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Research Interests

Primary Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organisation

Secondary Law and Economics, Information Economics

Education

since 2011 UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, GERMANY
 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
 CENTER FOR DOCTORAL STUDIES IN ECONOMICS
 PhD Program in Economics

2006-2011 UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG, GERMANY
 Diplom (Master equivalent) in Economics

2008-2009 UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA, ITALY
 Visiting Graduate Student in Economics and Political Science

Working Papers

Managing a Conflict – Alternative Dispute Resolution in Contests (**Job Market Paper**, with Benjamin Balzer)

Persuasion, Pandering, and Sequential Proposal

Work in Progress

Optimal Mediation with Informational Punishment (with Benjamin Balzer)

Discriminating between models of learning - An experimental study with intra-team communication (with Stefan Penczynski)

Academic Employment

since 2014 UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM, CHAIR OF PROF. VOLKER NOCKE, PhD
 Research Assistant

2007-2010 UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG, CHAIR OF PROF. THOMAS GEHRIG, PhD
 Student Research Assistant

Teaching Experience

COURSES TAUGHT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM

Teaching Assistant in Intermediate Microeconomics (Mikroökonomik B) in German and English

Teaching Assistant in Introductory Microeconomics (Mikroökonomik A) in German (scheduled)

Teaching Assistant in Advanced Microeconomics III (Mechanism Design) for PhD students in English (scheduled)

COURSES TAUGHT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG

Teaching Assistant in Introductory Microeconomics (Mikroökonomik I) in German

Conferences and Workshops

- 2015 ENTER Jamboree (Mannheim), SFB-TR15 Young Researchers Workshop (Bonn), Econometric Society World Congress (Montréal), EEA Annual Congress (Mannheim, poster), EARIE Annual Conference (Munich), TSE MaCCI ENTER Workshop on Competition (Toulouse), ENTER Seminar (UCL) [scheduled]
- 2014 MaCCI Annual Conference (Mannheim), EEA-ESEM Annual Congress (Toulouse), EARIE Annual Conference (Milan), MaCCI IO Day (Mannheim), Brown Bag Seminar (Toulouse School of Economics)
- 2013 IAREP/SABE Conference (Morrow, GA)

Affiliations

MaCCI Mannheim Center for Competition and Innovation

Stipends and Fellowships

- 2011-2012 German Science Foundation (DFG), PhD Scholarship
- 2012-2013 Fontana Foundation, Fellowship to finance PhD studies

Administrative Duties

- 2015 Local Organizer of the ENTER Jamboree in Mannheim
- 2013-2015 Student Representative at the “erweiterter Abteilungsrat” (enlarged department council) in Mannheim
- 2013-2015 Student Coordinator of the ENTER seminar exchange program in Mannheim

Additional Skills

Languages: *German (native), English (fluent), Swedish (fluent), Italian (Intermediate)*

Software: *Mathematica, Matlab, Stata, Latex, Python*

References

Prof. Volker Nocke <i>University of Mannheim</i> ☎+49 621 181 1834 ✉ nocke@uni-mannheim.de	Prof. Thomas Tröger <i>University of Mannheim</i> ☎+49 621 181 3423 ✉ troeger@uni-mannheim.de	Prof. Martin Peitz <i>University of Mannheim</i> ☎+49 621 181 1835 ✉ martin.peitz@googlemail.com
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Abstracts

Managing a Conflict – Alternative Dispute Resolution in Contests (*with Benjamin Balzer*)

We study optimal alternative dispute resolution (ADR) by a third party mediator between two litigants facing each other in court. Formal litigation is an all-pay contest and serves as the outside option if ADR fails. The mediator's objective is to maximize the number of cases settled before litigation. Litigants are privately informed about their cost of evidence provision during litigation. We use a mechanism design approach with endogenous outside option depending on players' beliefs. Belief systems prove to be an important channel to consider, especially if the outside option is a contest game such as litigation. The challenge for the mediator is to manage the information structure after mediation breakdown. The optimal mechanism always discriminates even between symmetric players. One player is better off after ADR-breakdown, the other is better off after settlement. Moreover, the information released to each player is independent of the reported player type. ADR is effective and leads to settlement in more than 50% of the cases. The mediator solves a two-step problem: (1) The mediator derives the optimal information structure to satisfy incentive compatibility, and (2) scales it to exactly satisfy resource constraint.

Persuasion, Pandering, and Sequential Proposal

In this paper, I look at the features of a model in which an informed sender can propose a project to an uninformed receiver. The receiver can accept or reject the projects implementation. If the receiver rejects, the sender can propose a different project (if available) to the receiver, which, in turn, may be accepted or rejected. Overall, only one project can be implemented. Both players share an interest in the within-project realization. Across projects, preferences are not aligned. For the case of two projects, I show existence of a robust mixed strategy equilibrium. In it, the sender panders to the unconditionally receiver-preferred project. Increasing the number of periods leads to a second class of equilibria. In this class the sender signals through waiting. The shortest "waiting equilibrium" corresponds in many ways to the mixed strategy equilibrium. Discounting and non-availability play an important role in the evaluation of the equilibria. As an application I consider a firm that needs clearance of a proposed merger by an anti-trust authority. Both players prefer higher synergies. Post merger the authority prefers high competition, the firm prefers low. Merger realization are private information of the firm.

Discriminating between models of learning - An experimental study with intra-team communication (*with Stefan Penczynski*)

In this study, we investigate the learning behavior in strategic games and report results from an experiment that uses incentivized intra-team communication as in Burchardi and Penczynski (2011) to gather additional information about how players learn to play a strategic game. In particular, teams of 2 players are playing as one entity. Each team member can initially send a 'suggested decision' and a justifying 'message' to her team partner in order to explain her arguments. She has an incentive to do so because both players give – again individually – a 'final decision' after the *simultaneous* exchange of their messages. One of those is chosen randomly by the computer to be the 'team's action.' We use repeated Four Card Barry games with a fixed team matching to investigate how people learn in a zero-sum game with a unique, non-uniform mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition to the action data, we search the communicated messages for characteristic arguments of the three main learning models and categorize

them accordingly into reinforcement learning, fictitious play and rule learning. We obtain a rich insight into the development of subjects' reasoning. We can identify the predominant mode of learning and are able to refine these models thanks to the high temporal and individual resolution of the data. We gain insights into the roles various ways of learning play over the course of the repeated games. Furthermore, we can detect a heterogeneity among subjects that is reminiscent of the heterogeneity observed in the level- k literature. In conclusion, we believe that the additional information is indeed able to shed new light on this important topic.