

# **Collective Action or Exchange?: Framing International Cooperation in Alliance Politics**

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**How do elite frames of allied military  
spending affect public support for  
cooperation in alliances?**

# Why Should You Care?





1. Argument: Frames and alliance member size.

# Outline

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2. Survey Experiment Design.

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3. Pretest Results from the US and Germany.

# Argument

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1. **Collective Action:** Free-riding and disproportionate contributions.
2. **Exchange:** Trading different foreign policy goods-security for influence.

**These frames have opposite effects on attitudes towards alliances in leading and junior states.**

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1. **Collective Action Framing:** Increases support for cooperation: conditional cooperation and perceptions of benevolent leadership.
2. **Exchange Framing:** Decreases support for cooperation: reduces leader legitimacy.

## Summary of Predictions

|            | Large    | Small    |
|------------|----------|----------|
| Collective | Decrease | Increase |
| Exchange   | Increase | Decrease |

# Experimental Design

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Two studies examining attitudes towards NATO in the United States and Germany. 210 respondents in each study. Randomly assign neutral, collective action or exchange vignette about NATO and military spending.



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1. Favorability towards NATO.
2. Support for withdrawal (US) or higher defense spending (Germany).
3. Support for military intervention.

# Vignettes

1. **Neutral:** (Your Country) has an important role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO is a military alliance where members promise to support one another in war. According to an expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, a non-partisan think tank, some NATO members spend a smaller share of their resources on the military than the United States.

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2. **Collective Action:** adds *because other states make limited contributions to collective security, and count on the United States to carry the load.*
3. **Exchange:** adds *because they support US priorities and interests in international politics in exchange for protection by the United States.*

# Response Questions

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


# Response Questions

1. **Favorability:** 1-5 scale from Very Unfavorable to Very Favorable.
2. **Policy Change:** Yes/No on withdrawal (US) and military spending (Germany).
3. **Intervention:** Yes/No.

# Pretest Results

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

# United States: Raw Data






# United States: Treatment Effects

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
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# Germany: Raw Data



# Germany: Treatment Effects



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1. Inadequate statistical power. Also hard to detect heterogeneous effects with this small sample.
2. Pre-treatment of collective action frames in the United States.
3. Non-representative pre-test data.

# Conclusion

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This project is in the preliminary stages. I would love your thoughts on:

1. The argument.
2. The experimental design.

**Thank you!**

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# Demographic Variables/Controls

- Partisanship
- Ideology
- Foreign Policy Knowledge
- National Pride
- Military Service
- College Education
- Age


# US Sample Concerns

- Lots of Democrats
- Above-average education
- Above-average foreign policy knowledge.


# German Sample Concerns

- Lots of Greens.
- Young (median age 27).
- Above-average education.


# Partisanship by Group



# Mechanism in Neutral Frame



# Map of Favorability



# Map of Support for Nonintervention

