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Research Interests

Primary   Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organisation

Secondary Law and Economics, Information Economics

Education

since 2011 UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, GERMANY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS *PhD Program in Economics, PhD expected: May 2016*

2006-2011 UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG, GERMANY
Diplom (Master equivalent) in Economics, June 2011

2008-2009 UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA, ITALY
Visiting Graduate Student in Economics and Political Science

Research

Working Papers

Managing a Conflict – Alternative Dispute Resolution in Contests (**Job Market Paper**, with Benjamin Balzer)

Persuasion, Pandering, and Sequential Proposal

Work in Progress

Optimal Mediation with Informational Punishment (with Benjamin Balzer)

Discriminating between models of learning - An experimental study with intra-team communication (with Stefan Penczynski)

Academic Employment

since 2014 UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, CHAIR OF PROF. VOLKER NOCKE, PHD
Research Assistant

2007-2010 UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG, CHAIR OF PROF. THOMAS GEHRIG, PHD
Student Research Assistant

Teaching Experience

Spring 2016   Advanced Microeconomics III (Mechanism Design) for PhD students in English (scheduled), Teaching Assistant, University of Mannheim

Spring 2016   Introductory Microeconomics (Mikroökonomik A) in German (scheduled), Teaching Assistant, University of Mannheim

Fall 2012 - 2014	Intermediate Microeconomics (Mikroökonomik B) in German and English, Teaching Assistant, University of Mannheim
Fall 2010	Introductory Microeconomics (Mikroökonomik I) in German, Teaching Assistant, University of Freiburg

Conferences and Workshops

2015	ENTER Jamboree (Mannheim), SFB-TR15 Young Researcher Workshop (Bonn), Econometric Society World Congress (Montrèal), EEA Annual Congress (Mannheim, poster), EARIE Annual Conference (Munich), TSE MaCCI ENTER Workshop on Competition (Toulouse), ENTER Seminar (UCL), SFB-TR15 Young Researcher Workshop (Munich) Econometric Society European Winter Meeting (Milan) [scheduled]
2014	MaCCI Annual Conference (Mannheim), EEA-ESEM Annual Congress (Toulouse), EARIE Annual Conference (Milan), MaCCI IO Day (Mannheim), Brown Bag Seminar (Toulouse School of Economics)
2013	IAREP/SABE Conference (Morrow, GA)

Stipends and Fellowships

2012-2013	Fontana Foundation, Fellowship to finance PhD studies
2011-2012	German Science Foundation (DFG), PhD Scholarship

Administrative Duties

2015	Local Organizer of the ENTER Jamboree in Mannheim
2015	Assistant of the Prorgram Chair of the EEA 2015
2013-2015	Student Representative at the "Erweiterter Abteilungsrat" (Enlarged Department Council) in Mannheim
2013-2015	Student Coordinator of the ENTER Seminar Exchange Program in Mannheim

Competences

Languages: *German (native), English (fluent), Swedish (fluent), Italian (intermediate)*

Software: *Mathematica, Matlab, Stata, Latex, Python*

References

Prof. Volker Nocke
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Prof. Thomas Tröger
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Prof. Martin Peitz
University of Mannheim
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Abstracts

Job Market Paper: **Managing a Conflict – Alternative Dispute Resolution in Contests** *(with Benjamin Balzer)*

We study the optimal design of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms by a third-party mediator. ADR takes place before two litigants face each other in court. Litigation is a legal contest with players who are privately informed about the cost of collecting admissible evidence. Players update their beliefs *after* the mediation process, but *before* they decide on evidence collection. Different to standard mechanism design problems, the belief-system post-ADR is thus important for the outcome of the continuation game: within litigation, choice variables are similar to strategic complements and the evidence supplied is driven by the belief system. There is an incentive for parties to misreport in ADR to profit from this deviation in litigation should ADR fail to resolve the conflict. We show that optimal ADR has to break down on-path in some cases to screen costs of evidence provision. Furthermore, ADR avoids incentives to misreport by inducing post-breakdown beliefs which are independent of type-reports during ADR. To reduce inefficiency vis-à-vis symmetric litigation, optimal ADR induces asymmetric breakdown beliefs even for ex-ante symmetric types to increase the settlement rate compared to symmetric mechanisms. Independent of the set of parameters, ADR achieves settlement for the majority of cases.

Persuasion, Pandering, and Sequential Proposal

I study a model in which an informed sender can propose a project to an uninformed receiver. The receiver can accept or reject the project's implementation. If the receiver rejects, the sender can propose a different project to the receiver, which, in turn, may be accepted or rejected. Overall, only one project can be implemented. Both players share preferences about the features of the project. Across projects, preferences are not aligned. There are two classes of equilibria. There always is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the sender panders towards the receiver-preferred project and the sender-preferred project is only implemented with a probability less than one. If the time horizon is sufficiently long a second type of equilibrium exists in which the sender persuades by waiting. In principle, many waiting equilibria exist. The shortest waiting equilibrium is ex-ante Pareto-dominated by the mixed strategy equilibrium, but a waiting equilibrium with intermediate waiting time is preferred by the receiver to all other equilibria. As an application, I consider a firm that needs clearance of a proposed merger by an anti-trust authority. Merger realizations are private to the firm. Both players prefer higher synergies. The authority prefers high competition, the firm prefers low.