Appendix: Public Attitudes Towards Military Alliances

June 24, 2021

In this appendix, I provide further background on the results in the manuscript. I start by analyzing responses to elite cues and alliance characteristics based on foreign policy dispositions or partisanship alone. I then analyze responses to an open ended question, and compare results with the rating and choice measures. Last, I present some descriptive data on the experimental treatment and demographics.

1 Alliance Support by Foreign Policy Disposition

The manuscript reports analyses that divide respondents by partisanship and foreign policy disposition. In this section of the appendix, I report subgroup analyses by foreign policy disposition alone. Figure 1 and Figure 2 plot the marginal means of elite cues and alliance attributes across militant assertiveness and isolationism.

Hawkish individuals are more likely to support alliance formation and maintenance, regardless of the experimental treatments. Hawks also respond to cues from Republican Senators and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doves pay more attention to cues from Democratic Senators. These differences are evident in the manuscript results, as Republicans are more hawkish, and Democrats more internationalist on average.

Isolationism does not reduce baseline support for alliances, but it affects individual responses



Figure 1: Marginal means of support for forming or maintaining a hypothetical alliances by militant assertiveness. For each experiment, the left two panels plot the marginal mean of support for alliance participation among hawks and doves under different alliance treatments. The rightmost panel plots the difference between these groups. Components marked with abbreviated labels to make the plot more legible.



Figure 2: Marginal means of support for forming or maintaining a hypothetical alliances by internationalism. For each experiment, the left two panels plot the marginal mean of support for maintaining an alliance among isolationists and internationalists under different alliance treatments. The rightmost panel plots the difference between these groups. Components marked with abbreviated labels to make the plot more legible.

to elite cues. Internationalist respondents are more receptive to elite cues, as Figure 2 shows. Although isolationists and internationalists express similar support for alliance participation across most alliance attributes, support among internationalists diverges strongly in response to elite cues. As a result, isolationists express higher alliance support than internationalists when elites oppose treaty formation.

2 Partisan Differences in Alliance Attitudes

This section considers partisan differences in alliance attitudes without dividing by foreign policy dispositions. It also summarizes the alliance attitudes of independents without any partisan lean. Figure 3 plots the marginal means of alliance support among Democrats, independents, and Republicans, along with the estimated differences in marginal means between these groups.

Democrats and Republicans respond primarily to copartisan elites. Support for new and existing alliances is much higher among Democrats when Democratic Senators support the alliance. Similarly, Republicans follow the cues of Republican Senators.

There are other clear partisan differences in alliance attitudes. Democrats are more likely to support alliance formation and maintenance regardless of alliance characteristics, relative to Republicans. Independents match Republicans in their attitudes towards alliance maintenance, but they are even more skeptical of forming new treaty commitments.

Independents are more likely to support alliances with backing from Republican Senators, but otherwise are less responsive to alliance characteristics and elite cues. As a result, there are substantial differences between the three partisan groups. An omnibus F-test finds significant differences between models that interact partisanship and the various treatments with unconditional models of alliance formation and maintenance.

Besides elite cues, there are other salient differences in how partisans respond to alliance attributes. Established democracy in an ally increases Republican support, but allied democracy exerts more influence on Democrats, who also prefer alliances with weak democracies. These partisan differences in attitudes towards allied democracy are less pronounced in the alliance formation experiment, however.

There is also a noteworthy partisan divide in attitudes towards alliances in different regions. Republicans are less likely to support new or existing alliances with African countries. Existing Middle Eastern and new Asia alliances also receive lower support from Republicans than Democrats.



Figure 3: Marginal means of support for forming or maintaining a hypothetical alliances by partisanship. For each experiment, the left two panels plot the marginal mean of support for maintaining an alliance among Democrats and Republicans under different alliance treatments and the rightmost panel plots the difference between these groups. Components marked with abbreviated labels to make the plot more legible.

The source of these differences merit further investigation.

Overall, Figure 3 reveals clear partisan differences in alliance attitudes. Members of the two major parties follow cues from co-partisan elites and value different alliance characteristics. These differences are consistent with the findings in the manuscript, as they reflect aggregate attitudes across the varying foreign policy dispositions within each party.

3 Open-Ended Alliance Attitude Question

To further examine the sources of alliance attitudes, I asked respondents to identify the most important factors behind their support or opposition to the hypothetical alliances in an open-ended question. Roughly half of the respondents gave an invalid response, which limits the utility of the following analysis. The results do provide some insight into the individual characteristics that predict particular emphases in alliance attitudes, however.

Based on the open-ended question responses, I created three dummy indicators. The first takes on a value of one if an individual mentions any of the following; generic elite cues, bipartisanship, partisan leaders, military support, or diplomatic cues. The second has a value of one if a respondent references alliance partner attributes such as trade, regime type, threat, region, recent military cooperation and capability. The last indicator captures any mention of alliance obligations, including cost, issue linkages, defense cooperation and conditions on military support. These three variables are not mutually exclusive, because some respondents mentioned multiple factors from different categories.

Because individuals highlight multiple alliance attributes, I analyze the open-ended responses with a trivariate probit model, which adjusts for correlations between the different response classes. Each equation of the model predicts open-ended response content using individual characteristics, including the strength of individual partisan attachment, international economic interests, gender, race, education, region and income. To ensure that the coefficient magnitudes are compara-



Figure 4: Coefficient estimates from trivariate probit models of open-ended response content in the alliance formation and maintenance experiments. Points mark the coefficient estimates, and error bars capture the 95% confidence intervals. Colors differentiate between the formation and maintenance experiments. All continuous variables rescaled by two standard deviations.

ble, I rescaled all continuous variables by two standard deviations (Gelman, 2008). I estimated the trivariate probit model using the Joint Generalized Regression estimator of Braumoeller et al. (2018).[1] I fit separate trivariate probit models for each experiment.

I plot the probit coefficients for each equation of two models in Figure 4. These estimates of the relationship between indidividual concerns and open-ended response content reveal further patterns that are consistent with the results in the manuscript. As isolationism increases, individuals

[1]The pre-analysis plan stated that I would use Bayesian estimation of the multivariate probit model. Unfortunately, this proved impractical, as the Bayesian model would not converge and was numerically unstable. This also precluded a more fine-grained analysis with more response categories.

are less likely to mention elite cues as a source of their responses.[2] Isolationism has the largest substantive effect. Hawkish individuals are less likely to mention any treatment, especially in the maintenance experiment. This reflects hawks' tendency to express strong alliance support regardless of experimental treatments. Last, stronger partisan attachment makes individuals less likely to mention alliance or partner attributes.

There are a few other noteworthy patterns. Greater education is positively correlated with mentioning elite support. A two-standard deviation increase in age also increases the likelihood of mentioning all three factors. Individuals with economic ties to export-oriented sectors follow elites on alliance maintenance, but pay more attention to partner and alliance attributes in alliance formation.

[2]Two respondents in the formation experiment explicitly called themselves isolationists.



Figure 5: Unconditional AMCE estimates for alliance formation choices and ratings.

4 Ratings Results

In the two experiments, I ask respondents to answer yes or no on alliance formation or maintenance and provide a numeric rating of the alliance. Ratings range from zero to 100, where 0 is a poor alliance and 100 is a great alliance. This section of the appendix compares the choice and rating results. To do this, Figure 5 and Figure 6 plot the unconditional AMCE estimates for the rating and choice measures in both experiments.

Regardless of the outcome measure, I make similar inferences about treatment effects in the two conjoint experiments. Democracy and elite cues are the dominant influences on support for



Figure 6: Unconditional AMCE estimates for alliance maintenance choices and ratings.

new and existing alliances. Inferences about more marginal factors are also similar, with some exceptions.

There are minor differences between the choice and ratings results. In the alliance formation experiment, past support in war from a prospective ally has a much stronger effect on ratings. For alliance maintenance, there is a substantial difference in ratings between alliances with an annual cost of $15 billion, relative to $10 billion. The ratings results also show more evidence of a small positive impact for defense cooperation and recent military cooperation.

Although the choice outcome connects to important policy issues, the rating measure has a more intuitive interpretation. On a scale from zero to 100, most factors have null or small effects.

Only partisan elite cues and consolidated alliance democracy increase alliance ratings by more than three points.

As with the choice measure, partisanship and foreign policy dispositions create substantial differences in alliance ratings. Figure 7 and Figure 8 plot the marginal means of individual alliance ratings across partisanship and foreign policy dispositions. The patterns in these figures are similar to the manuscript results.

While foreign policy dispositions clearly impact alliance ratings, there are also partisan differences that match those in the manuscript. Hawkish and dovish Republicans have the lowest alliance ratings. Hawkish and isolationist Democrats express high ratings of alliances in general. Last, hawkish Republicans and internationalist Democrats are most responsive to elite cues.



Figure 7: Marginal means of ratings for hypothetical new alliances across party identification and foreign policy dispositions. For each group, the estimates mark the marginal mean of support for alliance participation under different alliance treatments. Components marked with abbreviated labels to make the plot more legible. Independents omitted.



Figure 8: Marginal means of ratings for hypothetical existing alliances across party identification and foreign policy dispositions. For each group, the estimates mark the marginal mean of support for alliance participation under different alliance treatments. Components marked with abbreviated labels to make the plot more legible. Independents omitted.

5 Distribution of Foreign Policy Dispositions

In this section, I summarize the number of respondents in each group of partisanship and foreign policy dispositions. Table 1 summarizes these values for the alliance maintenance experiment. Table 2 contains the same information for the alliance formation experiment.

Disposition	Number of Respondents
Republican-Dove-International	69
Independent-Dove-International	82
Democrat-Dove-International	240
Republican-Hawk-International	236
Independent-Hawk-International	71
Democrat-Hawk-International	242
Republican-Dove-Isolation	53
Independent-Dove-Isolation	46
Democrat-Dove-Isolation	134
Republican-Hawk-Isolation	180
Independent-Hawk-Isolation	34
Democrat-Hawk-Isolation	194

Table 1: Number of respondents in each group of partisanship and foreign policy disposition for the alliance maintenance experiment.

The distribution of foreign policy dispositions by partisan affiliation is similar across the two experiments. Most Republicans are hawkish, with a slight preponderance of militant internationalists. Democrats have an internationalist bent and are more equally split between hawks and doves. The few independents lean towards internationalism, but have a more even distribution of foreign policy dispositions.

This categorical breakdown uses numeric questions on militant assertiveness and isolationism to divide respondents. Figure 9 summarizes the full distribution of these variables by party. For the categorical measures, isolationists scored a 4 or 5 on that scale, while hawks had a militant assertiveness score of three or greater. In both experiments and parties, isolationism is concentrated at moderate values of militant assertiveness just above the midpoint of that scale, so many hawks have isolationist tendencies as well.



Figure 9: Bar chart of militant assertiveness and isolationism by partisan affiliation. Colors within each bar divide respondents at each level of militant assertiveness by isolationism. The vertical line marks the cut point for the categorical distinction between hawks and doves at the midpoint of the militant assertiveness scale.

Disposition	Number of Respondents
Republican-Dove-International	81
Independent-Dove-International	65
Democrat-Dove-International	232
Republican-Hawk-International	268
Independent-Hawk-International	76
Democrat-Hawk-International	223
Republican-Dove-Isolation	47
Independent-Dove-Isolation	43
Democrat-Dove-Isolation	120
Republican-Hawk-Isolation	190
Independent-Hawk-Isolation	48
Democrat-Hawk-Isolation	213

Table 2: Number of respondents in each group of partisanship and foreign policy disposition for the alliance formation experiment.

6 Frequency of Conjoint Treatments

Figure 10 shows that the conjoint attributes appeared at similar rates in both experiments.



Figure 10: Frequency of each conjoint experiment attribute in the alliance formation and maintenance conjoint experiments. Colors mark the attribute, while the y-axis values specify each level.

References

Braumoeller, Bear F, Giampiero Marra, Rosalba Radice and Aisha E Bradshaw. 2018. "Flexible causal inference for political science." *Political Analysis* 26(1):54–71.

Gelman, Andrew. 2008. "Scaling regression inputs by dividing by two standard deviations." *Statistics in medicine* 27(15):2865–2873.