

# JOHANNES SCHNEIDER

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## Research Interests

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Primary    Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organisation

Secondary   Law and Economics, Information Economics

## Education

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since 2011   UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, GERMANY  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS *PhD Program in Economics, PhD expected: May 2016*

2006-2011   UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG, GERMANY  
*Diplom (Master equivalent) in Economics, June 2011*

2008-2009   UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA, ITALY  
*Visiting Graduate Student in Economics and Political Science*

## Research

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### Working Papers

*Managing a Conflict – Alternative Dispute Resolution in Contests* (**Job Market Paper**, with Benjamin Balzer)

*Persuasion, Pandering, and Sequential Proposal*

### Work in Progress

*Optimal Mediation with Informational Punishment* (with Benjamin Balzer)

*Discriminating between models of learning - An experimental study with intra-team communication* (with Stefan Penczynski)

## Academic Employment

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since 2014   UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, CHAIR OF PROF. VOLKER NOCKE, PHD  
*Research Assistant*

2007-2010   UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG, CHAIR OF PROF. THOMAS GEHRIG, PHD  
*Student Research Assistant*

## Teaching Experience

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Spring 2016    Advanced Microeconomics III (Mechanism Design) for PhD students in English, Teaching Assistant, University of Mannheim

Spring 2016    Introductory Microeconomics (Mikroökonomik A) in German, Teaching Assistant, University of Mannheim

- Fall 2012 - 2014 Intermediate Microeconomics (Mikroökonomik B) in German and English, Teaching Assistant, University of Mannheim
- Fall 2010 Introductory Microeconomics (Mikroökonomik I) in German, Teaching Assistant, University of Freiburg

### Research Talks

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- 2016 BI Oslo, University of Oslo, NHH Bergen, CUNEF Madrid, UC Louvain, Carlos III de Madrid, Johnson at Cornell, Western University, University of Miami, UT Sydney, EEA-ESEM (Geneva) [scheduled], Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Palma) [invited session, scheduled], Verein für Sozialpolitik, Jahrestagung (Augsburg) [scheduled]
- 2015 ENTER Jamboree (Mannheim), SFB-TR15 Young Researcher Workshop (Bonn), Econometric Society World Congress (Montréal), EEA Annual Congress (Mannheim, poster), EARIE Annual Conference (Munich), TSE MaCCI ENTER Workshop on Competition (Toulouse), ENTER Seminar (UCL), SFB-TR15 Young Researcher Workshop (Munich), Econometric Society European Winter Meeting (Milan)
- 2014 MaCCI Annual Conference (Mannheim), EEA-ESEM Annual Congress (Toulouse), EARIE Annual Conference (Milan), MaCCI IO Day (Mannheim), Brown Bag Seminar (Toulouse School of Economics)
- 2013 IAREP/SABE Conference (Morrow, GA)

### Stipends and Fellowships

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- 2012-2013 Fontana Foundation, Fellowship to finance PhD studies
- 2011-2012 German Science Foundation (DFG), PhD Scholarship

### Administrative Duties

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- 2015 Local Organizer of the ENTER Jamboree in Mannheim
- 2015 Assistant of the Program Chair of the EEA 2015
- 2013-2015 Student Representative at the "Erweiterter Abteilungsrat" (Enlarged Department Council) in Mannheim
- 2013-2015 Student Coordinator of the ENTER Seminar Exchange Program in Mannheim

### Competences

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Languages: *German (native), English (fluent), Swedish (fluent), Italian (intermediate)*

Software: *Mathematica, Matlab, Stata, Latex, Python*

### References

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Job Market Paper: **Managing a Conflict – Alternative Dispute Resolution in Contests** (*with Benjamin Balzer*)

We study the optimal design of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms by a third-party mediator. ADR takes place before two litigants face each other in court. Litigation is a legal contest with players who are privately informed about the cost of collecting admissible evidence. Players update their beliefs *after* the mediation process, but *before* they decide on evidence collection. Different from standard mechanism design problems, the belief-system post-ADR is important for the outcome of the continuation game: within litigation, choice variables are similar to strategic complements and the evidence supplied is driven by the belief system. There is an incentive for parties to misreport in ADR to profit from this deviation in litigation should ADR fail to resolve the conflict. We show that optimal ADR has to break down on-path in some cases to screen the players with respect to their costs. Furthermore, ADR induces truthful reporting by creating post-breakdown beliefs which are independent of type-reports during ADR. To reduce inefficiency vis-à-vis symmetric litigation, optimal ADR induces asymmetric breakdown beliefs even for ex-ante symmetric types to increase the settlement rate compared to symmetric mechanisms. Independent of the set of parameters, ADR achieves settlement for the majority of cases.

### **Persuasion, Pandering, and Sequential Proposal**

I study a model in which an informed sender can propose a project to an uninformed receiver. The receiver can accept or reject the project's implementation. If the receiver rejects, the sender can propose a different project to the receiver, which, in turn, may be accepted or rejected. Overall, only one project can be implemented. Both players share preferences about the features of the project. Across projects, preferences are not aligned. There are two classes of equilibria. There always is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the sender panders towards the receiver-preferred project and the sender-preferred project is only implemented with a probability less than one. If the time horizon is sufficiently long a second type of equilibrium exists in which the sender persuades by waiting. In principle, many waiting equilibria exist. The shortest waiting equilibrium is ex-ante Pareto-dominated by the mixed strategy equilibrium, but a waiting equilibrium with intermediate waiting time is preferred by the receiver to all other equilibria. As an application, I consider a firm that needs clearance of a proposed merger by an anti-trust authority. Merger realizations are private to the firm. Both players prefer higher synergies. The authority prefers high competition, the firm prefers low.