PART THREE

Roles

6

The Monitorial Role

Harold Lasswell (1948) gave the media's monitorial role a theoretical basis, describing a basic function of all communication as *surveillance.* This idea has been generally adopted in communication theory to refer to the process of observing an extended environment for relevant information about events, conditions, trends, and threats. It conjures an image of a watching post, a lookout tower, or the crow's nest of a ship, which gives a longer and wider view and early warning of developments on the horizon, both natural and human. Surveillance is sometimes used as a shorthand expression to cover processes of observation, collection of information, and the informational content itself.

In fact, Lasswell's term *surveillance* suggests not only looking out but doing so in a planned and systematic way, guided by criteria of relevance and reliability. Sometimes it includes a process of reporting back to authorities or interested parties. In some uses, the term also refers to intelligence gathering and to watching for purposes of control, as in the expression "under police surveillance." In its most negative meaning it translates as spying. Foucault's panopticon, or model prison, in which inmates are under constant vigilance from a control point, is based on this sense of surveillance. In recent times, in the context of a "war on terror," this meaning has even come to predominate, especially with the extension of possibilities for electronic eavesdropping. Therefore, the term is no longer suitable to describe the function of news, because of its somewhat sinister connotations and implications of hidden purposes of control. We use instead the more general and neutral term "monitorial." This label emphasizes the open character of the activity and its intention to benefit the receiver of information rather than the agents of information or control.

The monitorial role largely fits within an early model of mediation in which the news media intervene between events and sources on the one hand and individual

members of the public on the other. In this sense, reporters act as double agents of communication, serving their sources as well as meeting the informational needs of the public (Westley and MacLean 1957). News is selected according to the anticipated informational needs of the audience. The intervention extends to providing sources with feedback about public response, which also serves as a guide for the media organization in its decisions about news priorities.

The most basic meaning of the term *monitorial* is that of an organized scanning of the real world of people, conditions, and events, and of potentially relevant sources of information. A subsidiary meaning is that of evaluation and interpretation, guided by criteria of relevance, significance, and reigning normative frameworks for the public arena. This element differentiates monitoring from the now familiar model of the omnivorous electronic search engine that assembles information more or less blindly. A third element of meaning that still lurks somewhat in the background is that of vigilance and control, with some negative implications.

A free press, given minimum conditions of independence and transparency, can legitimately operate according to all three of these elements in its informational activities, subject to the judgment of its own audience. Regarding its contribution to the democratic political process, the underlying basis for the monitorial role is the notion of the monitorial citizen—one who actively seeks information in order to participate in this process (Schudson 1998). In short, the news media in their monitorial role are acting in conjunction with a body of social actors and providing them with an essential resource. We return to this matter later in the chapter.

The Origins of the Monitorial Role

The function of public information dates far back to the military and administrative needs of governments, as well as to the needs of international commerce in predemocratic and premedia times. In its early days, most news gathering and distribution confined itself, in part as a safeguard against censorship, to factual reports of events and could be subsumed under the notions of observation and information. Early newsletters carried information along trade and postal routes about foreign events affecting commerce, especially within Europe. From the early seventeenth century onward, this form of press information, when converted into a saleable commodity, was assessed and valued according to its reliability as a guide to distant events and possible future conditions (Dooley and Baran 2001).

Reports that interpreted events were left to potential users, mainly those engaged in trade and commerce, but presumably also in governmental and religious circles. These early press activities were part of a larger range of in-

formation collecting and reporting activities, which were engaged in by agents of church and state for propagandist purposes, as well as by many other kinds of travelers and commentators. In fact the activity of informing the public by way of the printed press was part of a much wider pattern of activities intrinsic to cultural and social diffusion and change.

Not only were facts relevant for business and politics in demand but so was news of all kinds—about ideas, art and design, fashion, food, architecture, crafts, and technologies. The search for and retransmission of certain kinds of news has often been singled out as the key role of journalism and of the press. But this focus neglects many other peripheral reporting and publishing activities, especially in social and cultural matters not directly connected with political or economic affairs.

The Monitorial Role among Others

In clarifying the meaning of the monitorial role, it is useful to see it within a wider framework of media roles. One of the first typologies of such roles was based on a study of American foreign correspondents (Cohen 1963). These journalists tended to see their own role as acting as a link between (government) policymakers and the public but also as involving various degrees and kinds of engagement or neutrality. These could range from the role of informer and educator of the public to the role of advocate of policy, as well as critic. The basic tension at the heart of the journalist's work between neutral mediation and active participation has been a constant theme of subsequent research on the organization of journalistic work up to today (see Patterson 1998).

In the context of the struggles and conflicts of Western society in the 1960s, ideological virtue came to be attributed to active engagement by journalists on behalf of the public and even to some partisanship—contrary to the norm of objectivity that had been more or less established as the proper journalist stance. Nevertheless, professional virtue was still ascribed to those journalists who strove not to take sides but to provide the information the public needed for forming its own opinion (Janowitz 1975). There were and remain differences in the balance of valuation between these two views of the journalistic role, with significant variations between countries (Hallin and Mancini 2004).

Research evidence from the role definitions offered by journalists themselves shows some shifts over time (Johnstone, Slwaski, and Bowman 1976; Weaver and Wilhoit 1986), along with the changing spirit of the times. But the role of the neutral reporter has remained the predominant emphasis—essentially the basic task of surveillance—supported by the values of objectivity. Weaver and Wilhoit's (1996) evidence indicates that American journalists have consistently emphasized "getting information quickly to the public." A value has continued

to be attached to interpretation and investigation, the latter mainly with respect to activities of government and business that are perceived to be against the public interest. The additional roles of adversary, critic, and participant have attracted much less endorsement, although they have retained a minority following. This is consistent with the secular and commercial nature of the press, and its reduced ties with political parties, governments, and even campaigning proprietors. In other parts of the world, the predominance of neutrality as the desirable stance of journalism is less pronounced. However, it is still the most typical mode of journalistic operation (see Weaver 1999) and it has found its way into the reformed press systems of the former Communist world (for example, Wu, Weaver, and Johnson 1996).

It is tempting, when interpreting the work of journalism, to focus on the central activity of collecting and disseminating reliable information about real-world events—and to equate this with the monitorial role and with the idea of journalistic objectivity. However, this is too restricted a view. Media information does entail this core element, but it has an interface with other, less neutral activities and perspectives.

First of all, information is unlikely to be adequate without judicious selection and some direct or implied interpretation, which inevitably opens the door to subjectivity. It is hard to gather and publish information without making value judgments or applying criteria of relevance that have no objective basis. Second, the monitorial role overlaps with the familiar press role of watchdog or guardian of the public interest (Gleason 1994), since one of the criteria for selective monitoring is the wish to protect the public. This opens the way for a potentially critical or even adversarial stance. Third, monitorial activity also extends into the practice of investigative reporting that requires the identification of some problem and an active search for evidence rather than simply collecting and disseminating what is readily available. This can hardly be accomplished without personal engagement and without deploying some clear value judgments, even if not advocating them (Ettema and Glasser 1998). These remarks help to place the vigilance and control elements of monitoring in a positive light, since the "good" forms of surveillance are justified by the motive of public enlightenment. This is especially true when the media monitor on behalf of an uninformed public or of a victimized group and against the misuse of power or the negligence of elected authorities.

Finally, the related role of the news media as a forum for diverse views reminds us that our information environment includes not only data but also expressions of opinions, values, and beliefs relating to public issues. Contents of this kind are also factual events when they become part of the public record.

Despite the breadth and elasticity of the monitorial notion, we can differentiate it from certain other press roles. One of these is partisan advocacy or

commitment. In this case, any information offered is likely to be biased, since it does not claim to give a full account of reality and openly seeks to select and interpret news according to one predominant perspective and on behalf of some cause or group. Similar remarks apply to mobilization or campaigning functions of the press on behalf of a self-chosen objective. Two other distinct roles are those of entertainer and forger of social consensus (Fjaestad and Holmlov 1976); the latter refers to the many ways the media promote social cohesion and identity, sometimes deliberately, more often implicitly. Although information is usually distinguished from entertainment, there is no doubt that the satisfaction of general curiosity and the stories the news tells often have a diversionary and potentially entertaining character. There is no clear dividing line between hard information and other kinds of messages about reality.

Theoretical Underpinnings

It is clear from the description so far that the provision of information to the public has been a defining feature of journalism since its beginnings. In some respects, it is the essential task of the news media as defined by the press itself, that is, the very core of journalistic professional practice. For this reason, we do not have to look far beyond the press institution for justification and legitimation of this role. We could say that journalism offers its own theoretical foundations expressed in the various formulations of norms for the profession (see, e.g., Laitila 1995; Meyer 1987), which not only indicate lines of desirable action but also sometimes prescribe various responsibilities and lines of accountability: to the public served, to society, to those who are reported on, to journalists themselves, and to employers.

Nevertheless, there is no universal agreement on what is entailed by the central practice of monitoring and then reporting on events and circumstances. There are many acceptable variants and styles, as well as gaps, in the corpus of professional ethics. There are also failures and weaknesses that arise from the fact that journalism is not independent of its masters—the owners and managers who typically have other goals besides those of professional journalism. It is also arguable that journalism is too important to society to be left to journalists alone to decide on the appropriate normative principles. They see what is desirable or not from their own perspectives, which do not necessarily reflect the perspectives of others with an equal interest in the outcome of public communication.

For this reason, the monitorial role has attracted the attention of extrajournalistic media theorists. Historically, the first relevant theory was that of democratic politics itself, even if it is hard to find, before relatively recent times, any clear and agreed-on statement about the press's role in the democratic process—apart

from the belief that freedom of expression and the press were cornerstones of political liberty. Certainly during the nineteenth century and even earlier, the press acquired a key task of reporting on proceedings in parliaments and similar assemblies, without which their democratic credentials would have been much reduced. This aspect of the press's role gave rise to the notion of a fourth estate, which attributed power to the press as at least equivalent in principle to that of other branches of government (Schulz 1998).

While the claims made to fourth estate status have often been criticized for arrogance or lack of credibility, the key role played by the press in contemporary politics, even as neutral carriers of information, keeps this idea alive. At its best, this role is essential to maintaining the independent accountability of government to the public and wider society and securing the health of the public sphere. Democratic election procedures all take for granted that the media will freely circulate information about government actions, problems, issues, and politics affecting the public, as well as about candidates for office. Democratic theory tends not to dwell on such obvious matters, but they are necessary conditions of democracy, and they provide a source of criteria for judging the press and urging it to do better.

Arising at least indirectly from the same source is another body of relevant theory: that on the social responsibility of the media formulated in the report of the Hutchins Commission (Blanchard 1977; Hutchins 1947). In a famous phrase, it called on the press to provide "a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning." The press was asked to separate fact from comment and present both sides of disputed issues. Both of these points are aspects of monitoring, although not named as such. Taken together, they go well beyond what journalistic ethics require, since the latter are focused more on the avoidance of harm than on service to some wider public good.

The standards of fullness and fairness that the Commission proposed were echoed in numerous subsequent assessments and inquiries and appeared in many of the declarations that were formulated to define the informational task of public broadcasting in many countries (Nordenstreng 1974). The requirements for broadcasting, especially with respect to fairness and objectivity, went beyond the original formulation of social responsibility. They became part of a regulatory framework that largely ruled out partisanship and the unlimited expression of editorial opinion that newspapers were allowed. The reasons for this lay mainly in the shortage of channels and sometimes the monopolistic position of broadcasters.

Despite all the positive arguments just advanced, critical theory has generally spoken against rather than for the monitorial role of the media as described. Critical theorists question the very notion of objectivity (Hackett 1984) and thus the

desirability as well as the viability of any satisfactory conduct of the monitorial role. These theorists have typically viewed the provision of news information as a practice that does little more than reinforce the dominant and basically ideological interpretation of the world circulated by power holders and elites in their own interests. Neutrality in news is said to protect the essentials of the established system. At the same time, critical theory has usually stopped short of condemning the whole enterprise of objective journalism and called instead for greater awareness of its limits, for measures to secure true journalistic freedom, and for a diversity of news channels and perspectives on the world. A more radical branch of critical theory would still tend to view mainstream mass media as inevitably tending to the maintenance of an unjust social order. This is especially the case where critics adopt the perspective of marginal or disadvantaged groups and classes or simply of the developing world in its relations with dominant countries. In the postcritical era that arguably we have entered, normative theory has generally withdrawn from totally negative judgments and focused more on identifying the requirements of civil society and the public sphere for diverse and voluminous flows of information and expression (Curran 1996).

Informational Practices

The monitorial role involves any or all of the following practices in various forms and degrees:

- Keeping and publishing an agenda of public events, as notified by cultural institutions
- Receiving and screening notices and messages intended by external sources for further public dissemination; here, media act as an agent both of voices in society and of the public or intended audience as the latter presumably search for information
- Maintaining a reportorial presence at the main forums where political, social, and economic decisions are made or new events are announced and set in motion; this includes routine coverage of parliaments, assemblies, law courts, press conferences of significant bodies, and so forth
- Publishing reports on significant current events and reproducing key factual data on a continuous basis (ranging from financial data to sports results)
- Providing the public with warnings of risks, threats, and dangers that might have consequences for it, ranging from weather reports to travel disruptions and foreign war and disorder
- Providing a guide to public opinion and to attitudes and beliefs of key groups and figures on major issues
- Offering an agenda that signals current problems and issues according to criteria of relevance and significance to the audience and society

- Providing analysis and interpretation of events and opinions in a balanced and judicious manner
- Acting as a fourth estate in political matters by mediating between government and citizens and providing a means for holding government accountable at the bar of public opinion
- Adopting an active watchdog stance by "barking" when some major social actor is perceived to be acting against the public interest, especially in an underhanded or disguised way
- Initiating and pursuing self-chosen inquiries, when the information obtained suggests major deviance from the moral or social order; this may involve keeping track of gossip, rumors, and unofficial or personal information

There is an implied continuum of initiative and activity in this list of tasks, ranging from a purely observational and transmission role to a stance of readiness to take preemptive warning actions and finally to active investigation and actual pursuit. At this point, the monitorial role gives way to the critical and dialectical mode, which is essentially different. This continuum of activity is summarized below:

INFORMATION TASK AND DEGREES OF ACTIVITY
Receive and transmit notices of events (*passive*)
Selectively observe, report, and publish (*active/passive*)
Signal deviance and warn the public (*active*)
Seek, investigate, and expose transgressions (*active and engaged*)

As we have already shown, there are several tensions at the heart of the monitorial role, quite apart from the related issues of the perceived independence of the observing journalist and the degree of trust that can be earned from an audience. The most salient tension develops when informing moves along the continuum indicated above and finds a more active expression, for instance in investigative reporting, which acts as "custodian of the public conscience," in Ettema and Glasser's terms (1998). However, these authors draw attention to the paradox of journalists claiming to do this without applying their personal moralities. In keeping with the principles of objectivity, investigative reporters claim to apply news judgments rather than value judgments when they identify victims and wrongdoing. They see themselves as pursuing the culprits on behalf of the victims and society at large, not acting out of ideology or bias. At the very least, this indicates one of the main tensions in carrying out the monitorial role.

The problem of separating facts from values lies at the heart of the critique of objectivity and threatens to undermine the integrity of the monitorial role. When values and opinions guide the selection of facts, even when they are claimed to stem from a demonstrable concern of the audience or public, the basic understanding of the role as we have described it is violated to some extent.

There is no general solution to this dilemma, but it looks as if the information provision can only extend to active pursuit when there is a high degree of consensus on some widely agreed violation of the moral order or some compelling source of danger for the society as a whole. Beyond that, it becomes partisan advocacy or propaganda.

There is no single way of carrying out the monitorial role and no sure way of recognizing relevant practices. A diverse media system has numerous variants of form, format, and purpose. There are quite different media genres involved, although all share some element of "reality-orientation"; fiction and entertainment are largely excluded from consideration, if only by convention. But this still leaves a wide range of types of performance, including talk shows, heavyweight editorials, stock market reports, weather forecasts, and published gossip concerning any one of the many social worlds that the media bring into view for the private citizen.

Even within one format there can be distinct alternatives. For example, Campbell and Reeves (1989) studied the U.S. television documentary program *60 Minutes* and identified three different modes of doing what is essentially the monitorial task. One is the model of the "detective," another that of the "tourist," and a third that of the "analyst." The terms correspond approximately to the journalistic activities of investigation, observation, and interpretation, respectively. The terms also give a vivid indication of quite different purposes, practices, outcomes, and criteria. While these three different modes were found within the title and format of one television series, it is more common to find the variations distributed across different publications and formats, designed for different kinds of audiences.

JOURNALISTIC OBJECTIVITY

Most agreement can probably be found, especially among professional journalists, on the idea of the "neutral and objective reporting" of events as they take place. Here *neutral* means balanced and disinterested, unbiased, without an axe to grind. *Objective* refers to verifiable facts, and *reporting* means telling an unvarnished story in a nonemotive manner. In this view, the observer-reporter is no more than an extension of the senses of the members of the public on whose behalf the press acts. Those who hold this view do not want their press to do more than tell them what is happening in social reality, without value judgments, emotion, or interventions.

There is more to be said, but the idea of a monitorial role in this dominant meaning can be seen as delegitimating journalism activities that go too far in the direction of expressing opinions, conveying ideologies, or taking too active a part in the wider affairs of society as an involved and partisan actor. Emphasis is placed on information quality in terms of accuracy, fullness, relevance, and

verifiability. The information provision also seems to require the reporter not to be selective in observation when selection might serve some particular interest or have a distorting effect. So the requirement is to report as much of the truth as possible and nothing that is not believed to be true and open to verification.

The concept of the neutral reporter recognizes that there are many competing interests and warring parties in society but insists that the news media do not have to take sides or have any vested interests of their own. Society is also understood, despite its conflicts, as fundamentally united—sharing the same basic values and a common interest in survival. The perceived capacity of journalism as an institution to identify possible harm and to expose deviance presupposes a large measure of consensus on norms and values. Whatever the political system, when it comes to basic welfare or warfare, there is almost always, as noted above, the possibility of an ultimate appeal to a national interest.

Theories of pluralistic democracy of the kind formulated by Robert Dahl (1967) and others in the mid–twentieth century, especially in the United States, are most consistent with this view, even if some of its assumptions may be illusory, especially the notion of a basic shared interest between social classes. The more one parts company with such an individualistic and liberal view of society, the more the monitorial role seems either impossible to fulfill according to its own implicit norms or at risk of becoming a mystification concealing certain special interests.

According to contemporary thinking about the public sphere, the monitorial role of the news media is a dual one. First, it serves to define the boundaries of public space and the actors, issues, and events that lie within these boundaries and on which public opinion forms and collective decisions are taken. The news media are continually constructing and reaffirming the shape and contents of the public sphere. What is not noticed or not published is essentially invisible and cannot easily be made the stuff of politics or public deliberation. The second aspect of public information is the detailed work of filling in the foreground and background of the social world and identifying the figures within it. The boundary between what is and is not public has to be maintained and policed. The news media do this task without specifically choosing it.

If one accepts the main assumptions concerning the possibility and desirability of the information provision—defined as objective reporting—as the dominant press paradigm, then it seems to be the role most appropriate to democracy. The monitorial task is appropriate to liberal and individualistic democracy, but particularly to deliberative or participative forms. Both types of democracy presuppose that citizens as voters need to know enough to make informed and rational decisions, especially at periodic elections. The press has to be a major source of such information, since no other institution is able to offer enough ostensibly disinterested knowledge on such a scale and in so timely

a manner. Members of the public served by a press in this role are deemed to be capable of learning whatever they need to know about "reality" and in a position to act in their own self-interest. If the press is true to the informational ideals as outlined, there are no favors to special interests, lobbies, power holders. In some respects, those with power may even seem more restricted by the application of media information than other groups or interests, since the press knows who they are and is organizationally geared to keeping an eye on them. But such an impression is very misleading, since there are many legitimate as well as illegitimate ways available to those with power or financial resources to manipulate news media norms and practices for their own advantage.

Accountability

The press in its monitorial role is primarily accountable to its own audiences, clients, and sources for the way it carries out this role. The flow of information is largely self-regulating, with professionals motivated to serve their audience, and the audience considered able to judge for itself the quality of information or warnings it receives. A news medium that fails in the quality of the information offered, on any of several dimensions relevant to monitoring, will eventually lose the trust of its audience and have no value as a service. Moreover, freedom of the press in democratic societies gives strong protection to this version of accountability.

Nevertheless, a good deal of observational evidence suggests that the media can fail, both on a case-by-case basis and more systematically at an institutional level, in delivering an adequate survey of the environment. At the institutional level, there are numerous examples of the demonstrated failure of general public newspapers and the broadcast press to give adequate coverage to international events, their lack of diversity in news reporting as a result of media concentration, and a general failure to pursue any critical line of inquiry that offends the powerful.

The first trend has been described as affecting the United States to an increasing degree in the past decade or longer. The second has been identified in different countries as a result of market conditions, and the third also occurs widely because of risk-avoidance behavior. Overall, many if not most systemic failures can be traced to market conditions. As the media become increasingly valuable commercial undertakings, economic profit goals replace political or professional objectives.

Among the principal means of accountability that have been identified (e.g., in Bertrand 2003; Gillmor, Dennis, and Glasser 1989; McQuail 2003; Pritchard 2000), the market offers the least satisfaction as a remedy for failure, since the market is part of the problem. This leaves three main alternatives. One is profes-

sional self-regulation and an appeal to journalistic ethics. This matters a great deal, but cannot achieve much in the way of remedy in the face of corporate power and in light of its own internal weakness. There is also relatively little that governments can do by law and regulation when the media fail to offer quality information.

There is an exception in those countries where a public broadcasting system still exists, governed by requirements to provide full and balanced information services. But even this is vulnerable to commercial and political pressures. Indirectly, governments can do more to encourage adequate structures of media and information. The time has passed, however, when direct intervention to protect or raise press standards, as occurred in Europe in the latter half of the twentieth century, would be possible. There remains the pressure of public opinion, as distinct from the audience and advertising market, as a potential force for accountability. While this is effective on certain issues of media performance, it does not promise a great deal, except in the most egregious cases of media failure.

Power and the Monitorial Role

The media's relationship to power (social, economic, and political) inevitably shapes role performance. Criteria of news relevance are partly determined by the power of sources or the power of those who are featured in news. A central issue for democracy is that of the press's independence from the holding and exercise of power in society. In general, the West identifies a free press as necessarily detached from the State's power and with some independence from agents of economic power. Without this, the monitorial role could not serve the people but only the interests of power holders. Nonetheless, varying degrees of separation are found, ranging from complete separation and neutrality to full cooperation with authority.

The venerable notion of the fourth estate offers a kind of solution by crediting the press with its own power, distinct from that of the state. The control of information creates a power base in itself and is a very common feature of contemporary media. A question involving both daily choice and the institutional positioning of the news media is how much opposition or criticism media can engage in without appearing to undermine legitimate authority or challenge democratic norms.

Of course, there is more to the situation than this, including flaws in this optimistic line of reasoning. It is true that the press continuously spotlights existing power holders, special interests, and advantaged groups as it performs the monitorial role. But the same interests can also use this visibility to their advantage. The information provision not only puts a check on some interests

but also can differentially advantage them. It is a question of manipulating free publicity to the best advantage, and the skills and occasions for doing this are available. Leaving aside the issue of which concept of democracy one prefers, the idea of the press as watchdog has been supplemented by the notion of its being a guard dog for many vested interests (Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien 1995).

The activities we have presented as carrying out the media's providing of information inevitably lead to journalism serving as a conduit for information, ideas, and images that are far from evenly accessible to all because of differential access and the knowledge gap. The conduit is designed mainly for a vertical flow downward. The more powerful the interest, the more it claims the channels of publicity, on the very ground that it is powerful and therefore relevant for the public to know about. It has been argued that an objective press, as in the United States, only accepts responsibility to report the main streams of opinion about events and perhaps cannot legitimately go much further. The result is to restrict the reporting of very critical, radical, or minority views and to give extra weight to the power of the state over the media (Bennett 1990).

In the balance between benefit and harm from the media's informational activities, it is far from certain that the balance is always positive. And any assessment must account for the fact that the press is rarely a neutral observer. It is also a social actor, an economic interest in itself, and perhaps also a voice for some political or economically powerful proprietor. The example of the press reporting on issues affecting itself (for example, regulation, monopoly, or criticism) demonstrates the news media's partisanship, even when ostensibly detached from party politics.

Despite criticism along the lines indicated, and the vulnerability of the whole paradigm of objective reporting, the definition of the press as essentially an instrument for conveying information in the wider public interest has shown a certain capacity to survive and to propagate itself, even against the odds. As noted, a journalism that claims to observe and report reality but patently fails to do so loses credibility and any raison d'etre at some point. Where such a press is preserved by superior power, it still needs to maintain some semblance of connection with reality.

Even its failures to report can be a source of information about what is going on, as experienced readers of Communist newspapers learned at the height of censorship. During wartime, propagandists and controllers of information tell as much that is true as possible by way of the news media in order to maintain some credibility and at least the possibility of influence. There is an ultimate contradiction between very idea of the press (as understood here) and its gross failure to report on reality; seeing these as contradictory sustains faith in the monitorial role as the press's most basic task.

The Monitorial Role and Types of Democracy

As noted, the monitorial role seems most adapted to liberal-pluralist democracy, in which all citizens are presumed to need information relevant to their particular circumstances and to be in a position to generate a demand for it, which it is in the interest of a free press to supply. The market also promotes the appearance of news channels and publications that are directed at special interests, by whatever criterion these are defined. In the liberal-pluralist model, ideologically tinged news also can be purveyed.

Other models of democracy cannot operate without some version of the monitorial role, but with differences of emphasis and outcome. The administrative type of democracy puts weight on the informational quality of news and deploys a hierarchical notion of performance that deviates from purely market criteria. An adequate supply of information is only possible on the basis of a highly professionalized journalism that has an elitist orientation. By implication, this version of journalistic quality sets a high value on officially validated reporting or on information that of its nature is precise and capable of being verified. The highest quality of information is likely to be in authoritative statistical form. Facts count for more than ideas, values, or opinions.

Civic democracy values information differently and attaches more weight to the search for and supply of information. Service to the particular community matters most, and in this mode the monitorial role of the media is likely to be more directed or selective than under conditions of libertarianism or administrative democracy. Much the same can be said of direct democracy, where the ideal of objective news reporting can be challenged for its failures to promote democratically chosen values.

Barriers to Performance

The media's role of informing is well established and even protected in many countries by constitutional and other legal provisions. The press often has certain customary or even legal privileges, for example, allowing criticism of public figures, protection of sources, access to the sites of news events. However, even in well-ordered and relatively open societies, there are barriers to fulfilling the monitorial role; some are internal to the media and some external.

One obstacle concerns access to information that is not in the public domain, whether held by governments or private organizations. The rights of journalists to pursue observation and inquiry are limited by claims to confidentiality or economic interest in protecting certain information. The full and unhindered exercise of the monitorial role is rarely possible, although legal efforts have been made in many countries to extend public access to information. There has been

progress, although the news media are not always the beneficiaries. As recent experience has shown, under conditions of even limited warfare or threats to internal security, government and military sources usually control information tightly; access is granted only when the information predominantly favors the authorities, as distinct from the public. And information highly relevant to the public may not be made available because it is expensive to collect or sensitive enough to expose the publisher to legal risks. Judgments on such matters can usually be made only when there is full disclosure, which is itself the issue. In addition, limits are set to what can be published without potential harm to individuals.

A second general problem arises from the constraints on publishing information that arise from the economic conditions of media operations. Most news media operate according to commercial principles, seeking profit from the sale of news or advertising space. This puts pressure on the resources available for collecting information and a premium on large audiences. The selection of news for publication is influenced in two main ways: readily available information is more economical, and news that interests a majority is more attractive.

The first of these tendencies is likely to favor the reproduction of news from sources that are best organized to supply what the media want: news agencies, public relations firms, official sources, or other well-financed organizations or lobby groups. The general effect is to limit journalism's independence and critical thrust, as well as preventing a full and balanced monitoring of what is going on. Often this factor plays into the hands of the would-be managers and manipulators of news and news events, increasing the chance of news being propaganda.

The second tendency is likely to have consequences for the quality of news that is offered, especially its depth and fullness. Many complaints about the increased brevity, superficiality, and sensationalism of news content can be attributed to the imperative of gaining and keeping an audience. The term *infotainment* has often been used to specify the intrinsic inadequacy of much contemporary news from this point of view. The charge is especially launched against the neglect of more serious and complex public issues of the kind that, according to all versions of democratic theory, should form the subjects of political debate.

It is sometimes argued in return that making the news attractive is a way of gaining an audience. Information without delivery is obviously useless, whatever its intrinsic quality. It is also arguable that trying to please and interest an audience does not necessarily reduce journalism's critical edge, since political scandal and its exposure can have important accountability value while also engaging the public's interest. It is certainly true that the success of the monitorial role depends not only on relevant information but also on the public's attending to it. In that sense, the particular failing under discussion cannot be blamed entirely on the media.

Aside from commercial pressures for audience maximization, there is another factor at work, stemming from the culture of news production and its wider media setting: mediatization, whereby the criteria of newsworthiness and manner of presentation are more and more governed by a media thirst for a good story or good television. Central to this rationale is a strong attachment to dramatic narrative, to compelling characters and personalities. There is a premium on action, surprise, excitement, and emotional involvement, as well as on whatever can be visualized in the most compelling way. Such criteria put the form of presentation before content and inevitably distort the balance of choices made. There is likely to be a bias against length; wordiness; complex, abstract, or unfamiliar ideas; memory; and explanation. The existence of this "media logic" in turn affects those who seek access to news coverage, transferring the same criteria to the sources and shapers of public information.

There are other consequences of subordinating information gathering and publication to the influence of a dominant news culture and the requirements of news organizations in a very competitive market environment. One well-attested factor is the enormous regard for the scoop among journalists, which gives relatively greater value to unique ownership of some information than to its deeper significance. The citizen looking for warning or advice could certainly be ill served by this custom. Of particular relevance to the monitorial role is the well-attested custom of all news media in a given market to follow the same story (one held to have high news value) and pay continuing attention to it well beyond any informational value. This phenomenon has sometimes been referred to as media hype (Vasterman 2005). One of its features is the creation of news with a limited basis in reality, as when a few prominent incidents are made to look like a crime wave and promote a self-generating moral panic. All this reduces the value of news to the citizen as a "burglar alarm" that we describe below.

The net effect of mediatization, arguably, is a distortion of public discourse and a flight from substantive information. We have noted on behalf of news-making an argument that at least gains an audience, but it loses its force if the information loses most of its potential value. There is no certain way to settle this debate, since the outcome turns on what precisely is to be expected from the monitorial role, and in turn, what needs it is supposed to fulfill.

In a contribution to this discussion, Zaller (2003) advanced the proposition that for healthy democracy, news only has to serve a burglar alarm function. In his view, it does not need to meet the criteria of news encouraged by social responsibility theory, what he terms the "full news standard." In his perspective, news should be feasible as well as useful. According to the burglar (or fire) alarm standard, the essential value of news in a democracy is to enable concerned citizens to maintain a routine vigilance regarding political issues and problems

that are arising, without needing deep knowledge. On occasion, citizens need to know more and be more active, but not continuously.

Zaller's view is based essentially on the notion of the monitorial citizen invoked by Schudson (1998). It can also be supported by reference to Downs's (1957) economic theory of democracy, which sees the consumption of political information as guided by the personal need of individuals and the cost in time or money they are prepared to pay. A good deal of empirical research from the long tradition of news learning research also shows that the general public appears to learn rather little from even extensive and good-quality news, when it is routinely received by way of television or other mass media (e.g., Robinson and Levy 1986). At the same time, Doris Graber (2001; 2003; 2006) over a number of years has made a strong case for the view that the general public can understand and learn the essentials on important matters without needing a great volume of information. From the point of view advanced, most news consumers would seem to be sufficiently served as citizens by minimal, but well-chosen and presented, news provisions most of the time.

This line of argument is open to critique, especially on the ground that it simply tends to endorse current media trends of soft news, personalization, sensationalism, and scandal, which have been seen as diverting citizens from political participation. More specifically, Bennett's (2003) response to Zaller points to the problem that the news as a burglar alarm often sounds false alarms or fails completely when there are real problems. He also notes that although the full news standard and the burglar alarm model should be in tension in the newsroom, the burglar alarm model tends to be preferred.

The accumulated literature on press practice and performance does seem to support the view that the monitorial role is carried out only selectively and imperfectly (McQuail 1992). However, we have shown that there are various and sometimes alternative explanations for this weakness—especially in terms of media economics. It is not necessary to resort to totalizing theories that condemn the whole idea of press surveillance to the realm of ideology, propaganda, and mystification. Different media have different remits and goals. In fact, media institutions as a whole have become specialized according to their own choice of market sector. This means that in one sense, each medium can justify being selective in its own surveillance, on the grounds that other media will cover other events. But in practice, the whole spectrum of events is not covered, and there is excessive repetition as the media try to please the same news consumers. In its monitorial role, the media are usually a business first and a social institution second.

Although the monitorial role varies in its type and efficacy from media system to media system and from case to case, some general points from communica-

tion research indicate the factors that shape the monitoring process. The most relevant points are as follows:

- The range of the environment that can or will be monitored by a given medium or system is limited by geographic and cultural (including linguistic) factors, as well as by the medium's technical and organizational capacity. The periphery is typically viewed from a notional center, and the gaze is inevitably ethnocentric.
- The focus of attention is determined by economic and political criteria, according to the interests of the source of monitoring.
- Other things being equal, the large size and high status of objects, persons, and events is a guide to attention, plus what is believed to be of consuming interest to an audience (sports, popular culture, and so forth).
- More attention is attached to objects who seek publicity and wish to be monitored and less to those who wish to avoid it. The use of power and money by the objects of monitoring often shapes the difference. The environment is not evenly open to observation.
- Monitoring is not simply a matter of observing and recording isolated facts but of viewing the world from a limited number of interpretive frames. The choice of frames is likely to be limited by the range and strength of elite and popular opinion, and by considerations of national or sectional interest. Bennett (1990) has posited a process of indexation by which the media typically reflect the dominant and authoritative interpretations and marginalize deviant or minority views.
- Observation by the media is often guided and structured by a changing issue agenda that provides an initial guide to further monitoring.
- The probable effects of the monitorial role on the public are not a direct one-way transmission of information or views but a dialogic process. The media signal what sources the audience seems to want, and audiences develop an interest in, or familiarity with, what the media highlight. There is mutual adaptation.

Conclusion

In a democratic society with a free press, the news media in performing their monitorial role are vulnerable to numerous failures. In this respect, to a large extent, the quality of journalism is determined by society's general quality, especially regarding citizenship, the vitality of civil society, and the health of the democratic process. There is no special or certain remedy for this situation. At the same time, it should be recalled that there are strong natural supports for the monitorial role, both in the information needs that are continuously and widely experienced and in the traditions of reporting that have survived many

unpropitious times and threatening circumstances. The monitorial role is at the heart of journalistic activity, and this is what the profession has learned to do best. It is unlikely to fail completely or to lack some self-provided remedies, given the necessary freedom. The entire press system does not have to perform perfectly for essential needs to be met.

7

The Facilitative Role

The facilitative role of the news media is rooted in the democratic tradition of civic republicanism (chapter 4). The media reflect the political order in which they are situated, and the logic and rationale for their facilitating public life is primarily that of civic democracy. In this perspective, only within active communities do we discover goods together that we cannot know alone. Public opinion arises from deliberation and is not antecedent to it. Rather than an aggregation of personal preferences generated by the innermost self, public opinion is collective wisdom based on open debate. Civic democracy understands community as constituted by interaction, and therefore public communication cultivates shared interests and common goals. In James Carey's terms, journalism only makes sense in relation to the public. Therefore, it ought to

> preside over and within the conversation of our culture: to stimulate it and organize it, to keep it moving and to leave a record of it so that other conversations—art, science, religion—might have something off which they can feed. The public will begin to awaken when they are addressed as a conversational partner and are encouraged to join the talk rather than sit passively as spectators before a discussion conducted by journalists and experts. (1987, 17)

In their facilitative role, the media promote dialogue among their readers and viewers through communication that engages them and in which they actively participate. In facilitative terms, the news media support and strengthen participation in civil society outside the state and the market. Consistent with the normative character of their roles, the media do not merely report on civil society's associations and activities but seek to enrich and improve them. Citizens are taken seriously in clarifying and resolving public problems. The aim of this interactive mode is democratic pluralism. Instead of insisting on artificial

consensus and uniform public opinion, the media in their facilitative role promote a mosaic of diverse cultures and worldviews. In meeting this challenge, the media are accountable to the widely shared moral frameworks that orient the society in which they operate and give it meaning. In order to elaborate how deliberation, civil society, pluralism, and the moral order work in concert, the facilitative role of the media needs to be understood in its historical, sociological, and theoretical contexts.

Deliberation

The facilitative role of the news media is both rooted in and promotes deliberative democracy. In deliberative politics, the public articulate their claims in terms accessible to one another rather than holding them "in the privacy of one's own mind" or "appeal[ing] only to the authority of revelation" (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 4). They must "reason beyond their narrow self-interest" and use arguments that "can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them" (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 55, 2; see 255). The media facilitate the process of negotiation over the social, political, and cultural agenda. Deliberation is open to a "wide range of evidence, respectful of different views," rational in weighing available data and willing to consider "alternative possibilities" (Macedo 1999, 58).

The deliberation facilitated by the press frames the democratic process in normative terms as interactive dialogue in which citizens engage one another on both practical matters and social vision. In this approach, "norms and institutions are open to challenge and debate, and derive their legitimacy from the actual agreement of citizens" (Deveaux 2000, 141). The public is more likely "to take a broader view of the issues" when moral reasons are exchanged rather than using "political power as the only currency" (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 11).

Social conflicts are a major component of democratic life, and in deliberative politics they remain the province of citizens rather than of judicial or legislative experts. Affirmative action, environmental protection, health care policy (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, ch. 5, 139–59), global warming, gun control, arms trade, welfare reform, and doctor-assisted suicide (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) raise moral conflicts that the public itself must negotiate. Zygmunt Bauman (1993) defines postmodern sensibility as awareness that there are human problems without good solutions. When agreement is not forthcoming, channels of continued interaction are kept open by acknowledging "the moral standing of reasonable views" opposed to one's own (Macedo 1999, 123). Rather than taking for granted a consensual society, the presumption of unresolved disagreement appreciates the inevitably multidimensional character of community.

The Hutchins Commission understood the media's facilitative role essentially in these terms. The Commission went beyond news as accurate information and

argued that the press should provide "a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning" (Commission on Freedom of the Press 1947, 21). Put in different terms, the news media ought to provide "full access to the day's intelligence" (28). The Hutchins report called for news reporting that makes available "the opinions and attitudes of the groups in society to one another" (22). The report recommended that the media serve "as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism" (23). Recognizing the complicated character of democratic life, the major mission of mass communications, the Commission argued, is to raise social conflict "from the plane of violence to the plane of discussion" (23). Socially responsible news is defined by its obligations to the community. Instead of individual rights to publish, the press's rationale was centered in a healthy society.

For more than four decades, development communication models have taught us about the facilitative role as well.[1] But as Robert White argues, from the beginning development theory and practice have been "caught in a fundamental contradiction regarding the principle of participation" (1994). On the one hand, participatory communication has been emphasized, stretching from "local theater groups to participation of farmers' organizations in the formulation of agricultural policy." But all the while, scientifically based social engineering, and in some cases the primacy of state planning, have guided the logic of development practice, reserving for the "professional elite the initiative and control of development processes that deny the possibility of real participation" (95–96, 101). Early on, development journalism became anchored in monologic, positivistic, technologically oriented media theory (see Servaes 2001; 2007). The mechanistic modernization theories of Lerner and Schramm became development journalism's scholarly foundation, with "modernization at bottom an euphemism for Westernization" (Dare 2000, 167). The seemingly beneficial transfer of modern technology and organization has come to be recognized as "in reality an extension of the North Atlantic nations which implied a continued dependent linkage and a division of labor benefiting the industrialized nations" (White 1994, 104).

In contrast to the modernization model favoring political and entrepreneurial elites, participatory media in the republican tradition build and sustain a democratic constituency. Andrew Moemeka argues for a "facilitative strategy" in which development communicators "lead from behind." Derived from an ancient African tradition, leading from behind is a Socratic process of identifying together "what is appropriate to do and how to effectively and efficiently do it" (2000, 119). Ideas and plans are not imposed by outside experts, but communities build up their own knowledge and experience through interactive learning. This dialogic version of development communication depends on collaboration within the grass roots rather than a top-down approach to problem solving. Looking closely at the "complex process of constructing meaning in everyday

life," White identifies a "ritualistic cultural dramaturgy" distinct from the diffusion paradigm. "The focus is on the grass roots construction of meaning, the generation of common cultural symbols, and projection of a public conception of historical development that evokes wide identification and participation" (1994, 113–14).[2] The role of the state is not to command the efforts of local and regional groups, but to respond to and facilitate their initiatives.

Breaking with the Western ideal of objective and detached reporting, development communication identifies the ways citizens can act on their own. According to Galtung and Vincent, development-oriented news media give people a voice, allowing them to talk, letting them "run more of society," and then reporting on what happens (1992, 146, 163–64). Such media promote participatory communication among ordinary people and respond to the peoples' concerns rather than the interests of the governmental elite and powerful nations. Journalists are seen as active community participants committed to understanding the concrete life of their community from the inside out.

The social narrative we call news is an agent of deliberation. In Glasser's conversational model of journalism, publicly told stories engage others by creating shared experiences and fostering mutual understanding (1991; see 1999b). In these terms, public journalism has made the facilitative role the most nuanced and explicit. Also called civic or community journalism, public journalism follows in the tradition of social responsibility theory and development communication, but is more up front with its citizen-based values and is more ambitious about actually understanding the community.[3] From this perspective, journalism is an avowedly democratic practice that "stimulate[s] citizen deliberation and build[s] public understanding of issues, and . . . report[s] on major public problems in a way that advances public knowledge of possible solutions and the values served by alternative courses of action" (Lambeth, Meyer, and Thorson 1998, 17). Such journalism differs from conventional journalism in seeing people as a public rather than individual consumers, "as potential actors in arriving at democratic solutions to public problems." Public journalism goes "beyond the limited mission of telling the news to a broader mission of helping public life to go well" (Merritt 1995, 113–14; see Merritt and McCombs 2004).[4]

In the midst of weakening demand for serious news, political news losing its credibility, and flagging interest in civic affairs, media professionals and academics began searching in the 1990s for a new kind of journalism. "They set out to understand democracy in a new way, so they could see journalism from another angle: as democracy's cultivator, as well as its chronicler" (Rosen 1999b, 8). Public journalism was born from the need for a more robust public and greater citizen involvement. Edmund Lambeth describes this form of journalism as listening sympathetically to the stories and ideas of citizens and choosing frames for them that best stimulate the people's deliberation and build public understanding of the issues (Lambeth 1998, 17).

While the movement spawned by public journalism has its roots in the United States, similar "experiments [are being] carried out by media houses around the world," attempting to engage citizens in interactive democracy. In Latin America, "more public journalism projects have been carried out than in any other continent" (Mwangi 2001, 24–25; 2007). *El Nuevo Dia* and *La Razon* have identified corruption as the main threat to democracy in Bolivia and are highlighting citizens' responsibility to come to grips with it. In Costa Rica, Radio Reloj, the leading news radio station, and San Jose's Channel 6 television station are engaged in community forums. Journalists in Kingston, Jamaica, involve citizens in serious efforts to take on health problems such as HIV and prostate cancer (Mwangi 2001, 26; 2007). Since the mid-1980s, "many Guatemalan newspapers have enlarged and invigorated the public sphere by reporting and commenting on the peace process, and by opening their pages to a variety of public opinion" (Crocker 2000, 113).

James Fishkin (2007; see 1992; see Fishkin and Laslett 2003; Ackerman and Fishkin 2005) of Stanford University's Center for Deliberative Democracy has carried out successful experiments in facilitating democratic deliberation. He advocates deliberative polling, in which citizens inform themselves on the issues ahead of time and then discuss them together before a national television audience, with the conclusions reported in the major newspapers. In October 2007, a European Union–wide deliberative opinion poll was held in Brussels from a Friday afternoon through a Sunday evening. A total of 362 citizens from all twenty-seven EU countries deliberated in twenty-two languages on key social and foreign policy issues, under the title *Tomorrow's Europe* and hosted by Fishkin's "deliberative poll" and *Notre Europe,* with twenty cosponsors across Europe. The delegates were chosen by country in proportion to their representation in the EU parliament, from a random sample of thirty-five hundred citizens who took a comprehensive questionnaire to qualify for final selection. The pre- and posttests indicated that as the event concluded the participants were dramatically more informed and changed their views about a number of important issues relating to the European Union's future. Participants from the twelve newer and fifteen older member states generally started with different opinions but tended to converge on such issues as economic reform, international trade, enlargement, and the European Union's role in the world (see www.tomorrow.stanfo.eu; http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/eu/index/html).

"We the People Wisconsin" (WTPW) is a facilitative project operating in Madison, Wisconsin, since 1992—the oldest civic journalism enterprise in the United States. The rationale for WTPW is deliberation. Television, newspapers, and radio collaborate to air to the community town hall meetings, hearings, debates, and citizen juries on policy issues and elections (see www.wtpeople.com). For the principals of WTPW, its basic mission is "to facilitate conversa-

tions and to help reestablish the link between people and politics. . . . ["We the People"] views [itself] as a catalyst for stronger community conversation and therefore for stronger public life" (Friedland, Sotirovic, and Daily 1998, 202; see Friedland 2003; Sirianni and Friedland 2005, ch. 5). The longevity of the project gives it notoriety, and the quality of its televised deliberations makes it credible. It has generated coalitions across a wide range of economic, religious, political, and voluntary grassroots groups. However, as the project's scope is statewide, it has been less successful at generating local problem solving. This project demonstrates how media-driven deliberation can be institutionalized cooperatively, though it self-consciously uses a strategy of weak deliberation (Barber 1984; see 1998; 2007) in which "there is no intention to organize deliberation beyond the presentation of individual projects" (Friedland et al. 1998, 206; see Friedland 2004).

In journalism's facilitative role, media practitioners do not reduce social issues to financial and administrative problems for politicians but enable the public to come to terms with their everyday experiences themselves. They aim for "writing that moves a public to meaningful judgment and meaningful action"; they exhibit a "form of textuality that turns citizens into readers and readers into persons who take democratic action in the world" (Denzin 1997, 282; see 2003, 106–30).

Civil Society

The media facilitate civil society. They actively support and strengthen democratic participation in neighborhoods, churches, and organizations outside the state and the market (Arato 2000; 2005; Cohen and Arato 1992; Edwards 2004; Sandel 1998; 2005, ch. 5). Since Habermas, theorists of deliberative democracy have disputed the proper range of deliberation. Rather than being limited to conventional government institutions, as Joshua Cohen (2002) and others would restrict it, deliberation here includes all civic, professional, and cultural associations. This is a normative claim, in that the media do not simply report on civil society's activities and institutions but seek to promote and improve them. The civil society argument is considered a "strategy to remedy a number of the political ills that plague contemporary politics" (Fierlbeck 1998, 148; see Miller and Walzer 2007; Walzer 1995; 2004, 66–89).

The pivotal historical figure in developing the concept of civil society was G. W. F. Hegel. In the early nineteenth century, he identified self-supporting citizens with their own centers of gravity as entities distinct from the political state on the one hand and from the family on the other. Fierlbeck (150) refers to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right.* Taylor (1991) puts Hegel's notion in the context of other political theorists, principally Locke and Montesquieu. Reidel (1984)

describes civil society in terms of Hegel himself. For Kaviraj and Khilnani, Hegel also is "the pivotal figure in shaping contemporary understandings" of civil society (2001, 23), while they remind us that it is an old term that "entered into English usage via the Latin translation, *societas civilis,* of Aristotle's *koinonia politike*" (17). In addition, their comprehensive review locates other traditions besides the German strand running through Hegel and Marx, such as those of the Scottish and French Enlightenment (chs. 4 and 5). Kaviraj and Khilnani also describe how intellectuals in various non-Western countries are "infusing new and complex life" (12) into the concept—in India, Latin America, the Middle East, China, Africa, and Southeast Asia (chs. 8–14).

Habermas describes civil society as "nongovernmental and noneconomic connections and voluntary associations that anchor communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of the life world" (1996a, 366–67). A precondition of civil societies is that members have transient character, are mutable, "able to choose political loyalties and public affiliations," and thus have "the capacity of being open to discursive persuasion and deliberation" (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001, 28). In this sense, healthy democracies depend on an "energetic civil society which is able to force issues and perspectives onto a public agenda" (Stevenson 1999, 43).[5] The Sudanese Council of Churches has broadcast its *Radio Voice of Hope* (www.radiovoiceofhope.net) to millions of displaced persons in southern Sudan during years of war, mistrust, and political conflict (Herfkens 2001, 6; see Lippman 2007). The League of Women Voters has advocated a wide variety of civic innovations in child care and the environment. Authoritarian states insist on a quiescent and depoliticized civil society instead.

The public sphere is located in civil society. Therefore, among contemporary North American philosophers such as Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, and Robert Bellah, the concern is not the overwhelming power of the state but "the nature of citizenship itself" (Fierlbeck 1998, 153; see 2006). For Sandel, liberal freedom in the Lockean tradition presumes "a neutral framework of rights within which people can choose their own values and ends." The civil society is built on "republican freedom," which "requires a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities of character that self-government requires" (Sandel 1998, 58; see 2005, ch. 5). In Taylor's terms, advocating the ideal civil society pushes us toward the "norm of self-determination" rather than marginalizing the political. Retrieving a rich and complex understanding of civil society gives us a framework for moving forward on human rights (Taylor 1991, 131; see Benhabib 2006, 13–81; Fierlbeck 1998, 173).

At the last World Conference on Human Rights, for example, in Vienna in the summer of 1993, 171 states were represented, but 800 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were also—two-thirds of them at the grassroots level. The UN General Assembly, not the NGOs, set the agenda and endorsed the

resolutions. Moreover, the committee drafting the final declaration excluded the NGOs, and their three thousand representatives were largely sealed off on the first floor of the Austria Center from the official delegates of participating governments. Despite these limitations, human rights agencies and organizations exercised enormous influence. The voice and expertise of NGO delegates explicitly shaped the assessment of how much had been accomplished since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New ground would not have been broken, extending the definition of human rights to children, indigenous people, and women, without the presence of the NGOs Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Human Rights Law Group, and the Global Campaign for Women's Human Rights, among others. United Nations mechanisms for defending human rights would not have been strengthened without their presence either.[6] Meanwhile, the NGOs' knowledge of human rights history, specific abuses, UN machinery, additional resources, and strategies were indispensable to the news media in their coverage of the convention. The voices of civil society were crucial in developing an understanding of the ways democratic participation and sustainable development must be integrated.

Civil society is not merely "those human networks that exist independently of, if not anterior to, the political state" (Isaac 1993, 357; see Fierlbeck 1998, 154; Taylor 1991, 117). The "composition of state and civil society" is a "complex relationship rather than a clear opposition. . . . Politicians, military officers, and bureaucrats belong to churches or clubs or cultural associations" and thus do not always make "decisions on behalf of the state that are purely divorced from the interests of civil society" (Fierlbeck 1998, 155–56). Civil associations lobby the government; and trade unions, for example, galvanized democratization in South Africa. In terms of civil society's genealogy, some versions of the concept are concerned about authoritarian states, "while those in industrial democracies tend to focus on the political apathy and nihilism of modern urban life" (162).

Gordon White accounts for these complexities by adopting a broad definition of civil society but insisting that each manifestation be understood in its particular context. Civil society, in his terms, is "the intermediate associational realm between the state and family populated by organizations which . . . are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values." All such associations must be explained in terms of their "relationship to the broader socio-economic structure" in which they are embedded (White 1994, 378, 386). Deliberation is never free of power (Cohen and Arato 1994, 23). The civil society is not an ideal arena absent of coercion. It includes such nongovernmental international associations as Doctors Without Borders, Friends of the Earth, World Peace Federation, World-Watch on Deforestation, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the International Red Cross, the Roman Catholic Church, Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace, Amnesty International,

the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, and the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines. Women's movements and organized labor also are civil society associations. All of them of any consequence "contain inequalities and domination," and their "internal balances of power" typically determine their effectiveness as agents of democratization (White 1994, 385).[7]

Cultural Context

The media facilitate the cultural conditions of democratic life. Through communication, human beings not only exchange goods and services but vivify their beliefs and presumptions about the world. A "secure cultural context" is increasingly recognized as resisting the individualizing forces of liberal democracy (Taylor 1992b; see 2007). For Benhabib, Rawls's political conception of democracy is rooted "in the state and its organizations, including first and foremost the legal sphere and its institutions" (2002, 109). She argues that his model of public reason gives us a restricted agenda. It pushes too many issues that involve our cultural lives "into the private sphere and precludes them from public consideration" (110). Her version of civic republicanism—what she calls deliberative democracy—includes a second, cultural track, though not as a separate and isolated "background culture" (111; Rawls's label); dualism is "analytically untenable." The noncoercive political process to which democracies subscribe cannot be isolated from their religious, philosophical, and moral dimensions: "gender equality, bodily integrity, freedom of the person, education of children," and the practices of minority subcultures (111). There is no "baseline of a nonpolitical culture in a liberal society" (120). A "vital interaction" exists between the formal institutions of liberal democracies like legislatures, the courts, and the bureaucracy and the unofficial processes of civil society as articulated through the media and social movements and associations" (121). In the discourse ethics that undergirds Benhabib's multicultural democracy, a society's members are required to create "public practices, dialogues and spaces" for "controversial normative questions in which all those affected can participate" (114; see 2006, 13–44).

In other words, culture provides the environment in which autonomy and rights are meaningful. Human identity is constituted through the sociocultural realm. Cultures are the collective beliefs and customs within which we communicate, and therefore the fundamental "context within which we make our political choices" (Tully 1995, 5; see Brett and Tully 2006). While the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of public life are thoroughly intermixed, cultural practices and institutions also need to be understood and critiqued on their own terms. Exclusion from housing or employment is political and economic but is simultaneously infected by racism, gender bias, and what Thor-

stein Veblen called conspicuous consumption. "Economic deprivation, political marginalization and cultural disrespect" operate in and through one another (Stevenson 1999, 50). A concern with poverty involves struggling with dependency and a lack of dignity. Since Raymond Williams and Walter Benjamin, we have recognized that culture must be both democratized and politicized. Widely shared public culture is a major arena for both antidemocratic oppression and social transformation.

Global broadcasting represents these entangled dimensions. Ownership structures, policy, content, and technology need to be understood in themselves and together (see Vincent, Nordenstreng, and Traber 1999). Cultural issues are also crucial. The technological enterprise is a human process, value-laden throughout. Valuing penetrates all technological activity, from selecting what needs to address and what materials to use through the processes of design and fabrication and to the resulting tools and products. Technology proceeds out of our whole human experience and is directed by our ultimate commitments. The problems of one group are addressed, but not all. Certain resources are used and not others. Arnold Pacey (1992; see 2001) reminds us that today's technologies, including the media, are rooted in deep-seated beliefs about expertise, unlimited natural resources, and progress. As a result, the values of magnitude, power, and efficiency direct the technological process as a whole at present, and global broadcasting specifically. And if we want to see a revolution toward more humane technologies that meet society's basic needs rather than serve productivity and technical virtuosity, then a revolution is needed in the cultural context in which technologies are embedded. When we turn the mythologies of industrial progress, engineering expertise, and neutral reality on their head, new forms of technology will emerge as a result. In fulfilling its facilitative role, the news media must represent the cultural values underlying the industrial world—not only its mechanics and functions on the surface.

In their facilitative role, media professionals do not merely emphasize cultural institutions such as libraries, museums, concert halls, educational systems, and public broadcasting. Their focus is not limited to electronic music, cinema, television, feature magazines, theatre, and the arts. They do not cover only national holidays and institutional anniversaries. Culture is also a crucial dimension of our citizenship that requires nurturing and reflection. As cultural beings, the verbal and visual symbols of everyday life, images, representations, and myths make social relations meaningful for us and locate us in time and space. This semiotic material needs to be woven into our news narrative.

When we enact the facilitative role in reporting on human activities and institutions, we examine a creative process whereby people produce and maintain forms of life and society, as well as systems of meaning and value. This creative activity, the process by which humans establish their heritage in time and space,

is grounded in the ability to build cultural forms through symbols that express the will to live purposefully, and the reporter's first obligation is getting inside this process. Creativity is unique to the human species, and narratives that are valid pay circumspect attention to this distinctive aspect of social life. Knowing local languages in their nuance and complexity is crucial for representing communities and intermediate associations. Understanding religious language and ritual, for example, is essential. Symbolic forms are a critical element in our total humanization, and the evils of starvation, inadequate housing, health hazards, and unemployment cannot be solved in a culture of silence.

People arbitrate their own presences in the world. Human beings are not puppets on a string but live actors on a stage who improvise as the drama unfolds. They do not merely respond to stimuli but rather live by interpreting experience through the agency of culture. This is as true of microscopic forms of human interaction (e.g., conversation and neighborhood celebrations) as of the broadest human initiatives (e.g., attempts to build religious systems of ultimate meaning and significance). Communication is the catalytic agent, the driving force in cultural formation; therefore, the media are not neutral purveyors of information but agents of acculturation. All symbolic modes are culture builders—the dramatic arts, news discourse, literature, and electronic entertainment.[8] We are born into an intelligible and interpreted world, and we struggle to use these interpretations imaginatively for making sense of our lives and institutions. The ability to plan one's life, to choose commitments and pursuits, makes a community's existence worthwhile. "On this account, planning one's own life is not valuable because it promotes some further valuable end, but rather . . . the self-directed life is intrinsically good (Reaume 2000, 246). The concept of humans as cultural beings gives us the "starting hypothesis" that "all human cultures . . . have something important to say to all human beings" (Taylor et al. 1994, 66–67). Thus the media's facilitative role is dedicated to understanding the possibilities and contentions of language in human existence.

In Rousseau's terms, democracy is not an aggregate of atomized interests but the collective determination of what is best for the society as a whole. The moral framework of a society is the basis for respecting the moral worth of its members (Fierlbeck 1998, 89). In that sense, communally shared conceptions of the good have priority over individual rights. Appealing to rights tends to justify selfishness. Insisting on rights makes citizens' choices arbitrary—the expression of one's personal preferences that have no more validity than any others. Rights provide us no framework when communities face emergencies and crises. As societies fragment and break down, rights language is mute. For individual rights to matter beyond oneself, they cannot be separated from shared meanings and mutual belief in their importance. The common good is the axis around which communities have identity and purpose.

Social entities are considered moral orders and not merely lingual structures. Societies are not formed by language alone. There are no selves-in-relation without a moral commitment. Our widely shared moral intuitions—respect for the dignity of others, for instance—are developed through discourse within a community. A self exists within "webs of interlocution," and all self-interpretation implicitly or explicitly "acknowledges the necessarily social origin of any and all their conceptions of the good and so of themselves" (Mulhall and Swift 1996, 112–13). Moral frameworks are as fundamental for orienting us in social space as the need to "establish our bearings in physical space" (113). According to Charles Taylor, "Developing, maintaining and articulating" our moral intuitions and reactions are as natural for humans as learning up and down, right and left (1989, 27–29). Freud argued in *Totem and Taboo* that societies create taboo boundaries to distinguish themselves from others. But they also raise up totems to give themselves aspiration and identity. The news media as facilitator promotes discussion of these social characteristics and ideals.

Public life cannot be facilitated in technical terms only; journalists must speak of moral issues in appropriately moral discourse. And when they critique vacuous or unjust relations, they must do so in terms of common values that have wide acceptance in the community as a whole. In this sense, media professionals participate in a community's ongoing process of moral articulation. In fact, culture's continued existence depends on identifying and defending its normative base. Therefore, public texts must enable us "to discover truths about ourselves"; narratives ought to "bring a moral compass into readers' lives" by accounting for things that matter to them (Denzin 1997, 284; see 242–62). Communities are woven together by narratives that invigorate their common understanding of good and evil, happiness and reward, the meaning of life and death. Recovering and refashioning moral discourse help to amplify our deepest humanness.

Moral issues are concentrated in the proceedings of truth and reconciliation commissions (see Hayner 2002; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2006). Nelson Mandela appointed South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995 "to discover the dark facts of apartheid . . . [and] report them to South Africa and the world." Whereas most of such earlier commissions—including those in Uganda, Bolivia, Argentina, Zimbabwe, Uruguay, the Philippines, and Chile—did not hear testimony in public, "for fear that it might be too inflammatory or arouse retaliation from the ousted military officers (who were still around) or their patrons, the South African Commission . . . insisted on public as well as private testimony, and the public interrogation of accused perpetrators by victims as well as prosecutorial figures from the Commission's staff, and by the commissioners themselves" (Rotberg 2000, 5). The Commission, chaired by the Anglican archbishop Desmond Tutu, also facilitated public involvement

by gathering testimony in various locations throughout the country, making the proceedings accessible, maintaining a website, and responding fully and readily to public criticism. Radio and television "in many of the country's languages extensively covered" the Commission's activities, "especially the hearings on individual human rights violations and amnesty applications" (Crocker 2000, 101).

In the spirit of civic republicanism, the Commission's activities educated South African society generally, even before its official findings could be presented to the president and the parliament. "Widely disseminated verbatim accounts became the content of an ongoing national drama. . . . Unlike a trial, or a series of trials," the Commission expressed the range of behavior and issues "that society needs to judge and condemn, and to which it needs to be reconciled" (Rotberg 2000, 5, 9). Actual murders and murderers were unmasked and unmarked graves located. In its facilitative role, the press recognized that "proper remembrances fulfill the collective needs of badly damaged societies. . . . Forgetting reinforces losses of self-esteem among victims and even among victims as a group" (7).[9] In fact, public communicators played a crucial role. They endeavored to "lay bare the mind of even the worst perpetrators, while sensitively seeking to understand the suffering of victims and/or survivors in as comprehensive a manner" as professionally possible. It was said that citizens could not make intelligent and informed decisions about the reconciling process without "honest, blow-by-blow reporting which conveys the emotion, the atmosphere, and the angst of the moment." This kind of exposure of the victim or survivor to the perpetrator and vice versa is indispensable for "creating a climate within which reconciliation can occur" (Villa-Vicencio 2001, 31, 36).

As the cases of Argentina and Chile make clear, the work of truth commissions "can be compatible with trials and punishments" (Crocker 2000, 104). However, their rationale is not criminal justice per se but the morally ambitious goal of providing restorative justice. When done with depth and sophistication, while having no power to execute punitive justice, systems of communication institute "corrective moral justice by putting the record straight" (Villa-Vicencio 2001, 36). "Truth commissions have struggled with basic questions about what justice requires. . . . Out of these struggles are emerging new vocabularies of truth and justice as well as a new institutional repertoire for pursuing them." Truth commissions "direct a national morality play that places victims of injustice on center stage" while pursuing "profound and nuanced moral ends" (Kiss 2000, 70).

Pluralism

The media facilitate pluralism. For Hannah Arendt, the defining characteristic of democracy is plurality (Bohman and Rehg 1997, 401). Likewise, Nancy Fraser argues for a plurality of publics to prevent a unitary Other from dominating the

political order. Already in the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill identified "the tyranny of the majority" as an endemic problem for democratic societies. Even with today's demands for global thinking, citizenship ought to be what Held (2004) calls "multilevel and multidimensional" (114). For democracy to be deliberative, "decision-making should be decentralized as much as possible, maximizing each person's opportunity to influence the social conditions that shape his or her life" (101). The principle of inclusiveness "requires diverse and multiple democratic public forums for its suitable enactment" (102).[10]

The contemporary drive for cultural pluralism is potentially an obstacle to deliberative democracy, and therefore the media's challenge is to make "democratic life more vibrant"—that is, diverse—by improving "the public use of reason" (Bohman 2000, 72). The media's facilitative role under modern social conditions is not to be directed toward uniform public opinion but toward a multicultural mosaic and multifaceted governance.[11] The aim is a "public of publics" rather than "a distinctively unified and encompassing" aggregate of all individuals (140). Nation-states are composed of a variety of "polycentric and decentered" (148) communities, within which the interactors are reflexive and participatory.[12] Democracy is a "union of social unions" constructed of trade-offs and accommodation through "concessions of one's own for equal ones by others" (79–80).

The media's task in facilitating cultural pluralism cannot be reduced to settling political disputes (see Macedo 2003). When American citizens debate tax cuts or Europeans debate monetary policy within the European Union, they typically do not question the role of private property within the nation-state or the validity of elected governments. In addition to a shared framework, there is general agreement about the democratic procedures for settling differences politically (Bohman 2000, 73). But fostering cultural pluralism operates on a deeper level. Dealing with the political status of minority cultures, for example, often involves fundamental differences in moral assumptions and political processes. Some dilemmas are created by "irreconcilable values"—using Rawls's term—and raise a basic question about the role of reason and information, "if standards of rationality are themselves subject to deeply conflicting interpretations" (73). As James Bohman argues, the singular, procedural view of public reason Rawls advocates is not adequate for facilitating such pluralism. Rawls presumes a liberal constitutional state and "a common human reason," that is, "the capacities and procedures of reason, such as drawing inferences, weighing evidence, and balancing competing considerations" (79; Rawls 1993, 200). Habermas's more dynamic and complex understanding of public reason, where the "pluralism of convictions and worldviews" is not bracketed "from the outset" (Habermas 1995, 118–19), is closer to the way dilemmas and conflicts can be addressed fruitfully in pluralist democracies.[13]

Most democratic theorists since Rousseau have considered deep moral conflicts intractable. As Bohman notes, "moral and epistemic diversity often go hand in hand" (2000, 86). Differences in moral outlook are entangled in different assessments of the evidence, varying data, and disagreements over appropriate public language. In these instances, "appeal to a common human reason can still fail to produce agreement even when agents are not irrational" (86). And Rawls's "method of avoidance" in such cases is typically counterproductive. Certainly pragmatic strategies, such as a "gag rule" or "self-binding" device to remove some issues from public discussion, obviously do not enable deliberation but contradict it (74). Therefore, a dynamic and pluralistic framework does not seek a singular, impartial standpoint that every citizen is expected to endorse (Rawls 1993, 217). Rather, the media facilitate a public discourse that takes all interpretations into account, without aiming toward the convergence of an abstract point of view. No single norm of reasonableness is presupposed, and deliberation goes beyond trade-offs and making concessions that compromise people's beliefs. In a pluralist democracy, "agents can come to an agreement with one another for different publicly accessible reasons. . . . The ideal of public reason . . . permits rather than denies or avoids, moral conflict and differences in democratic politics" (Bohman 2000, 83–84).

Ronald Dworkin (1993) proposes a pluralistic agreement on abortion to which each side assents for different reasons. In his framework, "the intrinsic value of human life" is recognized without contradicting the "procreative autonomy" of women. Dworkin's proposal is public and pluralistic. "Each side can find its moral reasons represented, interpreted and assessed. . . . Citizens' values and conceptions of the good life are put up for public debate. . . . It is far from the method of avoidance" and in fact provides an "expanded framework for deliberating about differences" (Bohman 2000, 92). The terms of the debate are widened beyond the values of individual rights in procedural liberalism, with the expectation that original moral beliefs need not be abandoned in the continuing search for compromise or a new moral framework. When moral disagreements are reflected on dialogically, a larger universe of discourse emerges or, at a minimum, "deliberators may achieve mutual respect and accommodation as they exercise plural public reason" (Habermas 1996a, 411). Those who are morally prolife could conclude they can be coherently prochoice politically, and both sides can learn to tolerate each other's position, given the inconclusive biological debates over the exact origins of life.

Christian Scientists refuse to allow conventional medical treatment of their treatable diseases on the grounds that diagnosis or medical invasion will cause disease to occur. The conflict is not over medical facts but different assumptions about mind and matter. Adult Christian Scientists can exempt themselves from the healing process on the grounds of adult autonomy, but for their children no

legislative compromise is possible. Christian Science could conclude that living with this disjunction in a democratic society provides enough other benefits to make withdrawal unwise, as long as they can continue to contest the system as a cultural minority (see Bohman 2000, 76–77, 262). Pluralist and administrative liberalism (see chapter 3), in Joshua Cohen's terms, appeal to "nothing but the truth but not to the whole truth" (1993, 283). However, when deliberation is inclusive and dynamic, agreement in the broader arena enables cultural pluralism to prosper. And sometimes within that larger domain of agreements, a mutual belief emerges to move democratic life forward. Debates over pornography, for instance, ordinarily revolve around the rights of free expression versus moral offensiveness. However, deliberation focuses on a common framework of discrimination against women.[14] When both sides agree on gender equality, it becomes obvious that brutalizing women in hardcore pornography subordinates them, dominates them, and denies them equal opportunity. And on the same principle of gender equality, erotic realism in art is acceptable—that is, sensuality within a context of affinity could be aesthetically authentic and not exploitative.

The media also have a strategic role in facilitating dynamic and pluralist deliberation regarding minority subcultures. This aim is legitimate, despite the near intractability of persistent inequality that results from the history of conquest of the first peoples of Australia, Canada, and the United States, among others. Clearly political conflicts over mineral rights, taxation policies, education, and governance need careful and comprehensive press coverage. But what are the public bases of pluralism when fundamental differences exist over the very meaning of inclusion and citizenship (Kymlicka 1989; 2001)? Guaranteeing equitable and accessible voting does not in itself promote cultural identity. "Monetary solutions tend to benefit each member of the tribal group while providing no real protections or benefits for the cultural goals of the group as a whole" (Bohman 2000, 78).

Recognizing the dialogic, interactive structure of deliberation, in fact, is important in understanding correctly the media's facilitative role. The requirements of dialogue are "the mutual recognition of the deliberative liberties of others," "openness of one's own beliefs to revision," and "continued cooperation in public deliberation even with persistent disagreements" (Bohman 2000, 88–89). The interaction is a process of reflection on conflicting values, with the ongoing goal of creating a common framework and opening new avenues. As Monique Deveaux argues, cultural pluralism requires a thick conception of democracy. Deliberative versions "encourage respect for one another's social differences and cultural identities." They emphasize "reciprocity, political equality and mutual respect—all crucial to meeting basic justice claims" made by a nation's minorities. National and cultural minorities have the "right to challenge and help shape the public and political culture of the society in which

they live," and deliberative democracy makes such interaction a sine qua non (Deveaux 2000, 4–5; see 2007, ch. 4).

One such possibility is reconciliation, not as a singular abstraction with the content known in advance but as a negotiation text that suggests alternative ideas and policies. Breaking with the logic of hatred and revenge, in reconciliation new times and spaces are created for dealing with past grievances." The Canadian Charter of rights adopted in 1982, recognizing Quebec and tribal groups as distinct societies, is a rare political example of giving native peoples equal deliberative standing in constructing policy. As we have described, truth and reconciliation commissions can serve as another model of pluralistic deliberation, with reconciliation their axis and inspiration.

As Charles Taylor observes, one dimension of pluralism—what he calls "the politics of recognition"—is a troubling issue for democratic politics. Democratic societies are committed by definition to equal representation for all. Each counts for one; in principle every person is given equal access to the procedures of democratic institutions. Therefore, the crucial question: "Is a democracy letting its citizens down, excluding or discriminating against us in some morally troubling way, when major institutions fail to take account of our particular identities?" (Taylor et al. 1994, 3). In what sense should our specific cultural and social features as Albanians, Buddhists, Jews, the physically disabled, or children publicly matter? Democratic citizens in principle share an equal right to education, police protection, political liberties, religious freedom, due process, and health care. Shouldn't our public institutions treat us as free and equal citizens without regard to race, gender, or religion? Should universities and colleges that are circumspect about fairness and equal opportunity in admissions and the classroom also provide cultural centers and specialized curricula for underrepresented students of color?

The contemporary challenge of recognizing multicultural groups politically has no easy solution—especially in immigrant societies such as the United States and Canada. Perhaps there is a way for democracies to operate on two levels at the same time. While insisting on political neutrality in minimal terms at the polling booth and in taxation and legal protection, in other areas such as education, democratic institutions are free to reflect the values of one or more cultural communities.

Globalization makes the promotion of pluralism a demanding challenge these days (Bohman 2007). By *globalization* is meant a broad set of processes that have "intensified and accelerated" the "movement of people, images, ideas, technologies, and economic and cultural capital across national boundaries" (McCarthy et al. 2003, 444). Modern capitalization drives globalization, as well as the interests, needs, and desires of ordinary people everywhere, with the result that it is sweeping all corners of the contemporary world. These processes

are rapidly shrinking spatial relations between hitherto far-flung parts of the planet and deepening "the imbrication of the local in the global and the global in the local" (Giddens 1994, 181–89). The media are generating an explosion of new images, identities, and subjectivities in aesthetic culture generally. But these expanding representational technologies and capacities mean that many people "now express their sense of past, present and future" in terms of popular culture. Humanity cultivates its "interests, needs, desires, and fears in the landscape of the new media." The placeless language "of moral panic and its obverse, the language of panaceas and quick fixes," of e-commerce and technicistic discourse are deluging the modern subject, disempowering ordinary people, and eroding the efflorescence of everyday life in media-saturated societies (McCarthy et al. 2003, 455). A pluralist public realm is being challenged by this hybridization of culture and fragmentation of identity.

A study of government websites in sub-Saharan countries found that they reflect Western interests. Citizens are constructed as exotic others who can be marketed to foreign investors and tourists. The technological logic and aesthetics of the World Wide Web privilege affiliation with Western host institutions, and African authority over and local involvement in the text is ill defined. "Identification can be activated only by acceptance of problematic colonial representations and mostly Western forms of knowledge production" (Furisch and Robins 2002, 203–4). In more general terms, societies of the global South are typically considered cultures with agents. Even in well-meaning accounts of imperialism and colonialism radiating from Europe and North America, there is little recognition of resistance, indigenous struggles, and local alternatives. Non-Caucasians come through as dependent, with minimal talent and limited capacity for self-determining democracy. Therefore, the media ought to represent the voices of justice in children's theatre, aboriginal art, folktales, teen music, poetry, and people's radio (McCarthy 1998, 39–48).

Pluralism presumes a dynamic democratic form in which the public sphere is not a structure but a process of changing and emerging collectives. In order to remain democratic, societies need to be open to popular renewal and new social movements—green networks, ethnic organizations, educational reform, feminist campaigns, and so forth. Pluralism as a normative ideal uncovers the voices of the excluded and marginalized. Difference is discovered against the outpourings of centralized media. TV Globo is a virtual monopoly in Brazil. More than a hundred groups are active in video, developing an alternative communication system from below that allows users to control their own production and distribution. These video groups are spread throughout the country in both rural and urban areas, linked to labor unions, their churches, neighborhoods and cultural associations. Such grassroots movements for pluralism are an educational strategy for social change.

The facilitative role is a response to the fact that human lives are culturally complex and loaded with multiple interpretations. First-rate ethnographic accounts possess the "amount of depth, detail, emotionality, nuance, and coherence that will permit readers to form a critical consciousness. Such texts should also exhibit representational adequacy, including the absence of racial, class, and gender stereotyping" (Denzin 1997, 283). The Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) has established the world's largest research and advocacy network, systematically studying in 102 countries the way women's identity and contributions are represented in the news—radio, television, and newspapers. In seeking gender equality in public discourse, the GMMP recognizes that sexism has been embedded long-term in cultures around the world. The project insists on representational adequacy out of concern that old ideas of authority with diminished news-voices for women get in the way of new ideas of community and leadership (see Media and Gender Monitor 2005; Spears, Seydegart, and Gallagher 2000; Turley 2004).

The fundamental challenge for the media in their facilitative role is to foster conscientization—helping citizens gain their own voices and collaborate in their culture's transformation. "The semiotic struggle from below offers an ethics of resistance against the incorporation of people into dominant ideological categories" and media narratives ought to reflect these complexities (Stevenson 1999, 10).

Notes

1. For an overview of the long and complicated history of development communication see Moemeka (1994) and Gunaratne (1998, 292–302). Development journalism was a significant facet of the New World Information and Communication Order debates (cf. Gerbner, Mowlana, and Nordenstreng 1993; Nordenstreng 1984; Traber and Nordenstreng 2002). For a description of the way development journalism has been confused with authoritarian government-controlled media, see Gunaratne (1995).

2. For an elaboration of the various dimensions of authentic participatory communication for development in terms of Paulo Freire and Martin Buber, see Thomas (1994).

3. Lambeth (1998) summarizes these strategies as including but not limited to: "citizen polling to identify major issues on the public's mind; resource panels of both citizens and specialists to help journalists understand the basics of an issue before they immerse themselves in reporting; focus groups with citizens to deepen and give reporters firsthand knowledge of key facets of an issue; open forums to allow the public to begin to engage and work through public issues; and, finally, studies to discover how well media performed" (18).

4. For a thoughtful overview of public journalism's history and rationale, see Rosen (1999b). For an examination of the foundational issues raised by public journalism, see Glasser (1999b). For the most reflective account from a news professional, see Merritt (1995; Merritt and McCombs 2004).

5. Lewis Friedland speaks of civil society as social capital—"those stocks of social trust, norms, and networks that people can draw on to solve common problems. Networks of civic engagement, such as neighborhood associations, sports clubs, and cooperatives, are essential forms of social capital. The more dense these networks, according to social capital theory, the more likely that members of a community will cooperate for mutual benefit" (Friedland, Sotirovic, and Daily 1998, 195–96; see Friedland 2003; 2004; Sirianni and Friedland 2005).

6. For the "Official UN Report of the World Conference on Human Rights," see www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/WCHR+En?OpenDocument. For the "Documents of the World Conference on Human Rights," see www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/FramePage/WCHR+En?OpenDocument. For information on the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, see www.unhchr.ch/map.htm.

7. OneWorldOnline of the One World International Foundation is a civil society space on the Internet devoted to issues of human rights and sustainable development around the world. Launched in 1995, it has a thousand partners, including two hundred community radio and some video/TV members. Partners share their material without cost, making more than 2 million texts available for approximately a million users from over 125 countries. For a description of the OneWorld.net supersite, see Vittachi (2001).

8. Like that of Jacob Burckhardt (*Force and Freedom: Reflections on History),* this definition of culture is semiotic—in contrast to anthropology where culture refers to entire civilizations as complex wholes, and in contrast to traditional parlance, which identifies culture as refined manners. Most definitions of culture are expansive, encompassing virtually all social activity. Culture is thus said to involve technologies, customs, arts, sciences, products, habits, political and social organizations that characterize a people. Such a broad definition is not invoked here, but culture is distinguished from political and social structures, from direct experimental efforts to understand nature (such as chemistry, physics, and astronomy) and from religious institutions. Culture thus is defined as essentially human communicative activities, and refers primarily to the products of the arts and language.

9. Gutmann and Thompson analyze this therapeutic purpose in terms of restorative justice and democratization. "Many citizens (including the victims themselves) may reasonably believe that it is morally inappropriate to forgive people who are unwilling to be punished for their crimes, or unwilling to offer their victims restitution" (2004, 172; see 177–87).

10. Cultural pluralism in civic republicanism, diversity that is both ideological and ethnic, differs fundamentally from pluralist liberalism (see chapter 4). Pluralism in the facilitative role is rooted in positive liberty, whereas in procedural liberalism, pluralism assumes negative liberty, and equality of opportunity is basically a private matter. For the challenge of pluralism transnationally, see Bohman 2007.

11. Held (2004) properly insists on integrating the cultural and political: "De facto status as members of diverse communities needs to be matched by a de jure political status, if the mechanisms and institutions that govern these political spaces are to be brought under the . . . principle of inclusiveness and subsidiarity" (101).

12. Bohman holds out the hope that computer-mediated communication can expand deliberative interaction across national boundaries, thus enabling a more transnational cosmopolitan democracy than the traditional literary national public spheres (2004, 138–51; cf. 2007). For a thoughtful review of the major issues regarding the internet and democracy in a globalizing age, see Hilde (2004).

13. Building on Habermas' more dynamic view, Bohman advances his own complex "plural conception of public reason" for "working out reasonable moral compromises," and Bohman's perspective frames the argument here (2000, 75–105).

14. While not using this example, Charles Anderson calls this "meliorative reason" (1990, 174–76). He seeks to enhance this form of reasoning among public communicators, but does not mean producing a self-evident solution agreeable to all. Journalists skilled in this discourse are suggestive, point to different courses of action rather than reporting false dilemmas or conflict in itself (see Lambeth 1999, 30–31).

8

The Radical Role

The radical role of the media and journalism insists on the absolute equality and freedom of all members of a democratic society in a completely uncompromising way. Too often, in societies based on the competitive market principle, great imbalances of wealth, education, and access to information and communication are accepted as simply the rewards of personal initiative. Journalism in the radical role makes every effort to ensure that no injustice is ever tolerated. The radical democratic commitment works for the continual elimination of concentrations of social power to enable every person to participate equally in all societal decisions. Professionally, journalists are called on to encourage not just superficial changes, such as voting procedures, but changes in the core of the existing social institutions. There may be a focus on particular forms of discrimination and defense of particular groups of the voiceless and disenfranchised, but the long-range goal is a society of universal recognition of human rights for all.

The monitorial role typically takes a given power structure for granted and provides the systematic information needed to make such social configurations work. However, the radical role recognizes that power holders impede the flow of information and that it is necessary to change the system of public communication so that less powerful groups can get the information they need. Radical journalism seeks to help minorities articulate an alternative set of goals that represent the needs and just moral claims of all, especially the marginalized, the poor, and the dispossessed. The role of journalists is to challenge the injustices perpetrated by hegemonic alliances and to propose instead a new order and support movements opposing these injustices.

The radical role attempts to expose the conflict of interest between those who dominate the political-economic conditions and cultural values of a society

and those who have little influence over these conditions. Journalism in the dominant media may try to obscure these conflicts of interest; radical journalism not only exposes them but points out the injustices and contradictions in these conflicts. It also sides with those who are developing forms of resistance and advocacy against the dominant power holders. Thus, the radical media are by definition partisan.

The radical role rests on the view that there is a political-economic power structure in society that tends to produce a hegemony of the privileged few over the interests of the majority of ordinary people. The underprivileged may or may not be concerned about this structural imbalance. Whenever they are concerned, they constitute an active social force for emancipation and empowerment—either a moderate force for systemic reform or a revolutionary force for overturning the system. If the underprivileged are not concerned and are indifferent to change, according to this view, they have been socialized into passivity or a false consciousness. In this case, the process of emancipation must be triggered by activists and minority movements. Accordingly, the radical media support activist and avant-garde movements that try to liberate intellectually repressed or indoctrinated people, helping them to participate in the process of democratic governance.

From the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, a radical or revolutionary role for the press was part of political and religious reform movements that created the conditions for contemporary democratic societies. In the twentieth century, the politically focused press was transformed into mass-distribution commercial media that operate as a capitalist enterprise responding to the hunger for profits of investors who may care little for the media's responsibilities in a democratic society. These predominantly commercial media have been integrated into a market-driven mainstream that has less and less space for traditional radicalism spearheaded by political movements or political parties.

Since the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and with the globalization of market logic, the radical role is no longer tied so much to institutional parties but rather to new movements based on excluded social identities, such as feminists, ecologists, and ethnic and racial minorities. This shift of radicalism's main locus from institutional politics to issue and identity oriented movements has its parallel in the evolving theories of civil society (Cohen and Arato 1992) and of postmodern politics (Pulkkinen 2000) and in such concepts as emergent publics (Angus 2001).

These new centers of radical empowerment resort to alternative media (Atton 2004), community media (Howley 2005), and other forms of oppositional expression, outside the orbit of mainstream media (Couldry and Curran 2003). Less challenging versions of alternative media are supported by national or international media policies, giving minorities (ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and

political) access to and means for informational and cultural expression. In such cases it is no longer self-evident that we are talking about truly radical media, since after all they are integrated into the sociopolitical system at large. In that sense, there is a continuum of degrees of opposition by the media to the prevailing power structure. In fact, some of the alternative and community media represent such mild versions of radicalism that they could fit equally well in the facilitative category. Admittedly, there is a gray area of mixed roles between the poles of facilitative and radical, but it is still worth upholding the ideal types at the conceptual level.

In general terms, the rationale of the radical role is to expose to public opinion the concentration of social power, especially regarding the democratic procedures of collective decision making. This implies a persuasive dimension, with attempts to mobilize public opinion and public action toward the redistribution of social power. Much of this mobilization is to point out the harmful effects of the concentration of social power and, conversely, the benefits of a redistribution of social power.

Such consciousness-raising regarding power structures requires media that are more participatory and dialogical than the conventional media—even beyond the level reached by the facilitative role. In a truly democratic system the media must expose not only abuses of power but also the causes and consequences of power concentrations, helping the public to see avenues of action to redistribute social power. It is not enough to have brave but isolated voices to do this; the target is ultimately society at large, with prospects for structural change.

Therefore, "radical" refers here to a perspective that literally goes to the roots of the power relations in society, challenging the hegemony of those in power and offering an alternative vision not just for some building blocks but for the whole structure of society. We do not use the term "critical" to denote this oppositional role of the media, because a degree of critical distance from power structures is also presupposed by the monitorial and facilitative roles. Moreover, "critical" has come to carry so many meanings that it easily misses the point of fundamental challenge, which is better described as "radical." Yet it is important to acknowledge the general axiom that science is basically a reflexive critique with "no place for the absolutist mind," as Cees Hamelink points out in his contribution to the opening issue of *Communication, Culture and Critique* (2008, 3). Slavko Splichal reminds us that being critical is the essence of what the public sphere means, and it ultimately leads to the universal right to communicate (2008, 29).

In this context, journalism in the radical role seeks to redistribute the social power from the privileged (typically few) to the underprivileged (typically many). In a rough classification of ideologies into three—conservative, reformist, and revolutionary—we are dealing here with revolutionary ideology: journalism as

an instrument for challenging and changing political and economic systems. The monitorial and facilitative roles represent reformist ideology: the media as instruments for improving the system. The collaborative role represents conservative ideology: the media as active instruments for preserving the system. Radical journalism was a departure from both bourgeois elite journalism and from the emerging commercial mass press. It was typical of the nineteenth century in most of the Western world, with revolutionary movements in each country with its own particular conditions and timetables. As Jane Chapman has demonstrated (2005, 11), radicalism, along with political repression and economic change, emerges as one of the basic elements in comparative media history.

Indeed, radical journalism constitutes a crucial chapter in media history. Even the United States has a rich tradition of media radicalism—not so much in the form of revolutionary media as such but more as radical criticism of the mainstream commercial media, as documented by McChesney and Scott (2004) and by Berry and Theobald (2006). But the closer we come to the contemporary world, the less there is left of original radicalism in the media landscape. Radical journalism has been more and more integrated into a nonradical or even conservative mainstream. In general, the revolutionary movements and their radical journalism present a history of "rise and incorporation" (Conboy 2004, 88).

However, radical journalism still is to be found also in today's media—not only in minority media but also in sections of the so-called mainstream media that choose an independent line and provide platforms for radical criticism of established power on specific matters. Accordingly, we have to distinguish between radical media and radical journalism and acknowledge the fact that although in the contemporary world there are few truly radical media, radical journalism as a phenomenon has survived and is manifested in certain forms of public debate.

Radical Tradition

Historically, the idea of a radical role leads us to Marx and his evolution from reformist social democrat, striving for freedom, including press freedom, to revolutionary communist, striving for hegemony of the working class (see Hardt 2001). In this respect we are indeed dealing with a "Marxist theory of the press." On the other hand, it is fundamentally misleading to associate the radical role with the communist system, especially that of the former Soviet Union, as *Four Theories* did. The countries that used to call their regimes "real socialism" actually could hardly be said to have realized the original Marxist project. The theoretical roots of the radical role generated both the precommunist societies of the nineteenth century and the Western ideologies of the twentieth century.

An essential aspect of radicalism is captured by the phrase "ruthless criticism," which the young Karl Marx introduced in the 1840s to highlight his view that the true social criticism of the day "must not be afraid of its own conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers that be" (Solomon and McChesney 1993, 1). The same approach has inspired the so-called neo-Marxist schools, which gained prominence in the media scholarship of the post-1960s (Hardt 1992; Pietilä 2005; Schiller 1996). This intellectual movement—known by various names, including "critical theory" and "political economy"—had many variants but always remained faithful to the idea of ruthless criticism, in the sense of exposing what most people fail to see.

Actually the idea of the media's radical role is best captured by tracing the evolution of this approach rather than trying to establish a simple textbook definition. This can be done conveniently with the assistance of collections such as Durham and Kellner (2001): the evolution begins with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and their thesis that "the class which is the ruling *material* force in society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force" (39–42). Next came Antonio Gramsci and his notions of ideology, hegemony, and counterhegemony (43–47), and the Frankfurt School of Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, and others, who introduced the concept of "culture industries" as vehicles for diverting creative human energy into the service of soulless commercialism (48–101).

While Marx and Engels, and Gramsci, developed the perspective of a dominant class opposed by an energetic radical movement that inspired class struggle, the Frankfurt School instead promoted the gloomy prospect that "media culture simply reproduced the existing society and manipulated mass audiences into obedience" (Durham and Kellner 2001, 9). Jürgen Habermas, the post–Frankfurt School critical theorist, went on to conclude that a progressive bourgeois public sphere, which in the time of the early newspapers enabled democratic debate, had perished under the colonizing influence of corporate powers (1989). The same line of thought was pursued in France by Louis Althusser with his notion of "ideological state apparatuses" (1984), suggesting that the media and journalism are forms of an ideological machinery determined to serve class interests—especially those of the bourgeoisie.

Thus neo-Marxist thinking emphasized the evils of capitalism—a perspective that could seem to leave little hope of changing the world. In reality, it fueled radicalism by promoting a critical consciousness of the structural obstacles existing in Western societies. A radical approach to media—including the radical role of journalism—came to be known above all as a proactive movement for change, far from defeatism. An illuminating example was presented in Germany by the post-Frankfurt, post-Habermas approach of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1993), who advocated the possibility and necessity of a "proletarian public

sphere," despite all the sociopolitical system's cooptation of passive mass audiences. It was such an intellectual climate in the 1960s and 1970s that gave rise to theories of political economy and later to cultural studies.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CULTURAL STUDIES

In order to understand later developments of the radical tradition, it is vital to recall the broad landscape of communication research. It was dominated until the late 1960s by what Veikko Pietilä in his historical overview of the field calls "classical behavioral mass communication research" (2005, 105–26). This school of thought, dominant particularly in the United States, was rich in empirical findings and research techniques, spurred on by the advent of computers, but poor in wider theoretical approaches and more profound ethical perspectives. It was a typical case of logical positivism at the time—so dominant that it gave rise to critical reactions, especially outside the United States (see Nordenstreng 1968). Marxism in general and political economy in particular came to fill this vacuum of theories and values, with scholars such as Dallas Smythe and Herbert Schiller in North America and Armand Mattelart and Nicholas Garnham in Europe paving the way for a whole generation of radical researchers. This was by no means a uniform approach but subsumed several streams, some of which focused on economy and class structure, while others were concerned with ideology and subjectivity (Pietilä 2005, 221–44; Schiller 1996, 132–84). Yet the approach had a common core in "the recognition that the mass media are first and foremost industrial and commercial organizations which produce and distribute commodities" (Murdock and Golding 1974, 205–6) while it also perceived the media industry as involved in capitalist commodity production in many ways other than by manufacturing media products and audiences (Mosco 1996).

By the early 1980s, the entire field of communication research was profoundly affected, and in some countries even dominated, by the radical tradition—at least in its milder critical variants. A good reading of the situation is the special issue "Ferment in the Field" published by the *Journal of Communication* in 1983. It was typical of this period that this journal's editor, George Gerbner, concluded, after presenting an impressive panorama of research paradigms and their challenges, "if Marx were alive today, his principal work would be entitled *Communications* rather than *Capital*" (Gerbner 1983, 358). This rhetorical remark was not intended to undermine Marxist emphasis on capital and class but to highlight information and communication as equally crucial factors in any theory of postindustrial society. Connecting Marxism with communication also signaled an emerging new line of research inspired by notions such as "cyber-Marx" (Dyer-Witherford 1999) and "digital capitalism" (Schiller 2000),

with the perspective that "the information commodity has become the prime site of contemporary expansion—such as it is—within and for the world market system" (Schiller 2007, 16).

Parallel to these developments, cultural studies emerged as another strand of the radical tradition by the 1980s. Its roots go to the British school of cultural studies, built on the 1960s and 1970s work of Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson, and Stuart Hall. Cultural studies had a fairly positive perspective, counting on the potential resistance of working-class culture in the face of capitalist domination (see Barker 2000). In this version of the radical tradition, popular culture was seen to be full of contradictions, and the media were not understood to operate under a totally deterministic order. On the contrary, youth culture especially, with its rock music, was seen as a liberating force leading toward emancipation and empowerment (see Grossberg 1992).

Cultural studies expanded rapidly and while gaining worldwide recognition became so diversified that much of it could no longer be taken as critical, let alone radical. Although cultural studies, like political economy, can be seen as an intellectual child of antipositivism, these two streams diverged and by the 1990s were in frequent conflict with each other. While cultural studies welcomed the arrival of a host of scholars from the humanities—often frustrated by their original surroundings—those pursuing a political economy approach were surrounded by an increasingly hostile academic environment, especially after the collapse of communism. Robert McChesney describes this part of his journey as a radical media scholar as "the rise and fall of political economy of communication" (2007, 37). However, that stage was soon followed by a "historical turn," with a lot of potential for change. In general, the development of the field can be seen as a series of "ferments," with a more or less visible presence of the radical tradition (Nordenstreng 2004).

Summarizing the ups and downs of the radical tradition, James Curran situates it against the liberal tradition and pays special attention to the "new revisionist movement" that emerged in media and cultural studies during "the conservative 1980s" (2002, 107). He admits the "mid-life crisis of radical media studies" (x) but presents a program for revitalizing the radical tradition, with a conclusion that is highly relevant to scholarship on media roles:

> The radical tradition was weakened by self-referential revisionist argument, while the liberal tradition expanded relatively unchecked by criticism. Yet, the traditional radical perspective offers important insights that need to be retained. . . . Radical analysts are entirely right to insist that the media are, in general, subject to strong elite pressures which propel the media towards the sphere of established power. However, the media can also be exposed to countervailing popular influences. . . .

> In sum, a reconstituted radical perspective needs to be championed against the advancing tide of revisionist argument, which overstates popular influence on the media and understates the media's influence on the public. (Curran 2002, 165)

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

A worldwide prospect for radical thinking was opened up by the idea of a new international order in the 1970s, aiming at the decolonization of national economies as well as cultural and media systems in the developing world. This was no mere academic orientation but a powerful trend in international relations, spearheaded by the Non-Aligned Movement (Third World), with the support of the socialist countries (Second World), and leading to reform initiatives at the United Nations known as the New International Economic Order and the New International Information Order. The latter was further developed by UNESCO into the concept of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and was highlighted by the so-called MacBride Report (see Mansell and Nordenstreng 2006; Nordenstreng 1999). All this was only partly radical and revolutionary; mostly it stood for a reformist improvement of the media systems in the world. Even as such, it was considered a threat to Western political and corporate interests, which began to push it back under the conditions of changing power constellations in the 1980s fostered by the Reagan administration in the United States. Accordingly, a completely different "new world order" advocated by a United States–led Western coalition in the early 1990s replaced the Third World–driven new order, which had earlier inspired such concepts as NWICO.

By the turn of the millennium, this new world order was understood typically in terms of globalization, and its United States–driven market orientation gave rise to an antiglobalization movement embodying the same political and intellectual elements that had rallied around NWICO earlier. So ruthless criticism has not disappeared from the debate on the nature and role of media in society—particularly regarding the "information society" (Webster 2006) and "postmodern culture" (Best and Kellner 2001). According to Durham and Kellner, "a postmodern turn in culture and society would correspond to an emergent stage of global capitalism, characterized by new multimedia, exciting computer and informational technology, and a proliferation of novel forms of politics, society, culture, and everyday life" (2001, 26). The elements of radicalism at this "postmodern turn" offer a number of intriguing perspectives, beginning with the replacement of class by information as the determining factor in understanding societies (Castells 1996; Poster 2001) and ending with the emergence of hybrid cultures (Canclini 1995; Martin-Barbero 1993) as well as new approaches to morality and ethics (Stevenson 1999) and to critical pedagogy (Giroux 2004; McLaren and Kincheloe 2007).

RADICALISM IN THE DIGITAL AGE

The turn of the millennium has opened up contradictory perspectives for the radical role of the media in general and journalism in particular. First, the traditional left in the industrialized West, previously mobilized by the socialist and communist parties, has been largely integrated into the welfare society, while their century-old social and economic programs have been more or less established. Second, the new dissident movements that have emerged, particularly in the developing world, and are fueled typically by religious fundamentalism, are important, though this variant of radicalism does not fit within our definition of democratic radical media. The process of globalization, accompanied by neoliberal doctrines that challenge the humanitarian and communitarian values that used to fuel traditional radicalism, has provoked the formation of a third perspective of contemporary radicalism: a reaction in the form of the antiglobalization movement, with a strategy of employing new information and communication technologies (ICTs), particularly the Internet.

The result has been so-called indymedia, with its own global network organization (www.indymedia.org/). It was nurtured by the movement created during the demonstrations at the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle, "for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate telling of the truth." Indymedia has given rise to a worldwide movement of independent media centers related to the tradition of socialist anarchism (Downing 2003) and has inspired a new type of journalism (Platon and Deuze 2003). The latest version of alternative media is largely based on individually run weblogs.

These developments are also fueled by new approaches to intellectual property in computer-based media. The commercial software industry, notably Microsoft, is challenged by a worldwide movement of free software designers known as open source systems, notably Linux. For these computer programs, digitally transmitted communication should not be sources of capitalist gains but should be freely placed at people's disposal. In so doing, a commodity economy is replaced by a gift economy—essentially the same perspective that was raised by the political economy tradition of media studies, which on one hand exposed the undemocratic nature of capitalist media industry and on the other hand advocated a democratic order for public good.

Jay Rosen, one of the builders of the public journalism movement, lists "ten things radical about the weblog form in journalism" (http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2003/10/16/radical_ten.html). He begins with the point that "the weblog comes out of the gift economy, whereas most (not all) of today's journalism comes out of the market economy," and ends with the point that "journalism traditionally assumes that democracy is what we have, information is what we seek. Whereas in the weblog world, information is what we

have—it's all around us—and democracy is what we seek." In the same spirit, Douglas Kellner and Richard Kahn suggest that blogging leads to "a vision of the democratic future of the Net" (www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/internetsubculturesoppositionalpolitics.pdf).

Others claim that weblogs are no longer a predominantly radical force but rather have become a new means of feeding established media (Singer 2005). For example, Chantal Mouffe is not enthusiastic about the new media, because many people are not using "this incredible possibility of choice." Instead, according to Mouffe, the new media "perversely allow people to just live in their little worlds, and not be exposed anymore to the conflicting ideas that characterize the agonistic public space. New media are making it possible to only read and listen to things that completely reinforce what you believe in" (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006, 968).

Obviously there are both optimists and pessimists—the latter calling themselves realists—about the future of journalism in the digital age. An important category of optimists are the new advocates of critical pedagogy (see McLaren et al. 2005). Among them are those who see a huge potential in free software and open source technology, with applications such as Wikipedia: "If Gutenberg's revolution was about making printed media more abundant, the Wikipedia has the same effect multiplied to a different order of magnitude" (Suoranta and Vadén 2007, 146). Although the main focus of these scholars is a paradigm shift in education and the challenge to literacy, their discussion is also relevant to media and journalism: "When the self-organizational nature of hacker communities is combined with the observation that the digital code is not a scarce resource, we get a cybercommunist utopia where volunteer organizations and communities of non-alienated labor manage themselves in a post-scarcity economy" (153).

In short, the digital age has contributed two kinds of elements to the radical tradition. First, ICTs have been integrated into existing movements. Although they are called indymedia, they do not represent an independent force but are merely a new platform for traditional political struggles. Second, ICTs may also provide some genuinely new sites for radical thought and action. The open source approach is still at an exploratory stage, but it has intriguing potential for radical thinking broadly and radical journalism specifically. Curran (2003) concludes from the British-based Internet magazine *openDemocracy* that despite its elite connections, open source "has made a significant contribution toward building a global civil society" (239).

VARIANTS OF RADICALISM

After this excursion into the tradition of critical/radical media studies, it is clear that one simple definition of the radical role of the media in general and journal-

ism in particular is impossible. What *radical* means is a typical "it depends," in this case not only on the nature of the media in question but also on the nature of the society—indeed the nature of the world—that one is talking about. On one side is the traditional notion of radical media as instruments of significant revolutionary movements directed at the power structure at large. On the other side are those later forms of radical media defined by John Downing as "media, generally small-scale and in many different forms, that express an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, priorities, and perspectives" (2001, v).

Today a mainstream use of the word "radical" no longer suggests predominantly Marxist perspectives of the political left but increasingly suggests those fundamentalist approaches that in the Western ideological framework are typically connected to extremist Islamist movements and international terrorism. The radicalism of extremist political and religious movements is indeed one variant of radicalism, but in this connection it would be misleading to speak about the radical role of journalism. Whenever media serve as instruments of such extremist movements, they perform, according to our typology, a collaborative rather than a radical role. This applies to movements on the extreme right as well as the extreme left—fascist as well as Stalinist. Downing (2001, 88–96) lumps the two extremes together under the category *repressive* radical media, in contrast to *democratic* radical media. In our terminology, *radical* refers to a democratic rather than a repressive role for journalism. Although the border between repressive and democratic forms of radicalism is often unclear and sometimes impossible to draw, at the conceptual level it is still important to make—and to problematize—this distinction.

Accordingly, a radical role for journalism in our typology does not mean that the media serve any type of oppositional purpose. They serve those people in society who are opposed to the establishment because they do not have a fair share of the national public sphere—because they are underrepresented and disenfranchised. Thus the radical role, in our case, has a popular—even populist—undertone, and in this respect it is closely related to the concept not only of power but also of citizenship.

The radical role, in this sense of the term, is far removed from big institutional structures such as the state. It is typically pursued through various alternative media run by different elements of the civil society outside the established political parties, trade unions, and professional associations. For such new social movements and grassroots elements, the media are not just instruments to promote their causes but vehicles to articulate their oppositional ideas and activities. Accordingly, alternative media are an integral part of the movements or groups they represent—as the press organs of the early political parties and liberation movements used to be. In this respect, alternative media pursue advocacy journalism.

Actually advocacy journalism is pursued not only in alternative media but can be found also in conventional media that are not radical as such. Indeed, an important variant of the democratic radical role is constituted by critically engaged journalists working within the mainstream with reference to fundamental issues, including social justice and human rights. These radical voices appear as exceptions from a more or less conservative line of the mainstream media, and often these exceptions make a big difference within the overall climate of opinion. Thus a radical role should not be defined according to a medium or a whole media system, but rather according to a specific form of journalism that may even have a minority position within a conservative or liberal mainstream.

The facilitative role, on the other hand, provides dialogue and participation for the democratic process and thus fulfills an instrumental role. Both the facilitative and the radical roles operate at the level of civil society and promote the people's power, and in this respect there is little difference between them. What distinguishes them from each other in our typology is the purpose they are supposed to serve—promoting dialogue among citizens (facilitative) versus mobilizing opinion against the power structure in society (radical).

Alternative media as radical media—both in theory and practice—are thoroughly presented and discussed by Downing (2001) and by Atton (2002; 2003). Since around the turn of the millennium, the phenomenon of alternative media has gained more and more attention, because of developments in both the political and media worlds. In politics, established institutions, including old political parties, have lost their credibility among the electorate, calling for alternative ways to do politics. In the media world, the landscape is characterized by two contradictory tendencies: concentration of ownership and the decentralization of operations based on digital technology, particularly the Internet.

Clemencia Rodriguez (2001) carries the story further from alternative media to citizens' media, inspired both by global perspectives of NWICO and by various examples, notably in Latin America, of indigenous people and other grassroots groups taking media into their own hands and creating what can be seen as a worldwide movement of community media. Rodriguez avoids a dualism lurking behind the alternative media concept—between top-down institutional media (bad) and bottom-up popular media (good)—by reverting to these ideas: the "sense-making" of Brenda Dervin and Robert Huesca (1997), the "hybrid cultures" of Jesus Martin-Barbero (1993), and the "radical democratic citizenship" of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985; see Mouffe 1992). A crucial lesson of these reflections is that neither alternative nor citizens' media should be seen mechanistically as a binary phenomenon but dynamically as a hybridized phenomenon made up of multiple elements.

A similar paradigm, known as "subaltern studies," emerged in the 1990s in South Asia, notably India, and in Latin America—the latter motivated by the

United States–based Marxist Literacy Group inspired by Frederic Jameson (I. Rodriguez 2001, 1–2). This is a truly radical school of thought, in a spirit of academic militancy "placing our faith in the projects of the poor" (3). Although it has not produced a specific variant of radical media theory, it provides an example of the relevant intellectual environment surrounding those who pursue a radical role for journalism.

Last but not least are feminist studies, focusing on the structural inequalities embedded in the social relations based on patriarchy. Since the 1960s, this school of thought has been a vital part of radicalizing the media's context. With classics such as Nancy Fraser's *Unruly Practices* (1989), feminist studies has developed a distinct brand of media studies (van Zoonen 1994). However, this is by no means a homogenous school and is divided into several streams more or less radical.

Dimensions of the Radical Role

The foregoing history of radical thinking about the media has provided an overall profile and the main elements of what the radical role of journalism means. Next we focus on the dimensions we presented in chapter 5 as central factors in determining the journalistic roles.

POWER

Social-political power is the most crucial concept in defining a radical role. The media in enacting this role fundamentally depart from what is given by the state and other power structures in society. The radical role sustains an oppositional and antagonistic relation to the dominant forces, offering alternative channels and perspectives to those reflecting the political, economic, and cultural hegemony. While media in the collaborative role support the dominant institutional power typically represented by the state, and can be seen to enjoy minimal autonomy, the media in the radical role are located at the other end of the continuum, standing on the side of autonomous social movements and people's power directed against exclusivist powers.

The next question for understanding the media's radical role concerns the nature of power, and this question takes us back to the contradiction between radical and liberal traditions discussed earlier. As shown by Curran (2002), the variant of Marxism that sees power as directly determined by economy is too simple and even misleading. But it is equally misleading to undermine economy as a source of power and to take the view, as many postmodernists in cultural studies do, that power is so highly fragmented and widely diffused that, in effect, economy need not be taken seriously any longer. Such an approach represents the liberal paradigm of more or less independent individuals hanging in the thin air of abstract society.

It is important to see that there are two fundamentally different notions of power: an Anglo-American view and a Hegelian-Marxian view. The Anglo-American tradition, based on Thomas Hobbes, follows the Galilean metaphor of a universe of freely moving objects, including human beings with free will and the absence of external impediments. In this tradition, power means intervention against free movement; power is the capacity to block free movement. The Hegelian-Marxian tradition follows Kantian philosophy: human beings are determined by the laws of nature and also by moral reasoning. Freedom in this tradition means autonomy from nature and is based on the rational and moral capacity of human beings. Freedom "is not the ability to act according to one's will and interest without being intervened with, but rather is almost exactly the opposite—it is the placing of natural desires and interests in a position in which they are governed by moral judgments" (Pulkkinen 2000, 12). In the Hegelian-Marxian ontology, power is not an obstacle distracting natural movement but an essential instrument to ensure morality and order in civil society and ultimately in the state.

A radical approach to media typically belongs to the latter, German tradition, although the complicated intellectual history involved is not always made clear. Power in this ontology is far from a simple and mechanistic concept, as was the case in the Anglo-American tradition, which served as the springboard for a libertarian theory of politics and democracy, including modern classics such as the works of Robert Dahl. Libertarian theory defines politics as a game between atomistic individuals, whereas the Hegelian-Marxian tradition understands politics as an organic part of society, where power is not the relation between two individuals but "an instrument of justice in the process of the self-control of society" (Pulkkinen 2000, 94).

Michel Foucault (e.g. 1982) is a typical example of this second way, while he is also in general a very important source of inspiration for contemporary theorizing about social power. As summarized by Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato, and Jen Webb, "Foucault doesn't think of power as a thing to be owned or held by somebody, but as a ubiquitous, and ever-changing flow" (2000, 80). Thus power is dispersed and mobile but is still very much present and influential. Moreover, the Foucauldian thesis suggests that power is more effective when hidden from view. In those terms, there is a trend in (post)modern societies away from the brutal and public exercise of power to "hidden coercions" (81). This perspective is pursued by Schirato in his Foucauldian introduction to the role of communication in a "panoptical society" (Schirato 2000; Schirato and Webb 2003).

Such a notion of power opens up a challenging perspective for the media's radical role. The traditional Marxist concept of social power is typically associated with a class-based political and economic hegemony, which for its part fuels class-based opposition with its own radical media. But the Foucauldian

notion of power cannot be ascribed to a particular social position. Radicalism under such conditions does not mean to expose a clearly identifiable source of power but to see an omnipresent structural condition, that is, a built-in bias in the sociopolitical fabric.

This perspective is not completely new. It was already partly present in the thinking of Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, and later social critics such as Jacques Ellul, Stuart Hall, and Herbert Schiller. What they had in common was a holistic view whereby (Western) societies have a structural bias based on a power system that needs to be challenged by radical analysis and action. Those who pursue the radical role in journalism belong to the same intellectual tradition, with a holistic view of society and a notion of power as omnipresent.

COMMUNITY

Power is typically exercised in a community, but the two main traditions just discussed have fundamentally different views of the nature of community. The Anglo-American tradition conceives of a community as made up of individuals pursuing personal interests. The German tradition conceives of a community as a collective of individuals who are bound together by the exercise of reason, morality, and a common interest. The former notion of community is quite loose; the latter is very strong—with a Hegelian state representing a collective interest. Society in the libertarian tradition consists of individual subjects; society in the German tradition is composed of a collective subject: the community. The former tradition holds the community almost as fiction; the latter holds the individual almost as fiction.

In practice, community is mostly understood as a mixture of these traditions. Nowadays it is especially rare to meet a purely libertarian notion of community. This is true despite a worldwide trend of economic liberalism, the so-called neoliberalism. With all the talk of global governance and ecological crises, it is impossible to claim that there are no general interests beyond individuals. Accordingly, ideas of communitarianism and so-called strong democracy have gained more and more ground in the United States. This departure from the Anglo-American tradition does not introduce a new wave of radicalism; it is just a variant of libertarian doctrine, but a reminder of the impasse that classical liberalism has reached (discussed in chapter 1).

As for journalism's radical role, community is a very receptive site for it, as community is for the facilitative role. Most radical media are created or supported by a community—geographic or interest-based—but as Downing (2001, 39) points out, it is a fuzzy concept that raises more questions and dilemmas than it answers. Still, community media cannot be omitted when listing new centers of radical empowerment, as in the introduction of this chapter. Indeed, there is a worldwide movement to capitalize on it (Fuller 2007; Rennie 2006) and even

the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters does so (www.amarc.org/). Nico Carpentier, Rico Lie, and Jan Servaes (2007) distinguish four approaches: (1) media serving a community, and (2) community media as alternative to mainstream media, (3) as part of civil society, and (4) as "rhizome" embedded in flexible social movements. Each of these approaches may accommodate radical as well as other media types, but with an overall direction toward greater participation and wider access, they fit quite well within the radical role of journalism.

These ideas notwithstanding, some forms of radicalism do better without a community's collective support. Dissident voices and anarchist ideas may even be repressed by the stifling influence of a community—however radical it may be. For postmodernists like Lyotard (1988), respecting and supporting difference is the key for getting beyond the dualism of individual and community as suggested by the two main traditions.

LEGITIMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Being radical in society means to break free from the bonds of mutual trust of others, except for others belonging to the same radical group. Thus the radical role of journalism does not enjoy overall legitimacy in society; it is viewed by many as unsettling and subversive. However, the radical media and journalists themselves consider their own oppositional position to be highly legitimate, while society at large is seen as illegitimate.

This situation means that the radical role accepts no accountability to society at large and none to the state. However, conceptually the radical role is still a reaction to hegemonic power; such radicalism is unthinkable in the absence of the dominant power structures at which it is directed. Therefore, radical actors cannot totally delink themselves from the rest of society; an accountability relationship between the source and the target of radicalism always remains.

The very nature of radicalism, with its oppositional approach to the prevailing social system, is alien to the idea of legitimation and accountability. Therefore, it is not surprising that the four types of accountability presented in chapter 5 do not apply very well to this role. Radical journalism sees the legal frame as a threat to freedom instead of a regulatory safeguard. After all, the radical often aims at precisely changing the law and even the constitution. The market frame, for its part, represents the corporate power and bourgeois control that are typical targets of radicals' struggle. The public frame may fit within the radical role in cases when radicals are supported by elements of the civil society against the official levels of society, for example in labor disputes. The professional frame is likely to be counterproductive for the radical role, because professional self-regulation tends to jealously guard the profession's own values and indirectly the existing power structures in society.

Conclusion

How does the radical role relate to the four traditions of normative thinking presented in chapter 2? Obviously, it fits best within the tradition of citizen participation. The social responsibility and libertarian traditions may also have a radical dimension under certain circumstances. But there is little room for radicalism in the corporatist tradition, which is geared toward consensus and organic unity, whereas the radical role builds on conflict and division.

Relating the radical role to the four models of democracy introduced in chapter 4, it has a natural place within the two models of deliberative democracy, civic and direct. Both models count on a lively exchange of contradictory views based in civil society rather than in institutional structures. On the other hand, the pluralist and administrative models of democracy leave little space for a radical approach, since both are based on a logic of preserving rather than challenging the prevailing order.

While the radical role of journalism as specified in this chapter can be seen to enrich deliberative democracy, one can ask whether a really ideal democracy any longer needs radical journalism. After all, a democratic social order means that mechanisms such as political parties, professional associations, and trade unions channel various interests in society so that conflicts are negotiated in open debate and settled through legitimate institutions. Such democratic processes, if fully employed, do not allow any particular interests to occupy a hegemonic position that needs to be challenged by radical media. Indeed, under ideal conditions, the democratic order is supported by the monitorial, facilitative, and collaborative roles, leaving the radical role practically out of the picture.

However, an ideal theory of democracy seldom works, and there is constant need for a radical role for journalism. Even in a well-functioning democracy, it is important as a reserve mechanism to ensure that minorities and powerless segments are not marginalized and that a lively debate is carried on throughout society. Accordingly, the radical role can be seen as a safeguard for democracy, and radical journalism remains a vital element in democracy.

9

The Collaborative Role

Perhaps because the very idea of collaboration implies a relationship with the state or other centers of power that clashes with the libertarian ideal of a free and autonomous press, a collaborative role for journalism seldom receives the attention it deserves. In many parts of the world, the media exist as a check on power, not as a conduit for it. Lee Bollinger makes just this point when he describes American journalists' self-image with reference to a "model of journalistic autonomy" that "breathes life" into "a press conceived in the image of the artist . . . who lives (figuratively) outside of society, beyond normal conventions, and who is therefore better able to see and expose its shortcomings" (1991, 55). By conferring on journalists unfettered power and virtually no accountability, the reigning model of journalistic autonomy promotes what Bollinger views as "a posture toward the world that says, in effect, no one will tell you what to do" (57). Whatever can be said of the actual performance of the media, journalism often views itself in ways that effectively exclude cooperation or collaboration.

Without discounting the values of freedom and autonomy and the media roles they might imply, a collaborative role for journalism is too pervasive and too historically important to be swept aside by ignoring it or downplaying its significance. In democracies everywhere, collaboration not only describes instances of press performance but sometimes prescribes it as well. As reluctant as journalists might be to acknowledge it, at times collaboration distinguishes itself as a genuinely normative role for journalism—not merely an empirical claim about what the press is or does but an ideal that captures what the press should be or what journalists ought to do.

Collaboration characterizes any number of relationships in which the media willingly, sometimes even enthusiastically, participate. When the media agree to

withhold information about the location of troops during times of war, few journalists dismiss collaboration as inappropriate or without justification—many in fact view it as an obligation or a patriotic duty. When a television network agrees to cover a presidential debate, no one looks askance at the network and its decision to cooperate with the debate's organizers. Journalists ordinarily view it as a public service the networks should provide. In other instances, however, acts of collaboration might be considered a sign of weakness and a lack of commitment to the principle of independent news judgment. Whether in the end collaboration distinguishes itself normatively and democratically depends on whether a public justification can be made for it.

Collaboration with the state does not, of course, exhaust the collaborative roles the media might play, as the "public journalism" movement in the United States makes clear with its call for a reinvigorated relationship between the press and civil society (see Glasser 1999; Merritt 1995; Rosen 1999a, 1999b). Centers of power other than the state—from advertisers who subsidize the media to community activists who want access to the public—regularly appeal to the media for cooperation and sympathy. But collaboration with the state stands out as a special case, for only the state can intervene in the affairs of journalism in ways that fundamentally alter the nature of everyday news. Through its laws, policies, and directives, the state—and only the state—provides a legally permissible infrastructure for the media. C. Edwin Baker puts it succinctly when he reminds us that the state, however laissez-faire its approach to journalism might be, inevitably assumes some responsibility for ensuring a public purpose for a private press. Even in countries like the United States, Baker writes, where almost everyone equates a free press with free enterprise, legal support for a free press, including constitutional protection from an overbearing state, "should be read to allow the government to promote a press that, in its best judgment, democracy needs but that the market fails to provide" (2002, 213).

Among the democratic media roles we discuss, a collaborative role is unique in that it deals as much with the needs and expectations of the state as the needs and expectations of the press. Defined in relation to the state, a collaborative role for the media implicates government(s)—locally, regionally, nationally, and at times even transnationally—in the mission of the press. Collaboration represents an acknowledgment of the state's interest—to which the media accede either passively or unwittingly, reluctantly or wholeheartedly—in participating in the choices journalists make and the coverage they provide. This participation does not necessarily involve censorship. And when it does, censorship does not always run counter to the freedom and responsibility journalists want for themselves. But, invariably, participation by—or deference to—the state, no matter how benign or even positive its effect on media performance, raises important questions about the meaning of autonomy in journalism.

Autonomy and agency vary considerably across the range of relationships that defines the scope of a collaborative role for the media, and we allude to this variance in the next section, where we sketch out the contours of various forms of collaboration. But the bulk of this chapter examines a collaborative role for the media by focusing on particular instances of it. We begin with a brief look at the idea of "development journalism," which stands out as one of the few efforts, by practitioners and academics alike, to transform collaboration into a genuinely normative theory of the press. We then turn to examples of collaboration between the media and the state. The first involves the application of the principles of development journalism to Singapore's press, which is expected to assist the state in building and sustaining a national agenda for progress and prosperity. The second focuses on military censorship in Israel, which cultivates a certain bond between the media and the state. The third deals with public safety measures in the United States, where an agreement between the state and the media led to the publication of a terrorist's manifesto.

Conditions for Collaboration

Understood normatively, a collaborative role for the media implies a partnership, a relationship between the media and the state built on mutual trust and a shared commitment to mutually agreeable means and ends. In practice, collaboration between the state and the media often falls short of this ideal. A collaborative role for the media comes in many forms, depending on the grounds and motives for it, and more often than not it fails the test of "mutual trust" and "mutually agreeable means and ends." As outlined in table 2, the conditions for a collaborative role for the media range from coercion to full acceptance of the particular arrangements and outcomes that collaboration implies. Extrapolated from the work of David Held (1995, 160–62), table 2 divides the conditions for collaboration into three broadly distinguishable categories—compliance, acquiescence, and acceptance—and then expands these into seven analytically distinct forms of collaboration. While "these distinctions are analytical," Held reminds us, "in ordinary circumstances different types of agreement are often fused together" (161). These categories and distinctions nonetheless provide a useful framework for discriminating among various types of collaboration and a vocabulary with which to assess the legitimacy of a collaborative role for the media.

Collaboration through compliance offers the weakest and least compelling rationale for a collaborative role for the media. Collaboration achieved through coercion is collaboration in appearance only. The very idea of "coercive collaboration" is an oxymoron; any effort to compel journalists to collaborate preempts the very partnership on which a truly collaborative role rests. While apathy and tradition do not involve coercion, they amount to an uncritical acceptance of

Table 2. Conditions for a Collaborative Role for the Media: From Compliance to Acceptance

Collaboration as Compliance	
Coercion:	No choice in the matter; a law or some other form of overt control compels the press to cooperate
Apathy:	Indifference or ignorance; cooperation exists in the absence of any serious attention to it
Tradition:	Custom dictates action; journalists accept history as a justification for cooperation
Collaboration as Acquiescence	
Pragmatic:	Cooperation is unappealing but inevitable; journalists avoid coercion and accept their fate
Instrumental:	Cooperation is unappealing but instrumentally useful; journalists accept some kind of trade-off
Collaboration as Acceptance	
Practical Agreement:	Given what is known about particular circumstances, journalists judge cooperation to be right or proper
Normative Agreement:	Given all that needs to be known about these circumstances, journalists judge cooperation to be right or proper

prevailing arrangements; they conserve the status quo by leaving it unquestioned. In the case of apathy, a collaborative role for the media exists in the absence of any attention to it; through indifference or ignorance, journalists assume a role they neither endorse or perhaps even understand. In the case of tradition, the past justifies the present; with history as its foil, a collaborative role for the media resumes as a matter of custom or habit.

Collaboration through acquiescence involves a reluctant acceptance of arrangements. The commitment to collaborate is based on either a calculation of the consequences of not collaborating or a consideration of arrangements and outcomes unrelated to collaboration. The media acquiesce for pragmatic reasons when, in their judgment, a lack of collaboration will result in coercion; journalists "accept their fate" and avoid the ignominy of overt and direct control by the state. The press acquiesces for instrumental reasons when it agrees to collaborate for reasons unrelated to the arrangements and outcomes associated with collaboration. In this case, journalists benefit from a collaborative role but in ways extrinsic to the means and ends of collaboration.

Collaboration through acceptance is the only type that deals specifically and exclusively with the merits of a collaborative role for journalism. When journalists take into account *what they know* about *the particular circumstances of collaboration* and judge a collaborative role to be "correct" or "proper," they enter into a *practical* agreement to cooperate. They in effect agree that, given what they know about the means and ends of a collaborative relationship with the state, it is right to collaborate. When, however, journalists take into account

all that needs to be known about the *particular arrangements and outcomes of collaboration,* including an assessment of the consequences of cooperation for the larger community, and judge a collaborative role to be "correct" or "proper," they enter into a *fully normative* agreement to collaborate. They in effect agree that, given what they know about the means and ends of a cooperative relationship with the state *and the conceivable consequences of these means and ends for everyone affected by them,* it is right to collaborate.

A truly normative agreement represents a regulative ideal, an aspirational standard, what Held describes as a "hypothetically projected agreement" (1995, 162). It posits an idealized set of circumstances in which everyone affected by a collaborative role for the media consents to it. If, realistically, journalists cannot consult the community every time they consider a collaborative role, the demands of a normative agreement require that journalists prepare, intellectually and temperamentally, for an open and public discussion of the merits of their decision. While the ideal of a broad consensus, rooted in public debate, applies to any media role, it is especially important in the case of a collaborative role, insofar as collaboration contravenes the generally accepted separation of the press from the state.

The State and Development Journalism

The term "development journalism" denotes certain media practices and arrangements presumably appropriate for "transitional" nations whose political, economic, and cultural institutions lack the maturity that a truly free press arguably requires. For nearly three decades the term applied to nations of the so-called Third World, a Cold War and now obsolete term for countries outside the core of industrialized nations of North America, western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand (First World) and not aligned with the Soviet Union and its allies (Second World). With reference today to "underdeveloped, "developing," or, more positively, "advancing" nations, the idea of development journalism retains its focus on a media system that works, typically but not exclusively, with the state to develop and strengthen existing institutions. Development journalism calls on the media to stand alongside, rather than apart from, other institutions in society; together, these institutions pursue the benefits of modernization for themselves and for the nation as a whole. Whereas conflict, in different ways and for different reasons, dominated what Altschull describes broadly as the "press philosophies of the market and socialist systems," the "operative word in the ideology of the advancing press system was cooperation" (1984, 154–55).

Collaboration in the tradition of development journalism usually involves a partnership with the state, though not always a formal one, a relationship

premised on a commitment by the press to play a positive role in the processes of development. From this perspective, responsibility tempers press freedom; journalists can question, even challenge, the state, but not to the point where they undermine a government's basic plans for progress and prosperity. As a prominent local journalist explained at a conference in Ibadan, Nigeria, in 1980,

> So long as the journalist is aware of his responsibility towards the community—principally that of helping development—so long as he realizes that his freedom has bearing on what is good for society and as such is not freedom without limits, the tradition of mistrust will be dissolved, and government and journalism will become twin agents of socioeconomic progress. (quoted in Altschull 1984, 159)

The concept of development journalism originated in the 1960s as "independent journalism that provided constructive criticism of government and its agencies, informed readers how the development process was affecting them, and highlighted local self-help projects," as Shah (1996, 143) recounts the history of the term. However, it too often devolved into a "rationale to take control of mass media to promote state policies, often as a part of larger campaigns of repression." In light of this history, newer versions of development journalism generally steer clear of claims to support a state–press partnership and instead highlight the importance of a press that promotes and strengthens citizen involvement in programs of social change. Among others, Shah (1996) articulates an alternative approach to the question of modernization, in his case a "model of journalism and national development" that accentuates an emancipatory role for the press.

Shah's model of emancipatory journalism establishes a "position from which to consider a role for journalists as participants in a process of progressive social change" (1996, 144). It focuses "on specific and locally defined views of identity and community that recognize differences among and within marginalized groups" (146). By emphasizing roles for alternative media that "exist alongside and produce content different from the mainstream media" (162, n. 7), Shah posits a model that is arguably "more complete and more complex" than earlier versions of development journalism. It is more complete, Shah contends, because it "provides a theoretical link between citizen access to mass media and social change and because it articulates a specific mechanism by which journalists can participate in social change." And it is more complex insofar as it "incorporates principles of diversity and fluidity in the process of building cultural identities and communities and because it challenges journalistic practice by abandoning the idea of objectivity" (146).

Although it is an example of the "better and more positive version" of development journalism that McQuail (2000, 155) advocates, Shah's conception

of emancipatory journalism—similar in many ways to the claims made for the media under the facilitative and radical roles (see chapters 7 and 8)—fails to address the power of the state and the state's interest in maintaining certain roles for the mainstream media. It also fails to question the extent to which dominant media might overshadow alternative media in ways that render the latter ineffectual. Like others who appreciate the need for a multiplicity of media—a "media tier" that serves "differentiated audiences," as Curran (2000, 140) puts it—Shah makes the case for a more open and more democratic form of journalism. But key questions remain unanswered, even unasked: What is the nature of the role of an ostensibly independent press that limits itself, at least in certain areas, to constructive criticism of the state? What does it mean for an independent press to operate by the original definition of development journalism, a role that honors the mutual interests of the media and the state in strengthening and perhaps refining, but certainly not undermining, a national consensus? Specifically, Shah's model fails in its application to countries like Singapore, where the state turns to the media for assistance in a nation-building agenda.

The Politics of Consensus: The Case of Singapore

A multicultural society ensconced in a modern city-state, Singapore embraces what can be fairly termed an "authoritarian democracy," a political system of elites that honors the value of free and open markets while maintaining tight control over the mainstream press and other venues for public expression. One of the so-called newly industrialized countries and thus an interesting case study of the scope and duration of a development model of journalism, Singapore insists that it cannot withstand the vagaries of an unrestrained press. With an interventionist state that leaves little room for the development of civil society (Ang 2002, 80), Singapore's approach to progress and reform rests on what it repeatedly describes as consensus politics—a consensus defined by the state and sustained through the state's control of the means of public communication. That is, unlike societies that organize themselves as a "civil association," with emphasis on rules, processes, and procedures, Singapore exists principally as an "enterprise association," an organizing principle that emphasizes "a society-wide adherence to a shared undertaking" (George 2002b, 174). Accordingly, Singapore judges the value and success of its political, cultural, social, and economic institutions, including the press, by their contribution to what the state has defined, though not always in so many words, as Singapore's twin goals: harmony and prosperity.

The leaders of Singapore's ruling People's Action Party have been remarkably candid about what they expect from journalists, expectations that set forth in clear if not always compelling terms the need for an enduring partnership

between the state and the media. Lee Kuan Yew, who as prime minister led Singapore from its independence from British rule in 1965 until his retirement in 1990, developed an early aversion to a press that operates with little or no regard for the interests of the state. Suspicious of claims of freedom of the press, especially when they turned out to be little more than a defense of the "freedom of its owners to advance their personal and class interests" (Lee 2000, 213), Lee and his People's Action Party colleagues forged a plan for "managing the media," to cite the revealing title of one of the chapters in Lee's (2000, 212–25) memoirs. The plan was to instill among journalists a sense of responsibility for the success of Singapore and a genuine commitment to the prosperity of Singaporeans.

In a speech to the International Press Institute in Helsinki in 1971, a few years before the passage of legislation that would radically alter the ownership patterns of Singapore's newspapers,[1] Lee reviewed the needs of a "new and young country like Singapore" and outlined what he regarded as a proper role for the media and other agencies of public communication: "to reinforce, not undermine, the cultural values and social attitudes being inculcated in our schools and universities" (2000, 217). Focusing on the importance of moving Singapore beyond its colonial past and into a future of higher "standards of living for our people," Lee pointed to the requisite "knowledge, skills and disciplines of advanced countries" and the "mood" mass media can create "in which people become keen to acquire" them (217). Unwilling to subject Singapore to the unpredictable ire of a fully free press, Lee concluded his remarks to the assembly of journalists with an unequivocal rejection of the model of journalistic autonomy that American journalists embrace: "Freedom of the press, freedom of the news media, must be subordinated to the overriding needs of Singapore, and to the primacy of purpose of an elected government" (218).

By rejecting Western and especially American models of journalism, Singapore establishes for itself a distinctive, though hardly unique, view of the relationship between the press and the state. Given its enthusiasm for a strong, centralized state—one that seeks to create and sustain a national consensus on issues of public importance—Singapore's ruling elite will not allow the media, as Lee put it, "to assume a role in Singapore that the American media play in America, that is, that of invigilator, adversary and inquisitor of the administration" (2000, 223).

In Singapore, but seldom elsewhere, the standard textbook account of Singapore's media highlights the dangers of an unrestrained press and celebrates the power of a press that helps "in nation-building—creating one nation, one people, out of different races, worshipping different gods—by informing and educating Singaporeans of national policies and issues, and inculcating good values in the people" (Tan and Soh 1994, 52–53). Expressly tied to elements of social responsibility theory and media development theory, the received view of

the press in Singapore begins with a critique of a libertarian press that challenges or ridicules the prevailing social, moral, and political order and ends with an appreciation for the special contribution the press can make in promoting harmony, solidarity, and tolerance. Citing racial discord fueled by press accounts of it, The government of Singapore expects journalists to exhibit the sensitivity to differences that a culturally plural society requires.[2] And citing the widespread cynicism and disaffection associated with a "watchdog" press that constantly questions the wisdom of a government's plans and policies, Singapore calls on journalists to temper debate and discussion with respect for authority and deference to the state's interest in guiding citizens into a sustainable consensus on core values and key issues.[3]

In Singapore, the state creates the conditions for the media it wants through various laws that restrict content and limit ownership. The state also controls the distribution of publications and programming coming from outside the country. In part the legacy of a British colonial government that often equated controlling crises with controlling communication about them, but also in part a response by the People's Action Party to what it regards as "the harrowing historical and present-day evidence against a free-wheeling libertarian press" (Tan and Soh 1994, 50), the system of media laws in Singapore narrows the domain of civil society by establishing the state as the final arbiter of the range of acceptable expression. Although every democratic state defines and ultimately constrains the scope of civil discourse, Singapore does so to a degree that raises questions about when claims for the legitimacy of the state invalidate the basic premise of self-governance: the requirement of popular sovereignty.

Whether the Singapore government's treatment of the press facilitates or erodes popular sovereignty depends on whether and when the media can create opportunities for the "open and fair" discussions that democracy requires (see Christiano 1996, 3); and this, in turn, depends on what "open and fair" means. Critics contend that Singapore's media remains so heavily sedated by the state that, to shift metaphors, "its main function today seems to be to gorge itself silly with daily Government pronouncements and then regurgitate them for public consumption" (Chee 2000, 2). Others view the media as sufficiently free to engage in what Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong—in a speech in 1995 celebrating the 150th anniversary of the *Straits Times,* Singapore's largest and oldest English-language daily newspaper—recognized as a legitimate, though perhaps subsidiary, role for the media in Singapore: "accurately reporting wrongdoings" and "providing a forum for readers' complaints and debate on national issues." While critics charge that journalists in Singapore lack the independence of judgment they need in order to advance their own agendas, others point out that there is nothing fundamentally undemocratic or otherwise inappropriate about an agenda that focuses on, to cite the editor of the *Straits Times,* "enhanc-

ing Singapore's critical success factors, especially strong families, social harmony, education, thrift and hard work" (Cheong 1995, 130).

Given Singapore's history, location, and politics, and given the racial and ethnic mix of its people, the debate over a collaborative role for its press sooner or later turns to the topic of "Asian values"—a term that invariably promises more than it delivers. At an extreme, the debate refers to a clash of civilizations, as though Asian values represent a worldview wholly at odds with the West and Western conceptions of journalism. More moderate versions, the debate points to differences in emphasis between liberal and communitarian theories of democracy (see chapter 3), such that a larger framework of shared principles that provides a context within which to consider different, even divergent, conceptions of democratic practice and press performance.

Leaving aside the contentious proposition that there in fact exist pan-Asian values that inform an arguably Asian model of democracy, certain values in Singapore and elsewhere in Asia (and beyond) do indeed infuse claims about the press and its commitment to nation-building. Government officials in Singapore, through the laws they pass and in their public pronouncements, stress the importance of a press that distinguishes itself as less confrontational, less inflammatory, less sensational, and less driven by conflict than the press in the West; they assign to the press a responsibility to "forge consensus and . . . not fray the social fabric" (Goh 1995, 5). Journalists, too, define their responsibilities with attention to "maintaining a close press–state relationship" in which the media are "prosocial and willingly allied with government for the greater good of nation building" (Massey and Chang 2002, 990). The emphasis on the virtues of respect and obedience shows up even in the Code of Professional Conduct of the Singapore National Union of Journalists: "Every member shall keep in mind the dangers in the laws of libel, contempt of court and copyright" (quoted in Ang 2002, 89).

That the Committee to Protect Journalists finds that in Singapore "journalists have been taught to think of themselves not as critics but as partners of the state in 'nation-building'" (quoted in George 2002a, 7) does not by itself render the lesson unworthy. Likewise, that the state in Singapore teaches this lesson does not by itself render the lesson worthwhile. Just as we do not want to "conflate authoritarian leaders' ideas about the press with the values of journalists and citizens" (6), we do not want to reject these ideas only because authoritarian leaders advance them. A collaborative role for the press in Singapore, or elsewhere, meets the test of legitimacy when the relationship between the state and the press qualifies as a true partnership, an arrangement based on a shared commitment to mutually agreeable means and ends—and an arrangement, moreover, to which the larger community consents. The stringency of this test underscores the importance of distinguishing between the press complying

with or acquiescing to a collaborative role and the media (and others) freely accepting the claims and conditions of collaboration.

Little in the history of Singapore's state-press relations offers evidence of the existence of the conditions for a normative agreement on the need for—or even desirability of—a collaborative press role of the kind the state wants. Rather, the state in Singapore engages in strategic and subtle forms of coercion that in effect steer the media toward compliance and acquiescence. Cherian George calls this "calibrated coercion," a form of pressure designed to achieve "maximum effectiveness at minimal cost" (2005, 11). Careful to preserve the credibility of the media, which makes them more useful and persuasive collaborators, the ruling People's Action Party seldom resorts to the repressive tools it has at its disposal—from the detention of journalists to the revocation of a publication's license—and instead relies on the widespread knowledge that these tools have been used in the past and could be used again. "Calibrated coercion," observes George—a former *Straits Times* journalist who now teaches at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University and whose own work, both journalistic and academic, illustrates the government's tolerance of criticism and dissent—"provides journalists with periodic reminders of just who is boss, but also enough leeway to persuade enough of them that there is still a place in Singapore for the professional practice of journalism, and that the space is expanding" (15). Through fear and intimidation, then, and by structuring the media in a way that ensures a regime of compliant publishers, the state orchestrates obedience from media that seldom experience the state's direct and overt interference. The government of Singapore, George points out, "has achieved what possibly no other authoritarian state has done: effective, near-watertight suppression of the press without either nationalizing ownership of the media or brutalizing journalists" (14).

The Dilemma of Censorship: The Case of Israel

Prevailing conceptions of censorship rest, understandably, on a restrictive view of power. Censorship involves coercion, typically coercion by the state, which invariably restricts expression and impedes democratic participation. But as anthropologists and other social theorists point out, censorship also implies a productive view of power. In this expanded and somewhat paradoxical view of censorship, power is conceived as "formative" and "constitutive," to use Judith Butler's (1998) terms. As such, power in part forms the identity of the speaker and in part constitutes the legitimate boundaries of expression. Censorship denies freedom, of course, but also secures it, which is to say that censorship accounts for both the reduction *and* production of power. Thus by "refocusing the issue of censorship and self-censorship," as Alvin Gouldner suggests, on

shifting domains of freedom and the privileges of power they confer, the study of censorship becomes in effect the study of political participation: "The fundamental intentions of all political movements today can be appraised, and can be archeologically unearthed, by revealing the theory and practice of censorship with which they operate, tacitly or overtly, whether these be movements of the status quo or those opposed to them" (1976, 159). And because mass media play such a crucial role in so many of these movements, Gouldner finds that "all kinds of freedom today hinge on issues of media censorship" (160).

The nexus between media censorship and political freedom highlights the difficult position journalists find themselves in when censorship, or the prospects for it, expands the media's power but at the same time diminishes their autonomy; it explains, moreover, how journalists can in principle deplore censorship while in practice they benefit from it. Specifically, journalists face this dilemma—the dilemma of expanding their power at the expense of their autonomy—as they consider opportunities to work with the state in developing answers to questions of censorship. While journalists ordinarily believe, usually with good reason, that with autonomy comes power, in fact power trumps autonomy whenever journalists agree to work with state officials on the development of policies concerning what the public can know and how and when it can know it.

Journalists accept the productive power of censorship, and arguably relinquish at least some of the independence of judgment they might otherwise enjoy, whenever the details of national security are shared in confidence with the media but withheld from the general public, a situation that in effect compels journalists to think in more circumspect ways about what they can and should publish. This happens most often during times of war, when the line between circumspection and self-censorship blurs. On these occasions, the state appeals to journalists as a special class of citizen with a special stake in the state's success; under the guise of safety and security, agents of the state and agents of the media work together to keep the public in the dark about certain past, planned, or ongoing activities. In this context, censorship, at once both an expressive and repressive force in society, needs to be understood symbolically as well as legally; it needs to be viewed as a phenomenon involving rites as well as rights. In obvious ways censorship denies the press certain rights, typically by restricting what journalists can publish. But in other ways, which the media seldom acknowledge, censorship empowers journalists by extending to them opportunities and privileges that would not otherwise exist. Thus the requirements of censorship, a set of proscriptions aimed at controlling the form and content of the day's news, work in contradistinction to the rituals of censorship, which position journalists—some journalists at least—as privileged participants in discussions and decisions from which others are excluded.

The rituals of censorship flourish during times of total war, when war transforms a national economy into a war economy and civilian morale matters as much as troop morale (Hallin 1997, 209). When war expands or continues to the point where it takes over a nation's self-image—when, that is, war defines much more than a nation's plans and policies and begins to impinge on everyday life at home—the state and the media often work together to sustain a consensus, which in turn feeds a national identity, which in turn rationalizes the hardships of war. Under these circumstances, war brings about some of the best known and least contested examples of a collaborative role for the media. And nowhere is that role more in evidence than in Israel, where journalists and state officials have worked together for decades on matters of national security.

War in general, but especially war in a small country like Israel, invites involvement from everyone, old and young alike, regardless of their position in society, and journalists are no exception. It would be difficult to overstate the pervasive presence of the military in Israeli society, particularly the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). The IDF provides paramilitary training in high schools; operates vocational schools; assists in the education of soldiers from disadvantaged homes; publishes a popular weekly magazine (Ben Meir 1995, 6); and runs one of Israel's most successful radio stations, which produces a highly regarded news operation. Just about every Israeli shares a direct and everyday connection to the IDF, either through service in the military, active or reserve, or through a family member's service. With a conscription policy that cuts across almost every marker of status in society, including gender, the IDF stands out as one of Israel's most egalitarian institutions.

War in Israel, like war elsewhere, can be understood culturally in terms of what Hallin and Gitlin describe as "an enormously appealing symbolic terrain" (1993, 412); it can serve as "an arena of individual and national self-expression that generates far more emotional involvement than ordinary political events." Under these conditions, the practice of journalism can transform dispassionate and essentially secular reports of strategic gains and battlefield losses into sacred accounts of unity and prowess. With a reverence and deference that journalists ordinarily dismiss as "boosterism," war coverage can feed a public consciousness hungry for stories of might and right, stories where no one doubts the difference between good and evil, justice and injustice, innocence and guilt, heroes and villains. Policies may be disputed, leaders criticized, and issues debated, but the act of war itself almost always becomes an opportunity to honor "us" and vilify "them."

The constancy of war in Israel is palpably real, but it is also a state of mind, an attitude, a general orientation to everyday life. War involves politicians and policies, soldiers and strategies; but it also involves sympathy and solidarity, passion and patriotism. War requires planning and purpose, decisions and de-

termination; it is a technical feat, a political achievement, a military accomplishment. But war also vivifies values, sustains loyalties, and builds consensus. As much as anything else, war can be an affirmation of identity and a celebration of community. For journalists, war can create a hierarchy of roles and responsibilities. As one prominent Israeli editor put it in the early 1980s, "I am first of all an Israeli, then an officer in the reserves, and only after that a journalist and an editor" (quoted in Peri 2004, 86). Just as the Office of Censorship in the United States during World War II, directed by a journalist, depended on the voluntary cooperation of the press (Hallin 1995; Washburn 1990), military censorship in Israel exists as an appeal to shared interests and a strategy designed to soften the distinction between the goals of the state and the responsibilities of the press. As Hallin reminds us, wartime relations between the state and civil society involve "cooperation, co-optation and blurring of the lines, in which state functions were often taken on by institutions like the press, and vice versa" (6).

The system of censorship in Israel began, as did that in Singapore, with the remnants of British colonial law. The British Mandate, which ruled Palestine in the thirty years preceding Israel's independence in 1948, left a legacy of suppression that Israel to this day continues to use for its own purposes. Laws dating to the early 1930s granted British authorities broad powers of censorship aimed at controlling both the domestic and foreign press. These laws were incorporated verbatim into Israeli law and thereby established the legal framework for censorship in Israel today. Initial support for the press censorship in Israel can be explained in terms of a nation that was immediately at war with its neighbors—an official state of war that continues to this day—and journalists who were accustomed to censorship, including their own traditions of self-censorship, were pleased to see the laws of censorship shift from British to Israeli authorities (Lahav 1985; 1993; Limor and Nossek 1995, 5). But initial support for press censorship, including a unanimous vote of consent from editors of Israel's daily newspapers, quickly waned as it became evident that censorship was being defined and implemented in ways that offended journalists. Following months of negotiations—and the closing of several newspapers by military authorities—editors, government officials, and representatives of the military arrived at a written agreement that empowered journalists in unprecedented ways.

Under the agreement, promulgated in 1949 and subsequently revised and amended, a committee of daily newspaper editors—a decidedly "exclusive club," as Caspi and Limor (1999, 27) describe the committee's composition—and the chief military censor negotiate the exact terms of censorship; these terms applied to all media, including media whose executives were not a party to the agreement. Technically, the military censor retains the unilateral right to censor material, but in practice the censor and editors negotiate the content of sensitive stories. Censorship, therefore, continues as "largely the result of a

joint and consensual initiative by the political and communications establishments to restrict the free flow of information under justifiable circumstances" (214). And part of what makes this "joint and consensual initiative" possible is the generally "convivial relationship" between Israel's political and media elite, who "constantly rub shoulders at social events and fraternize at more intimate gatherings on weekends" (Limor and Nossek 1995, 294).

Journalists do not, then, frame censorship in terms of government versus journalism but rather as Israelis in different roles whose responsibilities converge on a common commitment to the security of their country. In the context of the confrontations and compromises that animate the relationship between the military and the media, journalists view the military censor as less an adversary than a partner. Theirs is "not a marriage of love, but one of convenience," as two Israeli media scholars recently put it: "Marriages of this type usually last for decades, mainly because all the alternatives available to the couple are worse than remaining together" (Nossek and Limor 2001, 31). Although in principle Israeli journalists deplore censorship, as a practical matter they condone it. Thus, rites triumph over rights under the conditions of Israeli censorship, which is to say that the *practice* of censorship, in contradistinction to the *laws* of censorship, accommodates newspaper editors—even empowers them—in ways that make censorship tolerable to the mainstream media.

Understood as a dynamic and fluid process, the mechanisms for military censorship in Israel provide greater flexibility and more room for negotiation than the law, read literally, allows. Moreover, the process of censorship serves as a useful reminder, as journalists themselves acknowledge (Glasser and Liebes 1996), of the responsibilities of the media during times of war; it extends to journalists a ready and regular forum for discussing the status of Israel's safety and the role of journalists in securing it. This perhaps explains why so many Israeli journalists prefer the status quo, even arguing against legislative reform. New laws and new interpretations by the courts might in principle benefit the media, but many in journalism prefer the decades of tradition associated with the existing legal framework, a tradition that includes quiet and creative ways to circumvent the letter of the law (Limor and Nossek 1995, 284; Nossek and Limor 2001, 29).

But support for censorship, and with it support for a collaborative role for the media, is being challenged on several fronts. First, a gap exists between the "old guard" of Israeli journalism—who grew up as Israel grew up and whose newspapers benefited directly, but discretely, from the prerequisites and prerogatives associated with the practice of censorship— and newer generations of journalists who are less inclined to forfeit their independence and professional obligations in exchange for the promise of privileged access to military secrets and other insider information. Research suggests that older journalists

are more "willing to submerge basic professional values to consideration of national morale, national image and a sweeping definition of national interest"; united in their support for the values of press freedom and autonomy, age makes a difference in terms of the "general values . . . most important to them as a guiding principle in their lives." Older journalists favor "collective values such as patriotism, national security and peace," while younger journalists favor "individual values such as happiness and self-fulfillment" (Shamir 1988, 594).

Second, as the computerization of communication creates new venues for domestic journalism, increases access to non-Israeli sources of journalism, and generally weakens the hegemony of the mainstream media, the institutions that support and orchestrate the practice of censorship, like the editors' committee, find it increasingly difficult to sustain an enforceable system of censorship.

Finally, if various peace initiatives in the Middle East end up strengthening Israel's sense of security, the grounds for censorship—and thus the conditions for collaboration—might dissipate entirely. Even in the absence of peace in the Middle East, however, there remain questions about the prudence of a collaborate role for the media that depends more on winks and nods than on the rule of law and therefore informally and unofficially privileges some journalists and not others.

Among others, Pnina Lahav (1985; 1993), who offers a formidable critique of the failure of Israel's formal system of law to adequately protect a free and independent press, laments a society in which suppression of communication persists "on a very significant scale" (1993, 178). Although Lahav recognizes the inevitable line any democratic nation draws between "ordinary times and national security crises" (179), she worries about the permanency of Israel's situation—a "never-ending chain of national security crises" (180), as she puts it—and the permanence of the measures used to deal with it. When other democracies in the West—which Lahav regards as the appropriate comparison, given Israel's political aspirations—deal with national security practices, their responses "are temporary and are recognized as undemocratic, at least in hindsight" (180). Although many Americans now worry about what a protracted "war on terrorism" portends for a permanent erosion of civil liberties, so far Israel distinguishes itself as the only Western democracy to embrace decades of illiberal press controls.

The Media and Public Safety: The Case of the United States

In mostly small and insignificant ways, the media and the state often work together on matters of public safety. Little or no controversy surrounds requests from the state to publish the details of a crime (a description of a suspect, for example), especially when that information might enable citizens to assist local

authorities in making a timely arrest. And hardly anyone objects when newsrooms, at the request of law enforcement officials, agree to withhold information that might jeopardize the investigation of suspected criminal activity, such as plans for an undercover operation. But considerable controversy erupted in the mid-1990s when the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post,* two of the most prestigious newspapers in the United States, accepted a recommendation from the U. S. attorney general and the FBI to publish the thirty-five-thousand-word "manifesto" of a domestic terrorist whose bombing spree had spanned seventeen years (for details, see Chase 2003).

The terrorist, popularly known as the Unabomber (from a Department of Justice acronym, UNABOM, which referred to the university and airline officials who were his initial targets) had mailed sixteen bombs, beginning in 1978, that killed three and injured another twenty-three. Despite a massive manhunt that involved an FBI task force with scores of agents assigned to it, a million-dollar reward for information leading to his capture, and the first "wanted" poster to appear in cyberspace, little was known about—and very little was heard from—the usually taciturn Unabomber. That changed in late April 1995 when his sixteenth bomb killed the president of the California Forestry Association in Sacramento, California.

On the same day, the *New York Times* received and later published, though only after the FBI had cleared and edited it, a letter in which the Unabomber offered to stop making and mailing bombs if arrangements could be made to publish in a "widely read, nationally distributed periodical" a lengthy manuscript, still in preparation. Publicly, the *Times* responded cautiously and without a commitment to any course of action: "While the pages of *The Times* can't be held hostage by those who threaten violence," said publisher Arthur Sulzberger Jr., "we're ready to receive the manuscript described in the letter. We'll take a careful look at it and make a journalistic decision about whether to publish it in our pages" (Dorgan 1995). Notwithstanding critics who viewed any cooperation with the Department of Justice as inappropriate and contrary to the traditions of an independent press, many in the journalism establishment understood and supported the *Times*'s position. Even uninvited and unlikely publishers, for example the *San Francisco Chronicle,* offered to consider taking "extraordinary measures to ensure public safety." Willing to ponder his own possible predicament, the *Chronicle*'s executive editor announced that his newspaper, too, would "give serious consideration to publishing such a document" (Glasser 1995, A19).

Being "ready to receive the manuscript" and being prepared to "make a journalistic decision about whether to publish it" were apparently enough encouragement for the Unabomber, who within a couple of months completed and submitted his work. Meanwhile, as the FBI distributed his essay privately, hoping that others might find in it some useful clues, the *Times* continued to "study our

options." A couple of months later, after close consultation with law enforcement officials, the details of which have never been disclosed, the *Times* and the *Washington Post* decided to go ahead with plans to jointly publish the tract.

At a length and in a style of writing that newspapers normally shun, the sixty-two-page, single-spaced essay on the evils of modern technology—a "closely reasoned scholarly tract," as the *Times* described it—filled an eight-page insert that appeared in the *Washington Post* on September 19, 1995. The publishers of the *Washington Post* and the *Times,* who had agreed to split the insert's cost, estimated at a dollar a word, issued a joint statement that cited "public safety reasons" as the justification for acceding to the terrorist's demands. This was no rush to judgment, the publishers reminded their readers, for they had known for three months about the Unabomber's plans to complete a manuscript and his demand that it be widely disseminated: "From the beginning, the two newspapers have consulted closely on the issue of whether to publish under the threat of violence. We have consulted law enforcement officials. Both the Attorney General and the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have now recommended that we print this document for public safety reasons, and we have agreed to do so." Separately, Sulzberger explained that "it's awfully hard to put too much faith in the words of someone with the record of violence that the Unabomber has . . . (but) you print and he doesn't kill anybody else, that's a pretty good deal. You print and he continues to kill people, what have you lost? The cost of newsprint?" (Hodges 1995, 248–49).

Of course, more was at stake than the cost of newsprint, as any number of critics pointed out. They took aim at what they regarded as, in the words of one defender of an autonomous press, "a dangerous erosion of the line between the media and government, a line that should be fixed and immutable": Journalists can and do report on threats to public safety, they can even provide commentary and advice, but "news organizations are not, and should never be, perceived to be arms of the government" (Kirtley 1995, 249–50). Others, however, questioned the "sacred line" that presumably separates the media from the state. The media on "many occasions" consult with government—on kidnapping, hostage takings, national security. Journalists' "so-called adversarial posture toward government does not require them to subscribe to the belief . . . that government is to be regarded as an enemy or hostile power" (Harwood 1995, 252).

Although Sulzberger assured his newsroom that the Unabomber "case was unique and not likely to become a journalistic precedent" (Hodges 1995, 249), assurances of this kind do little to deter the perception of a de facto policy having been established to which editors and publishers in the future can turn when faced with similar circumstances. Indeed, in their months of discussions, internally and with law enforcement officials, had any of the key managers at the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post* recalled, or been asked to recall,

with or without referring to it as a "precedent," the 1976 decision by these two newspapers to publish, along with three other newspapers, a two-column statement by a group calling itself Fighters for a Free Croatia that had killed a police officer and hijacked an airplane with ninety-two passengers aboard? And would it matter to the *Times* or the *Post* that members of the group freed their hostages and surrendered once their statement appeared in print?

Publication of the Unabomber's manuscript led directly to the arrest and later the conviction of Theodore Kaczynski, when his brother noticed similarities between what he read in the press and writings he had found a few months earlier while cleaning out the family home. But unless the *Times* and the *Post* resort to an ex post facto, ends-justifies-the-means argument, their reluctance to talk openly and candidly about the grounds for their decision—the reasons for their choices—has left many questions unanswered:

- Why and when did the *Times* shift from a promise to make a "journalistic decision" about the publication of the Unabomber's manuscript to a decision based on "public safety reasons"?
- With reference to newsrooms that "regularly receive messages from people threatening dire action unless their demands are met," what did Sulzberger mean when he said the *Times*'s "traditional response will continue to serve us well—we notify law enforcement officials, when appropriate, and print nothing." When and why is it appropriate to notify law enforcement officials? When and why is it appropriate to print nothing? Why was it appropriate for the *Times* to submit to the FBI, unopened, the letter it received from the Unabomber?
- Why did the *Times* and the *Post* publish the Unabomber's manuscript instead of insisting that the government serve as publisher by purchasing space in one or both of the newspapers? In other words, why would the *Times* and the *Post* jeopardize the integrity and independence of their newsrooms when they could have positioned the manuscript as an advertisement sponsored and paid for by the FBI?

The absence of answers to these and other questions makes it difficult to reach any conclusions about the nature of the collaborative role these two newspapers played in the Unabomber case. Until these newspapers—or the Department of Justice and the FBI—disclose the details of this particular collaboration between the media and the state, insufficient evidence exists to judge whether in this instance the publication of a terrorist's manuscript illustrates cooperation through compliance, acquiescence, or acceptance—to return to the framework introduced earlier. That is, given what little is known about the Unabomber case, it is impossible to say whether the two newspapers cooperated passively, reluctantly, or wholeheartedly; it is impossible to judge, therefore, the normative legitimacy of the press's collaborative role.

Conclusion

Defiance and deference can at times coexist, as they did in late 2005 when the *New York Times* revealed that in 2002 President George W. Bush had secretly authorized the National Security Agency to engage in domestic spying, without court-approved warrants, by eavesdropping on American citizens and other residents whose international phone calls and emails might disclose threats to the United States. The *Times* challenged the state by exposing a "major shift in American intelligence-gathering practices" and highlighting concerns about the "operation's legality." But in the continuation of the front-page story on page 22, the *Times* acknowledged that it had collaborated with the state by withholding the story for a year and omitting details that might aid terrorists:

> The White House asked *The New York Times* not to publish this article, arguing that it could jeopardize continuing investigations and alert would-be terrorists that they might be under scrutiny. After meeting with senior administration officials to hear their concerns, the newspaper delayed publication for a year to conduct additional reporting. Some of the information that administration officials argued could be useful to terrorists has been omitted. (Risen and Lichtblau 2005, A22)

Editor Bill Keller had little to say beyond what appeared in the story, except to point out that his reporters focused on a "secret policy reversal" and an "expansion of authority" that had "prompted debate within the government" (2005). As the story itself explained, until the *Times* detected dissent within the government, the editors deferred to the administration's claim that "existing safeguards are sufficient to protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans" (Risen and Lichtblau 2005, A22) and agreed not to make public what they knew about the domestic spying program. "It is not our place to pass judgment on the legal or civil liberties questions involved in such a program," Keller said, "but it became clear those questions loomed larger within the government than we had previously understood."

Predictably, readers wanted to know more. Some readers wanted to know why the *Times* had needed to wait until it could document disagreement among government officials before it felt comfortable publishing the story. Did the *Times* hold back a story that might have affected the outcome of the 2004 election? Others wanted to know who or what gave the *Times*—no matter what debate did or did not take place behind closed doors—the authority to publish classified information, and they welcomed a Justice Department investigation into the unlawful disclosure of a top-secret surveillance operation.

As in 1995 when they faced scrutiny of their decision to publish the Unabomber's manifesto, the editors of the *Times* declined every opportunity to answer

questions, including questions from the paper's own staff, and relied instead on a couple of prepared statements from Keller. The public editor at the *Times,* Byron Calame, who was hired to ask questions on behalf of curious and concerned readers, reported a "loud silence" in response to the twenty-eight questions he emailed to Keller and to publisher Arthur Sulzberger Jr. "The *New York Times*'s explanation of its decision to report, after what it said was a one-year delay, that the National Security Agency is eavesdropping domestically without court-approved warrants was woefully inadequate," he wrote in a column published two weeks after the story broke. "And I have had unusual difficulty getting a better explanation for readers, despite the paper's repeated pledge of greater transparency." Keller's only response to Calame's inquiry was the underdeveloped claim that there "is really no way to have a full discussion of the back story without talking about when and how we knew what we knew, and we can't do that." Calame surmised this response meant that "the sourcing for the eavesdropping article is so intertwined with the decisions about when and what to publish that a full explanation could risk revealing sources" (Calame 2006).

But the "back story" of importance to readers and others concerned about press roles and responsibilities does not require the *Times* to reveal the identity of sources or otherwise renege on promises of secrecy. There may be legitimate reasons for journalists to be less than candid, at least for a period of time, about how they have gathered information and developed a story, but those reasons do not apply to the morally interesting back story: the reasons for the reasons. Sissela Bok (1978, 104–5; 1982, 112–13), who has written widely on matters of public morality, makes just this point when she distinguishes between acts of secrecy and the practice of secrecy. Just as no one should expect physicians to violate patient confidentiality in order to justify patient confidentiality, no one needs to expect the *Times* to talk openly about particular acts of secrecy in order to explain and defend the practice of secrecy. No *need* for secrecy, in other words, prevents the *Times* from discussing its standards for *allowable* secrecy. Thus, with reference to the principles and policies that apply to, but reveal nothing in particular about, the domestic spying story, Keller and others at the *Times* could have—and should have—addressed any number of questions concerning secrecy in journalism and collaboration with the state:

- With regard to how it deals with state secrets: Under what circumstances, if any, does the rule of law require the *Times* to refuse to accept, with or without plans for publication, what it knows will be an illegally disclosed secret? Under what circumstances, if any, will the *Times* agree to conceal the secret information it retrieves or agrees to receive?
- With regard to the connection between collaboration and consensus: If no one in government regards a secret plan or operation as morally or legally dubious, does the *Times* have any justification for writing about it?

- And with regard to a full disclosure of its relationship with the state: What conditions need to be met before the *Times* will discuss in detail its dealings with state officials?

Articulating and accepting a normatively viable collaborative role for the press requires a more nuanced view of the state and state-press arrangements than most Western views of press freedom permit. So long as journalists insist on casting the state in the role of villain, collaboration with the state will remain a dishonorable and indefensible endeavor. Such disdain for any relationship with government officials is especially prevalent in the United States, which has over the years contributed more than its fair share to the world's literature on why the state needs to steer clear of any entanglements with the press. A rich folklore surrounds other roles for the media, particularly ones that pit the media against the state, but no mythology exists that celebrates cooperation, especially cooperation with the state. This state of mind deprives journalists of the cultural capital they need to develop for themselves—and for the public, an appreciation of the history and importance of state-press partnerships. In addition, it delays discussion of the various forms of collaboration, discussed earlier and outlined in table 2, and the very different grounds for them. Collaboration as a normative ideal, a partnership based on mutually agreeable means and ends, differs in important ways from other forms of collaboration, but these differences end up getting lost in the rhetoric of independence and autonomy.

Like any of the media roles we discuss in this book, a collaborative one needs to be understood in the context of its application. Roles apply in particular instances and at particular times. On any given day, most news media play multiple roles. Even in the context of a single project or story, the media can shift postures and play more than one role, depending on what practitioners want to achieve and how they want to achieve it. No role precludes another.

When the media refuse to discuss, openly and candidly, their criteria for collaboration, it invites the perception of collusion. This is why collaboration as a normative agreement, the most morally appealing form of collaboration, demands not only transparency but a deliberative process through which journalists and nonjournalists alike can assess the merits of a collaborative role for the media. In short, the legitimacy of such a role depends on publicity, which, Bok reminds us, requires more than mere openness regarding actual practices: "the arguments for and against these practices must themselves be submitted to debate" (1982, 113).

Notes

1. Legislation passed in 1977 virtually eliminated a privately owned press by prohibiting anyone from owning more than 3 percent of the ordinary shares of a newspaper, and by creating a special category of management shares—"golden" shares—that pay

the same dividends as regular shares but have two hundred times the voting power. The government approves the distribution of management shares and thus indirectly controls the fate of Singapore's newspapers (Ang 2002, 81–82; Lee 2000, 218; Soon and Soh 1994, 37–38).

2. The most frequently cited example of inflammatory journalism is the coverage of the decision to remove a young girl, Maria Hertogh, from her Muslim foster mother and place her with her Dutch Christian parents. Before departing for Holland, Maria stayed at a Roman Catholic convent, where journalists took photographs of her crying beside a nun and praying before a statue of the Virgin Mary. Outraged Muslims took to the streets, attacking Europeans and Eurasians, in what turned out to be some of the worst rioting in Singapore's history.

3. Officials in Singapore enjoy citing studies that show that "three times as many Singaporeans have a great deal of confidence in our press as Americans have in theirs, and three times as many Americans as Singaporeans view their domestic press with little confidence" (Goh 1995, 3). They also enjoy citing the Philippines as an example of the freest press in Southeast Asia and one of the worst records of modernization and economic progress (Tan and Soh 1994, 46).