

= Z @-@ 4 Plan =

The Z @-@ 4 Plan was a proposed basis for negotiations to end the Croatian War of Independence with a political settlement . It was drafted by Peter W. Galbraith , Leonid Kerestedjants and Geert @-@ Hinrich Ahrens on behalf of a mini @-@ Contact Group comprising United Nations envoys and diplomats from the United States , Russia and the European Union . The co @-@ chairs of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia , David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg , were closely involved in the political process surrounding the plan . The document was prepared in the final months of 1994 and early 1995 before being presented to Croatian President Franjo Tu?man and the leaders of the Republic of Serbian Krajina ( RSK ) on 30 January 1995 . Although Tu?man was displeased with the proposal , the RSK authorities ? influenced by Serbian President Slobodan Milo?evi? ? refused to receive the document , let alone discuss it . Milo?evi? was concerned that the plan might be used to force the settlement of a crisis in Serbia 's Kosovo province .

Three more attempts to revive the plan were made after Operation Flash in early May , when Croatia captured a portion of western Slavonia previously controlled by the RSK . The first initiative , begun later that month , failed because the RSK demanded that the Croatian forces pull back from western Slavonia ( which Croatia declined to do ) . The second attempt failed simply because neither party wanted to negotiate . The final round of negotiations where the Z @-@ 4 Plan was proposed by international diplomats occurred in early August , when a major Croatian attack against the RSK seemed imminent . Despite last @-@ ditch efforts by Galbraith to persuade Milo?evi? and the RSK leadership to accept the plan , disagreement among the RSK leaders allowed Croatia to claim that the RSK had no intention of negotiating . The Croatian delegation , which had little interest in the negotiations and wanted to lay the diplomatic groundwork for the imminent military operation , presented its own demands to the RSK ( which were also rejected ) . On 4 August Croatia launched Operation Storm , defeated the RSK and effectively ended the political process which led to the creation of the Z @-@ 4 Plan .

Elements of the plan made their way into two proposals on resolving the Kosovo crisis : in 1999 ( during the Kosovo War ) and in 2005 as a part of the Kosovo status process . Neither was accepted by the parties to that conflict .

= = Background = =

In August 1990 an insurgency known as the Log Revolution took place in Croatia , centred on the predominantly Serb @-@ populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around the city of Knin , parts of the Lika , Kordun , and Banovina regions , and settlements in eastern Croatia with significant Serb populations . These areas were subsequently named the Republic of Serbian Krajina ( RSK ) and , after the RSK declared its intention to unite with Serbia , the Government of Croatia declared the RSK a breakaway state . By March 1991 the conflict escalated , resulting in the Croatian War of Independence . In June 1991 , Croatia declared its independence as Yugoslavia disintegrated . A three @-@ month moratorium on Croatia and the RSK 's declarations followed , after which their decisions were implemented on 8 October .

Since the Yugoslav People 's Army ( JNA ) increasingly supported the RSK and the Croatian Police were unable to cope with the situation , the Croatian National Guard ( ZNG ) was formed in May 1991 . The ZNG was renamed the Croatian Army ( HV ) in November . The establishment of the Croatian military was hampered by a September UN arms embargo . The final months of 1991 saw JNA advances and the fiercest fighting of the war , culminating in the Siege of Dubrovnik and the Battle of Vukovar . In November a ceasefire was negotiated pending a political settlement ( which became known as the Vance plan ) , and it was implemented in early January 1992 . The ceasefire collapsed in January 1993 when the HV launched Operation Maslenica , and small @-@ scale clashes continued for more than a year . On 16 March 1994 , Russian envoy Vitaly Churkin brokered negotiations between Croatia and the RSK which produced a new ceasefire on 30 March . Further negotiations produced agreements on reopening a section of the Zagreb ? Belgrade motorway ( crossing the RSK @-@ held part of western Slavonia , the Adria oil pipeline and several

water @-@ supply lines ) by the end of 1994 .

= = Development = =

= = = Creation = = =

The Z @-@ 4 Plan was drafted by United States ambassador to Croatia Peter W. Galbraith , Russian ambassador to Croatia Leonid Kerestedjants and German diplomat Geert @-@ Hinrich Ahrens , representing the European Union ( EU ) in a " mini @-@ Contact Group " . The Z in the plan 's name stood for Zagreb ( Croatia 's capital ) , and 4 represented the involvement of the United States , Russia , the EU and the UN . The plan was the product of a process begun on 23 March 1994 , with Galbraith considering himself its principal author . It was a well @-@ developed legal document intended as the basis for negotiations and , according to Ahrens , designed to commit Croatia to an internationally agreed settlement and prevent it from turning to a military resolution of the war ( while being generous to the Croatian Serbs ) . According to Ahrens , the plan was actually too generous to the Serbs ; in essence , it created the legal foundation for a permanent Serb state in Croatia .

The heart of the plan was the Constitutional Agreement on Krajina ( Part One ) . Part One defined Krajina as an autonomous region of Croatia , with borders based on the results of the 1991 Croatian census ( which identified eleven municipalities with an absolute Serb majority ) . Those areas would enjoy a high level of autonomy , with most authority transferred from the central government in Zagreb to Krajina . The region would have its own president , cabinet , legislation , courts , police force , emblem , flag and currency , and the right to levy taxes and make international agreements . Part One also provided for demilitarising the autonomous area . Part Two of the plan , the Agreements Concerning Slavonia , Southern Baranja , Western Sirmium and Other Areas , related to areas where the Croatian Serbs did not form the majority in 1991 ( including eastern and western Slavonia ) and contained transitional provisions . Part Three of the plan spelled out safeguards on human rights , fundamental freedoms , prosecution of war crimes , a human @-@ rights court with international judges , and provisions allowing dual Croatian and Yugoslav citizenship for Croatian Serbs . The plan envisaged that western Slavonia would be the first to be restored to Croatian control , followed by eastern Slavonia ( where a transitional UN administration would be set up before the handover ) .

= = = Proposed changes = = =

The first draft of the Z @-@ 4 Plan was prepared in September 1994 , and further developed and amended on several occasions during the following four months . Over this period , International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia ( ICFY ) co @-@ chairs David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg requested amendments to the plan and opposed its presentation to Croatian or RSK authorities . The first set of changes requested was to include a provision that Croatia cede territory around the city of ?upanja ( on the north bank of the Sava River ) to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , allowing better communication between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb territory around Banja Luka . The request , submitted on 8 September , was turned down by the plan authors . That day , Owen requested that the plan allow Krajina to form a confederation with either Serbia or FR Yugoslavia . Owen and Stoltenberg sought to create a network of confederations between the former Yugoslav republics , but the authors of the Z @-@ 4 Plan deemed that impossible . German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel , on behalf of the German EU presidency , cautioned Owen that Krajina Serbs formed only 5 percent of Croatia 's population and a confederation between Kosovo and Albania would be more natural . On 6 October Russia declared its opposition to the confederation , but Owen regained the country 's support for the idea four days later ( shortly before it was abandoned ) .

The third group of requested amendments pertained to eastern Slavonia . Owen and Stoltenberg

requested its status to be left unresolved , instead of gradually reverting to Croatian control over a five @-@ year period and applying the postwar ethnic composition of the area as a formula for the ethnic mix of the local police and establishing a joint Croatian @-@ Yugoslav company to extract crude oil in ?eletovci . The proposal was turned down , but it led to local autonomy for Serb villages in the area and reduced the transitional period to two years . The fourth group of proposed amendments , tabled by Owen , included a proposal for continued Serb armed presence in Krajina and additional authority for Krajina concerning mineral resources and international treaties . After the proposals , the text of the plan became the subject of lengthy discussions between the contact group countries , the EU and the ICFY co @-@ chairs . The co @-@ chairs began drafting their version of the plan ; Stoltenberg stalled the plan through Norwegian diplomat ( and ICFY ambassador ) Kai Eide , creating a conflict between Eide and Galbraith .

= = = First news of the plan = = =

On 1 October , Galbraith informed Croatian President Franjo Tu?man of the plan without providing any details . Similarly , Ahrens and Eide informed RSK president Milan Marti? . Although early Z @-@ 4 Plan negotiations were planned without actually disclosing the plan to Croatia and the RSK , elements of the plan were leaked to Belgrade and Zagreb newspapers in mid @-@ October . According to Florence Hartmann , in October representatives of Tu?man and those of Serbian president Slobodan Milo?evi? met in Graz , Austria to discuss the proposed reintegration of the RSK into Croatia and their opposition to the Z @-@ 4 Plan . Tu?man disliked the plan because it envisaged a Serb state in Croatia , while Milo?evi? saw it as a dangerous precedent that could be applied to majority non @-@ Serb or ethnically @-@ mixed regions of rump Yugoslavia , such as Kosovo , Vojvodina and the Sand?ak .

Galbraith , Eide and Kerestedjants agreed to deliver the plan to Croatia and the RSK on 21 October , opposed by Owen and Stoltenberg . Owen also asked Vitaly Churkin to instruct his envoy to oppose the delivery . As instructed by Moscow , Kerestedjants pulled out of the move and Galbraith accused Owen of sabotaging the Z @-@ 4 Plan .

= = = Final version = = =

The 53 @-@ page final version of the Z @-@ 4 Plan was prepared on 18 January 1995 . Entitled " Draft Agreement on the Krajina , Slavonia , Southern Baranja and Western Sirmium " , it consisted of three documents and two provisional maps . The maps were considered provisional because of concerns that the inclusion of Benkovac in Krajina would be contested by Croatia ; a portion of the municipality had been predominantly inhabited by Croats , and it was on the Adriatic coast . Another territorial issue was the municipality of Slunj ; it was not included in Krajina , and the omission effectively cut Krajina in two . A possible solution to the problem was to split the municipality in two and award the areas east of Slunj to Krajina . In anticipation of this , planning began for a road bypassing Slunj . Despite the unresolved issues , delivery of the plan to Croatia and the RSK was scheduled for January . On 12 January , shortly before the plan 's final version was drafted , Tu?man announced in a letter to the UN that Croatia would not grant an extension of the UN peacekeeping mandate beyond 31 March and United Nations Protection Force ( UNPROFOR ) troops deployed to the RSK would have to leave .

= = Presentation = =

On 30 January the Z @-@ 4 Plan was presented to Tu?man by the French ambassador to Croatia , accompanied by Galbraith , Kerestedjants , Ahrens and Italian ambassador Alfredo Matarotta ( replacing Eide ) . Tu?man did not hide his displeasure with the plan , receiving the draft with the knowledge that Milo?evi? 's opposition to the plan ( because of his concerns for Kosovo ) would not allow it to be implemented . Tu?man accepted the plan ( which Croatia considered unacceptable ) as a base for negotiations with the RSK , hoping that they would dismiss it .

The five diplomats then travelled to Knin to present the Z @-@ 4 Plan to the RSK leadership . There they met with Martić , RSK prime minister Borislav Mikelić and foreign minister Milan Babić . Martić refused to receive the draft before the UN Security Council issued a written statement extending the UNPROFOR mandate to protect the RSK . Kerestedjants and Ahrens suggested that Martić should acknowledge receipt of the plan and then say that the RSK would not negotiate before the UNPROFOR issue was resolved , but he refused . The diplomats then attempted to meet Milošević in Belgrade about the matter , but Milošević refused to see them and the group returned to Zagreb the next day . Ahrens described the events of 30 January as " a fiasco " .

= = = Reactions = = =

Ahrens noted that Croatia and the RSK were satisfied with the outcome . Owen and Stoltenberg expressed their understanding of the RSK 's and Milošević 's rejection of the plan , provoking a sharp reaction from Galbraith . The RSK parliament convened on 8 February with the Z @-@ 4 Plan as the sole item on the agenda . In their speeches there , Martić , Mikelić and Babić described the plan as provocative to the RSK and saw Milošević 's support in refusing the plan as greatly encouraging . A number of other influential Serbian politicians rejected the plan in addition to Milošević , including Borisav Jović ? a close ally of Milošević , who considered the RSK strong enough militarily to resist Croatia ? and Vojislav ?e?elj , who considered the plan totally unacceptable . The opposition politicians in Serbia were split . Zoran ?in?ić said that since the RSK refused the plan Serbia should not accept it either , while Vuk Drašković favoured the plan as an historic opportunity . Drašković 's views ultimately prevailed in the Serbian media , but not before late August . The only official reaction from Croatia was from its chief negotiator , Hrvoje ?arinić . ?arinić said that Croatia endorsed the restoration of Croatian rule , the return of refugees and local self @-@ government for Croatian Serbs , but dismissed plan solutions incompatible with the Constitution of Croatia . In Croatia , the plan and its authors ( especially Galbraith ) were strongly criticised in what Ahrens described as a " vicious campaign " .

= = Attempts of reintroduction = =

= = = May and June 1995 = = =

There were several more attempts to advocate the Z @-@ 4 Plan as the basis of a political settlement of the Croatian War of Independence . After Croatia captured western Slavonia from the RSK in Operation Flash in early May , Owen and Stoltenberg invited Croatian and RSK officials to Geneva in an effort to revive the plan . The initiative was endorsed by the UN Security Council and the G7 , which was preparing its summit in Halifax at the time . The meeting was attended by Owen , Stoltenberg , Galbraith , Kerestedjants , Eide and Ahrens as the international diplomats ; the RSK was represented by Martić , Mikelić and Babić , and the Croatian delegation was led by ?arinić . ?arinić accepted the invitation , claiming that the venue was a Croatian concession because Croatian authorities considered the issue an internal matter which should normally be dealt with in Croatia . On the other hand , the RSK delegation insisted on Croatian withdrawal from the territory captured earlier that month before negotiations could proceed . Since no such withdrawal was requested by the UN Security Council , Croatia rejected the demand and the initiative collapsed .

A second attempt to revive the plan arose from talks between Kinkel and French foreign minister Hervé de Charette on 28 June . They proposed establishing zones of separation to enforce a ceasefire , monitoring the RSK 's external borders , specific guarantees for the safety of Croatian Serbs and implementing confidence @-@ building measures by economic cooperation between Croatia and the RSK . The initiative , however , did not gain ground when the RSK refused to negotiate .

= = = August 1995 = = =

Another effort involving the plan came about after Milošević asked the United States to stop an imminent Croatian attack against the RSK on 30 July . Although in his request he indicated that negotiations should be held based on the Z @-@ 4 Plan , he refused to meet Galbraith ( who wanted Milošević to pressure the RSK into accepting it ) on 2 August . Instead , Galbraith met Babić in Belgrade in an effort to persuade him to accept the plan . He told Babić that the RSK could not expect international sympathy because of its involvement in the Siege of Bihać , and they would have to accept Croatian terms to avoid war . As an alternative , Galbraith advised Babić to accept negotiations based on the Z @-@ 4 Plan . Babić complied , and Stoltenberg invited Croatian and RSK delegations to talks on 3 August . Genthod , near Geneva , was selected as the location to avoid media attention . The RSK delegation was headed by Major General Mile Novaković of the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Croatian delegation was headed by Tušman 's advisor , Ivić Pačalić .

At the meeting the RSK insisted on the withdrawal of the HV from western Slavonia and the gradual implementation of a ceasefire , followed by economic cooperation before a political settlement was discussed . The Croatian delegation did not intend to negotiate , but to prepare diplomatically for a military resolution of the war . Stoltenberg proposed a seven @-@ point compromise , including negotiations based on the Z @-@ 4 Plan , beginning on 10 August . The proposal was initially accepted by Babić , who then expressed reservations about the Z @-@ 4 Plan as a political settlement when he was asked to publicly declare support for the Stoltenberg proposal ( so the Novaković delegation would follow his lead ) . Pačalić then asked Novaković to accept Croatia 's seven demands , including immediate replacement of the RSK with a Croatian civilian government . Novaković refused Pačalić 's proposal , indicating that he accepted the Stoltenberg proposal instead , and Pačalić declared that the RSK had declined a Croatian offer to negotiate . Croatia did not consider Babić powerful enough to secure support for an initiative from Martić , and thus unable to commit the RSK to an agreement . This view was supported by Babić himself , who told Galbraith during their 2 August meeting in Belgrade that Martić would only obey Milošević . On 4 August Croatia launched Operation Storm against the RSK and , according to Galbraith , effectively terminated the Z @-@ 4 Plan and its associated political process .

One final attempt , organised by Babić , was made to revive the Z @-@ 4 Plan on 16 August . This initiative called for negotiating each point of the plan and extending the autonomous areas to eastern Slavonia . However , Ahrens and Stoltenberg considered any talks between Croatia and the exiled , discredited leaders of the RSK impossible . When they consulted Šarinić about the initiative , he dismissed any possibility of negotiation .

= = = September 1995 and beyond = = =

Following Croatian military success against the RSK during Operation Storm in August , and in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Republika Srpska during Operation Mistral 2 in September , US President Bill Clinton announced a new peace initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina . This initiative , which aimed to restore eastern Slavonia to Croatia , was based on Croatian sovereignty and the Z @-@ 4 Plan . Galbraith sought to reconcile the plan with new circumstances in the field ; an example was limited self @-@ government for Croatian Serbs in eastern Slavonian municipalities where they comprised a majority of the 1991 population ; after Croatia objected , the proposal was replaced with provisions from the Constitution of Croatia . By early October the process led to the Erdut Agreement , establishing a framework for restoring eastern Slavonia to Croatian rule . When the agreement was first implemented in 1996 , there were concerns in Croatia that the process might result in " covert " implementation of the Z @-@ 4 Plan in eastern Slavonia and political autonomy for the region .

The Z @-@ 4 Plan was again resurrected in 1999 as a template for the Rambouillet Agreement , a proposed peace treaty negotiated between FR Yugoslavia and ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo . In 2005 , after the Kosovo War , Serbia and Montenegro attempted to resolve the Kosovo status process by tabling a peace plan offering broad autonomy for Kosovo . According to Drašković , then

foreign minister of Serbia and Montenegro , the plan was a " mirror image of the Z @-@ 4 Plan " . That year an " RSK government @-@ in @-@ exile " was set up in Belgrade , demanding the revival of the Z @-@ 4 Plan in Croatia ( a move condemned by Dra?kovi? and Serbian President Boris Tadi? ) . The same idea was put forward in 2010 by a Serb refugee organisation led by Savo ?trbac .