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BARÓMETRO DE LAS AMÉRICAS COLOMBIA

2018

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Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation

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Peace, Post-Conflict and Reconciliation 2018

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Presentation

The Observatory for Democracy is the center for academic research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Department of Political Science of Universidad de los Andes. For more than a decade, the Observatory for Democracy has sought to conduct the main public opinion study of the American continent in Colombia: the Americas Barometer.

Through this rigorous study of public opinion, using historic comparability from the last 14 years in Colombia, as well as comparability among countries which are also part of the continent, the Observatory for Democracy interprets and analyzes the opinions, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of Colombians regarding structural and current issues, while informing the Government, the authorities, the academy and the population in general, with the objective of contributing to the debate and generation of public policy, initiatives and actions regarding the country's key issues.

The Americas Barometer is a public opinion survey which is carried out in 18 countries of the American continent, in coordination with the University of Vanderbilt. Currently, the Observatory for Democracy of Universidad de los Andes develops this study with support and financing from USAID, which allows for the country to have access to annually updated information, though national samples on even years and special samples on uneven years.

In the case of the study correspondent to 2018, a national sample named the 2018 Americas Barometer Colombia was carried out in six regions of the country, Bogotá, Caribbean, Central, Oriental, Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco and Bogotá.

There will be access to segmented studies, such as Peace, post-conflict and reconciliation, Democracy and Institutions and Attitudes and opinions Colombian women. All of these reports will be available in print and digital versions at the Observatory for Democracy webpage: **http://www.obsdemocracia.org**

The completion of the 2018 Americas Barometer study was possible thanks to the cooperation of several institutions.

We would like to highlight the work carried out in conjunction by the Observatory for Democracy, Universidad de los Andes, and USAID, as well as the fieldwork support from the IPSOS firm and Vanderbilt University. We must also mention the work undertaken by the management team and graduate assistants of the Observatory for Democracy made up of Juan Camilo Plata, Martín Rodríguez Rocha, María Carolina Mesa, Adriana Gaviria Dugand, Mariana Saldarriaga Osorio, Ana Villalba Castro, Carlos Arturo Avila García, Diana Alejandra Rivera Rivera and Franny Melissa Medina Ariza.

Sample Description

The fieldwork undertaken for the 2018 Americas Barometer for Colombia study took place between September 10th and December 27th, 2018. Its execution was conducted by the IPSOS firm. The population universe in the study was entirely made up of non-institutionalized legal age residents in Colombia (meaning that people who inhabit jails, schools, hospitals and military bases, were not included). The size of the sample group was 1,663 individuals within this population universe, which guaranteed that the sample represents said universe with a 2.5% margin of error.

Surveys were carried out in 47 municipalities in the following regions: (i) Bogotá, (ii) Caribbean, (iii) Central, (iv) Oriental, (v) Pacific and (vi) Amazon-Orinoco. Each of these regions constitutes a stratum of the sample, thus guaranteeing the representativeness of the sample universe as well as that of each region.

The selection method for these individuals (sampling method) was probabilistic, stratified, multi-staged, with random selection of sample units in each stage. The explanation of each one of these methods is listed below:

The sample is **probabilistic**, given that each person in the population universe had the same probability of being chosen through the random selection process of sample units.

 It is **stratified** because besides representing the total population universe, the study's sample represents joint populations (sample strata) within said universe, defined as follows:

- Population in the country's different regions: Bogotá, Caribbean, Central, Oriental, Pacific and Amazon-Orinoco.

- Population in municipalities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants (small), municipalities with a population ranging from 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (medium) and municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants (large).

- Population in urban and rural zones.

In order to guarantee the representativeness of the study's sample in each of these sample strata, the necessary number of respondents was calculated so that the proportion of respondents in each stratus corresponded to the real ratio of inhabitants in this stratus over the total of the sample universe.

It is **multi-staged**, because each of the sample units was randomly chosen. These sample units are housing complexes where the individuals of the sample universe live. The random selection of these units was carried out in four stages, as follows:

- First stage. Random selection of sample Primary Units, which were localities for the selection of respondents in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla (as they are the country's largest cities); and municipalities for the selection of respondents throughout the rest of the country. A total of 63 primary sample units were selected, distributed so that all the already specified strata samples would be represented.

- Second stage. Random selection of cartographic sectors (sets of blocks or paths in rural areas as define by DANE), within each locality or municipality. Four sectors within each locality or municipality were chosen.

- Third stage. Within each sector, the block in which the survey is to be carried out is randomly selected.

- Fourth Stage. Random selection of the households which inhabit each block country road (only one household per dwelling) selected in the previous stage, subject to compliance with age and gender quotas in order to avoid an imbalance within the sample.

Once random selection had been carried out in each household according the process described above, the pollsters applied the study's survey on a single member of said home, complying with quotas of sex (men and women) and age (18 to 30, 31 to 45, and over 46 years of age). Thus, six interviews had to be carried out in each cartographic cluster, each in a different household (given that many of the questions refer to the surveyed household), with the purpose of filling the specified sex and age quotas. Therewith, an imbalance in the total sample due to sex or age was avoided. Thus, the total of respondents in each cartographic sector should be six (24 per each primary sample unit). However, in anticipation of any difficulty regarding the quality of the surveys which would

force them to return to some sample point, IPSOS carried out additional surveys in some cases. Thus, the final sample is not made up of 1,512 planned surveys, but rather 1,663. Given that these additional surveys are not randomly distributed and in an effort to take advantage of this information, these surveys are weighed in such a way that the planned distribution is maintained, without losing the information.

Regarding the collection of data, just as in previous years, electronic devices were used though the SURVEYTOGO® application, which allowed for a strict fieldwork control, as well as the introduction of experiments within the survey.

Each survey had an average duration of one hour. The questionnaire included 229 questions, divided into two large groups. The first of these was made up of a common nucleus of questions used by all the countries which carry out the Americas Barometer study, with the purpose of having a comparative perspective of public opinion throughout the continent. The second group of questions, which was specifically tailored for the study of issues of interest in Colombia, was made up of a series of modules centered on the Peace Accord, as well as the attitudes and opinions of Colombian women.

Once all the information form the surveys of the 2018 Americas Barometer was gathered and processed, the Observatory for Democracy returned to four municipalities from the sample in order to gain a more profound knowledge and understanding of the perceptions of the Colombian citizens who live there and the differences which are present in these perceptions, according to region, age and gender.

A total of 16 focus groups were arranged in four municipalities: Bogotá, Cali (Pacific), San Martín (Oriental), and Sampués (Caribbean). In each municipality, four sessions were carried out, each one with a number of participants which ranged from 10 to 15 people; one with young people and another with adults. Women and men met separately. Its execution was performed by the IPSOS firm.

This particular task allowed the Observatory for Democracy to deepen the study's results, while making emphasis in post-conflict, gender and institutional issues. This report shows some of the perspectives which were found.

Notes

Glossary

Democracy Observatory: An academic center for research and analysis of public opinion and political and social behavior of the Political Science Department of the University of the Andes based in Bogotá (Colombia).

Americas Barometer-LAPOP: A public opinion study conducted in the Americas that explores the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and experiences of people in the Americas regarding democracy, institutions and political and economic processes in each country. This study is coordinated by the Vanderbilt University, based in Nashville, Tennessee.

Population (sample universe): A group of subjects to be studied or understood. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the population is made up of all non-institutionalized adults residing in Colombia. Sample: a group of people within the sample universe, from which inferences are made about the characteristics of that universe.

Observation unit (analysis unit): Units that make up the sample universe and on which inferences will be made. For example, in the Americas Barometer-LAPOP, the unit of analysis is the non-institutionalized adult resident in Colombia.

Sampling unit: A group containing the people being interviewed. These may include one person, when individual sampling. However, when sampling is done from agglomerations, each sampling unit may include several people. For example, in the survey used in this study, different sampling units are used, hierarchically ordered, where municipalities contain rural districts, within which households are located.

Stratification: A process that consists of defining populations groups with common characteristics within each of which the random selection of respondents is carried out. This procedure seeks to guarantee the representativeness of each of these population groups - for example: urban and rural areas, the six main regions of the country, etc.

Parameter (population value): A calculation obtained from the measurement made on all individuals in a population. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the 2005 DANE general census.

Estimator (sample value): A calculation obtained from the measurement made on individuals of a representative sample of the sample population. The estimator is used to obtain an approximate measurement of the parameters. For example, the total Colombian population obtained from the DANE's Large Integrated Household Survey.

Margin of error of the survey: It represents the degree of accuracy with which the survey includes the population values on which inferences are to be made. For example, a survey may estimate that 28% of the population sympathizes with candidate A. However, although the estimate would be different if we conducted the survey with a new sample, it is expected that the difference between those estimates and candidate A's true level of support will not be greater than the margin of error (e.g., ±2.0%).

Confidence interval: Is the range of values within which the estimated parameter is expected to be if the survey is repeated. Thus, this value reflects the level of dispersion with which a population value is estimated. For example, if on a scale of 1 to 7 people rate the level of approval of abortion, there will be greater dispersion (a greater confidence interval) over the population average if almost the same number of people select each of the response alternatives than if the majority selects one of the options. In this second case, we will have greater consistency (although the true value is not necessarily identified) in estimating the level of approval of abortion in the population.

Variable: An attribute or characteristic that was measured by the survey. Examples of variables are age, ethnic origin, gender, socioeconomic level, educational level, among others.

Introduction

The year 2018 marked the second anniversary of the signing of the Peace Accord between the national Government and the FARC-EP, while its implementation forges ahead. According to the third report regarding the actual state of the implementation of the Peace Accord (Kroc Institute 2017),[1] more than two thirds of the commitments of the Agreement are currently in progress or have been completed, thus reaching an implementation rate similar to other peace agreements around the world. The main accomplishments are related to the end of the armed conflict between the Government and the FARC-EP, the transformation of this guerrilla group into a political party and the operation of several verification monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms. Comparative studies of other peace processes show that reaching the two year mark, without returning to the conflict, is an important milestone which bodes well for success.

However, the Kroc Institute report regarding the actual state of the implementation of the Peace Agreement indicates that the process has decelerated during President Ivan Duque's term. While it is possible to justify this deceleration due to the natural adjustments brought about by a change of administration, the Kroc Institute warns that accelerating the pace of implementation is of the essence. As of February, 2019, the cutoff date for this report, 31% of the total commitments had not begun implementation, with Comprehensive Rural Reform and the solution to the problem of illegal drugs, significantly lagging behind. In both cases, half of the commitments have not been implemented. Additionally, while progress was made in the establishment of an institutional framework which provides legal stability to the main mechanisms required for the implementation of the Agreement, the Kroc institute warns that it is still necessary to strengthen and protect the legal stability of the Final Agreement and to finish the process of passing the pending laws and standards.

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1. The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame, is one of the world's leading peacebuilding research and study centers. One of its main projects is the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM), which constitutes the largest and most exhaustive database regarding the implementation of 34 peace accords signed around the world since 1989. Through the Final Accord for the Termination of Conflict and Stable and Durable Peacebuilding mandate, the Kroc Institute is responsible for providing technical support to the monitoring and evaluation process of the implementation to the same (numeral 6.3.3 of the Accord). It is the first time that a research center associated to an academic institution of higher learning plays such a direct role in a peace accord, and at the same time, that researchers measure the actual state of such process in real time.

As of February, 2015, which was the cutoff date for this report, **implementation on 31% of total commitments had not begun.** Comprehensive Rural Reform and the solution to the problem of illegal drugs were especially lagging.

A particularly worrisome aspect, as indicated by the Kroc Institute report, is the growing insecurity in post-agreement Colombia. Not only have the murders of social leaders increased, but additionally, other local conflicts have (re)emerged, finding a theater they did not have in the midst of the armed conflict. Similarly, the illegal economy which fed the internal conflict is still present; old and new armed groups vie over territory and coerce local populations.

In this context, the country faces an uncertain picture, in which short-term progress in the implementation of the Peace Accord, contrasts with challenges which cast doubt on its effective implementation in the medium and long terms. This uncertainty exacerbates the climate of political polarization which characterizes the opinion of Colombians regarding peace. The clearest manifestation of this was the result of the Plebiscite of 2016, in which the No vote triumphed with 50.21% of the vote. Given the circumstances currently faced by the country, it is of the essence to study and understand the opinions and attitudes of citizens vis-a-vis the Peace Accord and the post-accord.

In this context, **the country faces an uncertain picture**, in which short term progress in the **implementation of the Peace Process** contrast the challenges which threaten its effective short and long term implementation.

Since 2013, the Observatory for Democracy of Universidad de los Andes, has included a module of questions related to the Peace Process and post-accord in the Americas Barometer - LAPOP survey. Moreover, since 2016, the study includes questions related to the perceptions of respondents regarding the Peace Accord reached between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP. Thus, this report's purpose is to make a detailed presentation about the attitudes, opinions, and experiences of citizens concerning: the armed conflict, the Peace Accord, political participation on the part of ex-combatants, transitional justice, the reintegration of ex-combatants into life in society and the reconciliation between citizens and members of former armed groups. The presentation and analysis of these opinions and attitudes shall be executed in a comparative manner to the results of previous studies, offering, as well, a regional perspective of the results obtained from some questions.

The report is divided as follows. After this introduction, information regarding the victimization caused by the armed conflict will be presented. The second chapter deals with everything related to the negotiated end to the war, perceptions regarding the Peace Accord with the FARC, the expectations of Colombians concerning the impact of the implementation of the Accord and the understanding of the same among citizens. The third chapter analyzes the citizenry's attitude toward the reconciliation and cohabitation with FARC ex-combatants. The fourth chapter explores perceptions regarding the capacity of the state, particularly in terms of security and the provision of public services. Finally, the last chapter is dedicated to the conclusions of the study.

Notes

1. Victimization

1.1. Introduction

In order to build a stable and lasting peace, one of the most important endeavors on the part of the Colombian government is the recognition of the victims of the armed conflict, since this allows their rights to be guaranteed in terms of justice, truth and reparation.[2] Consequently, the Americas Barometer delved into the experiences of victimization within the framework of the armed conflict. Notably, the respondents were asked if they or any member of their families had been a victim of the following acts: kidnapping, exile, dispossession, forced displacement or loss of a relative. Similarly, respondents were asked about the recognition of victims, through the national registry of victims, as well as the reparation of victims on the part of the Government. In this chapter, two dimensions caused by the armed conflict are presented; the first makes reference to the occurrence of any act of victimization in the context of the armed conflict, without taking any particular timeframe into account (historical victimization), and the second is related to instances which occurred during the year immediately preceding the execution of the survey (victimization during the previous year).

It is important to point out that the degree of victimization that is presented in this study is imprecise in two respects. In the first place, the five acts of victimization which the study delves into, contrast with the 15 types acts of victimization which are listed by the National Information Network (Red Nacional de Información –RNI) and the Unit for the Attention and Comprehensive Reparation for Victims (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas).[3] Consequently, it is possible that the degree of victimization by the

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2. In Colombia, the process of identification and reparation of victims was established in 2011, through Law 1448 (Victims and Land Restitution Law). The Peace Accord signed by the national Government and the FARC-EP in 2016, brought about the creation of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition, made up of the Special Unit for the Search of Missing Persons deemed missing in the context and as a result of the armed conflict; the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Justicia Especial para La Paz – JEP), the Measures for Comprehensive Reparation for peacebuilding and the Guarantees of Non-Repetition.

3. The 15 types of act of victimizations included in the RIN/RNI are: abandonment or forced land despoilment, terrorist acts/attacks/offensives/harassment, threats, confinement, crimes against sexual freedom and integrity, forced disappearance, displacement, homicide, personal physical injury, personal psychological injury, anti-personnel mines/unexploded munition/explosive device/loss of movable and immovable property, kidnapping, tortured, recruitment of boys, girls and adolescents.

Americas Barometer underestimate the respondents' exposure to the armed conflict. However, another source of imprecision regarding the degree of victimization on the part of the study is related to the fact that that the survey captures the occurrence of the acts in an indirect manner, due to the fact that respondents were asked about personal experiences or those of a relative. In this sense, the extent of the study would be more comprehensive that of the RNI, since the unit of analysis is the family as opposed to the individual.[4] For the above reasons, the information which is presented in this chapter must be interpreted as an approximation to victimization.

The Americas Barometer inquired whether the respondents or any member of their families have been victims of: **kidnapping, exile, despoilment, forced displacement and loss of a relative**.

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4. This source of imprecision could explain why the proportion of historic victims related to the total population is higher in the study conducted by the Americas Barometer (40.8%), than that on the report based on official national Government figures (16.8).

1.2. Historic Victimization due to the armed conflict

Since 2004, the Americas Barometer has measured historic victimization due to the armed conflict in Colombia.[5] Graph 1 shows the historic tendency of the victimization index from 2004 to 2018. During this time period, historic victimization due to the armed conflict has remained stable: on average, 4 out of 10 respondents have suffered at least one of the acts of victimization inquired about by the survey. By observing the levels of historic victimization in the distant regions analyzed by the study, it was found that the percentage of individuals who reported having been victim to the armed conflict in Bogotá (25.3%), is significantly lower than in the rest of the regions such as the Central (47.4%), the Oriental (39.1%), the Pacific (47.4%) and the Amazon-Orinoco (65.8%) (Graph 2).

The percentage of individuals who reported having been **victim of the armed conflict in Bogotá (25.3%)** is significantly lower than in the regions such as the **Pacific (47.4%)** and **Amazon-Orinoco (65.8%)**

5. The presentation of degree of victimization is executed through the composition of an index which codifies of how the individual who reports any of the following modes of victimization due to the armed conflict: (1) kidnapping (2) exile (3) refuge (4) forced displacement (5) loss of a relative

Graph 1. Historic victimization due to the armed conflict

33.3% 28.6% 29.7% 34.0% 31.5% 32.6% 33.6% 32.5% 34.0% 38.0% 39.8% 37.8% 40.8%

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2018

% Víctimas del conflicto

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

WC1. Have you lost a member of your family or close kin due to the conflict? or Is there a missing family member due to the armed conflict?

WC3. Has any member of your family had to leave the country due to the conflict?

WC2. And, has any member of your family had to seek refuge or abandon their place of residence due to the conflict?

COLWC8. And, has a member of your family been a kidnapping victim?

COLWC9. Has any member of your family been despoiled of their land due to the armed conflict?

Graph 2. Historic victimization due to the conflict, 2018 by region

% Víctimas del conflicto

38.2% 25.3% 47.4% 39.1% 47.4% 65.8%

Caribe | Bogotá | Central | Oriental | Pacífica | Amazonía –Orinoquía

Regiones

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

1.3. Victimization in the previous year

In the interest of analyzing the intensity of victimization during different moments in time, the Americas Barometer identifies a recent dimension of victimization, asking those who have been victims if the incident happened during the 12 months previous to the execution of the study. This allows for a snapshot of the immediate effects of some current events in the country, such as, for instance, the signing of the Peace Accord in 2016. Graph 3 shows that the signing of the Peace Accord did not translate into a significant reduction of violence, given that since 2013, the percentage of victims in the previous year fluctuated between 6% and 9%.

The signing of the Peace Accord did not translate into a significant reduction of violence, given that **since 2013, the percentage of victims in the previous year fluctuated between 6% and 9%**.

Graph 3. Victimization

Y-axis: % Victimas del conflicto en el último año

8.5% 7.7% 5.7% 6.8%

2013   2014   2016   2018

X-axis: Año

95% Intervalo
de confianza
(Efecto de diseño
incorporado)

WC1T. Have you lost a member of your family or close relative due to the armed conflict? Or Has a relative gone missing due to the conflict? Did this happen within the last 12 months?

WC3T. Has any family member left due to the armed conflict? Did this happen within the last twelve months?

WC2T. Has a member of your family had to ask for asylum or abandon their place of residence due to the conflict? Did this happen within the last twelve months?

COLWC8T. Has a member of your family been a victim of kidnapping? Did this happen within the last twelve months?

1.4. Types of incidents and severity of victimization

Based on the different types of victimization inquired about in the study, it is possible to categorize the dynamics of the armed conflict, particularly in respect to the different types of victimization incidents and to the severity of victimization, measured as the quantity of incidents suffered by individuals. Graph 4 shows that displacement and the loss of a relative are the most common types of victimization among respondents (64.5% and 56.8% respectively). The former are followed by despoilment, incident experienced by half of the study's respondents (48.9%). Kidnapping and a relative's exile are less frequent, which have affected 1 out 10 victims and 2 out of 10 victims, respectively.[6]

Graph 4. Types of victimization due to the armed conflict, 2018

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

% que ha experimentado cada foma de victimización

10.7%	22.9%	48.9%	56.8%	64.5%
Familiar secuestrado	Familiar exiliado	Familiar despojado de su tierra	Pérdida de familiar	Familiar desplazado

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
6. Graph 4 shows the proportion of the victims of the conflict who reported having suffered each of the 5 different manifestations of victimization inquired about by the Americas Barometer. Given that a victim may experiment more than one type of victimization throughout their life, the sum of the percentage of victims in all manifestations of violence, does not add up to 100%.

Graph 5 presents the historic tendency of the two most common types of deed: the loss of a relative and displacement, indicating that they have remained stable since 2004. This stability reflects that the intensity of the armed conflict in Colombia has not increased during the last 14 years. The only act of victimization that has indeed changed over time, and which is also shown in Graph 5, is the exile of a relative. The number of respondents who had an exiled relative in 2018 (9.3%) has significantly increased, with respect to the number observed before 2012 (approximately 5%).

Graph 5. Historic victimization, by act of victimization

Legend:
— Familiar desplazado
— Pérdida de familiar
— Familiar exiliado
— 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

An important dimension of the armed conflict is the severity with which the victims have experimented violence. In order to analyze this dimension, the Observatory for Democracy studied the amount of acts of victimization reported by a single respondent, defining the most severe experience of violence, as one which involves a greater number of deeds. Graph 6 displays the percentage of historic victims who have experienced between one and five of the acts of victimization investigated by the Barometer of the Americas. It is evident that there is decreasing tendency regarding the percentage of victims as the number of acts of victimization increase, in other words, the number of victims decrease as we analyze higher degrees of exposure to violence. For example, 4 out of 10 victims in Colombia, (41.2%), have suffered at most, 1 of the 5 acts of victimization explored by the study; the percentage of victims who have suffered up to 2 acts of victimization decreases to 26.9%. If we observe the percentage of victims who have suffered all five acts of victimization researched by the Americas Barometer, it descends to 1.7%. In any case, it is noteworthy that, in general terms, the majority of the victims studied (6 out of 10), have been exposed to more than one act of victimization.

4 out of 10 victims in Colombia, [41.2%], have suffered at most, 1 of the 5 acts of victimization explored by the study; the percentage of victims who have suffered up to 2 acts of victimization decreases to 26.9%

Gráfica 6. Distribution of victims according to the level of historic victimization to which they have been exposed

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

Level	Percentage
1	41.2%
2	26.9%
3	21.0%
4	9.1%
5	1.7%

1.5. Main victimizers of the armed conflict

In comparison to other wars experienced by other countries, the armed conflict in Colombia is particularly dynamic, given the variety of economic and political factors which intertwine and instigate the war, as a consequence of a multiplicity of legal and illegal armed actors (National Center for Historical Memory – Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica CNMH 2013). In order to analyze the complexity of the Colombian conflict, since 2005, the Americas Barometer has inquired about those responsible for the acts of victimization detailed in the previous section. It was found that the guerrilla is the greatest perpetrator of acts of victimization in the country. The study shows that approximately, 5 out of 10 historic victims of the armed conflict identify guerrilla groups as those responsible for committing some type of act of victimization (Graph 7). Paramilitary groups occupy second place, with a significantly smaller percentage of victims (3 out of 10).

Graph 7. Perpetrators of acts of victimization, 2018

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

Which group or groups were responsible for these acts?
COLWC4A. The guerrilla**; COLWC4B.** The paramilitaries; **COLWC4D.** The army; **COLWC4E.** The police; **COLWC4G. BACRIM** (Criminal Gangs); **COLWC4C.** Ex-paramilitaries who have regrouped; **COLWC4F.** Others

The dynamism of the armed conflict in Colombia is also associated with the heterogeneous territorial occupation by armed groups. For example, the Colombian Caribbean was characterized by a strong presence on the part of Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). This came about as a result of a successful expansion process which did not work in the south of the country and due to low guerrilla presence, which materialized as a result of a process of expulsion which began in the 1980's (National Center for Historical Memory, 2018). Graph 8 is a reflection of what was previously mentioned; approximately half of the victims in the Caribbean region hold paramilitary groups responsible for having committed one of the acts of victimization inquired about by the Americas Barometer, thus displaying significant differences in relation to the resto of the regions of the country, where victimization figures do not exceed 25%. Conversely, the percentage of victims of the guerrilla is relatively homogeneous within the different regions of the country, fluctuating between 42% and 60%. The exception is the Caribbean region, where only 3 out of ten people held the guerrilla responsible for acts by which they were victimized.

Approximately **half of the victims of the armed conflict in the Caribbean region hold the paramilitaries responsible for having committed at least one act of victimization.** The percentage of victims of the guerrilla is relatively homogenous throughout the different regions of the country, ranging from 42% and 60%.

Graph 8. Victims on the regional level (2018), in relation to armed group

% de víctimas de la guerrilla

Región	Valor
Pacífica	44.2%
Oriental	59.7%
Central	41.7%
Bogotá	52.1%
Caribe	29.1%

% de víctimas de los paramilitares

Región	Valor
Pacífica	22.0%
Oriental	24.6%
Central	24.7%
Bogotá	20.2%
Caribe	42.6%

0   20   40   60   80   100

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

When the percentage of victims surveyed who hold the guerrilla responsible for having committed any of the acts of victimization inquired about by the survey during the previous year, it is notable that there is a statistically significant reduction between 2016 and 2018, going from 60% to 33.4% (Graph 9).[7] This decrease could be interpreted as the result of the Peace Process, particularly the ceasefire and the permanent end to bilateral hostilities, the abandonment of arms process and the demobilization of former combatants. It is also evident in Graph 9, that there is a considerable reduction of BACRIM victims during the same period, given that it decreases from 42% in 2016 to 5.5% in 2018. This decrease in the number of victims who point to the BACRIM as responsible for acts to which they were victim, could be explained due to two reasons. On the one hand, it is possible that the respondents may have difficulty correctly identifying groups responsible for acts of victimization and, on the other hand, the imprecision of the term

7. Graph 9 displays the percentage of respondents who warranted having been historic victims of the conflict. If the analysis is to be carried out based on the percentage of people in the survey who reported having been victims exclusively during the previous year, the results remain, without loss of generality.

BACRIM, could conclude that citizens associate an ample number of actors to this term.

A considerable **reduction is evident in the percentage of victims of the** BACRIM for the same period, since it decreases from **42% in 2016 to 5.5% in 2018**.

It is necessary to clarify that the decrease that has been observed in the percentage of victims who hold the guerrilla responsible for acts which occurred from 2016 to 2018, does not necessarily imply an increase in the percentage of victims of another victimizer. The latter is due to the nature of the question which is posed to the respondents. On the one hand, the respondents have the possibility of pointing out more than one perpetrator for the act of victimization declared by the victim. On the other hand, the question regarding the responsible actors is formulated once the respondent has reported all the acts to which they have been victim, and does not differentiate between those responsible for the acts which occurred within the previous year and those which occurred before. Thus, even though the quantity of people who hold the guerrilla and BACRIM responsible for the diverse acts of victimization inquired about by the Americas Barometer in 2016 and 2018, no increase is observed in Graph 9, regarding the increase in the percentage of victims of other victimizers which compensates the decrease of the victims of the guerrilla in the last year, nor did the general level of victimization significantly decrease in the previous year between 2016 (5.7%) and 2018 (6.8%) (See Graph 3).

However, in order to explore whether there has been a change in the dynamic of victimization in the armed conflict in Colombia between 2016 and 2018, the Observatory for Democracy carried out an exercise which consisted in analyzing if there had been changes in the armed groups reported by victims who met the following conditions: (i) have reported only one armed group in response to the question regarding those responsible for acts of victimization; (ii) having been victims exclusively in the previous year, and not before. This exercise yielded various interesting results. Firstly, an important reduction is corroborated between 2016 and 2018, as far as the number of victims who hold the guerrilla responsible for the acts

perpetrated in the previous year. Secondly, an increase is noted in the number of victims in the previous year, who hold other groups responsible, the paramilitaries and to a smaller degree- paramilitaries who have regrouped. This last result is important, because it reflects the mutation of the armed conflict in this phase of the post-accord, as well as the uncertainty regarding the groups which victimize the population. Nevertheless, the results of this exercise must be interpreted cautiously, as they are not statistically robust, given the small quantity of observations which meet the conditions which were previously set forth.

Graph 9. Perpetrators of victimization in the previous year 2016-2018

% víctimas de la guerrilla

2018	33.4%
2016	60.0%

% víctimas de los paramilitares

2018	26.7%
2016	31.5%

% víctimas de las BACRIM

2018	5.5%
2016	41.9%

0   20   40   60   80   100

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

Which groups were responsible for these acts?
COLWC4A. The Guerrilla;   **COLWC4B**. The Paramilitaries; **COLWC4G**. BACRIM (Criminal Gangs)

1.6. Recognition and reparation of victims

One of the most relevant aspects facing the post-accord phase is the process of identification and reparation of victims of the armed conflict. The Americas Barometer has inquired about the percentage of respondents involved in the conflict which are part of the national registry of victims and for the percentage of victims who, being part of the registry, have received some sort of reparation on the part of the national government.

Graph 10. Affiliation to the national registry of victims

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Promedio 2017: 33.6%

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

COLLT5. Are you affiliated to the national registry of victims?

Graph 10 shows the percentage of respondents involved in the conflict who are affiliated to the national registry of victims in 2012, 2013, 2016 and 2018. With respect to 2018, when 5.2% manifested being affiliated to the registry, this number has doubled in the past two years (10.8%). If this percentage is compared to the 2017 special sample, it is noted that the territories which are most highly affected by the armed conflict, the percentage of respondents is three times higher (33.6%). This reflects the higher degree of vulnerability of those interviewed in the 2017 special sample, in comparison to the national figures shown in Graph 10.

Graph 11. Affiliation to the national registry of victims, by region (2018)

COLLT5. Have you received any sort of reparation from the national Government?

From a regional point of view, some significant differences are evident regarding the number of respondents who are affiliated to the national registry of victims. For example, the percentage of respondents who are affiliated to the registry is lower in Bogotá (3.5%), with respect to the Central (14%), Pacific (16.9%) and Amazon-Orinoco 20.7%) regions, due to a higher intensity through which the regions have experienced the armed conflict, in comparison to Bogotá (Graph 11)

In terms of reparation of victims of the armed conflict, it is noted in Graph 12, that there are no statistically significant differences in the last three years of the study (2013, 2016 and 2018). In these years, the number of victims who have received reparations fluctuates between 31% and 44%.[8] At the regional level, in 2018, no significant differences are noted in the number of victims who have received some type of reparation.

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8. While comparing the 2018 national simple with the 2017 study in the regions which were most heavily affected by the armed conflict (Colombia Rural del Posconflicto - Post-conflict Rural Colombia), a significant difference is noted in the number of victims who have received some sort of reparation from the Government. While according to Colombia Rural del Posconflicto, approximately half of the victims have received some sort of reparation, only a third of the victims have received some sort of reparation according to the national sample. This difference suggests that there has been a prioritization on the part of the government, for the regions most heavily affected by the armed conflict.

There are some **significant differences in the ratio of responders** who belong to the national registry of victims. The percentage of responders who are affiliated to the registry is **lowest in Bogotá**, with respect to the **Central (14.5%)**, Pacific (16.9%), **Amazon-Orinoco (20.7%)**

Graph 12. Victims affiliated to the national registry of victims who have received some sort of reparation from the government

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

- - - - Promedio 2017: 46.9%

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

% Recibió reparación de parte del gobierno

Año	
2012	22.5%
2013	31.7%
2016	44.3%
2018	32.5%

COLLT6. Have you received some sort of reparation from the national Government?

1.7. Conclusions

This chapter exhibits stability in the percentage of the historic victims of the armed conflict since 2004. Around four out of 10 respondents have been victims of the conflict at some juncture of their lives. Additionally, it is clear that the guerrilla is the armed actor which is held responsible for the most victims within the framework of the conflict (45%), with an almost homogeneous participation throughout the national territory, in contrast to other groups such as the paramilitaries, whose strong presence in the Colombian Caribbean, caused a larger percentage of victims on the part of the latter, in relation to the rest of the country's regions. In terms of the severity with which the victims have experimented the armed conflict in Colombia, it is noted that most of the study's victims (6 out of 10) have been exposed to more than one act of victimization. However, as the number of acts of victimization increases, the proportion of victims who have experienced them decreases. Additionally, this chapter showed that, as far the reparation of victims, important challenges still remain regarding the building of a stable and lasting peace. The latter is due to the fact that only a third of the respondents who are affiliated to the national registry of victims have received some sort of reparation from the Government.

On the other hand, a significant reduction was noted in 2018, in relation to 2016, as far of the percentage of victims who hold the guerrilla and the BACRIM for incidents perpetrated during the previous year. Even though the reduction of victimization on the part of the guerrilla could be attributed to the ceasefire and end to hostilities agreed upon by the national Government and the FARC-EP in 2016, the study also found that the signing of the Peace Accord in 2016, did not reduce the general levels of victimization due to the armed conflict, given that in 2016, as well as in 2018, approximately 1 out of 10 respondents reported having been victim of the armed conflict during the previous year. In this context, it is worth asking who the actors are that are filling the voids left by the FARC-EP and perpetrating violence in the territories? A fact-finding exercise conducted by the Observatory for Democracy points out that the paramilitaries and ex-paramilitaries who have regrouped, as well as "other groups", are responsible for the violence to which the population has been exposed during the post-conflict.

It is clear that the **guerrilla is the armed actor which is held responsible for the most victims within the framework of the conflict (45%)**, with an almost homogeneous throughout the national territory.

2. Negotiated solution to the armed conflict and Peace Accord

2.1. Introduction

Since 2004, the Americas Barometer has inquired about the opinion of Colombians regarding the solution to the conflict involving the guerrilla. Additionally, since the negotiation phase with the FARC-EP, a monitoring has been conducted regarding citizens' attitudes regarding different aspects of the Peace Accord. Specifically, questions were asked regarding support for the Peace Accord signed by the national Government and the FARC-EP. Specific questions related to some specific components of the Peace Accord were included, such as the participation in politics of FARC ex-combatants and the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP – Special Jurisdiction for Peace). In order to analyze citizens' expectations regarding the implementation of the Accord, questions were asked regarding compliance with the pact on the part of the two actors involved (the Government and the FARC) and expectations pertaining to possible changes related to eventual modifications to the Peace Accord. Finally, a question which measures the level of knowledge regarding the Accord was included, specifically regarding the duration, in years, of the maximum jail sentence for a demobilized combatant who takes part in the JEP process. This question was answered correctly in 2018, by 5.8% of the respondents.

2.2. Support for the negotiated end to the conflict

In relation to this topic, it is noted that since 2011, the percentage of respondents who support the negotiated end to the conflict has risen, going from 54.6% in 2011 to 69.5% in 2018 (Graph 13). The biggest change is evident as of 2006, perhaps as a result of the Peace Accord on November 24th, 2016. In 2018, the number of people who supported the continuation of peace talks with the ELN was equally high at 67.2%. These talks had begun during President Juan Manuel Santos's term in February, 2017.[9]

The percentage of responders who **support the negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrilla has grown**, increasing from 54.6% in 2011 to **69.5% in 2018**.

9. Although the Government of President Iván Duque decided to break off peace talks with the ELN, after an attack perpetrated by this guerrilla group against National Police officer school, the peace talks with this guerilla group were in effect as of the date of the study by the Americas Barometer in 2018.

Furthermore, while the ratio of respondents who support a negotiated solution to the conflict has increased in the past years, and today, 7 out of 10 Colombians support a negotiated solution to the armed conflict with the guerrilla, in the rural zones traditionally affected by the conflict, the number of respondents who support negotiations in order to end the conflict with the insurgency is significantly higher (8 out of 10). It is possible that this difference is due to the need for these communities to mitigate their permanent risk of being victims of the conflict (see: Avila et al. 2017).

Graph 13. Support for a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrilla

Mejor opción para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla

Ambas
Uso de la fuerza militar
Negociación

COLPAZ1A. Which of the following options meant to solve the conflict with the guerrilla do you believe is best?

2.3. Support for the Peace Accord and its components

The Americas Barometer also inquired about the level of support from citizens to both the peace process with the FARC-EP, in the years 2013 and 2014, as well as the Peace Accord signed by President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP in 2016. Graph 14 shows that the percentage of respondents who were in favor with the process in 2013 and 2014 was significantly higher (53.6% in average) than the percentage of citizens who claimed to support the process in 2016 (40.8%). Additionally, the ratio of citizens who were in favor of the Peace Accord increased significantly in 2018 (48%). This was similar to the ratio of citizens who supported the negotiations observed before 2016. This evolution in the citizens' perception may be associated to critical moments in the Colombian political arena. For instance, the drop in the level of approval evident in 2016 could be the result of the opposing views in the public opinion about the Accord in the Plebiscite. In this context, Uribismo attacked the Accord and spread interpretations which in some cases had nothing to do with what had been agreed on.[10]

10. A directive of the NO campaign for the Plebiscite recognized in an interview that the strategy consisted on not explaining the content of the Accord points and focusing on the indignation feeling of Colombians (Ramirez 2016; Dinero 2016a). For example, there were messages spread through Whatsapp stating that the Government would offer guerrilla fighters a monthly salary of $1.600.000 pesos; that pensioners would pay taxes to finance the peace costs, or that the Accord would include a "gender ideology" component which would go against family Christian values (Semana 2016). However, further analysis of the text confirmed that "gender ideology" is not present in the Accord. On the contrary, on this particular topic, the Accord proposed the elimination of any kind of discrimination and values women as political subjects (Gonzalez 2017).

Graph 14. Support for the Process (2013-2014)/Peace Accord (2016-2018)

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

COLPROPAZ1. Currently, the government of Juan Manuel Santos is carrying out a peace process with the FARC. Using the same ranking, to what point do you support the peace process?

COLPROPAZ1B. The government of ex-president Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC have signed a peace accord. To what point do you support this peace process?

The Americas Barometer also inquired about the opinions of citizens regarding more specific points of the accord, such as the political participation of former FARC fighters, some elements of the transitional justice and land reform. Graph 15 shows a high level of approval to topics related to rural development, particularly land reform, with percentages of 79% in 2016 and 84% in 2018. Conversely, the support from the people to aspects like amnesty to FARC foot soldiers and that the political parties made up by former FARC fighters had the same opportunities as the other parties in terms of safety and access to mass media. Three out of ten respondents agreed in 2018 that the political parties made up of former fighters had access to the same conditions (29.1%) whereas only 18.9%, barely two out of 10, agreed the amnesty for FARC foot soldiers who demobilize. There are no considerable observable differences in Colombians' opinions about these components of the Peace Accord between 2016 when the Accord was signed, and 2018.

There is a **high approval rate to topics related to rural development**, in particular, the land reform with a percentage of **79.8%** for 2016 and **84.6%** in 2018.

Graph 15. Support for the agreement components, 2016 and 2018

% aprueba reforma agraria

2018	84.6%
2016	79.8%

% aprueba condiciones igualitarias partidos

2018	29.1%
2016	32.3%

% aprueba privación libertad sin cárcel miembros rasos de las FARC

2018	18.9%
2016	21.0%

0   20   40   60   80   100

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

COLPACT11. An agreement was reached so that political parties formed by FARC demobilized ex-combatants will have the same assurances of security and access to the media as other political parties already have. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPACT1. An agreement was reached so that demobilized FARC foot soldiers (no commanders) will not be sent to prison. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

**COLPACT10**. Vacant land will be distributed among peasant farmers who do not own enough land to cultivate. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPACT19. Illegal crop substitution programs will be implemented in the area where you live.

To delve into the issue of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, one of the components of the Agreement that has raised the most debate in public opinion, the Americas Barometer explored the opinions of respondents regarding the deprivation of liberty (without prison) and the reduction of penalties to members of the FARC and the Military Forces that confess the crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict. In general terms, it is evident that Colombians tend to express greater approval for the benefits of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace when applied to members of the Armed Forces than when it comes to former FARC combatants. Regarding the deprivation of liberty without prison to those who confess crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict, although only 32.1% of respondents agrees that it should apply to members of the Military Forces, the number drops to 24.2% when referring to members of the FARC (Graph 16). Regarding the reduction of penalties in exchange for truth, 40.7% approve that this measure is applicable to members of the Military Forces, while 32.5% agree that FARC members should benefit from this measure. In this way, there is also a greater approval towards the reduction of sentences than towards the deprivation of liberty without prison. This, without a doubt, reflects that citizens relate justice to serving a prison sentence. Indeed, in the focus groups conducted by the Observatory for Democracy, participants referred to the importance of war perpetrators paying for their crimes. Some testimonies serve as an example of it: "there can be no peace with impunity" (Adult woman, Pacific Region); "The resentment remains and the damage remains too. People prefer justice" (Adult woman, Bogotá). Likewise, they expressed disagreement regarding the concessions provided in the SJP for the perpetrators of crimes of the armed conflict: "I do not agree with the SJP because it is a justice that applies to specific cases, but not to all of them" (Adult woman, Eastern Region).

Colombians tend to **have greater approval of the benefits of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace when they apply to the military**, than when it comes to FARC ex-combatants.

Graph 16. Approval of some of the points of the SJP

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

% aprueba privación libertad sin cárcel miembros FF.MM. — 32.1%
% aprueba privación libertad sin cárcel miembros FARC — 24.2%

% aprueba rebajas de penas a miembros FF.MM. — 40.7%
% aprueba rebajas de penas a miembros FARC — 32.5%

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

COLPACT17A. Special Jurisdiction for Peace considers reduction of sentences for demobilized FARC members who confess crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPACT18A. Special Jurisdiction for Peace considers deprivation of liberty without prison for demobilized FARC members who confess crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPACT17B. Special Jurisdiction for Peace considers reduction of sentences for members of Armed Forces who confess crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPACT18B. Special Jurisdiction for Peace considers deprivation of liberty without prison for demobilized FARC members who confess crimes. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Bearing in mind that during his election campaign the current President Iván Duque proposed to modify the agreements reached between the Government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP, the Observatory of Democracy studied the consistency between the opinions of the interviewees regarding the Peace Accord and the possible modifications to them. Graph 17 shows the percentage of citizens who, in 2018, claimed to support the Peace Accord reached between the Government of former President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP, and the percentage that did not support the modifications to the Accord announced by the current President Iván Duque. While 47% of respondents support the Peace Accord, only 33.5% of respondents oppose any changes thereto. This result suggests that a proportion of citizens who support the Peace Accord would also agree with the changes proposed by President Duque.

Graph 17. Support for the Peace Accord and rejection to modifications to the Peace Accord

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

COLPROPAZ1B. The government of Colombian former president Juan Manuel Santos and FARC signed Peace Accord. To what extent do you support this accord?

COLPACT20. During his election campaign, President Iván Duque proposed to modify Peace Accord reached between the Colombian Government and FARC. To what extent do agree or disagree?

At regional level, Graph 18 shows that the highest percentage of respondents who disagree with possible modifications to the Peace Accord (43%) is in Bogotá. This proportion is significantly higher than that found in the Eastern region (27.3%) and the Central region (31%). In regard to support for the Peace Accord, the percentage of respondents who support them is higher in the Caribbean (60.1%), compared to that in the Central (41.7%) and Eastern (40.9%) regions.

In terms of **support for the Peace Accord**, the percentage of respondents who support them is **higher in the Caribbean** (60.1%), **compared to the Central** (41.7%) and **Eastern** (40.9%) regions.

Graph 18. Percentage of respondents supporting Peace Accord and rejecting of possible modifications

% Apoya Acuerdo de Paz

Region	%
Amazonía-Orinoquía	60.3%
Pacífica	48.1%
Oriental	40.9%
Central	41.7%
Bogotá	49.0%
Caribe	60.1%

% No apoya modificar el Acuerdo de Paz firmado entre el Gobierno colombiano y las FARC

Region	%
Amazonía-Orinoquía	36.7%
Pacífica	33.1%
Oriental	27.3%
Central	31.0%
Bogotá	43.0%
Caribe	34.0%

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

**Fuente:** © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

COLPROPAZ1B. The government of Colombian former president Juan Manuel Santos and FARC signed a Peace Accord. To what extent do you support this accord?

COLPACT20. During his election campaign, President Iván Duque proposed to modify the Peace Accord reached between the Colombian Government and FARC. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

2.4. Expectations about the Peace Accord, its compliance and confidence in the FARC

It is important to know the expectations of Colombians regarding compliance with agreements under the Peace Accord, both by the FARC and the national Government. Graph 19 shows the proportion of respondents who believe that the Government and the FARC will comply with the agreements. It is clear that there is a general atmosphere of skepticism regarding the commitment made with the signing of the Peace Accord between the parties involved. On the one hand, only one third of respondents believe that the Government will comply (35.7%) and only a quarter believe the FARC will (25.4%). The qualitative information also found skepticism among citizens regarding compliance with the Peace Accord. A participant in a focus group in Bogotá summed it up as follows: "agreements with the guerrillas have not been complied with, the JEP is not being honored, land restitution is not being done.

The Accord is not being complied with, because the truth will not be delivered to the country. There was no reparation of victims, violence continued. The guerrillas, seeing that the Government is not complying, are reorganizing" (Young woman, Bogotá).

Only one third of the respondents believe that the **Government will comply with the agreements in the Peace Accord (35.7%)** and only a quarter believe FARC will do (25.4%).

Graph 19. Perception of compliance with the Peace Accord, 2018

95% Intervalo
de confianza
(Efecto de diseño
incorporado)

COLPACT16A. The Colombian Government will comply with the agreements in the Peace Accord signed in Havana. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
COLPACT16B. The FARC will comply with the agreements in the Peace Accord signed in Havana. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

The fact that 3 out of every 4 Colombians remain skeptical of compliance by the FARC, with what is agreed on in the Peace Accord, is probably due to the low level of confidence of citizens in that organization. Graph 20 shows the percentage of respondents who trust the FARC, as an armed group between 2005 and 2016, and as a political party, the FARC (Common Alternative Revolutionary Force), in 2018. As of 2016, an increase in the number of respondents who trust this organization is seen, reaching a record 6.2%, which remains constant in 2018. This result may be due to the fact that, after the signing of the Peace Accord and the turning of the FARC into a political party, a greater number of Colombians dare to say that they trust the FARC. In turn, the fact that in 2018 the percentage of Colombians that trust this organization has remained steady reflects that, for the average citizen, there are no differences between the FARC as an armed group and as a political figure.

The perception of the participants towards the FARC political party was researched in focus groups. Divided opinions among the citizens were found. On the one hand, there were those who considered the political participation of this group to be positive, because doing politics is better than being at war: "I prefer them holding those five congress seats than seeing them bringing violence" (Young

woman, Bogotá); "You have to give them the chance to change. If you don't support them, they will not change" (Adult woman, Caribbean Region).

On the other hand, others expressed dissatisfaction and fear in the face of the possibility of being governed by members of the former guerrillas: "how are they going to allow it, that should not be like that … voting for them would mean more corruption, they will do whatever they want with the country" (Young woman, Caribbean Region). It is worth mentioning that in the Pacific Region it was found that the rejection of the political participation of the FARC party is justified in the name of memory: "they would be elected because of lack of information and lack of memory… They would not be elected for the sake of social conscience, because people should admit the mistakes they made and the massacres they took part in" (Adult woman, Pacific Region); "No candidate could be elected. There is no forgive and forget" (Adult woman, Pacific Region). For this reason, they consider it a mistake to have preserved the acronym of the former armed group in the name of the political party: "There is a stigma. For them to seek credibility, they should have been reborn" (Young Man, Pacific Region).

"they would be elected because of lack of information and lack of memory… **They would not be elected for the sake of social conscience**, because people should admit the mistakes they made and the massacres they took part in"

Lastly, it is striking that opinions regarding the FARC political party are permeated by the distrust of citizens towards politicians in general. This applies both to negative perceptions towards the FARC: "they have that political party just for their own convenience, it is a farce. All of them are like every other politician, they say they are going to do something but never comply with it" (Young woman, Bogotá). As for other less pessimistic views: "they have done a lot of damage to the country, but that has happened with white collar criminals, and the opportunity for them to help peasant farmers is good" (Young woman, Bogotá).

Graph 20. Trust in the FARC (2005 – 2016)

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

COLB60. To what extent do you trust the FARC?
COLB60N. To what extent do you trust the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force?

The Americas Barometer inquired about the respondents' expectations regarding the possible benefits that the implementation of the Peace Accord will bring. In particular, they were asked how much they hoped Colombian democracy would be strengthened, security and economic situation in their municipality would be improved, and farmers' access to land would improve.

Graph 21 shows that the issue that generates the greatest expectation in the Colombian population is that related to land. 61.8% of respondents believe that the implementation of the accord will improve the access of peasant farmers to land. In the background are the beliefs that the Peace Accord will improve the economic situation (48.2%) and local security (47.4%), and strengthen Colombian democracy (42.5%). At regional level, there are no significant differences between the expectations generated by the Peace Accord.

In the focus groups, participants were asked their expectations at the time of signing the Peace Accord, and the extent to which these expectations have been met in the post-agreement phase. In general, a gap is perceived between what was expected at the time of signing and what has been brought into effect in the implementation. The following testimonies synthesize that perception: "[I expected] that there would be peace, but they are deluding people" (Young woman, Caribbean Region); "I was happy for the peasant farmers because they were going to benefit. I was excited because I thought the sexual violence issues were going to change, that people weren't going to kidnap people" (Young woman, Bogotá). In some

cases, reference was made to structural conditions that prevent the changes raised in the Peace Accord, such as the lack of social opportunities or the persistence of the war business: "people will continue to be part of the guerrillas because there are no opportunities" (Adult woman, Bogotá); "It was a balm to take a small step, but the business of war remains" (Young man, Bogotá).

However, some participants have a more optimistic view of the post-agreement phase since they perceive that there have been changes in security matters: "there are villages where guerrillas used to be present, and now it is no longer so" (Young woman, Bogotá); "I am a victim of it and on my grandparents' farm, it is clear that things have improved by the peace process" (Young Woman, Eastern Region); "It is imperfect peace but it is better than the uncertainty of war" (Adult man, Pacific Region).

Graph 21. Expectations about the implementation of Peace Accord

% acuerdo la implementación del Acuerdo mejorará el acceso de los campesinos a la tierra

61.8%

% acuerdo la implementación del Acuerdo mejorará la situación económica del municipio

48.2%

% acuerdo la implementación del Acuerdo mejorará la seguridad en su municipio

47.4%

% acuerdo la implementación del Acuerdo fortalecerá la democracia colombiana

42.5%

0   20   40   60   80   100

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

COLPROPAZ13C. The implementation of Peace Accord will strengthen Colombian democracy. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPROPAZ13J. The implementation of Peace Accord will improve security in your municipality. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPROPAZ13K. The implementation of Peace Accord will improve the economy in your municipality. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

COLPROPAZ13M. The implementation of Peace Accord will improve access of peasant farmers to land. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

2.5. Knowledge about the Peace Accord

The Americas Barometer also inquired about the level of citizens' knowledge about the Peace Accord. Graph 22 shows the percentage of respondents who answered correctly the question about the duration, in years, of the maximum penalty to which a former combatant under the Special Justice for Peace is subject. This demonstrated that only 5.7% of the interviewees answered the question correctly. If the range of correct answers is extended, that is, between 6 and 10 years (8 being the correct answer), the percentage of Colombians whose answer is correct rises to 12.1%. When comparing the knowledge about the Peace Accord among the respondents of the national sample to those of the Colombia Rural del Postconflicto study in 2017 (Ávila et al. 2017), it is found that in the areas most affected by the armed conflict, the percentage of respondents who answered the question correctly almost triples that of the 2018 study (14.4%).

This difference in the level of knowledge about the Accord suggests that the proximity of citizens to the conflict leads them to be better informed about the issues that concern them most, either because information campaigns are stronger in these areas, or because citizens themselves make a greater effort to be informed. However, it is still worrisome that, both at the national level and in the areas most historically affected by the conflict, the proportion of Colombians who answered this question correctly is quite low, since it is the point of the Accord that has less approval among citizenship and the one which has brought about greater deal of political debate .

This difference in the level of knowledge about the Accord suggests that **the proximity of citizens to the conflict leads them to be better informed** about the issues that concern them most

Graph 22. Knowledge of the Peace Accord

Respuesta incorrecta o no sabe 94.3%

Respuesta correcta 5.7%

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

COLGI8. What is the longest penalty, in years, for a demobilized FARC ex-combatant subject to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace?

2.6. Conclusions

This chapter showed that the vast majority of Colombians believe that the solution to the conflict with the guerrilla must be achieved through negotiation (69.5%). However, only half of those interviewed support the Peace Accord signed between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC (48%). This gap between the proportion of Colombians that approves the negotiated end of the conflict and the one that supports the Accord reached with the FARC shows that, although citizens accept the idea of resolving conflicts in a negotiated manner, it does not mean that they support the contents and concessions that result from a peace agreement between the national government and an insurgent group.

The vast majority of Colombians believe that **the solution to the conflict with the guerrilla must be achieved through negotiation (69.5%)**.

The points of the Accord that have greatest support from the population are those that revolve around rural development (85.8%) and crop substitution (84.6%). The issues related to political participation and amnesty to demobilized members of the FARC have less popular support, with 29.1% and 18.9% approval, respectively. Regarding the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), citizen support is quite low, with significantly greater support when applied to members of the Military Forces. For example, the percentage of respondents who agree with the deprivation of liberty without prison for FARC ex-combatants who confess their crimes is 24.2%, while the proportion that agrees that this applies to the military is 32.1%. These results suggest that Colombians' vision of transitional justice is much more punitive than what was enshrined in the Peace Accord. Qualitative information suggests that the SJP generates disagreement among citizens because it is perceived as unfair. Some participants stated that citizens resent and therefore do not approve the concessions provided by the SJP. However, it is striking that the level of knowledge

of citizens about what was agreed regarding the SJP is very low, since the study found that only 5.7% of citizens provided a correct answer to the question about the duration, in years, of the maximum penalty that someone who has recourse to SJP can receive.

The percentage of respondents who **agree with the deprivation of liberty without jail for ex-combatants of the** FARC who confess their crimes is **24.2%**, while the proportion that **agrees that this applies to the military is 32.1%**.

On the other hand, the fact that the percentage of people who claimed to trust the FARC in 2016 (as an armed group) and in 2018 (as a political party) is the same indicates that, for citizens, there would not seem to be a difference between the armed actor and the political party. Indeed, in the focus groups, the perception of some participants that voting for this political party would threaten memory was identified, as it would imply forgetting the damage that this guerrilla caused to the country. In this sense, some citizens perceive that having retained the acronym of the armed group in the name of the political party is a mistake. However, the fact that the percentage of citizens who trust in the FARC increased since 2016 may be due to the fact that, after the signing of the Peace Accord and the transformation of the FARC into a political party, a greater number of Colombians dare to say that they trust that organization or that a group of citizens effectively changed their mind about this organization.

Regarding the expectations of compliance with the Peace Accord, the study found that there is a general atmosphere of skepticism regarding the commitment made with the signing of the Peace Agreement between the parties involved, although a greater percentage of citizens believe that the Government will comply with the agreement (35.7%), while those who believe that the FARC will do so drops to 25.4%. In regard to the changes that the implementation of the Accord would bring, the issue that generates the greatest expectation in the Colombian population is the one related to land.

61.8% of respondents believe that the implementation of the Accord will improve the access of peasant farmers to land. The beliefs that the Accord will improve the economic situation (48.2%) and local security (47.4%), and strengthen Colombian democracy (42.5%), fall on a secondary level. In the focus groups it was found that, in general, participants perceive a gap between what was expected at the time of the signing of the Peace Accord and what has been brought into effect during its implementation. The following testimony illustrates that perception: "[I hoped] there would be peace, but they are just deluding people" (Young woman, Caribbean Region). There is also the perception that there are structural conditions in the country that make it difficult to implement the Peace Accord such as the lack of social opportunities and the existence of illicit economies: "it was a balm to take a small step, but the business of war remains "(Young man, Bogotá). However, some participants have a more positive view of the post-agreement phase, since they perceive that there have been changes in security: "it is an imperfect peace but that is better than the uncertainty of war" (Adult man, Pacific Region).

"It was a balm to take a small step, but the business of war remains" (Young man, Bogotá).

Notes

3. Reconciliation

3.1. Introduction

In the current context of the country and with the beginning of the implementation of the Peace Accord signed with the FARC, it is important to consider citizen attitudes towards the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation. The Observatory for Democracy surveyed through the Americas Barometer about forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and demobilized ex-combatants of armed groups.

A concept framework of reconciliation from the field of social psychology was adopted. According to Nadler and Shnabel (2015), a reconciled society is characterized by the existence of positive and reliable relationships between former adversaries who have safe social identities and interact in an equitable social environment. To reach this stage, it is necessary for a society to advance in three areas that are interdependent: structural, relational and identity. The structural dimension refers to the evolution towards an equitable society. This dimension is especially relevant in situations where the parties involved in the conflict belong to the same social group, as it is the case in Colombia. The relational dimension focuses on interpersonal trust and positive relations between citizens, as a key element for reconciliation. Finally, the dimension of reconciliation associated with identity has to do with overcoming the labels and population stigmas derived from war, such as the condition of victim or victimizer.

According to Nadler and Shnabel (2015), **a reconciled society is characterized by the existence of positive and reliable relationships between former adversaries** who have safe social identities and interact in an equitable social environment.

The first section of the chapter looks into the overall willingness of Colombians towards forgiveness and reconciliation, and analyzes citizens' perceptions of the actions that contribute to reconciliation. Citizens' opinions about the contribution of different components of the Peace Accord about reconciliation are especially studied. These include the establishment of the truth, the compensation of victims and perpetrators' asking for forgiveness. Furthermore, this section presents an econometric exercise that studies the factors associated with citizens' attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation, taking into account recent debates that have taken place on this topic in academic literature. The next section of the chapter explores the relational dimension of reconciliation, especially about citizen's willingness to live together with demobilized FARC members. The identity dimension is not addressed in this report, but those interested in it can inquire about the positive and negative labels that citizens attribute to former combatants of armed groups in past reports (Galvis et al. 2016).

3.2. Attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation

During the last three years of the study (2014, 2016 and 2018) the percentage of Colombians who think of forgiveness and reconciliation between former FARC combatants and combatants and citizens as possible has remained steady. It mirrors clear division in public opinion on this topic. On average, one in two respondents considers that forgiveness and reconciliation between former FARC combatants and citizens are possible (Figure 23). From a regional point of view, in 2018 there are no significant differences in regard to the belief that forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC is possible (Graph 24).

Graph 23. Forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC 2004 -2018

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

% Ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación con las FARC

Año	%
2004	68.1%
2005	67.8%
2006	63.2%
2007	62.6%
2008	63.2%
2013	42.1%
2014	49.7%
2016	51.7%
2018	51.2%

COLPAZ6A. Do you think forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and demobilized FARC ex-combatants are possible?

Graph 24. Forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC 2018 by region

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

These attitudes were less favorable than in the 2004 – 2008 period, when the majority of respondents saw forgiveness and reconciliation from citizens to the demobilized ex-FARC fighters as a possibility. The decline in the ensuing years can be explained due to several factors. The first is that as a peace accord was reached between the Government and the FARC, the challenge of forgiveness and reconciliation became a reality and ceased to be simply a possibility, which may have led to the reduction of citizens who are willing to forgive and reconcile. Previous research has shown that people tend to have more favorable attitudes toward actions which carry a low probability of happening or which they see as distant, than to those which carry a high possibility of happening, (Trope and Liberman 2000).

Additionally, it is quite probable that the decrease in the number of respondents who see the feasibility for forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC after the year 2008, is due to the political polarization that the country has experienced since 2020. This polarization features a political camp led by former president Alvaro Uribe, which features and agenda of opposition against the peace process and a coalition of support for the government of President Juan Manuel Santos. During Mr. Alvaro Uribe's two terms, from 2002+201, the division among political elites of today did not exist. As a matter of fact, Mr. Uribe appointed Juan Manuel Santos as his Minister of Defense and endorsed his 2010 presidential campaign, which Mr. Santos won with 69% of the vote> Despite the fact that the relationship

between Mr. Uribe and Mr.Santos had deteriorated since the latter took office in 2010, the announcement of the peace negotiations with the FARC in 2012 marked the formal breakup between them,

leading to the founding of the current political party led by Uribe, the Democratic Center. Since then, Uribe has led the opposition to the negotiations and the Peace Accord with the FARC.

During the two periods Álvaro Uribe served as president between 2002 and 2010, there was no such division among political elites as there is today. Even former president Uribe appointed Juan Manuel Santos Minister of Defense and supported his candidacy for the Presidency in 2010.

Matanock and García Sánchez (2017) argue both that the divisions among the political elites influence the opinion of Colombians about the Peace Accord and that citizen voting mechanisms for the approval of a peace agreement, as was the Plebiscite of 2016 in the Colombian case, can be instruments that accentuate political division. Using data from the Americas Barometer in the 2004-2016 period, the authors demonstrated that, in Colombia, the 2016 Plebiscite deepened the divisions among public opinion regarding the support for negotiated end to the armed conflict and the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and former demobilized FARC combatants. As Graph 25 shows, the analysis done by Matanock and García Sánchez allows for the explanation of the trends in Colombian public opinion regarding forgiveness and reconciliation of citizens with demobilized FARC ex-combatants in the period 2006-2018. Between 2006 and 2008, there were no significant differences between the two political groups, but as of 2016, the year in which the Peace Accord was signed, a statistically significant gap was opened regarding the attitudes of citizens towards forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC. While in 2016 and 2018 the majority of citizens who did not belong to the Uribe party regard forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC as possible, in those years less than half of the citizens of the that political party responded that they considered forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC as possible.

Graph 25. Forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC 2006 -2018 by political group

Graph with y-axis "% Ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación con las FARC" and x-axis "Año".

Data points:
- 2006: 65.9%, 56.1%
- 2007: 63.7%, 62.4%
- 2008: 67.6%, 61.5%
- 2014: 56.5%, 45.8%
- 2016: 66.7%, 42.4%
- 2018: 63.1%, 45.5%

Legend:
- Uribistas
- No uribistas
- 95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

COLPAZ6A. Do you think forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and demobilized FARC ex-combatants are possible?

VB3N2. ¿Who did you vote for in the most recent presidential elections?

Given the complexity of the war in Colombia in which multiple armed actors, in addition to the FARC, have taken part, it is understandable how public opinion varies when it comes to forgiveness and reconciliation as there are different armed groups involved. The Americas Barometer inquired respondents' attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and demobilized FARC and ELN members and found that the attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized of both groups are very similar. As Graph 26 shows, since 2013 there has been a slight growing trend in the positive attitudes towards reconciliation of citizens towards both armed groups. In addition, the proportion of respondents who in 2018 consider forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and the FARC ex-combatants is possible (51.2%) is the same as the proportion of respondents who believe it is also possible to achieve with ELN ex-combatants (50.6%).

In the four years that the Americas Barometer has asked Colombians about their attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized members of these two armed groups (2013, 2014, 2016 and 2018), the only one in which there was a significant difference was in 2016, when the proportion of respondents who believed forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized of the FARC and the

ELN observed in 2018 is probably due to the fact that in that year progress in the negotiations of peace with the ELN was evident.[11]

Likewise, it is likely that such convergence might have been produced due to the fact that the beginning of the implementation of the Peace Accord with the FARC may have had a positive effect on the attitudes of reconciliation of citizens towards the ex-combatants of the ELN in 2018.

Graph 26. Forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC and ELN 2013 -2018

% Ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación con las FARC

% Ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación con el ELN

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

COLPAZ6A. Do you think forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and demobilized FARC ex-combatants are possible?
COLPAZ6B. Do you think forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and demobilized ELN ex-combatants are possible?

11. At the time of the publication of this study, the break of the peace talks between the national government and the ELN is official, after the car bomb attack at the Police Cadet School in Bogotá in January 2019. However, when Americas Barometer survey was carried out in the second half of 2018, the peace talks were still in progress. In August 2018, a joint statement was issued in which both delegations announced the end of the sixth cycle of talks. They announced progress was being made in terms of participation and ceasefire, and reiterated their willingness and commitment to continue developing the Dialogue Agenda (High Commissioner for Peace 2018).

Given noticeable skepticism from public opinion to the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and former combatants of armed groups, it is worth asking: What kinds of actions are necessary for more Colombians to believe in forgiveness and reconciliation with the demobilized members of insurgent groups? The Observatory of Democracy asked the respondents' opinion regarding the contribution that different aspects set out in the Peace Accord make to reach reconciliation. Particularly, the study inquired about the contribution of the following actions: compensating victims of the armed conflict both by the State and the perpetrators of violence, the establishment of reach reconciliation. Particularly, the study inquired about the contribution of the following actions: compensating victims of the armed conflict both by the State and the perpetrators of violence, the establishment of the truth about the events that occurred in the war and the request for forgiveness by those responsible for heinous crimes.

The indemnity to victims of the Armed Conflict, both from the State (74.3%) as well as from the Perpetrators (72%), is the action that citizens consider would contribute to reconciliation (Graph 27). A significantly lower portion of respondents believe that finding the truth about the events that happened in the war (63.4%) and that the perpetrators of egregious crimes ask for forgiveness to the victims (63.3%) would contribute to reconciliation. Graph 27 shows that between 2016 and 2018 the percentage of Colombians who believe that an indemnity from the FARC to the victims and that truth and forgiveness are acts that contribute to reconciliation has dropped significantly. This result may be a consequence of the fact that there are actually few cases in which perpetrators have revealed the truth and have actually asked for forgiveness from the victims. The cases in which there is a financial compensation are very few as well.

The qualitative information evidenced that social justice is a key element in the attitudes towards reconciliation. Participants often expressed their discomfort towards the benefits that former fighters who belong to the re-incorporation process receive. They do not consider it fair that the State bestow benefits to former fighters of the armed groups that the rest of the population does not receive: "They committed a lot of massacres and now they are awarded. That´s not fair" (Adult woman Eastern Region); "It's not fair that they receive money, since they were in the guerrilla, and those who have always worked honestly do not get any help" (Young woman, Bogota); "Guerrilla members come out and they are going to receive so much money, and people like me, we do not get any help from the State" (Adult man, Eastern region). Finally, it is important to point out that other participants claimed to agree to these benefits, because

they consider them necessary for the construction of Peace: "It makes them feel useful, they generate their own income, and use their energy in positive actions" (Adult woman, Pacific Region). This percentage however, is lower.

"It makes them feel useful, they generate their own income, and use their energy in positive actions" (Adult woman, Pacific Region)

Graph 27. Actions that would contribute to reconciliation 2016 and 2018

% Contribuiría Estado indemnice a las víctimas del conflicto armado

2018	74.3%
2016	75.4%

% Contribuiría victimarios indemnicen a las víctimas

2018	72.7%
2016	81.8%

% Contribuiría la verdad sobre los hechos ocurridos

2018	63.4%
2016	82.5%

% Contribuiría responsables de crímenes atroces pidan perdón a las víctimas

2018	63.3%
2016	73.9%

0   20   40   60   80   100

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

I am going to read a series of actions to you and I want you to tell me if you consider that they would contribute a little or a lot for reconciliation to be possible between the victims of the armed conflict and their perpetrators .

COLRECON19B. Perpetrators of egregious crimes ask victims for forgiveness.

COLRECON19C. The State should provide indemnity to the victims of the armed conflict.

COLRECON20B. Finding the truth about the events that occurred in the conflict.

COLRECON20C. Perpetrators should provide indemnity to the victims of the armed conflict.

Colombians' opinions about the actions that would contribute to reconciliation are relatively similar in all the regions, except in regard to the aspect of indemnity of the victims. In this case, 9 out of 10 inhabitants of the Amazon-Orinoco region consider that it would contribute to reconciliation. On the other hand, in other regions the proportion of respondents who agree with this is 7 and 8 out of 10 (Graph 28). It is likely that indemnity to the victims is important to a greater percentage of respondents in the Amazon-Orinoco region, because this region harbors the greatest number of victims of the armed conflict. As described in the chapter about Victimization in this report, in the Amazon-Orinoco region, 7 out of 10 respondents have been victims of the armed conflict at some point in their lives, while in the other regions less than half of the respondents have been victims. For the same reason, it is possible to explain why, compared to Bogotá, a larger proportion of respondents in the Pacific and Eastern regions consider that indemnity to the victims from the State would contribute to reconciliation. In Bogotá, barely a 25.3% of the respondents have been victims of the armed conflict, in these regions 39.1% and 47.4%, respectively claimed to have been victimized (Graph 2). There are no observable regional differences in the respondents´ opinions about how finding the truth about the events that occurred, and that perpetrators asking for forgiveness, will contribute to reconciliation.

It is likely that indemnity to the victims is important for a greater percentage of respondents in the Amazon-Orinoquia region **because this region harbors the greatest number of victims of the armed conflict**.

Graph 28. Actions that would contribute to reconciliation. 2018, in each region

**% Contribuiría Estado indemnice
a las víctimas del conflicto armado**

Región	%
Amazonía–Orinoquía	92.2%
Pacífica	81.6%
Oriental	80.0%
Central	69.0%
Bogotá	67.5%
Caribe	71.5%

**% Contribuiría victimarios indemnicen
a las víctimas del conflicto armado**

Región	%
Amazonía–Orinoquía	91.0%
Pacífica	65.8%
Oriental	76.6%
Central	72.5%
Bogotá	66.0%
Caribe	78.8%

0   20   40   60   80   100

95% Intervalo
de confianza
(Efecto de diseño
incorporado)

I am going to read a series of actions to you and I want you to tell me if you consider that they would contribute a little or a lot for reconciliation to be possible between the victims of the armed conflict and their perpetrators .

COLRECON20C. Perpetrators should provide indemnity to victims of the armed conflict. .

COLRECON19C. The State should provide indemnity to victims of the armed conflict.

After some regression analysis, the Observatory for Democracy studied the aspects associated to the attitudes of citizens towards forgiveness and reconciliation. In particular, the relation between victimization experiences and willingness to reconciliation were analyzed. This latter took into account that there is a discussion in the literature about this issue and that the evidence in the Colombian context differs. On the one hand, some studies suggest that being a victim of violence makes a person more prone to psychological traumas, which in turn makes them less willing to accept reconciliation. On the other hand, other studies have found evidence that after traumatic experiences, individuals experiment a process of

personal growth called "Post traumatic growth" which is shown in different ways. These include more appreciation for life, interpersonal relationships are warmer and more intimate, a higher sense of personal strength, acknowledging of new opportunities in life and spiritual development.[12]

Although studies on this topic in the Colombian context are not entirely comparable, nor have the psychological mechanisms been measured in such a way that they tell the relation between the exposure to violence and the attitudes towards reconciliation, there is evidence both in favor and against the hypothesis that psychological traumas could negatively affect the willingness to accept reconciliation (Fergusson *et al.*2018), as well as for the positive effect of "Post traumatic growth" (Krause 2017, Tellez 2018).

Probit models were used where the dependent variable is the possibility that citizens see forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized former FARC fighters likely, and the variable of interest are the experiences of victimization of the respondents. Other independent variables that were included in this model were gender, interpersonal trust, affinity to Centro Democrático and other control variables.[13] Table 1 shows the significant variables in the two regression models and its corresponding sign. The only difference between both models is that the second (right column) includes the relation between gender and victimization, taking into account

12. Along this line, studies in Sierra Leona, Indonesia, Israel, Burundi, Nepal, Uganda, among other countries have found that traumas related to violence are associated positively to variables which could favor reconciliation. Some of these are participation in community organizations (Blattman 2009) and cooperative and generous behavior in economic experiments. (Bauer et al. 2016)

13. Experiences of victimization were measured with a variable which captures in a scale of 0 to 5, the number of act of victimizations that respondents claimed to have experimented in their family. This includes loss and/or disappearance of a relative, kidnapping, shelter or forced displacement, exile and land dispossession. Gender is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 when the respondent is a woman and 0 if it is a man. Interpersonal trust is measured in a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 indicates that the respondent considers that his/her community is not trustworthy, and 4 if people in their community are trustworthy. Lastly, affinity to Centro Democrático is measured in a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 implies that the respondents do not feel represented at all by this political party, and 7 if they feel very identified with it. As control variables age, educational level, and whether the respondent is employed, the family income, size of housing, whether it is a rural or an urban area and the effects on the region.

that previous investigations have shown that women are the most vulnerable victims of the conflict.[14]

Table 1. Determiners of favorable attitudes of citizens towards forgiveness and reconciliation with demobilized former FARC fighters.

Variables	Models	
	(1) **Without relation woman-victim**	**(2)** **With relation woman-victim**
Victim		+
Woman	-	
Relation woman-victim		-
Interpersonal trust	+	
Affinity with Centro Democrático	-	
Age	+	
Educational level		
Employment		
Family income	-	
Housing size		
Urban area		

The first result that stands out is that the first model of the variable which captures victimization experiences is not significant; whereas gender is significant (being a woman is associated with a lower willingness to be in favor of reconciliation). After including the interaction of both variables in the second model, we can see that the relation is significant and negative, while the variable of gender loses significance. This result suggests that victimization experiences positively affect the attitudes towards reconciliation of women and men in Colombia. The regression result is interesting because it seems to suggest a third hypothesis to take into account in the current debate in literature: violent experiences could have different effects according to gender. It negatively affects women's attitudes towards reconciliation, while in

14. Several studies have suggested that victimization experiences affect women more severely than men. On the one hand, households headed by women because of forced displacement, that is, families whose head of the household was murdered or left the household, are extremely vulnerable, caught in a trap of poverty and with a higher risk of repeated victimization (Ibáñez, 2008). The vulnerability of women is also associated to sexual violence. According to official figures from the Victims Unit, up to April 2019, approximately 9 out of 10 victims of sexual crimes are women (RNI 2019). Meertens (2012) explains that women who are victims makes them particularly vulnerable. Meertens points out that the experience of forced displacement is more costly on women than on men. This is because of the severing of family and community ties in which women can rely on to make solidarity networks and reciprocity.

men, it could be generating "Post traumatic growth", which is reflected in more favorable attitudes towards reconciliation.

Victimization **experiences affect negatively the possibility** t**hat women have favorable attitudes towards reconciliation**, while in the case of men, the opposite case could be happening.

This interpretation coincides with previous studies which have shown that the mechanisms that explain Colombians' opinions in relation to Peace and reconciliation vary according to the gender of each citizen. Based on data from the Americas Barometer from 2013, Angulo et al. (2014) found that victimization suffered by women as a result of the conflict tends to generate a weaker support to the negotiation and the peace process with the FARC. Additionally, skepticism towards demobilization and reconciliation with the members of this armed group increases and it contributes to reduce approval rate towards political participation of demobilized members. Conversely, for Colombian men, victimization experiences are not significant. Leftist ideological trend and higher interest on politics are the variables which influence support to the peace process the most. Also, men express a higher trust in demobilization and reconciliation, as well as a higher approval to political participation to members of the FARC. In any case, it is important to emphasize that more profound studies are necessary to explore the differences of gender and their relation to attitudes of reconciliation.

Other variables related significantly with the willingness to accept forgiveness and reconciliation are interpersonal trust and age. Both of them are positively related to the dependent variable. Likewise, affinity with Centro Democrático and family income are negatively related to the attitudes of reconciliation. The result of the variable of interpersonal trust coincides with the findings of social psychology, which establishes that trust among individuals and positive relations among citizens are a key element for reconciliation (relational dimension of reconciliation) (Nadler and Shnabel 2015). In terms of age, it is possible that this has a positive relation to the reconciliation attitudes because older people have lived the war in Colombia

during a longer period of time, this could cause that comparatively the young population, believe in the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation among citizens and former FARC fighters.[15]

Lastly, it is not surprising that affinity to Centro Democrático is a variable, which relates negatively to reconciliation attitudes. This political party has led an unwavering opposition to the Peace Accord and its implementation, as well as the rejection of all members of the FARC guerrilla.

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15. It is worth noting that in an econometric exercise carried out by the Observatory for Democracy with a representative sample of the universe of households of the 170 towns PDET, interpersonal trust and age are also significant variables which are related positively to the respondents' attitudes towards reconciliation.

3.3. Living with former fighters

Rejoining of former FARC fighters can be analyzed in different ways. It can be seen as a coexistence in the same area and the interaction in closer contexts. After taking these possible opportunities of living with the former fighters of the armed groups into account, it is possible to see several important differences about how willing Colombians are to live with these people and their families. Graph 29 shows that respondents' willingness to share spaces of daily life with former members of the armed groups tends to decrease as they are asked more personal questions. While most Colombians are willing to have a former fighter as a neighbor (71.3%), less than half would accept that their company offered jobs for them (45.5%) or that their children go to the same school with children of former fighters (42.1%). Likewise, the proportion of respondents who accept their children to befriend a former fighter is even smaller (23.6%).

Graph 29. Willingness to live with demobilized fighters in different spaces, 2018

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

COLDIS35F. Thinking about the demobilized members of armed groups, please let me know if Do you have any problem with having them as neighbors?
COLRECON7N. Would you accept that the company you work for offered a job for a demobilized of the FARC. In what cases would you accept it?

COLRECON18. Would you accept that your children go to school with demobilized former fighters' children? Up to what point would you accept it?

COLRECON6. Would you accept that one of our children befriended a demobilized member of the FARC. Up to what point would you accept it?

While it is true that a large proportion of Colombians still refuses to live with former fighters of illegal groups, when comparing the results of previous years, it is possible to see a higher willingness from the respondents to share their neighborhoods with former fighters. Graph 30 shows that after 2016 the proportion of Colombians willing to have former members as neighbors reaching 71.3% in 2018, the highest level ever recorded since 2012. On the other hand, in the contexts related to their children, there is no increase in the willingness to live with demobilized members. Graph 31, between 2016 and 2018 there are no statistical differences in the proportion of respondents who would accept that their children go with children of demobilized former fighters. In terms of the acceptance that a respondent´s child can befriend a demobilized, there is a significant drop between 2016, when 35.1% of the respondents answer that they would accept this situation, and 2018 when only 23.6% did. It is interesting to point out that this reduction went down to the same level of 2014, when almost 1 out of 4 respondents answered that they would accept that their child befriend a demobilized individual (Graph 32). Taking this into account, we can interpret that the level of support in this context reached in 2016 was probably associated to the optimism caused by the signing of the Peace Accord with the FARC in many Colombians.[16]

16. This report does not include the historical comparison of the question about the respondents' willingness to share work spaces with former fighters of illegal groups because in 2018 there was a change in the questionnaire used by the Americas Barometer. The question about the willingness for sharing their work space with demobilized men or women was not asked independently anymore. Instead these questions were replaced by the acceptance that their company gave a jobs to demobilized members, as it is shown in Graph 34.

In terms of **the acceptance that a respondent´s child can befriend a demobilized**, there is a significant drop between **2016**, when **35.1%** of the respondents answer that they would accept this situation, and **2018** when only **23.6%** did.

Graph 30. Acceptance of demobilized members as neighbors

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2018.

COLDIS35F. Considering the demobilized members of armed groups, please let me know if ...You have any problem with having them as neighbors?

Graph 31. Accepting their children to go to school with demobilized members' children

COLRECON18. Would you accept that your children go to school with demobilized former fighters' children? Up to what point would you accept it?

Graph 32. Acceptance of a children befriending demobilized members' children

COLRECON6. Would you accept that one of our children befriend a demobilized member of the FARC? Up to what point would you accept it?

In the focus groups, the Observatory for Democracy inquired about the reasons why there is more resistance to living with demobilized members in contexts where there are children. Fear was found to be the main reason.

There is a fear that living with former fighters' children will put them at risk: "As a mother you want the best for your children and that´s why there is fear that they would harm the children" (Young woman, Bogota). According to the opinions collected, children of demobilized members could adopt "certain behaviors which they learned from their parents" (Adult woman, Pacific Region). In any case, some participants do not agree with this opinion and on the contrary, they think that children do not deserve to carry this stigma: "what their parents did is not these children´s fault" (Adult woman, Caribbean Region).

"As a mother you want the best for your children and that´s why there is fear that they would harm the children" [Young woman, Bogota].

From a regional point of view, it is noticeable that people in Bogotá generally tend to be more willing to live with former fighters of illegal groups in different contexts. 53% of Bogotanos are willing to coexist with former fighters in work contexts. In this case the percentage is higher than in the Pacific region (43.3%) and Caribbean region (38.4%) (Graph 33). In the same way, there is more willingness among Bogotanos to have their children coexist with former fighters' children in school spaces (48.8%), as compared to the Central region (39.3%) and Caribbean region (35.9%) (Graph 34). Lastly, the proportion of respondents who would accept that their child would befriend a former fighter from FARC is significantly higher in the Amazon- Orinoco region (35.5%) and in Bogotá (33.5%) than in the rest of the regions of the country (Graph 35).

Graph 33. Accepting to share work space with a demobilized member, in different regions 2018

Amazonía–Orinoquía **54.2%**
Bogotá **53.3%**
Oriental **47.2%**
Central **44.7%**
Pacífica **43.3%**
Caribe **38.4%**

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

0   20   40   60   80
% aprueba

COLRECON7N. Would you accept that the company you work for offered a job to a demobilized member of the FARC. In what cases would you accept it?

Graph 34. Acceptance of children going to school with demobilized members' children, in different regions 2018

Bogotá **48.8%**
Oriental **46.3%**
Amazonía–Orinoquía **45.4%**
Pacífica **40.6%**
Central **39.3%**
Caribe **35.9%**

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

0   20   40   60   80
% aprueba

COLRECON18. Would you accept that your children go to school with demobilized former fighters' children? Up to what point would you accept it?

Graph 35. Acceptance of respondents' children befriending demobilized members' children, by region

Amazonía–Orinoquía — 35.5%
Bogotá — 33.5%
Central — 22.3%
Oriental — 21.9%
Pacífica — 21.5%
Caribe — 17.6%

% aprueba

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

COLRECON6. Would you accept that one of our children befriended a demobilized member of the FARC. Up to what point would you accept it?

Finally, after comparing respondents' willingness to live with demobilized members in a 2018 national sample, with the respondents' willingness in the Study Colombia Rural in the Post Conflict in 2017, it is found that there is more willingness to live with demobilized members in PDET municipalities than in the rest of the country. Graph 36 shows a significant difference in all the contexts analyzed in the study, making evident that compared to the national sample of 2018, there is a greater proportion of inhabitants of Rural Colombia in the Post-conflict would be willing to share with demobilized members in their neighborhoods (83.2% vs. 71.3%), at their children schools (48.3% vs 42.1%) and their children's social life (39.4% vs. 23.6%).

Graph 36. Willingness to live with demobilized members in different spaces 2017 and 2018

% No tiene problema con tener de vecinos a desmovilizados

2018 — **71.3%**

2017 — **83.2%**

% Aprueba que su hijo(a) estudie con hijos de desmovilizados

2018 — **42.1%**

2017 — **48.3%**

% Aprueba que su hijo(a) sea amigo(a) de desmovilizados

2018 — **23.6%**

2017 — **39.4%**

0   20   40   60   80   100

95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

COLDIS35F. Considering the demobilized members of armed groups, please let me know if…You have any problem with having them as neighbors?

COLRECON18. Would you accept that your children go to school with demobilized former fighters' children? Up to what point would you accept it?

COLRECON6. Would you accept that one of our children befriended a demobilized member of the FARC. Up to what point would you accept it?

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter presented the perceptions and opinions of Colombians concerning forgiveness and reconciliation with former FARC and ELN members. Additionally, it delved in the relational dimension of reconciliation, especially in the willingness citizens had to live with demobilized members of FARC.

Regarding reconciliation with former FARC fighters, starting in 2014 there is evidence of a clear separation in the public opinion about this topic. On average, one out of two respondents see forgiveness and reconciliation between former fighters and citizens as possible. Before 2013, the proportion of respondents who say this is possible fluctuated between 68 and 63%. This chapter argues that a possible that the political polarization of the country contributes to diminishing the percentage of citizens who see forgiveness and reconciliation possible, since after 2016, the year when the Peace Accord was signed, a statistically significant gap opens among the citizens´ attitudes towards forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC. While in 2016 and 2018 most of the citizens who did not follow Uribe saw forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC as possible, in these years less than half of the citizens who follow Uribe answered that they see forgiveness and reconciliation with the FARC possible.

Before 2013, the proportion of respondents who say **this possible fluctuated between 68% and 63%**.

Regarding respondents' opinions about the factors that contribute the most for reconciliation, it was found citizens consider that the action which would contribute the most to reconciliation is indemnity to the victims of the armed conflict, both from the side of the State (74.3%) as from the perpetrators (72.7%). A significantly lower proportion of respondents believe that finding the truth about the events which occurred during the war (63.4%) and that of perpetrators of

egregious crimes (63.3%) would contribute to reconciliation. This result can be a consequence of the fact that there are actually few cases in which perpetrators have revealed the truth and have asked for forgiveness to the victims. The cases in which there has been economic compensation are actually lower. Additionally, qualitative evidence indicates that social justice is a key element in the attitudes towards reconciliation. Participants in the focus groups often expressed their resentment towards the benefits that the State offers to former fighters in rejoining process since they consider unfair that the rest of the population do not receive these benefits. The next testimonial illustrates this opinion: "Guerrilla members come out and they are going to receive so much money, and people like me, we do not get any help from the State" (Adult man, Eastern Region)

Finally, the chapter showed that respondents' willingness to share spaces of daily life with former members of illegal armed groups tends to reduce as they are asked for more personal interactions. While most Colombians are willing to have a former fighter as a neighbor (71.3%), less than half would accept that the company they work for would give jobs to former fighters (45.5%) or that their children go to the same school with former members of illegal groups' children (42.1%). In the same way, the proportion of respondents who would accept that their children befriended a former fighter is even lower (23.6%). In the focal groups some opinions which reflect the fear that living with the former fighters' children arises. It is believed that this could put children at risk. For example, As a mother you want the best for your children and that´s why there is fear that they would harm the children" (Young woman, Bogota).

While most Colombians are willing to have a former fighter as a neighbor (71.3%), **less than half would accept that the company they work for would give jobs to former fighters (45.5%)**.

4. General conclusions

The results that the Observatory for Democracy presented in this report, allow us to reach several conclusions in regard to the opinions, attitudes and expectations of Colombian population towards peace. In general terms, it is true that most Colombians continue to support a negotiated end to the armed conflict. It is also clear that the country is facing important challenges to construct a durable and stable peace.

This report proved that there is a lot to do about the implementation of the Peace Accord, especially in terms of maintaining safety and victims' reparation. It is disappointing that the signing of the Peace Accord has not caused a significant reduction of violence, because since 2013 the percentage of victims in the last year ranges between 6% and 9%. Although between 2016 and 2018 there was a powerful decrease in the proportion of victims who hold the guerrilla accountable for the events occurred in the previous year, there are other actors who continue to victimize the population. Besides, only 1 out of 3 respondents who belong to the national registry of victims have received some kind of compensation from the Government.

It is disappointing that the signing of the Peace Accord has not caused a significant reduction of violence, because **since 2013 the percentage of victims in the last year ranges between 6% and 9%.**

On another note, it is crucial that the country move forward in the implementation of the Peace Accord sections that concern land reform and the problem of drug trafficking. These are the aspects that have more support among the citizenship (86% and 85%) and the ones which have generated more expectations in the population. 61.8% of the respondents consider that the implementation of the Accord will improve the access of peasants to land. However, the Kroc Institute report about the actual status of implementation of the Peace Accord indicates that these two points of the Accord are lagging behind in their implementation. In both cases, half of the commitments have not been implemented by February 2019. The qualitative information gathered in this study reveals two important aspects in relation to this situation. On the one hand, people perceive a gap between the expectations at the moment of signing the document, and the actual changes in the post Accord period: "I was expecting peace, but they are giving people false hopes" (Young woman, Caribbean Region). On the other hand, some participants pointed out the lack of social opportunities, especially in rural areas as well as the persistence of illegal economies as elements which perpetuate the armed conflict in Colombia and make implementation difficult: "it was a silver lining for a small step, but the business is still strong" (Young man, Bogotá). Because of this, and taking into account that only 35% of the citizens consider that the Government will accomplish what was agreed in Havana, it is of utmost importance to speed up the process of implementation of the Peace Accord. Otherwise, the general skepticism towards the implementation of the Peace Accord will increase.

Meanwhile, it seems contradictory that the most important achievements in the implementation of the Peace Accord are happening in the aspects with the lowest popular support. According to Kroc Institute, the main steps toward progress in the implementation of the Accord are the end of the armed conflict between the Government and the FARC-EP and the transformation of this guerrilla group into a political party. Regarding the end of the conflict, the report about the actual status of the implementation of the Peace Accord points out some progress in the socioeconomic rejoining of the former members of the FARC-EP. Although the report highlights that these are crucial processes for the construction of a long lasting and stable peace, since they make former fighters´ life projects possible, the qualitative information in this study proves that the socioeconomic rejoining process of former FARC-EP members, also generates some resentment in the public opinion. Very frequently, participants expressed their discomfort about the process of rejoining, because they do not consider it fair that the Government provide former fighters of the armed groups benefits that the rest

of the population cannot access. "It's not fair that they receive money, since they were in the guerrilla, and those who have always worked honestly do not get any help" (Young woman, Bogota). In terms of the political participation of FARC, this study found that only 3 out of 10 Colombians support this component of the Peace Accord. In the focus groups it was identified that the perception of some participants that voting for this political party would be an insult to memory, because it would imply forgetting all the harm that this guerrilla caused the country. In this sense, some citizens believe that keeping the same acronym that they used as an armed group for the name of the political party is a mistake. "Many of them will be elected as a result of the lack of information and collective memory... They would not be elected based on social consciousness. People should remember their mistakes and their massacres" (Adult woman, Pacific Region)

In terms of **the political participation of** FARC, this study found that only **3 out of 10 Colombians support this component of the Peace Accord**.

Regarding reconciliation with all the former fighters of the FARC, it is evident that starting in 2014, there is a clear division in the public opinion about this topic. On average, one of every two respondents see forgiveness and reconciliation between citizens and former fighters of the FARC as possible. Before 2013, the proportion of respondents who considered that forgiveness and reconciliation with the former FARC members was possible ranged between 68% and 63%. In terms of respondents' opinion about the aspects that contribute the most to reconciliation, it was found that indemnity was the action that would contribute the most to reconciliation. State indemnity rates at 74% while indemnity from the perpetrators rates at 72.7%. A significantly smaller proportion of respondents consider that finding the truth about the events occurred during the war (63.4%) and that the perpetrators of egregious crimes ask for forgiveness to the victims (63.3%) would contribute to reconciliation.

Finally, the report showed that respondents' willingness to share spaces of daily life with former members of illegal armed groups tends to reduce as they are asked for more personal interactions. While most Colombians are willing to have a former fighter as a neighbor (71.3%), less than half would accept that the company they work for would give jobs to former fighters (45.5%) or that their children go to the same school with former members of illegal groups' children (42.1%). In the same way, the proportion of respondents who would accept that their children befriended a former fighter is even lower (23.6%). In the focal groups some opinions which reflect the fear that living with the former fighters' children arises. It is believed that this could put children at risk.

The proportion of respondents who would **accept that their children befriended a former fighter is even lower (23.6%)**.

In short, this report shows that the country faces structural challenges in order to construct a lasting and stable peace. As presented throughout the document, it is crucial that the Colombian Government strengthen the following aspects: guaranteeing the safety of citizens in the territories that used to be occupied by the FARC and making progress in the reparation for the victims of the conflict, accelerate the implementation of the components of the Peace Accord which deal with the land reform and the solution to drug trafficking. The Government must also generate conditions of social equity to prevent citizens from feeling that the benefits of the socioeconomic rejoining that the Government gives to former FARC-EP members are exclusive. It is obvious that all efforts in these directions will counteract against citizens' skepticism regarding the Peace Accord and promote reconciliation.

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Notes

Appendix A: Regression models

Table A.1. Estimates of probit models regarding favorable attitudes toward forgiveness and reconciliation between ctiziens and FARC EXCOMBATANTS, Americas Barometer 2018

Esta tabla presenta las salidas de los ejercicios econométricos realizados por el Observatorio de la Democracia con la base de datos del Barómetro de las Américas 2018, para estudiar los factores asociados a las actitudes de reconciliación. Se corrieron dos regresiones; la segunda agrega al modelo la interacción entre el género y las experiencias de victimización. La tabla presenta los coeficientes y los errores estándar (entre paréntesis). Además, para cada variable, la tabla señala con uno (*), dos (**) o tres asteriscos (***) el nivel de significancia estadística de la variable, al 90%, 95% y 99%, respectivamente.

Variable dependiente: actitudes frente al perdón y la reconciliación entre los ciudadanos y los desmovilizados de las FARC		
	(1)	(2)
Víctima	0.068 (1.82)	0.159 (3.47)**
Mujer	-0.417 (3.60)**	-0.255 (1.91)
Mujer víctima		-0.189 (2.60)*
Cercanía al Centro Democrático	-0.090 (4.06)**	-0.088 (3.89)**
Confianza interpersonal	0.148 (2.58)*	0.150 (2.61)*
Edad	0.008 (2.18)*	0.008 (2.15)*
Nivel educativo	0.202 (1.94)	0.193 (1.84)
Empleado	-0.052 (0.38)	-0.065 (0.47)
Ingresos del hogar	-0.026 (2.08)*	-0.027 (2.14)*
Tamaño del hogar	0.003 (0.11)	0.000 (0.00)
Zona urbana	-0.006 (0.03)	0.013 (0.07)
Región Bogotá	-0.113 (0.66)	-0.105 (0.62)
Región Central	-0.119 (0.57)	-0.140 (0.67)
Región Oriental	-0.068 (0.39)	-0.054 (0.31)
Región Pacífica	0.119 (0.52)	0.125 (0.55)
Región Amazonía-Orinoquía	0.200 (1.52)	0.236 (1.53)
Constante	-0.422 (1.14)	-0.485 (1.27)
Observaciones	641	641

Table A.2. Estimate of probit models with ranking of favorable attitudes toward forgiveness and reconciliation between ctiziens and FARC excombatants , PDET Baseline 2017

En esta tabla se presentan las salidas de los ejercicios econométricos realizados por el Observatorio de la Democracia con la base de datos de la Evaluación de línea de base Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, estudio realizado en 2018 por Management Systems International – MSI, la Agencia de Renovación del Territorio del Gobierno de Colombia y el Centro Nacional de Consultoría, bajo el contrato AID-514-C-13-00003, EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), y apoyado por la Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID). El estudio está basado en más de 8.000 encuestas y es representativo del universo de hogares de los 170 municipios priorizados y las zonas urbanas y rurales de 6 regiones que agrupan las 16 subregiones PDET. Se corrieron dos regresiones; la segunda agrega al modelo la interacción entre el género y las experiencias de victimización. La tabla presenta los coeficientes y los errores estándar (entre paréntesis). Además, para cada variable, la tabla señala con uno (*), dos (**) o tres asteriscos (***) el nivel de significancia estadística de la variable, al 90%, 95% y 99%, respectivamente.

Variable dependiente: actitudes frente al perdón y la reconciliación entre los ciudadanos y los desmovilizados de las FARC		
	(1)	(2)
Víctima	0.067	0.073
	(1.23)	(0.95)
Mujer	-0.160	-0.153
	(5.91)**	(2.92)**
Mujer víctima		-0.012
		(0.18)
Confianza interpersonal	0.085	0.085
	(5.30)**	(5.29)**
Edad	0.004	0.004
	(3.43)**	(3.43)**
Nivel educativo	0.032	0.032
	(4.67)**	(4.75)**
Empleado	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ingresos del hogar	0.000	0.000
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Tamaño del hogar	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.29)	(0.29)
Zona urbana	-0.137	-0.137
	(3.13)**	(3.12)**
N	8,310	8,310

Notes

AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad **[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]**

(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad

(2) Pandillas

(3) Policía o militares

(4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes

(5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia

(6) Delincuentes comunes

(9) Guerrilla

(10) Las BACRIM

(11) Seguridad privada (celadores)

(7) **[NO LEER]** Otros

(8) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy **in**seguro(a)?

(1) Muy seguro(a)   (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA A

COLAOJ21A. Ahora voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos garantiza la seguridad en el lugar donde vive **[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]**

(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad

(2) Pandillas

(3) Policía o militares

(4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes

(5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia

(6) Delincuentes comunes

(7) Guerrilla

(8) Las BACRIM

(9) Seguridad privada (celadores)

(10) **[NO LEER]** Otros

(11) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

COLAOJ21B. ¿Y cuál de los siguientes grupos garantizaba la seguridad hace doce meses en el lugar donde usted vive? **[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]**

(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad

(2) Pandillas

(3) Policía o militares

(4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes

(5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia

(6) Delincuentes comunes

(7) Guerrilla

(8) Las BACRIM

(9) Seguridad privada o celadores

(10) **[NO LEER]** Otros

(11) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

WC1. ¿Usted ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano a consecuencia del conflicto armado? O ¿tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?

(1) Sí **[Sigue]**   (2) No **[Pasa a WC3]**

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a WC3]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a WC3]**

WC1T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí   (2) No   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**   (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?

(1) Sí **[Sigue]**   (2) No **[Pasa a WC2]**

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a WC2]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a WC2]**

WC3T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí   (2) No   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**   (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto?

(1) Sí **[Sigue]**   (2) No **[Pasa a COLWC8]**

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC8]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC8]**

WC2T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí   (2) No   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**   (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

COLWC8. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia fue víctima de un secuestro? (1) Sí **[Sigue]** (2) No **[Pasa a COLWC9]** (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC9]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a COLWC9]**	
COLWC8T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**	
COLWC9. ¿Por razones del conflicto armado algún miembro de su familia fue despojado de su tierra? (1) Sí **[Sigue]** (2) No **[Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLLT5]** (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLLT5]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a INSTRUCCIONES COLWC4 si respondió SI en al menos una WC o COLWC. De lo contrario, pasa a COLLT5]**	
COLWC9T. ¿Esto sucedió en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**	

¿Qué grupo o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? **[NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS. EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (888888) No sabe (988888) No responde]**

	Sí	No	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable (no fue víctima) [NO LEER]	
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4D. El ejército	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4E. La policía	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4G. BACRIM (Bandas criminales)	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4C. Ex paramilitares que se han reagrupado	1	2	888888	988888	999999	
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	888888	988888	999999	

COLLT5. ¿Hace parte usted del registro nacional de víctimas del conflicto armado?   (1) Sí **[Sigue]**   (2) No **[Pasa a COLPAZ1A]**   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPAZ1A]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a COLPAZ1A]**

COLLT6. ¿Ha recibido algún tipo de reparación por parte del Gobierno Nacional?

(1) Sí   (2) No

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? **[Leer alternativas]**	1	2	3	888888	988888

CUESTIONARIO A

¿Y usted ve posible, sí o no, el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con los excombatientes desmovilizados de:

COLPAZ6A. Las FARC?

(1) Sí   (2) No   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO B

¿Y usted ve posible, sí o no, el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con los excombatientes desmovilizados de:

COLPAZ6C. El ELN?

(1) Sí   (2) No   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B" AL ENTREVISTADO]

B0. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿Ahasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Nada						**Mucho**	**No sabe** **[NO LEER]**	**No responde** **[NO LEER]**
[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]								

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. **B1**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? [Sondee: *Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio*]	
COLB60N. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la FARC?	

Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta, **[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]**	
COLPROPAZ1B. El gobierno del ex presidente Juan Manuel Santos y las FARC firmaron un acuerdo de paz. ¿Hasta qué punto apoya usted este acuerdo de paz?	

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA A

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

Ahora le voy a leer una serie de acciones y quiero que me diga si usted cree que ellas contribuirían nada o contribuirían mucho para que se dé la reconciliación entre las víctimas del conflicto armado y sus victimarios. **[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]**	
COLRECON19B. Que los responsables de crímenes atroces pidan perdón a las víctimas.	
COLRECON19C. Que el Estado indemnice a las víctimas del conflicto armado.	

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA B

[Seguir utilizando tarjeta "B"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

Ahora le voy a leer una serie de acciones y quiero que me diga si usted cree que ellas contribuirían nada o contribuirían mucho para que se dé la reconciliación entre las víctimas del conflicto armado y sus victimarios. **[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]**	
COLRECON20B. Que se establezca la verdad sobre los hechos ocurridos en el marco del conflicto armado.	
COLRECON20C. Que los victimarios indemnicen a las víctimas del conflicto armado.	

[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "B"]

COLPROPAZ1CN. El gobierno del expresidente Juan Manuel Santos inició un proceso de paz con el ELN. ¿Hasta qué punto apoya usted este proceso de paz?	

CUESTIONARIO A

[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]

Ahora, pensando en la implementación del acuerdo de paz firmado entre el Gobierno y las FARC, ¿hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones? **[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]** **[ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE LAS PREGUNTAS COLPROPAZ13C-J]**	
COLPROPAZ13C. La implementación del acuerdo fortalecerá la democracia colombiana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13J. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la seguridad en su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPACT16A. El Gobierno cumplirá con lo pactado en el acuerdo de paz firmado en La Habana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

CUESTIONARIO B

[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]

Ahora, pensando en la implementación del acuerdo de paz firmado entre el Gobierno y las FARC, ¿hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones? **[Anotar 1-7, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]** **[ALEATORIZAR ORDEN DE LAS PREGUNTAS COLPROPAZ13K-M]**	

COLPROPAZ13K. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará la situación económica de su municipio. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPROPAZ13M. La implementación del acuerdo mejorará el acceso de los campesinos a la tierra. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPACT16B. Las FARC cumplirán con lo pactado en el acuerdo de paz firmado en La Habana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLPACT20. El presidente Iván Duque propuso durante su campaña electoral, modificar los acuerdos alcanzados entre el Gobierno colombiano y las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA A

[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

En la mesa de negociación de La Habana, el Gobierno y las FARC llegaron a varios acuerdos. Quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre algunos de ellos.	
COLPACT11. Se acordó que los partidos políticos formados por excombatientes desmovilizados de las FARC tendrán las mismas garantías de seguridad y de acceso a medios de comunicación que ya tienen los demás partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
COLPACT1. Se acordó que los miembros rasos de las FARC (no comandantes) que se desmovilicen no irán a la cárcel. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	

Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.	
COLPACT17A. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla rebajas de penas a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLPACT18A. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a desmovilizados de las FARC que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

CUESTIONARIO COLOMBIA B

[Seguir utilizando Tarjeta "C"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999 = Inaplicable]

Utilizando la misma tarjeta, quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes acciones…	
COLPACT10. Que se distribuyan tierras baldías entre campesinos que no tienen suficiente tierra para cultivar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
COLPACT19. Que se desarrollen programas de sustitución de cultivos en su municipio ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora, pensando en la Justicia Especial para la Paz creada en los acuerdos de paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC, quisiera pedirle su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones.

COLPACT17B. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla rebajas de penas a miembros de las Fuerzas Militares que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

COLPACT18B. La Justicia Especial para la Paz contempla privación de la libertad sin cárcel a miembros de las Fuerzas Militares que confiesen sus crímenes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

Ahora quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría las siguientes situaciones, utilizando la misma tarjeta.

[Anotar 1-10, (888888) No sabe, (988888) No responde, (999999) Inaplicable]

COLRECON6. Que una hija o hijo suyo fuera amigo de un desmovilizado de las FARC.

¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?

COLRECON18. Que en el colegio de su hija o hijo estudien hijos de excombatientes desmovilizados de grupos armados ilegales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?

COLRECON7N. Que en la empresa o lugar donde usted trabaje le dieran empleo a un desmovilizado o desmovilizada de las FARC. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba esta situación?


[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]

COLDIS35F. Pensando en los desmovilizados de los grupos armados, por favor dígame si... **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) No los quiere de vecinos

(0) No tiene problema con tenerlos de vecinos

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

COLGI8. ¿Cuál es la pena máxima en años para un excombatiente desmovilizado de las FARC que se acoja a la Justicia Especial de Paz?

[ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]

_____

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Tarjeta A (L1)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda									**Derecha**

Tarjeta B

7 — Mucho
6
5
4
3
2
Nada — 1

Tarjeta C

7 — Muy de acuerdo

6

5

4

3

2

Muy en desacuerdo — 1

Tarjeta D

10 Aprueba
firmemente

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

Desaprueba
firmemente **1**

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A través de este riguroso estudio de opinión pública en Colombia, con comparabilidad histórica para los últimos 14 años y comparabilidad entre países del continente, el Observatorio de la Democracia interpreta y analiza las opiniones, creencias, actitudes y percepciones de los colombianos frente a temas estructurales y coyunturales, informando a Gobierno, autoridades, academia y población en general, con el fin de contribuir de esta manera a la generación de políticas públicas, iniciativas, acciones y debates frente a temas clave para el desarrollo del país.

El Barómetro de las Américas es una encuesta de opinión pública que se lleva a cabo en 18 países del continente americano, bajo la coordinación de la Universidad de Vanderbilt. En la actualidad, el Observatorio de la Democracia de la Universidad de los Andes desarrolla este estudio con el apoyo y financiación de USAID, lo que posibilita que el país cuente con información actualizada anualmente, a través de muestras nacionales en los años pares y muestras especiales en los años impares.