

Collective Action or Exchange?: Framing International Cooperation in Alliance Politics

Joshua Alley

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University of Virginia

How do elite frames of allied military spending affect public support for cooperation in alliances?

Why Should You Care?



Outline

1. Argument.

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2. Survey Experiment Design.

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3. Pretest Results.

Argument

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1. **Collective Action:** Free-riding and disproportionate contributions.
2. **Exchange:** Trading different foreign policy goods-security for influence.

These frames have opposite effects on attitudes towards cooperation in leading and junior institutional members.

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2. **Exchange:** Increases support for cooperation: reciprocity.

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Framing disproportionate defense spending by a large state:

1. **Collective Action:** Increases support for cooperation: conditional cooperation and perceptions of benevolent leadership.
2. **Exchange:** Decreases support for cooperation: reduces leader legitimacy.

Experimental Design

Emphasis

Attitudes towards NATO in the United States and Germany.
210 respondents in each study. Randomly assign neutral, collective action or exchange vignette about NATO and military spending.

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1. Favorability towards NATO.
2. Support for withdrawal (US) or higher defense spending (Germany).
3. Support for military intervention.

Vignettes

1. **Neutral:** The United States has an important role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO is a military alliance where members promise to support one another in war. According to an expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, a non-partisan think tank, some NATO members spend a smaller share of their resources on the military than the United States.

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2. **Collective Action:** *adds because other states make limited contributions to collective security, and count on the United States to carry the load.*
3. **Exchange:** *adds because they support US priorities and interests in international politics in exchange for protection by the United States.*

Response Questions

1. **Favorability:** 1-5 scale from Very Unfavorable to Very Favorable.

Response Questions




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3. **Intervention:** Yes/No.



Pretest Results

United States: Raw Data






United States: Treatment Effects



United States: Treatment Effects



Germany: Raw Data



Germany: Treatment Effects



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2. Pre-treatment of collective action frames in the United States.
3. Non-representative pre-test data.

Conclusion

Mixed evidence at best: would love your thoughts on:

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1. The argument.
2. The experimental design.

Last, thanks!

jkalley@virginia.edu


Demographic Variables/Controls

- Partisanship
- Ideology
- Foreign Policy Knowledge
- National Pride
- Military Service
- College Education
- Age


MTurk Sample Concerns

- Lots of Democrats
- Above-average education
- Above-average foreign policy knowledge.


Partisanship by Group



Mechanism in Neutral Frame



Map of Favorability



Map of Support for Nonintervention

