will increase criminality, reduce job opportunities and corrupt social values. Paradoxically, fewer Colombians also believe that living with demobilized combatants will build a more inclusive society.

For Colombians,

reconciliation has a lot to do with the structural aspects associated with the social conditions of the population most affected by violence.

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Anexo A: Modelos de regresión

Tabla A.1. Estimación de modelo de regresión simple del apoyo al Acuerdo de Paz, controlando por exposición al conflicto (Zonas PDET)

	Coeficiente	Error estándar
Zona urbana	- 0.143	1.616
Mujer	-2.620**	1.263
Edad	0.094**	0.040
Nivel educativo	0.008	0.185
Ingresos del hogar	0.187	0.144
Zonas PDET	3.460**	1.743
Confianza en el Presidente	5.617***	0.398
Aprobación presidencial	0.469***	0.029
Ideología Izquierda Derecha	-1.864 -0.195	1.360 1.509
Constante	6.693*	3.377
R-cuadrado	0.38	
F	156.03	
Número de casos	2357	

Tabla A.2. Estimación de modelo de regresión simple del apoyo al Acuerdo de Paz, controlando por victimización

	Coeficiente	Error estándar
Zona urbana	-1.421	1.379
Mujer	-2.655**	1.260
Edad	0.083**	0.040
Nivel educativo	-0.017	0.185
Ingresos del hogar	0.171	0.147
Víctima	2.065*	1.238
Confianza en el Presidente	5.593***	0.401
Aprobación presidencial	0.475***	0.029
Ideología Izquierda Derecha	-1.885 -0.300	1.364 1.535
Constante	8.574***	3.209
R-cuadrado	0.38	
F	155.71	
Número de casos	2357	

Tabla A.3. Estimación de modelo de regresión simple de la disposición a convivir con excombatientes

	Coeficiente	Error estándar
Zona urbana	0.079	0.128
Mujer	-0.675***	0.122
Edad	-0.014***	0.004
Nivel educativo	0.084***	0.017
Ingresos del hogar	0.058***	0.016
Zonas PDET	0.295**	0.132
Confianza en el Presidente	0.039	0.036
Aprobación presidencial	0.015***	0.002
Ideología Izquierda Derecha	-0.028 -0.189	0.131 0.146
Constante	4.836***	0.343
R-cuadrado	0.093	
F	26.42	
Número de casos	2364	

Notas

Anexo B: Cuestionario Colombia Rural del Posconflicto 2017

[NO leer alternativas; Aceptar SOLO (
Agua, falta de	19	Los políticos	59						
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	La guerrilla	62						
Conflicto armado	30	Las BACRIM/ paramilitares	63						
Corrupción	13	La paz/el acuerdo de paz	64						
Crédito, falta de	09	Mal gobierno	15						
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Medio ambiente	10						
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Migración	16						
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Narcotráfico	12						
Desigualdad	58	Pandillas	14						
Desnutrición	23	Pobreza	04						
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Política agraria/campesina	65						
Deuda externa	26	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06						
Discriminación	25	Salud, falta de servicio	22						
Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción	11	Secuestro	31						
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Seguridad (falta de)	27						
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Terrorismo	33						
Electricidad, falta de	24	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07						
Explosión demográfica	20	Transporte, problemas con el	60						
Guerra contra el terrorismo	17	Violencia	57						
Impunidad	61	Vivienda	55						
Inflación, altos precios	02	Otro	70						
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888	No responde [NO LEER]	988888						

A4LOC2 . En su opinión ¿cuál es el probarrio/vereda? [NO LEER ALTERNATI			
Agua, falta de	19	Los políticos	59
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	La guerrilla	62
Conflicto armado	30	Las BACRIM/ paramilitares	63
Corrupción	13	La paz/el acuerdo de paz	64
Crédito, falta de	09	Mal gobierno	15
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Medio ambiente	10
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Migración	16
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Narcotráfico	12
Desigualdad	58	Pandillas	14
Desnutrición	23	Pobreza	04
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Política agraria/campesina	65
Deuda externa	26	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Discriminación	25	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción	11	Secuestro	31
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Terrorismo	33
Electricidad, falta de	24	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Explosión demográfica	20	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Guerra contra el terrorismo	17	Violencia	57
Impunidad	61	Vivienda	55
Inflación, altos precios	02	Otro	70
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888	No responde [NO LEER]	988888

COLAOJ21A. Ahora voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos garantiza la seguridad en el lugar donde vive **[Leer alternativas. Marcar solo una respuesta]**

- (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad
- (2) Pandillas
- (3) Policía o militares
- (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes
- (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia
- (6) Delincuentes comunes
- (7) Guerrilla
- (8) Las BACRIM
- (9) Seguridad privada (celadores)
- (10) [NO LEER] Otros
- (11) [NO LEER] Ninguno
- (888888) No sabe [NO LEER]
- (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA B

COLAOJ21B. ¿Y cuál de los siguientes grupos garantizaba la seguridad hace doce meses en el lugar donde usted vive? [Leer alternativas. Marcar solo una respuesta]

- (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad
- (2) Pandillas
- (3) Policía o militares
- (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes
- (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia
- (6) Delincuentes comunes
- (7) Guerrilla
- (8) Las BACRIM
- (9) Seguridad privada o celadores
- (10) [NO LEER] Otros
- (11) [NO LEER] Ninguno
- (888888) No sabe [NO LEER]
- (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

COLPESE4. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de inseguridad actual en **su barrio** (vereda) es mayor, igual, o menor que el de hace 12 meses? (1) Mayor (2) Iqual (3) Menor (888888) No sabe **NO LEER** (988888) No responde [NO LEER] COLPESE5A. Pensando en el barrio (vereda) donde usted vive, la Policía Nacional hace presencia... [Leer alternativas] (1) Permanente (pasa a COLDH2B) (2) De vez en cuando (pasa a COLPESE5B) (3) Nunca (pasa a COLPESE5B) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (pasa a COLDH2B) (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (pasa a COLDH2B) COLPESE5B. ¿Y si hubiera presencia permanente de la Policía Nacional, usted cree que la seguridad del barrio (vereda) donde usted vive... [Leer alternativas] Disminuiría? Permanecería igual? Aumentaría? 888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] WC1. ¿Usted ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? O ¿tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto? (1) Sí **[Sique]** (2) No [Pasa a WC3] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a WC3] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a WC3] WC1T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER] WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país? (1) Sí **[Sique]** (2) No **[Pasa a WC2]** (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a WC2] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a WC2] WC3T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** (999999) Inaplicable INO LEER WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país? (1) Sí **[Sique]** (2) No **[Pasa a COLWC8]** (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC8] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC8] WC2T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (1) Sí (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

COLWC8. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia fue víctima de un secuestro? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a COLWC9] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC9] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC9]	
COLWC8T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	
COLWC9. ¿Por razones del conflicto armado algún miembro de su familia fue despojado de su tierra? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLLT5] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLLT5] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLLT5]	
COLWC9T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	

¿Qué grupo o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? [NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS. EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (888888) No sabe (988888) No responde]

	Sí	No	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable (no fue víctima) [NO LEER]	
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4D. El Ejército	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4E. La policía	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4G. BACRIM (Bandas criminales)	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4C. Ex paramilitares que se han reagrupado	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	888888	988888	999999	

COLLT5. ¿Hace parte usted del registro nacional de víctimas del conflicto armado? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a COLPAZ1A] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPAZ1A] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPAZ1A]	
COLLT6. ¿Ha recibido algún tipo de reparación por parte del Gobierno Nacional? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	No sabe	No responde	
colpazia. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [Leer alternativas]	1	2	3	888888	988888	

COLPAZ4AN2. ¿Está de acuerdo con la reintegración a la sociedad de los excombatientes desmovilizados de Las FARC? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]					
¿Y usted ve posible, sí o no, el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con los excombatientes desmovilizados de:					
COLPAZ6A. Las FARC? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]					

COLPGEN1N. Pensando en los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC, ¿quién cree usted que se reintegrará más fácilmente a la vida civil: un hombre desmovilizado o una mujer desmovilizada? (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) Ambos por igual [NO LEER] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]				
COLB60A. ¿Usted hoy confía en las FARC: más, lo mismo o menos que hace doce meses? (1) Más (2) Lo mismo (3) Menos (888888) No sabe [NO LEER]				

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B" AL ENTREVISTADO]

calón r yo le pi puntaje está er	más bajo reguntara e de 1. Si ntre nada	y signific hasta qu por el co y mucho	ca NADA ué punto ontrario I elegiría	y el 7 es le gusta e gusta r un punta	el escalo ver televi nucho ve je interm	ón más a sión, si a r televisio edio. Ento	s del uno al siete, en lto y significa MUCh usted no le gusta ve ón me diría el núme onces, ¿hasta qué p trevistado entienda	HO. Por ejemplo, si er nada, elegiría un ero 7. Si su opinión unto le gusta a us-
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
	Nad	a		ı	Mucho		No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]
	[4	notar ur	númer	1-7, 88	8888 = 1	lo sabe,	988888= No respo	nde]
puesta númer B1 . ¿H rantiza para na	Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? [Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio]							
COLB	0. ¿Hast	a qué pu	nto tiene	usted co	onfianza e	en las FA	RC?	
	pre usan r un núm		,	,	be, 9888	88= No r	esponde]	
		_					Santos y las FARC ste acuerdo de pazí	

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

Ahora le voy a leer una serie de acciones y quiero que me diga si usted cree que ellas contribuirían nada o contribuirían mucho para que se dé la reconciliación entre las víctimas del conflicto armado v sus victimarios. [Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable] COLRECON19A. Que los responsables de crímenes atroces, que confiesen sus delitos, paquen entre 5 y 8 años de privación de la libertad. **COLRECON19B.** Que los responsables de crímenes atroces pidan perdón a las víctimas. COLRECON19C. Que el Estado indemnice a las víctimas del conflicto armado. COLRECON19D. Que el Estado repare a las comunidades que fueron afectadas por el conflicto armado. COLRECON19E. Que se realicen eventos conmemorativos para recordar públicamente a las víctimas del conflicto armado. Utilizando la misma tarieta, quisiera que me diiera qué tanto contribuyeron los siguientes actores a alcanzar el acuerdo de paz entre el gobierno y las FARC COLPROPAZ14B, El Presidente Juan Manuel Santos COLPROPAZ14F. Los negociadores de las FARC COLPROPAZ14C. Las Fuerzas Armadas? ¿Qué tanto han contribuido? COLPROPAZ14D. La comunidad internacional COLPROPAZ14E. El expresidente Álvaro Uribe COLPROPAZ14A. Los negociadores del gobierno

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA B

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

del conflicto armado

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

Ahora le voy a leer una serie de acciones y quiero que me diga si usted cree que ellas contribuirían nada o contribuirían mucho para que se dé la reconciliación entre las víctimas del conflicto armado y sus victimarios

[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable].

COLRECON20A. Que los responsables de crímenes atroces, que no confiesen sus delitos, paguen más de 8 años de cárcel.

COLRECON20B. Que se establezca la verdad sobre los hechos ocurridos en el marco

 $\textbf{COLRECON20C.} \ \ \text{Que los victimarios indemnicen a las víctimas del conflicto armado.}$

COLRECON20D. Que los victimarios reparen a las comunidades que fueron afectadas por el conflicto armado.	
COLRECON20E. Que se construya un museo en el que se recuerden los hechos ocurridos en el marco del conflicto armado.	
Utilizando la misma tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera qué tanto contribuyeron los siguien a terminar la guerra entre el Estado colombiano y las FARC	tes actores
COLPROPAZ15B. El Presidente Juan Manuel Santos	
COLPROPAZ15F. Los negociadores de las FARC	
COLPROPAZ15C. Las Fuerzas Armadas? ¿Qué tanto han contribuido?	
COLPROPAZ15D. La comunidad internacional	
COLPROPAZ15E. El expresidente Álvaro Uribe	
COLPROPAZ15A. Los negociadores del gobierno	

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

Y pensando en este lugar donde usted vive, SD2NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]	
SD3NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted[Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]	
SD6NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted[Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]	
COLSD8NEW2. Con la calidad de los servicios de acueducto y alcantarillado? ¿Está usted[Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]	

COLINFRAX. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía.
¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía?

[Anote el número de horas y minutos; si la persona responde menos de una hora, coloque 0 en horas y el valor correspondiente en la casilla de minutos]

___(horas)____(minutos)

(977777) **[NO LEER]** No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca (88888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "C" AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera en donde el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

1	2	3	4	5	5 6 7		888888	988888	
Muy er	n desacu	erdo		ı	Muy de a	cuerdo	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

Le voy a leer algunas frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

COLPACT16B. Las FARC cumplirán con lo pactado en el acuerdo de paz firmado en La Habana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

COLINSTGOB12. En comparación con hace 12 meses, hoy las personas acuden con más frecuencia a las instituciones del Estado para resolver una disputa con algún vecino. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

más frecuencia a las instituciones del Estado para resolver una disputa con algún vecino. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Ahora, pensando en la implementación del acuerdo de paz firmado entre el Gobierno y las FARC, ¿hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones? [Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]

COLPROPAZ13C. La implementación del acuerdo fortalecerá la democracia colombiana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

COLPROPAZ13J. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la seguridad en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

COLPROPAZ13K. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la situación económica de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

COLPROPAZ13L. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la efectividad de la justicia en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

COLPROPAZ13M. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará el acceso de los campesinos a la tierra en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13N. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la calidad de las carreteras de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13Q. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará el acceso a asesoría técnica para los campesinos de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPACT16A. El Gobierno cumplirá con lo pactado en el acuerdo de paz firmado en La Habana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora, pensando en los excombatientes desmovilizados de los grupos armados ilegales en general, ¿hasta qué punto usted está de acuerdo con que al compartir el mismo espacio con los excombatientes desmovilizados e interactuar con ellos [Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]	
COLDESM3A. Se corromperían los valores sociales?	
COLDESM3B. Se reducirían las oportunidades laborales?	
COLDESM3E. Se construiría una sociedad más incluyente?	
COLDESM3C. Se aumentarían las tasas de criminalidad?	

[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

En la mesa de negociación de La Habana, el Gobierno y las FARC llegaron a varios acuerdos. Quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre algunos de ellos.						
COLPACT11. Se acordó que los partidos políticos formados por excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC tendrán las mismas garantías de seguridad y de acceso a medios de comunicación que ya tienen los demás partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?						
COLPACT1. Se acordó que los miembros rasos de las FARC (no comandantes) que se desmovilicen no irán a la cárcel. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?						
Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.						
COLPACT17A. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla rebajas de penas a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?						
COLPACT18A. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?						

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA B

[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]					
Utilizando la misma tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacue do con las siguientes acciones					
COLPACT8. Que se reserven curules del Congreso para las regiones más afectadas por el conflicto armado, con el fin de que estas regiones tengan mayor representación en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?					
COLPACT9. Que se formen Zonas de Reserva Campesina que beneficiarán a pequeños productores y que no se podrán vender a grandes empresas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?					
COLPACT10. Que se distribuyan tierras baldas entre campesinos que no tienen suficiente tierra para cultivar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?					
COLPACT19. Que se desarrollen programas de sustitución de cultivos en su municipio ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?					

Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.

COLPACT17B. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla rebajas de penas a miembros de las Fuerzas Militares que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

COLPACT18B. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a miembros de las Fuerzas Militares que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "D" AL ENTREVISTADO]

punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría...

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	888888 No sabe [NO LEER]	988888 No responde [NO LEER]
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente						

[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
COLESPA1. Usando la misma tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprueba o desaprueba que los excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC formen un partido político. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

Ahora quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría las siguientes situaciones, utilizando la misma tarjeta. [Anotar 1-10, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]	
COLRECON8. Que en la empresa o lugar donde usted trabaje le dieran empleo a una mujer desmovilizada de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?	
COLRECON6. Que una hija o hijo suyo fuera amigo de un desmovilizado de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?	
COLRECON18. Que en el colegio de su hija o hijo estudien hijos de excombatientes desmovilizados de grupos armados ilegales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?	
COLRECON7. Que en la empresa o lugar donde usted trabaje le dieran empleo a un hombre desmovilizado de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?	

[RECOGER Tarjeta "D"]

COLDIS35F. Pensando en los excombatientes desmovilizados de los grupos armados, por favor dígame si... **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]**

- 1) No los quiere de vecinos
- 2) No tiene problema con tenerlos de vecinos


(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

COLGI8. ¿Cuál es la pena máxima en años para un excombatiente desmovilizado de las FARC que se acoja a la Justicia Especial de Paz?


[ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**


Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D



Notas

Notas

Notas

