Nation-Building Through Military Service*

Juan Pedro Ronconi† Diego Ramos-Toro‡

April 28, 2023

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Abstract

This paper studies conscription's role in durably shaping attitudes and beliefs consistent with nation-building. We pair original survey data covering 29 cohorts of conscripts in Argentina with random variation in service emerging from a lottery. We find that serving in the military leads to a stronger national identity and social integration several decades after serving, but does not affect civic behavior such as voting or paying taxes. Leveraging open-ended responses about the values promoted by the military, as well as heterogenous treatment effects based on the type of government under which conscripts served, we show that value inculcation during service helps explain the baseline patterns. Exposure to diverse peers in the military reinforces but does not explain these results, while other channels such as conflict exposure or labor market outcomes do not serve as mediating channels.

JEL Codes: D91, H56, J15, P16, Z1

*This research benefited from comments by Rob Blair, Jesse Bruhn, Pedro Dal Bó, Andrew Foster, John Friedman, Oded Galor, Toru Kitagawa, Brian Knight, Rafael La Porta, Stelios Michalopoulos, Jonathan Roth, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Jonathan Zinman, and audiences at Brown, ASREC 2023 (Harvard), ASREC Europe 2022 (Notre Dame, London), NEUDC 2022 (Yale), Ridge 2022 (Los Andes, Colombia), VEAEBES, PhD-EVS, and AAEP. We are also grateful to the personnel of the Argentine Army's Historical Archive for their collaboration. We received IRB approval from Dartmouth College in January 2022 (STUDY00032419). We pre-registered our analyses on the AEA RCT Registry in February 2022 (AEARCTR-0008950) and in August 2022 (AEARCTR-0009914). Ronconi acknowledges support from the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.

†Brown University; juan_pedro_ronconi@brown.edu

‡Dartmouth College; diego.ramos-toro@dartmouth.edu

1 Introduction

Modern states commonly leverage conscription to ensure a permanent, professionally trained army. Indeed, 80% of countries implemented some form of conscription during the first half of the 20th century, and 35% still conscript soldiers today (The Economist, 2021). Recruiting, maintaining, and training these conscripts likely contributed to the historical consolidation of national states, given the fiscal infrastructure required to fund those operations effectively (Tilly, 1990). An issue that remains empirically underexplored is whether compulsory military service has contributed to the consolidation of national states by promoting national pride and social cohesiveness.

This paper evaluates whether conscription durably shapes beliefs and attitudes conducive to and consistent with nation-building. We identify causal effects by leveraging a policy in Argentina that, throughout the 20th century, mandated military service based on a lottery. The lottery generated random variation in service within birth cohorts, allowing us to address endogenous selection into the military. This historical experiment enables an assessment of conscription's role in promoting long-lasting beliefs and attitudes related to nation-building among those who served.

In February and August 2022, we conducted two online surveys of 3,086 Argentinian men born between 1944 and 1975. Participants provided their demographic characteristics and those of their ancestors, then answered questions designed to capture different dimensions of national values, civic values, and social preferences. We combine this information with administrative data showing results from the military draft lottery, which lets us determine if the respondent was called to serve when his cohort was subjected to the lottery.

We document a large and statistically significant effect of conscription on a National Values index (+0.23 standard deviations), which combines two questions on national pride and attachment to the nation. In contrast, we find a small and statistically insignificant effect on a Civic Values index, which combines voting behavior, views on tax evasion, and views on taking the law into one's own hands to punish criminals. These results suggest that conscription durably fosters national attachment without altering civic attitudes.

The long-run effects of compulsory military service on national values reflect a durable mark on national cohesion and social integration. Specifically, conscription increases by 16% the number of Argentinians to whom participants feel similar "in what is most important," indicating less perceived social distance from fellow nationals. Moreover, conscription reduces the likelihood of respondents feeling uncomfortable with neighbors belonging to different outgroups. Crucially, serving in the military increases the diversity of individuals' social

networks even decades after serving: It increases the odds of having a close acquaintance from a different province, makes it more likely for individuals from a low socioeconomic (SE) background to be friends with someone of high-SE status, and increases the likelihood that non-Catholics are close friends with Catholics. All in all, these results suggest that compulsory military service durably fosters attitudes and beliefs that are consistent with and conducive to cohesive nations.

We explore the mechanisms behind these results using several complementary approaches. First, we ask all participants to describe, in their own words, the main lessons that they think are effectively transmitted by the Argentine military to conscripts. Leveraging natural language processing techniques, we find that national values and social integration were frequently mentioned in the answers, and military veterans are more likely to mention these topics. Moreover, serving increases the frequency with which participants discuss these values with their acquaintances. These results suggest that national affiliation and social integration were actively instilled in the military, and that narrative repetition enacted through frequent conversations about these topics may help sustain these behaviors in the long run.

Second, we elicit data about exposure to outgroups during conscription, asking former conscripts which province they served in and to what extent they interacted with soldiers from backgrounds different from theirs. We show that the positive baseline effects are stronger for, though not driven by, those who had more contact with diverse peers during military service. Crucially, conscription's effect on national values remains highly significant among individuals who were not exposed to a diverse set of peers during service. All in all, contact with outgroups is not the main driver behind the effect of compulsory military service on nation-building, although these interactions do seem to reinforce a shared national identity among conscripts.

An analysis of heterogeneous experiences across cohorts offers further insight into the mechanisms at work. In line with the argument that value inculcation in the military is a key mechanism, we find that conscripts adopt the ideology of the government under which they serve. Specifically, serving under a military government leads to relatively worse civic values, serving under a protectionist government leads to a stronger preference for regulation, and serving under a pro-market government leads to a stronger dislike for regulation. As for other potential mechanisms, we show that our results are not driven by wartime service, suggesting that experiences of conflict do not explain the baseline patterns. If anything, in fact, war exposure undermines the baseline patterns. Likewise, the data do not support other plausible mechanisms that have been studied in the literature, such as educational achievement, occupational choice, family formation, or religiosity.

Our paper speaks to several strands of literature. First, it complements previous studies of nation-building in different contexts (Bazzi et al., 2019; Depetris-Chauvin, Durante and Campante, 2020; Blanc and Kubo, 2021; Rohner and Zhuravskaya, 2023). Our paper shows that conscription, which has been prevalent across time and geographical space, durably fosters a shared (national) identity and higher social integration. Relatedly, our paper contributes to the literature on policies that foster civic values (Bandiera et al., 2019; Bove, Di Leo and Giani, 2022). We show that conscription durably fosters cohesiveness but has no effect on other dimensions of civic values and civic engagement. This suggests that policies that foster national affiliation and cohesion may be distinct from those that promote desirable civic behavior.

We also contribute to the robust literature examining how military service affects short-term and long-term individual outcomes (Angrist, 1990; Angrist, Chen and Song, 2011; Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky, 2011; Greenberg et al., 2020), especially outcomes related to beliefs and attitudes (Dahl, Kotsadam and Rooth, 2021; Cagé et al., 2021; Ertola Navajas et al., 2022). Our paper shows that conscription promotes better attitudes toward outgroups who are part of the nation. Moreover, we examine how conscription's effects vary depending on the type of government under which conscripts serve, and we assess differences between wartime and peacetime conscription, two important yet underexplored dimensions of heterogeneity. We also provide suggestive evidence that value inculcation is an important channel through which conscription affects veterans' attitudes and beliefs in the long run.

The paper also contributes to recent research on how intergroup interaction may promote integration and cooperation (Mousa, 2020; Lowe, 2021; Cáceres-Delpiano et al., 2021; Bagues and Roth, 2022; Okunogbe, 2018). In particular, Cáceres-Delpiano et al. (2021) and Bagues and Roth (2022) leverage the random assignment of men serving in the military to different regions in Spain; they find that, among conscripts from regions that feature weak national identity, assignment to a different region fosters national affiliation. We extend this finding to show that conscription itself fosters national affiliation, relative to respondents who were not conscripted. Importantly, our results indicate that intergroup interactions within the military —including cross-regional interactions, but also those across other cleavages— reinforce but do not explain the baseline patterns. Hence, although intergroup contact in the military may explain why some conscripts develop a stronger national attachment than others, our results show that those who serve are more likely to hold stronger national values than those who don't serve, and that these effects do not depend necessarily on intergroup interaction.

Finally, our paper contributes to the set of papers that study the impact of narratives on beliefs and behavior (Shiller, 2017; Bénabou, Falk and Tirole, 2020; Michalopoulos and Xue,

2021), particularly in terms of how specific experiences may foster motivated reasoning and self-persuasion (Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2007; Huffman, Raymond and Shvets, 2019; Schwardmann, Tripodi and Van der Weele, 2022). We show that, relative to those who did not serve, conscripted men are more likely to talk about the military and the values they learned in it (especially national values and social integration), suggesting that narrative repetition, motivated reasoning, and self-persuasion may be mechanisms that help sustain the effect of past events on views and attitudes.

Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the historical background of conscription in Argentina. Section 3 presents our empirical approach, discussing how we collected data and showing that our sample is balanced and not prone to sample-selection issues. Section 4 discusses the baseline results, Section 5 examines the mechanisms, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Background

This section provides an overview of conscription in Argentina and describes the lottery system that determined who was required to serve. On December 6, 1901, the Argentine Congress passed Law 4031, which established compulsory military service for Argentine men during the year they turned 21 (lowered to age 19 in 1977). The first cohort served in 1902 and the last one in 1994, when conscription abruptly came to an end after the death of a conscript. Since 1994, only volunteers have served in the Argentine armed forces.

The share of conscripts from each cohort varied from year to year at the discretion of the authorities, depending on budgetary and strategic considerations. Crucially, a lottery determined who was required to serve from within each cohort, which took place around April of the year in which the cohort turned 20. The lottery, which was broadcast on national radio and television, assigned a number between 1 and 1000 to each combination of the last 3 digits of the national ID number (which is between 7 and 8 digits long). At the beginning of the following year, authorities would determine a cutoff number, such that all individuals with a lottery number above the cutoff would be required to serve (individuals below the cutoff were exempted from service). Lottery numbers also determined which branch the individual was assigned to: conscripts in the first subset of numbers above the cutoff were sent to the Army, the next-highest subset went to the Air Force, and the remaining subset (with the highest numbers) was sent to the Navy.

Around six months after the lottery, all men in the cohort had to take a health exam-

ination, which would determine if they were "fit to serve." This was an important source of non-compliance with the lottery outcome and allowed for strategic behavior among those who were called to serve.[1] Argentinians from all regions and backgrounds ended up serving, which provided fertile ground for intergroup interactions. In our sample, 38% of conscripts served in a different province, 41% had no parents with a high school degree, and 13% had at least one parent with a college degree.

The typical experience involved a full year of service, including one to three months of basic military training. After that, conscripts would be assigned to a military unit where they would do various tasks—a mix of unskilled labor (such as painting, cooking, or cleaning) and skilled labor (such as repairing trucks or building bridges). After discharge, they were not expected to serve again unless there was a national emergency. While most conscripts would serve in a military unit within their home province, many were assigned to units outside of it.

Conscripts frequently engaged in activities that promoted different values, especially discipline, respect for authority, patriotism, camaraderie, and cooperation. A few examples of such activities involved marching, a daily salute of the flag, and working in teams on different tasks. There was also time for leisure and socialization, such as playing sports. Finally, anecdotal evidence indicates that some events were especially meaningful, such as participating in a military parade in a nearby city or pledging allegiance to the national flag.

During the period we consider (1965–1994) there were two military governments: one from 1967 to 1973 and another from 1976 to 1983. Thus, half of the cohorts in our sample served under a military government. Moreover, although the vast majority served during peacetime, there were also two major conflicts, one internal and one external, implying that some cohorts were exposed to the risk of being sent to combat. In 1975 and early 1976, the "*Operativo Independencia*" took place, where the armed forces fought internal guerrillas inside Argentina's borders. Anecdotal and journalistic evidence indicates that a minority of conscripts were exposed to combat. Cohorts incorporated at that time were those born in 1953 and 1954. In 1982, Argentina fought the United Kingdom in the Malvinas/Falklands conflict. Cohorts born in 1962 and 1963 were serving when it took place. Administrative data indicates that 5.8% of conscripts were mobilized to Malvinas and that 0.1% were killed.

There are three cohorts that we drop from the analysis because they lacked variability in lottery outcomes: cohort 1955 was required to serve virtually in full (it was up for service in 1976 when the military coup took place) and cohorts 1956 and 1957 were exempted from

[1]The other source of non-compliance was volunteers who, unlike drop-outs, represented a small share of the population.

service, as in 1977 the age of incorporation was reduced by two years.

3 Empirical Approach

The analysis relies on data from two surveys that we designed and implemented, as well as administrative data on the military draft. We leverage these data to estimate two-stage least-squares (2SLS) models, which allow us to deal with selection into military service.

3.1 Data

We collected data on the characteristics, beliefs, and attitudes of 3,086 Argentine men born between 1944 and 1975 (excluding 1955-1957, as explained in Section 2), through two rounds of online surveys that we designed and distributed in February and August of 2022.[2] Because some questions were only included in one of the two rounds, we can classify outcomes into three groups: those present in both rounds, for which we have 3,086 observations; those present only in the first round (1,994 observations); and those present only in the second round (2,058 observations).

In both rounds we obtained personal characteristics, including year of birth, province of residence at age 16, educational achievement, occupational and civic status, religiosity, and socioeconomic background information (parents' education and country of origin, as well as number of immigrant grandparents). We also asked for the last 3 digits of the respondent's national ID, a key component to determine whether the individual was called to serve.[3] Table A1 in the Appendix presents summary statistics on the main sample.

We build standardized indices to measure National Values and Civic Values. The National Values index is based on two questions capturing national pride ("*How proud are you of being Argentinian?*") and attachment to the nation ("*How much do you agree with the*

[2]The surveys were distributed by Netquest, a panel provider company specializing in Latin America and frequently used in the social sciences. They recruit respondents and give them tokens for each survey they complete, which later can be exchanged for prizes. Importantly, the invitation to participate did not make reference to conscription—only that this was a study about "social and political perspectives." Participants had to pass a set of attention checks to be considered for the final sample. In the second round we collected responses from a mix of new respondents (1,092) and, due to sample size limitations of the panel provider, recontacts from the first round (966).

[3]In Argentina people are used to providing the last 3 digits of their national IDs, which are between 7 and 8 digits long, so identity is not at risk of being revealed. For example, this is standard practice when participating in a raffle. In Figure A1 in the Appendix, we show that there is no clear bunching in the distribution of IDs, which would have implied untruthful reporting and provides reassuring evidence that the data is of good quality.

following statement? 'Despite the problems it may have, Argentina is the best country to have been born in.'".) The Civic Values index is based on three questions measuring voting behavior ("*How often do you go to vote?*"), along with attitudes toward tax evasion ("*How justifiable is it to evade taxes?*") and taking the law into one's own hands to punish criminals ("*To what extent do you approve of people taking the law into their own hands when the State doesn't punish criminals?*").[4]

We analyze social integration with three complementary sets of questions. First, we introduce a novel question measuring perceived social distance from other Argentinians (Shayo, 2009), which reflects the strength of internal cleavages. The question asks: "*Out of 10 Argentinians, how many would you say are similar to you in the most important things?*" (henceforth, 'similarity'). We interpret higher numbers as reflecting a smaller perceived social distance toward that group of Argentinians, and thus being more socially integrated. Second, we measure respondents' attitudes toward outgroups from within the country, by asking whether they would *not* like to have members of different groups as neighbors. We build indicator variables for each group that the respondent does not want as neighbors, including people who are indigenous, low SES, of another sexual orientation, and of another religion. Third, we document the size and composition of respondents' social networks. These outcomes involve costly behavior by the respondents and reflect their degree of social integration: "*With how many people that you know would you be willing to discuss personal problems?*" and "*Out of the [X] persons you mentioned in the previous question, how many belong to each of the following groups? Former conscripts; from another province; college graduates; practicing Catholics.*"

We also include several additional questions to test for possible mechanisms. Crucially, we introduce an open-ended question asking respondents to describe in their own words the main values that were transmitted through conscription in Argentina: "*Some people think that compulsory military service instilled a set of values and lessons to those who served, while others do not think that was the case. In your opinion, what values or lessons were transmitted to conscripts, and how? If you think there was actually no transmission of values or lessons, please say so and explain why you think that is the case.*" We also ask respondents how often they talk about this topic with close acquaintances and relatives.

We rely on administrative data for the results of the conscription lottery in every year covered by our sample. We obtain it from two sources: a dataset made available from

[4] All questions allow for a 4-item Likert scale answer. We build indicator variables for choosing the highest or the highest two items and obtain the indices based on them, following Anderson (2008). In all variables, higher values indicate stronger national or civic values.

previous work by Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky (2011) and our own archival work in the Argentine Army's Historical Archives. From Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky (2011) we obtain lottery number assignments for all cohorts and cutoff numbers for every year until 1984. From 1985 onward, cutoff numbers varied across military districts, which are not included in their data.[5] Thus, we obtain the district-varying cutoff numbers from the Argentine Army's Historical Archive for every year between 1985 and 1994.

3.2 Methods

We are interested in estimating the causal impact of conscription on a set of outcomes. The challenge we need to overcome is that individuals who serve are not similar to individuals who do not serve in terms of ex-ante characteristics—that is, there is selection into the military. We deal with this by exploiting the conscription lottery, which provides an exogenous source of variation for military service —an instrument— and allows the estimation of two-stage least-squares (2SLS) models (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996).

We estimate 2SLS models of the following form:

$$served_i = \alpha highnumber_i + \mu^{fs}_{c(i)} + \delta^{fs}_{d(i)} + \Gamma' X_i + \nu_i \tag{1}$$

$$y_i = \beta served_i + \mu_{c(i)} + \delta_{d(i)} + \Theta' X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{2}$$

Where equation (1) corresponds to the first stage and equation (2) to the second stage of the 2SLS model; y_i is an outcome of interest, $served_i$ is an indicator for having served in the military, $highnumber_i$ is an indicator for having a lottery number that is above the cutoff that determined who was called to serve, $\mu^{fs}_{c(i)}$ and $\mu_{c(i)}$ are vectors of cohort fixed effects, and $\delta^{fs}_{d(i)}$ and $\delta_{d(i)}$ are vectors of district fixed effects.[6] X_i is a set of additional controls

[5] Military districts were aligned with provinces for the most part. The province of Buenos Aires included the districts of Bahía Blanca, Junín, La Plata, San Martín, and Tandil; the province of Córdoba included Córdoba and Río Cuarto; and the province of Santa Fe included Rosario and Santa Fe. The military district of Santa Cruz included the provinces of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego (0.5% of our sample corresponds to this district). Note also that in 1976 and 1984, cutoff numbers varied slightly across the five Army corps, which were very large divisions that cut through provinces. The range was 24 in 1976 and 72 in 1984.

[6] Since cutoff numbers could vary across military districts starting in 1985, one could also include fixed effects at the district-cohort level for those years. However, many of these fixed effects would be singletons, and there are no substantive differences in the lottery numbers across districts within each cohort. The largest districts used cutoff numbers that were not far apart from each other — Province of Buenos Aires, City of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Mendoza (where 69% of the population resided in 1991 according to the census) display mean and median ranges of 232 and 224 throughout the 1985-1994 period.

to improve precision. These include a set of individual characteristics determined before the lottery: indicators for having a father who served in the military, for the educational levels of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. When the outcome was measured in both survey rounds, we also control for a survey-round indicator.[7]

The coefficient of interest, β, is an estimate for the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), which captures the average treatment effect on the population of 'compliers': the set of individuals who only serve if they are required to do so.[8] Table A2 in the Appendix provides a characterization of compliers and how they compare to the full sample in terms of background characteristics. The only sizable difference is that compliers are less likely to have at least one parent who finished high school or college. This is consistent with compliers coming from more disadvantaged backgrounds.

Finally, we cluster standard errors at the last 3 digits of the ID-times-cohort level throughout the paper, as this is the level at which treatment was assigned (Abadie et al., 2022).

We attempt to falsify the validity of our design in several ways. First, we run a balance test using covariates determined before the lottery. Table 1 reports the coefficients and clustered standard errors of regressing the instrument ($highnumber_i$) on different subsets of covariates, controlling for cohort and district fixed effects. We find no evidence that these ex-ante characteristics can predict the instrument. In particular, the F-statistic for joint significance in the last column is 0.75 (p=0.66).

Second, we test for differential selection into the sample by instrument status. If we observed that the frequency of individuals with high lottery number was different in our sample compared to the general population, we would be concerned that the lottery outcome affected the probability of participating in the survey, which would imply that high- and low-number individuals are not comparable in our sample. Table A3 in the Appendix shows that the share of individuals in our sample who received a high lottery number is similar to the population share. This implies that having been called to serve does not affect the likelihood of answering our survey, which is consistent with the instrument being randomly allocated within our sample as well.

Nevertheless, we replicate all main analyses in Appendix B and show that our results are largely unchanged.

[7] We also observe the country of origin of the parents, but we don't use it since it is highly correlated with the number of immigrant grandparents, which is a more informative variable overall.

[8] Not every conscript was a complier, as there could be volunteers or individuals who would have served later in life but were forced to do so earlier by the lottery. Thus, even though we refer to 'conscripts' throughout the paper, it should be kept in mind that the effects we estimate are only identified from conscripts that were also compliers.

Table 1: Balance test

	High-number				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Father served in military	-0.019				-0.019
	(0.017)				(0.017)
Father: Secondary educ.		-0.015			-0.016
		(0.019)			(0.020)
Father: Higher educ.		-0.022			-0.033
		(0.022)			(0.026)
Mother: Secondary educ.			-0.017		-0.007
			(0.019)		(0.021)
Mother: Higher educ.			0.009		0.025
			(0.024)		(0.028)
One immigrant grandp.				0.003	0.003
				(0.025)	(0.025)
Two immigrant grandp's				0.024	0.024
				(0.023)	(0.023)
Three immigrant grandp's				0.007	0.006
				(0.032)	(0.032)
Four immigrant grandp's				-0.013	-0.016
				(0.024)	(0.024)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Each column regresses the instrument for having served in the military on sets of ex-ante characteristics, controlling for cohort and district fixed effects. The instrument is an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implied being required to serve. The control group is low-number individuals. The F-statistic for joint significance in the last column equals 0.75 (p=0.66). Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

4 Results

This section examines conscription's durable effects on national values, civic values, and social integration. We then turn to other outcomes examined by earlier papers studying the consequences of conscription, as well as other dimensions of behavior that may have been affected by military service.

4.1 National Values and Civic Values

Historians, sociologists, and political scientists have long debated whether conscription, besides providing a stable military force, also helped to promote national integration and produce better citizens (Krebs, 2004). We examine this issue by asking whether serving in the military leads to stronger, long-lasting national values and desirable civic attitudes. The former is measured with a standardized index that collects the questions on "pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in." The latter is measured with a standardized index that collects the questions on voting, tax evasion, and taking the law into one's own hands.

Table 2 starts by showing that the instrument strongly predicts the regressor of interest (Columns 1–2). Including district fixed effects and ex-ante characteristics doesn't affect the size and precision of the coefficient of interest. The effective F-statistics (Olea and Pflueger, 2013) equal 487 and 492, respectively.

Table 2: First stage, National Values, and Civic Values

	Served (First Stage)		National Values Index		Civic Values Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
High-number	0.39***	0.39***				
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
Served			0.24**	0.23**	0.02	0.02
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Eff. F-stat	487	492				
Control mean	0.12	0.12	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Columns 1–2 show estimates for the first stage, including the effective F-statistic by Olea and Pflueger (2013). The instrument is an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of one's national ID), which implies being required to serve. Columns 3–4 show 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the National Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of two questions ("pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in"). Columns 5–6 show 2SLS estimates for the Civic Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of three questions ("(not) justifying evasion," "going to vote," and "(not) taking the law into your own hands"). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Columns 3–4 show that serving in the military has a positive, large, and statistically strong effect on the National Values index: +0.23 standard deviation units (p=0.032) under our preferred specification. On the other hand, Columns 5–6 show that there is an economically and statistically insignificant effect on the Civic Values index.[9] These results provide evidence that conscription contributed to promoting national affiliation in the long run, in line with the fundamental objectives of nation-building (Alesina, Giuliano and Reich, 2021). However, unlike other institutions such as universal education (Bandiera et al., 2019), we find no evidence that conscription shaped civic attitudes. This disconnect implies that allegiance to the nation is not necessarily tied to desirable civic behavior.

4.2 Social integration

Though many studies of nation-building emphasize a strong national identity, possibly an even more important outcome is social integration, given its direct implications for internal conflict and cooperation. We exploit three complementary questions measuring social integration. The first one asks to how many (out of 10) Argentinians the individual feels similar "in the most important things." We interpret this as perceived social distance from other Argentinians (higher values imply lower distance), which has a direct connection to group identity and the strength of social cleavages (Shayo, 2009). The second question captures concrete attitudes toward different groups of people by asking whether the respondent would *not* want them as neighbors. This is a widely used question in the social sciences and is regularly included in public opinion surveys.

Table 3 shows that conscription had positive effects on our first two measures of social integration: perceived social distance ("similarity") and attitudes toward specific outgroups within the country ("neighbors"). Column 1 documents that serving in the military had a positive effect of 0.65 (p=0.04) on the number of people the respondent feels similar to. This represents a 16% increase over the control group mean (low-number individuals), who report feeling similar to around 4 people, on average.

Columns 2–6 present results from regressions with binary dependent variables, which indicate whether the respondent rejects neighbors from different groups. Column 2 shows no significant impact of serving in the military on rejecting people from another religion, which is likely a consequence of the lack of religious diversity during the 20th century in Argentina.[10] On the other hand, Columns 3 and 4 document that serving reduces the

[9] Table A4 in the Appendix shows that these effects are similar across the individual components of each index.

[10] Catholic affiliation in Argentina was 91% in 1970 (Pew Research Center 2014).

likelihood of rejecting indigenous people and people of another sexual orientation. Finally, Columns 5 and 6 show a reduction in rejection of low-SES individuals, which is fully driven by respondents coming from a medium or high socioeconomic background— those with at least one parent who finished high school, who represent 61% of the sample. Finally, Column 7 regresses a standardized index of the previous four outcomes as an aggregate measure of openness toward outgroups from within the country. We find that conscription leads to a highly significant reduction of 0.28 standard deviations on this index.

Table 3: Social Integration: Similarity and Attitudes Toward Neighbors

	Similarity	Neighbors (rejection)					
	(1)	(2) other relig.	(3) indigenous	(4) other sex. orient.	(5) low SES	(6) low SES	(7) Index
Served	0.65**	0.03	-0.06**	-0.09*	-0.04	0.06	-0.28**
	(0.32)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)
Served x HS-grad par.						-0.17**	
						(0.07)	
HS-grad parent						0.12***	
						(0.03)	
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group						-0.12*	
						0.06	
Control mean	4.12	0.07	0.05	0.16	0.17	0.11	0.07
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Column 1 shows the impact on the number of people a respondent feels similar to "in the most important things," out of 10 randomly-chosen Argentinians. Outcomes in Columns 2–6 correspond to indicators for rejecting the type of neighbor described in the column heading. The questions in this table were only asked in the first survey round. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The third measure of social integration involves the size and composition of respondents' social networks. These outcomes allow us to examine whether the effects we have documented so far translate into changes in behavior. Table 4 presents the estimates from regressing network size and composition indicators (*i.e.*, dummy variables for having at least one person from each group) on serving in the military. The first column shows that the size of the network is unaffected by military service. Columns 2 and 3 document that serving tends to increase the probability of having a close acquaintance who also served (+9 p.p.) and who comes from a different province (+10 p.p.), although they are noisily estimated. Columns 4

and 6 present positive baseline effects on being close to a college graduate and to a practising Catholic. However, this masks strong heterogeneous effects: the positive impact is driven by individuals from a low-SES background in the first case, and by non-Catholics in the second case, which is consistent with forming a more diverse social network. In particular, individuals from a low-SES background who served are significantly more likely to be close acquaintances with a high-SES individual (+17 p.p.), and non-Catholics are significantly more likely to be close to a practising Catholic (+22 p.p.).[11] Finally, Column 8 regresses a standardized index of the previous four outcomes as an aggregate measure of social network diversity. We find that conscription leads to a highly significant increase of 0.31 standard deviations on this index.

Table 4: Social Integration: Social networks

	Net. Size	Conscripts	Other prov.	College grad.		Practising Cath.		Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Served	-0.00	0.09	0.10*	0.09	0.17**	0.12**	0.22**	0.31**
	(0.69)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Served x HS-grad par.					-0.14			
					(0.09)			
HS-grad parent					0.15***			
					(0.04)			
Served x Catholic							-0.14	
							(0.10)	
catholic						0.28***	0.33***	
						(0.02)	(0.04)	
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group					0.03		0.08	
					0.07		0.06	
Control mean	4.95	0.44	0.27	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.41	-0.10
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Column 1 regresses the number of individuals a respondent feels comfortable discussing personal issues with (the size of their social network). Columns 2–7 regress indicators for having at least one person in their close social network from the group described in the column heading. The questions in this table were only asked in the first survey round. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Overall, we find that serving in the military leads to the formation of more diverse social

[11] Column 7 may suffer from a "bad control" problem if serving in the military affected religious affiliation. In Table A11 we find no evidence that this is the case.

networks, with former conscripts being more likely to have close relationships with people belonging to different outgroups from within the country. This finding is consistent with better attitudes toward outgroups from within the country and with significant changes in behavior arising from them.

4.3 Other outcomes

We also considered other outcomes relevant to nation-building that could have been affected by conscription. These include trust in other nationalities (Chileans, Paraguayans, Uruguayans, and English),[12] trust in domestic and international institutions (the Church, the Armed Forces, the Supreme Court, and the International Monetary Fund), internal migration, and, for those who are in a relationship, background characteristics of their partners. Table A5 shows that conscription did not significantly affect these outcomes, although the magnitudes of some of the coefficients are non-negligible.

We next turn to outcomes capturing migration and family structure. Table A6 shows that serving in the military did not affect the probability of moving to another province and had a marginally significant effect on moving from larger to smaller localities, or vice versa. Finally, Table A7 shows that former conscripts are not more likely to enter a relationship with people from a different background in terms of province, religion, and socioeconomic status.

Lastly, in Table A8 we also test whether conscription impacted deeply ingrained cultural values, including generalized trust, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and moral universalism. We use experimentally validated measures for all of these dimensions of behavior (Falk et al., 2018; Enke, Rodriguez-Padilla and Zimmermann, 2022), showing that conscription had no effect on them. The last column of Table A8 also shows no impact on beliefs about gender equality (disagreeing with the statement "*When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.*")

5 Mechanisms

In this section we present suggestive evidence on the mechanisms through which conscription may have enduringly shaped national values and social integration. In subsection 5.1, we

[12]Paraguayans are the largest group of immigrants in Argentina. Uruguayans are a culturally and ethnically similar group. Argentina's external conflicts during the 20th century were with Chile (although war never took place) and the United Kingdom (the Malvinas/Falklands war).

start by implementing text analysis tools on an open-ended question, which reveals that these outcomes were directly inculcated during military service. Moreover, we also find that conscripts tend to adopt salient ideological features of the government under which they served. In subsection 5.2, we move on to show how exposure to and interaction with outgroups during conscription is a complementary mechanism that reinforces (but does not fully account for) the baseline patterns. We also explore alternative channels, such as labor market outcomes, family formation, religiosity, and combat exposure, finding no evidence that any of these can explain the baseline effects on nation-building outcomes.

5.1 Inculcation of values

We begin by examining the role of value inculcation during service as an underlying mechanism. To that end, we examine an open-ended question where we asked all respondents to share in their own words the main values or lessons transmitted during conscription in Argentina (see Section 3.1).[13] Open-ended questions have been shown to provide a valuable window into understanding rationales that may be hard to observe in other ways (Ferrario and Stantcheva, 2022). We obtained rich answers in general: the median and mean answers were 15 and 21 words long, respectively.

We implement two complementary approaches to extract information from the answers. First, we estimate a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003), which allows to retrieve in an unsupervised manner the topics that respondents discuss in their answers. Under an LDA, each answer is modeled as a mixture of latent variables (topics), which in turn are probability distributions over words. In particular, words that tend to occur together receive higher weight under a given topic. Second, we also build bags of words related to the concepts we want to analyze, which provides more precise measures of the topics mentioned in the answers.[14]

Figure 1 presents word clouds of the main terms associated with four of the five topics we extract using the LDA.[15] Topic 1, which is the most frequent (22.5% mean prevalence),

[13]This question was asked in the first round only and its order in the survey was randomized, with the objective of priming half of the respondents before they answered questions on national and civic values. We find very small and statistically insignificant effects of the priming treatment.

[14]We also measure sentiment on a positive–negative scale using a model based on Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT), which we use to evaluate whether serving affects how positively individuals feel about conscription. Table A12 shows that we obtain positive, but small and statistically insignificant, effects.

[15]We pre-process texts using the following procedure: we translate them into English using DeepL; remove punctuation and special characters; convert contractions; remove stopwords; tag parts-of-speech (POS) to estimate the model only on nouns; and lemmatize using POS tags to improve accuracy.

(a) Topic 1

(b) Topic 2

(c) Topic 3

(d) Topic 4

Figure 1: Topic word-clouds

Note: The figure shows word clouds obtained from an unsupervised natural language processing technique based on open-ended responses about the type of values that are instilled in the military. Specifically, each word cloud reflects the main terms associated with topics estimated from a 5-topic Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). The open-ended question was only asked in the first survey round. The mean prevalence of each topic is, respectively, 22.5%, 21.4%, 21.4%, and 16.3%. Overall, the figure shows that national values and social integration feature prominently in the responses.

makes reference to national values and social integration, featuring words such as 'homeland,' 'country,' 'comradeship,' and 'companionship.' Topics 2 and 3 (both with 21.4% mean prevalence) focus on traditional military values, including 'respect,' 'obedience,' 'discipline,' and 'order.' Finally, Topic 4 (16.3% average prevalence) captures negative opinions, especially about time-wasting. Subsection 6 of the Appendix presents, for each topic, the four responses where they are most prevalent. Finally, it should be noted that there are virtually no terms that can be related to civic values, which aligns with conscription's insignificant effects on this dimension of behavior.

We also implement a complementary analysis where we specify what we want to measure by building bags of words (word lists) related to different topics.[16] This approach provides

[16]The process of building the bags of words involved two steps. First, each coauthor independently listed terms related to each topic. Second, we classified responses on whether they mentioned each topic or not,

precise measures of the prevalence of each topic, which we use to estimate the impact of serving in the military on the probability of talking about a given topic in the answers. We consider the following topics: 'national values,' 'social integration,' 'civic values,' 'authoritarianism,' 'discipline,' and 'time-wasting.' The list of terms included under each topic can be found in subsection 6 in the Appendix. We consider indicator variables that equal 1 if at least one of the terms is mentioned in an answer, and estimate 2SLS models following the baseline specification in the paper.

Table 5 presents the results, with Columns 1–6 ordered by their mean prevalence in the control group (low-number individuals). Columns 1 and 2 show that 'authoritarianism' and 'discipline' are very prevalent topics: 44% and 35% of responses among low-number individuals mention them, respectively, and this probability is not significantly affected by serving in the military. Columns 3 and 4 show that 20% and 16% of responses mention terms related to 'national values' and 'social integration' in the control group. In this case, serving in the military substantially increases the probability of talking about these topics: +5 p.p. (25%) in the first case, although noisily estimated, and +10 p.p. (76%) in the second case. Column 5 shows that 'time-wasting' follows a similar pattern: 14% of responses in the control group make reference to this topic, which goes up by 5 p.p. (36%) due to serving, although it is also noisily estimated. Finally, the last column documents that 'civic values' is the least prevalent among these topics: 9% of individuals make reference to them, which barely changes with conscription.

Column 7 shows that, despite having no incentives to do so, former conscripts wrote significantly longer answers (+21% number of words). This is in line with former conscripts being more informed of what types of values are transmitted in the military, as well as caring more about the subject. Finally, immediately after the open-ended question we also asked "*how often do you talk about these matters?*," allowing for a 4-item Likert scale that included: never, almost never, occasionally/at most once per year, and frequently/more than once per year. We find that serving in the military significantly increases the probability of saying 'occasionally' or 'frequently" by 17 p.p., which represents a 33% increase over the mean for low-number individuals (Column 8).

Overall, former conscripts are more likely to discuss national values and social integration as lessons that the military instills, they tend to care more about the values transmitted by such institutions (as signaled by the longer answers), and they tend to discuss these issues

and checked, for a random subset of responses, whether the classification was accurate or not. Based on the second step, we included additional terms and modified existing ones to avoid contamination from other terms that share the same root or ending.

more frequently with close acquaintances and relatives. These findings suggest that self-persuasion (i.e., discussing the lessons they learned in a one-year costly experience) and narrative repetition may help explain why the baseline patterns persist for more than 30 years after service.

Table 5: Value inculcation: Bags of words

	Topics						Log-Length	Freq.
	(1) Authorit.	(2) Discip.	(3) National V.	(4) Integration	(5) Time Waste	(6) Civic V.	(7)	(8)
Served	-0.07	-0.00	0.05	0.10**	0.05	0.02	0.21**	0.17***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.06)
Coh. & Dist. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.44	0.35	0.20	0.13	0.14	0.09	2.71	0.52
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes in Columns 1–6 are indicators for mentioning at least one term related to that topic in an open-ended question about what values were inculcated in the military. Column 7 regresses the log of the number of words in the answer to the open-ended question, and Column 8 regresses an indicator for talking "occasionally/at most once per year" or "frequently/more than once per year" about the types of values transmitted in the military. The open-ended question was only asked in the first survey round. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

If former conscripts durably adopt the values instilled during service, then one could expect these conscripts to persistently adopt some of the views of the government under which they served. Table 6 leverages several historical episode in Argentina to examine this possibility. First, in 1983 Argentina's last military government came to an end, giving way to a democratic transition that radically changed the attitude of political leaders with respect to military coups. While before 1983 the armed forces frequently took control of the government by force, it has not happened once since then. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show that there is a strong heterogeneity in the impact of military service on civic values along this line: individuals who served after the democratic transition tend to display significantly higher civic values than those who served before (+0.46 p.p.).

A second historical episode pertains to changes in government with different positions about the regulation and intervention of the economy. In particular, between 1983 and 1989 Raúl Alfonsín's interventionist government took office, while between 1990 and 1994 Carlos Menem's pro-market government did. In line with value inculcation, Columns 3 and 4 show

that conscripts who served under the former administration tend to demand higher regulation today (+0.21 p.p. probability of agreeing with the statement that the government should regulate the economy to guarantee its good functioning), while those who served under the latter demand less regulation (-0.84 p.p.). All in all, conscripts continue to display views and attitudes consistent with the government under which they served, which corroborates the scope of value inculcation as an important mechanism underlying the baseline results.

Table 6: Value inculcation: Transmission of political and economic preferences

	Civic Values		Demand Regulation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Served	0.02	-0.19	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Served x I[post '83]		0.46**		0.23*
		(0.23)		(0.14)
Served x I[post '89]		0.01		-1.05***
		(0.47)		(0.37)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group 1		0.27		0.21*
		0.19		0.11
Coef. int. group 2		0.28		-0.84**
		0.44		0.35
Control mean	-0.05	-0.05	0.52	0.52
Obs.	3086	3086	1972	1972

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. The outcome in Columns 1–2 is the Civic Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of three questions ("(not) justifying evasion," "going to vote," and "(not) taking the law into your own hands"). The outcome in Columns 3–4 is an indicator for agreeing with the statement that "the government should regulate the economy to guarantee its good functioning." Coef. int. group 1 refers to the effect of serving during 1983-1989 (Alfonsin's interventionist government). Coef. int. group 2 refers to the effect of serving during 1990-1994 (Menem's pro-market government). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

5.2 Exposure to outgroups

Studies that have examined intergroup contact in the military have shown that such contact has strengthened the national affiliation of conscripts from regions where such affiliation was weak to begin with (Cáceres-Delpiano et al., 2021; Bagues and Roth, 2022; Okunogbe, 2018). To assess the role of exposure to outgroups as an intervening mechanism behind conscription's causal effect on national affiliation, we elicited data on intergroup contact during military service. We asked former conscripts in what province they served and to what extent they were exposed to and interacted with different outgroup members.[17]

Table 7 shows that having been exposed to a more diverse set of peers is associated with stronger effects on national identity (Columns 3 and 4), by approximately 0.08 standard deviation units for a 1 unit increase in the peer-diversity index. Moreover, serving in a different province is associated with a much stronger effect, more than double the effect when serving in one's home province. These results are consistent with the interpretation that exposure to outgroups from within the country may have reinforced a national identity by weakening some perceived socioeconomic cleavages.

Crucially, however, the effect of conscription on national values remains highly significant among individuals who were not exposed to a particularly diverse set of peers: the effect on individuals with a standard deviation *less* in peer-diversity exposure is approximately 0.28 p.p. (p=0.037). The same holds for individuals who served in their home province (β=0.22, p=0.007). All in all, these results suggest that exposure to outgroups reinforces but does not fully account for conscription's persistent effect on national affiliation and social integration.

5.3 Wartime v. peacetime conscription

Exposure to conflict may be a reason behind the baseline patterns, given that threats or attacks can strengthen group cohesion. To assess the scope for this explanation, we exploit the fact that four cohorts in our sample served during periods of heightened combat risk due to internal conflicts in 1975 and early 1976, and external conflict during the Malvinas/Falklands war in 1982. Importantly, the chance of being exposed to combat was very low, as very few

[17] Specifically, we asked: "*Thinking about your fellow conscripts, do you remember if there were... People from another province? Indigenous people? People of low SES? People of high SES? Gay people? People of a non-Catholic religion?*" Answers allowed for four options: (i) "*Yes and I had frequent contact*," (ii) "*Yes, but I didn't have frequent contact*," (iii) "*There were none*," and (iv) "*I don't know/Don't remember*." We build two sets of indicators, one set for selecting option (i), and another set for selection options (i) or (ii). We then build standardized indices based on each set of indicators. With respect to province of service, we build an indicator for having served in a different province to their residence.

troops were actually mobilized. For example, in the Malvinas/Falklands war, administrative data indicates that only 5.8% of conscripts participated and 0.1% were killed. We find that serving during wartime does not affect national values and social integration —if anything, it tends to reduce them— and it leads to having lower civic values. This implies that combat is not a mechanism driving our baseline results; on the contrary, it is peacetime conscription that generates the effects.

Table 7: Intergroup contact: Exposure to diverse peers

	National Values				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Served	0.23**	0.34***	0.34***	0.33***	0.20**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Served x peer div. index, freq. contact			0.07**		
			(0.04)		
Served x peer div. index, any contact				0.08**	
				(0.04)	
Served x diff. province					0.38**
					(0.17)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.04	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
Obs.	3086	2058	2058	2058	2058

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the National Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of two questions ("pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in"). Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Column 2 includes an interaction term with an index capturing the degree of frequent contact with outgroups during the military. Column 3 includes an interaction with a similar index capturing the degree of exposure (with or without frequent contact). Column 4 includes an interaction with serving in a different province from the one where they resided at the time. From Column 2 onward the sample is restricted to the second survey round, as the peer diversity questions were only asked there. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Column 1 also includes a survey round FE. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Heterogeneous effects during wartime v. peacetime

	(1) National Values	(2) Civic Values	(3) Similarity	(4) Neighbors index	(5) Network diversity
Served	0.31**	0.11	0.96**	-0.32**	0.33**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.37)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Served x wartime	-0.43*	-0.49**	-1.59**	0.21	-0.11
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.73)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group	-0.12	-0.38**	-0.64	-0.11	0.21
	0.20	0.18	0.62	0.22	0.22
Control mean	-0.04	-0.05	4.12	0.07	-0.10
Obs.	3086	3086	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes and its interaction with serving during wartime (cohorts incorporated in '74-'75 and in '81-'82). Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. The outcome in Column 1 is the National Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of two questions ("pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in"). The outcome in Column 2 is the Civic Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of three questions ("(not) justifying evasion," "going to vote," and "(not) taking the law into your own hands"). The outcome in Column 3 is the number of people a respondent feels similar to "in the most important things," out of 10 randomly-chosen Argentinians. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we explore conscription's role in the process of nation-building. Despite the historical and geographical prevalence of compulsory military service, empirical evidence that informs this issue remains scant. We focus on the case of Argentina, where conscription was historically determined by a lottery and military service followed a similar structure to other countries in the world. Leveraging random variation in military service arising from the Argentine draft and original data on almost 3,100 individuals, we provide causal estimates showing that conscription itself has durably contributed to national affiliation and social integration, but not to civic values. Because we cover 29 cohorts of conscripts that were exposed to this policy over 28 years ago, we are able to show that the baseline patterns are persistent and robust to different time periods, including democratic and non-democratic regimes.

We establish that the main channel through which military service generates these effects is the direct inculcation of values. Content analysis of open-ended responses indicates that national values and social integration (but not civic values) were actively transmitted during service. We also find evidence consistent with the "contact hypothesis," as the effects tend to be stronger among individuals who were more exposed to diverse peers in the military. However, this channel does not drive the effects, as conscription's impact remains large and significant even for individuals with little exposure to outgroups. On the other hand, we find no evidence that combat experience or changes in educational, occupational, family, or religious outcomes play a role in our findings. Finally, our results indicate that former conscripts tend to talk more often about the values instilled by the military, which may indicate that narrative repetition and motivated reasoning can be one of the vehicles that help to sustain these lessons in the long run.

Mandatory enlistment is making a comeback around the world (The Economist, 2021). In the United States, there is an ongoing debate about the introduction of compulsory national service to promote social integration (Bridgeland and DiIulio, 2019). In many European countries, most saliently Germany, governments are discussing the reintroduction of military service after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Our research shows that value transmission in the military can play an important role in the promotion of national identity and a more integrated society. However, our results also indicate that conscription's persistent effects on views and attitudes depend on the type of values instilled by the military, and that different types of government may inculcate different attitudes. Ultimately, conscription as a nation-building tool also carries an intrinsic risk in contexts where governments may wish to transmit views that could undermine social stability (Rohner and Zhuravskaya, 2023). This underscores the relevance of further research shedding light on practices in the military capable of fomenting conscription's positive effects, while averting or mitigating its potential perils.

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Appendix A

Table A1: Summary statistics

	Full sample			Means by served status		Diff. (w/ cohort FE)	
	Mean	Min	Max	Yes	No	Coef.	p-val
Served	0.375	0	1	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000
High-number	0.546	0	1	0.855	0.361	0.379	0.000
Age	58.62	47	78	61.98	56.61	-	-
BA metro	0.511	0	1	0.552	0.487	0.023	0.238
High school parent	0.614	0	1	0.586	0.631	-0.025	0.195
College parent	0.136	0	1	0.130	0.140	0.002	0.896
Num. immig. grandp.	1.687	0	4	1.842	1.594	-0.020	0.730
Father served	0.675	0	1	0.671	0.677	0.004	0.848

Note: This table presents summary statistics for the regressor of interest (*Served*), the instrumental variable (*High-number*), and characteristics determined before conscription, for the full sample and by treatment status. The last two columns test for statistically significant differences between conscripts and non-conscripts at the within-cohort level. Conscripts are more likely to come from the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area and from a more disadvantaged background, as proxied by the educational level of the parents.

Table A2: Characterization of compliers

	Full sample mean	Compliers mean	Ratio
BA metro	0.511	0.501	0.980
High school parent	0.614	0.547	0.891
College parent	0.136	0.105	0.772
Num. immig. grandp.	1.687	1.680	0.996
Father served	0.675	0.661	0.979

Note: This table presents the mean value of characteristics determined before conscription for the full sample and for the sub-sample of compliers. Compliers are more likely to come from a disadvantaged background, as proxied by the educational level of the parents.

Table A3: Selection into sample by high-number status

cohort	N	pop. share w/ high number	sample share w/ high number	difference	p_value
1944	16	0.77	0.94	-0.17**	0.02
1945	29	0.74	0.72	0.02	0.85
1946	35	0.79	0.86	-0.07	0.27
1947	31	0.72	0.65	0.07	0.40
1948	46	0.71	0.80	-0.09	0.12
1949	56	0.79	0.73	0.06	0.34
1950	70	0.76	0.81	-0.05	0.25
1951	67	0.87	0.88	-0.01	0.79
1952	100	0.88	0.91	-0.03	0.30
1953	88	0.86	0.82	0.04	0.31
1954	96	0.93	0.90	0.03	0.28
1958	132	0.83	0.82	0.01	0.73
1959	126	0.68	0.64	0.04	0.39
1960	118	0.66	0.63	0.03	0.46
1961	121	0.65	0.64	0.01	0.76
1962	154	0.68	0.69	-0.01	0.82
1963	135	0.65	0.65	-0.00	0.96
1964	132	0.60	0.63	-0.03	0.50
1965	147	0.61	0.61	-0.00	0.96
1966	113	0.33	0.39	-0.06	0.20
1967	134	0.31	0.40	-0.09**	0.03
1968	134	0.37	0.37	-0.00	0.94
1969	153	0.41	0.52	-0.11***	0.01
1970	140	0.47	0.43	0.04	0.33
1971	146	0.28	0.29	-0.01	0.70
1972	127	0.11	0.15	-0.04	0.21
1973	143	0.25	0.20	0.05	0.16
1974	153	0.28	0.25	0.03	0.37
1975	144	0.26	0.23	0.03	0.43
Total	3,086	0.55	0.55	0.01	0.42

Note: This table tests, cohort by cohort and for the full sample (last row), whether sample shares with high number are statistically different to population shares with high-number. Statistically significant differences would imply that the lottery outcome induces selection into the sample. We find reassuring evidence that there is no observable selection, especially given the negligible difference at the full-sample level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A1: Distribution of last-3 digits of the ID



Note: This graph plots the frequency of last-3 digits of the ID, grouped in 10-digit bins.

Table A4: Components of National Values and Civic Values Indexes

	National Values		Civic Values		
	(1) Arg. best	(2) Pride Arg.	(3) Evasion	(4) Own justice	(5) Voting
Served	0.12**	0.07	-0.05	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.65	0.57	0.63	0.58	0.93
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Columns 1 and 4 are indicators for choosing the upper two items out of a 4-item Likert scale. Columns 2, 3, and 5 are indicators for choosing the upper item out of a 4-item scale. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Trust in other nationalities and in institutions

	Nationalities					Institutions			
	(1) Paraguay	(2) Chile	(3) Uruguay	(4) English	(5) Index	(6) Church	(7) Armed Forces	(8) Sup. Court	(9) IMF
Served	0.12*	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.16	0.08	-0.05	0.03	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.58	0.40	0.75	0.53	-0.06	0.34	0.61	0.32	0.27
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Columns are indicators for choosing the upper two items out of a 4-item Likert scale. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Internal migration

	By Province			By Size of Locality		
	(1) Current	(2) Temporary	(3) Ever	(4) Small/Med. to Large	(5) Large to Small/Med.	(6) Any change
Served	-0.04	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.17	0.14	0.31	0.11	0.06	0.20
Obs.	2058	2058	2058	2058	2058	2058

Note: Columns are indicators for currently living in a province different to age 16 (1), for currently living in the same province to age 16 but having lived in a different province for at least 2 years since age 25 (2), for taking value 1 in any of the two previous columns (3), for currently living in a large locality but having lived in a small/medium-sized locality at age 16 (4), for currently living in a small/medium-sized locality but having lived in a large locality at age 16 (5), for taking value 1 in any of the two previous columns (6). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7: Partner characteristics

	(1) Diff. Province	(2) Diff. Relig. Raised	(3) Diff. SES background	(4) Index
Served	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01	-0.15
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.28	0.17	0.33	0.01
Obs.	1551	1551	1348	1551

Note: Columns are indicators for having a partner who was raised in a different province (1), in a different religion (2), and in a different socioeconomic background (3). Column 4 is an index of the first three. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Social capital, moral universalism, and gender equality

	(1) Trust	(2) Positive recip.	(3) Negative recip.	(4) Altruism	(5) Universalism	(6) Gender
Served	0.02	-0.03	0.09	-0.01	-0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.05)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.42	-0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	2058	2058

Note: Columns include the standard measure of generalized trust (1), standardized measures of negative reciprocity, positive reciprocity, and altruism (2-4) following Falk et al. (2018), a standardized index of three questions measuring universalism among foreign individuals in terms of religion, language, and political ideology, following Enke, Rodriguez-Padilla and Zimmermann (2022) (5), and beliefs about gender equality (6). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9: Education and occupational choice

	(1) high school grad.	(2) college grad.	(3) selfemployed	(4) pubsec_emp	(5) privsec_emp	(6) unemployed	(7) retired
Served	0.04*	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.95	0.38	0.29	0.20	0.34	0.07	0.10
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Columns are indicators for falling in each category. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10: Family outcomes

	(1) single	(2) married	(3) divorced	(4) free union	(5) widower
Served	0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.15	0.54	0.14	0.15	0.02
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086
f_test					

Note: Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A11: Religiosity

	religion		religiosity	
	(1) Catholic	(2) none	(3) imp. of God	(4) high attendance
Served	0.08	-0.04	0.08	-0.08*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.04)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.63	0.25	2.99	0.19
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Top coincidences in topic model

Topic 1:

- "*Responsibility. Respect. Love for the homeland. Companionship.*"

- "*Conscription did leave values, in addition to respecting the patriotic symbols also learned to value life, learned to have a sense of belonging, respect, loyalty, companionship etc.*"

- "*Responsibility in the first place The sense of honor for the country Respect for adults I support the idea that it has been modified to do so at 18 years of age.*"

Topic 2:

- "*respect, obedience, honor, sacrifice, because I went to high school in the military school.*"

- "*Learning: trades for the future and the opportunity to finish their primary education. Through work (trade) and school attendance (education).*"

- "*education, respect, obedience, and an education to the Argentine people who need it more and more every day.*"

Topic 3:

- "*Order, discipline, rootedness with the symbols of the nation, respect, respect for authority, order, responsibility and responsibility.*"

- "*through the vertical authority,,,, values were learned such as respect for the superior,,, not to question an order,,, to comply with it,,, to be a group among the same rank "soldiers",,, to manage a friendship,,, to value the group,,, to defend it,,,,, and to respect,,,,*"

- "*There is no doubt that the training and discipline imparted in the military service were very good. Courage, cleanliness and personal care, courage, discipline, respect, social values, the problem is that many times they were badly taught. Because the middle/lower military did not behave as true leaders or instructors, they lacked professionalism, they used to be an abusive caste with the conscripts.*"

Topic 4:

- "*I think it had no value, just a waste of time, for the time it was mandatory.*"

- "*In my case, as a university student, it was a total waste of time, i had to quit my job and my studies.*"

- "*The values are transmitted by the parents, the military service is a waste of time, in any case would justify a "national service" where they perform tasks of help and improvements in various areas.*"

Topic 5:

- "*Abuse of power cannot teach anything.*"
- "*None, it was useless. A year of study or work was lost.*"
- "*I do not think that the military system in Argentina was the right one to transmit values except for the service to the country, I do not believe that military service is positive, although it does teach some lessons by contradiction, for example to know how to value what one has in terms of daily life, that is to say, there are worse things.*"



Figure A2: Topic 5

Bags-of-words components

- **National values**: *homeland fatherland patriot flag anthem emblem symbol country national identi ‘ nation’*
- **Civic values**: *civic norm institu dignit rule law citizen honest justice conduct ‘ ethi’ ‘respect for society’ ‘service to society’*
- **Integration**: *empathy socializ integration compan comrad camarad shar colleag coex brotherhood communit ‘social values’ ‘ toleran’ ‘ equal’ ‘sense of belonging’*

- **Discipline**: *discipl order organiz dedicat punctua responsib*
- **Authoritarianism**: *viole authorit obedie obey respect subordinat coerc control superior hierarchy indoctrinat*
- **Waste of time**: *lose lost loss useless nothing none waste 'no learning at all' 'no transmission' 'no value'*

Table A12: Sentiment analysis

	(1) Sentiment score	(2) I[score=1]	(3) I[score=0]
Served	0.07	0.06	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.56	0.50	0.37
Obs.	1994	1994	1994

Note: Column 1 regresses a measure of how positive is the sentiment in the open ended question discussed in section 5.1, ranging from 0 to 1. Column 2 regresses an indicator for giving a fully positive response and column 3 for giving a fully negative response. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix B: Full set of fixed effects

Table B1: First stage, National Values, and Civic Values

	Served (First Stage)		National Values Index		Civic Values Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
High number	0.39***	0.40***				
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
Served			0.22**	0.20*	-0.04	-0.04
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Full set FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Eff. F-stat	466	471				
Control mean	0.12	0.12	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
Obs.	3033	3033	3033	3033	3033	3033

Note: Columns 1–2 show estimates for the first stage, including the effective F-statistic by Olea and Pflueger (2013). The instrument is an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of one's national ID), which implies being required to serve. Columns 3–4 show 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the National Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of two questions ("pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in"). Columns 5–6 show 2SLS estimates for the Civic Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of three questions ("(not) justifying evasion," "going to vote," and "(not) taking the law into your own hands"). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B2: Social Integration: Similarity and Attitudes Toward Neighbors

	Similarity	Neighbors (rejection)					
	(1)	(2) other relig.	(3) indigenous	(4) other sex. orient.	(5) low SES	(6) low SES	(7) Index
Served	0.58*	0.04	-0.05**	-0.09*	-0.03	0.08	-0.25*
	(0.33)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)
Served x HS-grad par.						-0.18**	
						(0.07)	
HS-grad parent						0.12***	
						(0.03)	
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group						-0.10	
						0.07	
Control mean	4.10	0.06	0.04	0.15	0.17	0.10	0.06
Obs.	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Column 1 shows the impact on the number of people a respondent feels similar to "in the most important things," out of 10 randomly-chosen Argentinians. Outcomes in Columns 2–6 correspond to indicators for rejecting the type of neighbor described in the column heading. The questions in this table were only asked in the first survey round. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B3: Social Integration: Social networks

	Net. Size	Conscripts	Other prov.	College grad.		Practising Cath.		Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Served	0.12	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.14*	0.14**	0.20*	0.23*
	(0.72)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Served x HS-grad par.					-0.13			
					(0.09)			
HS-grad parent					0.15***			
					(0.04)			
Served x Catholic							-0.09	
							(0.11)	
catholic						0.27***	0.31***	
						(0.02)	(0.05)	
Full set FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group					0.01		0.11	
					0.07		0.07	
Control mean	4.97	0.44	0.27	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.42	-0.09
Obs.	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Column 1 regresses the number of individuals a respondent feels comfortable discussing personal issues with (the size of their social network). Columns 2–7 regress indicators for having at least one person in their close social network from the group described in the column heading. The questions in this table were only asked in the first survey round. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4: Value inculcation: Bags of words

	Topics						Log-Length	Freq.
	(1) Authorit.	(2) Discip.	(3) National V.	(4) Integration	(5) Time Waste	(6) Civic V.	(7)	(8)
Served	-0.10	-0.01	0.07	0.10**	0.06	-0.01	0.19*	0.14**
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Coh. & Dist. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.44	0.34	0.19	0.13	0.14	0.09	2.71	0.52
Obs.	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927	1927

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes in Columns 1–6 are indicators for mentioning at least one term related to that topic in an open-ended question about what values were inculcated in the military. Column 7 regresses the log of the number of words in the answer to the open-ended question, and Column 8 regresses an indicator for talking "occasionally/at most once per year" or "frequently/more than once per year" about the types of values transmitted in the military. The open-ended question was only asked in the first survey round. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B5: Intergroup contact: Exposure to diverse peers

	National Values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Served	0.20*	0.36***	0.36***	0.21**
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Served x peer div. index, freq. contact			0.06*	
			(0.04)	
Served x diff. province				0.40**
				(0.18)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.05	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10
Obs.	3033	2001	2001	2001

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the National Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of two questions ("pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in"). Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Column 2 includes an interaction term with an index capturing the degree of frequent contact with outgroups during the military. Column 3 includes an interaction with a similar index capturing the degree of exposure (with or without frequent contact). Column 4 includes an interaction with serving in a different province from the one where they resided at the time. From Column 2 onward the sample is restricted to the second survey round, as the peer diversity questions were only asked there. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Column 1 also includes a survey round FE. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B6: Heterogeneous effects during wartime v. peacetime

	(1) National Values	(2) Civic Values	(3) Similarity	(4) Neighbors index	(5) Network diversity
Served	0.29**	0.05	0.91**	-0.29*	0.24
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.38)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Served x wartime	-0.40*	-0.45**	-1.60**	0.18	-0.07
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.75)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group	-0.11	-0.40**	-0.69	-0.11	0.18
	0.20	0.18	0.64	0.22	0.23
Control mean	-0.05	-0.04	4.10	0.06	-0.09
Obs.	3033	3033	1927	1927	1927

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes and its interaction with serving during wartime (cohorts incorporated in '74-'75 and in '81-'82). Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. The outcome in Column 1 is the National Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of two questions ("pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in"). The outcome in Column 2 is the Civic Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of three questions ("(not) justifying evasion," "going to vote," and "(not) taking the law into your own hands"). The outcome in Column 3 is the number of people a respondent feels similar to "in the most important things," out of 10 randomly-chosen Argentinians. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix C: Reduced form effects

Table C1: First stage, National Values, and Civic Values

	Served		National Values Index		Civic Values Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
High number	0.39***	0.39***	0.09**	0.09**	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control mean	0.12	0.12	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05
R2	0.27	0.27	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.01
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Columns 1–2 show estimates for the first stage, columns 3–4 show 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the National Values index, and columns 5–6 show the analogous estimates for the Civic Values index. The National Values index is a standardized aggregate of two questions ("pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in"). The Civic Values index is a standardized aggregate of three questions ("justify evasion," "going to vote," and "taking the law into own hands"). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C2: Social Integration: Similarity and Attitudes Toward Neighbors

	Similarity	Neighbors (rejection)					
	(1)	(2) other relig.	(3) indigenous	(4) other sex. orient.	(5) low SES	(6) low SES	(7) Index
High number	0.26**	0.01	-0.02**	-0.04*	-0.02	0.03	-0.11**
	(0.13)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
High N. x HS-grad par.						-0.08**	
						(0.03)	
HS-grad parent						0.09***	
						(0.02)	
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group						-0.05**	
						0.02	
Control mean	4.12	0.07	0.05	0.16	0.17	0.11	0.07
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: The control group is low-number individuals in columns 1-6 and low-number individuals with no high-school graduate parents in column 7. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C3: Social Integration: Social networks

	Net. Size	Conscripts	Other prov.	College grad.		Practising Cath.		Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
High number	-0.00	0.04	0.04*	0.03	0.08**	0.05**	0.09**	0.12**
	(0.27)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)
High N. x HS-grad par.					-0.07*			
					(0.04)			
HS-grad parent					0.14***			
					(0.03)			
High N. x Catholic							-0.06	
							(0.05)	
catholic						0.29***	0.32***	
						(0.02)	(0.03)	
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group					0.01		0.03	
					0.03		0.03	
Control mean	4.95	0.44	0.27	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.41	-0.10
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C4: Value inculcation: Bags of words

	Topics						Log-Length	Freq.
	(1) Authorit.	(2) Discip.	(3) National V.	(4) Integration	(5) Time Waste	(6) Civic V.	(7)	(8)
High number	-0.03	-0.00	0.02	0.04**	0.02	0.01	0.08**	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Coh. & Dist. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.44	0.35	0.20	0.13	0.14	0.09	2.71	0.52
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Columns 1–6 regress indicator variables for mentioning at least one term related to that topic, Column 7 regresses the log of the number of words, and column 8 regresses an indicator for reporting to talk "occasionally/at most once per year" or "frequently/more than once per year" about the types of values transmitted in the military. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C5: Intergroup contact: Exposure to diverse peers

	National Values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High number	0.09**	0.14***	0.14***	0.14**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
int_smopeers_fc_highnum			0.07**	
			(0.04)	
int_diff_prov2_highnum				-0.00
				(0.06)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.04	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
Obs.	3086	2058	2058	2058

Note: Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C6: Value inculcation: Transmission of political and economic preferences

	Civic Values		Demand Regulation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High number	0.01	-0.09	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)
int_post83_highnum		0.19**		0.10*
		(0.09)		(0.06)
int_post89_highnum		-0.04		-0.25***
		(0.12)		(0.07)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group 1		0.11		0.09**
		0.07		0.05
Coef. int. group 2		0.06		-0.16***
		0.09		0.05
Control mean	-0.05	-0.05	0.52	0.52
Obs.	3086	3086	1972	1972

Note: Each column shows reduced form estimates for the effect of receiving a high lottery number on different outcomes. The outcome in Columns 1–2 is the Civic Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of three questions ("(not) justifying evasion," "going to vote," and "(not) taking the law into your own hands"). The outcome in Columns 3–4 is an indicator for agreeing with the statement that "the government should regulate the economy to guarantee its good functioning." Coef. int. group 1 refers to the effect of serving during 1983-1989 (Alfonsin's interventionist government). Coef. int. group 2 refers to the effect of serving during 1990-1994 (Menem's pro-market government). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C7: Heterogeneous effects during wartime v. peacetime

	(1) National Values	(2) Civic Values	(3) Similarity	(4) Neighbors index	(5) Network diversity
High number	0.11**	0.04	0.35***	-0.12**	0.12**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.05)
High N. x wartime	-0.18	-0.25**	-0.70*	0.06	-0.00
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.37)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Cohort & District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coef. int. group	-0.06	-0.21**	-0.35	-0.06	0.12
	0.10	0.09	0.34	0.12	0.12
Control mean	-0.04	-0.05	4.12	0.07	-0.10
Obs.	3086	3086	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows reduced form estimates for the effect of receiving a high lottery number on different outcomes and its interaction with wartime (cohorts incorporated in '74-'75 and in '81-'82). The outcome in Column 1 is the National Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of two questions ("pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in"). The outcome in Column 2 is the Civic Values index, which is a standardized aggregate of three questions ("(not) justifying evasion," "going to vote," and "(not) taking the law into your own hands"). The outcome in Column 3 is the number of people a respondent feels similar to "in the most important things," out of 10 randomly-chosen Argentinians. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.