



NATO COE TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS COURSE

scl defence

Behavioural Dynamics
Institute

IOTA
Global

1. INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS Course developed for NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence. The aim of this intensive course is to provide the theoretical foundations, the practical tools, hands-on experience and confidence needed for students to successfully conduct TAA. Lectures combine with illustrative case studies and participatory workshops of increasing complexity, all of which are necessary components to enable students to internalise the taught material.

Purpose of the Course

This training course has been designed to train strategic communication and psychological operations professionals in the necessary skills, knowledge and research methods required to conduct target audience analysis (TAA) in line with the Behavioural Dynamics Institute's tried-and-tested behavioural influence methodology. The course is highly demanding and aims to produce TAA professionals who may then subsequently train others in the use of a specialized, and practical, social scientific methodology for designing influence campaigns.

Psychological operations, information operations, influence, counter-propaganda and strategic communication, all depend on a deep and robust understanding of human motivations and behaviour, in the context of the operational environment, in order to achieve targeted measurable behavior change. That is precisely what this course will teach you.

The TAA methodology that is the core of this training course grew out of the need to address the following:

- The need for better models of behaviour change applied to conflict environments
- The need to think more scientifically about TAA, i.e. using evidence to find what really works (and why) so that it can be successfully repeated
- The need to design better interventions, communication campaigns, and accurately report them so that others can adjust and replicate
- The need to measure the effects of those interventions
- The need for a practical and operational application of social and behavioural science theory in conflict

2. OUTLINE OF COURSE CONTENT

The course encompasses a wide-range of knowledge areas and disciplines, ranging from the theoretical to the practical. However, all theory is taught with a firm view of its practical utility.

There are over a dozen lecturer-trainers on this course all of whom are specialists in their fields and have extensive experience in applying what they teach to real-world problems.

Over the span of this inter-disciplinary course, the following topic areas will be covered, both with a theoretical component and a practical one:

- Human social and behavioural science
- Military strategic communication, psychological operations and TAA
- Behavioural Dynamics Methodology process and parameters
- Problem space mapping
- Behavioural modeling & system dynamics modeling
- Research design and statistics
- Real-world research applications
- Qualitative and quantitative methods
- Social media analysis for TAA
- Online influence and persuasion
- Behaviour change methods and interventions

3. ASSESSMENT

The course will be assessed on two levels: first, at TAA *Practitioner* level; and second, at TAA *Train-the-Trainer* level.

Attendance on the course is mandatory and a register taken daily. Each student is assigned to a group (there are 4 groups of 5 students) and will work together with the other group members on various workshops and joint practical exercises. The training team members will observe students as they work within their groups, and all students are expected to contribute to group discussions and exercises. All groups will be required at several stages throughout the course to present their work, and each student will be required to contribute to presentations during PHASE 1 of the course. The contributions of each student will be observed, recorded and graded. During PHASE 1 each student will have a one-to-one tutorial session with the Course Director.

Assessment for *Practitioner* level will be a combination of attendance, group-work contribution, tutorial, individual presentations, and multiple-choice examination. The examination for PHASE 1 will be on Friday 29th May and the individual presentations will be prepared by the students during the break between PHASES 1 & 2 and delivered during the first two weeks of PHASE 2.

Assessment for *Train-the-Trainer* level will be (a) performance on the *Practitioner* level, and (b) two examinations, the first on Friday 29th May and the second on Wednesday 15th July. The PHASE 1 examination will be multiple-choice only, whereas the PHASE 2 examination will combine multiple-choice with open-answer

questions. To qualify on the course at *Train-the-Trainer* level, students will need to achieve 70% on all examinations.

PHASE 1 <i>Practitioner</i>	<i>Train-the-Trainer</i>
Exam: Multiple-Choice (29 th May)	Exam: Multiple-Choice (29 th May)
PHASE 2 <i>Practitioner</i>	<i>Train-the-Trainer</i>
Assessment: Individual Presentations	Exam: Written Questions (15 th July)

“There is nothing so practical as a good theory”

~Kurt Lewin, social psychologist, 1890-1947

TAA COURSE

NATO CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Timetable for Phase 1: 8-29 May 2015 / Riga

NATO COE TAA COURSE - WEEK 1

4-8 May 2015

	MONDAY 04-May	TUESDAY 05-May	WEDNESDAY 06-May	THURSDAY 07-May	FRIDAY 08-May DAY 1	SATURDAY 09-May DAY 2	KEY
07:00 - 08:00					Breakfast		SESSION KEY:
08:00 - 09:00					Travel to Defence Academy		BDI METHODOLOGY
09:00					TEAM INTRO (ALL) STUDENT INTROS		PILLARS AND PARAMETERS
09:30					COURSE INTRODUCTION (GV)		BDI METHODOLOGY
10:00					Coffee Break		PROCESS AND PRACTICE
10:30					ACADEMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COURSE ASSESSMENT (LR)		THEORY AND CONTEXT
11:00					Lunch		CASE STUDIES:
11:30					OFFICIAL NATO OPENING (JANIS) AND GROUP PHOTO		PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
12:00	NATIONAL HOLIDAY LATVIA	TRAINING TEAM DEPLOY	SET UP	STUDENTS ARRIVE	1.1 OPEN LECTURE: THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE (ST)		SKILLS
12:30					Coffee Break		STUDENT TASKS, EXERCISES, AND WORKSHOPS
13:00					1.2 OPEN LECTURE: THE MARKETING APPROACH (NJO)		CS: LIVE CASE STUDY
13:30					1.3 OPEN LECTURE: CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING COMMUNICATION FOR BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (OP)		OPS
14:00					Travel back to Hotels		Down Time
14:30							TRAINER KEY (Alphabetical):
15:00							
15:30							
16:00							
16:30							
17:30 - 18:00						19:30 - 23:00	
19:30 - 23:00						SOCIAL EVENT	
TRAINERS					GV, LR, NJO, OP, ST		

NATO COE TAA COURSE - WEEK 2

11-15 May 2015

NOTE: In week 2 there will be compulsory attendance to a security briefing - to be scheduled

	MONDAY 11-May DAY 3	TUESDAY 12-May DAY 4	WEDNESDAY 13-May DAY 5	THURSDAY 14-May DAY 6	FRIDAY 15-May DAY 7	SATURDAY 16-May DAY 8	KEY
07:00 - 08:00	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	
08:00 - 09:00	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	
09:00	1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE BEHAVIOURAL DYNAMICS PROCESS (GV)	1.9 PILLAR 1: ATTITUDES VERSUS BEHAVIOURS (LR)	1.14 PILLAR 2: INDIVIDUALS VERSUS GROUPS (NJO)	1.18 REVIEWING DATA: THE BASICS OF CODING AND SEGMENTATION FOR SCP (GV & MJ)	POSSIBLE OPEN INVITATION: CRISIS WORKSHOP HELDON (GV, LR, NJO, ST)	1.20 9am-12pm CRISIS WORKSHOP HELDON PRESENTATIONS (4 X 30 MINS EACH) (GV, LR, NJO, ST) ALBERT HOTEL	
09:30							
10:00		1.10 MILITARY PLANNING: OP PATWIN (ST)					
10:30	Coffee Break		Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break		
11:00	1.5 OPEN LECTURE: WHY DID I DO THAT? UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOUR (LR)	Coffee Break	1.15 GROUP AND BEHAVIOUR PAIRS SHORTLISTING (GV & MJ)	1.19 GROUP AND BEHAVIOUR PAIRS REPORTING AND TA IDENTIFICATION (GV & MJ)	CRISIS WORKSHOP HELDON (GV, LR, NJO, ST)		
11:30		1.11 SCP OVERVIEW STRATCOM PLANNING AND SCP STAGE 1: PROBLEM EXPLORATION (GV)					
12:00	1.6 OPEN LECTURE: WHY DID THEY DO THAT? EMIC LOGIC (GV)						
12:30			Lunch	Lunch	Lunch		
13:00	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch		
13:30	1.7 OPEN LECTURE: THE FAILURE OF MILITARY TARGET AUDIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN (MM)	1.12 WATERMELON CASE STUDY (NJO)	1.16 SCP STAGE 2 and 3: INTERVIEW DESIGN AND INTERVIEWING (MJ)	CS: SCP EXERCISE: RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN LATVIA PROBLEM SPACE MAPPING AND GROUP AND BEHAVIOUR PAIRS (ALL)	CRISIS WORKSHOP HELDON (GV, LR, NJO, ST)		
14:00			Coffee Break	Coffee Break			
14:30							
15:00	Coffee Break		1.13 SCP PRACTICAL WORKSHOP PROBLEM SPACE MAPPING AFGHANISTAN (LR)	1.17 RESEARCH FOR SCP GATHERING DATA EXERCISE (GV & MJ)	SESSION INCLUDES A WORKING COFFEE BREAK		
15:30	1.8 DESIGNING ADVERTS WORKSHOP (NJO)						
16:00					MENTORING / Q&A	ALLOCATION WEEKEND PROJECT (LR & GV)	SUNDAY 17TH MAY SPM DEADLINE TO SEND IN WEEKEND PROJECT
16:30 - 17:00	Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	
TRAINERS	GV, LR, MM, NJO	GV, LR, NJO	GV, MJ, NJO	GV, LR, MJ, NJO, ST	GV, LR, NJO, ST		

NATO COE TAA COURSE - WEEK 3

18-22 May 2015

	MONDAY 18-May DAY 9	TUESDAY 19-May DAY 10	WEDNESDAY 20-May DAY 11	THURSDAY 21-May DAY 12	FRIDAY 22-May DAY 13	KEY
07:00 - 08:00	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	SESSION KEY: BDI METHODOLOGY PILLARS AND PARAMETERS
08:00 - 09:00	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	BDI METHODOLOGY PROCESS AND PRACTICE
09:00	2.1 TAA OVERVIEW (LR, ST)	CS: INCORPORATING FEEDBACK RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN LATVIA (GV)	2.9 ATTITUDES VERSUS BEHAVIOURS AND ELASTICITY OF BRAND AFFILIATION MIDDLE-EAST FOCUS (AE)	2.13 REAL WORLD RESEARCH (AE)	2.16 RUSSIAN INFLUENCE: THEORY (BS)	THEORY AND CONTEXT CASE STUDIES: PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATIONS SKILLS STUDENT TASKS, EXERCISES, AND WORKSHOPS CS: LIVE CASE STUDY OPS Down Time
09:30	2.4 PILLAR 3: DESCRIPTIVE VERSUS DIAGNOSTIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (LR)					
10:00						
10:30	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	
11:00	CRISIS WORKSHOP HELDON FEEDBACK (LR)	2.6 BASIC SYSTEM DYNAMICS (JM)	2.5 PILLAR 4: PERSONALITIES VERSUS PERSONAS 2.10 PILLAR 5: PUSH VS PULL PILLAR 6: PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES VERSUS MOTIVATIONAL ALIGNMENT (NJO)	2.14 USING AND ENGAGING WITH THE MEDIA (AE)	2.17 FIELD PSYOPS (AE)	
11:30						
12:00						
12:30	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	
13:00						
13:30	2.3 BINARY OPPOSITION, INITIATING SETS AND RITUALS (NJO)	2.7 ANP CASE STUDY (JM)	2.11 TAA IN ACTION PROJECT DUOC (AE, NJO)	2.15 FOCUS GROUP DESIGN (GV)	TAA IN ACTION: PROJECT MERCURY CASE STUDY (ST) CS: GROUP WORK RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN LATVIA FOCUS GROUP 1 14:30 UNTIL 16:00	TRAINER KEY (Alphabetical):
14:00						
14:30	Coffee Break	Travel back to Hotels		Coffee Break		
15:00	CS: FEEDBACK ON SCP EXERCISE RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN LATVIA (GUEST SME)		Coffee Break			
15:30		CONSOLIDATION TIME				
16:00			2.12 TAA QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN (LR)	CS: FOCUS GROUP DESIGN EXERCISE: RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN LATVIA CASE STUDY (GV)	INCLUDES A WORKING COFFEE BREAK	
16:30 - 17:00	Travel back to Hotels		Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	
TRAINERS	GV, JM, LR, NJO, ST	JM, LR, NJO	AE, GV	AE, GV, LR	AE, BS, GV, ST	

NATO COE TAA COURSE - WEEK 4

25-29 May 2015

	MONDAY 25-May DAY 14	TUESDAY 26-May DAY 15	WEDNESDAY 27-May DAY 16	THURSDAY 28-May DAY 17	FRIDAY 29-May DAY 18	KEY
07:00 - 08:00	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	SESSION KEY:
08:00 - 09:00	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	Travel to Defence Academy	BDI METHODOLOGY
09:00	3.1 CS FOCUS GROUP DATA			3.6 REAL WORLD RESEARCH IN THE ROUND (GV)	3.9 SOCIAL MEDIA (IT)	PILLARS AND PARAMETERS
09:30	(GV)	CS: GROUP WORK	CS: GROUP WORK			BDI METHODOLOGY
10:00		RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN LATVIA QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN	RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN LATVIA QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN			PROCESS AND PRACTICE
10:30	Coffee Break	GENERATING QUESTIONS INCLUDES A WORKING COFFEE BREAK (GV)	SORTING AND REFINING QUESTIONS INCLUDES A WORKING COFFEE BREAK (GV)	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	THEORY AND CONTEXT
11:00	3.2 CS WORK PREPARING FG 2 AND GENERATING QUESTIONS FOR QUESTIONNAIRE (GV / IT)			3.7 OPEN LECTURE: SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCE (JT)	3.10 SOCIAL MEDIA WORKSHOP (IT)	CASE STUDIES: PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
11:30						SKILLS
12:00						STUDENT TASKS, EXERCISES, AND WORKSHOPS
12:30	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	CS: LIVE CASE STUDY
13:00						OPS
13:30	3.3 RUSSIAN INFLUENCE: PRACTICE (BS)	CS: GROUP WORK RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN LATVIA	3.4 THE PLACE OF INFLUENCE IN FULL SPECTRUM TARGETING (AM)	3.8 METHODOLOGY RE-CAP (GV)		Down Time
14:00						
14:30	Coffee Break	QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN GENERATING QUESTIONS INCLUDES A WORKING COFFEE BREAK (GV)	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	Coffee Break	TRAINER KEY (Alphabetical):
15:00	CS: EXPERT INTERVIEWS		3.5 OPEN LECTURE: TRUST: SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND ONLINE RELATIONSHIPS (JT)	EXAM QUESTIONS AND ADDITIONAL STUDY TIME		
15:30						
16:00						EXAM DISCUSSION/FEEDBACK
16:30 - 17:00	Travel to TNS Research venue	Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	Travel back to Hotels	ALLOCATION MID-COURSE BREAK HOMEWORK (LR & GV)
17:30 - 19:00	FOCUS GROUP 2					
TRAINERS	BS, GV, LR	BS, GV, LR	GV, JT, LR	GV, JT, LR, ST	GV, IT, LR, ST	



OVERVIEW OF THE BDI METHODOLOGY

OVERVIEW OF THE BDI METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

Effectively targeted communication is essential in the modern world, and is the origin of all power and influence. People of all places, of all kinds and in all ages have used communication to try and change minds and behaviours. Now, in a vastly more complex and information-rich world than ever before, it is imperative that power is used to harmonise, rather than to polarise or alienate. A plethora of 'difficulties' loom for the 21st Century, such as conflicts, natural disasters, population expansion, disease outbreaks, and resource scarcity, to name a few; and therefore, it becomes incumbent upon responsible parties operating in these environments to communicate appropriately, for reputation management and to instigate positive changes.


The Behavioural Dynamics Methodology is a scientific approach to conducting effective and measurable Strategic Communication. At its core is a research-based and comprehensive Target Audience Analysis component that enables specific interventions on human groups to transact Behavioural Influence. The methodology, although formally specified, has been developed to allow a wide degree of flexibility in its process and application.

The methodology achieves several functions. First, it provides a roughly linear framework for conducting TAA-based Strategic Communication. Second, it operates as a diagnostic problem-solving tool for identifying the cause of a behavioural problem and the strategy of influence over a Target Group. Third, it enables accurate and efficient research by theory-driven methods that investigate relevant parameters for human behavioural dynamics. Fourth, it inculcates a way of thinking in the practitioner to perform highly effective Strategic Communication Campaigns. And, fifth, it is structured to measure the effectiveness of intervention campaigns.

Consequently, the Behavioural Dynamic Institute's approach to Strategic Communication is applicable to all scenarios and spheres of conduct where the shaping and management of behaviour, perceptions and attitudes is critical to success, such as conflict, public diplomacy, violence reduction, peace maintenance, marketing, commercial and elections.


Five separate Phases comprise the methodology:

Phase One	Phase Two	Phase Three	Phase Four	Phase Five
<i>Strategic Campaign Planning</i>	<i>Target Audience Analysis</i>	<i>Campaign Intervention Strategy</i>	<i>Intervention</i>	<i>Measures of Effectiveness</i>
<i>SCP</i>	<i>TAA</i>	<i>Baseline MOE Prognosis</i>	<i>CIS</i>	<i>INT</i>
				<i>MOE</i>



Each Phase is a modular component of the entire process, and must be completed for any Strategic Communication project to achieve maximum success.

All Phases comprise several Stages, which are key decision-making points in the application of the methodology. Stages follow in linear fashion, such that, to conduct a campaign optimally, a subsequent Stage cannot be completed until the Stage prior to it has been finished. However, each Stage adopts a process, and the processes may be ongoing:



Strategic Campaign Planning (also coined Strategic Communications Planning) is the process resulting in the selection of the Target Groups and Target Audiences with which a strategic communication campaign will be initiated. During the second phase, Target Audience Analysis, qualitative and quantitative measures are employed in order to develop an in-depth understanding of the Target Groups and Audiences. On the basis of the TAA report generated during this phase, at the Campaign Intervention Strategy (Phase 3) the Behavioural Objectives in the Target Audience are formulated and synthesised with a practical change strategy, or Intervention Strategy. During phase 4, campaign design and execution become a function of the Intervention Strategy. Lastly, integrated MOE ensures the campaign can be assessed throughout rollout and after completion.

The Phases of a strategic campaign effort as described above are the 4 roughly chronological sub-divisions of the BDi research methodology. Each Phase can be researched and understood in terms of a set of assessment questions that need to be answered before moving to the next phase, indicating the linearity of the 4 phases of the methodology.

Each Phase is subdivided into Stages that indicate decisions that must be made within that phase. Stages are separate elements of a Phase that should be performed to reach an outcome. The stages will usually be conducted in sequence, although it will often be possible to begin later stage before an earlier one is completed. It is not possible to complete a later stage before an earlier one is complete.

Stages are conducted using various empirical and analytical methods and incorporate a number of processes (that is, sub-components of a stage that enable the effective steps to the desired outcome).

Processes within each stage are to be conducted where possible. It is not imperative that they proceed in order; instead there is likely to be iteration between processes so that the outcome of each stage is reached to the highest degree obtainable.

During the research process it will often be necessary to adjust the stages within each phase in relation to each other on the basis of research findings, viability checks, or the renewal and development of communication or campaign objectives. This applies not least to the determination of behavioural objectives and sub-objectives and the choice of Campaign Target Groups and Target Audiences. It is important to understand therefore that the stages are not linear. Rather, within each phase the move between stages is an iterative process guided by the assessment questions that indicate the overall aims and objectives of the phase during which they occur.

RESEARCH PARAMETERS

There are 45 Research Parameters that are measured / used throughout the research Phases of the BDi methodology. These are central to the methodology, have been the subject of empirical and theoretical investigation over many years and have been established as critical factors in the influence and persuasion of groups. An overview of each parameter and its importance to strategic communication is included in this folder:

DESCRIPTIVE	PROGNOSTIC	TRANSFORMATIVE
AUDIENCE STATISTICS	INFORMATIONAL RELIANCE	MESSAGE APPEALS
LANGUAGE	PROPENSITY FOR CHANGE	COMMON ENEMIES
LITERACY	EMIC LOGIC	BINARY OPPOSITION
CURRENT BEHAVIOUR	NORMATIVE AFFILIATION	SOURCE CREDIBILITY
SIZE	LOCUS OF CONTROL	RWARD STRUCTURES
LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE	MOTIVATIONS	DECISION PATH
FINANCING	POLARISING MOTIVATING PROPENSITY	FILTERS
RELEVANT ISSUES	INSTRUMENTAL BEHAVIOUR	NOISE
HISTORIC CONTEXT	INFLUENCEABILITY	ATTITUDES
CHANNEL CREDIBILITY	BELIEFS	INITIATING SETS
GROUP COMPOSITION	INTENT	RITUALS
MISSION	SKILL	ABILITY
VALUES	POWER STRUCTURES	EXPECTANCY
GROUP MEMBERSHIP	IDEOLOGY	FEARS
CHANNEL EXPOSURE	FRAGILITY / RESILIENCE	
NEEDS		

2



Ministerie van Defensie



Geadresseerde(n)
CZMCARIB

Defensiestaf
Directie Operaties

NOTA

Aanbieding Rapport Project LARAHA (Curaçao en Aruba)

Datum

Onze referentie
BS2016024562

Uw referentie

Door tussenkomst van

In afschrift aan
CZSK

Behandeld door

[REDACTED]

Aantal pagina's inclusief
bijlage(n)
98

Bij beantwoording datum,
onze referentie en onderwerp
vermelden.

Eind vorig jaar is binnen de DOPS de behoefte ontstaan om te bezien of en op welke wijze Strategische Communicatie (STRATCOM) deel moet uitmaken van het militair planningsproces. Onderdeel van deze behoefte was het in kaart brengen van een stappenplan voor STRATCOM en het uittesten hiervan. Eén van de belangrijkste stappen is het uitvoeren van een doelgroepanalyse middels een zogenaamde Actor & Audience Analysis (AAA). Gezien de actuele situatie is gekozen om een dergelijk onderzoek op Aruba en Curaçao uit te voeren. In bijlage treft u het rapport aan dat is opgesteld op basis van de uitkomsten van de gemaakte analyse.


Project LARAHA startte op 1 juni 2016 en test een voor Defensie nieuwe methode voor doelgroepanalyse. Het doel van het onderzoek is om defensie inzicht te geven of er draagvlak is onder de bevolking van Curaçao en Aruba voor de aanwezigheid van militairen. Indien dit draagvlak aanwezig is, hoe kan deze verder vergroot worden in het geval van een noodzakelijke uitbreiding van de militaire presentie in het gebied naar aanleiding van een veranderende veiligheidssituatie rond de ABC-eilanden?

Dit project is een leerzame weg gebleken om deze stap binnen het STRATCOM proces in kaart te brengen. De resultaten van de analyse geven onder andere inzicht in het verschil in beleving van de militaire aanwezigheid op de eilanden Curaçao en Aruba. Ook worden in het rapport mogelijke oplossingsrichtingen voor het vergroten van het draagvlak gegeven.

Mijn voorstel is dat een afvaardiging van het team dat het onderzoek bij u heeft uitgevoerd, de uitkomsten aan u presenteert. Indien u besluit invulling te geven aan de adviezen uit het rapport voor de huidige situatie kunt u via CZSK en CLAS beroep doen op ondersteuning vanuit 1CMICo bij het opstellen en uitwerken van de aangegeven oplossingsrichtingen.

Voor de situatie waarin onverhoopd de militaire aanwezigheid tijdelijk moet worden uitgebreid zult u voor de coördinerende taken vanuit de DOPS worden ondersteund om invulling aan STRATCOM te geven.

[REDACTED]



Defensiestaf
Directie Operaties

Datum

Onze referentie
BS2016024562

Tenslotte wil ik u hartelijk bedanken voor de gastvrijheid, steun en medewerking die het team van 1CMIco ontving tijdens het onderzoek. Mede door deze goede randvoorwaarden heeft het onderzoek in mijn ogen waardevolle informatie opgeleverd.

DE DIRECTEUR OPERATIES

mr. R.G. Oppelaar
Generaal-majoor der mariniers

Toelichting rapport project LARAHA aan afdeling communicatie CZSK / DCO dd 14 november '16

Waarom is project LARAHA opgezet?

Strategische communicatie (Stratcom) is het synchroniseren van acties, beelden en woorden tot een coherent geheel op alle niveaus.

Eind vorig jaar is binnen de DOPS de behoefte ontstaan om te bezien of en op welke wijze Strategische communicatie deel kan uitmaken van het militair planningsproces. Hiertoe zoekt zij naar een 'proof of concept' om Stratcom in te zetten zodat het een versterkend effect heeft.

Tot nu toe benut defensie het informatiedomein Stratcom niet voldoende. Hierdoor is het onvoldoende mogelijk om binnen dit domein defensieve en offensieve slagkracht te genereren en effecten te bereiken die de militaire inspanningen ondersteunen. Om na te gaan of Stratcom inderdaad redelijk eenvoudig binnen het militaire planningsproces is te integreren is in overleg met 1CMlco besloten tot het opzetten en uitvoeren van een doelgroep analyse, een zogenaamde Actor en Audience Analysis (AAA).

Actor en Audience Analysis geeft antwoord op de vraag wat motiveert en drijft de mensen en onder welke omstandigheden willen zij dit gedrag veranderen. Ook is de meetbaarheid van het begin af aan ingeregd in het analyseproces.

Gezien de actuele situatie is gekozen om een dergelijk onderzoek op Aruba en Curaçao uit te voeren. Het doel van het onderzoek is om defensie inzicht te geven of er draagvlak is onder de bevolking van Curaçao en Aruba voor militaire presentie.

De uitkomsten van AAA geven, behalve antwoord op de vraag of er draagvlak is voor militaire presentie op de ABC eilanden, ook inzicht in de (gebruiks)mogelijkheden van Stratcom.

De conclusies uit het rapport LARAHA zijn bruikbaar en moeten uitgewerkt worden zodat ze een goede bijdrage leveren aan CZMCARIB.

Opdracht analyse

1CMlco heeft vanuit de DOPS de opdracht gekregen de doelgroepen analyse AAA uit te voeren op Curaçao en Aruba. Dit in overleg met en steun van CZMCARIB. 6 medewerkers van 1CMlco hebben gedurende 6 weken interviews gehouden onder bewoners van Curaçao en Aruba. De resultaten zijn verschenen in het Rapport Project LARAHA en dit is begin oktober gepresenteerd aan DDOPS en nu aan CZMCARIB aangeboden. Een afvaardiging van 1CMlco, in ieder geval KAPT ~~DE RECHTER~~, zal op Curaçao het onderzoek presenteren, de resultaten bespreken en in overleg met de communicatie CZSK, DCO en de (Strat)communicatieadviseur bij CZMCARIB, een stappenplan opstellen om de aanbevelingen te implementeren.

Uitvoering analyse

Met guidelines van CZMCARIB zijn de te interviewen personen geselecteerd. Dit zijn belanghebbende binnen de overheid, Nederlands defensiepersoneel, Kustwachtpersoneel,

CURMIL personeel, en lokale inwoners van Curaçao (inclusief expats die op Curaçao wonen). Daarnaast hebben 53 Curaçaoënaars meegedaan aan een korte vragenlijst gericht op het bevestigen van een aantal bevindingen. Op Aruba zijn in totaal 80 mensen geïnterviewd, waaronder Nederlands defensie personeel, stakeholder binnen overhedsinstanties, kustwachtpersoneel, ARUMIL personeel en lokale inwoners van Aruba. In zes weken tijd zijn door 1CMICo ruim 180 mensen geïnterviewd op Curaçao en Aruba. De twee overkoepelende doelstellingen voor dit project waren:

- 1) Het vaststellen van de publieke opinie over additionele Nederlandse militaire ondersteuning op aanvraag van de Curaçaoëse en/of Arubaanse overheden.
- 2) Het in kaart brengen van waarschijnlijke publieke reacties op het eventueel verhogen van het aantal Nederlandse militairen op Curaçao en/of Aruba.

Het onderzoek is gebaseerd op twee onderzoeks vragen afgeleid van de doelstellingen:

- 1) Is er draagvlak onder de bevolking van Curaçao en Aruba voor de aanwezige militairen?
- 2) Hoe kan dit draagvlak (indien niet aanwezig) worden gecreëerd? Indien wel aanwezig, hoe kan het draagvlak worden vergroot, met name kijkend naar een eventuele uitbreiding van het aantal militairen op Curaçao en Aruba.

Er is gewerkt met Dashboards. Dit is een visuele representatie van een interventievoorstel, gespiegeld aan AAA data. De gehanteerde AAA methode blijkt een effectieve tool te zijn welke nuttige informatie geeft om te onderzoeken welke informatie verstrekking welk effect heeft op de doelgroep. Voorstellen uit het rapport, maar ook nieuwe ideeën, kunnen getest worden aan de hand van de populatie profielen.

- Geef de goede voorbeelden zodat het draagvlak versterkt wordt om de algemene kennis van de burger over defensie te vergroten (om het informatie gat te dichten).

Hoe nu verder?

Plan toelichting (in overleg) rapport LARAHA door KAPT [REDACTED] bij CZMCARIB
Half oktober per Xpost is het rapport aangeboden aan CZSK en CZMCARIB en separaat op 31 oktober toegestuurd aan KLTZ [REDACTED], KLTZ [REDACTED] en LTZ2OC [REDACTED]

Conclusie rapport LARAHA

De conclusie van het onderzoek is dat er in principe draagvlak is voor de aanwezigheid en uitbreiding van militairen op Curaçao en Aruba. Dit draagvlak is op Aruba groter dan op Curaçao en is daar met name gebaseerd op positieve ervaringen en anekdotes uit het verleden. Dat het draagvlak op beide eilanden een zwakke basis heeft, is met name te wijten aan een gebrek aan algemene kennis van de taakstelling van Defensie in het Caribisch gebied.

Aanbevelingen rapport LARAHA

- Formuleer een Stratcom visie voor CZMCARIB en gebruik dit als uitgangspunt voor invulling ambitiedocument 2015-2018
- Opleiding / meegeven guidelines Stratcom voor woordvoerder CZMCARIB
- Dicht het informatie gat van de bevolking Curaçao en Aruba mbt kennis over rol militairen
- Strategische positionering van Defensie (((op de eilanden zodat mensen het belang van de aanwezigheid zien en dit vergroot het draagvlak))))
- Intensieveer de samenwerking met CURMIL door het geven van cultuurlessen door CURMIL aan cie in de West.
- Open dagen organiseren
- Stel de externe mediaberichten ook in het Papiaments op
- Wees duidelijk zichtbaar bij publieke evenementen zoals carnaval maar neem dit wel serieus qua aankleding.
- Zorg voor meer begrip tussen de culturen
- Stel weer Miss Marinier in op Aruba
- Momenteel een 'Lack of rolemodel' voor jeugd op scholen en thuis. Neem de voorbeeldrol op je.
- Win de hearts and minds van de bevolking door als defensiepersoneel zichtbaar vrijwilligers werk te doen (conform de Amerikanen)
- Weet met wie je je wel en niet kan associëren
- Verbeter je informatiepositie. Gebruik medium radio en social media (storytelling)


PROJECT LARAHA (CURAÇAO and ARUBA)

Behavioural research into public support for Dutch military presence



MINDEF Contact: Captain [REDACTED]
Function: PSYOPS instruction group, senior Target Audience Analyst, 1CMICo
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

106 INLESK	106 Inlichtingen Eskadron (Joint ISTAR Commando)
AAA	Actor and Audience Analysis
ARUMIL	Aruba Militia
BDI	Behavioural Dynamics Institute
CURMIL	Curaçao Militia
CMICo	Civiel Militair Interactie Commando
CZMCARIB	Commandant der Zeemacht in het Caribisch Gebied
DBR	Desk-Based Research
DDOPS	Directeur Directie Operaties
DOPS	Directie Operaties
JISTARC	Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Commando
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information
VK	Vrijwilligerskorps
VKC	Vrijwilligerskorps Curaçao

BELANGRIJKE ACHTERGRONDINFORMATIE EN UITGANGSPUNten VAN HET RAPPORT

Op verzoek van DOPS J5 is dit rapport in het Engels geschreven, met een Nederlandstalige Management Samenvatting.

Belangrijke vertaling

Het Nederlandse woord 'draagvlak' is in het Engels vertaald als 'support'.

Belangrijke achtergrondinformatie

Project Laraha, gestart op 1 Juni 2016 en uitgevoerd in opdracht van Directeur Directie Operaties (DDOPS) van het Ministerie van Defensie, test een, voor Defensie, nieuwe methode voor populatieonderzoek. Het doel van het onderzoek is om strategisch adviseurs en besluitvormers binnen de Nederlandse overheid, en het ministerie van Defensie in bijzonder, te ondersteunen door hen inzicht te geven in de mogelijke reacties op het leveren van extra militaire bijstand aan de ABC-eilanden. Het onderzoek was gericht op het meten van het huidige draagvlak voor Nederlandse militairen in algemene zin, maar ook specifiek met betrekking tot de meest waarschijnlijke reden voor extra militaire bijstand: het ondersteunen van de lokale autoriteiten op de ABC-eilanden bij het voorkomen, danwel bestrijden, van een mogelijke crisis die kan ontstaan uit de verslechterde politieke, economische en sociale ontwikkelingen in Venezuela.

Twee overkoepelende doelstellingen vormen de basis van dit project:

1. Het vaststellen van de publieke opinie over additionele Nederlandse militaire ondersteuning op aanvraag van de Curaçaose en/of Arubaanse overheden.
2. Het in kaart brengen van waarschijnlijke publieke reacties op het eventueel verhogen van het aantal Nederlandse militairen op Curaçao en/of Aruba.

Het onderzoek is gebaseerd op twee onderzoeksvragen afgeleid van de doelstellingen:

1. Is er draagvlak onder de bevolking van Curaçao en Aruba voor de aanwezige militairen?
2. Hoe kan dit draagvlak (indien niet aanwezig) worden gecreëerd? Indien wel aanwezig, hoe kan het draagvlak worden vergroot, met name kijkend naar een eventuele uitbreiding van het aantal militairen op Curaçao en Aruba.

Eindprodukt: Strategisch Communicatie Advies

Opdrachtgever: DDOPS

Project tijdsbestek: 4 maanden, van begin Juni tot eind September 2016 (veldonderzoek vond plaats van begin Juli tot eind Augustus 2016).

Primaire data collectie: Op Curaçao zijn in totaal meer dan 100 mensen geïnterviewd, waaronder belanghebbenden binnen de overheid, Nederlands defensie personeel, Kustwacht personeel, CURMIL personeel, en lokale inwoners van Curaçao (inclusief expats die op Curaçao wonen). Daarnaast hebben 53 Curaçaonaren meegedaan aan een korte vragenlijst gericht op het bevestigen van een aantal bevindingen.

Op Aruba zijn in totaal 80 mensen geïnterviewd, waaronder Nederlands defensie personeel, stakeholders binnen overheidsinstanties, Kustwacht personeel, ARUMIL personeel en lokale inwoners van Aruba.

SECTION 1. MANAGEMENT SAMENVATTING

1.01 UITKOMST VAN HET ONDERZOEK

Er is in principe draagvlak voor de aanwezigheid en uitbreiding van militairen op Curaçao en Aruba.

Draagvlak op Aruba is hoger dan op Curaçao, en is daar met name gebaseerd op positieve ervaringen en anekdotes uit het verleden.

Draagvlak op beide eilanden heeft een zwakke basis, die met name te wijten is aan een gebrek aan algemene kennis van de taakstelling van Defensie in het Caribisch gebied. Factoren die draagvlak beïnvloeden zijn op beide eilanden hetzelfde, maar de mate waarin, en de manier waarop, verschillen voor Aruba en Curaçao.

Beïnvloedende factor op draagvlak	Curaçao	Aruba
1. Publieke kennis van (de rol van) militairen op Curaçao en Aruba.	Zeer weinig algemene publieke kennis van de taakstelling van Defensie op het eiland.	
2. Frequentie en het soort interactie tussen de Nederlandse militairen en de lokale bevolkingen.	Frequentie van sociale interactie is erg laag. Interactie is veelal werk-gerelateerd en oppervlakkig. Nederlandse militairen hebben te weinig culturele achtergrondkennis van de eilanden waar ze gestationeerd zijn. Dit zorgt voor frustraties, onbegrip en onwenselijke situaties.	
3. Huidige percepties van, en houding tegenover, de aanwezige militairen (en Nederlanders in het algemeen).	Publieke percepties van Defensie en militairen zijn over het algemeen neutraal tot positief. Het gros ziet het nut en de noodzaak van militairen maar heeft verder geen overwogen opinie, of weinig interesse. De opinies over Nederlanders, en met name Nederlandse politiek, zijn verdeeld.	Publieke percepties van Defensie en militairen alsmede Nederlanders in zijn algemeenheid zijn over het geheel genomen positief.
4. De reden voor (de aanvraag van) additionele militaire bijstand door de lokale regeringen op Curaçao en Aruba (en de publieke perceptie van de noodzaak van militaire uitbreiding).	Publieke opinie over de problematiek heeft invloed op draagvlak. Als er meer militairen komen om te helpen met een probleem dat de bevolking zelf erkent dan is er draagvlak. Als er geen probleem wordt ervaren zal militaire uitbreiding op Curaçao gezien worden als Nederlandse (politieke) inmenging.	Op Aruba is draagvlak voor de uitbreiding van Nederlandse militairen ongerelateerd aan huidige problematiek of percepties van noodzaak voor uitbreiding.
5. De mond-tot-mond communicatie alsmede berichtgeving in de media over de aanvraag van additionele militaire steun voor Curaçao en Aruba.	Media zowel als mond-tot-mond communicatie en commentaar zijn belangrijk in publieke opinie-vorming. Veel media op Curaçao zijn, net zoals op Aruba, politiek gelieerd, en worden niet beschouwd als erg betrouwbaar.	
6. De reacties van opinieleiders en andere geloofwaardige bronnen op de aanvraag van additionele militaire steun voor Curaçao en Aruba.	Publieke opinie-leiders hebben een disproportionele invloed op Curaçao en Aruba. Het vertrouwen in de politiek is over het algemeen erg laag, en daarnaast zijn mensen zich ervan bewust dat er veel 'onzin' in de krant staat. Lokale charismatische leiders (ook op het niveau van bijvoorbeeld wijk-oudsten, evenals politieke opinie-leiders en bloggers of nieuws websites spelen een grote rol in het vormen van 'de algemene opinie'.	
7. De effectiviteit van de huidige communicatie van Defensie.	Defensie lijkt op dit moment niet in staat om via de juiste kanalen de lokale populatie te voorzien van informatie aangaande de taken van de Nederlandse militairen gestationeerd op beide eilanden.	

1.02 BELANGRIJKSTE BEVINDINGEN

Het publieke gebrek aan kennis van (de rol van) militairen op Curaçao en Aruba vormt een risico voor de lange termijn.

Dit risico kan onderverdeeld worden in drie factoren.

1. Groepen en individuen hebben momenteel binnen de lokale bevolking hun eigen idee over wat de militairen doen. Als er een vraag om uitbreiding komt, heeft elke eilandbewoner zijn eigen referentiekader, waardoor Defensie alle controle over reacties en publieke opinie kwijt is. Als iemand weet dat militairen ook noodhulp bieden en de politie ondersteunen dan zal hij/zij anders reageren op een vraag om uitbreiding (voor welk doel dan ook) dan iemand die denkt dat alle militairen op het eiland alleen maar trainen, of 'special forces' zijn.
2. De manier waarop meningen en 'algemene waarheden' tot stand komen op de eilanden. Mensen vangen veel op via word-of-mouth en checken vervolgens zelden de feiten; er wordt pas over nagedacht als er een conflict is tussen twee verklaringen.
3. Er is een gebrek aan kritisch denkvermogen onder de bevolkingen van beide eilanden. Velen nemen verhalen één-op-één over van (sociale) media en van elkaar zonder alternatieve opvattingen te overwegen, vragen te stellen over beweringen en conclusies, of feiten te controleren. Ook in de lokale journalistiek is dit een bekend probleem (gebrek aan onderzoeksjournalistiek).

Het gebrek aan raakvlak tussen de Nederlandse militairen en de lokale bevolkingen, in combinatie met het gebrek bij militairen aan culturele achtergrondkennis van de eilanden zorgt voor miscommunicatie en misinterpretatie.

Op beide eilanden bewegen Nederlandse militairen zich in compleet andere cirkels dan de lokale bevolking; er zijn weinig raakvlakken op sociaal niveau (dus niet werk- of service gerelateerd). Dit is op zich geen probleem, maar draagt bij aan de instandhouding en versterking van stereotypen. Op Aruba is het stereotype van een marinier overwegend positief, op Curaçao zijn de meningen verdeeld (waar negatief zien lokale Curaçaoenaars de Nederlanders als discriminerend, arrogant en onaangepast, terwijl Nederlanders de Curaçaoenaars typeren als discriminerend, onvriendelijk en lui). In de meerderheid van de gevallen kunnen frustraties en misverstanden voorkomen worden door een betere kennis van de lokale cultuur.

Neutrale tot positieve percepties van Nederlandse militairen op de eilanden zijn gunstig voor draagvlak, echter omdat mensen geen interesse hebben om hun kennis van Defensie te vergroten hebben deze percepties een te zwakke basis.

Nederlandse militairen op Curaçao en Aruba hebben een goede reputatie volgens veel geïnterviewden. De redenen hiervoor verschillen; velen vinden dat de militairen belangrijk werk doen omdat ze de eilanden beschermen, anderen zijn blij dat ze assisteren met drugsvangst of sociale projecten ondernemen. Een groot aantal geïnterviewden ziet het nut en de noodzaak van militairen maar heeft verder geen overwogen opinie, of erg weinig interesse: de Nederlandse militairen op het eiland zijn een feit, en daar wordt door velen niet over nagedacht. Echter er is geen actieve desinteresse; sommige geïnterviewden zijn bijvoorbeeld naar een open dag geweest en hebben een positief beeld van militairen en defensie, maar weten erg weinig van de militairen en hun taakstelling.

Op dit moment lijkt er geen reden om deze kennis te verdiepen. Door de verslechterende veiligheidssituatie op de eilanden, in combinatie met de groei van illegale immigratie zal de publieke perceptie van noodzaak voor de aanwezigheid van (Nederlandse) militairen groeien. Deze perceptie van noodzaak zal de populaties derhalve motiveren om actief kennis en informatie te zoeken over concepten zoals veiligheid, verdediging, bescherming en Defensie. Mensen zullen vooral zoeken naar informatie over de praktische invulling van deze concepten (wie doet wat, en wat betekend dat voor mij als burger). Defensie zal zich moeten voorbereiden op de publieke behoefte aan informatie.

Een aanvraag van additionele militaire bijstand door de lokale regeringen op Curaçao en Aruba gerelateerd aan de influx van illegale Venezolanen zal door beide bevolkingen geaccepteerd worden omdat er een publieke perceptie van noodzaak bestaat.

(Venezolaanse) illegale immigranten worden gezien als een probleem. Het wordt opgemerkt dat er meer Spaans op straat wordt gesproken, en er is een perceptie van verhoging in het aantal overvallen en inbraken (en dit wordt door velen gekoppeld aan de toename in illegale immigranten (met name Venezolanen) op het eiland).

Het tegenhouden van illegale Venezolanen wordt door een kleine minderheid genoemd als taak van militairen op de eilanden, en draagt positief bij aan het draagvlak voor militairen. Sommigen vinden dat militairen ook meer moeten ondersteunen in het tegengaan van criminaliteit en drugsmokkel.

Door het publieke gebrek aan kennis over militairen en hun taken vormen 'credible sources' (bijvoorbeeld opinieleiders) een risico factor; zij kunnen zich negatief uitlaten over Defensie / militairen en mensen hebben te weinig voorkennis om feit van fictie te kunnen onderscheiden.

Met name de laag- tot mid-opgeleiden op Curaçao en Aruba leunen sterk op mond-totmond communicatie in het vormen van hun mening. 'Feiten' in de media worden vaak gebruikt als bewijs voor een mening of standpunt in de wandelgangen, en wanneer een nieuw 'feit' eenmaal algemeen bekend is, is het erg moeilijk daar iets aan te veranderen.

De huidige communicatie van Defensie in het Caribisch gebied is ineffectief met betrekking tot het type media dat gebruikt wordt, alsmede de inhoud van de berichtgeving.

Tenzij communicatie wordt afgestemd op media consumptie van de lokalen bevolkingen, zal Defensie-berichtgeving hen slechts in beperkte mate bereiken.

Media zowel als *word-of-mouth* verklaringen en commentaar zijn belangrijk in publieke opinie-vorming. Veel media op Curaçao en Aruba zijn politiek gelieerd en worden niet beschouwd als erg betrouwbaar. Toch zijn radio, kranten en televisie - naast Facebook, Whatsapp, en mond-tot mond communicatie - populair voor nieuws en informatie. Daarbij is het voor Defensie van belang zich te realiseren dat 'feiten' in de vorm van informatie / nieuws via Whatsapp, Facebook, Bloggs en in de wandelgangen worden voorzien van commentaar en meningen. 'Nieuws' wordt sneller onder de bevolking verspreid en opgenomen als het een directe individuele aantrekkingskracht heeft, of een hoge entertainment factor heeft (hoe meer sensationeel, onconventioneel, of eccentric het commentaar, hoe sneller het bericht wordt doorgegeven).

De combinatie van deze vorm van opinie-vorming en het bestaande informatiegat van feitelijke kennis over Defensie (en de aanwezige militairen), kan leiden tot misconceptie en misinterpretatie.

1.03 STRATEGISCH COMMUNICATIE ADVIES

Voor de ontwikkeling van de communicatie strategie zijn drie overkoepelende principes van belang:

1. Dichten van het informatie-gat
2. Strategische positionering van Defensie
3. Vergroten en tonen van 'cultural awareness' van militair personeel

Dichten van het informatie-gat

De eerste stap in gerichte strategische communicatie is het leggen van een basis van algemene informatie, zodat bekend is wat 'de burger' weet en niet weet. Het is aan te bevelen om na het dichten van het informatie-gat een tweede perceptie-meting te doen om:

- Te testen of de publieke kennis van Defensie daadwerkelijk is vergroot, en;
- Te meten of de publieke perceptie van Defensie verandert op basis van nieuwe informatie (en welke 'feiten' een positieve danwel negatieve invloed hebben op draagvlak voor militairen)

Advies om het informatie-gat op Curaçao en Aruba te dichten:

1. Communiceer de taakstelling en rol van Defensie op de eilanden in termen die resoneren bij de bevolking (begrijpbaar) en op een manier die bij mensen 'blijft hangen'. Leg daarbij ook uit waar Defensie niet voor is. Gebruik hiervoor media die de bevolking als betrouwbaar en politiek neutraal beschouwd. Een radio commercial, billboards, flyers, communicatie via de wijkoudste(n) en Facebook, zowel in het Papiaments als het Nederlands, zijn de beste kanalen. Voor Aruba geldt specifiek dat de media campagne enkel gericht moet zijn op Aruba en de Arubaanse bevolking; enige relatie met Curacao is niet gewenst omdat vanuit historisch perspectief elke vorm van communicatie die de indruk wekt dat de eilanden 'over een kam worden geschorst' weerstand zal opwekken.
2. Push van informatie; er is geen zelfstandige pull van informatie over Defensie door Arubanen en Curaçaoenaars. Een basis van algemene informatie die aangeboden wordt aan de bevolking kan bijvoorbeeld uitstekend worden gelegd via een brede media informatie campagne en het jaarlijks houden van een (informatieve) Open Dag. Voor maximum effect moet een open dag ieder jaar gebeuren, op dezelfde datum. De Facebook pagina zal een 'like' pagina moeten worden die gepersonaliseerd wordt voor respectievelijk Parera en Savaneta. Via een boost van de Facebook pagina zal de bevolking van beide eilanden een push van informatie via social media ontvangen.

Strategische positionering van Defensie

Strategische positionering van Defensie is noodzakelijk ter ondersteuning van de informatiecampagne. Samenwerking met stakeholders in het veiligheidsdomein, zoals politie, justitie, kustwacht, rampenburo en de veiligheidsdienst, zal weloverwogen gecommuniceerd moeten worden. Deze veiligheidspartners worden door de lokale bevolkingen gezien als corrupt en inefficient, en Defensie moet voorkomen dat de aanname onstaat dat dit ook voor Defensie het geval is (te wijten aan het gebrek aan kritisch denkvermogen). Defensie moet worden gepresenteerd als een op zichzelf staande entiteit die meer raakvlakken heeft met de lokale bevolking dan met corrupte, ineffectieve 'veiligheidsinstanties'.

Advies om Defensie beter strategisch te positioneren:

1. Draag bij aan de sociale ontwikkeling van de jeugd in de vorm van educatie (voorlichting op scholen) gericht op normen en waarden. Om draagvlak te vergroten moeten raakvlakken worden gecreëerd. Eilandbewoners maken zich het meest zorgen over educatie en opvoeding. Een bijdrage aan educatieve programma's door militairen kan het best worden ingevuld door parallellen tussen militairen en lokale jongeren te trekken, zoals bijvoorbeeld vertellen over werken in groepen (groep versus individualisme) en kameraadschap (falen is niet erg, als je elkaar maar helpt).
2. Vergroot raakvlakken met bevolking door bijvoorbeeld sportieve activiteiten (zoals voetbal/honkbal).
3. Vergroot interactie met de bevolking door cultuurrelevante activiteiten (zoals carnaval).
4. Integreer CURMIL en ARUMIL beter in de Defensieorganisatie in het Caribisch gebied, zodat defensie gezien wordt als een gedeelde taak tussen de Nederlandse en lokale militairen. (Feitelijk is defensie een overheidstaak, echter in strategische communicatie moet Defensie dit minder benadrukken. De populatie heeft weinig vertrouwen in de politiek en de overheid, maar ziet wel de meerwaarde van militairen in zijn algemeenheid.)

Vergroten en tonen van 'cultural awareness' van militair personeel

Militair personeel gestationeerd op beide eilanden hebben op dagelijkse basis te maken met verschillen tussen de Nederlandse en lokale cultuur. Deze cultuurverschillen worden niet voldoende begrepen door Nederlandse militairen in het Caribisch gebied, en leiden soms tot problemen of frustraties in de omgang met de lokale bevolking.

Advies om 'cultural awareness' van militair personeel te vergroten:

1. Zorg ervoor dat militairen met een stakeholder engagement / communicatie rol beter Papiaments leren spreken.
2. Geef lessen in culturele achtergrond alvorens militairen uitgezonden worden naar het Caribisch gebied.

Binnen de drie overkoepelende principes voor de ontwikkeling van de communicatie strategie zijn er naast bovenstaande adviezen met betrekking tot implementatie nog talloze alternatieve campagnes mogelijk. Het is van belang dat deze campagnes gespiegeld worden aan de data die middels het uitgevoerde Actor and Audience Analysis zijn verzameld. Het 1CMI commando heeft de beschikking over een reach-back capaciteit die deze functie

kan vervullen. Met andere woorden, elk initiatief dat Defensie (in casu CZM Carib) overweegt, kan door het 1CMI commando worden getest en voorzien van advies.

1.04 STRATEGISCHE COMMUNICATIE NARRATIEVEN

Om het draagvlak voor de uitbreiding van de aanwezigheid van militairen op de eilanden in het kader van de verslechterende situatie in Venezuela verder te vergroten kunnen onderstaande narratieve worden gebruikt.

Strategische Communicatie Narratief voor uitbreiding van Nederlandse militairen op Curaçao

Op verzoek van de regering van Curaçao breidt Defensie tijdelijk het aantal aanwezige militairen uit om Curaçao en de inwoners van Curaçao te ondersteunen in het uitvoeren van humanitaire taken met betrekking tot vluchtelingenopvang.

Strategische Communicatie Narratief voor uitbreiding van Nederlandse militairen op Aruba

Op verzoek van de Arubaanse regering wordt op de Marinierskazerne tijdelijk het aantal aanwezig militairen uitgebreid om Aruba en de inwonders van Aruba te ondersteunen in het uitvoeren van humanitaire taken met betrekking tot vluchtelingenopvang.

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SECTION 2. INTRODUCTION

2.01 OVERVIEW

Project Laraha was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Defence (DDOPS) on 1 June 2016 in order to trial a new research approach into a country's population. This project has been designed to assist strategists across the Dutch Government in understanding the possible popular reactions to an increase in military presence on the ABC-Islands. The research sought to understand the current level of support for Dutch military presence in general, and specifically with regard to the most likely reason for additional military assistance; to assist the local authorities on the ABC-Islands in their efforts to prevent or fight a potential crisis as a result of political, economic and social deterioration in Venezuela.

2.02 PROJECT AIMS

Project Laraha aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of support for the presence, and increase, of military personnel stationed on Curaçao and Aruba, **from the point of view of the population**. It thereby aimed to recommend programmes and narratives that might be adopted by the Dutch ministry of Defence as part of its efforts to promote support for the military on the islands.

This project secondly aimed to demonstrate the utility to government of a new method of research, which goes beyond simple attitudinal polling, and understands the human dimension using the latest insights from social psychology, anthropology, sociology, and the behavioural social sciences.

Two main overarching objectives guided this project:

1. Understanding public perceptions of the request for additional Dutch military assistance by the Curaçao and/or Aruban Governments.
2. Discover the likely behavioural reactions to (an increase in) Dutch military presence on the part of the local population on Curaçao and/or Aruba.

Two research questions were derived that determined fieldwork design:

1. Is there currently support for the military on Curaçao and Aruba?
2. If there is no support for the military on the islands, how can this be created? If there is support, how can this be increased, specifically with regard to a potential increase in military presence on Curaçao and Aruba.

2.03 PROJECT METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE SIZE

In order to fulfill the project aims, Project Laraha was designed as a qualitative research project. The BDI methodology used in this research is a framework for thinking that is structured around a pragmatist world view: it is well known in the social sciences that not all research questions can be answered using the same research methods, and the BDI methodology uses qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches dependent on the research question(s) and project aims. Because very little was known beforehand about support for the military on Curaçao and Aruba, or about the factors that constitute support for the military, this research lent itself most to a qualitative research approach.

On Curaçao, in total over 100 people were interviewed, among whom key Government Stakeholders, Dutch military personnel, Coast Guard personnel, CURMIL staff, and members of the local population (including expats living in Curaçao).

On Aruba in total 80 people were interviewed, among whom Dutch military personnel, Coast Guard personnel, members of the ARUMIL, stakeholders within the Aruban government and local population of Aruba.

2.04 PROJECT TIMELINE AND DELIVERABLES

The project duration was 4 months, from early June to late September 2016 (In-country fieldwork took place between 26 July and 31 August 2016).

2.05 PROJECT LIMITATIONS

At the initial stage of the fieldwork on Curaçao, the project team only had permission to interview military staff inside marine bases Parera and Suffisant. The core reasons for this were the sensitivities related to the upcoming elections (September 30th 2016), and unfamiliarity with a new form of audience research. CZMCARIB subsequently granted the team permission to conduct interviews with the local population. Permission was not granted to conduct interviews with political figures, the Curaçao police, the VKC (Vrijwilligers Korps Curaçao), or the media.

The project limitations with regard to population interviews mainly affected the timeline at the start of the project, but had no impact on the final data or data quality. The fact that no interviews were conducted with political figures, the Curaçao police, the VKC, and the media has limited the possibility to provide context findings related to these groups, but has no implications for the recommendations related to public support (the core research question).

The project team on Aruba had no limitations regarding the interviews that were held on the island. Team Aruba started their fieldwork research stage one week later on August 1st 2016.

SECTION 3. RESEARCH

3.01 DESIGN AND PROCESS

This section describes the steps taken in applying the BDI Methodology to the study of support for the military on Curaçao and Aruba. It covers the thinking steps that guided the project and the movement between the phases – including the design of the instruments – in a linear fashion.

The research used a cross-sectional design that incorporated both inductive and deductive theoretical approaches. During Phase I, data was collected from a wide range of sources, including desk-based research and conversations with the client and stakeholders. The data was used to construct an accurate description of the (perceived) perceptual and behavioural problems, and to derive research questions. These were translated into operational terms and subsequently tested in Phase II, whereby data was collected from cases within the local populations on the two islands.

Phase 1 comprised three stages: Phase 1.1, in which Desk-based Research and Key Stakeholder Engagement were conducted to gain a detailed, but not exhaustive, understanding of the culture, the potential audience groups, the behaviours they exhibit, and the general Problem Space (a term used in the Behavioural Dynamics Methodology to describe the totality of non-desired behaviours, initially understood from the Client's perspective and subsequently elaborated on through stakeholder investigation and field research until a full picture of the 'problem' and any direct and indirect consequences emerges); Phase 1.2, in which the Problem Space was operationalised as a research design, and Phase 1.3, where the research instruments were tested and refined based on initial feedback from the field in the form of pilot interviews.

During Phase 2, Semi-structured In-Depth Interviews (IDIs) were conducted with military staff and members of the local population to collect research data aimed at understanding influence paths to the Curaçao and Aruba populations, and to gather more specific and accurate information about people's Motivations, Values, Group Structures, and communication channels (Channel and Source Exposure and Credibility) with respect to the overarching objectives.

The iterative nature of the research process provided a compelling approach to audience profiling and analysis by allowing flexibility of movement between discrete stages of the methodology, in real-time, with the emerging themes and hypotheses from the incoming data.

During Phase 3 the audience profiles and research data regarding the overarching objectives were combined into a series of recommendations for strategic communication on Curaçao and Aruba.

PROJECT COMPONENT / PHASE		KEY COMPONENT PARTS
Methodology Phase 1	1.1 Stakeholder and Expert Elicitation, Secondary Research	Strategic Assessment, Existing Data Assessment and Gap Analysis, including Key stakeholder interviews and engagement.
	1.2 Research Development/Design	On the basis of the knowledge from phase 1.1, an initial problem space map is created, and the main research phase is designed and scoped.
	1.3 Research Phase A: Pilot / Observation Research	Prior to the full roll-out of any research instrument, a small-scale pilot is conducted in the field to ensure the validity of research instruments and to solve any problems pertaining to their design (such as rephrasing or replacing questions that do not work or adding additional explanations), translation, feasibility etc.
Methodology Phase 2	2.1 Research Phase B: Maximum Diversity Sample / Unstructured Interviewing	To seek out differences between groups in a society, the first sample seeks to interview people who are as different from each other as possible, to seek patterns of similarity and difference and set the research sample based on hypothesised differences.
	2.2 Interim Analysis / Adaptation of Interview Guide	On the basis of the knowledge from phase 2.1, the main research phase is designed and scoped.
	2.3 Research Phase C: Semi Structured Guided Interviews	Data collection and analysis of In-Depth Interviews of approximately one-hour duration each.
Methodology Phase 3	Ongoing Analysis, Campaign Design and Strategy Recommendations	All data is combined into a strategic campaign design, covering: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Campaign Strategy advice to achieve the desired behaviour change • Message type and message tone • Message sources (Initiating Sets and credible sources to be used in the campaign) • Separate design recommendations for sub-groups where necessary • Channel recommendations
Reporting		<p>There are two core final deliverables:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A final project report (this deliverable) detailing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project and research approach • Findings and Recommendations • Observations on the use of the BDI Methodology for the Dutch Ministry of Defence (Strengths, Limitations, Lessons Learned and Recommendations for future implementation) 2. A presentation to the client stakeholder team

There were three main components to the initial planning phase:

1. Client and stakeholder discussions and project scoping
2. Desk-based research
3. Expert elicitation and expert interviews

The objectives were to synthesise the information gathered into a more accurate understanding of the problem and to develop a research plan to effectively investigate (how to increase) support for the military on Curaçao and Aruba.

Desk-Based Research (DBR)

The aim of the initial phase of problem exploration was to construct a foundational understanding of Curaçao and Aruba, their Governments and cultures. The desk-based research helped clarify or refute certain ideas and assumptions, and helped create a foundation for subsequent research. Because this was the first time that the CMI Command conducted DBR for AAA, the General Awareness document created by 106 INLESK (JISTARC) was used as starting point and supplemented with CMI related PMESII factors (all mainly based on OSINT analysis) and a list of further DBR questions such as:


1. Which groups exist on the islands, how do they express themselves, and what are the public and Government reactions to these groups?
2. What is 'hot' among the youth on the islands? What influences them?
3. How do the locals influence each other on the islands?
4. What are the most important national days and festivals on Curaçao and Aruba?
5. Who is the biggest 'national hero' on each of the islands?
6. What are the most important social structures?
7. What role does religion play in the lives of the local Curaçao and Aruba populations? What religions are practiced?

Expert Elicitation and Expert Interviews

Expert elicitation, DBR and analysis are a continuous and iterative process throughout the first phase of the BDI Methodology. The stages within each phase are not linear in their application, and throughout the field research, the research teams conducted interviews with key stakeholders and experts on Dutch Defence communication, the Dutch military on the island, etc. A list of respondents for this research can be found in Appendix A.

Initial Problem Space Map

The information gathered about the aforementioned seven DBR categories, combined with the understanding gained from client discussions and initial expert elicitation, assisted the creation of a concept map in which the most important concepts were linked to the main concept of support for the military through logical antecedents. The choice of antecedents is a form of anticipatory data reduction that permits and supports data collection and later analysis by focussing the research: later analytic moves are prefigured by design decisions at the initial planning phase. The concept map that results is a conceptual framework that explains which key concepts, factors and groups are the main focus of research at any one time, and is updated as the data that is being gathered changes the researcher's understanding of the links between these concepts, factors and groups. Normally, research that follows the BDI methodology starts with another kind of conceptual framework: a behaviour map. However, in this study, a specific concept (rather than a problem behaviour) was the starting point of the study as per the Client Brief, and a concept map is the most instructive conceptual framework to narrow down the Problem Space. The concept map presented on the next page is the concept map that guided the design decisions for phase 1 research in Curaçao and Aruba.



3.02 INITIAL RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

The first hypotheses were constructed on the basis of communications with DOPS J5 as tasking authority and the overarching research questions (1. Understanding public perceptions of the request for additional Dutch military assistance by the Curaçao and/or Aruban Governments, and 2. Discover the likely behavioural reactions to (an increase in) Dutch military presence on the part of the local populations on both islands). There were 8 core initial hypotheses that the research sought to confirm or refute, many of them based on existing beliefs and/or perceptions on the part of the key stakeholders within the client team. Hypotheses were designed to include attitudes and perceptions, behavioural indications of support for the military (or the lack thereof), groups that may influence public support, and communication parameters and other tools for engagement.

- Hypothesis 1 (Stemming from the perception among key stakeholders that there is anti-Dutch sentiment among the Curaçao population): There is a difference between perceptions of Dutch ex-pats living in Curaçao, Dutch tourists, the Dutch Government, the Dutch as a generic group of people (notably those living in the Netherlands) and Dutch military on the island.
- Hypothesis 2: Current communication on the part of the Dutch military does not reach the local population.
- Hypothesis 3: Public perception of the Dutch military is shaped more by visible actions on Curaçao and Aruba than it is by communications in the media.
- Hypothesis 4: People are currently politically disengaged. However, negative political rhetoric in relation to increased military presence could lead to a political split if it is used to fuel dissent among the population in order to garner votes for the upcoming election.
- Hypothesis 5: Culturally specific interests are the best tools for engaging the local populations on the islands.
- Hypothesis 6: There is no strong concept of a 'national identity' and hence what it means to be from Curaçao/Aruba is determined more by historic narratives and ethnic origin/ancestry.
- Hypothesis 7: Public perceptions of local militia and local police influence people's perception of Dutch military, especially since the Dutch military is training local militias.
- Hypothesis 8: There is a tipping point at which acceptance of an increase in Dutch military presence becomes less about the general principle of acceptance and more about the visibility and practical ramifications of the absolute numbers of military personnel on the ground.

The hypotheses were in turn broken down into a series of secondary research questions that were used in the design of the interview guide, as follows:

Hypothesis 1: (Stemming from the perception among key stakeholders that there is anti-Dutch sentiment among the Curaçao and Aruba populations): There is a difference between perceptions of Dutch ex-pats living in Curaçao/Aruba, Dutch tourists, the Dutch Government, the Dutch as a generic group of people (notably those living in the Netherlands) and Dutch military on the islands.

Anti-Dutch sentiment, whilst having 'historic roots', may presently be directed predominantly at specific groups. For example, the population may recognise that ex-pats and tourists contribute to society in a different way than the military does, and hence there may be a perceptual difference between Dutch tourists (who bring money but go back home after their holiday), Dutch ex-pats living on the island (who 'steal the nicest beaches' and 'live in big and expensive gated communities.'), and Dutch military (who provide assistance and bring safety). It is equally possible that people have an issue with Dutch Foreign Policy or Dutch 'Government Interference', but at the same time like the Dutch people in general. It is likely that different groups interact differently with the local population, and it is therefore worth exploring whether there is a difference in how the local population views these groups.

Research questions to prove or refute this hypothesis:

1. Does the population distinguish in their perception between:
 - Dutch military
 - Dutch ex-pats other than military
 - Dutch government
 - Dutch tourists
 - Dutch people residing in the Netherlands (perceptions of culture, stereotypes)
2. If yes, what is their perception of each group and how do they differ?

Hypothesis 2: Current communication on the part of the Dutch military does not reach the local population

Research questions to prove or refute this hypothesis:

1. How does the Dutch military currently communicate with the local population?
 - What media channels do they use?
 - What is the frequency of communication?
 - What are the most common subjects of communication?
2. What channels, print media and social media does the population consume?
3. Which channels and sources do the local population perceive as most credible and does this differ for different audiences?
4. How can we best reach the local population, in terms of:
 - Media
 - Message type and tone
 - Motivations
 - Attitudes
5. Does the local population understand why there is Dutch military presence in Curaçao? Do they agree? Do they believe their presence is vital for Curaçao?

Hypothesis 3: Public perception of the Dutch military is shaped more by visible actions in Curaçao than it is by communications in the media.

Research questions to prove or refute this hypothesis:

1. Does the population know that the Curaçao government has requested additional military support in their planning for a possible refugee stream from Venezuela?
 - Has this been officially communicated to the population and if so, could we have the articles / media around this?
2. What is the public perception of the Observation Posts that have been built alongside the coastline?
 - Do people understand why they are there?
3. Are people worried about (increased numbers of) refugees coming to their island? Have they noticed the refugees that are already there? What is their opinion?

Hypothesis 4: People are currently politically unengaged. However, negative political rhetoric in relation to increased military presence could lead to a political split if is used to fuel dissent among the population in order to garner votes for the upcoming election

Research questions to prove or refute this hypothesis:

1. How is PS (Pueblo Soberano) performing in the polls for the September 2016 elections?
2. What was the voter turnout in the last elections? Percentages for youth voters versus older voters?
3. What were the party manifestos in the Curaçao referendum for independence?
 - What was the voter turnout?
 - What were the voter demographics 'for' and 'against'?
4. Which political parties use anti-Dutch vs. pro-Dutch narratives?
5. What is the public trust in their government? In Politics?
6. Are there any 'respected' politicians? Who (or, why not)?

Hypothesis 5: Culturally specific interests are the best tools for engaging the local Curaçao and Aruba populations

Research questions to prove or refute this hypothesis:

1. What is 'hot' among the local population?
2. What are the festivals, national days, etc. that the population cares about?
3. Is there a local youth 'slang'?
4. How do the locals influence each other?
5. Who is the biggest national hero (sports, culture, film, radio, TV stars)?

Hypothesis 6: There is no strong concept of a 'national identity' and hence what it means to be from Curaçao/Aruba is determined more by historic narratives and ethnic origin/ancestry.

Research questions to prove or refute this hypothesis:

1. Are people proud to be from Curaçao/Aruba? What makes them proud?
2. How do people define themselves (how do they talk about who they are)?
3. What does it mean to be a 'local'?

Hypothesis 7: Public perceptions of local militia and local police influence people's perception of Dutch military and police, especially since the Dutch military is training local militias.

Research questions to prove or refute this hypothesis:

1. What are local perceptions of the militia?
 - Does this differ for different audiences or is this a unanimous opinion?
 - Are people proud to be a member of the militia?
 - Would people consider joining? Why? Why not?
2. What are public perceptions of the local police force?
 - Does this differ for different audiences or is this a unanimous opinion?
 - Would people consider joining? Why? Why not?
3. What are public perceptions of the VK?
 - Does this differ for different audiences or is this a unanimous opinion?
 - Would people consider joining? Why? Why not?

Hypothesis 8: There is a tipping point at which acceptance of an increase in Dutch military presence becomes less about the general principle of acceptance and more about the visibility and practical ramifications of the absolute numbers of military personnel on the ground.

Research questions to prove or refute this hypothesis:

1. How many Dutch military are currently stationed on Curaçao and Aruba?
2. How 'visible' are they? What do they do in their spare time? Where do they go? Where do they never go?
3. What is the maximum number to which the Dutch military might increase?

3.03 RELEVANT BDI PARAMETERS

In addition to conducting research to prove or refute the above hypotheses, this research was designed to measure the following psychosocial and socio-dynamic parameters relevant to influence and behaviour change in the context of the research questions for this project:

- Historic Context
- Current Behaviour
- Identity

- Values
- Motivations and Reward Structures
- Aspirations
- Locus of Control
- Expectancy
- Entitlement
- Propensity for Change
- Time Orientation
- Binary Oppositions
- Normative Affiliation
- Influenceability
- Power Structures
- Common Enemies
- Needs

3.04 SEMI-STRUCTURED DEPTH-INTERVIEWS

Semi-Structured Depth Interviews were conducted during Phase 2 of the research to provide information on critical domains of interest, such as behaviours, motivations, communications and paths of influence within the Dutch military stationed on Curaçao and Aruba, the CURMIL, ARUMIL, and the local populations on both islands. Each interview was structured to last for approximately one hour, however when respondents felt comfortable talking and as long as the conversation was yielding new data, interviews were continued. The majority of interviews were between 1 and 1.5 hours duration, however some of the interviews approached 2 hours in length. In a small minority of cases an interviewee requested to terminate an interview, in which case they were replaced as a respondent. In a few cases the interviewer terminated the interview early when respondents gave one-word answers or were giving little or no useful information. Within specific audience groups, each interview was conducted using the same interview schedule, thus ensuring that each interviewee was given the same context of questioning, therefore receiving the same interview stimulus. This allows for responses to be aggregated in a reliable fashion in relation to identical cues. The purpose of this methodical and systematic approach was to provide high quality data relevant to the hypotheses that were being tested.

Both convenience sampling (i.e. by virtue of accessibility) and stratified sampling methods were used during Phase 2, where sampling was aimed to cover the Problem Space as broadly as possible. Stratified sampling was used to recruit respondents from the general population as well as target demographics.

3.05 PREPARATION OF INSTRUMENTS

Qualitative Instruments

All interview schedules were composed to high standards, and in accord with the Behavioural Dynamics Institute methodology. To prevent respondent fatigue, the interview schedule was adjusted after pilot interviews to an appropriate length and that it possessed a clear yet interesting structure. For some of the questions the respondent was required to answer as an informant, such that he or she was responding as an informer on other people's behaviours, motivations, and attitudes. This technique is exquisite at eliciting socially held tacit knowledge that is relevant to general group and cultural traits.

The questions were constructed according to established principles within social research and thus sought to avoid being ambiguous, long, double-barrelled, general, leading, two-fold, technical, or esoteric. Questions were piloted and altered or discarded if deemed unsuitable.

Interview guides for experts and stakeholders were unstructured and designed for each interview. Two semi-structured interview guides were composed: one for Military staff interviews, and another for the general population. After the pilot interviews, adjustments were made to the interview guides for Aruba and Curaçao separately; care was taken to ensure they sought the same type of information, but questions were adapted to the local cultures.

Quantitative Instrument

On Curaçao, a one-page quick poll was designed at the very last stage of the research to augment the qualitative research findings. This poll was not designed to uncover any new information; it was a 'nice to have' that was used to illustrate the qualitative research findings in this report. A total of 53 people participated in the quick poll.

All interview guides that were used on Aruba during interviews with the local population and ARUMIL contained a quick poll with quantitatively focused questions to illustrate qualitative findings. The poll was aimed at specific parameter data such as Locus of Control and Normative Affiliation.

3.06 INFORMATION STORAGE

All information regarding participant contact details and interview data was stored on a secure drive. Most of the population interviews were conducted by finding respondents in specifically sampled areas, and interviews were conducted there and then. In these cases last names and contact details were not requested.

3.07 FIELD RESEARCH

All participation in the research was entirely voluntary. Prior to engaging in the interview all participants were assured that their responses and identity would be kept entirely confidential. They were informed that they could terminate the interview at any stage and that they were not obliged to answer any questions that they were not comfortable with. Interviews were summarised from hand-written notes.

Interviews were conducted in various locations, such as hotels, markets, restaurants, homes, and parks. This was simply due to the difficulty of getting participants to travel, and the additional difficulty (and likely introduction of bias or discomfort) of bringing a respondent to a military base where the teams had access to offices. In all instances the best possible provision was made to ensure a quiet and comfortable location.

All interviewers were diligent and made sure that they had rehearsed the interview schedule. They adopted a friendly and relaxed manner, but also they were self-assured and confident. Where appropriate, background research on experts was conducted in advance. Developing good rapport with interviewees was a strong consideration.

3.08 CODING AND ANALYSIS

The interview summaries were read and re-read to achieve familiarity and rudimentary understanding. Subsequently, distinct themes were formulated to assist in initial categorisation of the data. The responses relevant to the identified categories were then transferred to an alternative analysis document, which grouped responses from all studied summaries in their respective categories.

In Phases 1.3 and 2.1 of the research, where the objective was to identify emergent themes and finalise questions to guide Phase 2.3 research, the data was analysed using a combination of Grounded Theory and Content Analysis. Grounded Theory is an iterative technique that aims to provide an accurate and comprehensive description of a research situation where little is known beforehand. A procedure of constant comparison between data and concepts allowed a theoretical elaboration of the concepts to ensure that the correspondence between categories and indicators was not lost. Component parts of the interview summaries were categorised according to the criteria of potential theoretical significance and saliency. Codes allowed the labeling, separation, organisation and compilation of data.

Phase 2.3 research utilised Content Analysis. In this method codes are assigned to the categorised data. There were clear rules governing the coding process, which was transparent by following the Behavioural Dynamics Institute methodology for measuring specific parameters. A coding frame was drawn up that specified what type of information was to be included in the specified codes and rules derived for assigning codes to specific data, such as words, subjects, themes and dispositions. Content Analysis is a valid method for attaining an objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the communicated data.

3.09 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The research was conducted in an ethical manner that conformed to standard practices in social science research. In particular the following were adhered to:

- All participants provided entirely voluntary informed consent
- In all instances the participants were provided with a satisfactory explanation of the study's aims and what their participation would involve
- Participants were allowed to withdraw from the study at any time
- All participants were guaranteed absolute confidentiality
- All methods were non-invasive and non-harmful
- All researchers were polite and non-threatening
- All researchers avoided asking sensitive questions

3.10 SAMPLE

Sampling Methodology

For Phase 1.3, the qualitative sampling frame applied to field research was designed to be as inclusive of the population make-up as possible in terms of criteria such as socio-economic status, geography, age-range, etc. Typically, between 8 and 10 interviews per group suffice for a pilot study in order to establish a framework for analysis, yet this is always entirely dependent on the size and homogeneity of the group under study, and on the research questions. The Dutch military proved to be a fairly homogenous group on both Curaçao and Aruba, and after around 8 interviews patterns started to emerge from the data. The local populations of Curaçao en Aruba are of course more heterogeneous groups, and, because the ultimate aim of the research is to identify pathways for influence, only patterns that hold true across the population are relevant for strategic communication. Such patterns started to emerge after around 10-15 interviews.

For Phase 2.1, sampling was based on a process of theoretical saturation; an initial set of 6 to 8 interviews was analyzed according to the methodology established in Phase 1. Subsequently, interviews were conducted in iterations - until no new concepts or categories emerged and a point of theoretical saturation had been reached. For the military interviews, a total of 20-25 interviews confirmed the initial patterns, and whilst on both islands more confirmatory interviews were conducted, they yielded no further new insights. Population interviews similarly yielded patterns relatively quickly, though the pattern that stood out on both islands was the lack of knowledge of the military and – as a result – the superficiality of attitudes held. On both islands, interviews continued until after theoretical saturation was reached, and confidence in the data validity is therefore high.

In order to ensure data quality, interviewers were made responsible for the identification of those respondents who both met the inclusion criteria and were deemed 'satisfactory' respondents. When a respondent had been initially identified, a few screening questions were asked to ensure that the respondent met the criteria required:

- Individuals had to live on Curaçao or Aruba
- Individuals were only included if they were born on Curaçao or Aruba (in the general awareness interviews locals who were not born on either island but had lived there for most of their life were also interviewed)
- Individuals who had lived abroad for most of their life (a qualitative assessment on the part of the interviewer) were excluded from the research

Sample size and validity (and a comparison to quantitative research)

How large a sample size should be is never a simple or procedural matter. Rather, it can only be answered by examining how the interview data connects with the analytical framework of the project, in the same way that the sample size for quantitative research is dependent on the research question(s). In statistics, quality assurance, and survey methodology (i.e. in **quantitative research methods**) sampling is concerned with the selection of a subset of individuals from within a statistical population to estimate characteristics of the whole population. A specific set of measures (such as age, education, opinions etc.) is taken from each individual, and the aim is to make a statement about the percentages of occurrences of a specific variable within a population. Weights can be applied to the data to

adjust for the sample design, particularly stratified sampling. But neither method has a 'magic' number unrelated to the research aims or the size of the sample universe. According to Patricia and Peter Adler, who are scholars, former editors of the *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* and who have taught qualitative research methods for over three decades:

A key difference involves the hypothetico-deductive approach that guides quantitative research versus the inductive paradigm framing qualitative research. In trying to verify hypotheses, quantitative researchers have finite ideas, prior to starting research, about the scope and aims of their projects. Qualitative researchers, working in the context of discovery, are more open-ended, and often follow emergent empirical and conceptual findings in unexpected ways. Thus, they may not know, in advance, how much data they need to gather. The best answer is simply to gather data until empirical saturation is reached; however this is not always possible or practical.¹

The key to understanding sampling for qualitative research versus quantitative research is the difference in the types of research question they can answer and their approach:

	Qualitative research methods	Quantitative research methods
Methods	Examples include focus groups, interviews, ethnography, participant observation, and literature reviews.	Examples include surveys, polls, censuses, and questionnaires.
Process	Primarily inductive process to generate hypotheses or theory. Emergent and non-linear process.	Primarily a linear, deductive process.
Data	Text-based.	Number-based.
Aims	To describe a situation or gain insight into a practice. To gather in-depth information, or what is known as a 'rich' or 'thick' description on a few cases.	To test pre-specified concepts, constructs and theories, and measure magnitude; how widespread an issue is.
Response options	No predetermined response format. Open ended questions: unstructured or semi-structured response options.	Fixed response options such as multiple-choice or Likert-scales. Responses yield numbers through predetermined response formats.
Analysis	Preliminary analysis is an inherent part of data collection. For example Grounded Theory, Content Analysis, Narrative Analysis, Discourse Analysis.	Statistical tests.
Tests	None	Statistical Tests to test hypotheses, uses data to support conclusions.
Validity and Reliability	Validity and reliability is mostly determined by the skills and rigor of the researcher(s).	Validity and reliability is mostly determined by the definition and measurement of the constructs, instrument design and degree of true randomness of the sample.
Time expenditure	Slower in general, and time expenditure is heaviest during the analysis phase.	Rapid to slower, time expenditure is heaviest during the instrument design and data collection phase and lighter during analysis.
Generalisability	Less generalisable (unless patterns are at the 'highest level', i.e. true for all cases)	More generalisable.
Sampling	Theoretical.	Statistical.

¹ Baker, Sarah Elsie and Edwards, Rosalind (2012), p. 8.

As a rough guideline, by far most qualitative studies will use a sample size between one (a case study) and a hundred, with longitudinal, comparative or multi-country studies being most likely to exceed that number. Yet "How many interviews are enough?" is a question that is as old as qualitative research itself. The late Harry F. Wolcott (Ph.D. Stanford), a pioneering qualitative researcher who authored several ethnographic texts and also wrote on ethnographic method, answers the question as follows:


That is, of course, a perennial question if not a great one. The answer, as with all things qualitative, is "it depends." [...] But in general the old rule seems to hold that you keep asking as long as you are getting different answers, and that is a reminder that with our little samples we can't establish frequencies but we should be able to find the RANGE of responses. Whatever the way the question is handled, the best answer is to report fully how it was resolved.²

For this project, data collection continued post the point saturation was reached, and sample sizes on both islands were large by any qualitative sampling standard used.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

Curaçao Research Sample

On Curaçao, in total over 100 people were interviewed, among whom key Government Stakeholders, Dutch military personnel, Coast Guard personnel, CURMIL staff, and members of the local population (including expats living in Curaçao). Respondent residence locations are shown with red dots on the map below.



Audience	Sub-division	Sample Size
Qualitative Interviews with Stakeholders and Experts		9
Qualitative Interviews with Military Personnel	CZSK Marns	3
	CZSK Vloot	4
	KMAR	4
	Army (CLAS)	6
	Coast Guard	6
	CURMIL	6
Qualitative Interviews with ex-Military Personnel living on Curaçao		2
Qualitative Interviews with civilians working at Parera		9
Qualitative Population Interviews: General Awareness Interviews	14	57
Qualitative Population Interviews: Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews	43	
TOTAL		106
Additional quantitative quick poll (confirmatory and for illustration purposes)		53

More information about the research sample for Curaçao can be found in Appendices A and B.

Aruba Research Sample

On Aruba, 80 people were interviewed, among whom Dutch military personnel, Coast Guard personnel, members of the ARUMIL, stakeholders within the Aruban government and a cross-section of the population with a geographical sample split to ensure an inclusive sample. Interview locations are shown with red dots on the map below.



Audience	Sub-division	Sample Size
Qualitative Interviews with Military Personnel	CZSK Mams	16
	CZSK Vloot	6
	KMAR	1
	Army (CLAS)	3
	Coast Guard	4
	ARUMIL	7
Qualitative Interviews with ex-Military Personnel living on Aruba		4
Qualitative Interviews with civilians working at Savaneta		3
Qualitative Population Interviews: General Awareness Interviews		12
Qualitative Population Interviews: Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews		24
TOTAL		80

More information about the research sample for Aruba can be found in Appendices A and B.

3.11 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

Research Objectives

The overarching objectives for this research were very clear, and in principle the concepts used in their formulation (such as support ('draagvlak' in Dutch) were relatively easy to define in terms of behavioural indicators. That said, the understanding of the concept of support for the military differed between stakeholders, as did the perception of the existence of a 'problem space' in its entirety: some stakeholders believed there was a lack of support for military on both islands that constituted a problem for Dutch Defence, and other stakeholders did not believe there was a problem. In formulating the research questions, multiple views were taken into account, which strengthened the research. Simultaneously however, the difficulty in pinpointing measurable problematic attitudes and behaviours meant that the research was set up to be quite broad in scope and allow for multiple explorations of the meaning of 'support for the military.'

Access

Research for this project took place in a permissive and peaceful environment with relatively easy access to the majority of the local population on both islands. On Curaçao, the least accessible group were the residents (notably the poorer (and predominantly younger) locals) of neighbourhoods that are considered criminal or otherwise unsafe. The research team secured some access at the later stages of the research through a trusted source, and hence aside from the access that was denied by CZMCARIB (media and politically engaged locals) the research on Curaçao was conducted with a fairly inclusive sample of the local population.

Time

An important strength of this project, the timeframe was lenient and fully allowed for the iterative nature of this kind of research.

Research team size and composition

The size of the research team for Curaçao was good, perhaps even large for the scale of the project. The size of the research team in Aruba was sufficient for the scale of the project. Both teams had a trained Audience Analyst (trained in BDI methodology) and experienced interviewers (engagement and ETaC trained).

Language

Most of the locals on both islands speak two to four languages with some proficiency, amongst which are Dutch and English. The research team could therefore conduct interviews without translators with the majority of the local population. It would have enhanced efficiency somewhat to have a locally sourced temporary team member who is proficient in Papiamento to assist each of the research teams (one on Aruba and one on Curaçao).

Permissions

An important limitation at the initial stage of the fieldwork on Curaçao was that the project team was only granted permission to interview military staff inside marine bases Parera and Suffisant. The core reasons for this were the sensitivities related to the upcoming elections (September 30th 2016), and unfamiliarity with a new form of audience research. CZMCARIB subsequently granted the team permission to conduct informal interviews with the local population (unstructured interviews without mentioning Defence as the Client) in the first week of August. During the second week of August the team was given full permission to conducting depth-interviews with local population. Permission was not granted to conduct interviews with political figures, the Curaçao police, the VKC (Vrijwilligers Korps Curaçao), and the media. As such, the formal and informal power and influence structures within these organisations and their support for military presence on the island (as key influencers) were not investigated. Their influence on public opinion was of course researched as part of the interviews with the general population.

SECTION 4. KEY OVERARCHING FINDINGS

4.01 KEY OVERARCHING FINDINGS: CURAÇAO

Likely public reactions to (the request for) additional Dutch military assistance by the Curaçao Government depend on six factors:

1. Public knowledge of (the role of) the military on Curaçao (how many are stationed on the island, what their core tasks are and what other roles they fulfill)
2. Frequency and types of interactions between the Dutch military and the local population
3. Current perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the military (and by proxy the Dutch in general)
4. The reason for (the request for) additional Dutch military assistance by the Curaçao Government (and notably the public perception of the necessity of military expansion)
5. The 'word-of-mouth' as well as media explanations / coverage of (the request for) additional Dutch military assistance on Curaçao
6. The reactions of opinion leaders and other 'credible sources' to (the request for) additional Dutch military assistance on Curaçao

FACTOR 1: PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF (THE ROLE OF) THE MILITARY ON CURAÇAO

Finding: Public knowledge of the tasks of the Dutch military on Curaçao is very limited, as is knowledge of the military bases on the island.

When asked what they know about the Dutch Military, many respondents profess they do not know anything about the role of defence or the tasks of the Dutch military on the island. Tasks most frequently mentioned by those who knew a bit more about the military were defence in case of a war, anti drugs operations, and training. A few respondents also mention social projects that the military have been involved with, such as school projects, building roofs, and more generally 'helping people.'

Interviewer: "What do you know about the Dutch military on Curaçao?"

Respondent: "They ensure there is a bit of stability in the region. For example so Venezuela doesn't suddenly invade Curaçao. Counter drugs operations, or for example the crisis assistance to Haiti. When I was still in school I went to one of the Open Days and received a lot of information."

(P39, Male, 34, Dutch (Curaçao))

Most people also do not know the difference in responsibilities between the different security partners: i.e. the police, coast guard, military (and its sub-divisions), fire department, security service (Veiligheidsdienst Curaçao) and the local disaster management agency (Rampenbureau).

Interviewer: "What do you know about the Dutch military on Curaçao?"

Respondent: "They [military] are here because we are part of the Kingdom. Defence of the island. I don't know exactly what their job entails, where it becomes a matter for the local police or the criminal investigation department (recherche)."

(P34, Male, 24, Dutch (Curaçao))


Further to the qualitative findings, people were asked in a quick poll (n=53) if they could indicate which on a list of tasks are the responsibilities of the military on Curaçao.

Whilst a representative sample is likely to present a slightly different overall distribution, the table overleaf illustrates the general point that people attribute responsibilities to the Dutch military that they do not have, and are ignorant of some of their actual tasks.

Task	Percentage of people who believe this task is the responsibility of the military on Curaçao	Task of the military on Curaçao
Assist in case of natural disaster	92.5%	Yes
Defend Curaçao in a war	86.8%	Yes
Conduct training	49.1%	No
Assist other islands in the Kingdom	62.3%	Yes
Train the Fire Brigade	11.3%	No
Train the Police	11.3%	No
Train the Coast Guard	47.2%	No
Train the Curaçao Militia	75.5%	Yes
Assist the Fire Brigade	7.5%	Yes, if requested
Assist the Police	26.4%	Yes, if requested
Assist the Coast Guard	62.3%	Yes, if requested
Assist the Curaçao Militia	79.2	Yes, if requested

The Curaçao population also knows very little about the military bases themselves. Only a handful of respondents mentioned the existence of Suffisant, and whilst the majority of interviewees know of the existence of marine base Parera, they don't know how many people are stationed there and what they do on a daily basis.

A quick poll of 53 people was asked how many Dutch military they thought work on marine base Parera, and how certain they were about their response. Whilst close to 70% of respondents answered close to the true number of military staff (500), 76% of those people also said their answer was a 'complete guess'. In total, 83% of respondents guessed their answer, and only 2 people of the total sample answered they were absolutely certain they were right (one respondent answered 'below 500' and the other '500-750').



This finding indicates that in all likelihood, should the military expand its personnel base on Parera without stating a reason and without drawing media attention to the fact, most people would not even be aware there was an increase in military staff on the island.

Finding: The local population on Curaçao does not actively seek information about the military.

The knowledge people have has been obtained predominantly through newspapers, word-of-mouth, the Open Day, and occasionally through social media. Many people on Curaçao have predominantly favourable attitudes towards military presence, but are not particularly motivated to seek further information.

"They are at Parera, they had an Open Day (it was advertised in the newspaper), I went there, it was fun, there is a lot to see and you can ask questions, I looked at guns with my son."

(P5, Female, 34, Dutch (Curaçao), a)

FACTOR 2: FREQUENCY AND TYPES OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE DUTCH MILITARY AND THE LOCAL POPULATION

Finding: Interactions between the Dutch Military and the local population are sparse.

The majority of Dutch military personnel based on Curaçao report that they have few interactions with members of the local population in a professional capacity. Where they do interact, it tends to be relatively superficial in nature.

On a social level, interactions between the Dutch military and the local population are also very limited. Most military personnel prefer to spend their free time in the more 'touristic' restaurants, beaches, and bars on the island, which are less frequented by the local population. The vast majority of military personnel, even those who have lived on the island for years, profess they do not have 'local friends', only acquaintances.

There are two important consequences of the lack of interactions between the Dutch military and the local population. The first consequence is that stereotypes of the 'other' as a group are amplified. Whilst the majority of Dutch Military based on Curaçao perceive their interactions with members of the local population as neutral or positive, there are some (mostly anecdotal) stories of tensions. Dutch military reports of clashes between the local population and themselves are mainly about real or imagined discrimination, or grievances related to perceptions of 'efficiency' (such as lack of discipline and timeliness on the part of the local population) and violations of 'good manners'. Interaction breeds understanding, and in the absence of interaction both the local population and military personnel interpret each other's actions through the lens of existing stereotypes about the 'group' rather than on an individual basis. Second, a lack of interaction is linked to a lack of visibility and understanding of the role and tasks of the Dutch military on the island. Currently, the local population does not have much knowledge of the role of the military, and therefore their conclusions about what the military does are predominantly based on what they can see.

"If I see them, I see busses driving past. I assume they are training."

(P24, Female, 25, Dutch (Curaçao), b)

A lack of interaction and limited visibility impacts support for the military where the population concludes that the military do not contribute very much on Curaçao. In the quick poll this was further explored by asking people to read two statements and choose the one they believe to be most right:

Quick Poll question 8: You will now read two statements at a time, A and B. Please choose the one you believe is most right	Percentage of quick poll respondents who choose statement A and B
A: Most people think the military don't do much for Curaçao	49%
B: Most people think the military work hard and do a good job	51%

At the same time that many people believe the military don't do much for Curaçao (indicating the need for information about their tasks), the majority would like the military to be more visible:

Quick Poll question 8: You will now read two statements at a time, A and B. Please choose the one you believe is most right	Percentage of quick poll respondents who choose statement A and B
A: Most people want the military to be more visible	89%
B: Most people don't really care about the military	11%

Finding: Increased visibility and interaction with the local population can lead to an increase in support for the military, but only if their 'contribution' and tasks are clarified first and foremost.

A very important consideration in increasing visibility is that – if done in the short term – it must be linked to the core tasks of the military; visibility for the sake of visibility, for example in the form of more training on the island, social patrols, etc. has the potential to backfire by confirming existing beliefs of those who believe that the military don't do much for the country.

FACTOR 3: CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF, AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS, THE MILITARY (AND THE DUTCH IN GENERAL)

Finding: The perceptions of (Dutch) military on Curaçao are predominantly positive

The local population on Curaçao have a positive perception of, and attitude towards, the Dutch military. Currently the perception that the military hosts exercises prevails, and most see clear 'further tasks' for the military, such as training the police and assisting them in fighting crime, countering the influx of illegal immigrants, assisting the coast guard in general, and conduct social projects.

Finding: Support for the military on Curaçao exists in principle, but needs to be 'solidified' because it is often based on weakly held attitudes that the military is 'important', without a strong factual foundation or a deep unified understanding why the military is important.

To the question "What is your overall opinion of the Dutch military on Curaçao", around half of the interviewees respond that they don't really know or that they don't have an opinion, and some others simply state that "It is good that they are here" or that the military have a good name and are respected. Predominantly those respondents who know some of the tasks that the military perform are able to qualify their statement. A handful of respondents mention illegal immigrants or the crisis in Venezuela when they consider their opinion of the Dutch military, and in all of these cases the perception of a threat or problem positively contributes to support for the military.

Quick Poll question 8: You will now read two statements at a time, A and B. Please choose the one you believe is most right	Percentage of quick poll respondents who choose statement A and B
A: Most people think that Curaçao doesn't need a military	9.5%
B: Most people think the military is important and necessary	90.5%

Finding: Dutch military personnel are not aware enough of the cultural differences between Curaçao and the Netherlands.

Military personnel stationed on Curaçao are challenged with cultural differences in relation to daily operations, engaging stakeholders as well as in their private lives. Specifically, a difference in time orientation (future-orientation in Dutch culture and present-orientation in Curaçao culture) and different cultural definitions of what it means to be respectful can lead to misunderstandings that are relatively easy to avoid.

FACTOR 4: THE REASON FOR (THE REQUEST FOR) ADDITIONAL DUTCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY THE CURAÇAO GOVERNMENT (AND NOTABLY THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE NECESSITY OF MILITARY EXPANSION)

Garnering support for an increase in military personnel on the island needs to be based on a public perception of necessity. From a population perspective, the influx of illegal immigrants as a result of the crisis in Venezuela poses a real threat, and if the military were to expand to assist the local government in combatting this problem, the population will support this fully. If the military were to expand without providing any reason, this would also not necessarily be a problem, unless it becomes an issue of interference. This risk is quite low, however it is best to increase military staff based on a communicated and 'accepted' reason.

FACTOR 5: THE 'WORD-OF-MOUTH' AS WELL AS MEDIA EXPLANATIONS / COVERAGE OF (THE REQUEST FOR) ADDITIONAL DUTCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON CURAÇAO

Finding: Press releases from Dutch Defence on Curaçao are received and read only by some.

When respondents are asked if they have ever seen any communication from the Dutch military on television, in the newspaper, or online, many profess they have never seen any Defence communications in the local media. Some mention having read about the conducting of excercises in Amigoe or online, and others recall commercials surrounding Kingsday or the Open Day. Successes in intercepting drugs being smuggled to the island, and information about the arrival of a new ship were also mentioned by a few respondents.

Finding: Word-of-mouth is one of the most important communication channels on Curaçao

News that is considered worth sharing travels very fast on Curaçao. 'Factual' information, when shared, will be accompanied by an opinion, and once a story is 'out there', it tends to stick, whether it is true or not. Communication to the local population needs to be designed to be simple to understand, and mitigate any 'conclusions' that might be drawn by the local population. A good example is the coverage of three coast guard employees that were arrested in 2015 on suspicion of drugsmuggling. The local population has since concluded, "the coast guard is corrupt," which is now an established local opinion that will be very difficult to change.

Finding: Journalism is an 'amateur' profession on Curaçao

Critical thinking skills are overall lacking within the Curaçao population, and journalism is no exception. Fact-checking is not necessarily common practice, and this presents both an opportunity and a risk. The opportunity is obvious:

"We give press releases to all newspapers and radiostations, in both Dutch and Papiamento. Everything we give is printed word-for-word. Research journalism does not exist."

(Interview EI2, [REDACTED])

The risk, of course, is that any 'credible' source can potentially publish information to the detriment of the military or defence (which has happened in the past, too), and the best way to mitigate this is to ensure the information that the military wishes the population to understand has been communicated, and is repeated.

FACTOR 6: THE REACTIONS OF OPINION LEADERS AND OTHER 'CREDIBLE SOURCES' TO (THE REQUEST FOR) ADDITIONAL DUTCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON CURAÇAO

Initiatives or campaigns that make people feel they have a role in affecting change, that provide appropriate incentives to do so and that use charismatic public figures to set an example as stimulus are very likely to succeed. If someone actively wishes to influence public opinion about the military in a negative way, there is a very fertile ground to spread any information, true or false, and this constitutes by far the biggest risk to public support for the military on Curaçao.

4.02 KEY OVERARCHING FINDINGS: ARUBA

Likely public reactions to (the request for) additional Dutch military assistance by the Aruba Government depend on five factors:

7. General knowledge of (the role of) the military on Aruba (how many marines are stationed on the island, what their core tasks are and what other roles they might fulfill)
8. Interactions between the Marines or other Dutch military and the local population
9. Current perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the military (and by proxy the Dutch in general)
10. Current perceptions on the security situation on Aruba in relation to illegal immigration
11. 'Word-of-mouth' as well as media explanations / coverage of (the request for) additional Dutch military assistance on Aruba

FACTOR 1: GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF (THE ROLE OF) THE MILITARY ON ARUBA

Finding: Public knowledge of the tasks of Defence / the Dutch military on Aruba is very limited

Other than the Open Day and occasional exposure during on-island exercises, the local public knowledge of the Dutch military stationed on Aruba is very limited. There is no knowledge of the number of military personnel stationed on Aruba, nor is there knowledge on the exact role of the military on the island. All knowledge and perceptions seem to be based on historical data such as an occasional exercise or anecdote. Most of the anecdotes are related to historical events such as a carnival parade, ceremonial duty during opening of the Parliament or children having fun at the Open Day. When asked what the role of the military should be, answers differ. Some respondents relate this role to security in general, others limit this to support for the Coast Guard. In general there is a lack of clear distinction by the respondents between the Dutch military, ARUMIL, police, coastguard, fire department and disaster management.

Finding: The local Aruban population does not actively seek information on Dutch military

At this time the population does not actively seek information on the military (both Dutch military and ARUMIL). There seems to be no need or relevance for them to do so, other than to find out on what day the Open Day is held. Most people want information on the Open Day because it will cause major traffic jams around the road leading to Marinebase Savaneta. Most Arubans, however, look forward to the Open Day because it is a nice daytrip for kids and because the Open Day is a yearly event. The Church service around Christmas is also one of the events that the base is known for.

FACTOR 2: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE MARINES OR OTHER DUTCH MILITARY AND THE LOCAL POPULATION

"In the past I used to see them [marines] running or marching, but nowadays I do not see them anymore. Are there still some stationed at the base or not?"

(APF10, Female, 47, Dutch (Aruba))

Finding: Dutch military on Aruba hardly interact with local population

Dutch military stationed on Aruba rarely interact with Arubans on a social level. Some may join a sportsclub but most interactions do not exceed formal contacts or supermarket visits. Dutch military personnel seek out each other's company or other Dutch expats living on the island. The lack of interaction and information on the military in general creates anecdotes that shape perceptions, some of which are negative. An example is anecdotes about a marine causing an accident because of drunk driving. The drunk driving was not a cause for concern per se when discussing this anecdote. Arubans indicate that drunk driving is a general issue on Aruba and marines cannot be blamed for displaying behaviour that all Arubans display as well. The cause of concern was a sense of class justice; the population believe that marines can do whatever they want without legal consequences because there is no line of communication about the consequences a marine faces after such events. Another example is the perception that there is hardly any military personnel stationed at the base. In the past the exposure of military personnel at sports

clubs or during carnival was higher. Because this exposure has decreased, the perception is that there are also less marines on the base.

"Nowadays children growing up in Aruba do not get the values that we used to get in our upbringing. They do not have a figure that they can look up to. They think guns are cool and only care about themselves. They do not realize the dangerous consequences guns can have. You [military] might be able to teach them that guns are not cool and that people need to look after each other."

(APF1, Female, 43, Dutch (Aruba),

z)

Finding: Arubans feel that the Dutch military could contribute more than they currently do

The local population has a clear opinion of what possible roles might be for the Dutch military besides an obvious military role. This opinion on is based mainly on the direct relation to the decreased sense of safety (factor 4). Many Arubans indicate that the marines could play a significant role in education of young people on Aruba. Their reputation as disciplined, group orientated and taking responsibility resonates well with a large part of the Arubans that were interviewed. These Arubans therefore believe they could contribute to educating youth on these core values. The lack of role models in Aruban society in combination with the sense of decreased security supports this opinion.

FACTOR 3: CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF, AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS, THE MILITARY (AND BY PROXY THE DUTCH IN GENERAL)

Finding: There is a pro Dutch sentiment on Aruba

Arubans feel a strong connection to the Netherlands. There are more Dutch flags on houses in Aruba than there are in the Netherlands. When Arubans discuss their independence (Status Aparte) they refer to that independence as independence from Curaçao, and not the Netherlands. Many Arubans feel they have ties with the Netherlands and genuinely feel part of the Kingdom. Dutch Marines are part of that Kingdom and simply welcomed as such. There is a clear distinction between the Netherlands and Dutch politics however. Trust in politics in general is very low. Arubans stress the difference between Dutch in general and Dutch politicians. With the latter being welcomed but with careful reservations.

"I look up to the Marines that come here to work. They have a lot of experience in the military that I would like to have as well. I am a Dutch soldier too you know, just like you. I would really like to be send on deployments as well but I know I cannot. That is frustrating."

(AMA22, Male, 21, Dutch (Aruba),

z)

Finding: The perceptions of (Dutch) military on Aruba are positive

Arubans have a positive perception and attitude towards the military in general, and Dutch military in particular. The role of the military should reach further than providing security as a concept. Currently the perception that the military hosts exercises prevails. The reason for these exercises ranges from events related to natural disasters to counter drugs operations to support the Coast Guard. Some feel that the military could protect Aruba in case of Venezuelan threats. But what this entails exactly remains an opinion based on guesses rather than factual information.

FACTOR 4: CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE SECURITY SITUATION ON ARUBA IN RELATION TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Finding: Illegal immigrants are blamed for the deterioration of the security situation on Aruba.

Arubans link the increase in illegal immigration, from all regions in South America with Venezuelan and Colombians in particular, to the currently deteriorating security situation. The local police is considered corrupt and ineffective. Arubans notice an increase in armed robberies but also youth carrying arms. Youth resorting to criminal behaviour is a growing concern for the average Aruban. A large number of Arubans mention the reach of the coastal radar as a problem. It seems to be local common knowledge that certain areas in Aruba are out of reach of the coastal radar so illegal immigrants can land on beaches such as Baby Beach on the North tip of the island with relative ease. Because the local police force is understaffed they are not able to do nightly patrols. The perception at this point is that the slow but steady increase in illegal immigration will take its toll in the near future.

Finding: There is a widespread belief that local culture is disappearing because of illegal immigration

Local Aruban culture is mainly based upon language. Speaking Papiamento in combination with love for the island is what makes an Aruban. Because Aruba is, and always has been, a multicultural society most people speak at least four languages. Most of the illegal immigrants do not speak Papiamento. As a result more Papiamento speaking residents on the island will start to use Spanish and English as their language of choice. English because of the tourism industry and Spanish because of (illegal) South American immigrants. The fact that the use Papiamento seems to decrease causes a sense of threat to many Arubans. They fear their entire culture will disappear with it. Many Arubans welcome foreigners to the island, as tourists but also to live on the island. Arubans are proud of their own tolerance and acceptance of foreigners, but many fear that this tolerance has its limits.

Finding: The public perception of local security forces is that they are ineffective

Most Arubans feel that their security forces are ineffective. This is especially true of the police force which has a reputation of being late, ineffective, corrupt and severely understaffed. Most Arubans are not aware that the ARUMIL exists. They think that the ARUMIL is the same as the Sociaal Vormings Traject (SVT); a reintegration program for troubled youth. The role of the Dutch military in relation to the security situation is also unclear to many. It is based mainly on assumptions that the military will probably be there if anything happens. The disaster management department of the Aruban government has a reputation of being late in response and ill prepared. The reputation of the Coast Guard is good apart from the issues with the reach of the coastal radar system.

FACTOR 5: WORD OF MOUTH AS WELL AS MEDIA EXPLANATIONS AND/OR COVERAGE OF DUTCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON ARUBA

Finding: The Dutch military is hardly ever covered in local media

There seems to be a lack of common expression on behalf of the Dutch military in Aruba; expression of the corporate vision as well as sharing values and principles into unified action. With the exception of a few interviewees, no Aruban could remember or mention a single recent story about the Dutch military as well as ARUMIL on the island. Anecdotes about the Open Day or a marine that helped out during a flash flood were singular events that were mentioned but general stories or information of any kind were not known. The fact that the Aruban government has requested help in planning for possible shelter related to the crisis in Venezuela was not known. Actions on behalf of the Dutch military (words, imagery and deeds) are insufficiently integrated to achieve a desired effect in the Information Environment in Aruba.

Finding: Word of mouth is the most effective method of communication on Aruba

Although Aruba has a wide range of (traditional) media outlets, word of mouth is the most used and effective method of communication in combination with Whatsapp (groups). Messages that are spread through word of mouth always come across as reliable and spread fast. The downside to this is that once a story is spread it is very difficult to prove a story wrong. An example is a recent case of pedophilia that was covered in all newspapers and was the talk of town. Stories were blown out of proportion but when confronted with facts about the case people were not open to changing their opinion about the case. The same goes for stories such as the class justice story about the drunk driving marine. Once a story is out, control over the story is lost and Arubans will not be likely to change opinions about it. The lack of motivations to check facts is the underlying problem.

Finding: Journalism in general is considered sensational or politically tinted

Traditional media outlets such as newspapers or TV are considered biased for several reasons. Politics is the first. Because of the two party political system on Aruba, a newspaper can be in favour of either one of the two parties. News coverage on different local matters will also be covered as such. This is also true for certain TV stations. Especially election time is a time where a paper can write whatever they decide to influence election choices. Arubans know this and also take this into account when reading stories or tune into certain stations. There are a few radio stations that are considered neutral. The second reason is sensation. If a story is not sensational it will not be printed on a front page. Arubans know this but do enjoy a sensational story. Interesting to note is that most of the international news stories are on the last pages of the newspaper. News in general is mainly locally oriented.

SECTION 5. AUDIENCE PROFILES (BDI PARAMETER FINDINGS)

An understanding of the (social) context and the psychosocial and socio-dynamic characteristics of a group or audience whose behaviour a campaign is intended to change is vital for the success of that campaign. These findings may appear unrelated to the research question(s), the problem behaviours and the ultimate project objectives, however they are key to finding the right triggers for attitude and behaviour change: campaigns or communication cannot go against a cultural value system for example, or it will be ridiculed or ignored at best, and at worst have unintended consequences, backfire, or otherwise meet resistance from intended recipients.

5.01 HISTORIC CONTEXT

A full understanding of general anti-Dutch sentiments among the local Curaçao population – and the ways in which this might influence attitudes towards the Dutch military - requires an understanding of the historic context between the two countries and cultures, and the link between anti-Dutch sentiment and the island's slave past.

In an interview with two village elders (*wijkoudsten*) in Otrabanda, Curaçao, they explained that the reason why some locals bring up the slave past is not just political but also because people did not bring across nor have accepted African culture and therefore emulate Dutch culture and the relations as they existed during slavery.

"If you don't know your own culture, you take someone else's."

(Interview GA14, Two Males, Dutch (CUR), aged 65+, [REDACTED])

According to the village elders, "I am a slave" is ingrained in the way the population thinks, and looking up to 'de Sjon' (the boss) is still a habit for many. Though some of the youth are trying to escape this way of thinking, a lack of 'coloured leadership' is considered a barrier. Local leaders that do exist (Wiels for example) are very aggressive in the way they express themselves, and not everyone identifies with them. An inferiority complex and a fixation on physical appearance are logical results according to the village elders.

The most palpable tensions between Dutch people and the local population that arose in interviews are issues of discrimination. Inextricably linked to the slave past, discrimination is perceived as a problem both by the local population and the Dutch military. Some interviewees - from within both groups – have experienced discrimination, and many others know stories or anecdotes from others.

It is important to understand however that there is a tendency to describe many real or imagined injustices or negative experiences as 'discrimination', whilst analysis of actual occurrences shows many of these experiences are due to cultural differences. In addition there is a tendency on the part of some of the local population to adopt a 'victim' role.

Discrimination, both real and imagined, is a problem that requires not only increased awareness and understanding by all groups involved, but more positive examples of the *absence* of discrimination, such as local role models and positive accounts of good working relations and friendships between local population and the Dutch military.

On Aruba, the slave past hardly has any impact on current perceptions of the Dutch. The most important historic event in their collective memory is their 'Status Aparte' from Curaçao:

Respondent: "It is important for you to realise that we are Dutch too and proud to be Dutch as well. We are a part of the Kingdom just like Holland. We are not a colony, we have our own government and a Dutch passport. People should know that. But what is even more important is that when we got the "Status Aparte" it was independence from Curaçao, not from the Kingdom."

Interviewer: "Why is this important for us to know?"

Respondent: "Because that is our history. We are an independent country within the Kingdom and in no way similar to Curaçao."

(Interview APF11, Male, Aruban, aged 52, [REDACTED])

5.02 CURRENT BEHAVIOUR

The current behaviour of a target audience encompasses that audience's existing practices and actions, including those that a strategic communication campaign is intended and designed to alter. Current behaviour helps in identifying a highly influential Target Audience. Various culturally bound behaviours may affect the reception of a message. Understanding current behaviours can provide a potential entry-point to understanding a specific Non-Desirable Behaviour, and may in turn suggest the means to change it, and how to generate messages (in culturally meaningful terms) that persuade people to change it.

Dutch military personnel on both islands, who live off base, state that they see their neighbours on occasion and are friendly with them, but that they are not friends. In general Dutch military personnel do not interact with the local population on a social basis much, such as participation on local sports events and having local friends.

Another relevant factor related to current behaviour is the fact that very few members of the local population actively seek information (critically and analytically) about anything, including the military, and base their opinions on what little information or facts they have. As an example, the following respondent from Curaçao, who knew of the existence of marine base Parera, was asked what the Dutch marines do, and how he knew this:

Respondent: "I know they are the heavy boys, they are more than a military man. The marines are deployed for specific missions, like finding Osama Bin Laden as a specific target. Those I call the marines."

Interviewer: "How do you know this?"

Respondent: "By playing games, by watching films, by reading."

Interviewer: "And what do you read for example?"

Respondent: "I read the definition of the marines on the internet."

(P23, Male, 28, Surinamer, [REDACTED])

The local populations on both islands tend to live by the day (also see Time Orientation 5.08) and often seek excuses for inaction.

Both populations are practical, and many are short-term thinkers. The downside of this practical outlook on life is that people can 'be for sale'. This can result in buying votes in elections for example, but is also an important factor in relation to disaster management: Neither of the populations are prepared in case of an emergency. People do not stock up on supplies or prepare when there is an upcoming shortage of fuel.

5.03 IDENTITY

Cultural identity is part of an individual or group's self-conception and self-perception and is mostly related to nationality, ethnicity, religion, social class, generation locality or any kind of social group that has its own distinct culture.

There is a very strong sense of a *Yu di Kòrsou* (child of Curaçao) identity on the island. However, there is no shared definition what it means to be a local. The same goes for Aruba. Language has become a key part of local identity, partly through a lack of other shared characteristics. In other words, speaking Papiamento is an important part of being 'from' Curaçao or Aruba.

During a focus group held at the University of Aruba the participants could not agree on a definition of Aruban culture further than love for the island and speaking Papiamento. National Holidays and foods were based upon too many foreign influences to be considered 'local'. The group was surprised and somewhat disappointed when they realised that the definition of identity might actually be very subjective to context and personal circumstances.

Also on Curaçao, there is no single definition of a 'local' Dutch person. Locals themselves are more likely to think about definitions in terms of speaking Papiamento, having been born on the island, and 'knowing the country' whilst the Dutch Military are more likely to see race as a defining factor.

Respondent: "Being an Aruban means love for the island and speaking Papiamento."

Interviewer: "So does that mean if I speak Papiamento and love Aruba and have only lived here 6 months that I am an Aruban?"

Respondent: "No that is not possible."

Interviewer: "Why not?"

Respondent: "I do not really know why not, but being Aruban means a lot more I just have difficulty to explain what more this could be. I am not sure if you have to be born on the island because I was not born here either. My parents were though, so I guess that makes me more Aruban too."

(Interview APF21, Female, Aruban, aged 32, [REDACTED])

5.04 VALUES

Values are strong, semi-permanent, abstract and sometimes implicit dispositions held by a group or society. Despite being non-material, they exert a powerful effect on behaviour. Through understanding a group's value structure, it is possible to identify what is important to the target audience, and what levers to pull to create change. They may conjure powerful emotional responses. If an influence campaign is associated with positive emotions it is more likely to succeed, while if it is associated with negative values (or contradicts positive values) it is likely to be rejected.

The Dutch Military is quite homogenous as a group, with an easily discernible value system:

Health and overall happiness	Material possessions	Respect	Absence of worries	(Education)
Core Values (Good health increases happiness).	Material possessions are perceived as important in their own right (increase happiness), but predominantly as a means to look after family and a means to achieve a worry-free existence.	Respect for others and for the environment is important, and mainly defined as 'having good manners'.	Absence of worries (perceived to increase happiness).	Education is subservient to other values, but important as it is perceived to lead to greater material possessions and related to respect.

The value system of the Aruban and Curaçao populations differs somewhat for the different population groups that live on the islands, however the following are overall core values that must be considered:

Health and Happiness	Respect	Humility	One-upmanship	(Education)
Core Values (Good health increases happiness).	Respect is one of the most important values in both Curaçao and Aruban societies. Respect for elders, for oneself, being polite (not raising one's voice), having a respectful physical appearance, and treating others like you would like to be treated. Children can enhance one's respect as a mother, if they are seen as well-mannered, polite and respectful (well-raised).	It is important to appreciate what you have, and not chase wealth. Helping the poor / underprivileged is considered one of the most important good deeds.	Perhaps seemingly contradictory to the consciously held value of humility is the one-upmanship that shines through in many actions and beliefs on both islands. Especially on Curaçao, people compete with each other and are jealous of each other when it comes to their successes.	Education is a value in-and-of itself, but predominantly seen as a way to 'raise children well', instill good manners and respect. I.e. it is not regarded first and foremost as the 'gateway' to a career and money (though this is important too).

"Someone is a good person when they have a good attitude, are polite and show respect. When you stick to your promises you are also a good person. Do not say yes and act no. Reliability is very important."

(APF16, Male, 22, Aruban, [REDACTED])

5.05 MOTIVATIONS AND REWARD STRUCTURES

Motivations are driving forces that initiate, direct, intensify, and maintain a specific behaviour. The Motivations underpinning a particular behaviour are often numerous and diverse, both in nature and intensity. When studying motivations, the Behavioural Dynamics Methodology distinguishes between intrinsic motivations (called Motivations in this study) and extrinsic motivations (called Reward structures in the Behavioural Dynamics Methodology).

Taking advantage of an audience's Motivations is an essential contributor to the success of an influence campaign in two ways. First, it facilitates the process of the selection of the most suitable audience(s) according to the campaign's objective. Second, a deep comprehension of a group's Motivations helps determine the most efficient path to influencing an audience, and persuade its members to take action and alter their behaviour. It may permit a campaign, for instance, which frames a desired behaviour (on the part of the problem owner) as a waypoint in achieving key Motivations. Studying Motivations moreover allows the identification of suitable incentives that might be offered for engaging in a desired behaviour.

Reward Structures are systems through which rewards (financial and non-financial) motivate people towards a particular course of action or influence preference for one of a number of choices. Rewards and punishments are effective ways of providing external justification for actions.

Rewards may be used to gain compliance or to adjust attitudes, depending on the size of a reward or severity of a punishment. Studying the current systems of reward structures surrounding behaviour can determine the appropriateness of a proposed reward, or help to 'out-bid' those offering rewards for competing behaviours.

A reward structure that is prevalent on both islands is respect, from family as well as peer group respect.

5.06 ASPIRATIONS

Aspirations are usually used to refer to educational ambitions but it can also be used to refer to more general life ambitions such as building a career, starting a family or live in a certain area. Low aspirations might also indicate low ambition.

The research showed low aspirations on both islands (especially among the lesser educated locals), while both populations have a high propensity for change. This seems contradicting, but can be in part explained by low expectancy, strong feelings of victimization, a lack of role models, and a (perceived) lack of opportunity.

5.07 EXPECTANCY

Expectancy is a group's confidence that its efforts will produce a certain level of performance.

Essential to understanding behaviour is understanding people's expectations and how this affects their ability to be influenced. Adjusting the expected likelihood of certain events can encourage people to take certain actions, while expected rewards and costs are also key elements. Commitment is vital in understanding how groups move through the various stages of behaviour change.

Expectancy theory assumes that people act in accord with choices among expected outcomes. They assign probabilities to three factors: expectancy (as above), instrumentality (the group's confidence that its performance will produce particular outcomes) and valence (the value the group assigns to those specific outcomes). A measure of a group's confidence in its performance is important in determining if a group might choose to act.

Expectancy is relatively low on Curaçao and Aruba, meaning people do not typically link their own behaviour to positive or altered outcomes. As a result, people feel that they have low influence to change their circumstances, as there is little/no perceived benefit in doing so. Exceptions are situations where results are immediate, such as payment for a task, or visible in the short term. When designing communications for the island populations, it is important to take into account that people will only take action if there is a visible benefit in the short term. For example, a campaign asking people to save for a pension because it will help them in the future will not work with this audience no matter how well it is designed.