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Political Trust and Disenchantment with Politics

International Perspectives

Edited by

Christina Eder
Ingvill C. Mochmann
Markus Quandt



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CHAPTER 8

Thinking Outside the Democratic Box

Political Values, Performance and Political Support in Authoritarian Regimes. A Comparative Analysis

Wiebke Breustedt and Toralf Stark

Introduction

The downfall of the USSR was a decisive moment for all of its member countries. As such, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus Region and Central Asia started out from a more or less comparable political situation into a new political future. Since then, democracy has been established in most Central and Eastern European countries. In Central Asia, however, the countries have not democratized successfully (Grotz and Müller-Rommel 2011, 11).

In light of this development, political culture research has experienced a revival as an explanatory approach (Fuchs 2007, 161). Its main argument is that the congruence between political culture (in terms of the citizens' values and attitudes) and the political institutions of a given country are essential for the effective functioning and persistence of any political regime (Almond and Verba 1963, 20–21; Diamond 1993, 422–426; Easton 1965, 157; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, 91; Verba 1965, 513). So far, public opinion studies have mainly focused on democracies (Anderson et al. 2005; Dalton 2004; Inoguchi and Blondel 2008; Kaase and Newton 1995; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Norris 1999; Nye, Zelikow and King 1997; Pharr and Putnam 2000). However, political culture is a relevant societal basis for the maintenance and successful implementation of power not only in democratic systems but also in authoritarian regimes (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 158, 187–188; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, 8).

Among the many theoretical models of political support developed in the tradition of political culture research (Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton 2004; Easton 1965; Fuchs 1989, 2002, 2007; Lipset 1959; Norris 1999; Welzel and Inglehart 1999; Westle 1989) Fuchs' (1999, 2002, 2007) model is particularly suitable for the study of political support in authoritarian regimes.¹ It is better applicable than the other models as Fuchs clarifies the systemic consequences

¹ Other innovations include those by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who focus more on modernization as a cause of change in political culture as well as the interaction between social and political values. For a comprehensive summary see Pickel and Pickel (2006).

of different types of political support with respect to regime persistence. In addition, it is innovative in so far as he clearly outlines the hierarchy of dimensions of the political system. However, for the sake of simplicity, Fuchs exclusively applies his model of political support to democratic political systems. Nevertheless, he states that “the assumption that a regime that wants to remain persistent in the long run, requires a political culture that is in congruency with the institutional structure, can be generally applied to all regime types” (Fuchs 2007, 163–164).

In line with previous research results indicating the importance of political support in authoritarian regimes (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 186–191), we study in how far Fuchs’ model can be applied to authoritarian systems. Fuchs states that support of democratic values and the democratic political regime are the most important aspects of political support in order to ensure the persistence of democratic political regimes. We argue that in authoritarian regimes the most important aspect of political support is trust in national government in order to maintain the authoritarian regime. Thus, it is crucial to study what determines trust in national government. According to the logic of political systems theory, the types of conditions that generate citizens’ support of the political regime and authorities are the same independent of the regime type (Easton 1975). We therefore study empirically the conditions of high political trust in national government in Central Asia. Our analysis serves to answer the question: Is the fact that people trust their national government in Central Asia conditioned by their assessment of socio-economic and political performance and political values?²

The analysis focuses on Central Asian authoritarian regimes for several reasons. First, in general, there is little comparative research on the conditions of high political trust in authoritarian regimes. Most of the analyses are case studies and focus on East and Southeast Asia (Chu and Huang 2007; Dalton and Shin 2003; Inoguchi and Blondel 2008; Inoguchi 2008). While there are some case studies on Central Asian countries (Inoguchi 2008), so far, there have only been a few comparative, theory-testing studies (Dadabaev 2005; Dononbaev and Naskeeva 2004; Haerpfer 2008; Inoguchi 2008). However, the arguments upon which the conceptual political support framework is based have thus far not been adjusted to authoritarian regimes.

Second, the common political heritage of the Central Asian countries as former Soviet republics and their common status as authoritarian regimes provide sufficient homogeneity of the cases considered to ensure that they are

² We would like to thank Claudio Wagemann and Carsten Schneider for helpful comments and remarks in the course of the ECPR SSMT 2011.

comparable with regard to the conditions of political trust. Third, due to the fact that the political systems of these countries can be characterized as authoritarian regimes to a different extent and since the political systems differ with regard to their socio-economic characteristics, the cases are diverse enough to supply maximum heterogeneity between the cases (Berg-Schlosser and de Meur 2009, 20–21).

In order to specify the conditional patterns of high trust in national government in Central Asia, we use individual-level data from the Asia Barometer Survey 2005. As social desirability is even more of an issue in authoritarian regimes than in democracies, we heed the advice to perform contextualized analyses by taking into account the characteristics of the countries' respective authoritarian political regime type (Inoguchi 2008, 17).

In order to derive the conditions of the outcome of high political trust in national government, we apply fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). So far, QCA has rarely been applied to individual-level data due to its hitherto more case-oriented applications. However, the levels of application of QCA have been broadened to include the individual level (for a summary of applications see Rihoux et al. 2009, 173–174). Here, the unit of analysis, i.e. the individual himself, is not primarily of interest. Rather, the analysis of conditions of high trust in national government is intended to derive *types* of individuals as reflected in different conjunctions of conditions that lead to high trust in national government (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 401).

FsQCA has several advantages for our analysis: First, unlike crisp set QCA (csQCA), it permits a differentiation between individuals both in terms of differences in kind – do they trust their government or not – as well as in terms of degree – to what extent do they trust their government.³ Second, unlike standard statistical analyses it incorporates separate tests for necessary and sufficient conditions of the outcome (Wagemann and Schneider 2010, 380).⁴ Third, it allows the researcher to study complex interaction effects. Previous studies of political support usually applied multiple regression analysis, which follows the principle of additivity (Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Dalton 2004; Inglehart

3 In csQCA, cases only differ in kind: they are either members (1) or non-members (0) of the set of high trusters in national government. FsQCA membership scores account for gradations in set membership.

4 Generally, “a condition is necessary if, whenever the *outcome* is present, the condition is also present, but there can be cases that are members of the condition but not the outcome” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 329–330; original emphasis). A condition is sufficient “if, whenever the conditions is present, the *outcome* is also present, but there can be cases that are members of the outcome but not the condition” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 333; original emphasis).

and Welzel 2005; Mishler and Rose 2001; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Wong, Wan and Hsiao 2011). As research has shown, citizens' political trust primarily results from their assessment of the socio-economic and political performance of the political system as well as their political values.⁵ However, the literature suggests that these factors do not affect political trust in an isolated manner. Rather, they influence political trust *in conjunction*. Consequently, multiple regression analyses that determine the net effect of the single best predictor do not adequately take into account the causal complexity reflected in the research findings (Ragin 1987, 83; Ragin 2008, 176–182). In QCA, third, fourth and fifth order interaction terms are common, unlike in multiple regression analysis (Wagemann and Schneider 2010, 384).⁶ Finally, QCA takes equifinality into account, i.e. "different constellations of factors may lead to the same result" (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 8). This is important to bear in mind since the combinations or conjunctions of the conditions that affect political trust may differ both within and between the countries studied.

In sum, the article contributes theoretically by elaborating the model of political support developed by Fuchs as we apply it to authoritarian regimes. In addition, the article enhances the knowledge of the conditions of high political trust in national government in Central Asia from a comparative perspective, which is very seldom found in analyses of Central Asian countries thus far. Furthermore, the article contributes methodologically by applying fsQCA to test the newly developed theoretical arguments and by using individual-level survey data to study the conditions of high political trust in national government.

Theoretical Background

A Model of Political Support for Authoritarian Regimes

For our analysis, we refer to the model by Fuchs (1999, 2002, 2007), which is a recent and innovative elaboration of the political support model based on

5 For a recent summary of the different approaches to explaining political trust see Kotzian (2011, 26–28) and Wong, Wan and Hsiao (2011: 264–267).

6 Specifically, QCA enables the analysis of so-called INUS conditions. An INUS condition is a single condition that derives its name from the initial letters of the italicized words in the following definition: It is "an *insufficient* but *necessary* part of a condition which is itself *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the result" (Mackie 1965, 245; original emphasis). In other words, it is a "single *condition* that is insufficient for producing the *outcome* on its own but which is a *necessary* part of a *conjunction* that, in turn, is unnecessary but *sufficient* for producing the outcome" (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 328; original emphasis).

Easton. Political support is defined as "an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively" (Easton 1975, 436). Fuchs first discerns between three hierarchically ranked dimensions of the political system each of which comprises different political objects, namely political values, the institutions of a regime and the political authorities. He then goes on to specify the corresponding types of political support for democratic political systems, namely commitment to democratic values, support of the democratic regime of the country and support of the political authorities, respectively. In line with Easton he further states that trust is an essential dimension of political support (Fuchs 2007, 164–166; see also Easton 1975, 447).

Conceiving political support as a system of attitudes, he, like other researchers before him (Almond 1980; Easton 1975; Pappi 1986), assumes that the different dimensions of political support interact and are affected by citizens' assessment of political and socio-economic performance. However, he is the first to systematize and to justify theoretically the relationship between the different dimensions of political support (Fuchs 1999, 124; Fuchs 2002, 37–38; Fuchs 2007, 165).⁷

Furthermore, Fuchs derives the systemic consequences that arise from the different types of political support (Fuchs 2002, 37). He does so by relating the dimensions of political support to the dimensions of the political system. Based on Parsons (1971) and Luhmann (1970, 1984), he argues that political values can be attributed to the cultural dimension, support of the regime reflects the structural dimension and support of the authorities represents the procedural dimension of the political system (Fuchs 2002, 35–36).⁸ He then states the respective consequences of the different dimensions of political support: persistence of a democratic system of the country, persistence of the type of democratic system of the country, re-election or de-election of political authorities.

7 In "Critical Citizens" and "Democratic Deficit – Critical Citizens Revisited" Norris (1999, 2011) also presents a hierarchical model of political support. Unlike her, Fuchs clearly distinguishes between general democratic values and the democratic values inherent in the institutional structure of the current political regime (Fuchs 1999, 124–125; Fuchs 2002, 37; Fuchs 2007, 165, see also Dalton 2004, 6–7). In addition, he does not include 'identification with the political community' in the concept of political support (see Fuchs 2007, 169–172 for a detailed explanation).

8 He thus elaborates Easton's concept of political support. Easton differentiates the dimensions of political support by attributing them to individual objects of the political system, i.e. the political community, the regime as a whole and the political authorities. Fuchs takes on a more general approach by associating the types of political support to different kinds of dimensions of the overall political system.

Generally, there is no reason to believe why Fuchs' model of political support should not be equally applicable to democracies and autocracies. The dimensions of the political system and the respective dimensions of political support can be applied to both democratic and authoritarian regimes in line with the logic of political systems theory (Easton 1965, 8). His argument concerning the origins of political support is based on a universal assumption about human nature, namely that it derives from people's socialization experiences as well as their assessments of political and socio-economic performance. Therefore, he assumes that support develops in the same manner in all humans, independent of the type of political system they live in. Consequently, the fact that the different dimensions of political support and performance evaluations interact applies to authoritarian and democratic regimes.

However, the *consequences* of the different kinds of political support for the political system *differ*. Fuchs considers support of democratic rule, i.e. the commitment to democratic values, to be the most important dimension of political support for the persistence of democracies in general and states that support of the current political regime is indispensable for the persistence of the type of democratic regime in the respective country (Fuchs 2002, 31; Fuchs 2007, 166–167). We argue that in authoritarian regimes, high political trust in national government is crucial for the persistence of authoritarian regimes.

Since the national government is mainly perceived in terms of the political elites that represent the government, political trust in national government is located at the level of political authorities (Fuchs 1999, 124; Fuchs 2007, 165–166). Due to the non- or bare existence of a system of checks and balances, the locus of institutional power rests with the authorities. Since the authorities are not elected or the elections are mere charades, over time, the central political institutions are mainly framed by the political leader(s). Therefore, a clear separation between the authorities themselves and the institutions is no longer possible. Consequently, the extent to which the objects of political support of the political system can be distinguished is not as clear-cut as in democracies.⁹ Instead, the values as well as the institutions of the regime are associated with the political authorities. In authoritarian countries, the authorities in national government and the ruling parties themselves personify the values of authoritarian rule.¹⁰

⁹ The question whether the objects of political support can be clearly distinguished in democracies has also been subject of a long debate (Miller and Citrin debate: Miller 1974a, 1974b; Citrin 1974; Citrin and Luks 2001).

¹⁰ Unlike in democracies where the constitutions specify the democratic values inherent in the political institutions of the political regime.




FIGURE 1 *Dimensions of political support in authoritarian regimes*

SOURCE: OWN COMPILATION BASED ON FUCHS (2007)

This has implications both for the most important aspect of political support for regime persistence as well as the interaction of the dimensions of political support. In general, based on this line of argument, it is high trust in national government that matters most for the persistence of the authoritarian regime in a given country (see figure 1). In authoritarian countries, it is therefore essential to study the conditions of high political trust in national government.

According to the original model by Fuchs, political trust in political authorities, i.e. the incumbents in political offices, results from the extent to which people are satisfied with their political and socio-economic performance (Easton 1975, 438–439; see also Fuchs 1999, 124). In addition, generalized trust in institutions provides political authorities with an advance in trust. According to our model, citizens also base their trust in the authorities on political values. Political trust in national government in authoritarian regimes can thus be considered to be affected by people's trust in the institutions of the regime, their political values as well as their evaluations of the political and socio-economic performance.

Since “[...] different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy” (Geddes 1999, 121), we also have to

consider the different manifestations of authoritarianism in Central Asia when choosing the conditions of high levels of trust in national government. In order to do so, initially, it is important to set autocracies apart from democracies as autocracies function according to regime-specific mechanisms and principles in their own right (Sartori 1997, 185). We do so in reference to a number of authors who distinguish between political regimes based on this dichotomous differentiation (Geddes 1999, 122–130; Linz 2000, 49–53; Sartori 1997, 185–186). Empirically, we draw on Freedom House and Polity IV, the two most commonly used empirical indices measuring the political performance of political regimes (Coppedge et al. 2011, 248).¹¹

In terms of their political performance, the Central Asian countries highly differ, but none of them pass the democratic threshold (see figure 2).¹² With respect to the type of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and political competition, the countries have either remained autocratic (Uzbekistan), have fluctuated between autocracy and anocracy (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan) or have remained in an anocratic state between autocracy and democracy (Kyrgyzstan) (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011).¹³

Concerning the implementation of political rights and civil liberties, Freedom House has persistently rated some of the countries as not free (Uzbekistan), but has also assigned improving scores of freedom over time, while still categorizing the countries as not free (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan). Kyrgyzstan has been classified as either partly free or as not free.¹⁴ This brief summary indicates that this region contains political regimes that have implemented the authoritarian rules in terms of electoral institutions, as well as political rights and civil liberties to different degrees (Freedom House 2012).


However, the differences between political regimes are not just a matter of quantitative degrees of authoritarianism but also a question of qualitative differences between authoritarian regimes. Possible qualitative differences should therefore also be considered when determining the conditions of high trust in national government.

¹¹ Polity IV and Freedom House refer to two dimensions: "contestation" and "inclusiveness" based on Dahl's concept of polyarchy (Dahl 1971, 4–5).

¹² Considering the fluctuations in Kyrgyzstan's assessment of political performance over the past years, it remains to be seen whether the country will manage to maintain its positive development.

¹³ Polity IV differentiates three regime types. Countries ranked between 10 and 6 are called democracy, countries ranked between 5 and -5 are referred to as anocracies and those ranging from -6 to -10 are entitled 'autocracy'.

¹⁴ Freedom House divides their scale into three dimensions: 1–2.5 = free; 3–5 = partly free; 5.5–7 not free.

FIGURE 2 *Constitutional and actual rights of freedom and participation*

SOURCE: FREEDOM HOUSE (2012)/ POLITY IV (2011)

In order to classify the types of authoritarian political regimes in Central Asia in a qualitative manner, we use the approach by Hadenius and Teorell (2006) which is based on Barbara Geddes' seminal proposal (1999). Hadenius and Teorell elaborate Geddes' concept in two respects. First, they classify authoritarian regimes based on three modes of political power maintenance: (a) hereditary succession; (b) actual or threatened use of military force and (c) popular election. The resulting regime types are monarchy, military regimes and electoral regimes. These basic types can be divided into several subtypes. Electoral regimes are differentiated into no-party regimes, one-party regimes and limited multiparty regimes (Hadenius and Teorell 2006, 6–7). Following Hadenius and Teorell, all Central Asian regimes are classified as limited multiparty regimes (Hadenius and Teorell 2006, 27). **These arguments underline that – in limited multiparty regimes as in Central Asia¹⁵ – trust in parliament should contribute to trust in national government, as parliament is the main institutional display of the power of national parties.**

Second, unlike Geddes, Hadenius and Teorell do not consider personalism to be a regime type in its own right but state that it is a characteristic which is more or less present in all authoritarian regimes (Hadenius and Teorell 2006, 4). Since personalism is characteristic of all authoritarian regimes, support of strong political leadership (by a party or person) as a political value must be considered as a condition of trust in national government when studying these regimes. The importance of support of strong political leadership for citizens'

¹⁵ as well as in one-party regimes

trust in national government in authoritarian regimes is substantiated by Welzel and Inglehart (2009). They argue that citizens' intrinsic preference for authoritarianism is essential in order for them to support authoritarian rule in the long run (Welzel and Inglehart 2009, 134–135). According to them, citizens prefer authoritarianism intrinsically when they reject emancipative values, i.e. when they "give priority to authority and strong leadership over freedom and expression" (Welzel and Inglehart 2009, 131). They also show empirically that the congruence between citizens' values and political structures has systemic consequences (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 186–191).

Assumptions

Fuchs' model implies that positive assessment of performance is a necessary condition of political trust in national government as political trust in national government mainly develops based on short-term evaluations of the political authorities (Easton 1975, 448), i.e. whenever people trust national government they also positively evaluate the socio-economic and/or political performance.

In addition, based on the arguments outlined in the previous section, support of strong leadership, positive assessment of socio-economic and political performance as well as political trust in parliament are sufficient for high trust in national government, i.e. whenever people support strong leadership and/or positively evaluate the performance, they also trust national government. These conditions can be sufficient either by themselves or as INUS conditions.¹⁶

According to Fuchs' model, there should be sufficient conjunctions that exclusively include the positive assessment of socio-economic and political performance ('performance-driven' trustees). These conjunctions are likely to be complemented by trust in other institutions such as parliament. In contrast, according to our application of Fuchs' model to authoritarian regimes, we expect conjunctions of conditions that include performance, trust in parliament and support of strong leadership, as citizens in authoritarian regimes do not distinguish as clearly between the different dimensions of the political regime as in democracies. Support of strong leadership is expected to be part of a sufficient conjunction of conditions among the individuals in all countries due to the fact that the analysis is based on survey data from individuals who have all been socialized in Central Asian authoritarian regimes. Similarly, authoritarian values could also be sufficient by themselves ('value-driven' trustees).

¹⁶ see footnote 6.

Method and Data

We will now turn to the empirical determination of the necessary and sufficient conditions of high political trust in national government in authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. The study of the conditions of political trust is not merely a question of whether and why people trust or not. It involves both the question of qualitative states – do people trust or do they not trust – as well as the question of degree – to what extent do people trust or distrust. The most appropriate way to account for these differences in kind (qualitative differences) and degree (quantitative differences) both in terms of conceptualization as well as measurement when studying the conditions of high political trust in national government is to apply fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 2008, 30; Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 184).

The individuals' responses to the survey questions in the Asia Barometer 2005 provide the raw data for the study of the conditions of high political trust in national government in the countries of analysis. The Asia Barometer is a regional public opinion survey project which has been conducted on an annual basis in East, Southeast, South and Central Asia since 2003 (Inoguchi and Fujii 2008, 187). In 2005, the survey focused on South and Central Asian countries. The survey items cover a range of issues pertaining to the quality of life, including political attitudes, political values and assessment of socio-economic and political performance (Inoguchi and Fujii 2008, 164–197).

The selection of conditions is based on our model of political support. Therefore, items pertaining to authoritarian values, political trust in parliament as well as the assessment of socio-economic and political performance are included in the analysis (see Appendix A). With respect to the definition of the outcome, we deviate from Fuchs' model. According to the argument outlined earlier, the choice of high political trust in national government as the outcome is based on the assumption that high political trust in national government is comparatively more important for the persistence of authoritarian regimes in a given country than authoritarian political values or high trust in the political system and its institutions as such.

In order to perform a fsQCA to determine the necessity and sufficiency of the conditions, first, those respondents of the Asia Barometer 2005 were chosen which replied to the items pertaining to political performance, socio-economic performance, political values and political trust.¹⁷ The survey data

¹⁷ Kazakhstan N = 508; Kyrgyzstan N = 442; Tajikistan N = 414; Uzbekistan N = 353. A comparison of the distributions of our sample with the distributions in the original sample

was then calibrated in order to perform a fsQCA to study the individual-level conditions of high political trust in national government. Each individual was therefore assigned set membership scores in the sets described by the characteristics of the conditions¹⁸ and the outcome (see Appendix A).

According to the set-theoretic logic of fsQCA, the set membership scores range from 0 (full non-membership in the set, i.e. fully non-trusting) to 1 (full membership, i.e. fully trusting). The qualitative difference between the cases is determined by the 0.5 score, which represents the point of maximum ambiguity where cases are neither in nor out of a set (Ragin 2008, 30). This is why cases should not have a set membership of 0.5 because they cannot be clearly specified as members or non-members of a set. This in turn affects the ability to determine the specific truth table rows where they fit best (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 28). The quantitative differences in the degree of set membership between the cases that are similar in kind are indicated by assigning different fuzzy set membership scores to the respective cases either above or below the point of maximum ambiguity (Ragin 2009, 89–90; Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 184–185).

In order to reflect the qualitative character, each fuzzy set score was assigned a linguistic qualifier (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 184). Since the Asia Barometer Survey uses fully verbalized scales, the linguistic qualifiers of the fuzzy set values are actually inherent in the labels of the response categories. According to research in survey methodology, the response categories of survey items affect the respondents' cognitive process in choosing a response category when replying to the survey questions (see for example Mazaheri and Theuns 2009). These facts provide substantive reasons to assign a set membership score to each of the response categories. The endpoints of the scales were used as qualitative anchors to designate full membership and full non-membership, the crossover point was based on the meaning inherent in the labels of the response categories.¹⁹ All 3-point scales were calibrated as follows:

(not shown here) regarding the socio-demographic characteristics (sex, age and education) according to which the representative sample was drawn showed that the distributions are similar.

- 18 Overall, there are 18 items that pertain to political performance, socio-economic performance, political values and political trust. Among these, there are several items in the Asia Barometer that are similar in terms of content. In these cases (f.ex. satisfaction with public safety and satisfaction with the way government is dealing with crime), only those items were chosen for the analysis that explicitly referred to government performance.
- 19 Due to the large number of respondents per country, the raw data are not presented here. However, the data set is available on the Asia Barometer website. While the raw data can

TABLE 1 *Calibration of three-point scales*

Fuzzy set membership scores	Survey item response categories	Linguistic qualifiers
1	1	Very good
0.55	2	Fairly good
0	3	Very bad

SOURCE: OWN CALIBRATION BASED ON ASIA BAROMETER 2005

The point of maximum ambiguity was set between response category 2 and 3, as indicated by the labels. Response category 3 was coded as 0.55 because the linguistic qualifier reflects a positive tendency and the assignment of a set membership of 0.5 should be avoided as mentioned above. The 4-point scales were calibrated according to the calibration rules in Table 2

TABLE 2 *Calibration of four-point scales*

Fuzzy set membership scores	Survey item response categories	Linguistic qualifiers
1	1	Trust a lot/very well/very satisfied
0.66	2	Trust to a degree/fairly well/somewhat satisfied
0.33	3	Don't really trust/not so well/somewhat dissatisfied
0	4	Don't trust at all/not well at all/very dissatisfied

SOURCE: OWN CALIBRATION BASED ON ASIA BAROMETER 2005

In the case of 4-point scales, the point of maximum ambiguity was set between response category 2 and 3 as the labels clearly indicate a qualitative difference. The 5-point scales were calibrated according to the calibration rules in Table 3. The point of maximum ambiguity was set between response categories 3

be calibrated according to the calibration rules outlined above, the fsQCA data set is also available upon request to facilitate the reanalysis of the data.

TABLE 3 *Calibration of five-point scales*

Fuzzy set membership scores	Survey item response categories	Linguistic qualifiers
1	1	Very satisfied/strongly agree
0.75	2	Somewhat satisfied/agree
0.55	3	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied/ neither disagree nor agree ²⁰
0.25	4	Somewhat dissatisfied/disagree
0	5	Very dissatisfied/strongly disagree

SOURCE: OWN CALIBRATION BASED ON ASIA BAROMETER 2005

and 4. A detailed overview of the calibration of each of the conditions is listed in Appendix A.

Analysis of the Conditions of High Political Trust in National Government in Central Asian Authoritarian Regimes

First, we determined the necessary conditions of high political trust in national government (TG) as well as their consistency and coverage per country. Consistency indicates “the degree to which the empirical information at hand is in line with the statement of necessity, i.e., how far the outcome can be considered a subset of the condition” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 143). When studying necessary conditions, coverage indicates the relevance of a necessary condition (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 325). Second, we derived the sufficient conditions of high political trust in national government (TG) in a separate analysis for each of the countries. We also report the fit measures of consistency and coverage for sufficient conditions. Again, “consistency provides a numerical expression for the degree to which the empirical information deviates from a perfect subset relation” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 129). When studying sufficient conditions, coverage reflects to which degree the solution term explains the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 325).

²⁰ The linguistic qualifier suggests a neutral middle category. However, due to the reasons elaborated with respect to table 1, cases should not be assigned a set membership of 0.50. We therefore assumed a positive response tendency in calibrating survey item responses ‘3’ as 0.55.

Analysis of Necessity

When analyzing the necessity of the conditions, we sought to determine whether there are any conditions of which the outcome of high political trust in national government (TG) is a subset, i.e. whenever high political trust in national government (TG) is present, the condition is also present (Wagemann and Schneider 2010, 383). In order to determine whether the conditions listed in Appendix A are necessary for high political trust in national government (TG), we assessed their consistency. We considered only those conditions whose consistency was above 0.9, 1 being the highest possible consistency value (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 143).

As expected, we found several political and socio-economic performance conditions that can be considered necessary based on their consistency value.²¹ In *Kazakhstan*, *Kyrgyzstan* and *Uzbekistan*, high satisfaction with the current scope of the right to vote (sv) could be considered necessary. Counter-intuitively, in *Kyrgyzstan*, *Tajikistan* and *Uzbekistan*, the *absence* of the conviction that the government is dealing well with unemployment (~su)²² could be considered necessary, and in *Kazakhstan*, *Kyrgyzstan* and *Uzbekistan*, the same applies to the belief that there is widespread corruption among those who govern (C).²³

However, "conditions that pass the consistency test as a necessary condition should not be deemed to be relevant necessary conditions unless they also obtain a high value in the relevance measure" (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 147). The coverage of a necessary condition indicates the extent to which the set TG is smaller in relation to each conditional set. If the condition is irrelevant, its coverage will be low (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 147, 237). This is the case for all conditions listed above. Therefore, we must conclude that there are no *relevant* necessary conditions. Nevertheless, the omnipresence of high satisfaction with the current scope of the right to vote (sv), the *absence* of the conviction that the government is dealing well with unemployment (~su) and the belief that there is widespread corruption among those who govern (C) in the Central Asian countries indicated by the distribution of the values (not shown here) is in itself an important finding in terms of survey research as well as the quality of the political systems. We will elaborate this further when discussing the findings in the conclusion.

Analysis of Sufficiency

When analyzing the sufficiency of the conditions, we sought to determine which conditions are subsets of the outcome for high political trust in national

²¹ See Appendix B for the consistency and coverage values of each necessary condition with regard to the outcome 'high political trust in national government' (TG) for each country.

²² The '~' indicates the logical negation (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 47).

²³ The consistency level of 'widespread corruption' (C) is also very high in Tajikistan (0.88).

government (TG), i.e. whenever the condition is present, high political trust in national government (TG) is present (Schneider and Wagemann 2007, 32). QCA is characterized by causal complexity which is expressed by the fact that, a lot of the time, conjunctions of conditions instead of single conditions contribute to the outcome. This is indicated by “*” which stands for the logical AND. When considering the conjunctions of conditions, it is also possible that the outcome can result from both the presence and the absence of a certain condition, depending on which conditions it is combined with, i.e. $A^*B + \sim A^*C \rightarrow Y$ are permissible. In addition, QCA solution terms are characterized by equifinality, i.e. several conjunctions of conditions can be related to the same outcome (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 8; Wagemann and Schneider 2010, 384; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 54). This is indicated by ‘+’ which stands for the logical OR. However, the OR is not exclusive but rather inclusive, i.e. an individual displays a high level of political trust if conjunction $A^*B \text{ OR } \sim A^*C \rightarrow Y$ is present or both. Thus, the fsQCA solution term yields patterns of attitudes described by different solution paths. The arrow indicates that the expressions on the left side of the arrow are subsets of the outcome to the right side of the arrow. This subset relation implies sufficiency of the conditions for the outcome.

Based on our theoretical model, we included high trust in parliament (TP), the conviction that having a powerful leader (L) is good, and conditions characterizing socio-economic and political performance. With regard to the items measuring political and socio-economic performance, QCA's case-orientedness supports the idea of functionally equivalent conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 403). We chose those functionally equivalent items listed in Appendix A that yielded the best consistency and coverage values per country. The following conditions are included in the fsQCA in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan:

TABLE 4 *Conditions included in the analysis of sufficiency*

Dimensions of conditions	Political Support		Political performance (functional equivalents)	Socio-economic performance (functional equivalents)
	Countries	Values	Structure	
Kazakhstan	L	TP	SI	SE, SL
Kyrgyzstan	L	TP	SI, SV	SH
Tajikistan	L	TP	SI	SE, SH
Uzbekistan	L	TP	SI	SU, SH, SC

SOURCE: SEE APPENDIX A

These conditions can be combined into 2^k conjunctions of conditions. Each logically possible conjunction represents one truth table row. The truth table rows are essential for the derivation of the solution formula that describes the sufficient conditions and conjunctions of conditions of high trust in national government presented below. For each country, we assigned each individual to the truth table row that described it best based on the fuzzy set scores, i.e. the ideal typical conjunction of conditions where the individual had a set membership of higher than 0.5. We then determined the outcome value for each truth table row (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 179–186). In order to decide which rows are considered sufficient for the outcome and are therefore included in the logical minimization process, we used raw consistency as well as the proportional reduction in error (PRE). Whereas the raw consistency indicates the degree to which the conjunctions of conditions are a subset of the outcome, the PRE provides a numerical indication of truth table rows' simultaneous subset relations of the conjunctions of conditions in the outcome and the non-occurrence of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 242). We decided to include those rows with a raw consistency level of at least 0.90 and a PRE (proportional reduction in error) score of 0.79 or higher.²⁴ The analysis of sufficiency was performed using the QuineMcClusky truth table algorithm incorporated in the fsQCA program. With respect to the analysis of the individuals from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, several truth table rows (Uzbekistan: 22 rows; Kyrgyzstan: 3 rows) did not have cases with a set membership of more than 0.5. They are therefore logical remainders. However, we did not make any assumptions about them (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 162). The truth table minimization yielded the following conservative solution terms:²⁵

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Kazakhstan: } & \text{TP} + \text{L}^* \text{SI}^* \text{SL} + \text{L}^* \text{SE}^* \text{SL} + \text{SI}^* \text{SE}^* \text{SL} \longrightarrow \text{TG} \\ \text{Kyrgyzstan: } & \text{L}^* \text{TP}^* \text{SH}^* \text{SV} + \text{SI}^* \text{TP}^* \text{SH}^* \text{SV} \longrightarrow \text{TG} \end{aligned}$$

-
- ²⁴ The truth tables are included in Appendix C. The consistency threshold was set at 0.9 to ensure high consistency while allowing for some minor inconsistencies due to measurement error in the surveys. The 0.79 PRE threshold was chosen due to the fact that in all of the countries, all of the truth table rows with a consistency value of at least 0.9 exhibited a gap in the PRE score below 0.79.
- ²⁵ The parsimonious solution for Uzbekistan is: $\text{TP}^* \text{SU} + \text{SI}^* \text{SH}^* \text{SC}^* \text{TP}^* \sim \text{L}$. The parsimonious solution for Kyrgyzstan is: $\text{L}^* \text{TP}^* \text{SH}^* \text{SV} + \sim \text{L}^* \text{TP}^* \text{SH}^* \text{SI} + \text{TP}^* \text{SH}^* \text{SI}^* \text{SV}$ (solution includes all prime implicants). We chose not to present and interpret the parsimonious or intermediate solution as we did not want to make any assumptions about the logical remainders which would have to be justified. By presenting the conservative solution, we exclusively relied on our empirical data.

Tajikistan: $TP + L^*SE + SE^*SH + SE^*SI + L^*SI^*\sim SH + \sim L^*SI^*SH \longrightarrow TG$

Uzbekistan: $SC^*SU^*SI^*TP + SC^*SU^*L^*TP + SC^*SH^*SI^*\sim L^*TP + SI^*SH^*SU^*\sim L^*TP \longrightarrow TG$

The solution terms cover all sufficient truth table rows, i.e. all conjunctions of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome of high political trust in national government (TG). Since there are hardly ever any perfect subset relations in the social sciences, “it is important to assess the *degree* to which the empirical evidence is consistent with the set theoretic relation in question” (Ragin 2009, 108; original emphasis). Thus, before interpreting the solution terms, it is important to consider the consistency, the raw and unique coverage of the individual solution paths as well as the solution coverage and consistency. These parameters of fit are summarized in tables 5-8 below.

TABLE 5 *Kazakhstan*

	Sufficient conditions of TG				
	TP	+	L^*SI^*SL	+	L^*SE^*SL + SI^*SE^*SL
Raw coverage	0.813082		0.331405		0.382253 0.590487
Unique coverage	0.220254		0.005361		0.021054 0.030054
Consistency	0.922853		0.939832		0.933212 0.954417
Solution coverage				0.891546	
Solution consistency				0.901002	

SOURCE: OWN CALCULATIONS BASED ON ASIA BAROMETER 2005

TABLE 6 *Kyrgyzstan*

	Sufficient conditions of TG		
	L^*TP^*SH^*SV	+	SI^*TP^*SH^*SV
Raw coverage	0.401046		0.502772
Unique coverage	0.058800		0.160526
Consistency	0.936026		0.925965
Solution coverage		0.561572	
Solution consistency		0.925156	

SOURCE: OWN CALCULATIONS BASED ON ASIA BAROMETER 2005

TABLE 7 *Tajikistan*

Parameters of fit	Sufficient conditions of TG										
	TP	+	L*SE	+	SE* SH	+	SE*SI	+	L*SI*~SH	+	~L*SI*SH
Raw coverage	0.768204		0.353803		0.478605		0.446794		0.242735		0.315009
Unique coverage	0.223106		0.006323		0.010746		0.005974		0.011289		0.014509
Consistency	0.867634		0.948222		0.962025		0.969281		0.948893		0.962542
Solution coverage							0.866975				
Solution consistency							0.861727				

SOURCE: OWN CALCULATIONS BASED ON ASIA BAROMETER 2005

TABLE 8 *Uzbekistan*

Parameters of fit	Sufficient conditions of TG							
	SC*SU*	+	SC*SU*	+	SC*SH*	+	SI*SH*SU*	
	SI*TP		L*TP		SI*~L*TP		~L* TP	
Raw coverage	0.259300		0.105340		0.326887		0.220257	
Unique coverage	0.023082		0.019583		0.112584		0.005955	
Consistency	0.977099		0.981132		0.961018		0.975265	
Solution coverage					0.397421			
Solution consistency					0.961818			

SOURCE: OWN CALCULATIONS BASED ON ASIA BAROMETER 2005

The consistency scores for sufficiency of the overall solutions in all four countries indicate that the statement that the solutions are sufficient for high political trust in national government (TG) is in line with the empirical survey data. Therefore, usually, individuals' membership score in the solution term is lower or equal to their membership score in high political trust in national government (TG). This means that there are very few instances where individuals have a membership score in the overall solution term that is larger than their set membership in high political trust in national government (TG).

The solution coverage for sufficiency shows how much of the outcome is explained by the solution paths. It is very high in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and comparatively lower in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. While there is no lower

threshold for coverage, a high coverage score for sufficiency indicates the empirical importance of the solution term (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 137–138). Therefore, overall, the solution terms in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are highly important whereas their importance in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is lower.

The consistency scores for sufficiency of the individual solution paths show that the conjunctions of conditions are empirically sufficient for high political trust in national government (TG). In terms of analytical content, this means that in Tajikistan, for example, the individuals in the survey usually trust parliament to the same (or lesser) extent as they trust national government (TG).

The raw coverage score of the individual solution paths “indicates how much of the membership in the outcome is covered by the membership in a single path” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 139). Overall, as reflected in the raw coverage scores, in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, high political trust in parliament (TP) has the highest empirical importance, in Kyrgyzstan, it is SI*TP*SH*SV and in Uzbekistan, it is SC* SH* SI*~L*TP.

Due to the inclusiveness of the logical or, individuals can have a set membership of more than 0.5 in more than one solution path, i.e. we cannot state from the raw coverage scores in how far certain conditions have a ‘higher effect’ on individuals.²⁶

At the same time, in fsQCA it is also possible to determine ‘types’ of trusters, i.e. those who are ‘value-driven’ and those who are ‘performance-driven’. In order to do so, we need to consider the unique coverage score. The unique coverage score indicates the unique contribution of each solution path to the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 137, 139).²⁷ Only those individuals which have a membership of greater than 0.5 in a single path are uniquely covered. According to the results, there are exclusively performance-based sufficient conjunctions of conditions. These uniquely cover the ‘performance-driven trusters’: SI*SE*SL in Kazakhstan and SE*SI as well as SE*SH in Tajikistan. However, there are no ‘value-driven trusters’ in any of the countries.

Conclusions Regarding the Assumptions

As outlined above, according to Fuchs’ model, a positive assessment of performance is a necessary condition of high political trust in national government. In the analysis of necessity, we found that satisfaction with the current scope of the right to vote (sv) is necessary. The *absence* of satisfaction with the way

²⁶ This is in contrast to the usual discussion of OLS regressions, where either values or performance indicators are deemed more important.

²⁷ “A case is uniquely covered if it holds a membership value higher than 0.5 in only one sufficient path” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 137).

government is handling unemployment (~SU) and the agreement with the statement that there is widespread corruption among those who govern (C) contradict our assumptions. Yet, as indicated by the coverage of necessity, the conditions SV, ~SU and C are trivial in most of the Central Asian countries. This means that the majority of respondents in our sample of the Asia Barometer Survey are satisfied with the right to vote in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are dissatisfied with the way government is handling unemployment in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and believe that there is high corruption among those who govern in all four countries. Therefore, unlike suggested by Fuchs' model, neither political nor socio-economic performance are *relevant* necessary conditions for high trust in national government (TG), highlighting the need to take into account the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions when studying the conditions of political trust.

With regard to the question of sufficient conditions, as outlined earlier Fuchs' model suggested that there are exclusively performance-based trusters. As the unique coverage scores of the sufficient conjunctions of conditions show, there are indeed exclusively performance-based sufficient conjunctions of conditions: SI*SE*SL in Kazakhstan and SE*SI as well as SE*SH in Tajikistan. These uniquely cover the 'performance-driven trusters'. However, the unique coverage is very low, which shows that there are very few cases to which these conjunctions of conditions apply, i.e. they are theoretically interesting but empirically almost irrelevant. Furthermore, there are no 'value-driven trusters'. This means that there are no individuals who base their high trust in national government (TG) exclusively on intrinsic support of authoritarian values. Instead, authoritarian values always occur in conjunction with instrumental aspects as well as the other dimension of political support.

In line with our assumption, the results show that high trust in parliament (TP), support of strong leadership (L) and satisfaction with socio-economic and political performance interact. In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the sufficient conjunctions of conditions that include all of these dimensions have high raw coverage ($L^*TP^*SH^*SV$ in Kyrgyzstan, $SC^*SH^*SI^*~L^*TP$ and $SI^*SH^*SU^*~L^*TP$ in Uzbekistan). In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the sufficient conjunctions of conditions that cover support of strong leadership (L) and satisfaction with socio-economic and political performance also have high raw coverage (L^*SI^*SL in Kazakhstan, $L^*SI^*~SH$ and $~L^*SI^*SH$ in Tajikistan). However, in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, high trust in parliament (TP) has the greatest explanatory power by itself which does not corroborate our assumption regarding the profound interaction of the conditions.

In order to substantiate these results and ensure that these conjunctions of conditions are not also sufficient for the non-occurrence of the outcome, we

also carried out analyses of sufficiency for no trust in national government (not shown here). In Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, none of the conjunctions of conditions passed the sufficiency threshold of 0.9 and the PRE threshold of .79, indicating that they are not sufficient for explaining no trust in national government. In Uzbekistan, the analysis of sufficiency showed that: ~TP*~SU*~SH*~SC+~TP*~SI*~SU*~SH+~TP*~L*~SU*~SC are sufficient for no trust in national government. These results highlight that high trust in national government and no trust in national government are two qualitatively different states of mind that are not subject to the principle of symmetric causation. Furthermore, with the exception of Uzbekistan, no trust in national government appears to derive from factors other than those included in this analysis. This also underlines the need to account for asymmetric causation in future analyses of the causes of political trust (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 81–83).

Implications

In our article, we set out to determine the conditions of high trust in national government in authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. In order to do so, we adapted Fuchs' model of political support, which applies to democracies, to authoritarian regimes. First, the results contribute theoretically to the model of political support as developed by Fuchs as they show the need to revise the model when it is applied to authoritarian regimes. Second, the study clearly reflects the methodological need to allow for equifinality by taking country-specific conditions into account and to distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions. Third, the results of the analysis of necessity give important insights into the use of survey data in authoritarian regimes.

As justified theoretically, the first thing that should be taken into account when studying the conditions of political support in authoritarian regimes is that political trust in the political authorities is the essential dimension that should be studied due to its relevance for the persistence of the authoritarian regime in a given country: In authoritarian regimes the values as well as the institutions of the regime are associated with the political authorities.

In general, the chosen conditions explain high trust in national government well in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The degree to which political values, institutional trust, socio-economic and political performance explain high political trust in government is considerably lower in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Methodologically, this finding highlights the need for a context-sensitive choice of conditions of high trust in national government. With regard to the model of political support in general, this leads us to conclude that there may

be other conditions in Central Asian authoritarian regimes that explain high trust in national government to a greater extent beyond the conditions suggested by the theoretical model.

As for the assumptions regarding the manner in which political values, trust in institutions, socio-economic and political performance affect high trust in national government, the results of the analysis provide a mixed picture. Generally, they support our assumption that these conditions interact. This is particularly evident in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, political values and satisfaction with socio-economic and political performance are also important but comparatively less so than institutional trust.

Beyond these model-specific assumptions regarding the sufficient conditions, the fact that each country exhibits its own specific conjunctions of conditions underlines the usefulness of the application of the principle of equifinality. This takes into account both within- and between-country variations in the conditions of high trust in national government but allows for a test of a general theoretical model all the same.

The analysis of the necessary conditions yielded findings that are pertinent both from a substantial and a methodological perspective. High satisfaction with the current scope of the right to vote, the *absence* of the conviction that the government is dealing well with unemployment and the belief that there is widespread corruption among those who govern is common among the respondents in the Central Asian countries. All four countries exhibit high rates of corruption, which the public clearly perceives and judges negatively. Even though all four countries have similar unemployment rates, Kazakhstan is the wealthiest in resources among the four, which may account for the fact that dissatisfaction with unemployment is not as omnipresent in Kazakhstan as in the other three countries which are comparatively poorer. As for satisfaction with the scope of the right to vote, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan provide these rights to the greatest extent compared to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which is again reflected in the survey responses. Methodologically, it is important to note that the survey respondents stated their opinion regarding the socio-economic and political performance of their regimes very openly. This is indicated by the overall negative assessment of the treatment of corruption and unemployment. This provides greater confidence in the survey responses in these authoritarian regimes.

As for the generalizability of the results, it is possible to "formulate propositions that we can then apply, with appropriate caution, to other similar cases – that is, cases that share a reasonable number of characteristics with those that were the subject of the QCA" (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 12). Since socio-economic and political performance, authoritarian values and trust in

parliament are included in the conjunctions of conditions in all countries, our assumption that the people do not discern clearly between national government and parliament as well as political values is generally sustained. Therefore, the results suggest that our model outlines the conditions whose interactions should be taken into account when performing analyses of high political trust in multiparty authoritarian regimes in future research.

Appendix A: Conditions and Calibration Rules

Concept	Quest. Set		Abbr.	Resp. Cat.	Fuzzy set M.ship	Linguistic qualifiers score
Outcome						
	Q27a	High political trust in central government.	TG	1	1	Trust a lot
				2	0.66	Trust to a degree
				3	0.33	Don't really trust
				4	0	Don't trust at all
Conditions						
<i>Political support</i>		Q27f	High political trust in parliament.	TP	1	1
					2	0.66
					3	0.33
					4	0
		Q34a	Having a government by a powerful leader without the restriction of parliament or elections is good.	L	1	1
					2	0.55
					3	0
<i>Political performance</i>		Q31b	There is widespread corruption among those who govern the country.	C	1	1
					2	0.75
					3	0.55
					4	0.25
					5	0

Appendix A (cont.)

Concept	Quest.	Set	Abbr.	Resp. Cat.	Fuzzy set M.ship	Linguistic qualifiers
	Q31g	Government officials pay little attention to what citizens like me think.	A	1 2 3 4 5	1 0.75 0.55 0.25 0	Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree
	Q35a	Very satisfied with the current scope of the right to vote.	SV	1 2 3 4	1 0.66 0.33 0	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
	Q35d	Very satisfied with current scope of the right to be informed about the work and functions of government.	SI	1 2 3 4	1 0.66 0.33 0	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
	Q28c	The government is dealing well with human rights.	SR	1 2 3 4	1 0.66 0.33 0	Very well Fairly well Not so well Not well at all
<i>Socio-economic performance</i>						
	Q6d	Very satisfied with the standard of living.	SL	1 2 3 4 5	1 0.75 0.55 0.25 0	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied

Appendix A (cont.)

Concept	Quest.	Set	Abbr.	Resp. Cat.	Fuzzy set M.ship score	Linguistic qualifiers
	Q6e	Very satisfied with household income.	SH	1	1	Very satisfied
				2	0.75	Somewhat satisfied
				3	0.55	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
				4	0.25	Somewhat dissatisfied
				5	0	Very dissatisfied
	Q28e	The government is dealing with crime very well.	SC	1	1	Very well
				2	0.66	Fairly well
				3	0.33	Not so well
				4	0	Not well at all
	Q28a	The government is dealing with the economy very well.	SE	1	1	Very well
				2	0.66	Fairly well
				3	0.33	Not so well
				4	0	Not well at all
	Q28d	The government is dealing with unemployment very well.	SU	1	1	Very well
				2	0.66	Fairly well
				3	0.33	Not so well
				4	0	Not well at all

SOURCE: OWN CALIBRATION BASED ON ASIA BAROMETER 2005

Appendix B: Analysis of Necessity

B.1: Kazakhstan

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
TP	0.813079	0.922853
~TP	0.578464	0.751763
L	0.479302	0.763759
~L	0.657449	0.642687
SV	0.916302	0.765672

Appendix B (cont.)

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
~SV	0.391285	0.862247
SI	0.749072	0.835296
~SI	0.589673	0.782318
C	0.908082	0.691978
~C	0.322112	0.952354
A	0.880400	0.700996
~A	0.362336	0.918238
SR	0.635063	0.928860
~SR	0.706250	0.730484
SE	0.825458	0.885257
~SE	0.563031	0.784082
SU	0.496522	0.916572
~SU	0.812462	0.732734
SC	0.440671	0.966990
~SC	0.857916	0.718035
SL	0.802714	0.790592
~SL	0.475176	0.748082
SH	0.757130	0.804523
~SH	0.534796	0.753836

B.2: Kyrgyzstan

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
TP	0.772623	0.842796
~TP	0.621846	0.586843
L	0.597387	0.642617
~L	0.608431	0.581247
SV	0.907304	0.640317
~SV	0.357627	0.639277
SI	0.762160	0.697565
~SI	0.579412	0.655603
C	0.899836	0.564884
~C	0.317205	0.827289
A	0.879402	0.564657
~A	0.357895	0.854216

Appendix B (cont.)

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
SR	0.617240	0.881313
~SR	0.738372	0.578652
SE	0.563940	0.907012
~SE	0.781030	0.576564
SU	0.267214	0.895683
~SU	0.917901	0.547005
SC	0.357180	0.872815
~SC	0.852439	0.543940
SL	0.799005	0.656466
~SL	0.490295	0.645760
SH	0.742307	0.693877
~SH	0.556071	0.613366

B.3: Tajikistan

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
TP	0.768202	0.867634
~TP	0.541993	0.752059
L	0.538036	0.749271
~L	0.622801	0.701354
SV	0.807733	0.812273
~SV	0.501880	0.820511
C	0.882257	0.696539
~C	0.306823	0.903886
A	0.851182	0.716441
~A	0.380144	0.909420
SR	0.627767	0.891914
~SR	0.710942	0.787978
SE	0.590331	0.942346
~SE	0.751093	0.766712
SC	0.571089	0.913440
~SC	0.761180	0.776024
SL	0.766495	0.787015
~SL	0.499901	0.790795

Appendix B (cont.)

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
SI	0.602085	0.890930
~SI	0.722541	0.776689
SU	0.290607	0.933923
~SU	0.920197	0.710627
SH	0.690225	0.825615
~SH	0.604258	0.784685

B.4: Uzbekistan

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
TP	0.796990	0.857247
~TP	0.661999	0.535053
L	0.312031	0.608743
~L	0.848739	0.513024
SV	0.898278	0.662456
~SV	0.520502	0.641814
SI	0.603866	0.781210
~SI	0.804417	0.577065
C	0.894165	0.549660
~C	0.468323	0.866932
A	0.860034	0.533613
~A	0.473909	0.853510
SR	0.581705	0.893962
~SR	0.838180	0.552794
SE	0.640330	0.879956
~SE	0.828358	0.575535
SU	0.340330	0.922923
~SU	0.939653	0.522548
SC	0.656720	0.771138
~SC	0.794411	0.603958
SL	0.842109	0.683848
~SL	0.580538	0.620538
SH	0.747757	0.681074
~SH	0.662736	0.619925

Appendix C: Truth Tables²⁸

C.1: Kazakhstan

Row	Conditions					Outcome	Number of individuals	Consistency	PRE
	TP	L	SI	SE	SL				
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	78	0.979464	0.952760
2	1	0	1	1	1	1	50	0.985451	0.954857
3	1	1	0	1	1	1	42	0.967684	0.905339
4	0	0	1	1	1	1	28	0.969413	0.853813
5	0	1	0	1	1	1	24	0.955220	0.796246
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	0.850061	0.258314
7	0	0	0	0	1	0	22	0.890967	0.404693
8	1	0	0	1	1	1	19	0.976856	0.903121
9	0	1	1	1	1	1	18	0.965579	0.845638
10	0	0	1	0	1	0	15	0.945466	0.664123
11	1	1	1	0	1	1	15	0.968583	0.886741
12	0	0	1	0	0	0	14	0.910163	0.504420
13	1	0	0	0	1	1	14	0.987413	0.928260
14	1	1	0	0	1	1	14	0.984750	0.933523
15	1	1	1	1	0	1	13	0.976318	0.917289
16	1	0	1	0	1	1	11	0.985928	0.925027
17	0	1	0	0	1	0	10	0.942332	0.602441
18	1	0	1	0	0	1	10	0.975050	0.851182
19	0	1	0	0	0	0	9	0.897946	0.342447
20	1	1	0	1	0	1	9	0.977087	0.891510
21	0	0	0	1	1	0	8	0.954100	0.719709
22	0	1	1	0	1	1	8	0.971858	0.828359

²⁸ The following truth tables might give the impression that we used csQCA since the conditions are only represented in terms of '0' (not present) and '1' (present). However, this is not the case. Each individual has partial membership in all rows but is assigned to a single truth table row where he has a set membership of > 0.5, as reflected by the column 'number of individuals'. The set membership score in the conjunctions of conditions is derived from the individuals' fuzzy set membership in the sets described by the individual conditions. The consistency and coverage values of the conjunctions of conditions are also based on fuzzy set membership scores. For a detailed outline of the procedure, see Ragin (2008, Chapter 7) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012, Chapters 4 and 5).

Appendix C (cont.)

Row	Conditions					Outcome	Number of individuals	Consistency	PRE
	TP	L	SI	SE	SL				
23	0	1	1	1	0	0	8	0.951613	0.722749
24	1	0	1	1	0	1	8	0.978420	0.900000
25	0	1	1	0	0	0	7	0.948125	0.676018
26	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	0.937869	0.604576
27	0	1	0	1	0	0	6	0.947718	0.660168
28	1	0	0	1	0	1	6	0.985255	0.915645
29	1	1	1	0	0	1	6	0.978015	0.897716
30	1	1	0	0	0	1	4	0.970714	0.820195
31	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.952006	0.695524
32	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.980801	0.852731

C.2: Kyrgyzstan

Row	Conditions					Outcome	Number of individuals	Consistency	PRE
	L	SH	TP	SI	SV				
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	39	0.942996	0.808241
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	67	0.939141	0.839896
3	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0.935093	0.601828
4	0	1	1	1	1	1	31	0.931888	0.804707
5	0	1	1	0	1	0	12	0.9263	0.6917
6	1	0	1	1	1	0	21	0.918549	0.726751
7	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.914573	0.610374
8	1	0	1	0	1	0	16	0.913406	0.64154
9	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0.91219	0.530928
10	1	1	1	0	0	0	5	0.907526	0.57647
11	0	0	1	1	1	0	8	0.906578	0.652897
12	0	0	1	0	1	0	6	0.902893	0.561498
13	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.895954	0.460674
14	1	1	0	0	1	0	17	0.855836	0.46746
15	0	1	0	0	1	0	10	0.854481	0.390068
16	1	1	0	1	1	0	52	0.849473	0.55946
17	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.836132	0.384802

Appendix C (cont.)

Row	Conditions					Outcome	Number of individuals	Consistency	PRE
	L	SH	TP	SI	SV				
18	0	1	0	1	1	0	24	0.835867	0.467185
19	1	0	0	0	1	0	10	0.83193	0.372409
20	1	1	0	1	0	0	9	0.818954	0.371527
21	1	0	0	1	1	0	25	0.814674	0.416548
22	0	1	0	0	0	0	8	0.807599	0.285122
23	1	1	0	0	0	0	10	0.800098	0.308475
24	0	0	0	1	1	0	16	0.794332	0.352107
25	0	0	0	0	1	0	12	0.792533	0.272588
26	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0.749033	0.22921
27	1	0	0	1	0	0	7	0.747564	0.22012
28	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	0.746256	0.198214
29	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0.710994	0.208956
30-32	Logical remainders					0			

C.3: Tajikistan

Row	Conditions					Outcome	Number of individuals	Consistency	PRE
	TP	L	SI	SE	SH				
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	12	0.998074	0.991859
2	1	0	0	1	1	1	14	0.992681	0.971584
3	0	1	0	1	1	1	8	0.993590	0.944840
4	1	1	1	1	1	1	35	0.983393	0.943864
5	1	0	1	1	0	1	5	0.987769	0.939560
6	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.993200	0.936210
7	1	0	0	1	0	1	9	0.982085	0.931226
8	0	1	1	1	1	1	10	0.989816	0.929205
9	1	1	1	1	0	1	5	0.983010	0.915310
10	1	0	0	0	1	1	12	0.978785	0.909540
11	1	1	0	0	1	1	36	0.977347	0.904403
12	1	0	1	0	1	1	10	0.977355	0.902203
13	0	1	1	1	0	1	3	0.985647	0.900685

Appendix C (cont.)

Row	Conditions					Outcome	Number of individuals	Consistency	PRE
	TP	L	SI	SE	SH				
14	1	0	1	0	0	1	4	0.979411	0.896552
15	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0.985655	0.891981
16	1	1	0	1	1	1	17	0.976993	0.882517
17	1	1	1	0	1	1	30	0.970885	0.879631
18	1	1	0	1	0	1	7	0.976618	0.874158
19	0	0	0	1	1	1	6	0.976475	0.841270
20	0	0	1	0	1	1	10	0.975244	0.841010
21	1	1	1	0	0	1	6	0.968831	0.836799
22	1	1	0	0	0	1	17	0.963590	0.835901
23	0	1	0	1	0	1	4	0.976855	0.833606
24	1	0	0	0	0	1	21	0.950293	0.831792
25	0	1	1	0	0	1	12	0.970699	0.827161
26	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.958021	0.755459
27	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.954361	0.728796
28	0	0	0	0	1	0	18	0.934140	0.702415
29	0	1	1	0	1	0	20	0.949027	0.702382
30	0	1	0	0	1	0	27	0.939960	0.658122
31	0	1	0	0	0	0	12	0.932408	0.612567
32	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	0.837200	0.480155

C.4: Uzbekistan

Row	Conditions						Outcome	Number of individuals	Consistency	PRE
	TP	L	SI	SU	SC	SH				
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1.000.000	1.000.000
2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1.000.000	1.000.000
3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	1.000.000	1.000.000
4	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.982312	0.853535
5	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.974595	0.840909
6	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	13	0.965793	0.811089
7	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.981706	0.800677
8	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	0.974419	0.797546

Appendix C (cont.)

Row	Conditions						Outcome	Number of individuals	Consistency	PRE
	TP	L	SI	SU	SC	SH				
9	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	7	0.955674	0.760766
10	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.969438	0.750000
11	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	19	0.948702	0.737342
12	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	6	0.953074	0.721448
13	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	0.962904	0.711628
14	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.950783	0.690141
15	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	10	0.950923	0.675339
16	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.950254	0.671642
17	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	0.953084	0.664179
18	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.958457	0.644068
19	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	13	0.923765	0.612022
20	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.946860	0.571429
21	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0.942738	0.570895
22	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.934035	0.567639
23	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0.924259	0.562945
24	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	23	0.906971	0.560945
25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	7	0.916667	0.497076
26	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.913649	0.421642
27	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	0.942074	0.418182
28	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	7	0.922006	0.348609
29	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.903280	0.340909
30	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.913471	0.276316
31	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	15	0.801932	0.272852
32	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	18	0.817402	0.255930
33	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	20	0.845005	0.247713
34	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	9	0.848420	0.212861
35	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	10	0.837791	0.193966
36	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	8	0.871275	0.185557
37	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	6	0.827545	0.180266
38	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	34	0.784494	0.162551
39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	0.732458	0.162433
40	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	13	0.875122	0.157550
41	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	16	0.741506	0.142723
42	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.844573	0.030641
43–64	Logical remainders						0			

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