

# A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THIS REPOSITORY

## > IMPORTANT NOTE:

The paper used both capital 'M' ( $M+1$  = number of rates) and lowercase 'm' (number of channels the jammer can sweep simultaneously). I am using lower case 'm' for the former (# rates) and lowercase 'n' for the latter.

## analysis.py

intended to replicate figures presented in the paper

→ runs `optimize_game` from `optimize.py`

returns

↙ `model.py`

`model`: Model of the game containing parameters, transition matrices, etc.

`f`: optimal transmit strategy

`y`: optimal jammer strategy

→ runs many simulations to determine average performance

↙ `simulation.py`

## optimize.py

\* `optimize_game` (function): Finds the Nash equilibrium (NE) for a set of parameters and returns the strategies & game model

→ runs `find_equilibrium`

→ uses `scipy.optimize.minimize` to find the minimum of objective-function

$$\sum_x V_1(x) + V_2(x)$$

AKA `memfunc.get(0, ...)`  
↙ best-transmitter-value

↖ best-jammer-value

→ AKA `memfunc.get(1, ...)`

“memfunc”  
↑  
NOTE class Memory Functions is used to save computation time

GOAL: minimize Egn. (22) AKA objective-function

best-transmitter-value AKA memfunc-get(0, ...)

$$V_1(x) \uparrow = \max_{\vec{y}} ( \overset{A \times S}{R(x)} \overset{S \times 1}{\vec{y}} + \delta \overset{A \times S}{T(x, V_1)} \overset{S \times 1}{\vec{y}} )$$

$\begin{matrix} \uparrow & \leftarrow S \rightarrow \\ A & \begin{bmatrix} \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \end{bmatrix} \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ & (1) & \end{matrix}$

Let  $A$  be the size of the action space of the transmitter, ( $A = 2(M+1)$ ), and  $S$  be the size of the strategy of the jammer ( $S = M+1$ ).

$R(x)$  AKA model.reward-matrices  $[x]$

get-reward-matrix( $x$ )  
(MODEL.PY)

$$= \begin{bmatrix} r(x, a_0, p_{j_0}) & \dots & r(x, a_0, p_{j_m}) \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ r(x, a_{2m+1}, p_{j_0}) & \dots & r(x, a_{2m+1}, p_{j_m}) \end{bmatrix}$$

where  $r(x, a, p)$

AKA transmitter-rewards  
get-immediate-transmitter-reward  
(MODEL.PY)

$$= \sum_{x'} U(\cdot, a_1, a_2, x') P(x' | x, a_1, a_2)$$

$U(\cdot, a_1, a_2, x')$

AKA transmitter-payoffs  
get-immediate-transmitter-payoffs  
(MODEL.PY)

$P(x' | x, a_1, a_2)$

AKA transition-probabilities  
get-transition-probabilities  
(MODEL.PY)

= Equation 8

= Egn. 9, 11, and 12

best-jammer-value AKA memfunc-get(1, ...)

$$V_2(x) \uparrow = \max_{\vec{f}} ( - \overset{1 \times A}{f(x)} \overset{A \times S}{R(x)} + \delta \overset{1 \times A}{f(x)} \overset{A \times S}{T(x, V_2)} )$$