

# Performance paradox in stochastic dynamic matching models

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joint work with J.M. Fourneau (U. Versailles), A. Busic and A. Cadas (Inria Paris)

Universidad del Pais Vasco / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

December 19, 2023

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Dynamic Matching Models
- 3 Performance Paradox
  - Main Results for FCFM
  - Extensions
- 4 Other Matching Models
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# Static Matching Models

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Given a set of people with different likings, how to create couples so that the number of uncoupled people is minimized?

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- Initial population


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
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
Known as the marriage problem (or assignment problem or the dancing problem...)

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
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
Existence of the perfect matching? How to achieve it?



# Example with 4 nodes




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How to achieve the perfect matching?

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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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# Matching Models



Applications: Not only to marry people


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
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
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
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**DYNAMIC**

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Items arrive according to a random process

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
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
Introduced in Mairesse et al 2016

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
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
With probability  $\alpha_3$

Compatibles  $\Rightarrow$  Match and leave






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
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# Dynamic Matching Model

With probability  $\alpha_1$


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# Dynamic Matching Model

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# Dynamic Matching Model vs Queueing Models

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**QUEUEING THEORY CANNOT BE APPLIED DIRECTLY!**

**New research challenges!**

## Matching Policy

When an incoming item is compatible with more than one item, the matching policy determines with which is it matched (and both leave the system)


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
### Examples:

- First-Come-First-Matched (FCFM)
- Match the Longest (ML)


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
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
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
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When an item of type 4 arrives, it is matched with an item of type 2 (the oldest item)



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
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
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
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

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**Example:**  $w = (2, 1, 1)$



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## Definition: Independent set

The nodes that are not connected

$\mathcal{I}$ : the set of all independent sets

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
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
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$$\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 < \alpha_3 + \alpha_4$$


$$\alpha_3 < \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha_4$$

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**Theorem (Mairesse et al, 2016)**


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**Proof:**  $\Gamma(V1) = V2$  and  $\Gamma(V2) = V1$



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$\Rightarrow \alpha_{\Gamma(V1)} = \alpha_{V2} > \alpha_{V1}$  and  $\alpha_{\Gamma(V2)} = \alpha_{V1} > \alpha_{V2}$  cannot be satisfied together!



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

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

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


## Intuitive Idea

The expected number of unmatched items cannot increase when we add an edge in the compatibility graph (more matchings can be done)


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## FCFM policy




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## FCFM policy



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
## Definition: Performance Paradox

The performance paradox exists in dynamic matching model if, when we add an edge to the compatibility graph, then the expected number of unmatched items increases.

Analogous phenomenon to the Braess paradox


# Our Results

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with  $\delta \in (0, 0.1)$

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## Theorem

For the above compatibility graph and FCFM, the performance paradox exists if and only if  $\delta < 0.0818$ .

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The Markov chains of

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## Intuitive idea

When  $\delta \rightarrow 0$ , the stability condition in node 3 is nearly satisfied



# Our Results: Arbitrary compatibility graph and FCFM

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When the node in saturation is connected to the nodes where the edge is added, there exists a performance paradox for  $\delta$  small enough

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- We compute the expected number of unmatched items (Comte 2021)
- We study the obtained expressions when  $\delta \rightarrow 0$  and check that the condition for the performance paradox is satisfied.

- 1 Introduction
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

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

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The Markov chains of the below models coincide for any greedy policy (same transitions and states).





# (Truncated) Markov chain of the Complete graph



# From FCFM to other matching policies

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

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The performance paradox for the above graph exists for any greedy policy (because it exists for FCFM).

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



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
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


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Assuming that  $\alpha_x = \alpha_n + \alpha_{n-1}$ , the mean number of unmatched items in both models for any greedy policy is the same.



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
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## Sketch of the proof

The Markov chain of the left is lumpable in a way that all the items of  $n$  and  $n - 1$  are aggregated

The lumped Markov chain corresponds to that of the right model.

# Large Networks using Aggregation




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


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- The proof is valid if we replace  $K_{n-2}$  by any other compatibility graph
- The proof is valid if in the left model there are more than one nodes:  $n, n-1, n-2, \dots$

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
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
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If the model to the right has a performance paradox, so does the model of the left (with previous generalizations)

⇒ Graphs with performance paradox can be as large as we want!

# On the Assumption about the Unique Saturated Node


# On the Assumption about the Unique Saturated Node



We assume there exists a unique node in saturation

Example: Node 3


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The independent sets  $\{1, 2\}$  and  $\{3\}$  are in saturation




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
There exists a performance paradox if and only if  $\delta < 0.0563$ .

The uniqueness of the saturated node is a technical assumption for our main result about general graphs

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
# Dynamic Matching Model with Loops

We allow self-matchings in the compatibility graph



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## Our Result (Busic et al 2022)

For FCFM, the steady-state distribution of unmatched items has a product form expression

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## Observation

In a matching model with loops, we have a finite-state Markov chain for any greedy policy and an arbitrary graph

⇒ Stability is not an issue!

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
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
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




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Does it exhibit the performance paradox in bipartite matching models?  
For FCFM? For a given network topology?

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Dynamic matching models and the properties of the derived Markov chains

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Abandonments in dynamic matching models

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# References about the work of this presentation

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# Muchas gracias

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