

**JOSE MORALES-ARILLA**

<https://scholar.harvard.edu/josemorales-arilla>

[jrm488@g.harvard.edu](mailto:jrm488@g.harvard.edu)

**HARVARD UNIVERSITY**

**Harvard Kennedy School**

Placement Director: Marcella Alsan

[MARCELLA\\_ALSAN@HKS.HARVARD.EDU](mailto:MARCELLA_ALSAN@HKS.HARVARD.EDU)

617-495-1923

Doctoral Programs Director: Nicole Tateosian

[NICOLE\\_TATEOSIAN@HKS.HARVARD.EDU](mailto:NICOLE_TATEOSIAN@HKS.HARVARD.EDU)

617-496-4485

**Harvard Economics Department**

Placement Director: Amanda Pallais

[APALLAIS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU](mailto:APALLAIS@FAS.HARVARD.EDU)

617-495-2151

Placement Director: Elie Tamer

[ELIETAMER@FAS.HARVARD.EDU](mailto:ELIETAMER@FAS.HARVARD.EDU)

617-496-1526

Assistant Director: Brenda Piquet

[BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU](mailto:BPIQUET@FAS.HARVARD.EDU)

617-495-8927

**Contact Information**

24 Alpine Street

Somerville, MA, 02144

617-620-9896

**Personal Information:**

Citizenship: Venezuelan and Spanish

**Undergraduate and Masters Studies:**

Master in Public Administration in International Development, Harvard University, 2012

Bachelor's Degree in Economics, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 2009

**Doctoral Studies:**

Harvard University, 2016 to present

Ph.D. Candidate in Public Policy (Economics Track)

Thesis Title: "Essays on the Political Economy of Development"

Expected Completion Date: May 2022

**References:**

Prof. Edward Glaeser (Chair)

Harvard University

Department of Economics

617-495-0575

[eglaeser@harvard.edu](mailto:eglaeser@harvard.edu)

Prof. Ricardo Hausmann

Harvard University

Kennedy School of Government

617-496-3740

[ricardo\\_hausmann@hks.harvard.edu](mailto:ricardo_hausmann@hks.harvard.edu)

Prof. Horacio Larreguy

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

Departments of Economics & Political Science

+52 (55) 5628 4000

[horacio.larreguy@itam.mx](mailto:horacio.larreguy@itam.mx)

Prof. Nathan Nunn

Harvard University

Department of Economics

617-495-5493

[nunn@fas.harvard.edu](mailto:nunn@fas.harvard.edu)

Prof. Melissa Dell

Harvard University

Department of Economics

617-384-7272

[melissadell@fas.harvard.edu](mailto:melissadell@fas.harvard.edu)

Prof. Dan Levy (Teaching Reference)

Harvard University

Kennedy School of Government

617-496-4281

[dan\\_levy@hks.harvard.edu](mailto:dan_levy@hks.harvard.edu)

### **Teaching and Research Fields:**

Political Economy, Development Economics, Applied Econometrics

### **Teaching Experience:**

Spring 2020	“Big Data for Solving Economic and Social Problems,” Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Professor Raj Chetty.
Fall 2019	“Advanced Quantitative Methods,” Harvard Kennedy School, Teaching Fellow for Professor Dan Levy
Fall 2018	“Development Policy Strategy,” Harvard Kennedy School, Teaching Fellow for Professor Ricardo Hausmann
Fall 2017	Co-author of HBS Case “Improving worker safety in the era of machine learning”
Fall 2012	“Political Economy,” Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Professor

### **Academic Appointments and Work Experience:**

2021 – Present	The Brookings Institution, Visiting Researcher at the Global Development Program
2020 – 2021	CID Growth Lab at Harvard University, Doctoral Fellow
2013 – 2016	CID Growth Lab at Harvard University, Research Fellow
2012 – 2013	Henrique Capriles’ Presidential Campaigns, Policy Advisor
2009 – 2010	Transparency International (Venezuelan Chapter), Public Finance Coordinator
2008 – 2009	Central Bank of Venezuela, Economic Analyst

### **Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:**

2020 – 2021	Mercatus Center’s Orkar Morgenstern Fellow
2019 – 2020	Mercatus Center’s Adam Smith Fellow
2016	Harvard University’s PhD Program Financial Award
2020	Harvard Kennedy School, Distinction in Student Teaching
2019	Harvard Kennedy School, Distinction in Student Teaching
2012	Harvard-MIT’s II Annual Geopolitics of Energy Case Competition
2012	Harvard Kennedy School’s Friederick Fisher Memorial Prize
2012	Harvard Kennedy School’s SYPA Honorable Mention
2012	Harvard Kennedy School’s HIID Full Tuition Scholarship

### **Research Papers:**

*“Autocrats in crisis mode: Strategic favoritism during economic shocks”*  
(Job Market Paper)

Do autocrats favor their supporters during economic shocks? I introduce a model of redistribution and regime stability that shows how in-group favors can be a strategic response to economic downturns. The model predicts that, as economic shocks worsen, autocrats may favor their supporters and confront opposition protests to save on appeasement costs. I test the model's main results in two empirical settings. First, I focus on the Venezuelan blackouts of 2019. Consistent with the model, the Maduro regime was more likely to exempt regime-supporting regions affected by the blackout from later power rationing. Moreover, blackout-induced protests were limited to opposition-leaning regions. I then focus on negative rainfall shocks in Sub-Saharan Africa. Droughts magnify differences in development, protests and state-coercion outcomes in favor of leaders' home regions.

*The economic victims of violence: Local exports during the Mexican drug war*  
(With Jesus Gorrrin and Bernardo Ricca – Under review)

This paper documents how violence resulting from the Mexican Drug War hindered local export growth. Focusing on exports allows us to abstract from demand factors and estimate effects on local capacity to supply foreign markets. We compare exports of the same product to the same country, but facing differential exposure to violence after a close electoral outcome. Firms exogenously exposed to the Drug War experienced lower export growth. Violence eroded the local capacity to attract capital investment, disproportionately hampering large exporters and capital-intensive activities.

*Gains from globalization and economic nationalism: AMLO v. NAFTA in the 2006 Mexican election*  
(With Sebastian Bustos – Under review)

Do gains from globalization erode support for economic nationalism? We implement a shift-share strategy to study how NAFTA-enhanced local access to US-markets affected Mexican demands for protectionist platforms. The left, led by Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), under-performed in cities benefiting from export access gains during the 2006 presidential elections. This effect is observed strictly in 2006, the only post-NAFTA election in which debates over trade integration played a salient role. Our findings are robust to controls for import competing pressures from NAFTA and the China Shock. AMLO's 2006 protectionist platform likely cost him that year's election, and campaign media strategies in 2012 map to this earlier backlash.

*The local vote effect of presidential candidate visits*  
(Under review)

Given how candidates' scarce time is often devoted to visits aiming to stimulate local support, the limited causal evidence on these effects is surprising. Comparing outcomes between visited and non-visited places is likely to yield biased estimates. This paper studies the local electoral effects of Henrique Capriles' visits in the 2012 Venezuelan presidential election. Leveraging the panel structure of electoral data and unique detailed data on the determinants of other local campaign efforts, I estimate that Capriles' visits eroded Chavismo's vote shares by 0.6 percentage points. Turnout levels seem unaffected, suggesting a persuasive effect of visits. Effects are concentrated in low priority States and States with a Chavista governor, suggesting that visits matter most in regions receiving less campaign resources and stronger rival presence. Effects are also driven by Capriles' later campaign visits, highlighting the relevance of the timing of candidate appearance. These results suggest that visits affected electoral outcomes by enhancing local information about the candidate.

*Remote Work Wanted? Evidence from job postings during COVID-19*  
(With Carlos Daboin – Under review)

As the COVID-19 pandemic pushed firms to comply with social distancing guidelines, the relative demand for work that could be performed from home was expected to increase. However, while employment in "remotable" occupations was relatively resilient during the pandemic, online job postings, which measure demand for new hires, for these occupations dropped disproportionately. This apparent contradiction is not explained by prior job "churning" in "non-remote" jobs, nor by the recomposition of the labor market across economic sectors. The underperformance of postings for "remotable" jobs during the pandemic is concentrated in essential occupations and occupations with high returns to experience.

**Ongoing Research:**

- Regime vulnerability to in-group protests: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa
- Political responses in migrant-hosting communities: Evidence from Venezuelan refugees
- Repression and identity: The effects of Franquista violence on Catalan nationalism
- Solidarity against the machine: Food-banks and the effectiveness of clientelism in Venezuela

### **Conference Presentations:**

June 2021	ACM COMPASS 2021: Computing and Sustainable Societies: “Is remote work in high demand?”
March 2021	Pacific Conference for Development Economics (PacDev): “The economic victims of violence”
Nov 2019	Southern Economic Association Conference: “Gains from globalization and economic nationalism”
Nov 2019	Southern Economic Association Conference: “The economic victims of violence”
Nov 2019	Southern Economic Association Conference: “Solidarity against the machine”

### **Policy Analyses and Teaching Cases:**

- “*Impact of the 2017 sanctions on Venezuela: Revisiting the evidence*” (2019)
- “*Economic complexity and technological relatedness: Findings for American cities*” (2019)
- “*Growing cities that work for all: A capabilities approach to regional economic competitiveness*” (2019)
- “*There is a future after cars: Economic growth analysis for Hermosillo*” (2018)
- “*Economic complexity reports for Baja California, Tabasco and Campeche*” (2018)
- “*Improving worker safety in the era of machine learning*” (2017)
- “*Panama beyond the canal: Technological proximities and opportunities for diversification*” (2017)
- “*Economic complexity in Panama: Assessing opportunities for productive diversification*” (2016)
- “*Economic reforms in Venezuela: Anti-poverty and social programs*” (2016)
- “*Rethinking the Taboo: Gasoline subsidies in Venezuela*” (2012)
- “*Direct distribution of oil revenues in Venezuela: A viable alternative?*” (2012)

### **Service:**

2020 – 2021	Vice-President of the Harvard Venezuelan Student Association (HVSA)
2010 – 2011	President of the Venezuelan Caucus at the Harvard Kennedy School
2009 – 2010	Graduate of IESA-UCAB 1 <sup>st</sup> “LIDERA” Youth Leadership Program
2007 – 2010	Founding President of the “Comunidad de Debate” NGO
2007 – 2008	Elected Student Representative at UCAB

### **Miscellaneous:**

- Opinion writer and commentator for [Project Syndicate](#), [Prodavinci](#) and other media outlets.