was a battle over ideas, wouldn't it be necessary to pay much more substantial attention to the rise of the social as well to as ordinary people because they were the carriers of ideas, making them alive and meaningful? In exploring ordinary people's experiences, we should investigate what kinds of individual emotions—hope, fear, anger, etc.—were carried through in the form of ideology. In doing so, we can further think about what really was being fought over on the grassroots level in the name of the Cold War. Actually, these are not new questions. In an anthology based on an international symposium organized by Westad in Oslo, Norway, in 1998, John Lewis Gaddis urged, "So what *did* ordinary people during the Cold War really think? Perhaps we should ask them" ("On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to Studying the Cold War," in Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War* [2000], 27–42, here 36). Yet, after twenty years, and after the publication of *The Cold War*, we still don't have that kind of synthesis. Westad has shown one mode of the perfection of Cold War scholarship; now we must contemplate what to do next.

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Samuel Moyn. *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. xii, 277. Cloth $29.95.

Samuel Moyn's *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World* is as much about the present and the future as about the past. It is a *cri de coeur*, a lament about the narrowing objectives of human rights activists in today's political climate and a plea for them to mount a fundamental challenge to the forces that have brought about extremes of inequality within and among nations. Moyn fears that in the absence of a principled critique of the concentration of wealth, people across the globe will turn to forms of populism that will endanger even the gains made by human rights movements. Moyn's fears are all too justified.

Moyn nevertheless finds in the historical record openings to a fuller integration of economic equality with individual rights and liberties. He makes clear the limitations of those openings but sees them as an antidote to assumptions of structural determinism in the present. Moyn acknowledges the "fit" between the individualism of human rights discourse with the individualism of market fundamentalism. But the relationship, he argues, is not a necessary one, offering possibilities for mobilized publics and the governments they elect to construct different relationships between the protection of personal liberties and access to resources. He wants the mobilization to be ambitious and not stop with providing a floor beneath humanity's feet—minimal access to food, water, health care, and education. Rather, he argues for a more thorough redistribution that will constrain excesses of wealth as well as provide the material basis for civil society.

Moyn's historical narrative brings out the volatile relationship of rights, equality, and subsistence in the writings of political activists and theorists. He sees in the Enlightenment's concept of "society" the starting point for defining both sufficiency and equality as norms and hence objects for political debate. The Jacobins railed against luxury as they preached the equality of citizens, and they debated the extent of the state's obligation to assure necessities to its people. The tension between welfare and rights appeared quickly, for property rights conflicted with any state project of equalization. Over much of the nineteenth century, the argument for property as a right overlapped with market-centered political economy to produce what Moyn calls a "heartless" vision of economy and society (26). This vision was countered by socialist pleas for at least a "sufficient minimum" of human welfare. For Marx and his followers, however, the task was not "distributional equality" but the overthrow of private property itself. There were alternative routes to a more egalitarian society, as there were multiple defenses of inequality.

The advent of the welfare state, Moyn insists, was a class compromise intended to deflect revolutionary impulses, drawing less on rights-based arguments than on political pragmatism and focusing more on sufficiency than equality. Debates over welfare—not just their outcome—are important to Moyn, for it points to the basis in European political thought for treating equality and sufficiency as imaginable objects for political action. The resolution, in any case, took place within national polities and excluded vast numbers of people: the rightless subjects of European empires.

Moyn's emphasis is thus on the boundedness of the early twentieth-century welfare state: a national, minimalist, and exclusionary project. Nonetheless, socialists kept ideas of equality alive, and after 1917, communism provided a model for an egalitarian political order, pushing European states toward compromise, notably with labor movements. The communist project, however, was not rights based; on the contrary, it valued state and society over individual rights. Fascist regimes could also promote a degree of social inclusiveness while denying civil and political rights. The strength of Moyn's account is above all its eliciting of a range of ways of thinking about rights, equality, and

sufficiency, sometimes clashing, sometimes overlapping, and at times capable of yielding policies that improved the standard of living of workers (especially male workers) and the poor.

The Great Depression and World War II brought an opening. Franklin Roosevelt's phrase "freedom from want" posited that a free society required people to be adequately fed and housed and a government willing to act accordingly. The war demanded sacrifices from all citizens, and its aftermath brought challenges from the Left in several European countries, which empowered labor and brought forth popular demands for more equitable societies. In the United States—the laggard among industrial states when it came to welfare—Roosevelt expanded in 1944 on his vision of freedom from want to lay out specific measures that might have made the country less unequal. In Europe in the 1940s, intellectuals like Georges Gurvitch presented a coherent case for social rights. But opposition to government promotion of social equality and, indeed, to any notion of rights other than protection of the individual against the state was strong, and not just in the United States. The inclusion of social and economic rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Moyn argues, was less than a breakthrough, for it built as much on what had already been accomplished—welfare reform in industrial states—and it provided no mechanism for enforcing such rights other than imploring nationally constituted states to do so. The tension between economic and social rights as a global concern and a national project remained.

The national framework is important to Moyn's argument—both as the site where rights could be claimed and as a limitation on addressing problems that would not fit into national containers. But the "nation" was a changing notion in the post–World War II years: colonial empires were collapsing, and the national form was for the first time in history becoming the norm for political organization. Political movements in decolonizing states could argue that the concomitant of their quest for political equality was economic equality. Moyn in fact underestimates how much anticolonial advocates looked beyond nationalism to claim social and economic equality at imperial or global levels. Anxious that the collapse of empire could be a destabilizing force, wealthy states sought to channel such aspirations into the pursuit of "development" by new states with the help of affluent states and international organizations. Such moves reframed in global context the old debate between sufficiency and equality. Should the international community aspire to raise the rest of the world to the level of the most affluent regions, or merely prevent extreme misery? Should its focus be on promoting equality of people or equality of states? Should it take an interest in inequality *within* the new states? Should it focus on needs or on rights? At the time when sovereignty was becoming a universal norm, the question became whether its acquisition by all peoples would be a force for global equality or a rationale for hiding inequities behind the walls of the sovereign state.

Moyn makes clear the mixed motives behind development policies as well as the extent of opposition to efforts to bring about a more equal world. These issues came to a head in the 1970s when a group of "underdeveloped" states got together to press for the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and beyond that the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a call to reverse the concentration of wealth in a small number of states in Europe and North America. Moyn points that the NIEO kept to a national framework, emphasizing each underdeveloped state's right to control and profit from its own resources and to control foreign investment and commerce for its own benefit, as well as to demand redistribution of wealth on an international scale. Coming at a time of global tension over disruption to the world economy, the NIEO sparked fierce opposition from international financial organizations and the leaders of rich states. They not only refused the demands for the NIEO but sought to deny the ethical basis of any such claims. The free market was both a means to optimizing outcomes and an end in itself—a world respectful of individual rights, including a right to possess and use property on a global scale. Faced with this onslaught, advocates for the poor fell back on calling to meet "basic needs"—a step away from both equality and rights.

At the end of Moyn's historical trajectory lies the fit between "neoliberalism" and "human rights." He rejects recent accusations of an inherent relation between the two and refuses to dismiss rights as a bourgeois fiction. The ascendancy of market fundamentalism had less to do with the persuasiveness of the argument than the economic power of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other agencies that adopted such a line in the 1980s and 1990s. The ascendancy of human rights, as Moyn argued in his previous book *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (2010), emerged in this same time period out of recognition of the fact that the "freeing" of states had not led to the freeing of people from state oppression any more than communism had liberated the working class. Sovereignty, activists argued, could be compromised in order to protect the rights of humans. Despite the overlapping individualism of neoliberalism and human rights, Moyn points out that nonmarket economies also violate rights and that rights can be defended in socialist societies. The fit is not a necessary one. Hence the plea in Moyn's conclusion for advocates of rights to take a firm stance in favor of protecting economic and social rights as essential in themselves and necessary to making the fulfillment of other rights—and democratic society—feasible. He is well aware that this is an uphill battle, but he suggests that the shifting framings of

rights questions and issues of sufficiency and inequality suggest that it is not an impossible one.

Although in his historical discussion Moyn brings out the contestation over basic issues at any given moment and points to the ambiguity of policy positions, in his generalizations he asserts that an "age of national welfare" gave way to an "age of neoliberalism" (e.g., x–xi, 213). This epochal succession undercuts the author's engagement with the complexity of the debate at any given time. It entails a specific problem: the notion of neoliberalism itself, popular as it has become in academic discourse. Arguably, one can apply such a term to a certain ideological construct, although Moyn doesn't fully explain its contents. As Quinn Slobodian demonstrates in his *The Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (2018), the term is not as new as one might think and as deployed by its early advocates did not signify rejection of institutional controls in favor of a completely free market. Rather, Friedrich August von Hayek and his school wanted a regulated economic regime, but regulated in the interests of opening markets in goods and capital. They sought to protect international commerce against states, particularly against the egalitarian tendency in the politics of states that had to respond to voters. They saw in international law the means to limit the effects of democracy. Slobodian's neoliberals reacted vehemently to the NIEO, seeing in it a rival internationalism based on the egalitarianism they rejected. The implementation of neoliberal ideas may be found in the advent since the 1990s of the World Trade Organization and arbitration panels with the power to decide whether the freedom of international businesses has been compromised by state regulations. Neoliberals were ambivalent about rights, adhering strongly to "property rights" and not necessarily opposed to rights as constraints on states. But does all this define a "neoliberal age"? Reaganite and Thatcherite politics have not taken over continental Western Europe, where strong welfare states are vigorously defended (as Moyn acknowledges on 189). And crony capitalism—not just the liberal variety—is alive and well in many parts of the world, in Europe and the Americas as well as in Africa and Asia. China, the world's most dynamic economy, may be infested by capitalism but not by liberalism—not in relation to rights or political freedom, and not in relation to the exaltation of impersonal markets rather than state enterprise or personalized networks. Moyn and many others don't address the relationship of neoliberalism to an arguably potent trend toward "illiberal capitalism."

If Moyn's enemy is not defined with precision, neither is his remedy. What does a state do to promote equality? Moyn refers generally to the provision of health, education, adequate food, and support of families. He recognizes progress in "status equality"—equal rights for women in particular—but he stresses the failure of rights advocates in his "neoliberal age" to fight in favor of "distributional equality." He doesn't say what the fight would entail. He would like to see limits imposed on the concentration of wealth, not just on the material sufficiency of the poor. Would high marginal tax rates such as those prevalent in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s suffice? What policies in the present would follow from recognizing equality, and not just sufficiency, as a right adhering to every member of a political body? And—most difficult of all—how could equality be promoted across states? Moyn points to the limitations of development strategies in the postwar years—too focused on subsistence minima and empty rhetoric about a "right to development"—but he doesn't say what a rights-focused egalitarianism would actually entail at a global level.

Moyn's plea for doing something about inequality—if it isn't clear what—nevertheless resonates powerfully. He warns that if activists don't push harder against increasing inequality, demagogues will move into the space and champion the little guy by attacking scapegoats rather than the people and structures that are responsible. He has made the point that human rights—to political voice, and to protection against arbitrary punishment and rapacious government elites—cannot exist independent of the social conditions in which people exercise them. Worst of all, those who benefit from inequality will defend it, and if certain intellectuals and academics have effectively defended it in ideological terms, then once challenged, the defense of wealth and privilege can take the form of jails and guns.

It is possible that the defenders of inequality will reap what they sow. Illiberal capitalist states may trample everyone's rights and liberties, not just the well-being of the poor. Moyn points to the seminal case of Pinochet's Chile, where certain market fundamentalists refused to condemn a murderous regime as long as it promoted the free market. Chile then became a touchstone for critiques of the hypocrisy of advocates of economic "freedom." Are we today seeing a tendency for illiberal capitalism to converge not with human rights but with repressive governments in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, India, and post-communist Russia and China, and a perhaps more liberal capitalism with anti-democratic politics in Trump's United States? In tracking over time the complex relationship of social, economic, political, and civil rights, Moyn refuses to abandon human rights because it is "not enough," and warns of the dangers of narrowing the path to a rights regime so much that one loses sight of people's conditions of existence. He bemoans the surrender influential defenders of human rights have made to neoliberal doctrines, but there remains the danger that we may be headed to something even worse.

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