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Voice, Representation and Trust in Parliament

Abstract: The procedural justice literature argues that providing individuals voice in institutional processes facilitates trust in that institution. For democratic institutions, voice is provided to the citizenry via political representation. In this article, I apply the procedural justice argument to trust in parliament, equating representation with voice: if individuals believe they are represented in parliament, they will trust parliament more than if they believe otherwise. Analyses of data from three of four countries find support for this argument: those individuals who believe that a party with at least one seat in parliament represents their views trust parliament more than those who do not. This relationship holds even when accounting for political self-interest. For those who wish to promote trust in parliament, a suggested normative good with a host of politically important consequences, one potential pathway is to facilitate individuals' belief that there is a party in parliament that represents them.

Keywords: Voice, Representation, Trust in Parliament, Procedural Justice, Left-Right Congruence

Modern representative democracy requires citizens to authorize a small group of political elites to govern in their stead. This process entails that citizens trust that their elected representatives will advocate for their interests in the processes of government. Recent research, built on the procedural justice literature, argues that individuals trust parliament more if they believe they have a voice (i.e., the ability to express one's political preferences), in the form of a selected representative, in the policy-making process (Dunn, 2012). As the overwhelming majority of individuals never participate directly in parliament, they instead gain voice through representation. Individuals will thereby trust parliament more when their elected representative is perceived to advocate for their political preferences in the policy-making process.

Research in the representative congruence literature argues, either explicitly or implicitly, that electors and representatives should align on some relevant measure(s) of policy preference, often Left-Right identification/classification (Andeweg, 2011; Blais & Bodet, 2006; Dalton, Farrell, & McAllister, 2011; Golder & Stramski, 2010; Holmberg, 2011; Huber & Powell, 1994; M. Kim, 2009; Powell, 2009). Though there is debate regarding whether alignment results from bottom-up or top-down processes (or some combination of both), in any case, ideological alignment is suggested to be of central importance, with democratic representation considered normatively better where the policy preferences of the electorate and the parliament are ideologically congruent. Specifically, the congruence literature argues that the ideological distribution of the parliament should, as closely as possible, match that of the electorate. There are however, other ways of conceiving of representation, descriptive representation being the most readily apparent (cf., Mansbridge, 1999). Certain conceptions of representation suggest that parliament should act as the political voice of the electorate in the policy-making process. Verba (1993, p. 677) argues that a "bedrock principle" of modern democracy states that "in what the government does, the preferences and interests of each

citizen ought to be given equal consideration." Modern democratic representation should therefore make "*voice* its most active and consonant manifestation and *judgment* about just and unjust laws and policies its content" (Urbinati, 2006, p. 19). Though this argument does not necessarily translate to the equivalent individual-level argument that an individual representative act as the voice of his or her elector, from the perspective of the elector, this is precisely the purpose of a representative. For the individual-level perspective, a representative is a person or party chosen to provide voice to the elector in the policy-making process.

An individual perceives himself to have voice in the policy-making process, then, when he believes a party in parliament is representative of his interests, however an individual may define such. Since an individual tends to trust an institution (or process) more where he perceives himself to have a voice in the institution (or process) (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; Grimes, 2006; van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998), he will trust parliament more if he perceives that a party which holds at least one seat in parliament represents his interests. This article examines this hypothesis using data from recent waves of the Austrian, Dutch, New Zealand and Swiss Election Studies. Regression analyses indicate that believing one is represented by a party in parliament does, in most cases examined, result in a higher level of trust in parliament.

Trust and Voice in Parliament

Political trust has been an issue of interest to political scientists for decades. Political trust is often considered a fundamental indicator of the health and legitimacy of a democracy and crucial to its stability. Mishler and Rose (2001), for example, state that "popular trust in political institutions is vital to democracy." In addition to normative concerns, a number of quantitative investigations demonstrate that political trust impacts such political attitudes and

behaviors as policy preferences (Hetherington, 2005), voter turnout (Cox, 2003; Grönlund & Setälä, 2007), vote-choice (Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005; Hetherington, 1999; Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011), and perceived acceptability of illegal behavior (Marien & Hooghe, 2011). Political trust affects not only the normative legitimacy of democratic governance but also substantive outcomes associated with that governance.

The various facets and levels of political trust have gradually been fleshed out as research in this area has evolved. Political trust covers a spectrum divided into five (perhaps not so distinct, cf., Bowler & Karp, 2004) categories which proceed from diffuse to specific support (Easton, 1965, 1975): political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors (Norris, 1999a). As the institution most often referred to as the voice of the people and most often studied by those interested in representation, this paper focuses on trust in parliament, one aspect of the second most specific level of political trust, trust in regime institutions.

Trust in parliament is undoubtedly the result of myriad factors, some self-interested, some beneficent, some cognitive, and some affective. One recent suggestion regards the influence perceived voice exerts on trust in parliament (Dunn, 2012). This argument, developed from theory and evidence from the procedural justice literature, states that an individual will trust parliament more if he believes he has a voice in the parliament via a self-selected representative.

In modern representative democracy, individuals necessarily grant representatives the power to act on their behalf in the processes of governing (cf., Montesquieu, 2002 [1748]). In doing so, they abdicate control of their political lives to others and thereby place themselves at risk of neglect, harm, or worse. Even though unable to act on their own behalf, when individuals are given the opportunity to express their interests as respected members of the community

(Anand, 2001; Folger, 1977; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992), they gain a sense of control (van Prooijen, 2009) and certainty about the future (Lind & van den Bos, 2002) that they may otherwise lack. A perception of dignity and voice builds trust where authority is exercised by another whom one does not personally know and whose actions one cannot directly control (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; van den Bos, et al., 1998). Individuals are thereby more likely to trust institutions where they perceive themselves to have a voice in those decisions that affect them and their community.

Importantly, the impact of perceived voice on the perception of fair process and trust in institutions goes above and beyond simple self-interest; even when outcomes are negative, the process by which those outcomes are reached is of considerable importance for individual perceptions of fairness and trust. The perception of voice often results in the belief that the outcome, even if negative, is fair (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Walker, Lind, & Thibaut, 1979) which, in turn, produces greater levels of institutional trust (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; W. C. Kim & Mauborgne, 2003). A desire for voice is not simply the expression of a desire for favorable outcomes, but a desire to be a valued member of the group. Perceived provision of voice, believing that one's voice is heard and acknowledged, facilitates trust in those institutions where authority is held by another.

This is, of course, not to say that self-interest plays no part in the level of trust one expresses in institutions. Procedural justice research often finds that individuals trust processes and institutions more where those processes and institutions serve their self-interest (e.g., Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995; Lind, et al., 1990; Tyler, 1994). A number of studies of trust in political institutions indicate that trust is higher among electoral or policy winners – i.e., among those individuals who voted for or agree with the policy outputs of those currently in power (Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Banducci & Karp, 2003;

Hetherington, 1998; Miller, 1974; Miller & Borrelli, 1991; Norris, 1999b). As with nonpolitical institutions, trust in political institutions will likely result from a mixture of perception of voice and self-interested outcomes, among other things.

Individuals express greater trust in an institution when they believe they have a voice in that institution, even when that institution produces outcomes they do not agree with. In political terms, individuals will report greater trust in parliament if they feel they are represented in parliament even if the government is controlled by a non-favored party or coalition. Based on the proposed relationship, I derive and test the following prediction:

P_1: Trust in parliament will be positively related to perceived representation by a party with at least one seat in parliament.

Data and Measurement

There are two variables needed to examine the above prediction: trust in parliament and perceived representation by a party in parliament. There are a number of surveys that include a confidence or trust in parliament inquiry, with both of these items often used as indicators of trust in parliament. The second variable, perceived representation, is less straightforward. There are two measures that appear in a number of election surveys that can be considered to measure such. The first directly inquires as to whether the respondent feels represented by a political party, and if so, which one. Linking this question to the most recent parliamentary election allows one to determine whether the respondent feels represented by a party with at least one seat in parliament. The second and less direct measure, is whether an individual's vote-choice is perceived to be ideologically proximate to their own Left-Right placement. This is a one-to-one measure of ideological-congruence (Golder & Stramski, 2010) that utilizes intra-individual perceptions of the respondent's own and his vote-choice's location on the Left-Right scale; an ideological-congruence measure that avoids differential item

functioning (DIF) issues which can arise due to assuming inter-individual measurement equivalency where it does not exist (Aldrich & McKelvey, 1977; King, Murray, Salomon, & Tandon, 2004). This second measure makes the rather large assumptions that Left-Right placements of self and parties mean something to the respondent and that perceived congruence between these placements is equivalent to representation. Both the empirical and theoretical literature provide numerous arguments both for and against each of these assumptions. It is therefore preferable to use the former measure, or at least to confirm the convergent validity of the latter measure against the former.

Ideally, I would prefer to examine my stated hypothesis using data from a large-scale cross-country survey. This would ensure that any findings resulting from the analyses were applicable regardless of the political environment. This would also allow me to examine any potential conditioning factors – such as whether certain electoral systems or regime types condition the relationship between representation and trust in parliament.

Unfortunately, there is currently no large-scale cross-country dataset that provides both a confidence/trust in parliament measure and both, or even one, of the perceived representation measures. There are a small number of relatively recent election studies that include the trust in parliament inquiry and inquiries relevant to creating both of the perceived representation measures: the 2009 Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES; http://www.autnes.at/), the 2002 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES; http://www.dpes.nl/), the 2002 and 2008 New Zealand Election Studies (NZES; http://nzes.org), and the 2007 Swiss Election Study (SELECTS; http://www2.unil.ch/selects/). Each of these surveys provide the necessary individual-level data on trust in parliament, whether one feels represented by a political party (and which one), ideological self-identification, the perception of the ideological placement of major parties, and vote-choice, as well as a number of theoretically relevant control variables. This limited selection of cases restricts the conclusions that can be drawn from the

following analyses, but does allow me to determine whether the hypothesis receives support in at least a handful of Established Democracies.

The 2009 Austrian National Election Survey is a post-election survey of 1,165 enfranchised Austrian residents aged 18 and above. The fieldwork was conducted in German using computer assisted personal interviewing. The sample was drawn using multiple stratification with a clustered address random procedure (Kritzinger et al., 2013).

The 2002 Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey is a pre- and post-election survey of 1574 residents. The trust in parliament question is asked in the post-election survey, while the representation-relevant questions (see below) are split between the pre- and post election surveys. The interviews were conducted using computer assisted personal interviewing for all the pre-election interviews as well as for a majority of re-interviewees – a minority of re-interviewees were surveyed via self-administered surveys. The sample was drawn using a random sample of telephone numbers from a random sample of municipalities.

The 2002 New Zealand Election Survey is a post-election survey of 5783 enfranchised residents aged 18 and above. Respondents completed the survey using mail and telephone questionnaires. The sample consists of both a "new general sample" and follow-up panel samples. Both sample groups were randomly selected from the electoral register, proportionate to each of the then 62 regular parliamentary electorates; the 7 Maori electorates were oversampled and therefore not proportionately sampled. The 2008 sample was gathered similarly, consisting of 3042 individuals, including an oversample of 636 Maori.

The 2007 Swiss Election Survey is a post-election survey of 4392 Swiss citizens. The sample consists of a nationally representative sample mixed with an oversampling of small cantons to ensure at least 100 interviews per canton.

The dependent variable is an individual's *trust in parliament*. For Austria, this variable is determined via reference to the respondent's answer to the following inquiry: "How much do you trust… the Austrian parliament?" For the Netherlands: "How much trust do you have in the Second Chamber?" For New Zealand in 2002: "please indicate how much trust and confidence would you say you have in parliament." For New Zealand in 2008: "please indicate how much trust and confidence you have in Parliament." For Switzerland: "Please tell me for each institution how much trust you have in it…: Parliament." Unfortunately, there is a diverse range of possible responses for each case, with only Austria and Switzerland using a similar metric, making any comparison between countries difficult. However, to provide some sense of comparison, I transform trust in parliament in each case to range from 0 to 1, inclusive. With the above caveat in mind, in order from the lowest to the highest transformed mean: New Zealand (2002) = 0.542, Netherlands (2002) = 0.575, Austria (2008) = 0.580, New Zealand (2008) = 0.581, and Switzerland (2007) = 0.642. Comparison of means using a two-sample t-statistic indicates that 7 of the 10 comparisons yield statistically significant differences, with New Zealand (2002) being significantly lower and Switzerland (2007) being significantly higher than the three middle-level cases, and each other; the three middle-level cases are statistically indistinguishable from one another.

Above, I suggest two possible indicators of whether an individual believes he is represented in parliament. The first uses a more direct tact, asking whether the individual feels represented by a political party and then determining whether that party holds a seat in parliament. The question for the AUTNES reads: "Would you say that any of the parties in Austria represent your views reasonably well?" For the DPES (pre-election survey): "Is there in the Netherlands a political party which on the whole reflects or represents your opinion best?" For both iterations of the NZES: "Would you say that any of the parties in New Zealand represent your views reasonably well?" And for the SELECTS: "Is there a party that

represents your personal views well?" A follow-up question inquires as to which party. If the reported party holds at least one seat in parliament, the individual is coded as believing (s)he is represented by a party in parliament (=1). If the person responds with a "no" to the initial inquiry or does not answer either question, the individual is coded as not believing (s)he is represented by a party in parliament (=0). There is considerable difference between cases in the proportion of people who believe they are represented according to this measure: Switzerland reports the lowest proportion of people who believe they are represented, at 0.437, followed by New Zealand (2002) at 0.656, Austria at 0.611, the Netherlands at 0.705, and New Zealand (2008) at 0.811.

One drawback to this measure: as a result of each country relying on either a proportional or mixed-member proportional representation electoral system, an overwhelming majority of respondents who report a party, report a party that is represented in the parliament. This means there is very little difference between this measure and a measure simply coding whether a person feels represented by a political party.

The second possibility suggested above is a measure of *vote-congruence,* a respondent's perceived Left-Right congruence between himself and his reported vote choice. This variable is determined via reference to the respondent's Left-Right self-placement, his/her reported vote choice, and his/her perception of the Left-Right placement of his/her vote choice. In Austria, the respondent's perception of the Left-Right placement of political parties is determined via reference to the following question: "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Thinking of the parties in Austria, where would you place the following parties on a scale from 1 to 11 where 1 means the left and 11 means the right?" Respondents were asked to place the following parties: SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, Grüne, BZÖ, LIF, and Liste Dinkhauser. Respondents in the Netherlands were asked a substantively similar question and asked to place the following parties: PvdA, VVD, D66, GroenLinks, CDA, SGP,

ChristenUnie, Leefbaar Nederland, SP, and Lijst Pim Fortuyn. For the 2002 New Zealand election survey respondents were asked to place the following parties: National, Labour, New Zealand First, Alliance, Act, Green, Progressive Coalition, and United Future. For the 2008 New Zealand election survey: National, Labour, NZ First, United Future, Act, Green Party, Progressive, and the Maori Party. For the Swiss election survey: CVP, FDP, SP, SVP, Gruene, LPS, EVP, and LEGA. The request for Left-Right party placement was followed by a request for the respondent to place themselves on the same scale. In Austria, for example: "And what about yourself? Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 means left and 11 means right?" For the Netherlands, both the self- and party-placement inquiries were asked in the post-election survey. An individual's vote choice is determined via reference to a question directly asking if the respondent voted in the recent elections, and if so, for which party.

The respondent's vote-congruence is equal to ten minus the absolute value of the difference between the respondent's Left-Right placement and the Left-Right placement of his vote-choice. This produces an individual-level Left-Right-congruence score ranging from 0 to 10 with 10 being a precise match and 0 being the most extreme mismatch. Though this variable can range from 0 to 10, for Austria vote-congruence ranges from 1 to 10 and in the Netherlands, from 3 to 10. The distribution is heavily negatively skewed with the mean ranging from 8.569 (in Switzerland) to 8.997 (in the Netherlands); over 90% of respondents in each case (who were not removed from the analyses due to missing data) score between 7 and 10, inclusive.

Issues of accuracy in the Left-Right placement of parties, and therefore issues of projection bias (seeing one’s vote choice as ideologically more similar to oneself than is actually the case), are not an issue with this measure as it is solely concerned with individuals’ perceptions. The argument in this paper, as well as in the procedural justice literature in

general, is that the *perception* of voice matters for trust; in fact, it is precisely the relevance of perception over reality that leads some authors to express concerns regarding the potential of elite manipulation of perception to elicit trust in potentially unjust institutions (Cohen, 1989; Dunn, 2012).

Examining the relationship between the two suggested independent variables gives reason to suspect that perceived Left-Right vote-congruence may not accurately reflect whether an individual believes he is represented. Table 1 presents the output from three separate analyses analyzing the relationship between the two measures. The first analysis is a simple difference in means test between the vote-congruence scores of those who believe they are represented by a party in parliament and those who do not. Those who believe they are represented in parliament have a higher mean vote-congruence score than those who do not, and this difference is significant in three of the five cases analyzed: Austria (2008), the Netherlands (2002), and New Zealand (2002). There is a non-significant difference for New Zealand (2008) and Switzerland (2007). Pairwise correlations echo this result. There are minimal and inconsistently significant correlations between vote-congruence and whether one feels represented in parliament. A logistic regression of feeling represented on vote-congruence again echoes these results indicating that the predicted probability of feeling represented is higher for those with a higher level of vote-congruence, but this increase in probability is only significantly different from zero in the same three cases noted above.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

These two variables, though somewhat related in three of the five cases examined here, are clearly measuring different concepts (or are substantially differentially susceptible to noise); though these concepts are certainly related to some degree in three of the five cases. As the more direct measure possesses a higher degree of face validity, I will focus primarily on this

variable from here on. However, I retain the vote-congruence measure for inclusion in the following analyses as this variable is at least a face-valid indicator of how an individual perceives his relationship to his vote choice in terms of the Left-Right continuum.

In addition to the variables discussed above, research often argues for the inclusion of a number of other relevant variables hypothesized to influence political trust: *age*; *education*; *gender*; whether an individual's vote choice is included in government (*electoral winner*); an individual's *Left-Right identification*; and an individual's perception of the health of the economy (*perception of economy*) (e.g., Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Norris, 1999a).

Perception of the Economy: The *perception of economy* variable reflects the respondent's view of the state of the economy. The measurement of this variable varies from country to country though it is intended to capture perceptions of economic health. In Austria this variable is measured via reference to the following question: "How would you evaluate, very generally, the current economic situation of Austria?" In the Netherlands: "do you think that the economic situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the government policies?" In New Zealand 2002 and 2008: "How do you think the general economic situation in the country now compares with a year ago?" In Switzerland: "In your opinion: how is the current economic situation in Switzerland?" Each of these questions takes a slightly different approach to the intended concept and as such, the variable has slightly different meaning in each country. Nevertheless, the variable does, in each case, measure a respondent's perception of the economy, whether from an absolute perspective or relative to an earlier point of comparison. Higher values for this variable indicate a more negative view of the economy and should therefore be negatively related to trust in parliament.

Left-Right Identification: This variable indicates the respondent's Left-Right identification and is measured, as noted above, by reference to the following question in Austria and a substantively similar question in each of the other 4 surveys: "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right… Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 means left and 11 means right?"

Electoral Winner: This variable reflects whether the respondent's vote choice is represented in government, in the cabinet. Following the 2008 election, the Austrian cabinet consisted of members of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP). In the Netherlands, following the 2002 election, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), List Pim Fortuyn (PFL), and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) formed the cabinet. Following the 2002 New Zealand elections, Labour and the Progressives formed the cabinet and following the 2008 election, the National party formed a minority government. After the 2007 Swiss elections, the Federal Council consisted of members of the Liberals (FDP), Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP), Social Democratic Party (SP), and Swiss People's Party (SVP) as it has for decades due to the 'magic formula' (cf., Ladner, 2001). This variable is coded 1 if a person's vote choice is in the cabinet and 0 otherwise.

An individual's *age* is an approximate measure determined by subtracting the respondent's birth year from the year of the survey; *gender* is coded 0 for female and 1 for male; *education* is measured by reference to years of education in Austria and by level of education in the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland, with higher values indicating a longer duration or higher level of education; *political interest* is based on a question inquiring into how interested in politics the respondent is, with higher values corresponding to greater interest. Table A1 in appendix A provides a brief summary of the variables for each country.

The following analyses rely on datasets created using listwise deletion of missing data. Appendix B reports analyses using data derived from multiple imputation by chained equations (cf., Azur, Stuart, Frangakis, & Leaf, 2011; Royston & White, 2011; White, Royston, & Wood, 2011).

Analysis

The data are analyzed separately for each country using ordinary least squares regression for Austria, New Zealand and Switzerland and ordered logistic regression for the Netherlands. The outputs of the regression analyses are displayed in Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

Tables 2a and 2b display both the non-standardized and the standardized coefficients for the OLS regression models – Austria, New Zealand and Switzerland. Table 2c displays the log odds and the odds ratios for the ordered logistical regression – the Netherlands. Of the 5 cases, 4 demonstrate significant results for the relationship between perceived representation and trust in parliament. In Austria, the difference between not believing one is represented and believing one is represented predicts a 1.065 unit increase in the trust in parliament variable, from just below the mean score of trust in parliament at 5.147 (all other variables held at their mean), to just above the mean at 6.212; this corresponds to 0.413 standard deviation change in trust in parliament, jumping from -0.253 standard deviations below the mean to 0.161 standard deviations above. Of the variables included in the model, perceived representation demonstrates the most substantial relationship (in terms of standardized coefficients) with trust in parliament in Austria.

In the Netherlands, moving from not believing one is represented to believing one is represented corresponds with a 0.417 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of reporting a

higher category of trust in parliament, or 1.517 times greater than the odds of reporting a lower category. With the move from not believing one is represented to believing one is represented, the probability of reporting "absolutely no trust" decreases from 0.022 to 0.014, the probability of reporting "not so much trust" falls from 0.337 to 0.255, the probability of reporting "fairly much trust" increases from 0.608 to 0.681, and the probability of reporting "very much trust" increases from 0.033 to 0.049.

In New Zealand in 2002, the difference between not believing one is represented and believing one is represented predicts a 0.248 unit increase in the trust in parliament variable, from just below the mean score of trust in parliament at 4.172, to just above the mean at 4.420; this corresponds to 0.142 standard deviation change in trust in parliament, jumping from -0.093 standard deviations below the mean to 0.049 standard deviations above. In terms of relative impact, perceived representation lags behind all other significant variables save gender.

In New Zealand in 2008, the difference between not believing one is represented and believing one is represented corresponds with a 0.572 unit increase in the trust in parliament variable, from just below the mean score of trust in parliament at 4.760, to just above the mean at 5.333; this corresponds to 0.329 standard deviation change in trust in parliament, jumping from -0.267 standard deviations below the mean to 0.062 standard deviations above. For relative impact, perceived represented places third, behind education and political interest.

For Switzerland, this relationship is neither statistically nor substantively significant. As Switzerland is a fairly unique case among the four countries there are a number of reasons this may be the case, be it the country's federal design accommodating four linguistic/cultural regions or the seven-member relatively-fixed multi-party executive.

Vote-congruence is a less consistent predictor of trust in parliament. This relationship attains significance only in Austria and New Zealand in 2008. For these cases, perceived ideological congruence with one's vote choice independently and positively contributes to trust in parliament above and beyond perceived representation, though it exerts less impact than perceived representation.

The control variables, where they attain significance, act much as previous research leads us to expect. However, of the control variables, only two, age and negative perception of the economy, are consistently significantly related to trust in parliament. Age, though consistently related to trust in parliament, varies the polarity of its relationship among countries. In Austria and New Zealand, this variable is positively related to trust in parliament, with older age cohorts more trusting of parliament. In the Netherlands and Switzerland, this variable is negatively related to trust in parliament, with older cohorts less trusting of parliament. A negative perception of the economy is consistently negatively related to trust in parliament; a negative perception of the economy predicts less trust in parliament.

Education, Left-Right identification, political interest, and surprisingly, even whether one is an electoral winner are all only inconsistently related to trust in parliament. Education achieves significance and is positively related to trust in parliament in Austria and New Zealand; for Austria, a greater number of years in education predicts a higher level of trust in parliament; for New Zealand, a higher level of education predicts a higher level of trust in parliament. Left-Right identification achieves significance and is positively related to trust in parliament in New Zealand in 2008 and in Switzerland and negatively related to trust in parliament in the Netherlands; so whereas the those who identify with the Right are more trusting of parliament in New Zealand in 2008 and Switzerland, those who identify with the Left are more trusting of parliament in the Netherlands. Political interest achieves

significance only in Austria, the Netherlands, and in New Zealand in 2008 where it is positively related to trust in parliament; those who are more interested in politics report a higher level of trust in parliament.

Of the control variables, the most surprising result is that whether one voted for a party in government, and thereby one of the dominant coalition in parliament, is not significantly related to trust in parliament in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Plausible reasons for this that are most apparent are the relatively consensual and fixed nature of the party composition of the Swiss Federal Council (though, see Church, 2008) and the political turmoil following the assassination of Pim Fortuyn (whose internally conflicted and controversial party, PFL, formed part of the governing coalition following the 2002 election) during the 2002 election campaign (cf., Pennings & Keman, 2003).

Similar to other research on individual levels of political trust (e.g., Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005; Bowler & Karp, 2004; Mishler & Rose, 2001), the models examined here do not explain a great deal of the variance in the trust in parliament variable. Four of the models explain less than 10% of the variance of trust in parliament, with those of the Netherlands and Switzerland explaining less than even 5%. Austria is the exception, with the included variables explaining slightly over 17% of the variance of trust in parliament.

Conclusion

Political trust, considered a normative good by many, impacts political attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, exerting a definitive impact on a country's political climate. In seeking to understand political attitudes and behavior we are thereby encouraged to also understand political trust. This article looks at political trust, specifically trust in parliament, from the perspective of the procedural justice literature.

The literature on procedural fairness provides decades of evidence that perceived voice in a process increases individuals' trust in the process and the institution responsible for the process. Dunn (2012) extends this research into the political trust literature in an analysis of the effect of electoral systems on individually-held levels of trust in parliament, finding that voice in parliament (measured as the form and proportionality of the electoral system) predicts greater trust in parliament. This research argues that an individual will trust parliament more if the individual has a voice in that institution, but never directly measures whether an individual perceives that he has a voice in parliament. This paper resolves this by utilizing the concept of representation.

The proposition that democratic representatives should provide voice (i.e., the ability to express one's political preferences) to their constituents is common in political theory (e.g., Mansbridge, 2009; Mill, 1861; Urbinati, 2006; Williams, 1998) and is often echoed, at least cursorily, in recent quantitative research (e.g., Blais & Bodet, 2006; Golder & Stramski, 2010; Pande, 2003; Powell, 2006). In this sense, this article equates voice with democratic representation: an individual believes he is represented in parliament insofar as he believes that a representative in parliament provides him the ability to express his political preferences in the processes undertaken by parliament.

This train of reasoning leads me to predict that individuals will trust parliament more if they believe they are represented in parliament. Making use of five electoral surveys of four countries, this article tests whether believing one is represented by a party in parliament corresponds with a higher level of political trust. In three of the four countries, and four of the five cases (Austria 2009, the Netherlands 2002, New Zealand 2002, New Zealand 2008), believing one is represented by a party in parliament does correspond with a higher level of political trust. However, in Switzerland 2007, there is no significant relationship between believing one is represented and trust in parliament. Though there is confirmation of this

relationship in four of the five cases studied, the absence of any relationship in 2007 Switzerland suggests caution. Nevertheless, there is certainly reason to suggest that, in general, believing that one has a voice in parliament leads one to trust parliament more than one otherwise would.

The standard warning one should keep in mind when looking at evidence derived from cross-sectional data applies: these findings are correlational, even though the theory predicting them indicates a causal relationship. Further, as the data analyzed here are also restricted to only four countries, I cannot be sure of how these results will generalize to more culturally divergent areas. There is some comfort in the numerous cultural, geographic, historical, and institutional differences between the four countries. However, all of these countries are advanced democracies and thereby limit generalization. More conclusive tests could be derived from data allowing individual measurement of perceived representation and trust in parliament over time and across a wider variety of countries.

Data limitations notwithstanding, this evidence indicates that for those hoping to increase individuals' trust in parliament, facilitating the perception that one is represented in parliament appears a promising tactic. One possible method for doing this would be increasing the proportionality of the electoral system (Golder & Stramski, 2010; Huber & Powell, 1994; Powell, 2000, 2009), a method equated with increasing perceptions of voice in parliamentary representation (Dunn, 2012; Mill, 1861). However, further evidence is necessary to determine whether the results obtained here apply more broadly, whether Switzerland in 2007 is an anomaly or indicative of a broader trend, and whether electoral systems designed to deliver more proportional results do actually increase individual perceptions of representation.

Appendix A

[INSERT TABLE A1 HERE]

Appendix B

[INSERT TABLE B1 HERE]

References:

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Table 1: Difference between those who do and do not feel represented by a party in parliament

	Δ means	std.err.	pw.corr	Δ p.prob
Austria (2008)	**-0.220**	0.104	**0.076**	**0.242**
Netherlands (2002)	**-0.187**	0.066	**0.076**	**0.227**
New Zealand (2002)	**-0.319**	0.056	**0.106**	**0.361**
New Zealand (2008)	-0.144	0.078	0.044	0.152
Switzerland (2007)	-0.049	0.063	0.016	0.050

Note: **Bolded** values are significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

Table 2a: OLS Regression predicting Trust in Parliament in Austria and Switzerland

	Austria (2008)			Switzerland (2007)		
	β	s.e.	std.β	β	s.e.	std.β
age	**0.014**	0.005	**0.093**	**-0.005**	0.002	**-0.047**
education	**0.101**	0.037	**0.099**	0.022	0.017	0.029
electoral winner	**0.952**	0.198	**0.170**	0.168	0.099	0.035
gender (male)	0.007	0.176	0.001	**-0.211**	0.073	**-0.061**
Left-Right Identification	-0.045	0.037	-0.041	**0.089**	0.014	**0.131**
perception of economy	**-0.418**	0.111	**-0.128**	**-0.236**	0.052	**-0.097**
political interest	**0.290**	0.089	**0.114**	-0.063	0.054	-0.024
feel represented	**1.065**	0.180	**0.202**	0.103	0.072	0.029
vote congruence	**0.169**	0.061	**0.092**	-0.020	0.023	-0.018
constant	**2.439**	0.786	--	**6.868**	0.336	--
r-squared	0.173	--	--	0.034	--	--
observations	767	--	--	2420	--	--

Note: **Bolded** coefficients are significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

Table 2b: OLS Regression predicting Trust in Parliament in New Zealand

	New Zealand (2002)			New Zealand (2008)		
	β	s.e.	std.β	β	s.e.	std.β
age	**0.008**	0.002	**0.071**	**0.007**	0.003	**0.064**
education	**0.198**	0.019	**0.200**	**0.092**	0.016	**0.148**
electoral winner	**0.294**	0.072	**0.083**	**0.294**	0.096	**0.084**
gender (male)	**0.200**	0.063	**0.057**	-0.033	0.080	-0.009
Left-Right Identification	-0.019	0.015	-0.026	**0.061**	0.020	**0.084**
perception of economy	**-0.354**	0.044	**-0.152**	**-0.179**	0.052	**-0.081**
political interest	0.041	0.047	0.016	**0.361**	0.058	**0.147**
feel represented	**0.248**	0.067	**0.067**	**0.572**	0.102	**0.129**
vote congruence	0.034	0.022	0.028	**0.095**	0.031	**0.070**
constant	**3.158**	0.304	--	**2.238**	0.417	--
r-squared	0.095	--	--	0.097	--	--
observations	2883	--	--	1744	--	--

Table 2c: Ordered Logistic Regression predicting Trust in Parliament in the Netherlands

	Netherlands (2002)		
	β	s.e.	O.R.
age	**-0.008**	0.004	**0.992**
education	0.010	0.022	1.010
electoral winner	0.143	0.135	1.154
gender (male)	0.012	0.115	1.013
Left-Right Identification	**-0.065**	0.032	**0.937**
perception of economy	**-0.350**	0.083	**0.704**
political interest	**0.348**	0.109	**1.416**
feel represented	**0.417**	0.123	**1.517**
vote congruence	0.073	0.049	1.076
pseudo r-squared	0.027	--	--
observations	1408	--	--

Note: **Bolded** coefficients are significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Austria (2008)	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
trust in parliament	767	5.798	2.576	0	10
age	767	51.983	17.478	18	96
education	767	3.743	2.531	0	10
electoral winner	767	0.694	0.461	0	1
gender (male)	767	0.495	0.500	0	1
Left-Right Identification	767	4.755	2.360	0	10
perception of economy	767	3.180	0.788	1	5
political interest	767	3.538	1.015	1	5
feel represented	767	0.611	0.488	0	1
vote congruence	767	8.712	1.406	1	10

Netherlands (2002)	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
trust in parliament	1408	2.726	0.574	1	4
age	1408	49.564	15.833	18	97
education	1408	6.298	2.804	1	11
electoral winner	1408	0.530	0.499	0	1
gender (male)	1408	0.496	0.500	0	1
Left-Right Identification	1408	5.229	2.161	0	10
perception of economy	1408	1.577	0.685	1	3
political interest	1408	2.195	0.539	1	3
feel represented	1408	0.705	0.456	0	1
vote congruence	1408	8.997	1.129	3	10

New Zealand (2002)	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
trust in parliament	2883	4.335	1.753	0	8
age	2883	50.995	15.329	18	100
education	2883	4.870	1.766	1	8
electoral winner	2883	0.435	0.496	0	1
gender (male)	2883	0.503	0.500	0	1
Left-Right Identification	2883	5.147	2.388	0	10
perception of economy	2883	2.581	0.753	1	5
political interest	2883	3.051	0.695	1	4
feel represented	2883	0.656	0.475	0	1
vote congruence	2883	8.725	1.430	0	10

New Zealand (2008)	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
trust in parliament	1744	5.225	1.737	0	9
age	1744	53.607	16.140	18	100
education	1744	5.467	2.792	0	10
electoral winner	1744	0.423	0.494	0	1
gender (male)	1744	0.493	0.500	0	1

Left-Right Identification	1744	5.493	2.380	0	10
perception of economy	1744	4.288	0.788	1	5
political interest	1744	3.122	0.705	1	4
feel represented	1744	0.811	0.391	0	1
vote congruence	1744	8.895	1.281	0	10

Switzerland (2007)	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std.Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
trust in parliament	2420	6.421	1.734	0	10
age	2420	53.403	17.075	18	95
education	2420	4.628	2.244	1	8
electoral winner	2420	0.842	0.365	0	1
gender (male)	2420	0.510	0.500	0	1
Left-Right Identification	2420	5.271	2.551	0	10
perception of economy	2420	2.019	0.714	1	5
political interest	2420	3.147	0.670	1	4
feel represented	2420	0.437	0.496	0	1
vote congruence	2420	8.569	1.549	0	10

Table B1a: OLS Regression predicting Trust in Parliament (Imputed)

	Austria (2008)		**Switzerland (2007)**	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
age	**0.012**	0.004	**-0.007**	0.002
education	**0.067**	0.030	**0.039**	0.014
electoral winner	**0.988**	0.150	**0.409**	0.063
gender (male)	0.055	0.142	**-0.269**	0.061
Left-Right Identification	-0.044	0.033	**0.095**	0.013
perception of economy	**-0.496**	0.088	**-0.314**	0.041
political interest	**0.329**	0.068	**0.211**	0.039
feel represented	**0.917**	0.147	0.059	0.065
vote congruence	**0.156**	0.055	-0.027	0.029
constant	**2.856**	0.647	**6.034**	0.313
observations	1165	--	4392	--

Note: **Bolded** coefficients are significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

Table B1b: OLS Regression predicting Trust in Parliament (Imputed)

	New Zealand (2002)		New Zealand (2008)	
	β	s.e.	β	s.e.
age	**0.005**	0.002	**0.002**	0.001
education	**0.178**	0.016	**0.085**	0.013
electoral winner	**0.320**	0.060	**0.466**	0.081
gender (male)	**0.105**	0.050	0.014	0.068
Left-Right Identification	-0.011	0.014	**0.054**	0.018
perception of economy	**-0.382**	0.036	**-0.142**	0.044
political interest	0.052	0.039	**0.426**	0.047
feel represented	**0.370**	0.055	**0.690**	0.078
vote congruence	0.038	0.020	**0.106**	0.030
constant	**3.274**	0.249	**1.885**	0.344
observations	5783	--	3042	--

Note: **Bolded** coefficients are significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

Table B1c: Ordered Logistic Regression predicting Trust in Parliament (Imputed)

	Netherlands (2002)	
	β	s.e.
age	**-0.002**	0.001
education	0.003	0.006
electoral winner	0.067	0.036
gender (male)	0.020	0.031
Left-Right Identification	**-0.021**	0.008
perception of economy	**-0.092**	0.021
political interest	**0.107**	0.028
feel represented	**0.139**	0.032
vote congruence	0.019	0.013
constant	**2.499**	0.149
observations	1907	--

Note: **Bolded** coefficients are significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.