

Nation-Building Through Military Service*

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Abstract

This paper studies conscription's role in durably shaping attitudes and beliefs consistent with nation-building. We pair original survey data covering 29 cohorts of conscripts in Argentina with random variation in service emerging from a lottery. We find that serving in the military leads to a stronger national identity and social integration several decades after serving but does not affect civic behaviors such as voting or paying taxes. Value inculcation during service helps explain the baseline patterns, while exposure to and interaction with diverse peers reinforce but do not drive the results.

JEL Codes: D91, H56, J15, P16, Z1

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1 Introduction

Modern states commonly leverage conscription to ensure a permanent, professionally trained army. Indeed, 80% of countries implemented some form of conscription during the first half of the 20th century, and 35% still conscript soldiers today (The Economist, 2021). Recruiting, maintaining, and training these conscripts likely contributed to the historical consolidation of national states, given the fiscal infrastructure required to fund those operations effectively (Tilly, 1990). An issue that remains empirically underexplored is whether compulsory military service has also contributed to the consolidation of modern national states by promoting behaviors and attitudes that support this process.

This paper evaluates conscription’s role in promoting behaviors conducive to and consistent with nation-building. There are different behaviors that align with nation-building, which need not go hand in hand: Those that involve the integration of society, and those that are functional to the state apparatus (Hippler, 2005). The former correspond to attitudes and beliefs that signal a sense of belonging to a national community and an openness toward its members—in line with Anderson (1983)’s imagined communities—, whereas the latter directly contribute to the functioning of the state (e.g., willingness to pay taxes or to accept the state’s monopoly of violence). Importantly, our goal is to examine whether conscription fosters each of these dimensions of behavior, and the extent to which these behaviors move in the same direction.

We leverage a policy in Argentina that, throughout the 20th century, mandated military service based on a yearly lottery. The lottery generated random variation in service within birth cohorts, allowing us to address endogenous selection into the military. This historical experiment enables an assessment of conscription’s durable effect on the different dimensions of behaviors that are conducive to and consistent with nation-building.

In February and August 2022, we conducted two online surveys of 3,086 Argentinian men born between 1944 and 1975. Participants provided their demographic characteristics and those of their ancestors, and answered questions designed to capture different dimensions of national values, civic values, and social preferences. We combine this information with administrative data showing results from the military draft lottery, which lets us determine if the respondent was called to serve when his cohort was subjected to the lottery.

Our results reveal that conscription durably fosters the social integration component of nation-building. In particular, we document a large and statistically significant effect of conscription on a National Values Index (+0.23 standard deviations), which combines two questions on national pride and attachment to the nation. Moreover, conscription increases

by 16% the number of Argentinians to whom respondents feel similar in “what is most important”, it decreases participants’ tendency to reject outgroup neighbors (-0.28 standard deviations), and increases the diversity of their networks of close friends (+0.31 standard deviations). These results underscore conscription’s role in durably promoting a sense of belonging to and openness toward a national community.

As opposed to the patterns documented for social integration, conscription appears to have no effect on behaviors that are favorable to the state’s functionality, revealing a limited role of compulsory military service as a contributor to this other dimension of nation-building. In particular, we find a small and statistically insignificant effect on a Civic Values Index, which combines voting behavior, views on tax evasion, and views on taking the law into one’s own hands to punish criminals. Similarly, conscription has no effect on institutional trust, in line with its limited effect on engagement with the state. In sum, these results shed light on the nuanced contribution of conscription to nation-building, revealing that the two behavioral dimensions of this concept need not move in synchrony.

We leverage several complementary approaches to explore the mechanisms behind conscription’s effect on the integration component of nation-building. First, we ask all participants to describe, in their own words, the main lessons that they think were effectively transmitted by the Argentine military to conscripts. Leveraging natural language processing techniques, we find that national values and social integration are frequently mentioned in the answers, and military veterans are more likely to mention these topics. Moreover, serving increases the frequency with which participants discuss these values with their acquaintances. These results suggest that social integration was actively instilled in the military, and that narrative repetition enacted through frequent conversations about these topics may help sustain these behaviors in the long run.

Second, we elicit data about exposure to outgroups during conscription, asking former conscripts which province they served in and to what extent they interacted with soldiers from backgrounds different from theirs. We show that the positive baseline effects on national values are stronger for, though not driven by, those who had more contact with diverse peers during military service. Crucially, conscription’s effect remains highly significant among individuals who were not exposed to a diverse set of peers during service. All in all, contact with outgroups is not the main driver behind the effect of compulsory military service on national identity, although these interactions do seem to reinforce such identity among conscripts.

An analysis of heterogeneous experiences across cohorts offers further insights into the mechanisms. In line with the argument that value inculcation in the military is a key

mechanism, we find that conscripts tend to adopt the ideology of the government under which they serve. Specifically, serving under a military government leads to a relatively lower Civic Values Index, serving under a protectionist government leads to a stronger preference for regulation, and serving under a pro-market administration leads to a stronger dislike for regulation. Hence, the military appears to be a setting in which values can be effectively transmitted, revealing the scope for conscription to foster or discourage specific behaviors and values, depending on whether governments are aligned with them or not. As for other potential mechanisms, we show that our results are not driven by wartime service, suggesting that experiences of conflict do not explain the baseline patterns. If anything, in fact, war exposure undermines the baseline patterns. Likewise, we find little empirical support for other plausible mechanisms, such as educational achievement, occupational choice, family formation, or religiosity.

Our paper speaks to several strands of literature. First, it complements previous studies of nation-building in different contexts (Bazzi et al., 2019; Depetris-Chauvin, Durante and Campante, 2020; Blanc and Kubo, 2024; Rohner and Zhuravskaya, 2023). Our paper shows that conscription, which has been prevalent across time and geographical space, durably fosters social integration and a shared (national) identity. Relatedly, our paper adds to the literature on policies that contribute to nation-building by promoting behaviors that are functional to the state (Bandiera et al., 2019). Our results reveal that the social integration component of nation-building does not necessarily move in synchrony with the component that speaks to the functionality of the national state. Hence, policies that foster national identity and cohesion may be distinct from those that promote desirable civic behavior.

We also contribute to the robust literature examining how military service affects short-term and long-term individual outcomes (Angrist, 1990; Angrist, Chen and Song, 2011; Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky, 2011; Greenberg et al., 2020). In particular, our paper speaks to the body of literature in economics and political science that studies how serving in the military has a long-run effect on beliefs, attitudes, and political views (Erikson and Stoker, 2011; Kriner and Shen, 2016; Dahl, Kotsadam and Rooth, 2021; Cagé et al., 2023; Bove, Di Leo and Giani, 2022). Our paper shows that conscription promotes openness toward outgroups who are part of the nation, and provides suggestive evidence that value inculcation is an important channel through which conscription affects veterans' attitudes and beliefs in the long run.

The paper also speaks to recent research on how intergroup interaction may promote integration and cooperation (Mousa, 2020; Lowe, 2021; Cáceres-Delpiano et al., 2021; Bagues and Roth, 2022; Okunogbe, 2024). In particular, Cáceres-Delpiano et al. (2021) and Bagues

and Roth (2022) leverage the random assignment of men serving in the military to different regions in Spain; they find that, among conscripts from regions that feature weak national identity, assignment to a different region fosters national affiliation. These two papers thus indicate that specific conditions in the military, namely being deployed to different regions and exposure to different outgroups, strengthen national identity relative to regional ones. Moreover, Bagues and Roth (2022) also explores whether serving per se has an impact on national identity, leveraging data from a group of 387 individuals who were exempted from service. Due to lack of statistical power, however, they are unable to precisely estimate these effects, and their findings leave open the possibility that the net impact of military service may depend on the share of people who serve in the home region vs other regions. Our setting and empirical approach allows us to demonstrate that conscription itself fosters national affiliation, relative to people who were not conscripted. Importantly, our results indicate that the effects of conscription on national identity do not depend on intergroup interactions within the military—including cross-regional interactions due to serving in another province, but also those across other cleavages. Hence, although intergroup contact in the military may explain why some conscripts develop a stronger national identity than others, our results show that those who serve are more likely to hold stronger national values than those who don’t serve, and that these effects do not depend on whether conscripts served in a different region or on their interactions with outgroups in the military.

Crucially, our paper contributes to the literature that studies the long-run consequences of conscription in Argentina. The seminal study by Galiani, Rossi and Schargrotsky (2011) shows that conscription increases the likelihood of having a criminal record. Moreover, Ertola Navajas et al. (2022) shows that those who served in the Argentine military are more likely to durably adopt a military mindset. Lastly, Cruces, Rossi and Schargrotsky (2023) leverages the outcome of the lottery for men who were exempted from service, showing that dishonest behavior (as captured by cheating in the medical examination) increases the likelihood of occupying non-meritocratic public-sector employment later in life. Our paper complements these studies by uncovering significant heterogeneous treatment effects: Conscription’s effects on nation-building vary depending on the type of government under which conscripts serve (their ideology and whether the government was democratic), and there are notable differences between conscripts who were deployed in their own v. a different region. In particular, we find that serving under a military government, as well as serving during wartime, decreases the likelihood of exhibiting civic values, which aligns with Galiani, Rossi and Schargrotsky (2011)’s findings. Moreover, we analyze conscripts’ social networks as well as their personal narratives about conscription, which allow us to explore value

transmission and network formation, generating novel evidence around these mediators.

Finally, our paper contributes to the set of papers that study the impact of narratives on beliefs and behavior (Shiller, 2017; Bénabou, Falk and Tirole, 2020; Michalopoulos and Xue, 2021; Ramos-Toro and Voytas, 2024), particularly in terms of how specific experiences may foster motivated reasoning and self-persuasion (Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2007; Huffman, Raymond and Shvets, 2019; Schwardmann, Tripodi and Van der Weele, 2022). We show that, relative to those who did not serve, conscripted men are more likely to talk about the military and the values they learned in it (especially national values and social integration), suggesting that narrative repetition, motivated reasoning, and self-persuasion may be mechanisms that help sustain the effect of past events on views and attitudes.

The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the historical background of conscription in Argentina. Section 3 presents our empirical approach, discussing how we collected data and showing that our sample is balanced and not prone to sample-selection issues. Section 4 discusses the baseline results, Section 5 examines the mechanisms, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Background

This section provides an overview of conscription in Argentina and describes the lottery system that determined who was required to serve. On December 6, 1901, the Argentine Congress passed Law 4031, which established compulsory military service for Argentine men during the year they turned 21 (lowered to age 19 in 1977). The first cohort served in 1902 and the last one in 1994, when conscription abruptly came to an end after the death of a conscript. Since 1994, only volunteers have served in the Argentine armed forces.

The share of conscripts from each cohort varied from year to year at the discretion of the authorities, depending on budgetary and strategic considerations. Crucially, a lottery determined who was required to serve from within each cohort. The lottery, which was broadcast on national radio and television, assigned a number between 1 and 1000 to each combination of the last 3 digits of the national ID number (which is between 7 and 8 digits long).¹ This process took place around April of the year in which the cohort turned 20, and at the beginning of the following year authorities would determine a cutoff such that all individuals with a lottery number above the cutoff would be required to serve (individuals

¹The ID numbers, in turn, are assigned sequentially based on the chronological order of birth, so that smaller numbers correspond to younger people. The conscription lottery thus made it possible for individuals with consecutive ID numbers to have vastly different lottery numbers.

below the cutoff were exempted from service).

Around six months after the lottery, all men in the cohort had to take a health examination, and those who were not deemed “fit to serve” were exempted from serving in the military. This was an important source of non-compliance with the lottery outcome and allowed for strategic behavior among those who were called to serve.² Clergymen, religious officials, and men whose immediate family depended on them for economic sustenance (e.g., those with parents of old age or young children who could rely on no one else) were also exempted from service. Argentines from all regions and backgrounds ended up serving, which provided fertile ground for intergroup interactions. For example, in our sample, 41% had no parents with a high school degree and 13% had at least one parent with a college degree.

The typical experience involved a full year of service, including one to three months of basic military training. After that, conscripts would be assigned to a military unit where they would do various tasks—a mix of unskilled labor (such as painting, cooking, or cleaning) and skilled labor (such as repairing trucks or building bridges). After discharge, they were not expected to serve again unless there was a national emergency. While most conscripts would serve in a military unit within their home province, many were assigned to units outside of it (38% of individuals in our sample).

Conscripts frequently engaged in activities that promoted different values, especially discipline, respect for authority, patriotism, and camaraderie. A few examples of such activities involved marching, a daily salute of the flag, and working in teams on different tasks. There was also time for leisure and socialization, such as playing sports. Finally, anecdotal evidence indicates that some events were especially meaningful, such as participating in a military parade in a nearby city or pledging allegiance to the national flag.

During the period we consider (1965–1994) there were two military governments: one from 1967 to 1973 and another from 1976 to 1983. Thus, half of the cohorts in our sample served under a military government. Moreover, although the vast majority served during peacetime, there were also two major conflicts, one internal and one external, implying that some cohorts were exposed to the risk of being sent to combat. In 1975 and early 1976, the “*Operativo Independencia*” took place, where the armed forces fought internal guerrillas inside Argentina’s borders. Anecdotal and journalistic evidence indicates that a minority of conscripts were exposed to combat. Cohorts incorporated at that time were those born in 1953 and 1954. In 1982, Argentina fought the United Kingdom in the Malvinas/Falklands

²The other source of non-compliance was volunteers who, unlike drop-outs, represented a small share of the population.

conflict. Cohorts born in 1962 and 1963 were serving when it took place. Administrative data indicates that 5.8% of conscripts were mobilized to Malvinas and that 0.1% were killed.³

There are three cohorts that we drop from the analysis because they lacked variability in lottery outcomes: cohort 1955 was required to serve virtually in full (it was up for service in 1976 when the last military coup took place) and the 1956 and 1957 cohorts were exempted from service, as in 1977 the age of incorporation was reduced by two years.

3 Empirical Approach

Our analysis relies on data from two surveys that we designed and implemented, as well as administrative data on the military draft. We leverage these data to estimate two-stage least-squares (2SLS) models, which allow us to deal with selection into military service.

3.1 Data

This subsection provides details of the process we followed to recruit participants, the main characteristics of our sample, and the surveys we conducted. The information below is in line with the pre-analysis plans that we pre-registered in February and August of 2022 in the AEA registry (AEARCTR-0008950 and AEARCTR-0009914, respectively).⁴

3.1.1 Recruitment

We collected data on the characteristics, beliefs, and attitudes of 3,086 Argentine men born between 1944 and 1975 (excluding 1955–1957, as explained in Section 2), leveraging online surveys that we designed and distributed through Netquest, a panel provider company specializing in Latin America and frequently used in the social sciences (Argote Tironi et al., 2021; Oliveros, Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2023).⁵ Importantly, the invitation to participate did not refer to conscription—it only mentioned that this was a study about “social and political perspectives.” Moreover, questions about the military were asked at the end of the survey to ensure that willingness to participate would not be affected by having served (or not) in the military. Participants had to pass a set of attention checks to be considered for the final sample.

³See veteranos.defensa.gob.ar (last accessed on 1/13/2025).

⁴The pre-analysis plans are available in the [AEA registry](#) and in the authors’ websites.

⁵Netquest recruits respondents and incentivizes survey completion with tokens that later can be exchanged for prizes.

We conducted two survey rounds to attain our final sample. A total of 1,994 respondents participated in the first round, which we conducted in February 2022. To secure a larger sample size that could improve our ability to precisely estimate conscription’s effect on nation-building, we conducted a second round in August 2022, which allowed us to survey 1,092 new participants. The second round included a combination of questions that we asked in the first round and new questions to shed light on mechanisms. Moreover, to avoid being constrained by sample size when examining mechanisms, we also recontacted in the second round 966 of the first-round participants. Crucially, participants who were recontacted in the second round were not asked questions they had already responded to in the first round, and the main results remain unchanged if we exclude recontacts (as shown in Table B4 in the Appendix).⁶

3.1.2 Survey design and main outcomes of interests

All survey-respondents provided different individual characteristics, including year of birth, province of residence at age 16, educational achievement, occupational and civic status, religiosity, and socioeconomic background information (parents’ education and country of origin, as well as number of immigrant grandparents).⁷ We also asked for the last 3 digits of the respondent’s national ID, a key component to determine whether the individual was called to serve.⁸

We build standardized indices that allow us to assess conscription’s effects on the various facets of nation-building. Following Hippler (2005), nation-building is comprised of two main facets: Behaviors that align with and foster a social integration among fellow nationals, and those that contribute to the state’s functionality. We tackle the former by examining the tendency of participants to identify with the nation and their willingness to integrate with those who belong to it. To that end, we construct a National Values Index, which is based on two questions capturing national pride (“*How proud are you of being Argentinian?*”) and attachment to the nation (“*How much do you agree with the following statement? ‘Despite the problems it may have, Argentina is the best country to have been born in.’*”). This index

⁶We can thus classify outcome variables into three groups: those elicited in the first round (1,994 observations); those elicited in the second round (2,058 observations); and those elicited from all survey participants, regardless of the round in which they participated (3,086 observations).

⁷The questionnaires are available in Appendix C.

⁸In Argentina people are used to providing the last 3 digits of their national IDs, which are between 7 and 8 digits long, so identity is not at risk of being revealed. For example, this is standard practice when participating in a raffle. In Figure A1 in the Appendix, we show that there is no clear bunching in the distribution of IDs, which would have implied untruthful reporting, and thus provides reassuring evidence that the data is of good quality.

thus allows an analysis of the strength of national identity.⁹

To further examine conscription’s role in fostering social integration, we analyze three complementary sets of questions. First, we introduce a novel question measuring perceived social distance from other Argentines (Shayo, 2009), which reflects the strength of internal cleavages. The question asks: “*Out of 10 Argentines, how many would you say are similar to you in the most important things?*” (henceforth, ‘similarity’). We interpret higher numbers as reflecting a smaller perceived social distance toward fellow Argentines (and thus weaker internal cleavages). Second, we build a standardized index to measure respondents’ openness toward outgroups from within the country, which we build by asking whether they would *not* like to have members of different groups as neighbors. This is a widely used question in the social sciences and is regularly included in public opinion surveys. We inquire about potential neighbors who are indigenous, low SES, of another sexual orientation, and of another religion.¹⁰ Based on indicator variables that equal one when the respondent reports not wanting a neighbor who is a part of each of these groups, we construct a Neighbors Index that captures an underlying predisposition to reject outgroup neighbors (with lower values signaling a higher predisposition to tolerate outgroup neighbors). Third, we document the size and composition of respondents’ social networks. These outcomes involve costly behavior by respondents and reflect their degree of social integration: “*With how many people that you know would you be willing to discuss personal problems?*” and “*Out of the [X] persons you mentioned in the previous question, how many belong to each of the following groups? Former conscripts; from another province; college graduates; practicing Catholics.*” We build a Neighbor Diversity Index with the indicators for having a close acquaintance from each of these groups, which allows us to capture participants’ inclination to be close with people from different demographics.

As for behaviors that are functional to the state, we examine participants’ willingness to acknowledge and comply with what the state expects and requires from its citizens. These include respecting the state’s role as a fiscal authority, recognizing its monopoly on violence, and engaging with the channels foreseen for civic participation. We thus build a Civic Values Index with answers to a question eliciting participants’ attitudes toward tax evasion (“*How justifiable is it to evade taxes?*”), a question assessing their inclination to take the law into their own hands to punish criminals (“*To what extent do you approve*

⁹These questions allow for a 4-item Likert scale answer, so we build indicator variables that we aggregate into indexes following Anderson (2008). See Appendix C for further details.

¹⁰We also inquire about immigrant workers, which we treat differently as it corresponds to foreign individuals. We report the results on immigrant workers together with a question about trust in other nationalities (Appendix Table A13).

of people taking the law into their own hands when the State doesn't punish criminals?"), and a question measuring their voting behavior (*"How often do you go to vote?"*). In addition to the Civic Values Index, we measure participant's inclination to trust national institutions, a key attitude that affects institutional engagement and thus contributes to the state's functionality. Specifically, we build an Institutional Trust Index with answers to questions measuring trust in the supreme court and in the armed forces (*"How much do you trust each of the following institutions?"*). In sum, the Civic Values Index and the Institutional Trust Index enable an examination of conscription's role in promoting attitudes that are conducive to the functionality facet of nation-building.

Finally, we include additional questions to test for possible mechanisms. Crucially, we introduce an open-ended question asking respondents to describe in their own words the main values that were transmitted through conscription in Argentina: *"Some people think that compulsory military service instilled a set of values and lessons to those who served, while others do not think that was the case. In your opinion, what values or lessons were transmitted to conscripts, and how? If you think there was actually no transmission of values or lessons, please say so and explain why you think that is the case."* We also ask respondents how often they talk about this topic with close acquaintances and relatives.

3.1.3 Administrative Data

We combine our survey data with administrative data on the conscription lottery results in every year covered by our sample, allowing us to determine which participants were called to serve in the military based on their lottery numbers. We obtain these lottery results from two sources: a dataset made available from previous work by Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky (2011) and our own archival work in the Argentine Army's Historical Archives. From Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky (2011) we obtain lottery number assignments for all cohorts and cutoff numbers for every year until 1984. From 1985 onward, cutoff numbers varied across military districts, which are not included in their data.¹¹ Thus, we obtain the

¹¹Military districts were aligned with provinces for the most part. The province of Buenos Aires included the districts of Bahía Blanca, Junín, La Plata, San Martín, and Tandil; the province of Córdoba included Córdoba and Río Cuarto; and the province of Santa Fe included Rosario and Santa Fe. The military district of Santa Cruz included the provinces of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego (0.5% of our sample corresponds to this district). Note also that for two cohorts, 1976 and 1984, cutoff numbers varied across the five Army corps, which were large divisions that cut across provinces. For the purposes of this paper, however, these two exceptions to how the lottery worked do not undermine our approach: Observations for participants belonging to the 1976 cohort are dropped anyway (as explained in section 2). Moreover, the difference between the highest and lowest cutoff numbers across Army corps in 1984 was only 72, so we drop any individual whose ID falls between these cutoff numbers to ensure that we exclude observations for which it

district-varying cutoff numbers from the Argentine Army’s Historical Archive for every year between 1985 and 1994. We match these lottery and cutoff numbers to participants in our surveys based on the last 3 digits of their national IDs and their district of residence at age 16.

3.1.4 Sample Characteristics and Representativeness

Table A1 in the Appendix presents summary statistics on the main sample. The average age of our participants is 58.6 years, and the average number of immigrant grandparents is 1.6. Moreover, nearly 40% of our respondents come from households in which neither parent completed high school, and only 13% come from a household in which a parent has a college degree. Interestingly, Table A1 shows that there are no significant differences in these and other demographic dimensions between participants who served in the military and those who did not.

We conduct various analyses to ascertain the quality and representativeness of our sample. First, we test whether there’s differential selection into the sample depending on whether a participant’s lottery number was above or below the threshold that determined being called to serve. If the frequency of individuals with lottery numbers that were called to serve was different in our sample compared to the general population, we would be concerned that the lottery outcome affected the probability of participating in the survey. Table A3 in the Appendix shows that the share of individuals in our sample who received a high lottery number is similar to the population share (obtained from Galiani, Rossi and Schargrofsky (2011)). This implies that having been called to serve bears no relation to the likelihood of answering our survey. Importantly, Table A3 also addresses concerns about excess mortality among those who served in the military, which could also introduce bias in our sample: If serving had increased mortality rates, then the share of study participants who served (and who were surveyed decades after serving) should be lower than the overall share of the population that was conscripted decades ago.

We further investigate the representativeness of our sample by comparing the demographic characteristics of study participants with those of men who have participated in other nationally-representative surveys in Argentina. In particular, we focus on the 2022 Argentine Census and on those who have been surveyed by the World Values Survey (WVS) in Argentina. In both cases, we consider individuals who belong to the cohorts covered in our sample. Table A4 examines geographic and educational characteristics, comparing our

is unknown if they were required to serve or not.

sample with the census: our respondents exhibit a higher educational attainment and are more likely to be from the country’s capital. These differences, which are not uncommon in online surveys (more educated, more urban individuals), do not jeopardize the internal validity of our results. Moreover, Appendix tables B1 and B2 show that the main results are qualitatively similar if one restricts the sample to individuals from a low SES background or to those who are not from Buenos Aires City (though the decrease in sample size limits our ability to precisely estimate some of the effects). Additionally, Table A5 compares the national values and the civic values of our respondents to those surveyed in the WVS, conditioning on year-of-birth fixed effects. We find no differences between the civic and national values reported by participants in the WVS and those in our data, which suggests that the behaviors that align with nation-building in our sample are largely representative of those of Argentinian men born between 1944 and 1975.

3.2 Methods

We are interested in estimating the causal impact of conscription on a set of outcomes. The challenge we need to overcome is that individuals who serve are not similar to individuals who do not serve in terms of ex-ante characteristics—that is, there is selection into the military. We deal with this by exploiting the conscription lottery, which provides an exogenous source of variation for military service—an instrument—and allows the estimation of two-stage least-squares (2SLS) models (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996).

We estimate 2SLS models of the following form:

$$served_i = \alpha highnumber_i + \mu_{c(i)}^{fs} + \delta_{d(i)}^{fs} + \Gamma' X_i + \nu_i \quad (1)$$

$$y_i = \beta served_i + \mu_{c(i)} + \delta_{d(i)} + \Theta' X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

Where equation (1) corresponds to the first stage and equation (2) to the second stage of the 2SLS model; y_i is an outcome of interest, $served_i$ is an indicator for having served in the military, $highnumber_i$ is an indicator for having a lottery number that is above the cutoff that determined who was called to serve, $\mu_{c(i)}^{fs}$ and $\mu_{c(i)}$ are vectors of cohort fixed effects, and $\delta_{d(i)}^{fs}$ and $\delta_{d(i)}$ are vectors of fixed effects for district of residence at age 16.¹²

¹²Since cutoff numbers could vary across military districts starting in 1985, one could include fixed effects at the district-cohort level for those years. We replicate all main analyses under this specification (Table B6) and show that our results are largely unchanged. However, this approach is very taxing on the data, given

X_i is a set of additional controls to improve precision. These include a set of individual characteristics determined before the lottery: indicators for having a father who served in the military, for the educational levels of the respondent’s father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents.¹³ Importantly, however, we also provide results without accounting for these ancestral characteristics, showing that the main findings are statistically and economically very similar if one does not account for these pre-treatment controls. We also account for a survey-round indicator when the outcome was measured in both survey rounds. Finally, we cluster standard errors at the last 3 digits of the ID-times-cohort level throughout the paper, as this is the level at which treatment was assigned (Abadie et al., 2022).

The coefficient of interest, β , is an estimate for the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), which captures the average treatment effect on the population of ‘compliers’: the set of individuals who only serve if they are required to do so.¹⁴ Table A2 provides a characterization of compliers and how they compare to the full sample in terms of background characteristics. The only sizable difference is that compliers are less likely to have at least one parent who finished high school or college. This is consistent with compliers coming from more disadvantaged backgrounds.

We attempt to falsify the validity of our design by running a balance test using covariates determined before the lottery. Table 1 reports the coefficients and clustered standard errors of regressing the instrument (*highnumber_i*) on different subsets of covariates, controlling for cohort and district fixed effects. We find no evidence that these ex-ante characteristics can predict the instrument. This is in line with the random nature of our instrument and with the fact that IDs in Argentina do not convey individuals’ information or demographic characteristics. Importantly, the F-statistic for joint significance in the last column is 0.75 (p=0.66). Moreover, as shown in Appendix Table A3 and discussed in Section 3.1, the share of individuals in our sample who received a high lottery number is similar to the population

the amount of fixed effects included and that some district-cohort cells are singletons. Moreover, there are no substantive differences in the cutoff numbers that determined eligibility to serve across districts within each cohort. For example, the largest districts used cutoff numbers that were not far apart from each other — Province of Buenos Aires, City of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Mendoza (where 69% of the population resided in 1991 according to the census) display mean and median ranges of 232 and 224 numbers throughout the 1985–1994 period.

¹³We also observe whether parents are Argentinian or not, but we don’t use it since it is highly correlated with the number of immigrant grandparents, which is a more informative variable overall.

¹⁴Not every conscript was a complier, as there could be volunteers or individuals who would have served later in life but were forced to do so earlier by the lottery. Thus, even though we refer to ‘conscripts’ throughout the paper, it should be kept in mind that the effects we estimate are only identified from conscripts that were also compliers.

share, which is consistent with the instrument being randomly allocated within our sample as well.

Table 1: Balance test

	High number				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Father served in military	-0.019 (0.017)				-0.019 (0.017)
Father: Secondary educ.		-0.015 (0.019)			-0.016 (0.020)
Father: Higher educ.		-0.022 (0.022)			-0.033 (0.026)
Mother: Secondary educ.			-0.017 (0.019)		-0.007 (0.021)
Mother: Higher educ.			0.009 (0.024)		0.025 (0.028)
One immigrant grandp.				0.003 (0.025)	0.003 (0.025)
Two immigrant grandp's				0.024 (0.023)	0.024 (0.023)
Three immigrant grandp's				0.007 (0.032)	0.006 (0.032)
Four immigrant grandp's				-0.013 (0.024)	-0.016 (0.024)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Each column regresses the instrument for having served in the military on sets of ex-ante characteristics, controlling for cohort and district fixed effects. The instrument is an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implied being required to serve. The control group is low-number individuals. The F-statistic for joint significance in the last column equals 0.75 ($p=0.66$). Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

4 Results

This section examines the scope for conscription to promote behaviors that are conducive to and consistent with nation-building. A starting point for such an empirical examination is

acknowledging that there are different behavioral dimensions that align with nation-building (Hippler, 2005).¹⁵ One of these pertains to social integration—that is, promoting a shared identity that fosters belonging to and adherence toward a national community. This facet of nation-building is in line with Anderson (1983)’s envisioning of nations as imagined communities, as nation-building takes the form of the consolidation of a cohesive community to which members feel a strong sense of affiliation.

A second behavioral dimension that aligns with nation-building pertains to views and attitudes that enhance the functionality of the national state’s apparatus. These include the adoption of norms that underscore the legitimacy of the state to collect taxes and retain the monopoly of violence, as well as trust in and support for the procedures and institutions with which its citizens are expected to engage (Krebs, 2004). It is an empirical question whether or not this dimension moves in synchrony with the social integration dimension of nation-building.

This section begins with an assessment of conscription’s legacy of national identity and social integration, and proceeds with an analysis of the extent to which it promotes behaviors that are desirable from the standpoint of the state’s functionality. The section then presents evidence pertaining to other potential behavioral consequences from compulsory military service, and it closes with an examination of robustness checks.

4.1 National Identity and Social Integration

We begin by examining whether conscription instills a sense of national community in those who served. To that end, Table 2 starts by documenting the first stage of our two-stage least-squares approach. Columns 1–2, Panel B, show that the likelihood that someone who was not called to serve joined the military was 12%, and that the probability rose by 39 percentage points for those who received a lottery number that was above the cutoff. These first stage estimates are quantitatively and qualitatively identical to those documented by Ertola Navajas et al. (2022) in a study that leverages a different sampling methodology, which further corroborates our sample’s representativeness.¹⁶ Moreover, the effective F-statistics

¹⁵The dimensions of nation-building that we discuss here, following Hippler (2005), are in line with a recent characterization by Rohner and Zhuravskaya (2024), which discusses three types of outcomes that are conducive to and consistent with nation-building: state capacity (which we characterize as behaviors that promote the functionality of the national state), peace (which we refer to as social integration), and prosperity. The extent to which conscription has been conducive to prosperity is outside the scope of this study.

¹⁶Our first stage estimates are also consistent with the first stage documented in Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky (2011), although we find a smaller point estimate. The discrepancy is likely explained by the

(Olea and Pflueger, 2013) of 487 and 492 of the first stage underscore the fact that the instrument is powerful.

Table 2: First Stage and National Values

	Served		National Values Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares				
Served			0.24**	0.23**
			(0.11)	(0.11)
Panel B: First Stage and Reduced Form				
High number	0.39***	0.39***	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Effective F-stat	487	492		
Control mean	0.12	0.12	-0.04	-0.04
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Columns 1–2 show the first stage coefficient under Panel B, including the effective F-statistic by Olea and Pflueger (2013). Columns 3–4 show 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the National Values Index, which combines pride in nationality and attachment to the nation. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Columns 3 and 4 proceed with an examination of conscription’s effect on national identity as captured by the National Values Index described in Section 3.1. The reduced form-estimates show that receiving a high-lottery number increases the National Values Index by 0.09 standard deviation units (Panel B), while the two-stage least-squares estimates show that serving in the military increases the index by +0.23 standard deviation units

fact that our sample includes several additional cohorts that were conscripted after the end of the military government.

(Panel A).¹⁷ Notably, the estimated effects that account for ancestral characteristics are economically and statistically no different than those with no controls beyond cohort and district fixed-effects (which are necessary for the instrument to be valid, as discussed in Section 3). The results of Table 2 thus underscore the scope of conscription to instill a national identity on those who served versus those who did not.

Do these effects reflect an inclination to be socially integrated with and open to fellow nationals, or do they only capture a heightened sense of patriotism? Table 3 turns to an analysis of conscription’s effect on various measures of social integration and openness to fellow nationals. Columns 1 and 2 examine the number of Argentinians (out of 10) that the respondent feels similar to “in the most important things.” We interpret this as perceived social distance from other Argentinians (higher values imply lower distance), which has a direct connection to group identity and the strength of social cleavages (Shayo, 2009). Receiving a high lottery number increases by 0.26 the number of people the respondent feels similar to (Panel B), while conscription’s overall effect on this outcome (Panel A) is of 0.65. The latter represents a 16% increase over the control group mean (low-number individuals), who report feeling similar to around 4 people, on average.

Columns 3–4 turn to an analysis of survey outcomes that have been used in other nationally-representative surveys (e.g., World Values Survey) to elicit respondents’ tendency to be tolerant with and open to others. In particular, these columns have as a dependent variable the Neighbors Index described in Section 3.1, which captures an inclination to reject neighbors from different origins (i.e., lower values are in line with a tendency toward openness). Notably, both the reduced form and the 2SLS estimates reveal a durable negative effect of serving in the military on the tendency to reject different types of neighbors, with the latter estimates indicating a decrease of 0.28 standard deviations. Crucially, an examination of the components of the Neighbors Index reveals that respondents who served in the military are substantially more open to neighbors who are outgroups, in line with a national social integration that erodes other relevant cleavages. Indeed, Appendix Table A7 indicates that serving in the military reduces the likelihood of rejecting indigenous people and people of another sexual orientation, and it decreases the tendency to reject low-SES neighbors, particularly among those who come from a middle-to-high SES-background (i.e., among those with at least one parent who finished high school, in line with the erosion of the socioeconomic cleavage).

¹⁷Table A6 shows that these effects are similar across the individual components of each index.

Table 3: Perceived Similarity, Rejection of Outgroup Neighbors, and Social Network Diversity

	Similarity		Neighbors Index		Network Diversity Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.63*	0.65**	-0.29**	-0.28**	0.34**	0.31**
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.25**	0.26**	-0.11**	-0.11**	0.13**	0.12**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control mean	4.12	4.12	0.07	0.07	-0.10	-0.10
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the number of people a respondent feels similar to “in the most important things,” out of 10 randomly chosen Argentinians (columns 1–2); on an index capturing rejection of outgroup neighbors (columns 3–4); and on an index capturing how many different outgroups are included in the respondent’s close social network (columns 5–6). Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

An important question that remains is whether these survey outcomes are consistent with measurable behavior that one can detect decades after military service. To that end, we turn to an analysis of respondents’ social networks. In particular, we focus on participants’ inclination to be close friends with different groups of people. Columns 5 and 6 have as an outcome the Network Diversity Index, which is a summary index constructed with indicators for being close friends with someone belonging to each of the groups asked about in the survey (see Section 3.1). In line with conscription’s role as a promoter of openness to fellow nationals from all backgrounds, we find that serving in the military durably increases the diversity of the network of close friends by 0.31 standard deviations. Similarly, decades after the conscription lottery took place, we find that those who received a high lottery number

have a significantly more diverse network than those with a low number.

Table A8 further examines each of the components used to construct the Network Diversity Index, which provides further support to the claim that conscription fosters intergroup bonds among those who belong to the nation. Indeed, serving in the military increases the likelihood of being close friends with someone from another province, it makes it more likely for those coming from low-SES backgrounds to be friends with high-SES individuals, and it makes it more likely for non-Catholics to be friends with Catholics. Interestingly, there are no economic or statistical differences in the size of the network of those who served and those who did not serve, which indicates that conscription fosters the formation of friendships across different social cleavages despite its limited role in promoting more close friendships.

Also in the Appendix, Table A9 presents the baseline results under an OLS specification. We find muted effects throughout, which may be indicative of measurement error in the endogenous regressor or that compliers are more sensitive to the influence of military service compared to volunteers or dropouts. This is in line with results from other studies about conscription in Argentina, which also find attenuated effects under OLS and stress the latter interpretation (Ertola Navajas et al., 2022).

Finally, we also explore whether conscription—in its pursuit of integrating a diverse group of individuals and promoting certain values—homogenized beliefs among former conscripts. This is a key idea featured in the seminal work by Alesina, Reich and Riboni (2020). In this sense, the process of nation-building can erode diversity within the population. We find suggestive—although imprecise—evidence that military service in Argentina led to more homogeneous preferences among those who served.

We implement this analysis in two ways: First, we compute measures of tightness of beliefs at the individual level, following Winkler (2021). Specifically, we count how many times each individual holds the same belief as the typical individual in his reference group. We focus on the set of seven beliefs considered throughout the paper, so our measures of tightness of beliefs range from 0 to 7.¹⁸ We obtain two measures by varying the reference group: one considers all men in the same cohort, while the other considers all men in the same cohort-district cell.

The objective of these measures, as discussed by Winkler (2021), is to capture how similar individual beliefs are to those held by others in his group. Table A11 presents the results from estimating our 2SLS model with tightness of beliefs on the left hand side. We observe

¹⁸The set of beliefs includes the National Values Index, Similarity, the Neighbors Diversity Index, the Civic Values Index, the Institutional Trust Index, Demand for Regulation, and the Trust in Nationalities Index.

positive coefficients that correspond to 6.0–9.4% increases in belief tightness, although not statistically different from zero at the 5% level.

Second, we zoom-in on the socioeconomic cleavage—arguably the most salient cleavage in Argentina as in most of Latin America.¹⁹ We analyze whether military service affects the difference in average beliefs between high and low socioeconomic background individuals. Figure A2 presents the results for the set of beliefs studied throughout the paper. In all cases except one, we see smaller intergroup differences among former conscripts than among those who didn’t serve. This implies that conscription homogenized beliefs across ex-ante determined socioeconomic groups.

Taken together, these results are consistent with a homogenizing role played by military service in terms of cultural values, including national identity and social integration, but also civic values, attitudes toward foreigners, and economic preferences.

4.2 State’s Functionality – Civic Values and Institutional Trust

We now turn to conscription’s role in promoting behaviors that contribute to the national state’s functionality. In particular, our analysis focuses on respondents’ predisposition to respect the state’s functions and comply with its procedures. Table 4 examines the effect of serving in the military on a Civic Values Index, which captures a participant’s willingness to engage with the state’s political processes (i.e., voting), to support its role as a fiscal authority (i.e., paying taxes), and to acknowledge and comply with its monopoly of violence (i.e., avoid taking the law into one’s own hands). As opposed to conscription’s effect on national social integration, Columns 1 and 2 show that serving in the military has no detectable impact on civic behaviors that are desirable from the standpoint of the functionality of the national state. Indeed, the two-stage least-squares estimate is 0.02 standard deviations, while the reduced-form estimate of having received a high lottery number is of 0.01 standard deviations. Appendix Table A6 shows that these null effects are observed for each of the components of the Civic Values Index. Notably, the baseline effect of serving in the military on voting behavior is insignificant. Given that voting is a measurable behavior that captures democratic engagement, this result also suggests that serving in the military is not necessarily conducive to pro or antidemocratic attitudes.

¹⁹This is in line with the fact that Latin America is one of the most economically uneven regions in the world (Eslava and Valencia Caicedo, 2023), coupled with the fact that other relevant cleavages (e.g., linguistic, religious, ethnic) are not particularly salient in Argentina.

Table 4: Civic Values and Institutional Trust

	Civic Values Index		Institutional Trust Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares				
Served	0.02 (0.10)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.13)
Panel B: Reduced Form				
High number	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control mean	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03
Obs.	3086	3086	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the Civic Values Index (columns 1–2), which combines voting behavior with attitudes toward paying taxes and taking the law into one's own hands, and on the Institutional Trust Index (columns 3–4), which combines trust in the supreme court and in the armed forces. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A related dimension of behavior that affects the state's functionality is the degree of trust that individuals feel towards the institutions through which the state operates. Indeed, higher institutional trust could enhance the state's efficacy by enabling citizens' engagement and their willingness to collaborate with the state. To assess this dimension of behavior, Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 focus on the impact of conscription on the Institutional Trust Index described in Section 3.1. Notably, serving in the military has no detectable effect on the underlying tendency of participants to trust national institutions, a finding that Appendix Table A6 corroborates for each of the components.²⁰ Table A10 shows these results under

²⁰Interestingly, the point estimate of conscription's effect on trust in the armed forces is negative, although

ordinary least squares, which are also small and statistically insignificant.

Overall, these findings corroborate a limited role of conscription as a promoter of behaviors that are conducive to the functionality dimension of nation-building. The disconnect between the two dimensions of nation-building implies that promoting the national body’s social integration is not necessarily tied to the promotion of civic behaviors. This suggests that institutions that have been shown to contribute to one of these dimensions—e.g., the role of universal education in promoting civic attitudes (Bandiera et al., 2019))—are not necessarily conducive to national social integration, and vice versa.

4.3 Other Behavioral Consequences

The results thus far show that conscription has a sizable and durable effect on the social integration component of nation-building. Since this integration comes about on the basis of a stronger national identity, a related question is whether serving in the military could have affected other behaviors and social preferences, particularly those that relate to foreign individuals and institutions. Table A13 shows that conscription did not significantly affect trust in people with other nationalities or in foreign institutions like the IMF. This suggests that the strengthening of a national identity did not come at the expense of attitudes toward people and institutions that are foreign to the national social body.

We next turn to outcomes capturing migration and family structure, where a tendency to be socially integrated with fellow nationals could also manifest. Table A14 shows that serving in the military did not affect the probability of moving to another province and had a marginally significant effect on moving from larger to smaller localities, or vice versa. Similarly, Table A15 shows that the likelihood that former conscripts enter a relationship with people from a different background is also not affected. This suggests that conscription does not promote nor preclude the formation of diverse couples in terms of province, religion, or socioeconomic status, which is not incompatible with conscription’s role in improving attitudes towards outgroups and fostering close relationships with outgroup members (as documented in Table 3).

How did nation-building through conscription affect religion in Argentina? The ex-ante consequences of conscription on religiosity are ambiguous. On the one hand, previous research has shown that strengthening of a national identity may weaken other dimensions of identity, such as regional or ethnic ones (Depetris-Chauvin, Durante and Campante, 2020;

imprecisely estimated. Although this may seem counterintuitive, this result may partly reflect the negative experience that several conscripts had during service, which many recall as a waste of time (as suggested by some of the findings that we discuss in section 5).

Bagues and Roth, 2022). Hence, nation-building through conscription could have weakened religiosity and religious affiliation in Argentina. On the other hand, a stronger national identity could strengthen attachment to other social markers that were predominant in Argentina when participants in our sample served in the military, such as Catholicism. Indeed, Catholic affiliation in Argentina was 91% in 1970 (Pew Research Center 2014). Appendix Table A20 shows that serving in the military appears to have no meaningful impact on religious affiliation or religiosity, suggesting that the overall effect of conscription on the integration component of nation-building did not reinforce nor weaken the religious identity of those who served.

Finally, given the documented effects on attitudes related to others who belong to the nation, we examine whether conscription could have also affected other-regarding preferences. To examine this possibility, we use experimentally validated measures of generalized trust, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, moral universalism (Falk et al., 2018; Enke, Rodriguez-Padilla and Zimmermann, 2022), and—as discussed in the Pre-Analysis Plan for Round 2—an incentivized measure of cooperation with outgroups. Table A16 shows that conscription had no effect on these outcomes. Similarly, the last column of Table A16 also shows no impact on beliefs about gender equality (disagreeing with the statement “*When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.*”). These results, alongside the null effects on civic values, complement previous findings showing that serving in the military fosters a military mindset (Ertola Navajas et al., 2022): Despite fostering a psychology that extols military personality traits, we find no evidence that conscription may foster or undermine behaviors regarding pro-sociality or gender inequities in the labor market.

4.4 Robustness Checks

In this section, we provide evidence that our results are robust to different approaches, specifications, and subsets of our data. Specifically, we re-estimate all main results in the paper for different groups of individuals and under different sets of fixed effects, we adjust standard errors for multiple hypothesis testing, we pursue a regression discontinuity design around lottery cutoffs, and we leverage a (natural) placebo experiment to falsify the exclusion restriction.

In Section 3.1.4, we describe the characteristics of individuals that make our sample. In terms of representativeness, we find that our sample tends to be more educated and more likely to reside in Buenos Aires City, the country’s capital. Although this is not a threat to the internal validity of our estimates, we explore how robust our results are if we focus

exclusively on individuals from a low SES background (Table B1) and from outside Buenos Aires City (Table B2). In both cases, we find that all the main results from our paper remain roughly the same, despite a fall in precision due to the smaller sample sizes.

Another robustness check we implement is in relation to the empirical model. As discussed in Section 3, the Argentine military draft evolved over time and, for certain years, cutoff numbers were determined at the military district level. Although differences were not large within any given cohort, we redo all our main analyses including fixed effects at the cohort-district level, to account for the fact that randomization was done at that level. Table B6 presents the results. Although statistical power suffers from the considerably larger amounts of coefficients that need to be estimated and the loss of some observations due to some district-cohort cells having only one observation, effects remain roughly similar in magnitude and significance. Alternatively, in Table B7 we also re-estimate all main regressions under a specification that only controls for cohort fixed effects, and also find that results are robust to that approach.

We also consider a multiple hypothesis testing adjustment for the standard errors of the main outcomes in the paper. Table B8 shows False Discovery Rate (FDR) adjusted sharpened q-values, following Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) and Anderson (2008). The decrease in statistical significance is small, with all main findings remaining significant at the 10% level.

We also collected data on the 1976 birth cohort, the last cohort to face the draft lottery. However, because of the sudden end to military conscription after the death of a conscript in 1994, this cohort was never incorporated. This provides an ideal placebo experiment, allowing us to test whether the lottery had an impact through other means besides conscription. In other words, if the exclusion restriction holds, we should find no effects on this cohort. Table B9 presents the impact of having a high number on all main outcomes considered in the paper, using the previous year cutoff number. We find that most coefficients are small, and all are statistically insignificant. Moreover, the relatively larger coefficients tend to go in opposite directions. This provides reassuring evidence that our findings cannot be explained by omitted factors that mediate the relationship between lottery numbers and our main outcome variables.

Finally, the setting also allows us to estimate regression discontinuity models, leveraging the discontinuity in the likelihood of being called to serve based on whether a lottery number fell above or below the threshold set by the military. This allows us to estimate the local average treatment effects (LATE) of conscription for individuals near the threshold. Although this approach is heavily taxing on statistical power, it also helps to address the concern

that incentives for draft avoidance may affect some of our results (Cruces, Rossi and Scharrotsky, 2023). Since cutoffs were announced several months after the health examination, incentives for draft avoidance should not vary discontinuously around the cutoff. Figure B1 presents a manipulation test and the plots for the first stage and the reduced form impacts on national values and civic values. Moreover, Table B12 presents LATE estimates using a first-order polynomial and optimal bandwidth selection following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Although we are underpowered to precisely estimate effects, these results are in line with our baseline patterns.

5 Mechanisms

We now present suggestive evidence on the mechanisms through which conscription may have enduringly shaped national values and social integration. In subsection 5.1, we start by implementing text analysis tools on an open-ended question, which reveals that these outcomes were directly inculcated during military service. Moreover, we also find that conscripts tend to adopt salient ideological features of the government under which they served. In subsection 5.2, we show how exposure to and interaction with outgroups in the military is a complementary mechanism that reinforces (but does not fully account for) the baseline patterns. We also explore alternative channels, such as labor market outcomes, family formation, religiosity, and combat exposure, finding little support for these alternative mechanisms.

5.1 Inculcation of values

We begin by examining the role of value inculcation during service as an underlying mechanism. To that end, we examine an open-ended question where we asked all respondents to share in their own words the main values or lessons transmitted during conscription in Argentina (see Section 3.1).²¹ Open-ended questions have been shown to provide a valuable window into understanding rationales that may be hard to observe in other ways (Ferrario and Stantcheva, 2022). We obtained rich answers in general: the median and mean answers were 15 and 21 words long, respectively.

We implement two complementary approaches to extract information from the answers.

²¹This question was asked in the first round only and its order in the survey was randomized, with the objective of priming half of the respondents before they answered questions on national and civic values. Table A21 shows no impacts from this intervention, both on former and non-former conscripts.

First, we estimate a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003), which allows to retrieve in an unsupervised manner the topics that respondents discuss in their answers. Under an LDA, each answer is modeled as a mixture of latent variables (topics), which in turn are probability distributions over words. In particular, words that tend to occur together receive higher weight under a given topic. Second, we also build bags of words related to the concepts we want to analyze, which provides more precise measures of the topics mentioned in the answers.

Figure 1 presents word clouds of the main terms associated with four of the five topics we extract using the LDA.²² Topic 1, which is the most frequent (22.5% mean prevalence), makes reference to national values and social integration, featuring words such as ‘homeland,’ ‘country,’ ‘comradeship,’ and ‘companionship.’ Topics 2 and 3 (both with 21.4% mean prevalence) focus on traditional military values, including ‘respect,’ ‘obedience,’ ‘discipline,’ and ‘order.’ Finally, Topic 4 (16.3% average prevalence) captures negative opinions, especially about time-wasting. The last subsection of Appendix A presents, for each topic, the four responses where they are most prevalent. Finally, it should be noted that there are virtually no terms that can be related to civic values, which aligns with conscription’s insignificant effects on this dimension of behavior.


We also implement a complementary analysis where we specify what we want to measure by building bags of words (word lists) related to different topics.²³ This approach provides precise measures of the prevalence of each topic, and it allows us to examine whether those who were conscripted are more likely to highlight a specific set of values. Topics that former conscripts are more likely to mention, particularly if not prevalent among those who were not called to serve, provide direct evidence of values that conscripts associate with the military because of their lived experience and not because of common associations or public discussions among those who were not called to serve. We consider the following topics: ‘national values,’ ‘social integration,’ ‘civic values,’ ‘authoritarianism,’ ‘discipline,’ and ‘time-wasting.’ The list of terms included under each topic can be found in Appendix C. We consider indicator variables that equal 1 if at least one of the terms is mentioned in an answer and estimate 2SLS models following the baseline specification in the paper.

²²We pre-process texts using the following procedure: we translate them into English using DeepL; remove punctuation and special characters; convert contractions; remove stopwords; tag parts-of-speech (POS) to estimate the model only on nouns; and lemmatize using POS tags to improve accuracy.

²³The process of building the bags of words involved two steps. First, each coauthor independently listed terms related to each topic. Second, we classified responses on whether they mentioned each topic or not, and checked for a random subset of responses whether the classification was accurate or not. Based on the second step, we included additional terms and modified existing ones to avoid contamination from other terms that share the same root or ending.



(a) Topic 1



(b) Topic 2



(c) Topic 3



(d) Topic 4

Figure 1: Topic word-clouds

Note: The figure shows word clouds obtained from an unsupervised natural language processing technique based on open-ended responses about the type of values that are instilled in the military. Specifically, each word cloud reflects the main terms associated with topics estimated from a 5-topic Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). The open-ended question was only asked in the first survey round. The mean prevalence of each topic is, respectively, 22.5%, 21.4%, 21.4%, and 16.3%. Overall, the figure shows that national values and social integration feature prominently in the responses.

Table 5 presents the results, with Columns 1–6 ordered by their mean prevalence in the control group (low-number individuals). Columns 1 and 2 show that ‘authoritarianism’ is mentioned by 44% of low-number individuals while ‘discipline’ is mentioned by 35% of these individuals, indicating the high prevalence of these topics. The probability of mentioning the former appears to decrease because of conscription by 7 p.p. (16%), although imprecisely so, while the latter appears to be unaffected by military service. Columns 3 and 4 show that 20% and 16% of responses mention terms related to ‘national values’ and ‘social integration’ in the control group. Serving in the military substantially increases the probability of talking about these topics relative to the control group: +5 p.p. (25%) in the first case, although noisily estimated, and +10 p.p. (76%) in the second case. Column 5 shows that ‘time-wasting’ follows a similar pattern: 14% of responses in the control group make reference to this topic, which goes up by 5 p.p. (36%) due to serving, although it is also imprecisely estimated. Finally, the last column shows that conscription has an insignificant effect of 2 p.p. on referencing ‘civic values’, which is in line with conscription’s limited role in fostering desirable civic behaviors.

Column 7 shows that, despite having no incentives to do so, former conscripts wrote significantly longer answers (+21% number of words). This is in line with former conscripts being more informed of what types of values are transmitted in the military, as well as caring more about the subject. Finally, immediately after the open-ended question we also asked “*how often do you talk about these matters?*,” allowing for a 4-item Likert scale that included: never, almost never, occasionally/at most once per year, and frequently/more than once per year. We find that serving in the military significantly increases the probability of saying ‘occasionally’ or ‘frequently’ by 17 p.p., which represents a 33% increase over the mean for low-number individuals (Column 8).

Table 5: Value inculcation: Bags of words

	Topics						Log-Length	Freq.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Authorit.	Discip.	National V.	Integration	Time Waste	Civic V.		
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares								
Served	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.21** (0.10)	0.17*** (0.06)
Panel B: Reduced Form								
High number	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.08** (0.04)	0.07*** (0.03)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.44	0.35	0.20	0.13	0.14	0.09	2.71	0.52
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes in Columns 1-6 are indicators that equal 1 for respondents who, when asked about the values inculcated in the military, mentioned at least one term related to Authoritarianism, Discipline, National Values, Social Integration, the military as a waste of time, or Civic Values, respectively. Column 7 regresses the log of the number of words in the answer to the open-ended question, and Column 8 regresses an indicator for talking “occasionally/at most once per year” or “frequently/more than once per year” about the types of values transmitted in the military. The open-ended question was only asked in the first survey round. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent’s father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Overall, former conscripts are more likely to discuss national values and social integration as lessons that the military instills, they tend to care more about the values transmitted by such institution (as signaled by the longer answers), and they tend to discuss these issues more frequently with close acquaintances and relatives. These findings suggest that self-persuasion (*i.e.*, discussing the lessons they learned in a year-long costly experience) and narrative repetition (as indicated by the frequency of these conversations) may help explain why the baseline patterns persist for more than 30 years after service.

If former conscripts durably adopt the values instilled during service, then one could expect these conscripts to persistently adopt some of the views of the government under which they served. The scope for the inculcation of values that align with the government is amplified by the many actions that the executive branch could historically undertake to

promote those values within the military.²⁴ Table 6 leverages several historical episodes in Argentina to examine this possibility. First, in 1983, Argentina’s last military government came to an end, giving way to a democratic transition that radically changed the attitude of political leaders with respect to military coups. While before 1983 the armed forces frequently took control of the government by force, it has not happened once since then. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show that conscription’s effect on national values did not vary with the democratic transition, which suggests that these values are instilled on conscripts by both democratic regimes and non-democratic ones. Crucially, however, Columns 3 and 4 show that there is a strong heterogeneity in the impact of military service on civic values: individuals who served after the democratic transition tend to display significantly higher civic values than those who served before (+0.46 p.p.). Conscription under governments committed to democratic values thus seem to strengthen the civic values of those who serve, while the opposite appears to be true for governments that are not committed to these values.²⁵

A second historical episode pertains to changes in government with different positions about the regulation and intervention of the economy. In particular, between 1983 and 1989 Raúl Alfonsín’s interventionist government took office, while between 1990 and 1994 Carlos Menem’s pro-market government did. In line with value inculcation, Columns 3 and 4 show that conscripts who served under the former administration tend to demand higher regulation today (+0.21 p.p. probability of agreeing with the statement that the government should regulate the economy to guarantee its good functioning), while those who served under the latter demand less regulation (-0.84 p.p.). All in all, conscripts continue to display views and attitudes consistent with the government under which they served, which corroborates the scope of value inculcation as an important mechanism underlying the baseline results.

²⁴For instance, by reforming the military justice code (as pursued by President Alfonsín in 1983), removing and/or appointing of superiors that are ideologically aligned with the government (as exemplified by President Menem’s actions upon taking office in 1989), or by affecting the ideological stance of public entities and public media to which servicemen had access (Tedesco, 1996; McSherry, 1997; Ferrari, 2023). Value inculcation during the military could thus take many forms that are not necessarily limited to the direct, explicit promotion of values by superiors.

²⁵We pursue this analysis —before v. after 1983— instead of military v. democratic government because the civic values of the armed forces (and of most of the ruling elite) only changed after the democratic transition. Moreover, there are only four years in our sample’s pre-1983 period that were under a democratic government, so there is a high overlap between the pre-1983 period and military governments.

Table 6: Value inculcation: Transmission of political and economic preferences

	National Values		Civic Values		Demand Regulation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.23** (0.11)	0.23* (0.13)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)
Served x I[post '83]		-0.00 (0.21)		0.46** (0.22)		0.23* (0.14)
Served x I[post '89]						-1.05*** (0.37)
Rows 1+2		0.23 (0.17)		0.27 (0.18)		0.21* (0.11)
Rows 1+2+3						-0.84** (0.35)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.09** (0.04)	0.10* (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
High num. x I[post '83]		-0.03 (0.08)		0.18** (0.08)		0.10* (0.06)
High num. x I[post '89]						-0.25*** (0.07)
Rows 1+2		0.07 (0.06)		0.09 (0.06)		0.09** (0.05)
Rows 1+2+3						-0.16*** (0.05)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	0.52	0.52
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	1972	1972

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. The outcome in Columns 1–2 is the National Values Index, which is a standardized aggregate of two questions (national pride and attachment to the nation). The outcome in Columns 3–4 is the Civic Values Index, which is a standardized aggregate of three questions ((not) justifying evasion, going to vote, and (not) taking the law into your own hands). The outcome in Columns 5–6 is an indicator for agreeing with the statement that “the government should regulate the economy to guarantee its good functioning.” The coefficient of rows 1+2 refers to the effect of serving during 1983–1989 (Alfonsín’s interventionist government). The coefficient of rows 1+2+3 refers to the effect of serving during 1990–1994 (Menem’s pro-market government). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent’s father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, plus round indicator for Civic Values Index. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

5.2 Exposure to outgroups

Studies that have examined intergroup contact in the military have shown that it strengthens the national affiliation of conscripts from regions where such affiliation was weak to begin with (Cáceres-Delpiano et al., 2021; Bagues and Roth, 2022; Okunogbe, 2024). To assess the role of exposure to outgroups as an intervening mechanism behind conscription’s causal effect on national affiliation, we elicited data on intergroup contact during military service. Specifically, in the second round of data collection we asked former conscripts in what province they served, to what extent they served alongside outgroup members, and to what extent they interacted frequently with them.²⁶ Province of service and the composition of servicemen in each unit were arbitrarily chosen by the military and were thus unaffected by conscripts’ choices. However, frequent interactions with outgroups could partially reflect conscripts’ choices, so heterogeneity along this last dimension must be examined with caution.

Table 7 shows that serving in a different province is associated with a much stronger effect on national identity (Column 3), more than double the effect when serving in one’s home province. Moreover, having served alongside outgroups (Column 4) and frequently interacting with them (Column 5) are associated with stronger effects, by approximately 0.08 standard deviation units for a 1 unit increase in the peer-diversity index. These results are consistent with the interpretation that exposure to outgroups from within the country may have reinforced a national identity by weakening some perceived social cleavages.

Crucially, however, the effect of conscription on national values remains highly significant among individuals who were not exposed to a particularly diverse set of peers: the effect on individuals with one standard deviation *less* in peer-diversity exposure is approximately 0.28 p.p. ($p=0.037$). The same holds for individuals who served in their home province ($\beta=0.22$, $p=0.007$). All in all, these results suggest that exposure to outgroups reinforces but does not fully account for conscription’s persistent effect on national affiliation and social integration.

²⁶Specifically, we asked: “Thinking about your fellow conscripts, do you remember if there were... People from another province? Indigenous people? People of low SES? People of high SES? Gay people? People of a non-Catholic religion?” Answers allowed for four options: (i) “Yes and I had frequent contact,” (ii) “Yes, but I didn’t have frequent contact,” (iii) “There were none,” and (iv) “I don’t know/Don’t remember.” We build two sets of indicators, one set for selecting option (i), and another set for selection options (i) or (ii). We then build standardized indexes based on each set of indicators. With respect to province of service, we build an indicator for having served in a different province to their residence at age 16.

Table 7: Intergroup contact: Exposure to diverse peers

	National Values				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares					
Served	0.23** (0.11)	0.34*** (0.12)	0.20** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.12)	0.34*** (0.12)
Served x diff. province			0.38** (0.17)		
Served x peer div. index, any contact				0.08** (0.04)	
Served x peer div. index, freq. contact					0.07** (0.04)
Panel B: Reduced Form					
High number	0.09** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.14** (0.07)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
High num. x diff. province			-0.00 (0.06)		
High num. x peer div. index, any contact				0.09** (0.04)	
High num. x peer div. index, freq. contact					0.07** (0.04)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.04	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
Obs.	3086	2058	2058	2058	2058

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the National Values Index, which combines pride in nationality and attachment to the nation. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Column 2 includes an interaction term with an index capturing the degree of frequent contact with outgroups during the military. Column 3 includes an interaction with a similar index capturing the degree of exposure (with or without frequent contact). Column 4 includes an interaction with serving in a different province from the one where they resided at the time. From Column 2 onward the sample is restricted to the second survey round, as the peer diversity questions were only asked then. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Column 1 also includes a survey round FE. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

5.3 Wartime v. peacetime conscription

Exposure to conflict may be a reason behind the baseline patterns, given that threats or attacks can strengthen group cohesion. To assess the scope for this explanation, we exploit the fact that four cohorts in our sample served during periods of heightened combat risk due to internal conflicts in 1975 and early 1976, and external conflict during the Malvinas/Falklands war in 1982. Importantly, the chance of being exposed to combat was very low, as very few troops were actually mobilized (see Section 2). Table 8 shows that serving during wartime does not affect national values and social integration—if anything, it tends to reduce them—and it leads to having lower civic values.²⁷ This implies that combat is not a mechanism driving our baseline results; on the contrary, it is peacetime conscription that generates the effects.

5.4 Other Channels

Finally, we examine other potential channels that could partly underlie conscription’s long-run effects on nation-building. Specifically, we assess the role of educational attainment, labor market outcomes, family formation, or religiosity, which could have been affected by military service. Table A17 indicates that conscription’s effects on education and occupational choice are economically small and statistically insignificant, which reduces the scope for these outcomes as intervening mechanisms.²⁸ Likewise, conscription appears to have no effect on the likelihood of having a long-term partner or on the type of relationship that respondents have with their partner (Table A19), and it appears to have no meaningful impact on religious affiliation or religiosity (Table A20). Overall, these results reduce the scope for

²⁷The negative effect of wartime conscription on civic values appears to be partially at odds with Erikson and Stoker (2011), who find stronger anti-war attitudes among US-men who were vulnerable to being conscripted during the Vietnam War. However, this seeming contradiction is explained by the fact that Erikson and Stoker analyze attitudes against the Vietnam War, which reflect views related to the politics and social costs surrounding that specific conflict. Hence, a stance against the Vietnam War is not necessarily indicative of other dimensions of civic attitudes or of attitudes toward war in general.

²⁸Galiani, Rossi and Schargrodsky (2011) find economically small and statistically insignificant effects from conscription on unemployment (0.08 percentage points), earnings (1.6 percentage points), and participation in the formal labor market (0.22 percentage points) in Argentina, although they find a significant (but economically small) intent-to-treat effect on the latter two. Our imprecise estimates are thus in line with their findings, and discrepancies with their estimated intent-to-treat effect underscores the difference between the latter and LATE estimates on compliers when non-compliance is non-negligible, as in the Argentine context. Interestingly, however, our intent-to-treat estimates are fully in line with the baseline findings discussed in the paper. Moreover, the small and insignificant effects that we document on labor market outcomes in Argentina are also in line with the (lack of) long-term consequences of the Vietnam draft on earnings and unemployment (Angrist, Chen and Song, 2011).

outcomes pertaining to family and religion to serve as intervening mechanisms.

Table 8: Heterogeneous effects during wartime v. peacetime

	(1) Nat. Values	(2) Similarity	(3) Neighbors	(4) Network	(5) Civic Values	(6) Inst. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.31** (0.12)	0.96** (0.37)	-0.32** (0.15)	0.33** (0.15)	0.12 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.15)
Served x wartime	-0.42* (0.23)	-1.59** (0.73)	0.21 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.27)	-0.52** (0.22)	-0.02 (0.30)
Rows 1+2	-0.11 (0.20)	-0.64 (0.62)	-0.11 (0.22)	0.21 (0.22)	-0.40** (0.18)	-0.05 (0.26)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.11** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.13)	-0.12** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.06)
High num. x wartime	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.70* (0.37)	0.06 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.13)	-0.26** (0.10)	-0.02 (0.16)
Rows 1+2	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.35 (0.34)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.12 (0.12)	-0.21** (0.09)	-0.03 (0.15)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.04	4.12	0.07	-0.10	-0.05	-0.03
Obs.	3086	1994	1994	1994	3086	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes and its interaction with serving during wartime (cohorts incorporated in '74-'75 and in '81-'82). Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. The outcome in Column 1 is the National Values Index, which is a standardized aggregate of two questions ("pride in nationality" and "best country to have been born in"). The outcome in Column 2 is the Civic Values Index, which is a standardized aggregate of three questions ("not justifying evasion," "going to vote," and "(not) taking the law into your own hands"). The outcome in Column 3 is the number of people a respondent feels similar to "in the most important things," out of 10 randomly-chosen Argentinians. The coefficient of rows 1+2 represents the effect for individuals who served during wartime. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the respondent's father and mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6 Conclusion

We explore conscription's role in the process of nation-building. Despite the historical and geographical prevalence of compulsory military service, empirical evidence that informs this issue remains scant. We focus on the case of Argentina, where conscription was historically

determined by a lottery and military service followed a similar structure to other countries in the world. Leveraging random variation in military service arising from the Argentine draft and original data on 3,086 individuals, we provide causal estimates showing that conscription itself has durably contributed to nation-building through the promotion of national social integration, while it has not affected other behaviors that contribute to the functionality of the national state. Because we cover 29 cohorts of conscripts that were exposed to this policy over 28 years ago, we are able to show that the baseline patterns are persistent and robust to different time periods, including democratic and non-democratic regimes.

We establish that the main channel through which military service generates these effects is the direct inculcation of values. Content analysis of open-ended responses indicates that national values and social integration (but not civic values) were actively transmitted during service. We also find evidence consistent with the “contact hypothesis,” as the effects tend to be stronger among individuals who were more exposed to diverse peers in the military. However, this channel does not drive the effects, as conscription’s impact remains large and significant even for individuals with little exposure to outgroups. Moreover, we find no evidence that combat experience or changes in educational, occupational, family, or religious outcomes play a role in our findings. Finally, our results indicate that former conscripts tend to talk more often about the values instilled by the military, which may indicate that narrative repetition and motivated reasoning can be one of the vehicles that help to sustain these lessons in the long run.

Mandatory enlistment is making a comeback around the world (The Economist, 2021). In the United States, there is an ongoing debate about the introduction of compulsory national service to promote social integration (Bridgeland and DiIulio, 2019). In many European countries, most saliently Germany, governments are discussing the reintroduction of military service after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Our research shows that the military may have played an important role in the promotion of national identity and a more integrated society. Similarly, it also suggests that the end of military service in different countries may have been a contributing factor behind a growing social disintegration across the globe. Crucially, however, the fact that value transmission in the military plays a pivotal role in accounting for conscription’s persistent effects on nation-building indicates that reinstating conscription is not necessarily a desirable policy to tackle social disintegration. Indeed, conscription as a nation-building tool also carries an intrinsic risk in contexts where governments may wish to transmit views that could undermine social stability (Rohner and Zhuravskaya, 2023). This underscores the relevance of further research shedding light on practices in the military that foment conscription’s positive effects, while averting or mitigating its potential perils.

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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures

Additional Figures and Tables

Table A1: Summary statistics

	N	Full sample			Means by served status		Diff. (w/ cohort FE)	
		Mean	Min	Max	Yes	No	Coef.	p-val
Served	3086	0.375	0	1	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000
High-number	3086	0.546	0	1	0.855	0.361	0.379	0.000
Age	3086	58.62	47	78	61.98	56.61	-	-
BA metro	3086	0.511	0	1	0.552	0.487	0.023	0.238
High school parent	3086	0.614	0	1	0.586	0.631	-0.025	0.195
College parent	3086	0.136	0	1	0.130	0.140	0.002	0.896
Num. immig. grandp.	3086	1.687	0	4	1.842	1.594	-0.020	0.730
Father served	3086	0.675	0	1	0.671	0.677	0.004	0.848

Note: This table presents summary statistics for the regressor of interest (*Served*), the instrumental variable (*High-number*), and characteristics determined before conscription, for the full sample and by treatment status. The last two columns test for statistically significant differences between conscripts and non-conscripts at the within-cohort level. Conscripts are more likely to come from the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area and from a more disadvantaged background, as proxied by the educational level of the parents.

Table A2: Characterization of compliers

	N	Full sample mean	Compliers mean	Ratio
BA metro	3086	0.511	0.501	0.980
High school parent	3086	0.614	0.547	0.891
College parent	3086	0.136	0.105	0.772
Num. immig. grandp.	3086	1.687	1.680	0.996
Father served	3086	0.675	0.661	0.979


Note: This table presents the mean value of characteristics determined before conscription for the full sample and for the sub-sample of compliers. Compliers are more likely to come from a disadvantaged background, as proxied by the educational level of the parents.

Table A3: Selection into sample by high-number status

Cohort	Pop. Share w/ High Number	Sample Share w/ High Number	Difference	P-Value
1944	0.77	0.94	-0.17**	0.02
1945	0.74	0.72	0.02	0.85
1946	0.79	0.86	-0.07	0.27
1947	0.72	0.65	0.07	0.40
1948	0.71	0.80	-0.09	0.12
1949	0.79	0.73	0.06	0.34
1950	0.76	0.81	-0.05	0.25
1951	0.87	0.88	-0.01	0.79
1952	0.88	0.91	-0.03	0.30
1953	0.86	0.82	0.04	0.31
1954	0.93	0.90	0.03	0.28
1958	0.83	0.82	0.01	0.73
1959	0.68	0.64	0.04	0.39
1960	0.66	0.63	0.03	0.46
1961	0.65	0.64	0.01	0.76
1962	0.68	0.69	-0.01	0.82
1963	0.65	0.65	-0.00	0.96
1964	0.60	0.63	-0.03	0.50
1965	0.61	0.61	-0.00	0.96
1966	0.33	0.39	-0.06	0.20
1967	0.31	0.40	-0.09**	0.03
1968	0.37	0.37	-0.00	0.94
1969	0.41	0.52	-0.11***	0.01
1970	0.47	0.43	0.04	0.33
1971	0.28	0.29	-0.01	0.70
1972	0.11	0.15	-0.04	0.21
1973	0.25	0.20	0.05	0.16
1974	0.28	0.25	0.03	0.37
1975	0.26	0.23	0.03	0.43
Total	0.55	0.55	0.01	0.42

Note: This table tests, cohort by cohort and for the full sample (last row), whether sample shares with high number are statistically different to population shares with high-number. Statistically significant differences would imply that the lottery outcome induces selection into the sample. We find reassuring evidence that there is no observable selection, especially given the negligible difference at the full-sample level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A1: Distribution of last-3 digits of the ID



Note: This graph plots the frequency of last-3 digits of the ID, grouped in 10-digit bins.

Table A4: Sample Representativeness: Geographic and Educational Coverage

	Population Share	Respondent Share	Difference	P-Value
Panel A: District of Origin				
Buenos Aires Province	0.391	0.393	0.003	0.842
Buenos Aires City	0.078	0.257	0.179	0.000***
Catamarca	0.009	0.003	-0.006	0.756
Chaco	0.022	0.012	-0.009	0.605
Chubut	0.013	0.007	-0.006	0.760
Corrientes	0.025	0.007	-0.017	0.342
Córdoba	0.086	0.078	-0.008	0.660
Entre Ríos	0.032	0.025	-0.007	0.704
Formosa	0.012	0.006	-0.006	0.727
Jujuy	0.016	0.010	-0.006	0.720
La Pampa	0.009	0.007	-0.001	0.950
La Rioja	0.008	0.001	-0.006	0.744
Mendoza	0.044	0.040	-0.004	0.805
Misiones	0.024	0.012	-0.012	0.502
Neuquén	0.015	0.008	-0.007	0.703
Río Negro	0.017	0.008	-0.009	0.622
Salta	0.027	0.011	-0.016	0.373
San Juan	0.017	0.010	-0.007	0.714
San Luis	0.012	0.005	-0.007	0.704
Santa Cruz	0.010	0.005	-0.005	0.774
Santa Fe	0.080	0.068	-0.011	0.513
Santiago del Estero	0.020	0.007	-0.013	0.470
Tucumán	0.035	0.018	-0.017	0.342
Panel B: Educational Attainment				
High School or less	0.842	0.391	-0.451	0.000***
Tertiary or College	0.134	0.491	0.357	0.000***
Graduate	0.024	0.117	0.093	0.000***

Note: This table compares sample shares and population shares for each district of origin and each level of educational attainment. Population shares were obtained from the 2022 Census and correspond to men born between 1944 and 1975. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Sample Representativeness: National and Civic Values (selected)

	Pride Arg.		Civic Values Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Estimating sample	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Cohort FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control mean	0.61	0.61	0.01	0.01
Obs.	3519	3519	3526	3526

Note: This table compares the national and civic values held by respondents in our estimating sample to those held by men born between 1944 and 1975 who were surveyed in the World Values Survey (WVS), waves 6 and 7. The Civic Values Index is composed only of *Vote* and *Evasion*. The other questions making up our National Values Index and Civic Values Index—*ArgBest* and *OwnJustice*—are not included because they do not have a counterpart in the WVS. See Section 3.1 and Appendix C for further details of these variables. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Components of National Values Index, Civic Values Index, and Institutional Trust Index

	National Values Index		Civic Values Index			Institutional Trust Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Arg. Best	Pride Arg.	Evasion	Own Justice	Vote	Trust Armed F.	Trust Sup. Court
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares							
Served	0.12** (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)
Panel B: Reduced Form							
High number	0.05** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.65	0.57	0.62	0.58	0.93	0.61	0.32
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the components that make up the National Values Index (columns 1–2), the Civic Values Index (columns 3–5) and the Institutional Trust Index (columns 6–7). Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. See Section 3.1 and Appendix C for further details of these variables. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7: Components of Neighbors Index

	Anther Religion	Indigenous	Another Sexual Orient.	Low SES		Neighbors Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.03 (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.28** (0.13)
Served x HS-grad par.					-0.17** (0.07)	
HS-grad parent					0.12*** (0.03)	
Rows 1+2					-0.12* (0.06)	
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.11** (0.05)
High N. x HS-grad par.					-0.08** (0.03)	
HS-grad parent					0.09*** (0.02)	
Rows 1+2					-0.05** (0.02)	
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.07	0.05	0.16	0.17	0.11	0.07
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Columns 1–5 show 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the components that make up the Neighbors Index (column 6). Each component is a binary variable taking value 1 if respondent would not like to have a member of that group as neighbor. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. See Section 3.1 and Appendix C for further details of these variables. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Components of Network Diversity Index

	Net. Size	Conscripts	Other prov.	College grad.		Practising Cath.		Network Div. Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares								
Served	-0.00 (0.69)	0.09 (0.06)	0.10* (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.17** (0.08)	0.13** (0.06)	0.22** (0.10)	0.31** (0.13)
Served x HS-grad par.					-0.14 (0.09)			
HS-grad parent					0.15*** (0.04)			
Served x Catholic							-0.14 (0.10)	
Catholic							0.33*** (0.04)	
Rows 1+2					0.03 (0.07)			
Rows 1+4							0.08 (0.06)	
Panel B: Reduced Form								
High number	-0.00 (0.27)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.08** (0.04)	0.05** (0.02)	0.09** (0.04)	0.12** (0.05)
High N. x HS-grad par.					-0.07* (0.04)			
HS-grad parent					0.14*** (0.03)			
High N. x Catholic							-0.06 (0.05)	
Catholic							0.32*** (0.03)	
Rows 1+2					0.01 (0.03)			
Rows 1+4							0.03 (0.03)	
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	4.95	0.44	0.27	0.70	0.61	0.62	0.41	-0.10
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Column 1 shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the size of the respondent's network. Columns 2–7 present the corresponding coefficients on the components that make up the Network Diversity Index (column 8). Each component is a binary variable taking value 1 if respondent has a member of that group in his close social network. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. See Section 3.1 and Appendix C for further details of these variables. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9: National Values and Social Integration Under Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)

	(1) Nat. Values	(2) Similarity	(3) Neighbors	(4) Network
Served	0.13*** (0.04)	0.17 (0.12)	0.08 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.05	4.18	-0.01	-0.02
Obs.	3086	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows OLS estimates for the association between serving in the military and each of the main outcomes on national values and social integration. See Section 3.1 and Appendix C for further details of these variables. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10: Civic Values and Institutional Trust Under Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)

	(1) Civic Values	(2) Instit. Trust
Served	-0.03 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.01	-0.04
Obs.	3086	1994


Note: Each column shows OLS estimates for the association between serving in the military and each of the main outcomes on civic values and institutional trust. See Section 3.1 and Appendix C for further details of these variables. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A11: Tightness of Beliefs

	Cohort	Cohort-District
	(1)	(2)
Served	0.09 (0.09)	0.20 (0.15)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes
Control mean	1.51	2.12
Obs.	3086	3086

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on measures of tightness of beliefs. In both columns, tightness is computed at the individual level as the number of beliefs on which the individual coincides with the median belief in the distribution of the reference group. In Column 1, the reference group is the cohort. In column 2, the reference group is the cohort-district. The set of beliefs considered is: National Values Index, Similarity, Neighbors Diversity Index, Civic Values Index, Institutional Trust Index, Demand for Regulation, Trust in Nationalities Index. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. See Section 3.1 and Appendix C for further details of these variables. Standard errors clustered at the ID-Cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A2: Differences in Outcomes Between High and Low SES Background Individuals, by Serving Status



Note: This figure presents the difference in outcomes between high and low SES background individuals who served, and how it compares with the same difference among those who did not serve. The figure focuses on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper. These differences are obtained by estimating 2SLS models where serving status is interacted with SES background. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes are standardized to facilitate comparison. Controls include cohort FE, district FE, and indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. The control group is low-number individuals. Coefficients mostly indicate smaller intergroup differences among former conscripts compared to non-conscripts. See Section 3.1 and Appendix C for further details of these variables. 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level.

Table A12: Main Outcomes, Heterogeneity by Conscripted Share per Cohort

	(1) Nat. Values	(2) Similarity	(3) Neighbors	(4) Network	(5) Civic Values	(6) Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.21* (0.11)	0.61* (0.34)	-0.28** (0.14)	0.36*** (0.14)	0.06 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.14)
Served x share incorporated (std)	0.11 (0.12)	0.23 (0.38)	0.01 (0.16)	-0.28* (0.15)	-0.20* (0.12)	-0.11 (0.15)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.09** (0.04)	0.26** (0.13)	-0.11** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)
High num. x share incorporated (std)	0.06 (0.04)	0.13 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.04	4.12	0.07	-0.10	-0.05	-0.03
Obs.	3086	1994	1994	1994	3086	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper and its heterogeneity by the share of each cohort that was incorporated. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A13: Attitudes Toward Foreign Individuals and Institutions

	Trust in Other Nationalities					Reject Immig. Workers	Trust in the IMF
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Paraguay	Chile	Uruguay	English	Index		
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares							
Served	0.12*	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.16	0.03	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Panel B: Reduced Form							
High number	0.05*	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.58	0.40	0.75	0.53	-0.06	0.08	0.27
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes are indicators for trusting each corresponding nationality or institution. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A14: Internal Migration

	By Province			By Size of Locality		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Current	Temporary	Ever	Small/Med. to Large	Large to Small/Med.	Any change
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	-0.04 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.09* (0.05)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.17	0.14	0.31	0.11	0.06	0.20
Obs.	2058	2058	2058	2058	2058	2058

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes are indicators for currently living in a province different to age 16 (Column 1), for currently living in the same province to age 16 but having lived in a different province for at least 2 years since age 25 (Column 2), for taking value 1 in any of the two previous columns (Column 3), for currently living in a large locality but having lived in a small/medium-sized locality at age 16 (Column 4), for currently living in a small/medium-sized locality but having lived in a large locality at age 16 (Column 5), for taking value 1 in any of the two previous columns (Column 6). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A15: Partner Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Diff. Province	Diff. Relig. Raised	Diff. SES background	Index
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares				
Served	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.14)
Panel B: Reduced Form				
High number	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.06)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.28	0.17	0.33	0.01
Obs.	1551	1551	1348	1551

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes are indicators for having a partner who was raised in a different province (Column 1), in a different religion (Column 2), and in a different socioeconomic background (Column 3). Column 4 is an index of the first three. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A16: Social Preferences, Norms, and Ideology

	(1) Trust	(2) Positive recip.	(3) Negative recip.	(4) Altruism	(5) Universalism	(6) Cooperation	(7) Gender
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares							
Served	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.09 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Panel B: Reduced Form							
High number	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.42	-0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.77	0.80
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	2058	2058	2058

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes include the standard measure of generalized trust (Column 1), standardized measures of negative reciprocity, positive reciprocity, and altruism (Columns 2-4) following Falk et al. (2018), a standardized index of three questions measuring universalism among foreign individuals in terms of religion, language, and political ideology, following Enke, Rodriguez-Padilla and Zimmermann (2022) (Column 5), an incentivized measure of cooperation with outgroups as described in the Pre-Analysis Plan for Round 2 (Column 6), beliefs about gender equality (Column 7), and political identity (Column 8). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A17: Education and Occupational Choice

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	High School	College	Self-Employed	Public Sector Emp.	Priv. Sector Emp.	Unemp.
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.02)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.95	0.38	0.29	0.20	0.34	0.07
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes are indicators for belonging to each category. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A18: Socioeconomic Status
(Netquest)

	(1)	(2)
	Mid or High SES	High SES
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares		
Served	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Panel B: Reduced Form		
High number	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.59	0.26
Obs.	3086	3086

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on socioeconomic status, as measured by Netquest, the panel provider company. High SES corresponds to an “ABC1” status, where 26% of the sample falls. Medium SES corresponds to a “C2” status, where 34% of the sample falls. Netquest’s SES variable combines a wide range of information, including household earnings, education, occupational status, type of occupation, number of dependents, and health insurance. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A19: Family outcomes

	(1) single	(2) married	(3) divorced	(4) free union	(5) widower
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares					
Served	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)
Panel B: Reduced Form					
High number	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.15	0.54	0.14	0.15	0.02
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes are indicators for reporting the civil status described in each column heading. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A20: Religiosity

	Affiliation		Religiosity		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Catholic	None	Imp. of God	High Attendance	Religiosity Index
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares					
Served	0.08	-0.04	0.08	-0.08*	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Panel B: Reduced Form					
High number	0.03	-0.01	0.03	-0.03*	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.63	0.25	2.99	0.19	0.01
Obs.	3086	3086	3086	3086	3086

Note: Each column shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of serving in the military on different outcomes. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Outcomes are indicators for reporting being a Catholic (Column 1), having no religious affiliation (Column 2), reporting a high relevance of God in one's life (Column 3), and reporting frequent attendance to mass (Column 4). Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and of the mother, and for each possible number of immigrant grandparents. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A21: Priming Experiment

	National Values Index		Civic Values Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares				
Served	0.17 (0.13)	0.19 (0.16)	0.00 (0.13)	0.08 (0.16)
Served x Primed		-0.05 (0.19)		-0.15 (0.19)
Primed		0.04 (0.08)		0.14 (0.09)
Panel B: Reduced Form				
High number		0.08 (0.07)		0.04 (0.07)
High num. x Primed		-0.03 (0.09)		-0.07 (0.09)
Primed		0.04 (0.07)		0.12* (0.07)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rows 1+2+3		0.06 (0.08)		0.08 (0.08)
Control mean		-0.04		-0.02
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of being randomly primed to think about the values and lessons transmitted during military service in Argentina on the National Values Index and the Civic Values Index. The other main outcomes of the paper were not subject to the priming experiment. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A22: Components of Civic Values Index, Heterogeneity by Pre- v. Post-Democratic Transition

	(1) Evasion	(2) Own Justice	(3) Vote
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares			
Served	-0.13** (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.03)
Served x I[post '83]	0.18* (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	0.11** (0.05)
Rows 1+2	0.05 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.08* (0.04)
Panel B: Reduced Form			
High number	-0.06** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)
High num. x I[post '83]	0.08** (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.04** (0.02)
Rows 1+2	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03* (0.01)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.62	0.58	0.93
Obs.	3086	3086	3086

Note: Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the components of the Civic Values Index and its heterogeneity by serving before or after the democratic transition of 1983. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A23: Bags of Words, Heterogeneity by Pre- v. Post-Democratic Transition

	(1) Authorit.	(2) Discip.	(3) National V.	(4) Integration	(5) Time Waste	(6) Civic V.
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	-0.04 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)	0.16*** (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)
Served x I[post '83]	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	-0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)
High num. x I[post '83]	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.44	0.35	0.20	0.13	0.14	0.09
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the bags of words considered in Section 5.1 and its heterogeneity by serving before or after the democratic transition of 1983. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Top coincidences in topic model

Topic 1:

- “*Responsibility. Respect. Love for the homeland. Companionship.*”
- “*Conscription did leave values, in addition to respecting the patriotic symbols also learned to value life, learned to have a sense of belonging, respect, loyalty, companionship etc.*”
- “*Responsibility in the first place The sense of honor for the country Respect for adults I support the idea that it has been modified to do so at 18 years of age.*”

Topic 2:

- *“respect, obedience, honor, sacrifice, because I went to high school in the military school.”*
- *“Learning: trades for the future and the opportunity to finish their primary education. Through work (trade) and school attendance (education).”*
- *“education, respect, obedience, and an education to the Argentine people who need it more and more every day.”*

Topic 3:

- *“Order, discipline, rootedness with the symbols of the nation, respect, respect for authority, order, responsibility and responsibility.”*
- *“through the vertical authority,,, values were learned such as respect for the superior,,, not to question an order,,, to comply with it,,, to be a group among the same rank ”soldiers”,,, to manage a friendship,,, to value the group,,, to defend it,,,,, and to respect,,,,”*
- *“There is no doubt that the training and discipline imparted in the military service were very good. Courage, cleanliness and personal care, courage, discipline, respect, social values, the problem is that many times they were badly taught. Because the middle/lower military did not behave as true leaders or instructors, they lacked professionalism, they used to be an abusive caste with the conscripts.”*

Topic 4:

- *“I think it had no value, just a waste of time, for the time it was mandatory.”*
- *“In my case, as a university student, it was a total waste of time, i had to quit my job and my studies.”*
- *“The values are transmitted by the parents, the military service is a waste of time, in any case would justify a ”national service” where they perform tasks of help and improvements in various areas.”*

Topic 5:

- *“Abuse of power cannot teach anything.”*

- “None, it was useless. A year of study or work was lost.”
- “I do not think that the military system in Argentina was the right one to transmit values except for the service to the country, I do not believe that military service is positive, although it does teach some lessons by contradiction, for example to know how to value what one has in terms of daily life, that is to say, there are worse things.”




Figure A3: Topic 5

Appendix B: Robustness Checks

Main Results under Different Subsamples

Table B1: Main Outcomes, Low Socioeconomic Background Individuals Only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Values	Similarity	Neighbors	Network	Civic Values	Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.11	0.60	-0.14	0.44**	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.15)	(0.46)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.05	0.27	-0.06	0.20**	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.12	3.99	-0.09	0.35	0.00	-0.03
Obs.	1190	776	776	776	1190	776

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper on the sample of individuals from low SES background only. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B2: Main Outcomes, Individuals From Outside Buenos Aires City Only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Values	Similarity	Neighbors	Network	Civic Values	Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.19	0.65*	-0.32**	0.34**	0.02	-0.02
	(0.12)	(0.37)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.08	0.26*	-0.13**	0.14**	0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.02	4.18	0.09	-0.10	-0.06	0.01
Obs.	2292	1487	1487	1487	2292	1487

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper on the sample of individuals from outside Buenos Aires City only. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B3: Main Outcomes, Peacetime Cohorts Only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Values	Similarity	Neighbors	Network	Civic Values	Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.31**	0.99***	-0.32**	0.32**	0.12	-0.03
	(0.12)	(0.38)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.11**	0.36***	-0.12**	0.12**	0.05	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.05	4.12	0.08	-0.09	-0.07	-0.03
Obs.	2613	1685	1685	1685	2613	1685

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper on the sample of individuals from peacetime cohorts only. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4: Main Outcomes, Excluding Recontacts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Values	Similarity	Neighbors	Network	Civic Values	Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.17	0.86*	-0.40**	0.38**	0.00	0.05
	(0.13)	(0.49)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.07	0.32*	-0.15**	0.14**	0.00	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.00	4.20	0.13	-0.09	-0.07	-0.06
Obs.	2120	1028	1028	1028	2120	1028

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper on the sample of individuals who were contacted only once. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B5: Main Outcomes, Heterogeneity by Conscripted Father

	(1) Nat. Values	(2) Similarity	(3) Neighbors	(4) Network	(5) Civic Values	(6) Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.26* (0.16)	-0.01 (0.50)	-0.19 (0.20)	0.44** (0.19)	-0.15 (0.17)	0.01 (0.21)
Served x Father Consc.	-0.05 (0.17)	0.91* (0.52)	-0.13 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.20)	0.25 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.21)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.10 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.21)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.17** (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)
High num. x Father Consc.	-0.02 (0.08)	0.44* (0.24)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.09)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.10)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.04	4.12	0.07	-0.10	-0.05	-0.03
Obs.	3086	1994	1994	1994	3086	1994

Note: Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper and its heterogeneity by having a father who was also a conscript. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Main Results under Different Fixed Effects Configurations

Table B6: Main Outcomes, Cohort-District Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Values	Similarity	Neighbors	Network	Civic Values	Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.20*	0.58*	-0.25*	0.23*	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.33)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.08*	0.23*	-0.10*	0.09*	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Cohort-District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.05	4.10	0.06	-0.09	-0.04	-0.03
Obs.	3033	1927	1927	1927	3033	1927

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper, controlling for a full set of cohort-district fixed effects. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B7: Main Outcomes, Cohort Fixed Effects Only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Values	Similarity	Neighbors	Network	Civic Values	Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.19*	0.57*	-0.32**	0.36***	0.01	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.32)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.07*	0.22*	-0.13**	0.14***	0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	No	No	No	No	No	No
Add. controls	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control mean	-0.04	4.12	0.07	-0.10	-0.05	-0.03
Obs.	3086	1994	1994	1994	3086	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper, only controlling for cohort fixed effects. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Other Robustness Checks

Table B8: FDR-Adjusted Sharpened Q-Values

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Values	Similarity	Neighbors	Network	Civic Values	Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.23	0.65	-0.28	0.31	0.02	-0.03
	(0.032)**	(0.045)**	(0.032)**	(0.017)**	(0.865)	(0.815)
	[0.069]*	[0.069]*	[0.069]*	[0.069]*	[0.406]	[0.406]
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.09	0.26	-0.11	0.12	0.01	-0.01
	(0.032)**	(0.043)**	(0.029)**	(0.016)**	(0.865)	(0.815)
	[0.069]*	[0.069]*	[0.069]*	[0.069]*	[0.406]	[0.406]
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.04	4.12	0.07	-0.10	-0.05	-0.03
Obs.	3086	1994	1994	1994	3086	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper. Parentheses indicate standard p-values and brackets indicate false discovery rate adjusted sharpened q-values, following Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) and Anderson (2008). Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B9: Placebo Experiment: The 1976 Cohort

	(1) Nat. Values	(2) Similarity	(3) Neighbors	(4) Network	(5) Civic Values	(6) Instit. Trust
High Number	-0.07 (0.36)	-0.05 (0.63)	0.53 (0.36)	-0.06 (0.27)	-0.52 (0.34)	0.25 (0.33)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.08	4.26	0.07	-0.02	-0.00	-0.06
Obs.	94	94	94	94	94	94

Note: Each column shows reduced form estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper, using a sample of individuals from cohort 1976. This cohort faced the lottery but was never incorporated, as conscription abruptly came to an end a few months before their enlistment date. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B10: Main Outcomes, Clustering S.E. by ID-Cohort-Army Corps in 1984 Cohort

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nat. Values	Similarity	Neighbors	Network	Civic Values	Instit. Trust
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	0.23**	0.65**	-0.28**	0.31**	0.02	-0.03
	(0.11)	(0.32)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	0.09**	0.26**	-0.11**	0.12**	0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	-0.04	4.12	0.07	-0.10	-0.05	-0.03
Obs.	3086	1994	1994	1994	3086	1994

Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the main outcomes considered throughout the paper. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at ID-cohort-army corps level for the cohort that served in 1984, when cutoff numbers varied across army corps, and at ID-cohort level for all other cohorts. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B11: Bags of Words, Heterogeneity by Pre- v. Post-Democratic Transition

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Authorit.	Discip.	National V.	Integration	Time Waste	Civic V.
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares						
Served	-0.04 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)	0.16*** (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)
Served x I[post '83]	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)
Panel B: Reduced Form						
High number	-0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)
High num. x I[post '83]	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.44	0.35	0.20	0.13	0.14	0.09
Obs.	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994

Note: Note: Each column shows 2SLS (Panel A) and reduced form (Panel B) estimates for the effect of serving in the military on the bags of words considered in Section 5.1 and its heterogeneity by serving before or after the democratic transition of 1983. Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Additional controls include indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. See Appendix C for variables definitions. Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Regression Discontinuity Design

In this section, we present a regression discontinuity (RD) analysis that we pursue as a robustness check for our key results on national values and civic values. The RD relies on lottery cutoff numbers as thresholds determining eligibility for military conscription. Because of the presence of non-compliers, we estimate a fuzzy RD, where lottery numbers represent the running variable, serving status the treatment, and national and civic values the outcomes of interest.

Specifically, we estimate the following model (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008):

$$served_i = \alpha highnumber_i + \lambda^{fs}(l_i - t_{c(i),d(i)}) + \mu_{c(i)}^{fs} + \delta_{d(i)}^{fs} + \Gamma'X_i + \nu_i \quad (A1)$$

$$y_i = \beta \hat{served}_i + \lambda(l_i - t_{c(i),d(i)}) + \mu_{c(i)} + \delta_{d(i)} + \Theta'X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (A2)$$


Where equation (1) corresponds to the first stage and equation (2) to the second stage of the fuzzy RD model; l_i is the lottery number assigned to individual i and $t_{c(i),d(i)}$ is the cutoff number determined at the cohort- and, in some cases, district-level. The remaining regressors are equivalent to those used in the 2SLS model specified in the main body of the paper (Section 3.2). The bandwidths are selected based on Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth procedure. Table B12 presents the estimated β coefficients from the second stage on the National Values Index and the Civic Values Index.

Table B12: Regression Discontinuity


	National Values Index		Civic Values Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
RD Estimate (Served)	0.51 (0.47)	0.42 (0.47)	0.27 (0.37)	0.31 (0.37)
Cohort FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add. Contros	No	Yes	No	Yes
Obs.	2175	2175	2175	2175

Note: Columns show the LATE coefficient from regression discontinuity models under polynomials of order one and optimal bandwidths following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Serving is instrumented with an indicator for having a high lottery number (assigned based on the last 3 digits of the national ID), which implies being required to serve. Controls include cohort FE, district FE, and indicators for having a father who served in the military, for each possible educational level of the father and mother, for each possible number of immigrant grandparents, and for the survey round. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


Additionally, in Figure B1, we provide a manipulation test plot showing that there is no evidence of strategic behavior around the threshold; the relationship between treatment and the running variable (first stage plot); and the relationship between the National Values Index and the Civic Values Index with the running variable (reduced form plots).




(a) Manipulation Test



(b) First Stage



(c) National Values Index



(d) Civic Values Index

Figure B1: Regression Discontinuity Plots

Note: Panel (a) shows a manipulation plot. Panel (b) plots the first stage discontinuity. Panels (c) and (d) plot the reduced form discontinuities on the National Values Index and the Civic Values Index. See Appendix C for variables definitions.

Appendix C: Dictionary and Questionnaires

Variables Dictionary

(Main variables in bold)

- ArgBest – Binary variable taking value 1 if individual answers “strongly agree” or “agree” to the question “*How much do you agree with the following statement? ‘Despite the problems it may have, Argentina is the best country to have been born in.’*”. Possible answers included “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.”
- Catholic – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent identifies as Catholic, 0 otherwise.
- **CivicValuesIndex** – A standardized index of three variables: *Evasion*, *OwnJustice*, and *Voting*, following Anderson (2008).
- DemandRegulation – Binary variable taking value 1 if individual answers “strongly agree” or “agree” to the question “*How much do you agree with the following statement? ‘The government should regulate the economy to guarantee its good functioning.’*”. Possible answers included “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.”.
- Evasion – Binary variable taking value 1 if individual answers “never justified” to the question “*How justifiable is it to evade taxes?*” Possible answers included “never justified,” “few times justified,” “many times justified,” and “always justified.” We only take the bottom category to allow for some variability in the data, as 86% chose one of the bottom two categories.
- FatherServed – Binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent’s father served in the military, 0 otherwise.
- FatherSecondaryEduc / MotherSecondaryEduc – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent’s father/mother finished high school, 0 otherwise.
- FatherHigherEduc / MotherHigherEduc – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent’s father/mother has a tertiary or college degree, 0 otherwise.
- **High number** – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent was assigned a lottery number above the cutoff corresponding to his cohort and place of residence; 0 otherwise.

- **HS-GradParent** – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent has at least one parent who finished high school, 0 otherwise.
- **InstitutionalTrustIndex** – A standardized index of two variables: *TrustArmedForces* and *TrustSupremeCourt*, following Anderson (2008).
- **NationalValuesIndex** – A standardized index of two variables: *ArgBest* and *PrideArg*, following Anderson (2008).
- **Neighbors** – Vector of indicator variables, each of them taking value 1 if respondent mentions each corresponding group when answering to the question “*Next you will see different groups of people. Would you indicate which you would NOT want as neighbors? (In this question you may select one or more answers, or none at all.*”
- **NeighborsIndex** – A standardized index of the four indicator variables from the vector *Neighbors*, including people of another religion, indigenous people, people of another sexual orientation, and low SES people, following Anderson (2008).
- **NetworkDiversityIndex** – A standardized index of the four indicator variables from the vector *Network*, including former conscripts, people of another province, college graduates, and practicing Catholics, following Anderson (2008).
- **NetworkSize** – Answer to the question “*With how many people that you know would you be willing to discuss personal problems?*”
- **OwnJustice** – Binary variable taking value 1 if individual answers “strongly disapprove” or “disapprove” to the question “*To what extent do you approve of people taking the law into their own hands when the State doesn’t punish criminals?*” Possible answers included “strongly disapprove,” “disapprove,” “approve,” and “strongly approve.”
- **PeerDiversityIndex_FreqContact** – A standardized index following Anderson (2008) of indicator variables, each taking value 1 if the respondent answers having had frequent contact with members of each of the following groups during conscription: people of another province, indigenous people, people of a different SE status, homosexual people, and non-Catholics. The question was only asked to former conscripts.
- **PeerDiversityIndex_AnyContact** – A standardized index following Anderson (2008) of indicator variables, each taking value 1 if the respondent answers having had some contact with members of each of the following groups during conscription: people

of another province, indigenous people, people of a different SE status, homosexual people, and non-Catholics. The question was only asked to former conscripts.

- **PrideArg** – Binary variable taking value 1 if individual answers “very proud” or “somewhat proud” to the question “*How proud are you of being Argentinian?*”. Possible answers included “not at all proud,” “a little proud,” “somewhat proud,” and “very proud.”
- **Served** – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent reports having served in the military; 0 otherwise.
- **Similarity** – Answer to the question “*Out of 10 randomly chosen Argentinians, how many would you say are similar to you in the most important things?*”
- **SocialNetwork** – Vector of indicator variables, each of them taking value 1 if respondent answers a positive number on the corresponding group after the question “*Out of the [X] persons you mentioned in the previous question [NetworkSize], how many belong to each of the following groups?*”
- **TrustArmedForces** – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent reports trusting “somewhat” or “a lot” the Armed Forces, given the question “*How much do you trust each of the following institutions?—The Armed Forces*”. Possible answers included “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” and “a lot.”
- **TrustIMF** – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent reports trusting “somewhat” or “a lot” the IMF, given the question “*How much do you trust each of the following institutions?—The International Monetary Fund*”. Possible answers included “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” and “a lot.”
- **TrustNationalities** – Vector of indicator variables, each of them taking value 1 if respondent answers trusting “a lot” or “somewhat” each corresponding nationality, given the question “*How much do you trust each of the following nationalities?*”. Possible answers included “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” and “a lot.”
- **TrustSupremeCourt** – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent reports trusting “somewhat” or “a lot” the Supreme Court, given the question “*How much do you trust each of the following institutions?—The Supreme Court*”. Possible answers included “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” and “a lot.”

- Voting – Binary variable taking value 1 if individual answers “always” to the question “*When there are elections, how often do you go to vote?*”. Possible answers included “never,” “few times,” “many times,” and “always.” We only take the top category to allow for some variability, as 98% chose one of the top two categories.
- Wartime – Binary variable taking value 1 if respondent belongs to a cohort that served during an open conflict. These cohorts are those incorporated in 1974-1975 (war against internal guerrillas) and 1981-1982 (Malvinas/Falklands war against the United Kingdom).

Bags of words

The terms that make up each bag of words are as follows.

- **National values:** *homeland fatherland patriot flag anthem emblem symbol country national identi ‘nation’*
- **Civic values:** *civic norm institu dignit rule law citizen honest justice conduct ‘ethi’ ‘respect for society’ ‘service to society’*
- **Social Integration:** *empathy socializ integration compan comrad camarad shar colleag coex brotherhood communit ‘social values’ ‘toleran’ ‘equal’ ‘sense of belonging’*
- **Discipline:** *discipl order organiz dedicat punctua responsib*
- **Authoritarianism:** *viole authorit obedie obey respect subordinat coerc control superior hierarchy indoctrinat*
- **Waste of time:** *lose lost loss useless nothing none waste ‘no learning at all’ ‘no transmission’ ‘no value’*

Questionnaire Round 1

- Gender
- Year of birth
- Province of residence at age 16
- Marital status
- Maximum educational level completed
- In this question select the alternative “not very often,” please. This was only included to check if you are paying attention. (*Never; Not very often; Very often; Always*).
- [Only if education is less than college] What was the main reason why you didn’t continue your studies at the tertiary or university level? (*I considered it wasn’t worth it; Other obligations didn’t allow it; I couldn’t afford it; Other*)
- [Only if education equals tertiary] In what area were your tertiary studies? (*Economics/Business; Social Sciences; Education; Humanities; Gastronomy, Hospitality, and Tourism; Health; Tech & Industry; Other*)
- [Only if education equals college] In what area were your university studies? (*Economics/Business; Science; Social Sciences; Law; Humanities; Engineering; Health & Medicine*)
- Next, we ask for your opinion on a specific topic. Some people think that compulsory military service instilled a set of values and lessons to those who served, while others do not think that was the case. In your opinion, what values or lessons were transmitted to conscripts, and how? If you think there was actually no transmission of values or lessons, please say so and explain why you think that is the case.
- How often do you talk about this topic with your acquaintances? (*Somewhat frequently (a few times per year); Occasionally (at most once per year); Almost never; Never*)
- Who do you discuss this topic with more often? (*I don’t talk about this topic; Family; Friends; Coworkers; Neighbors*)
- How much do you agree with the following statement? ‘Despite the problems it may have, Argentina is the best country to have been born in.’ (*Strongly disagree; Disagree; Agree; Strongly agree*)

- How proud are you of being Argentinian? (*Not at all proud; A little proud; Somewhat proud; Very proud*)
- When there are elections, how often do you go to vote? (*Never; Few times; Many times; Always*)
- To what extent do you approve of people taking the law into their own hands when the State doesn't punish criminals? (*Fully disapprove; Disapprove; Approve; Fully approve*)
- How justifiable is it to evade taxes? (*Never justified; Few times; Many times; Always justified*)
- How justifiable is it for your neighbors to evade taxes? (That is, what do you think they would answer in the previous question). (*Never justified; Few times; Many times; Always justified*)
- How many Argentine politicians are involved in corruption? (*None; Some; Almost all; All*)
- How important do you think are the following reasons to choose to work in the public sector? (*Not at all important; A little important; Somewhat important; Very important*)
 - To have a stable job and a stable income
 - National pride and commitment with the country
- How much do you agree with the following statements? 'The government should regulate the economy to guarantee its good functioning.' (*Strongly disagree; Disagree; Agree; Strongly agree; I don't know*)
- How much do you trust each of the following institutions? (*Not at all; A little; Somewhat; A lot; I don't know*)
 - The Church
 - The Armed Forces
 - The Supreme Court
 - The International Monetary Fund (IMF)

- How important is it to you what your neighbors think of you? (*Not at all important; A little important; Somewhat important; Very important*)
- How important is it to you what your superiors think of you? (Your boss, a local authority, someone in a position of power, etc.) (*Not at all important; A little important; Somewhat important; Very important*)
- With how many people that you know would you be willing to discuss personal problems? (*0; 1; ...; 30*)
- Out of those you counted in the previous question...
 - How many are from the same province as you?
 - How many served in conscription?
 - How many have a college degree?
 - How many believe in and practice the Catholic religion?
 - How many are public employees?
- Out of 10 randomly chosen Argentinians, how many would you say are similar to you in the most important things? (*0; 1; ...; 10*)
- Next you will see different groups of people. Would you indicate which you would NOT want as neighbors? (In this question you may select one or more answers, or none at all.) (*Boxes that can be checked or left blank*)
 - Indigenous people
 - Low socioeconomic class people
 - People of another religion
 - People with another sexual orientation
 - Immigrant workers
- How much do you trust each of the following nationalities? (*Not at all; A little; Somewhat; A lot; I don't know*)
 - Paraguayans
 - Chileans

- Uruguayans
- English
- In general, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others? (*Most people can be trusted; You can never be too careful when dealing with others*)
- How well do each of the following expressions describe you as a person? (*5-item Likert scale, with 1 being ‘Does not describe me at all’ and 5 being ‘It describes me perfectly’*)
 - ‘When someone does me a favor I am willing to return it’
 - ‘If I am treated very unjustly, I will take revenge at the first occasion, even if there is a cost to do so’
- Imagine the following situation: Today you unexpectedly received 10 thousand pesos. How much of this amount would you donate to a good cause? (*0; 1,000; ...; 10,000*)
- Did you do military conscription? (*Yes; No*)
- Did your father do military conscription? (*Yes; No; I don’t know*)
- What is your religion? (*Catholic; Evangelical; Jewish; None; Other; I don’t know*)
- How important is God in your life? (*Not at all important; A little important; Somewhat important; Very important*)
- Besides weddings, baptisms, etc, how often do you assist to religious services? (*Never; Once a year or less; Only in certain festivities; Once per month; Once per week; More than once per week*)
- For this question, please select the last option. This was only included to check if you’re paying attention. (*Not at all important; A little important; Somewhat important; Very important*)
- What best describes your current occupational situation? (*Public sector employee; Private sector employee; Self-employed; Unemployed; Retired; Student*)
- [Only if occupation different than public sector employee] Have you ever worked as a public sector employee? (*Yes; No*)

- [only if answered Yes to previous question] Age of first entry into public sector (*16; ...; 45 or more*)
- In which country was your father born? (*Argentina; Other (complete blank)*)
- Father's educational level (*Less than elementary school; Elementary school; High school; Tertiary; College; Graduate degree; Doesn't know*)
- In which country was your mother born? (*Argentina; Other (complete blank)*)
- Mother's educational level (*Less than elementary school; Elementary school; High school; Tertiary; College; Graduate degree; Doesn't know*)
- Number of foreign grandparents (*0; ...; 4; Doesn't know*)

Questionnaire Round 2 (new questions only)

- Size of locality of residence at age 16 (*Town or small city (less than 50 thousand inhabitants); Medium-sized city (between 50 and 150 thousand inhabitants); Big city (more than 150 thousand inhabitants)*)
- Current province of residence (*list of Argentine provinces, plus ‘Abroad’ option*)
- Size of current locality of residence (*Town or small city (less than 50 thousand inhabitants); Medium-sized city (between 50 and 150 thousand inhabitants); Big city (more than 150 thousand inhabitants)*)
- Ever since you were 25, did you ever live for 2 years or more in a province different to your current one? (*Yes; No*)
- People often describe themselves as belonging to the lower class, middle class, or upper class. Which class would you say you belong to? (*Low class; Lower-middle class; Upper-middle class; High class*)
- For this question, please select the option “few times”. This was only included to check if you’re paying attention. (*Never; Few times; Many times; Always*)
- Cooperation game (see pre-analysis plan for details)
- We ask you to imagine the following situation: You and a group of Argentinians have to face a difficult situation. To what extent do you believe the Argentinians in your group would be willing to make sacrifices for the common good? (*They would not sacrifice at all; They would sacrifice a little; They would somewhat sacrifice; They would sacrifice a lot*)
- And thinking about that same situation, to what extent would you be willing to sacrifice for the common good? (*I would not sacrifice at all; I would sacrifice a little; I would somewhat sacrifice; I would sacrifice a lot*)
- If you had to divide 20,000 pesos between two randomly selected people from anywhere in the world, where one of them shares your political stance and the other has a different political stance, how much of those 20,000 pesos would you give to the person who shares your political stance? (Please assume that both people have the same income level and would never know that it was you who gave them the money.) (*20,000 (I*

would give it all to the one with my same political stance); ...; 0 (I would give it all to the one with a different political stance))

- (...), where one of them is of your same religion and the other is of a different religion, how much of those 20,000 pesos would you give to the person of your same religion? (...) (20,000; ...; 0)
- (...), where one of them speaks Spanish and the other speaks a different language, how much of those 20,000 pesos would you give to the person who speaks Spanish? (...) (20,000; ...; 0)
- How much do you agree with the following statement? ‘When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.’ (Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree)
- For this question, please select the option “few times”. This was only included to check if you’re paying attention. (Never; Few times; Many times; Always)
- Did you do military conscription? (Yes; No)
- For respondents who answered ‘Yes’ to last question:
 - In which province did you perform military service? (If you were in more than one province, please indicate where you spent the most time)
 - For how long did you serve, approximately? (5 months or less; 6 months; ...; 25 months or more)
 - On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is “extremely bad” and 10 is “extremely good,” how would you rate your experience in the military? (1; ...; 10)
 - Would you say you learned useful things in military service? (I didn’t learn anything useful; I learned few useful things; I learned some useful things; I learned many useful things)
 - Thinking about your fellow conscripts, do you remember if there were...? (Yes there were and I had frequent contact; Yes there were but I didn’t have frequent contact; There weren’t; I don’t know/I don’t remember)
 - * People from another province
 - * Indigenous people

- * Low socioeconomic class people
 - * High socioeconomic class people
 - * Homosexual people
 - * Non-catholic people
- How much do you agree with the following statement? ‘In military service, all conscripts were treated equally.’ (*Not at all; A little; Somewhat; A lot*)
- Province of origin of your spouse/partner
 - In what religion was your wife/partner raised? (*Catholic; Evangelical; Jewish; None; Other*)
 - Did any of your in-laws finish high school? (*Yes; No; I don’t know*)
 - Do any of your in-laws have (or did they have) a university degree? (*Yes; No; I don’t know*)