Competitive Markets for Personal Data

Simone Galperti
UCSD

Tianhao Liu
Columbia

Jacopo Perego
Columbia

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Motivation

Consumers supply crucial input for modern economy: their **personal data**

Yet, they often have **limited control** over who uses it and are **imperfectly compensated** in return

- Expropriation and barter, common practice in the industry (FTC '15)

This status quo may be source of market failures (Seim et al. '22)

Could a competitive market for data avoid these problems?

This Paper

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2. Propose three alternative **solutions**

- Data taxes; a data union; an making data markets more complete

model

A Stylized Data Economy

One merchant, one platform, a unit mass of consumers

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The **merchant** wants to sell products to consumers (zero MC)

Each **consumer** has unit demand for product and WTP $\omega \in \Omega$ (finite)

Consumer's WTP distributed as $\bar{q} \in \Delta(\Omega)$

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Two periods: 1. Data records are traded, 2. Data records are used

Period 1: Data Trade

Platform and consumers trade the data records in a **competitive market**

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Supply Side:

If type-ω consumer sells her record, she is paid price $p(\omega)$

If consumer does not sell, she forgoes price and platform's "service" and obtains reservation utility $r(\omega)$

Period 2: Data Use

Given acquired database $q \in \mathbb{R}_+^{\Omega}$, platform acts as **information designer**:

- It sends merchant signal about each consumer in database
- Given signal, merchant charges each consumer a personal fee a
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The **payoffs** in period 2 are:

Consumer's:	$u(a, \omega) =$ surplus
Merchant's:	$\pi(a, \omega) =$ profits
Platform's:	$v(a, \omega) = \gamma_u \; u(a, \omega) + \gamma_\pi \; \pi(a, \omega)$

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I.e., Platform chooses recommendation mechanism $x : \Omega \to \Delta(A)$ to solve

$$V(q) = \max_{x:\Omega\to\Delta(A)} \sum_{\omega,a} v(a,\omega)x(a|\omega)q(\omega)$$
$$\text{s.t. } \forall a, a' \colon \sum_{\omega} \Big(\pi(a,\omega) - \pi(a',\omega)\Big)x(a|\omega)q(\omega) \geq 0 \qquad (\mathcal{P}_q)$$

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Definition

A profile (p^*, ζ^*, q^*, x^*)

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(c). Given p^* and x^*, ζ^* solves consumers' problem, i.e.,

$$\zeta^*(\omega) \in \arg\max_{z \in [0,1]} z\Big(p^*(\omega) + \sum_a x^*(a|\omega) u(a,\omega)\Big) + (1-z) r(\omega)$$

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(d). Markets clear, i.e. $\quad q^*(\omega) = \zeta^*(\omega)\bar{q}(\omega) \qquad \forall \omega$

analysis

Efficiency Benchmark

Do equilibria "efficiently" allocate data records between consumers and platform?

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Definition

An outcome (q°, x°) is **constrained efficient** if it solves

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{q,x} \quad & W(q, x) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & q \leq \bar{q} \text{ and } x \text{ solves platform's ID problem given } q \end{aligned}$$

Main Result

Question: Are equilibrium outcomes constrained efficient?

Eqm efficiency depends on how platform uses data, thus on its objective

Recall: $v(a,\omega) = \gamma_u \; u(a,\omega) + \gamma_\pi \; \pi(a,\omega)$

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Proposition

- If $\gamma_u < \gamma_\pi$, equilibria are constrained efficient and thus consumers' welfare is maximal
- If $\gamma_u \geq \gamma_\pi$, equilibria can be inefficient (and consumers' welfare can be as low as $R = \sum_\omega r(\omega)\bar{q}(\omega)$)

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Equilibrium maximizes consumers welfare when platform cares more about merchant's payoff $\rightsquigarrow$ **Why?**

Intuition for Inefficiency

- When $\gamma_u \geq \gamma_\pi$, platform withholds some information from merchant
- How? Platform pools consumers of different types
- Composition of a pool determines merchant's belief, thus his fee
- If a consumer does not sell her data, she affects pool composition and, thus, other consumers' payoff
- Consumers exert **externality** on each other (Relation to GLP '23)

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In the Paper

The paper contains many more results:

- Existence
- An iff characterization of eqm efficiency
- Extension to "social" welfare
- An illustrative example

remedies

Remedies

How to fix this market failure?

We explore three alternative market designs:

1. Introducing **data taxes**
2. Introducing **data unions**
3. Making data markets more **complete**

data taxes

Data Taxes

Introduce a simple **data tax** on consumers:

- When selling her record, consumer pays tax / receive subsidy $t(\omega) \in \mathbb{R}$

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Data Taxes

Proposition

Fix any constrained-efficient outcome (q^*, x^*).

There exists an equilibrium of the competitive economy (p^*, ζ^*, q^*, x^*) and taxes

$$t^*(\omega) := \sum_a u(a, \omega) x^*(a|\omega) + p^*(\omega) - \psi_{q^*}(\omega) \qquad \forall \omega$$

supporting the constrained-efficient outcome. Thus, consumer welfare is maximized, regardless of platform's preferences.

Moreover, the budget is balanced.

Idea: with data tax, consumers internalize **social** benefit of selling their data

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Proposition

Equilibria of the data-union economy are constrained efficient and maximize consumers' welfare, regardless of platform's incentives

more-complete markets

Lindahl Economy

We allow consumers to trade **the way** their records are used by platform

More-complete markets:

- There is a market where type-ω records can be sold for "intended use a"
- The price of ω-records, $p(a, \omega)$, can now depend on how it is used

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Equilibria of the Lindahl economy are (**unconstrained**) efficient and maximize consumers' welfare, regardless of platform's incentives

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(p^*, ζ^*, q^*, x^*) is an equilibrium of the **monopsonist economy** if it solves

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{(p,\zeta,q,x)} \quad & V(q) - \sum_{\omega} p(\omega) q(\omega) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \text{conditions } (b), (c), (d) \text{ satisfied} \end{aligned}$$

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Remark

In a monopsony equilibrium, outcomes are constrained-efficient (and vice versa). Moreover, platform's payoff is maximal, while consumers' welfare is minimal

conclusion

Summary

1. A stylized framework to study competitive markets for personal data

   Rooted in GE tradition but leveraging recent progress in info-design literature

2. Emphasize a novel market failure

   Platform's role as an information intermediary enables an externality that leads to inefficiencies

3. We propose three alternative market designs that fix inefficiency: data taxes, data unions, more-complete data markets