Randomized Algorithms

— Game Theoretic View & Minimax Principles

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Outline

Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

- Minimax Theorems
 - Yao's Minimax Principle
 - An Application: Comparison-Based Sorting

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- 2 Minimax Theorems
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Payoff Matrix

	Scissors	Paper	Stone
Scissors	0	1	-1
Paper	-1	0	1
Stone	1	-1	0

- Rows: Alice's choices.
- Columns: Bob's choices.
- Entry position (i, j): state or profile.
- Entry value: the amount paid by Bob to Alice.

Payoff Matrix (the explicit form)

	Scissors	Paper	Stone
Scissors	(0,0)	(1, -1)	(-1,1)
Paper	(-1, 1)	(0,0)	(1, -1)
Stone	(1, -1)	(-1, 1)	(0,0)

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	В1	B2	В3	В4	B5
A1	0	-1	2	-3	4
A2	-5	6	-7	8	-9
A3	10	-11	12	-13	14
A4	-15	16	-17	18	-19
A5	20	-21	22	-23	24

	В1	B2	ВЗ	B4	B5
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- What is $\min_j M_{1j}$? $\min_j M_{2j}$? $\min_j M_{3j}$? $\min_j M_{4j}$? $\min_j M_{5j}$?
- What is $\max_i M_{i1}$? $\max_i M_{i2}$? $\max_i M_{i3}$? $\max_i M_{i4}$? $\max_i M_{i5}$?

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• $\max_i \min_j M_{ij} = -3$.

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- $\max_i \min_j M_{ij} = -3$.
- $\min_{j} \max_{i} M_{ij} = 16$.

Exercise

Observation

For all payoff matrices M,

$$\max_{i} \min_{j} M_{ij} \leq \min_{j} \max_{i} M_{ij}$$

Exercise

Observation

For all payoff matrices M,

$$V_R = \max_i \min_i M_{ij} \leq \min_i \max_i M_{ij} = V_C$$

• When the equality holds, the game is said to have a solution (saddle point) and the value is $V = V_R = V_C$.

	Scissors	Paper	Stone
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- * Introduce randomization in the choice of strategies.

	Scissors (33%)	Paper (33%)	Stone (33%)
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Paper (33%)	-1	0	1
Stone (33%)	-2	-1	0

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Mixed Strategies

Mixed Strategies

A mixed strategy is a probability distribution on the set of possible strategies.

- $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, \dots, p_n)$: probability distribution on the rows of \mathbf{M} .
- $\mathbf{q} = (q_1, \dots, q_m)$: probability distribution on the columns of M.
- The payoff (of Alice) now becomes a random variable.

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- The payoff (of Alice) now becomes a random variable.

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathsf{payoff}] = \mathbf{p}^{\top} \mathbf{M} \mathbf{q} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{m} p_{i} M_{ij} q_{j}.$$

Best over distributions

$$V_R = \max_{\mathbf{p}} \min_{\mathbf{q}} \mathbf{p}^{\top} \mathbf{M} \mathbf{q}$$

 $V_C = \min_{\mathbf{q}} \max_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbf{p}^{\top} \mathbf{M} \mathbf{q}$

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von Neumann's Minimax Theorem

For any two-player zero-sum game specified by a matrix M,

$$\max_{\mathbf{p}} \min_{\mathbf{q}} \mathbf{p}^{\top} \boldsymbol{M} \mathbf{q} = \min_{\mathbf{q}} \max_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbf{p}^{\top} \boldsymbol{M} \mathbf{q}.$$

 The saddle-point exists here and the two distributions p and q are called optimal mixed-strategies.

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- Once \mathbf{p} is fixed, $\mathbf{p}^{\top} M \mathbf{q}$ is a linear function of \mathbf{q} and can be minimized by setting 1 to the q_i with the smallest coefficient in the function.
- If *C* knows the distribution **p** being used by *R*, then its optimal strategy is a pure strategy.

Loomis' Theorem

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For any two-player zero-sum game specified by a matrix M,

$$\max_{\mathbf{p}} \min_{i} \mathbf{p}^{\top} \mathbf{M} \mathbf{e}_{j} = \min_{\mathbf{q}} \max_{i} \mathbf{e}_{i}^{\top} \mathbf{M} \mathbf{q}.$$

• e_k : a unit vector with value 1 in the kth position and 0's elsewhere.

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The Intuitive Idea

- View the algorithm designer as the column player C.
 - The columns: the set of all possible algorithms.
 - Each column: a pure strategy of C; a deterministic algorithm which is always correct.
 - * V_C : the worst-case running time of any deterministic algorithm.
- View the adversary choosing the input as the row player R.
 - The rows: the set of all possible inputs (of fixed size).
 - Each row: a pure strategy of R; a specific input.
 - \star V_R : the non-deterministic complexity of the problem.
- The payoff from C to R: some real-valued measure of the performance of an algorithm.
 - E.g., running time, solution quality, space, etc.



When considering mixed-strategies

- A mixed-strategy for C: a probability distribution over the space of always correct deterministic algorithms (Las Vegas).
- A mixed-strategy for *R*: a probability distribution over the space of all inputs.

Distributional Complexity

The expected running time of the best deterministic algorithm for the worst distribution on the inputs.

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 Smaller than the deterministic complexity since the algorithms knows the input distribution.

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Distributional Complexity

The expected running time of the best deterministic algorithm for the worst distribution on the inputs.

- Smaller than the deterministic complexity since the algorithms knows the input distribution.
- Loomis' Theorem implies that the distributional complexity = the least possible expected running time achievable by any randomized algorithm.

Corollary

- Let Π be a problem with a finite set $\mathcal I$ of input instances of fixed size.
- ullet Let ${\mathcal A}$ be a finite set of deterministic algorithms.
- Let C(I, A) denote the running time of algorithm $A \in A$ on input $I \in \mathcal{I}$.
- Let p be a probability distribution over I.
- Let \mathbf{q} be a probability distribution over \mathcal{A} .

Let $I_{\bf p}$ be a random input chosen according to ${\bf p}$ and $A_{\bf q}$ be a randomized algorithm chosen according to ${\bf q}$. Then

$$\max_{\mathbf{p}} \min_{\mathbf{q}} \mathbb{E}[C(I_{\mathbf{p}}, A_{\mathbf{q}})] = \min_{\mathbf{q}} \min_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbb{E}[C(I_{\mathbf{p}}, A_{\mathbf{q}})]$$

and

$$\max_{\mathbf{p}} \min_{A \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}[C(I_{\mathbf{p}}, A)] = \min_{\mathbf{q}} \min_{I \in \mathcal{I}} \mathbb{E}[C(I, A_{\mathbf{q}})].$$

Result by Andrew C.-C. Yao

Yao's Minimax Principle

For all distributions \mathbf{p} over \mathcal{I} and \mathbf{q} over \mathcal{A} ,

$$\min_{A \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}[C(I_{\mathbf{p}}, A)] \leq \max_{I \in \mathcal{I}} \mathbb{E}[C(I, A_{\mathbf{q}})]$$

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The expected running time of the optimal deterministic algorithm for an arbitrarily chosen input distribution \mathbf{p} is a lower bound on the expected running time of the optimal Las Vegas randomized algorithm for problem Π .

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 Trick: choose a suitable p and be aware of that the deterministic algorithm knows p.

Extension to Monte Carlo Type Randomized Algorithms

Proposition [Yao FOCS 1977]

For

- all distributions **p** over \mathcal{I} ,
- all distributions \mathbf{q} over \mathcal{A} ,
- ullet any $\epsilon \in [0,1/2]$,

we have

$$\frac{1}{2} \left(\min_{A \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}[C_{2\epsilon}(I_{\mathbf{p}}, A)] \right) \leq \max_{I \in \mathcal{I}} \mathbb{E}[C_{\epsilon}(I, A_{\mathbf{q}})]$$

• $\mathbb{E}[C_{\epsilon}(I_{\mathbf{p}}, A)]$: the expected running time of a deterministic algorithm A that errs with probability $\leq \epsilon$.

Randomized Algorithm - Minimax Principles


Minimax Theorems

An Application: Comparison-Based Sorting

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Comparison-Based Sorting Algorithms



- Examples: MergeSort, QuickSort, BubbleSort, SelectionSort, HeapSort, etc.
- Non-examples: RadixSort, BucketSort, etc.



Minimax Theorems


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Our Goal

Theorem


Any comparison-based Las Vegas sorting algorithm requires expected $\Omega(n \log n)$ time complexity.

Analysis (1/3)



• A decision tree which models any comparison-based sorting algorithm.

Analysis (1/3)




- A decision tree which models any comparison-based sorting algorithm.
- Each tree leaf corresponds to a permutation (i.e., sorted result).

Minimax Theorems


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- Each tree leaf corresponds to a permutation (i.e., sorted result).
 - Assume that the set of all permutations is uniformly distributed.
- Tree depth h: number of comparisons made by the algorithm.

Analysis (2/3)

• By the pigeonhole principle, we must have $2^h \ge n!$.

Randomized Algorithm - Minimax Principles

¹Note that $\lg_2(\cdot) = \log_2(\cdot)$.

Analysis (2/3)

- By the pigeonhole principle, we must have $2^h \ge n!$.
- Thus¹,

$$h \ge \lg n! = \lg n(n-1) \cdots 2 \cdot 1 = \sum_{i=2}^{n} \lg i$$

$$\ge \sum_{i=n/2+1}^{n} \lg i \ge \sum_{i=n/2+1}^{n} \lg \left(\frac{n}{2}\right)$$

$$= \frac{n}{2} \lg \left(\frac{n}{2}\right) = \Omega(n \log n).$$

Randomized Algorithm - Minimax Principles

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
$$= \frac{n}{2} \lg \left(\frac{n}{2}\right) = \Omega(n \log n).$$

• **Note:** This only bounds the maximum depth of a leaf in the tree.

Randomized Algorithm - Minimax Principles


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Analysis (3/3)



The average (i.e., expected) depth of the decision tree minimized when the tree is a completely balanced.

Analysis (3/3)



The average (i.e., expected) depth of the decision tree minimized when the tree is a completely balanced. $\implies \Omega(\lg n!) = \Omega(n \log n)$ expected depth.

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Discussions