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Political Geography, Church Attendance, and Mass Preferences Regarding Democratic Representation

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ABSTRACT *The extent to which elected officials are chosen to either lead their constituents, on the one hand, or follow their wishes, on the other, is one of the foundational questions that republican forms of government must consider. Contemporary research, however, has thus far offered little analysis of the manner and extent to which mass public preferences vary on this dimension. In this article, we present an analysis that clusters respondents to a large N survey according to the dominant political subculture in which they reside. Our analysis finds that individuals residing in "moralistic" states who are heavily immersed in community churches tend to hold "trustee" oriented representational preferences, while people in individualistic states tend toward a preference for "delegates".*

The manner in which political representation "works" is one of the most compelling theoretical and empirical puzzles in political science. The extent to which elected officials are chosen to either lead their constituents, on the one hand, or follow their wishes, on the other, is one of the foundational questions that republican forms of government must consider. Contemporary research, however, has thus far offered little analysis of the manner and extent to which mass public preferences vary on this dimension. While a burgeoning research enterprise has begun to use the implements available to modern social scientists to develop a deeper and broader understanding of public attitudes toward political representation, these efforts, at this stage, remain relatively limited.[1]

In this article we examine the variation in the way citizens expect to be represented, according to the geography of political culture in the US. While previous research (Carman, 2007) has examined individual-level variation in representational preferences by party affiliation and race, there is no existing work that examines empirically the extent to which people identified as sharing a common political culture also share fundamental perspectives on the nature of the relationship between elected officials and the publics who elect them.

Without a doubt, the concept of political culture – *the widely shared beliefs, norms and assumptions of a community as they pertain to the relationship between*

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citizens and government – has captured the interest of political thinkers since antiquity (Almond & Verba, 1980). As applied to US politics, many scholars have recognized that differences in political culture *within* the United States, in terms of geographically-based *subcultures*, may have profound influence over state politics, policymaking, and actual representation (e.g. Key, 1949; Patterson, 1971; Elazar, 1966; Thompson, et al., 1990; Erikson, et al., 1993). However, there have been surprisingly few attempts to identify *individual-level* attitudinal and preference commonalities within US political subcultures. Perhaps accordingly, development and testing of such theories has nearly ground to a halt in recent years, with many scholars now considering such theories anachronistic. An ancillary goal of this article, therefore, is to test the most copious model of US political subcultures – that of Daniel Elazar (e.g. 1966, 1972, 1994) – at the micro-level.[2]

In the following sections, we first elaborate upon the theoretical importance of understanding mass expectations regarding political representation and review the extant literature on the subject. We then offer a basic review of Elazar's theory, emphasizing how political culture may be transmitted through churches. We follow that with an explicit discussion of how Elazar's cultural identifiers might influence individual attitudes toward political representation. From there, we describe the data, research design, and methodology used to test these hypotheses, before finally reporting our findings and assessing their theoretical significance.

Understanding the "Demand Side" of Political Representation

Understanding citizen preferences regarding representational style is important in its own right. Indeed, the debate over the proper representational roles of US legislators is older than the republic itself. During the founding period, Federalists generally advocated what Anthony King has called the "division of labor" model of representation, wherein the public's influence over public policy begins and ends with the choice of *who* will make decisions for the country; governors are left to make decisions in *the best interest* of the state. By contrast, Anti-Federalists tended to voice an "agency" model – in which governors serve as agents of the governed and are bound (ethically, and perhaps legally) to follow the will of the governed (King, 1997; also see Rosenthal, 1998).

Similarly, in her well-known book *The Concept of Representation*, Hanna Pitkin (1967) demonstrated that representation may mean "acting for", or it may mean the more passive, symbolic or descriptive "standing for". These examples, while using different terminology, share a focus on the distinction between elected representatives as "delegates" or "trustees." Moreover, while both normative and empirical scholarship has identified several other ways in which to conceptualize representation (e.g. Eulau & Karps, 1977; Mansbridge, 2003), the delegate/trustee framework has guided (at least implicitly) a large body of normative and empirical work – especially that examining the correspondence between constituent opinion and legislative activity (for an overview, see Kuklinski & Segura, 1995; Mansbridge, 2003; Webels, 2007). Mansbridge (2003: 516) states, "Although promissory representation [trustee/

mandate conceptions] has never described actual representation fully, it has been and remains today one of the most important ways in which citizens influence political outcomes through their representatives".

It is surprising, then, that more scholarly effort has not been devoted to understanding how the mass public thinks about styles of representation. Malcolm Jewell (1985: 111) noted this point in 1985: "What roles do constituents expect their legislators to perform? Do they have clearly defined expectations? Relatively few efforts have been made to answer these questions, presumably because of the cost and difficulty of obtaining the necessary survey data".

In addition to a lack of useful data, perhaps another reason for the relative lack of intellectual attention to this question stems from the widespread assumption that citizens prefer delegate-style representation. As Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999: 30) state, "The mandate (delegate) conception of representation is widespread: scholars, journalists and ordinary citizens rely on it as if it were axiomatic". Anecdotally, this presumption does not seem to be necessarily true; we can all think of several examples of politicians who are criticized by the public as rudderless for shifting their positions in response to poll results.

Even if the scholarly assumptions and anecdotal evidence were in agreement with regard to mean preferences for delegates vs. trustees, the (dated) literature on the subject does little to extend our understanding of how representational attitudes vary across the country and its political subcultures. While studies provide evidence that individual representation preferences do carry a systematic component, varying across class, education and race based cleavages (Carman, 2007; Davidson, 1970; McMuray & Parsons, 1965), their findings lack consistency and suffer, at any rate, from the reliance on woefully outdated data. These shortcomings demand scholarly attention, because understanding mass preferences regarding representation is crucial, we contend, to evaluating democratic performance and accountability. By what means can the mass public hold its elected representatives accountable if that public does not even expect – or differentially expects – its representatives to follow the general will? It is certainly possible that those who envision representatives as trustees, rather than delegates, less frequently voice their opinions to those representatives. Given the well-known correspondence between public opinion and policy outputs (e.g. Page & Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, et al., 1995; Wlezien, 1995), systematic differences in such public expressions likely engender inequalities in the attention given to issues pertaining to different segments of society, not to mention direction of policy itself. Therefore, if these things vary systematically according to geographical subcultures, it would help explain why the kind of democracy Pennsylvanians get may be very different than the one Minnesotans get, and so on.

Political Subcultures in the United States

Unquestionably, the most notable contribution to understanding American geographical subcultures and their political consequences has been offered by Daniel J. Elazar (1966, 1972, 1994). Relying upon historical records of immigration/

migration patterns of religious and ethnic groups in the settlement of the American colonies, Elazar theorized that three distinct political subcultures are visible in the United States – *individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic*. Elazar argued that the states originally colonized by the Puritans and their descendants developed a *moralistic* political culture reflecting a *commonwealth*, where politics is value-based. By contrast, the states originally colonized by immigrants seeking economic opportunity or their progeny developed an *individualistic* political culture, reflecting a *market*, where legislation follows the demands of the self-interested voting public – even if the entire public is not expected to participate. Finally, the unique history of the south led those states to embrace a *traditionalistic* political culture, where legislation only gets passed in order to protect existing power structures, and politics in general is very elite-driven.

The distinction between politics as a marketplace (government supplies goods according to public demand) and politics as a commonwealth (government acts in its estimation of the common good, irrespective of public demand) has clear implications regarding the nature of political representation, and what citizens expect regarding the same. As Elazar depicts it, the individualistic culture clearly envisions political representation from the principal–agent perspective (see Mansbridge's discussion of "promissory representation", 2003: 516), where representatives act as instructed delegates – following what their constituents tell them, regardless of their own estimation of the utility of such public demands. For example, Elazar asserts that in the individualistic culture government officials "will initiate [new programs] only if demanded by public opinion" (1972: 120).

By contrast, the moralistic culture comports well with a vision of representation where representatives act as trustees of the public good. This culture expects elected representatives to take action on behalf of the commonwealth, based on a thoroughgoing consideration and deliberation of the issues, regardless of the particular demands of individuals or groups, and whether the majority in that commonwealth recognizes government actions as in their best overall interest or not. In this culture the emphasis, again, is on the good of the commonwealth and thus elected officials should act in the general interest, irrespective of the whims of public opinion (see Elazar, 1972: 120).[3]

The traditionalistic culture, which sees government as an agent designed to protect entrenched power hierarchies, disvalues citizen participation. Accordingly, public officials are not envisioned as representatives in either the "mandate" or the "trustee" sense and thus it should reveal the weakest correspondence (and the most variance) between public opinion and policy outcomes.[4]

In light of this, we simply suggest that by analyzing micro-level expectations of how representation ought to occur in democratic society (delegate vs. trustee), and comparing those evaluations made by citizens living in states representing the three Elazarian subcultures, we can gain purchase over whether we should expect individuals in different regions of the country to hold significantly different expectations regarding the relationship that is shared between the elected and electorate. There is precedent in the literature for this approach. Nardulli (1990) took the same tack in

his study of Illinois residents, finding that citizens residing in the parts of the state that could be classified as moralistic were more likely to agree with statements expressing belief that representatives should act for the common good, regardless of whether citizens demand such action.

The Central Role of Religiosity

According to Elazar, one of the primary means of transmitting cultural norms from one generation to another is through the church. To be sure, the notion of citizens picking up cultural assumptions and expectations about the proper character of community while sitting in pews and sharing pot luck dinners is not at all surprising. After all, the nature of people's responsibility to one another is the very business of church, and churches are those institutions specifically designated by societies to preserve – and spread – a community's beliefs, values and traditions (i.e. culture).

Even if churches could not be defined as institutions designated for the preservation of culture, there are still reasons to expect that they would serve that function. Political culture is preserved through social capital, social networks and general perceptions of the social/political context (e.g. Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1993; Burbank, 1997; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000). Thus, in much the same way that community norms can be cultivated in bowling leagues and block parties, churches facilitate common values and political orientations by virtue of the simple fact that they provide a forum for social interaction – a forum, we might add, where consensual patterns of belief and attitudes are often strongly encouraged (Mutz, 2006). Without a doubt, churches have been shown again and again to be vessels for the fostering of civic skills (Huckfeldt, et al., 1993; Verba, et al., 1995; Djupe & Gilbert, 2006) and political community development (Wald, et al., 1988), where "belonging" nurtures the sharing of particular political and social values (e.g. Layman, 2001; Leege & Kellstedt, 1993; Green, 2007).

Weaknesses of the Elazar Thesis

In spite of the large body of research showing that local governments in moralistic states are far more likely to behave in ways that reflect communitarian principles than do the governments of individualistic or traditionalistic states (see Erikson, et al., 1993, for an overview), many questions remain regarding Elazar's thesis. It is certainly possible that the well-documented decline of the traditional manifestations of social capital in the United States (as in many other countries) may have destroyed whatever cultures evolved from the settlement patterns of the European immigrants to North America. The growth in the urban populations combined with the high levels of transience within the American population may further serve to blur any cultural distinctions that may have once existed. Further still, with increased access to an ever-growing number of national media sources (and the general trend toward the nationalization of media), more Americans may be adopting the tastes and norms popularized in urban centers. That is, as the American

popular culture becomes homogenized, so too may American political culture, severely limiting the specific utility of Elazar's formulation and theories of political subcultures more generally.

Another possibility is that while the concept of subcultures may still carry some degree of utility, the redefining of "communities" in the United States from specific, geographically defined areas to broader, non-geographically based groupings may cause a shift in political cultural types (see Leege, et al. 2002). Relatedly, the overlay of the "culture war" (e.g. Hunter, 1991), which is marked by (1) a cleavage between urban (i.e. "blue") and rural (i.e. "red") communities, (2) increased ideological constraint and partisan intensity (e.g. Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998; but see Fiorina, et al., 2005), (3) mobilization of the Christian Right, and (4) the emergence of new, "easy" issues on the political agenda (e.g. Carmines & Stimson, 1980), may have come to overwhelm older, state-level differences in political culture.

To briefly recapitulate our argument to this point: first, citizens residing in moralistic states should be more likely to prefer trustee-style representation than those in individualistic states, who should disproportionately prefer delegate-style representation. Second, that relationship should be mitigated by factors that either diminish immersion in one's own geographical culture, or heighten exposure to other cultures. These factors may include youth, metropolitanism, education, media consumption, and – especially – religiosity. Third, citizens residing in traditionalistic states should display more variance in their representational preferences than those living in moralistic or individualistic states, because Elazar's theory does not contain a clear prediction for traditionalistic states regarding representational preference. Finally, while there is nothing in Elazar's theory to indicate that it should be limited to issue contexts salient at the time of Elazar's writing, and so we do not hypothesize that there should be a difference in the capacity of Elazar's typology to predict representational preferences according to such issue contexts, we test whether the newer issues associated with the "culture war" could prime different sets of concerns, thus overriding the influence of Elazarian culture.

Data and Methods

In October, 2004, we collected and analyzed responses to a Computer-Assisted Internet Interviewing (CAII) survey, administered by the University Center for Social and Urban Research at the University of Pittsburgh.[5] We purchased the sample (n = 3,742) from Survey Sampling International (SSI), whose Survey Spot Panel is generated to maximize response rate and generalizability,[6] and is updated frequently in order to minimize testing effects associated with repeated survey respondency.[7]

The sample was stratified by 11geographic areas; roughly equal-sized samples were drawn from each of the following states: Washington, California, Texas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. We chose these particular survey locales in order to allow for data collection across the three Elazarian cultures, but also to provide regional

variance within each of those cultures.[8] These locales represent nine distinct regions, often thought to have distinctive features: the Pacific Northwest, the Pacific Southwest, the Southwest, the Mountain West, the central North, the Midwest, the Mid-Atlantic, New England, and the Traditional South. More specifically, although Washington, Colorado and Minnesota are geographically quite distant, they (and their surrounding areas) each represent Elazar's proposed *moralistic* culture. Similarly, Massachusetts,[9] Illinois, and Pennsylvania represent Elazar's hypothesized *individualistic* culture (Elazar, 1972). Georgia represents the traditionalistic culture. The rest of the states are hybrids: California is moralistic-individualistic, with northern California being more moralistic, while southern California is more individualistic. Similarly, Missouri is individualistic-traditionalistic, with northern Missouri more individualistic and southern Missouri more traditionalistic. Texas is traditionalistic-individualistic, with West Texas being more individualistic, and North Carolina traditionalistic-moralistic, with the most moralistic areas being in the Appalachian part of the state (e.g. Asheville). Hence, we collected responses from at least 1,000 respondents in each of Elazar's three cultural regions, providing a sample of sufficient size to produce highly reliable confidence intervals for statistical inference.

The geographic diversity in our measurement of Elazar's cultures helps to minimize the chance that any culturally-based patterns emerging from our analysis are spurious functions of other factors unique to particular regions. The traditional culture, however, is generally regarded as less interesting in this sense as the "traditional" culture and the "South" (as a geographic region) are indistinguishable in terms of measurement.

As discussed earlier, because cities are more likely than rural areas to contain large numbers of international immigrants as well as people who have moved from other parts of the country – all living in close proximity – there are reasons to suspect that the geographical subcultures proposed by Elazar have dissipated in such melting pots. Accordingly, our sampling design contains another important layer: we drew our samples from two separate populations in each of the 11 sampling units: one urban (within the city limits of the most populous primary metropolitan statistical areas [MSA] within the state), and the other rural (beyond 100 miles of an MSA, but within the same geographical region and Elazarian culture). So in the end, we have a minimum of 200 respondents drawn from each of the 11 sampling units: greater than or equal to 100 respondents from each rural environment, and greater than or equal to 100 respondents from each urban environment.

Dependent Variables

In the course of our analysis, we estimate a series of equations predicting preferences regarding style of democratic representation. First, we predict general preferences, without regard to any particular issue area. Then we predict preferences as relating to two specific issue areas: taxes, and gay rights, respectively (see Appendix 1 for the specific wording of survey questions used to measure these preferences).

We chose these particular issue domains because, while they are both highly salient, they draw a distinction between economic and "cultural" issues. While the issue of taxes is central to the traditional Democrat/Republican cleavage structure, gay rights issues are central to the "culture war", and as such are precisely the sort of new issue that has emerged since Elazar developed his theory. Accordingly, it is important to test whether cultural differences, to the extent that they can be identified at all, apply equally to such new issues as to the traditional economic issues that dominated political debates at the time of Elazar's writing.

Independent Variables

Our primary independent variables of interest are dummy variables that classify the geographical units that correspond to Elazar's classification into moralistic, individualistic and traditionalistic states.[10] Given that our interpretation of Elazar's theory predicts that the main cultural distinction in terms of representational preference should be between individualistic states on the one hand and moralistic states on the other, with predictions regarding the traditionalistic culture less than clear, we have chosen citizens living in the states representing Elazar's individualistic culture as our reference category of respondents.

Several of the remaining independent variables in our specification serve primarily to test conditional hypotheses pertaining to Elazar's typology, as discussed earlier. For example, by multiplying the moralistic cultural indicator by whether the respondent lives in a metropolitan area, we are able to test the hypothesis that cultural "sameness" is diluted among urban dwellers. Further, with 83% of respondents reporting they were born and raised in the communities in which they currently reside, we include age as a proxy for community and cultural immersion. Finally, by estimating a second model interacting the moralistic cultural indicator with church attendance, we are able to evaluate one of the primary causal mechanisms through which Elazar suggested culture spreads within a community and is passed down from one generation to the next.[11] If the attitudinal correlates of geographic culture are limited to those for whom attending church is a priority, we will have simultaneously provided evidence supportive of (a) Elazar's cultural theory, and (b) the idea that such cultures may dissipate or die as the social institutions within communities no longer serve to inculcate cultural norms.

The remaining variables serve primarily as controls, or to account for findings observed in the (limited) extant literature. First, we must control for ideational characteristics such as party identification, partisan intensity, and ideology, which correspond to geographical locations to a certain extent, and which could interfere with the values taken to represent Elazarian culture. That is, if it turns out, for example, that citizens residing in states identified as moralistic tend to be disproportionately Democratic and/or liberal, and there is something about that liberalism that engenders greater trust in governmental institutions and thus, perhaps a preference for trustee-style representation, then failing to control for such attitudes could lead to spurious empirical support for Elazar's typology. Next, to account for explanations

of representational preferences that point to perceived majority/minority status as an important determinant (Carman, 2007), we include measures of household income, gender, and race. Finally, to account for idiosyncratic variance associated with particular geographic units, and to ensure that relationships are not being driven by any of those particular units, rather than the cultures they represent, we include dummies for each of the particular sampling units.[12]

For specifics regarding the measurement of each of these dependent and independent variables, see the appendix.

Estimation Procedure

Given the likely social-desirability bias built into questions asking respondents about preferences regarding democratic representation – stemming from the likelihood that many citizens have been socialized to embrace direct-democratic ideals and therefore to consider preferences for direct democracy as politically correct – it is not surprising that our dependent variables contain substantial positive skew (see Appendix). Furthermore, preferences of this sort are not continuous; that is, they do not have equal intervals between choice categories. This skewness and lack of interval-level measurement violates two basic assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares regression, inducing bias and inefficiency in the OLS estimator (see, e.g., Gujarati, 2003). Accordingly, we estimate these models within an ordered generalized linear modeling framework (OGLM), using maximum likelihood estimation to account for the non-continuous data,[13] with a complementary log–log link function to account for the skew in the data $\{-\ln[-\ln(y)]\}$.[14] To ease interpretation, coefficients have been reported in terms of odds ratios – interpreted in this case as the odds of the response falling in some higher category of the dependent variable, relative to all lower categories, for a one-unit increase in the independent variable, using the mean of the dependent variable as the baseline reference category and holding all other variables in the model at their means.

Furthermore, we expect that the error variance structure in these equations is not equal. In ordinal regression models, such heteroskedasticity biases both the standard errors and the parameter estimates (Williams, 2006). *More importantly, though, this underlying error variance is of substantive interest to us.* Recall that Elazar's typology does not lead to clear predictions regarding representational preferences for citizens residing in states embodying the traditionalistic culture. Accordingly, we expect that those preferences should display greater variation than those of respondents residing in states classified as moralistic or individualistic. In such cases, where the error variance structure of the data is of substantive interest, one useful way to model such variance, while simultaneously providing a statistical correction to the estimates in the main regression equation, is to employ a heteroskedastic choice model (see, e.g. Alvarez and Brehm 1995). In view of that, we have estimated the error variance in our dependent variables, predicting that variance by the cultural indicators. Because we expect the relevant distinction between these cultural indicators to be between the traditionalistic culture, on the one hand, and the

other two cultures, on the other, we have treated the traditionalistic culture as the reference category in the error variance models. Thus, we expect both the moralistic culture and individualistic culture indicators to display significant negative coefficients, indicating that responses by those residing in such states vary less than those residing in traditionalistic states.

To further account for other factors that could influence the variance structure, we also include measures of media consumption, civics knowledge, ideological understanding, and education. These variables are included to provide statistical correction, but do not carry theoretical interest particular to our hypotheses reflected in the main regression model.

We have calculated all standard errors using the Huber/White sandwich (robust) estimator of variance,[15] with clustering according to each particular survey sampling unit. As such, observations between each cluster are assumed to be independent, but this assumption is relaxed within clusters.[16]

We deleted missing data using the listwise procedure, reducing our sample size somewhat. Diagnostic tests reveal nothing systematic about these missing cases.

Results

Table 1 displays the results for our first set of equations, which do not take into account hypotheses pertaining to conditional relationships. The first column reveals the independent variables' ability to predict individual *general* preferences for representational style (delegate vs. trustee), without reference to any particular issue domain. The first row of coefficients shows that individuals residing in states classified by Elazar as moralistic were significantly more inclined to prefer trustee-style representation ($p < .05$), as Elazar's theory would have predicted. In fact, the odds of a respondent choosing a higher category of the dependent variable (corresponding to a preference for trustees), relative to any lower category, increase by a factor of roughly 19% among citizens in moralistic states, relative to those in individualistic states. Furthermore, looking at the heterogeneous variance model in the bottom half of the table, we observe that the responses of citizens living in traditionalistic states varied to a significantly greater degree than did those of respondents inhabiting moralistic or individualistic states. This result is also in keeping with what one would expect, given Elazar's reflections.

What about when respondents were asked to consider specific issues? Column two displays the independent variables' predictive capacity, as applied to the particular issue of taxes. Here, it appears that when respondents are primed to focus their thoughts on a highly salient pocketbook issue, Elazar's hypotheses receive even more support. Citizens making their homes in moralistic states were 1.34 times as likely to choose a higher response category (again, indicating preference or trustees), relative to any lower category, as compared to those living in individualistic states ($p < .001$). Again, citizens in traditionalistic states did not differ statistically from those in individualistic states. Also like the previous equation, the responses of citizens living in traditionalistic states varied significantly

Table 1. Heterogenous ordered complementary log–log regression: representation preferences on Elazarian cultural indicators and controls

	DV: General		DV: Taxes		DV: Gay Rights	
	Odds ratio	*Z-Score*[a]	Odds ratio	*Z-Score*[a]	Odds ratio	*Z-Score*[a]
Moralistic	1.19*	*1.84*	1.34***	*2.83*	1.52***	*3.62*
Traditionalistic	.76	*1.22*	.71	*1.25*	1.27	*1.25*
Metropolitan	.98	*.71*	.97	*.67*	1.06	*1.25*
Age	.99*	*2.03*	.94***	*2.81*	.98	*1.23*
Church attendance	1.05	*.67*	1.04	*1.45*	1.00	*.20*
Ideological understanding	1.01	*.41*	1.01	*.41*	.97*	*1.92*
Civics/campaign knowledge	.97**	*2.38*	.96*	*2.21*	.97*	*1.72*
Media consumption	1.02	*.56*	1.00	*.05*	1.08***	*2.76*
Education	1.01	*.95*	1.00	*.22*	1.05***	*3.15*
Party ID (GOP high)	.99	*.89*	.99	*.41*	1.01	*.56*
Partisan intensity	1.05	*1.57*	1.03	*.89*	1.01	*.32*
Ideology (Conservative high)	.99	*.50*	.95	*1.29*	.96	*1.18*
Female	.95	*1.24*	.95	*.84*	1.01	*.15*
Household income	.99	*1.47*	.99	*.60*	.99	*1.19*
African-American	.91	*1.05*	.86*	*1.66*	.81	*1.42*
N	1941		1465		1938	
Log-likelihood	−2527.10		−1747.09		−2531.76	
Cut Point 1	−.71***	*2.69*	−.67*	*1.93*	−.30	*1.44*
Cut Point 2	−.25	*.92*	−.70	*.21*	.24	*1.04*
Cut Point 3	.12	*.43*	.30	*.89*	.55*	*2.11*
Cut Point 4	.88***	*2.62*	.98***	*2.66*	1.25***	*4.12*
Heterogenous variance equation						
Moralistic	−.23***	*2.69*	−.28***	*3.61*	−.21***	*2.98*
Individualistic	−.17*	*1.89*	−.10	*1.01*	−.04	*.51*
Media consumption	.10***	*2.62*	.06	*1.15*	−.01	*.30*
Civics/campaign knowledge	−.01	*.63*	−.01	*.27*	−.02	*1.45*
Ideological understanding	−.08***	*3.17*	−.09***	*3.33*	−.08*	*1.66*
Education	.00	*.07*	.02	*.85*	−.01	*.38*

* $p \leq .05$ (one-tailed); ** $p \leq .01$ (one-tailed); *** $p \leq .001$ (one-tailed).
[a]Computed with robust standard errors, clustered by sampling unit.
Note: To simplify presentation, sampling unit dummies are not shown (but are included in all equations).
Source: 2004 National Political Culture Survey.

more than those living in moralistic states. However, unlike the previous equation, the same was not true when comparing those in traditionalistic states to those in individualistic states.

Does the apparent support for Elazar's theory crumble when citizens are asked to consider an issue area (gay rights) that not only was not on citizens' radar at the time of Elazar's original writing, but has since contributed to a partisan and ideological realignment in US politics? Column three reveals a finding that suggests just the opposite. Indeed, the relationship between living in a moralistic state and a preference for trustees is even more pronounced when citizens are asked to apply their preferences to the specific issue of gay rights – the odds of preferring trustees to delegates increases by 1.52 times among those in moralistic rather than individualistic states ($p < .001$). These results provide some suggestive evidence that not only do Elazar's propositions stand up under micro-level empirical scrutiny, they may have actually become more applicable as the issue context in the US has changed over time. As was the case in the tax equation, the responses of those living in traditionalistic states vary significantly more than those in moralistic states, but not than those living in individualistic states – providing partial support for what Elazar's typology would have predicted.

How are the effects of the moralistic cultural indicator on general representational preferences conditioned by church attendance? As can be seen in Table 2, one could say that the relationship is *dependent* upon this condition. As the first row in the table reveals, residence in a "moralistic" state is only marginally related to a preference for trustee-style representation among those who do not attend church. However, as the second row reveals, that relationship increases significantly as church attendance increases.[17] Specifically, among those who attend church "sometimes", the odds of a respondent choosing a higher category of the dependent variable (which represents a greater preference for trustees), relative to any lower category, increase by a factor of roughly 23% for those living in moralistic states, relative to those living in individualistic states. Among those who attend church "always", the odds of preferring greater trustee-style representation increase by ten additional percentage points, to 33%.

Discussion

In sum, this paper represents one of the first large-scale, theoretically motivated multivariate analyses of how the US public expects to be represented by its members of Congress. We found that citizens residing in states classified as "moralistic" by Elazar are more likely to prefer "trustee"-style representation than those living in "individualistic" states, who tend to prefer "delegate"-style representation. Furthermore, this relationship is not mitigated by metropolitanism, age, education, political knowledge, or media consumption. In other words, those living in areas where the original settlers and their descendants tended to view political life through the lens of a commonwealth, are more likely to expect their representatives to view life through such a lens, even today. On the other hand, those living in areas where

Table 2. Heterogenous ordered complementary log–log regression: representational preferences on Elazarian cultural indicators and controls, with church attendance interaction

	Odds ratio		Z-score[a]
Moralistic	1.13		1.41
Moralistic*Church Att.	1.10***		2.89
Traditionalistic	.76		1.24
Metropolitan	.98		.84
Age	.97*		2.07
Church attendance	.97		1.06
Ideological understanding	1.01		.32
Civics/campaign knowledge	.97*		2.14
Media consumption	1.02		.57
Education	1.02		1.18
Party ID (GOP high)	.99		.99
Partisan intensity	1.04		1.53
Ideology (Conservative high)	.99		.43
Female	.95		1.23
Household income	.99*		1.66
African-American	.91		1.06
N		1941	
Log-likelihood		–2524.08	
Cut point 1	–.74		
Cut point 2	–.28		
Cut point 3	.07		
Cut point 4	.82		
	Heterogenous variance equation		
Moralistic	–.23***		2.73
Individualistic	–.17*		1.95
Media consumption	.10***		2.61
Civics/campaign knowledge	–.02		.81
Ideological understanding	–.08***		3.17
Education	.00		.00

*p ≤ .05 (one-tailed); **p ≤ .01 (one-tailed); ***p ≤ .001 (one-tailed).
[a]Computed with robust standard errors, clustered by sampling unit.
Note: To simplify presentation, sampling unit dummies are not shown (but are included in all equations).
Source: 2004 National Political Culture Survey.

the original settlers and their descendants viewed politics as a means for individuals to get what they want, regardless of how that may affect some vision of a "common good," are still more likely to expect their representatives to simply respond to constituent demands, whatever they may be.

However, the relationship is conditioned by immersion in institutions that transmit culture – represented in our analysis by churches. Among non-churchgoers, there is little, if any, relationship between living in an area classified as moralistic and preferring trustee-style representation. As church attendance increases, though, so does the relationship, to the point where regular attendees in "moralistic" states are much more likely than others to report a preference for representatives as trustees. This finding comports well with Elazar's theory, which argued that culture was largely a function of religious tradition. It would make sense, then, that those who are not a part of any religious tradition would be less likely to absorb the prevailing culture of the tradition or region. These results also fit quite nicely with the social context literature, which has established churches as political communities wherein culture is transmitted. One could extrapolate, then, that as social institutions break down, the shared values and assumptions of given communities may eventually disappear.

Moreover, citizens living in either moralistic or individualistic states vary less in their representational preferences than do citizens living in traditionalistic states – an outcome that is consistent with Elazar's theory, because such preferences should depend on other factors according to Elazar's traditionalistic culture.

We consider these findings to be important for four primary reasons. First, they provide the first microfoundational evidence from a cross-state, large-N study undergirding the large body of work that has predicted aggregate outcomes with Elazar's typology. Until now, there had been very little evidence that would enable scholars to rule out other competing explanations of such associations (e.g. Hero 1998). Second, these results speak to the resiliency of geographically-based cultural patterns in the face of dramatic societal changes. Third, these results provide some evidence of yet another way that religiosity plays a central role in shaping political outcomes in the US – part of a pattern that has been becoming increasingly apparent to scholars over the last 20 years. Finally, these results start us down a path toward understanding how citizens come to vary in their expectations regarding democratic governance. If citizens living in some communities expect to be led, while others expect to be followed, that has dramatic consequences for how campaigns are waged, and how agendas are set, and how policies are made.

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Notes

1. See Carman, 2006 and 2007, for discussions of the current literature on the subject.
2. Of course, in a different stream of research many (e.g. Hunter, 1991; Brown & Carmines, 1995; Layman, 2001; Leege, et al., 2002) have come to assert that the central cleavages in American politics at the national level can be attributed to cultural differences between communities of US citizens (red vs. blue, metropolitan vs. pastoral, religious traditionalists vs. secular and religious progressives), and that campaigns have learned to strategically exploit those differences for electoral gain. Although our examination will take this body of work into account, enhanced understanding of the "culture wars" is not our focus.
3. It should be emphasized that the moralistic culture, while expecting representatives to act in the interest of the common good, does not let citizens "off the hook" in terms of political involvement. Rather, high levels of citizen participation are expected as part of the "good society" that the culture envisions. One empirical examination of this (Carman & Barker, 2005) shows that moralistic states tend to push for earlier nominating elections, to ensure citizens in those states a voice, whereas "frontloading" tends to occur in individualistic states when citizen demand appears high.
4. In their landmark study *Statehouse Democracy* (1993), Erikson, Wright and McIver found that state policy outputs mirror public opinion rather closely in individualistic states, but much more weakly in traditionalistic states.
5. For comparisons of the relative advantages and disadvantages of telephone and internet survey methods see Krosnick & Chang, 2001; Berrens, et al., 2003; Alvarez, et al., 2003.
6. Although the internet sample that we purchased included many provisions in an attempt to maximize its representativeness, we applied a weighting procedure to our data in order to match national ratios of men to women, and African Americans to Caucasians, drawn from US census bureau statistics. Despite this, we acknowledge that our sample characteristics may not be as representative of the general population in these states as they could be.
7. Specifically, Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI) draws the samples (given the regional and urban/rural parameters discussed above) from their national survey panel, contacts the potential respondents with an invitation to participate, and enters participants in a lottery run by SSI (this is similar to the methodology used by Harris Interactive, discussed in Alvarez, et al., 2003).
8. Survey locales were selected according to the dominant subculture as identified by Elazar (1972). Sampling areas do vary by secondary culture (again, as identified by Elazar, 1972).
9. It might surprise some readers that Massachusetts is classified by Elazar as individualistic, given its founding by the Puritans. Indeed, all of lower New England is classified as individualistic. This has to do with immigration patterns that occurred in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries – after the Congregationalists had begun to migrate west – that established Boston as a city of trade, finance and commerce, which led to the establishment of political institutions reflecting an individualistic culture (though Elazar acknowledges significant moralistic cultural "residue" in Massachusetts). For more details regarding this transition, see Elazar (1972).
10. The hybrid states are coded according to the sub-culture Elazar identified as the "dominant" culture in the state.
11. Our decision to measure the religious dimension with a behavior variable – church attendance – was made for both theoretical and practical reasons. First, recall that we expect churches to act as general places where social networks form and perpetuate (e.g. Wald, et al., 1988). In that way, the particular tradition of the church is less important to the conveyance of culture. However, we acknowledge that the mainline Protestant tradition may be particularly in tune with the moralistic culture. However, our data unfortunately do not have measures of denominational identity, beyond simple demarcations between Catholics and Protestants, and indicators of belief that signify evangelical identity. In this regard, alternate specifications of our models include measures of Catholic and evangelical identity as controls, and the findings do not change substantially.
12. In the models reported here, Georgia serves as the reference category for the geographic dummies. We chose this particular unit to serve as the reference category for two reasons. First, as one of the representatives of the traditionalistic culture, it is not central to our theoretical focus, which is

between the moralistic and individualistic cultures. Second, of our three traditionalistic sampling units (the others being Texas and North Carolina), Georgia is the only one that does not also contain elements of the other cultures, according to Elazar (Texas contains elements of the individualistic culture, while North Carolina includes elements of the moralistic culture).

13. For a detailed discussion and formal exposition of ordinal generalized linear models see Williams, 2006.
14. For more discussion and mathematical statements, see Clayton & Hills, 1993; Long, 1997.
15. For details see Rogers, 1993.
16. Given that our sampling, and indeed the measurement of our variables, takes place at two levels of analysis (at the individual level and at the aggregate level, to capture the geographically-based Elazarian cultures), some might expect a mixed-modeling (a.k.a. Hierarchical Linear Modeling) estimation strategy rather than one that controls for non-independence according to second-level variables by including fixed effects dummies and clustering the standard errors (as we do here). When one simply wants to estimate the independent effect of second-level units, rather than the variance in the first-level intercept and coefficients, hierarchical linear models do not provide much leverage over our approach (Osborne, 2000). As a robustness check, though, we have performed analyses using the SPSS Mixed procedure. As expected, the results produced by those models, with regard to the association between cultural variables and our dependent variables, mirror those reported here very closely. However, given that it is much more complicated to estimate skewed ordinal data in combination with a selection modeling procedure within a mixed modeling framework, we have chosen to report the OGLM (described above) results here, because those analyses provide more precise estimates and greater information overall.
17. Determining the significance of such conditional relationships – particularly the conditional standard errors – is not straightforward. As such, the political science literature is replete with studies that fail to actually calculate and interpret such relationships, often leading to conclusions that are incorrect (see Brambor, et al., 2006). To avoid this pitfall, and thus to produce the coefficients displayed in row 3 of Table 2, we followed the procedure outlined by Brambor, et al., 2006.

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Appendix 1: Measurement

Dependent Variables: Preference: Delegate v. Trustee

"As you know, members of Congress must think about many things when deciding how to vote on proposed laws in Congress. The next several questions ask about what considerations you think should have the most influence on the voting decisions of the members of Congress."

1. General: "In general, to what extent do you believe that your member of Congress should base his or her voting decisions on (their personal judgments about what they think is best for their constituents) instead of (the preferences of their constituents)? Note: the order of the parenthetical clauses was randomized.

(1) a great deal
(2) somewhat
(3) a little
(4) not at all.

Mean = 1.46, standard deviation = 1.29

2. Budget: "What about if your member of Congress was voting on the federal budget? To what extent do you believe that your member of Congress should base his or her voting decisions on (their personal judgments about what they think is best for their constituents) instead of (the preferences of their constituents)? Note: the order of the parenthetical clauses was randomized. The variable was ultimately coded so that "trustee" responses are high.

(1) a great deal
(2) somewhat
(3) a little
(4) not at all.

Mean = 1.17, standard deviation = 1.24

3. Gay Rights: The same format as above.

Mean = 1.58, standard deviation = 1.31

Independent Variables

1. Elazar's Moralistic Cultural Identity: Geographical sampling units = Los Angeles, Seattle, Denver, and Minneapolis, and rural zip-codes within southern California, Washington, Colorado, and Minnesota.

2. Elazar's Individualistic Cultural Identity: Geographical sampling units = Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, and Philadelphia, and rural zip-codes in Massachusetts, Illinois, Missouri, and Pennsylvania.

3. Elazar's Traditionalistic Cultural Identity: Geographical sampling units = Atlanta, Dallas, and Charlotte, and rural zip-codes within Georgia, Texas and North Carolina.

4. Metropolitan/Rural: whether the respondent was drawn from the metropolitan sampling unit or the surrounding rural units.

5. Church Attendance: 3-point scale generated from question, "Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious worship services?"

0 = rarely attend
1 = sometimes attend
2 = always attend.

Mean = 1.11, standard deviation = .96

6. Media Consumption: Factor score index (One factor extracted via Maximum Likelihood extraction; Eigenvalue = 1.07) computed from responses from questions:

- In the last week, how many days did you receive political information from a mainstream newspaper (including on-line versions), network television news program (CBS, NBC, ABC, PBS, CNN, FOX), or from National Public Radio? Factor Loading = .47
- How many days during the past week did you get political information from a political commentary program on cable television, such as Crossfire (CNN), Hardball (MSNBC), Hannity and Colmes (FOX), The O'Reilly Factor (FOX), Scarborough Country (MSNBC), or others like that? Factor Loading = .59
- How many days during the past week did you get political information from an entertainment program, such as The Tonight Show, Late Night with David Letterman, Saturday Night Live, The Daily Show, or others like that? Factor Loading = .26
- How many days during the past week did you get political information from a call-in political talk radio program, such as Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, Al Franken (or other Air America programs), or others like these (including local programming)? Factor Loading = .57
- How many days during the past week did you get political information from an opinion-based internet site (not on-line versions of mainstream newspapers or TV networks)? Factor Loading = .33

All questions responses range 0–7.

Mean = .10, standard deviation = .71

7. Age: 6 categories: 18–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–69, 70+.

Mean = 3.42, standard deviation = 1.38

8. Education: 0 = less than a high-school diploma; 1 = high school degree, no college, 2 = some college; 3 = college degree; 4 = MA or MBA, 5 = doctoral, professional, or law degree beyond an MA or MBA.

Mean = 1.39, standard deviation = 1.18

9. African-American. Self-identified. 1 = African American, Other = 0.

10. Female Gender: Self-identified. Female = 1, Male = 0.

11. Knowledge of Political Facts: a summed index of seven items: (1) what proportion of congressmen/women must vote to override a presidential veto; (2) which party holds majority control in House and Senate; (3) whether over the last four years the federal budget deficit has increased, decreased or stayed about the same; (4) to identify John Kerry's record during and after the Vietnam War; (5) on which group of Americans John Kerry proposed to scale back the Bush tax cuts; (6) identify John Edwards' home state; and (7) identify the company Dick Cheney headed before he became vice president.

Mean = 4.95, standard deviation = 1.71

12. Understanding of Political Values and Ideology: measured by asking respondents to classify five political values (personal responsibility, fairness, humanitarianism, moral traditionalism, and tolerance) as liberal or conservative, with definitions provided for each that would have clearly characterized personal responsibility and moral traditionalism as conservative and the others as liberal. Range 0–5.

Mean = 3.45, standard deviation = 1.20

13. Annual Household Income: Self-reported household income using a scale ranging 1 ("less than $20,000") to 9 ("more than $150,000").

Mean = 4.06, standard deviation = 2.28