Chapter 1

Ethics and politics of the media: the quest for quality

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Journalism is an honourable profession, though many of those who should care for it, often including its own professionals, have dishonoured it. Governments of most ideological leanings, when not actively persecuting it, have sought to censor and control it, usually with success. Owners have used it as a means of satisfying their quest for power and wealth, not to mention megalomania. As for journalists, they, as the humorous rhyme reminds us, do not even need to be bribed to behave unethically. Even 'consumers' have done journalism no service by putting up with trivia and trash, accepting execrable standards as the norm.

Yet journalism remains an honourable profession, because it has an honourable aim, the circulation of information, including news, comment and opinion. This is an honourable aim because the health of a community – especially a community that has any pretensions to democracy – depends on it. There is no reason why journalism should not have further aims as well, such as entertainment, so long as these are subordinated to the overall aim of the circulation of information.

Many of the issues raised so far are taken up in the essays in this book, and some of them will be commented on later in this introduction. But we are also concerned with the question of whether the honour of journalism can be restored, and with the global context which matters to do with community, democracy and the media cannot ignore as the world approaches the millennium. In both cases the issue of *quality* will be at the forefront.

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

Unprecedented changes as the world enters the final decade of the twentieth century present the media with great opportunities and

great problems. The opportunities arise from the global need for information as human beings assess the chances of their own survival as a species, or, at a less fateful level, just worry about what sort of world and what sort of life for its inhabitants there will be in the future. Global politics presents daunting challenges, but authoritarian structures are no longer regarded as an acceptable means to political ends. The sort of alternative democratic participation and involvement that is required is impossible without information. Here then, as the people of the world struggle for a worthwhile way of life within a sustainable future, is a role for the media, especially those media that can still be called the press, whether they are part of print or broadcast journalism, so long as they follow the traditional role of the press as providers of information.

It is something of a cliché that the world has shrunk to a village in which the major problems are problems for everyone, for they are unavoidable and cannot be escaped from by futile attempts to keep your own back yard clean. Further, it is said that the world has become an electronic village, for almost everyone has instant access through radio and television and newer electronic media to the latest circulated information. But it is precisely the quality of this information which is at issue.

The major problems facing humanity seem to arise from an unstable mixture of politics and science, using both these terms in a broad sense. First of all there is the global problem of environment, resources and population, a single whole which is a compound of numerous elements. These include the problem of feeding the world's hungry, which could be done now if existing food resources were distributed properly and fairly (though the effect on world food supply of the collapse of the Soviet Union remains to be assessed). But even so, there is an upward pressure on all resources as the world population continues to grow exponentially, and at the same time the environment faces increasing degradation from pollution of all kinds, including that which contributes to the alleged greenhouse effect.

In addition, national rivalries, often over resources, but fuelled by chauvinistic, ideological and religious differences, threaten to bring permanent instability to international relations, together with the constant threat of war based on the mass availability of sophisticated weaponry, including perhaps nuclear weapons released by the break-up of the Soviet Union. The falling-apart of this once fairly stable structure is itself a major world problem, promising a very uncertain

future for the inhabitants of the former political conglomerate, together with highly unpredictable consequences for the rest of the world, as a large part of the largest continent faces the prospect of involuntary transfer from the Second World to the Third, unless some sort of stable and reasonably prosperous future can be invented for it.

Underlying the other problems is something which itself is a problem, science. It promises so much and yet threatens even more. Instead of being the disinterested pursuit of knowledge allied to the application of theoretical advances to worthwhile practical projects of global significance, science has become a commodity, dedicated to the production of further commodities for the market, from nuclear power stations to microscopic eavesdropping devices to artificially engineered viruses. Taken over by capitalism, science has become the slave of a consumerism which demands the instant gratification of the latest want, whether it be for a piece of electronic wizardry or a genetically perfect baby.

The dissemination and discussion of information concerning the major problems the world and its people face is necessary to both the democratic understanding and the democratic action without which the problems cannot be solved – without which, in fact, they will escalate. So here is a great opportunity for the media to contribute to the advancement of peace, prosperity and progress. But can the media respond effectively? For they themselves are not free from many of the problems that contribute to the world's difficulties.

It is another cliché that the question of the relations of production has been replaced by the question of the relations of information and communication; but as is the case with many political clichés there is a good deal of ideological fog about this one. With one fifth of the world's population – one billion people – in a state of dire physical need, questions about the production, distribution and consumption, the ownership and control, of the world's material resources will continue to be of central relevance and importance to the political agenda.

No doubt questions about information and communication have increased in significance and will continue to do so, but they are the same questions, about production, distribution and consumption, ownership and control. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to regard the world's informational and communicational resources as any less material than its food and mineral resources.

All the different questions about information can be brought into

focus on the issue of *quality*. In the light of the problems the world faces, the typical daily content of an American television channel or a British tabloid newspaper is not just a shame but a crime. This is at a time when many parts of the world with no tradition of a free press are trying to develop media that better serve and reflect the rising tide of democracy, and are looking to the West for models to emulate. But disappointment and disillusionment could quickly follow. For in addition to stunning triviality, these searchers after new exemplars will find enormous concentration of ownership in the hands of transnational corporations, together with governments who think little of selling television channels to the highest bidder.

However, governments with a purely 'market' approach to communications are not the only ones with no interest in the free flow of information. This, however, raises the interesting question of whether it is now possible for individual governments to have much control over the information available to their populations. The Islamic Salvation Front, which won the first round of the Algerian election late in 1991, proposed (in addition to the suppression of the civil and political rights of women) to 'challenge the vibrant independent press'.[1] But could they have done it? No doubt newspapers can be closed down and journalists persecuted, but even the former Soviet bloc, with its strict controls on printing presses, photocopiers, duplicators and even typewriters, was unable to suppress the underground press. But this was old technology, and new authoritarian rulers cannot achieve their aims without a major and unprecedented act of techno-censorship which would ban faxes, computer networks and satellite dishes.[2]

For many years the apartheid regime in South Africa held out against a television network on the grounds that it would corrupt the moral fibre of the people – meaning, of course, challenge the survival of the potentially unstable minority regime. When the government finally gave in over television, many people predicted the end of apartheid. They were correct, although whether there has been any causal connection is much harder to establish.

But any investigation of this would have to make some sort of stab at distinguishing between form and content, a distinction often attacked these days, but one which is unavoidable when considering global informational flow. For some forms of media can be more convivial than others, to use Illich's term.[3] Desktop publishing and local electronic networks, for instance, can be organised in co-operative and participatory structures which encourage communit-

arian and democratic outlooks and behaviour. Global, monopolistic media networks controlled by transnational corporations are more likely to pander to a passive consumerism with negative psychological and political consequences. There is nothing inevitable about these outcomes, of course. Local networks might encourage parochialism and hostile nationalisms, while global networks might promote cosmopolitanism and internationalism, as telephones and fax machines already have. But whatever form the informational structures take, there is still the matter of their content, and more especially, its quality.

Still, on the global level the need for information to enable people to play their parts as citizens of the world is indisputable, and the opportunities for the media are therefore legion. But beyond this, because both the politics and the technology of the media are rapidly changing in unpredictable ways, it is questions rather than answers that suggest themselves as conclusions. Who will provide, produce, edit, control and distribute the information? If it is local networks, how can they provide the necessary international outlook? If it is global monopolies, how can they be encouraged to have aims more responsible than the mere pursuit of profit? Can the media play down national, ideological and other rivalries and emphasise common humanity facing common problems? As old totalitarianisms collapse, how can the threat from new ones be overcome without plunging the world into further risks of war?

These questions raise the issue of whether the pursuit of profit or power is compatible with quality in the media, and this in turn raises the question of freedom. What is meant by a 'free press'? Is it the freedom of democratically elected governments (no matter how imperfect the democracy) to propose and dispose? Is it the freedom of corporations or individual owners to buy up large chunks of the world's media and to mould them in their image? Is it the freedom of editors to decide what gets broadcast or published? Is it the freedom of journalists to offer fact and opinion without fear of sanction or persecution? Or is it the freedom of ordinary people to receive full and fair information on all issues that are likely to affect their lives and their interests?

QUALITY CONTROL: LAW OR ETHICS?

Turning now from the global to the national level, we find that the issue of quality is still inescapable. A free and vigorous press and

other organs of mass media and mass communications are agreed to be among the essential ingredients of a healthy democracy. (We include the word 'vigorous' because it is clear that freedom is not sufficient: a press could be free yet timid or torpid.) This need for media freedom is recognised in various charters and conventions of human rights, as well as in, famously, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. In Britain, however, the media are already more restricted by the law, both criminal and civil, than in most other countries of the democratic world. So can the law act as a mechanism for quality control, or should this be rather a matter of morality – of ethics? But is it really wise to suggest yet further restrictions of any sort, however inspiring the idea of moral principles and ethical codes of conduct might initially sound?

In Britain the media are restricted by the criminal laws of official secrets, obscenity, blasphemy, sedition, and reporting restrictions on Irish terrorist groups and their alleged supporters; by the civil laws of libel and breach of confidence; and by the judge-made law of contempt of court. In addition to the laws themselves there is the problem of a judiciary generally unsympathetic to the ideas of a free press and freedom of information and firmly wedded to prior restraint through the use of interlocutory ('gagging') injunctions, a legal move virtually impossible in the United States.

But there is nothing obscure about the difference between the British and American situations. It is a matter of the different constitutions, but beyond this, a fundamental cleavage in political ideology. Britain is not a republic of citizens but a monarchy of subjects, living in a system in which parliament is both supreme in legislation, largely independent of judicial review, and yet still hemmed in by crown prerogative exercised by the government of the day. Subjects do not, or indeed cannot, have rights in the way citizens can, which is why the British constitution finds it so hard to accommodate itself to the European Convention on Human Rights, or to incorporate it into domestic legislation. Nor can the constitution recognise freedom of information: British public life depends on a strictly interpreted need-to-know principle, and those who are on the receiving end of government – the electorate – are not regarded as needing to know. The fact that this fetters the exercise of the supposedly democratic franchise is a problem hardly yet tackled except by pressure groups like Liberty, Charter 88 and the Campaign for Freedom of Information, and the depth of the problem is shown by the further fact that individual members of

parliament are little better off than their constituents when it comes to access to information.

The general laws of the land and the peculiarities of the constitution do not exhaust the legal controls over the British media. Broadcasting is subject to a number of statutory licensing and regulating bodies, including the Independent Television Commission, the Radio Authority, the Broadcasting Complaints Commission and the Broadcasting Standards Council. This system of controls has been criticised for several reasons, including the charge that the bodies have unclear and overlapping jurisdictions. The Broadcasting Complaints Commission, for instance, is supposed to deal with complaints concerning matters such as lack of factual accuracy, unfairness in presentation and intrusions into privacy, whereas the Broadcasting Standards Council deals with alleged offences against taste and decency in the areas of sex, violence, bad language and the treatment of disasters. But broadcasters have found the bodies to have expansionist ambitions, while at the same time being narrow-minded and generally unsympathetic to the claims of media freedom.[4]

In the case of print journalism there is no statutory regulatory body, but the peculiar history and status of the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) might suggest that there is no real difference. In 1990 the Report of the Calcutt Committee on Privacy and Related Matters proposed that the previous voluntary body, the Press Council, which had become widely regarded on all sides as ineffective, should be replaced by the new PCC, the function of which would be to supervise a code of practice drawn up by the newspaper industry itself.[5] The Calcutt Committee further proposed that this double-act would have 18 months, starting 1 January 1991, to clean up the industry, and more especially to eliminate intrusions into private lives, otherwise parliament should feel free to introduce statutory protection for privacy. (The Calcutt Committee had proposed that physical intrusion, including 'doorstepping' and electronic eavesdropping, should become illegal.) The press, rightly alarmed that neither the draconian nature of this intimidation nor the disastrous consequences of trying to enforce it would inhibit parliamentary action, has attempted what was probably intended all along: to behave better. At the time of writing the press is still undergoing its period of probation.[6]

So what have the actual and potential legislative and statutory barriers done for the quality of the British media? Very little, but this is hardly surprising, since the emphasis has been on restriction, on

negativity, on what the media must not publish, rather than on the quality of what does appear on screens and pages. Only in one area – a reduction of the more vile or grotesque invasions of privacy by the tabloid press – has this negative approach had a beneficial effect. But if there has been at least this consequence, might it not be taken further, by giving privacy some statutory protection? The problem with this is that it would almost certainly have a severely deleterious effect on serious journalism, while leaving untouched the trivia and gossip that form the staple of the tabloids. And in general any legal restriction on the press, in the absence of a constitutional guarantee of press freedom and some sort of freedom of information legislation, is a one-sided detraction, preventing the press from fulfilling a proper democratic role.

So is it to ethics, and self-regulation along the lines of the PCC, that one should look for the protection and enhancement of quality? Clearly, even if (most) legal restrictions were lifted, ethics in journalism would still be required, and it is notable than in the USA, where the law is less restrictive, ethical debate among both theoreticians and practitioners of journalism is lively, widespread and accepted as normal. Ethical discussion is essential because there are many ways in which the media can offend without straying beyond the law: inaccuracy, lies, distortions, bias, propaganda, favouritism, sensationalism, trivialisation, lapses of taste, vulgarity, sleaze, sexism, racism, homophobia, personal attacks, smears, character assassination, cheque-book journalism, deception, betrayal of confidences and invasions of privacy. And this is by no means a complete list.

CODES AND ETHICS

Surveys show that the press (especially the tabloid press) is held in low esteem by the public for offending in many of the ways just listed,[7] and although this fact in itself tells us nothing about the ethical quality of the press, it does suggest that a start could be made on quality control by contemplating the introduction of a code of conduct which would prohibit these journalistic malpractices and provide that journalists be accountable for their actions.

The further possibility has been suggested, on the model of the medical and nursing professions, that journalists who violate the requirements of the professional code should be removed from a 'professional register', and thus prevented from practising. Against this it might be argued that the nature of the harm (for example, injury

to health) which can arise out of a health-care professional's malpractice is much more serious than the harm (for example, invasion of privacy) that can be caused by that of a journalist. This could be questioned, however, for in some parts of the world, a journalist's indiscretion could put in danger the life of the subject of a news story. Also, if harms can be measured on a scale of distress, some cases of invasion of privacy may cause more distress than certain kinds of injury to health. Nevertheless, the idea that a journalist should be licensed to practise – with the licence being removed for serious violations of a code of conduct – is surely too draconian and anti-democratic a solution to the problem of media malpractice.

Whatever the disciplinary mechanism associated with a code, it is likely that a code of conduct will play an essential part in quality assurance. A number of supplementary issues arise, however, the first of which is what the content of the code should be, and whether it should be specified in broad-sweep principles or closely defined points of detail. But whichever approach is chosen, there will be the further issue which eternally crops up whenever applied moral issues are discussed: where do you draw the line? Several contributors to this book are concerned in different ways with this issue.

Take honesty. Yes, journalists should certainly be honest in their activities, in both investigating and reporting. But suppose some public corruption can be investigated only under cover, with the journalist pretending to be someone ready to make a corrupt deal? Or suppose there is a war on, and the journalist discovers something that might harm the war effort? Take privacy. A journalist might have the highest regard for the right to privacy, but claim that some information about a politician doesn't qualify for this protection. Or take the broadcasting ban on terrorism. Even if some aspects of the ban can be defended, is it fair or in the interests of democracy to extend it to archive material of genuine historical and political interest? Or is it reasonable to prevent the broadcasting of the actual speaking voice of an alleged terrorist supporter while allowing him or her to be shown on film with an actor reading synchronised words?[8] It is not difficult to think that wherever the line should be drawn it should not be drawn here. But the general problem remains, both in this and many other cases. Moreover, however much effort is put into drawing clear lines in a code of conduct, it is the individual journalist who will come face to face with very difficult ethical dilemmas, and have to make moral choices. No code can anticipate every situation.

Another issue arising from the idea of a code of conduct is whether it should be negative or positive, emphasising the avoidance of unethical conduct or the promotion of ethical conduct. Of course, these are almost the two sides of the same coin, but not quite, for 'Do not lie' is not equivalent to 'Tell the truth'. Lying, as everyone knows from daily-life situations, can be avoided by silence, vagueness or changing the subject, which suggests that not lying is an insufficient ethical principle, in both daily life and journalism. A newspaper might just keep quiet about facts which could produce embarrassment for a cause it supports. But then again as almost everyone realises, telling the truth is not without its problems too, for the truth is endless and seamless, whereas the exigencies of time and resources require some selection to be made from the potentially infinite. Of course, selection should be done in ways that are fair and balanced – but where do you draw the line?

The final issue to be raised here is that of the basis of an ethical code of conduct. Ethics is not (just) a matter of codes of conduct (plus or minus sanctions), not just a matter of rules to be followed. It is more to do with principles concerning the rights and wrongs of human conduct, principles which have some reasoned theoretical basis and which therefore apply objectively and impartially. Of course, this is not the same as saying that we know what these principles are: the search for them and their refinement will continue as long as human beings survive to debate and argue; but it is precisely the reasoned and democratic nature of this discussion that differentiates ethical principles from dogmatic pronouncements. To some extent ethical principles are, as Jonathan Glover has suggested, analogous to scientific theories:[9] they are not, and cannot be, handed down by an authority, but have to be discovered through the ingenious interplay of human reason and human experience, a process which while producing results of great value in both science and ethics is both fallible and endless.

In the interim, however, a code of conduct does require a reasoned basis in ethical theory, but the bonus of offering such a basis is that it can throw light on some of the other issues raised above, such as where to draw the line. Consider a code which is formulated in terms of rights. The mere assertion of rights might appear to have great political significance, but it lacks credibility and force unless a theoretical justification of rights claims can be offered. However, if such a justification is forthcoming, it might suggest a solution to the line-drawing problem. For example, if people have a right not to be

deceived, then deception in investigative journalism, even for results which would be for the general benefit of the public, would not be permitted at all. But it is doubtful whether this solution is satisfactory, for presumably people also have a right not to be defrauded, so if the fraud can be exposed only through deception by journalists, which right should prevail? But if it is the fraudsters who are being deceived, do they have legitimate grounds for complaint? Perhaps these queries about rights-based theories cannot be answered by rights-based theories themselves.

So an alternative approach to seeking a reasoned basis for a code of conduct would be to look to some variation on a utilitarian theme, such as the theory that conduct should maximise the satisfaction of the interests of those to whom the conduct is directed, which in the case of journalism is presumably the general public or those members of it who are affected by the acquiring or publishing of a particular story. This would link the values of journalism to wider pre-existing community and political values like democracy, justice and the public good. But the idea of making the ethics of journalism subservient to these wider values, though plausible, brings out a difficulty in the notion of journalism as a profession. Traditionally a profession has been defined in terms of a relationship of trust between the individual practitioner and the individual client, law and medicine being the obvious examples. Here any public benefit would accrue as a by-product of the primary one-to-one relationship. Journalism clearly is not a profession in this sense, even though some parts of a code of conduct for journalists will inevitably be concerned with a journalist's duty to particular individuals, such as protecting the confidentiality of sources or respecting the privacy of people in the news. But the promotion of democracy, if that is to be regarded as part of the ethics of journalism, is not a duty owed to particular individuals. Nevertheless, a code ought to be not just compatible with, but in accordance with, wider moral and social values.

Yet a third approach to finding a reasoned basis for a code of conduct would be to anchor the conduct in a virtuous character, one that for journalists would exhibit specific virtues such as fairness, truthfulness, trustworthiness and non-malevolence.[10] Whereas this again has considerable plausibility, two comments are called for. First, if there are professional virtues they are not independent of whatever virtues there ought to be in general. But this is no criticism of this approach, as the whole object of providing a reasoned basis for a code of conduct is to link it with a general moral framework.

Second, however, it can be asked whether the general notion of virtue is actually foundational, because the virtuous character might well be explained further as precisely the one who respects the rights of others or who attempts to promote the general good.

Clearly, the matter of providing a reasoned basis in ethical theory for a code of conduct is neither simple nor something on which consensus is likely, and so this question, together with the other issues raised in this section, will continue to be debated. The important thing is to keep the discussion going.

QUALITY AND THE RESTORATION OF THE HONOUR OF JOURNALISM

We have already briefly commented on the question of whether journalism is a profession if it lacks the basic one-to-one practitioner–client relationship. The fact is, though, that this question is not particularly important. Even the traditional professions like law and medicine are no longer as rigid about this relationship as they used to be; and other professions like teaching or social work exhibit a variety of models of the practitioner–client relationship. What is important is not a precise definition of a profession, which is bound to be too restricted to apply to the variety of groups that have some fair claim to be professional these days, but rather the *quality* of the conduct of members of these groups, whether it be in medicine or journalism, so long as it has a potential for good or harm. What is important is that the activity that wishes to call itself professional be conducted on an ethical basis and that its practitioners be accountable for their actions.

So there is no reason why the concern of the original professions for an ethical basis – traditionally justified by the need to protect the interests of potentially vulnerable clients – should not be generalised to apply to the looser conception of a profession appropriate today. So professions should continue to be essentially concerned with standards of service, and to be value-guided, and typically to incorporate these concerns in an ethical code of conduct.

In journalism such a code can be regarded as involving two broad aspects, the input and the output. The latter is what is finally produced by the practice of journalism, the reports, articles and programmes, the information that actually reaches the public. Here it is plausible to suggest that the fundamental value is truth-telling, but as we have already suggested, this simple idea is complicated in

practice, for the truth cannot be the whole truth. So principles of selection are required, which are themselves further values: fairness, justice, democratic significance and avoidance of bias and harm.

For the input of journalism, the day-to-day practice of journalists as they go about their profession, it is plausible to suggest that the fundamental value is honesty, but again the realisation of this value in practice is not simple, and other values will also have to be called upon.

Even if the fundamental values behind ethical conduct are regarded as somehow beyond dispute, this neither produces a code nor settles all questions about conduct. Partly because of the interplay of values within a code and partly because there is always scope for improvement as general ethical discussion continues, no code of conduct can be regarded as fixed and final. For if a code for journalists should be partially dedicated to the ends of democracy, the code itself is also subject to democratic means, to the sway of reasoned argument and discussion of the fundamentals of ethical and political life. Thus the question arises (as in the case of other professional groups) whether it is adequate for professionals to devise their own code without allowing for lay input into the drafting procedures.

The ultimate reason for having a code of conduct is to ensure quality, and so we return to the issue with which we opened, the restoration of the honour of journalism. We suggest that in both input and output it is the relentless pursuit of quality which can restore journalism's lost honour. But success in this pursuit faces enormous obstacles, especially in the area of output which, because of the essential democratic function of information, is probably the most serious barrier to the restoration of honour. In Britain at the present time the major obstacle is the lack of a legal or constitutional guarantee of freedom of information, as this lack directly contradicts values such as truth, justice, balance and democratic significance. But unfortunately the problem is not just governmental or legal barriers, but something deeper: a generally attenuated attachment to the importance of media freedom as a means to, and as part of, the attainment of a genuinely democratic and fair society. Information is power, and an extremely inegalitarian distribution of power is incompatible with professed democratic ideals. So what is required is a thorough commitment by government, political parties, the judiciary, business, the owners and controllers of the media, editors, journalists and the general public to freedom of information. Without it the idea of a charter for citizens is nonsensical.

What is true on a national level is also true internationally. A commitment to quality of information and information flow to meet the urgent and demanding need for action in a troubled world is required on a global scale. To ensure freedom of information on this scale both global networks and democratic access are essential. Here the enemies of freedom are perhaps even more formidable, though intolerant or totalitarian governments and transnational capitalist corporations are not natural allies, and to some extent their interests conflict. But whether censorship – ideological, religious or commercial – can prevail against the need for quality in the global media is not something that can today be predicted.

NOTES

1 Victoria Brittain, 'Islamic Victory Erases Algeria's Model Image', *Guardian*, 2 January 1992. The Front was denied final victory when the second round of voting was cancelled.
2 Even the regime in Saudi Arabia, which imposes one of the strictest censorships in the world, has been unable to deal with satellite television and the ubiquitous fax machine. See *Silent Kingdom: Freedom of Expression in Saudi Arabia* (London, Article 19, 1991), esp. pp. 18–19, 32.
3 Ivan Illich, *Tools for Conviviality* (London, Calder & Boyars, 1973).
4 Georgina Henry, 'A Mania for All Seasons', *Guardian*, 22 July 1991 (on the Broadcasting Standards Council); John Wilson, 'The Victims of a Galloping Lurgy', *Guardian*, 22 July 1991, and Ray Fitzwalter, 'Tales Wag the Watchdog', *Guardian*, 14 October 1991 (on the Broadcasting Complaints Commission).
5 Home Office, *Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters* (Chairman, David Calcutt) (London, HMSO, 1990). On the PCC and the Code of Practice, see Press Complaints Commission, *Briefing* (London, PCC [1991]).
6 Maggie Brown, 'Newspapers Pass First Test of Self-Regulation', and Michael Leapman, 'Now Showing: Muckbusters II', *The Independent*, 18 September 1991.
7 Peter Kellner, 'Nobody Trusts Us and That's Bad News', *The Independent*, 7 August 1991.
8 See K.D. Ewing and C.A. Gearty, *Freedom Under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in Modern Britain* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 241–50.
9 Jonathan Glover, *Causing Death and Saving Lives* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977), p. 27.
10 Stephen Klaidman and Tom L. Beauchamp, *The Virtuous Journalist* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 19.