



Smart contracts security assessment

Final report

[Tariff: Top](#)

Tonpound Lending

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Introduction

The report has been prepared for **Tonpound Lending**.

The code is available in Github repo [tonpound/tonpound-lending-smart-contracts](#) and was audited after the commit [d8f0988](#).

The Tonpound lending is a fork of Compound protocol. Only changes made to commit [a303a325](#) were audited.

Update. Recheck was done after the commit [f96dfc2](#).

Name	Tonpound Lending
Audit date	2023-03-22 - 2023-03-31
Language	Solidity
Platform	Ethereum

Contracts checked

Name	Address
CToken	
TonpoundPriceOracle	
WhitePaperInterestRateModel	
Unitroller	
Reservoir	
Maximillion	
BaseJumpRateModelV2	
CDaiDelegate	
CErc20	
CErc20Delegate	
CErc20Delegator	

CErc20Immutable
CEther
CTokenInterfaces
Comptroller
ComptrollerStorage
CpTonDelegate
DAInterestRateModelV3
ErrorReporter
ExponentialNoError
InterestRateModel
JumpRateModel
JumpRateModelV2

Procedure

We perform our audit according to the following procedure:

Automated analysis

- Scanning the project's smart contracts with several publicly available automated Solidity analysis tools
- Manual verification (reject or confirm) all the issues found by the tools

Manual audit

- Manually analyze smart contracts for security vulnerabilities
- Smart contracts' logic check

Known vulnerabilities checked

Title	Check result
<u>Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain</u>	passed
<u>Code With No Effects</u>	passed
<u>Message call with hardcoded gas amount</u>	passed
<u>Typographical Error</u>	passed
<u>DoS With Block Gas Limit</u>	passed
<u>Presence of unused variables</u>	passed
<u>Incorrect Inheritance Order</u>	passed
<u>Requirement Violation</u>	passed
<u>Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes</u>	passed
<u>Shadowing State Variables</u>	passed
<u>Incorrect Constructor Name</u>	passed
<u>Block values as a proxy for time</u>	passed
<u>Authorization through tx.origin</u>	passed
<u>DoS with Failed Call</u>	passed
<u>Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee</u>	passed
<u>Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions</u>	passed
<u>Assert Violation</u>	passed
<u>State Variable Default Visibility</u>	passed
<u>Reentrancy</u>	passed
<u>Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction</u>	passed
<u>Unprotected Ether Withdrawal</u>	passed
<u>Unchecked Call Return Value</u>	passed

<u>Floating Pragma</u>	passed
<u>Outdated Compiler Version</u>	passed
<u>Integer Overflow and Underflow</u>	passed
<u>Function Default Visibility</u>	passed

🛡️ Classification of issue severity

High severity	High severity issues can cause a significant or full loss of funds, change of contract ownership, major interference with contract logic. Such issues require immediate attention.
Medium severity	Medium severity issues do not pose an immediate risk, but can be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited. Medium severity issues may lead to a contract failure and can be fixed by modifying the contract state or redeployment. Such issues require attention.
Low severity	Low severity issues do not cause significant destruction to the contract's functionality. Such issues are recommended to be taken into consideration.

🛡️ Issues

High severity issues

No issues were found

Medium severity issues

1. Wrong authorization check (CToken)

Status: Fixed

The changes made to the Compound protocol include that the protocol rewards should go to a Treasury contract. To claim rewards the Treasury should have rights to claim rewards, but the rewards can be claimed only by the admin.

```
function _reduceReservesFresh(uint reduceAmount) internal returns (uint) {
    // totalReserves - reduceAmount
    uint totalReservesNew;

    // Check caller is admin
    if (msg.sender != admin) {
        revert ReduceReservesAdminCheck();
    }
    ...
}
```

Recommendation: Change the authorization check to be callable only by the Treasury.

Low severity issues

1. Use fallback price from pair (TonpoundPriceOracle)

Status: Fixed

If price from Chainlink oracle is not fresh, a price from pair TWAP can be used as a fallback.

Recommendation: Implement fallback price for getting price from the Chainlink oracles.

Conclusion

Tonpound Lending CToken, TonpoundPriceOracle, WhitePaperInterestRateModel, Unitroller, Reservoir, Maximillion, BaseJumpRateModelV2, CDaiDelegate, CErc20, CErc20Delegate, CErc20Delegator, CErc20Immutable, CEther, CTokenInterfaces, Comptroller, ComptrollerStorage, CpTonDelegate, DAIInterestRateModelV3, ErrorReporter, ExponentialNoError, InterestRateModel, JumpRateModel, JumpRateModelV2 contracts were audited. 1 medium, 1 low severity issues were found.

1 medium, 1 low severity issues have been fixed in the update.

The Tonpound is a fork of Compound protocol. Only changes to the original code were audited.

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