pdfunite of poppler-0.55.0 call stack exhaustion vulnerability due to program logic problem

Overview

This is a vulnerability in the program logic of the **pdfunite** util of poppler-0.55.0(linux), which will cause the program fall into a recursive and interactive call of two functions and eventually exhaust the stack space due to a large call stack. This vulnerability can cause Denial-of-Service attack.

Software and Environments

Software: poppler-0.55.0

Operating System: Ubuntu 14.04 x86 64 Desktop

pengjiaqi@ubuntu:~/Documents/crash/poppler-0.55.0/build-gcc/utils\$ uname -a Linux ubuntu 3.13.0-32-generic #57-Ubuntu SMP Tue Jul 15 03:51:08 UTC 2014 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux

Compiler: gcc

pengjiaqi@ubuntu:~/Documents/crash/poppler-0.55.0/build-gcc/utils\$ gcc --version gcc (Ubuntu 4.8.4-2ubuntu1~14.04.3) 4.8.4

Reproducing

The crash can be reproduced in the following way:

```
cd /* path of poppler source code */
mkdir build-gcc; cd build-gcc
../autogen.sh –disable-shared
make
./utils/pdfunite /* path of PoC file */ 1.pdf
```

Exception

pengjiaqi@ubuntu:~/Documents/crash/poppler-0.55.0/build-gcc/utils\$./pdfunite PoC.pdf 1.pdf Segmentation fault

Analysis

The crash situation is:

```
0x7ffff6777b89 <_int_malloc+9>:
   0x7ffff6777b8a <_int_malloc+10>:
0x7ffff6777b91 <_int_malloc+17>:
                                                    rsp,0xb8
  0x7ffff6777b95 <_int_malloc+21>:
                                                    QWORD PTR [rsp+0x8],rsi
                                            mov
                                                    0x7ffff6778321 <_int_malloc+1953>
   0x7ffff6777b9a <_int_malloc+26>:
   0x7ffff6777ba0 <_int_malloc+32>:
                                            mov
                                                    rax,rsi
   0x7ffff6777ba3 <_int_malloc+35>:
                                                    ebp,0x20
                                            mov
   0x7ffff6777ba8 <_int_malloc+40>:
                                                    rbx,rdi
                                            mov
             , data, rodata, <mark>value</mark>
Stopped reason:
_int_malloc (av=0x7ffff6ab9760 <main_arena>, bytes=0x5) at malloc.c:3302
        malloc.c: No such file or directory.
```

Then check the stack space of current process:

```
info proc mapping
process 75623
Mapped address spaces:
         Start Addr
                              End Addr
                                             Size
                                                      Offset objfile
                         0x7ffff7fff000
      0x7fffff7ffe000
                                              0x1000
                                                            0x0
     0x7fffff800000
                          0x7ffffffff000
                                            0x7ff000
                                                             0x0
                                                                 [stack]
                                                                 [vsyscall]
  0xfffffffff600000 0xfffffffff601000
                                              0x1000
                                                             0×0
```

It is obvious that rsp (0x7fffff7feff0) in crash is smaller than the top of the whole stack, which is 0x7fffff800000, which causes this crash.

First, have a look at the call stack.

There are more than 60000 functions in crash stack. Here are some functions in the start and end of the crash stack:

Here, PDFDoc::markObject() and PDFDoc::makeDictionnary() are calling each other. Then in the last time of calling makeDictionnary(), the stack is exhausted, then the program crashes!

So, we analysis following this sequence:

main() -> markPageObjects() -> markObject() -> markDictionary()

in main():

```
Dict *pageDict = page.getDict();

Dict *resDict = docs[i]->getCatalog()->getPage(j)->getResourceDict();

if (resDict) {

Object *newResource = new Object();

newResource->initDict(resDict);

pageDict->set('Resources'', newResource);

delete newResource;

pageS.push_back(page);

offsets.push_back(numOffset);

docs[i]-{markPageObjects} pageDict, yRef, countRef, numOffset, refPage->num, refPage->num);
```

in markPageObjects():

```
void PDFDoc::markPageObjects Dict *pageDict, XRef *xRef, XRef *countRef, Guint numOffset,
int oldRefNum, int newRefNum)
 pageDict->remove(
 pageDict->remove(
  pageDict->remove(
  for (int n = 0; n < pageDict->getLength(); n++) {
  const char *key = pageDict->getKey(n);
    Object value; pageDict->getValNF(n, &value);
    if (strcmp(key, "
strcmp(key,
                                                       crash happeds when n=2
           strcmp(key,
                                     ') !=
                                            8.8
                                   ) != 6
           strcmp(key,
                                          &&
                             ") != 0 &&
t") != 0) {
         strcmp(key,
strcmp(key, "F
      markObject(&value, xRef, countRef, numOffset, oldRefNum, newRefNum);
                            value = pageDict.entries[2].val
     value.free();
```

The first argument of markObject() is &value and value comes from page->getValNF(n, &value) =>

value = pageDict.entries[n].val = pageDict.entries[2].val

in markObject():

The first argument of makeDictionnary() is obj->getDict() = value.dict = pageDict.entries[2].val.dict

in markDictionnary():

dict = pageDict.entries[2].val.dict

the first argument of markObject() is dict->getValNF(i, &obj1), which is dict.entries[i].val

After analysis, we get dict=pageDict (which will be analyzed later),

then when i=2, the argument will be **pageDict.entries[2].val**, which is the same as the last call of markObject().

So, the program will fall into a loop call of above several functions and won't terminate!

After above analysis, we know that **the root cause is:**

dict = pageDict.entries[2].val.dict = pageDict (which can be verified as below)

```
gdb-peda$ p pageDict
$178 = (Dict *) 0x823470
gdb-peda$ p pageDict.entries[2].val.dict
$181 = (Dict *) 0x823470
```

Then ,we analyze how pageDict comes from:

```
Object *newResource = new Object();

newResource->initDict(resDict);

pageDict->set("Resources", newResource);

detete newResource;

pages.push_back(page);

offsets.push back(numOffset);

docs[i]->markPageObjects(pageDict);

yRef, countRef, numOffset, refPage->num, refPage->num);
```

pageDict->set("Resources",newResource) will copy newResource.dict (=resDict) to pageDict.entries[i].val.dict whose pageDict.entries[i].key=="Resources".

Here, pageDict.entries[2].key="Resources":

```
gdb-peda$ p pageDict.entries[2].key
$182 = 0x83ea80 "Resources"
```

So, it will set pageDict.entries[2].val.dict to be resDict.

According to the shotscreen below, we know resDict = pageDict:

```
gdb-peda$ p resDict
$184 = (Dict *) 0x823470
```

then pageDict.entries[2].val.dict = pageDict

So, the cause becomes: resDict = pageDict.

pageDict = docs[0].xref.entries[docs[0].catalog.pageRefs[0]->num]->obj.dict resDict = docs[0].catalog.pages[0].attrs.resources.dict

Both of pageDict and resDict come from docs[0], which is built from the PoC file. However, how the two variables are related to the PoC file is too complicated to analyze, which we omit here. But, it is certain that we can craft a pdf file which will make pageDict and resDict equal to each other and then will cause an infinite call of two functions, leading to an exhaustion of call stack and eventually program crash.

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