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Employment

Stanford University

Postdoctoral Fellow

Golub Capital Social Impact Lab, Graduate School of Business, 2023-Present

Digital Economy Lab, Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, 2023-Present

Education

Harvard University

Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government, 2023

Committee: Melissa Dell, Jeffrey Frieden, Rema Hanna, Horacio Larreguy, Pia Raffler

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

B.A. in Economics (with honors), 2017

B.A. in Political Science (with honors), 2017

Fields

Political Economy; Development Economics

Economics of Social Media, AI, and Digital Transformation

References

Professor Susan Athey
Stanford Graduate School of Business
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Professor Erik Brynjolfsson
Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI
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Professor Rema Hanna
Harvard Kennedy School
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Professor Horacio Larreguy
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
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Professor Melissa Dell
Harvard University
melissadell@fas.harvard.edu

Professor Pia Raffler
Harvard University
praffler@gov.harvard.edu

Affiliations

Affiliated Researcher at the King Center on Global Development, Stanford University, 2024-Present

Teaching

Using Big Data to solve Social Problems, Economics Dept., Harvard University, Teaching Fellow, 2020-21

Politics and Policies: What Can Data Tell Us? Harvard Kennedy School, Teaching Fellow, 2020-21

Development Policy Strategy, Harvard Kennedy School, Teaching Fellow, 2019

Publications

Mass political information on social media: Facebook ads, electorate saturation, and electoral accountability in Mexico

(with Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Alberto Simpser)

Journal of the European Economic Association, 22(4), August 2024, p. 1678–1722.

Translational papers

Generative AI for Pro-Democracy Platforms

(with Alia Braley, Nuole Chen, Alex Pentland, Anka Reuel, and Lily L. Tsai)

An MIT Exploration of Generative AI, 2024

Job Market Paper**Accountability under Polarization**

(with Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Alberto Simpser)

Political polarization can weaken electoral accountability by shaping how citizens process information. We examine the impact of disseminating incumbent performance information on voting behavior in a polarized setting and assess the mitigating role of a debiasing nudge. We experimentally evaluate a local CSO's Facebook ad campaign that delivered COVID-19 case and death statistics to over 2 million unique users across 500 Mexican municipalities ahead of the 2021 elections. Polling-station-level results reveal that the information alone backfired: it increased (decreased) incumbent support in areas with high (low) COVID-19 impact. These effects are driven by areas with strong prior incumbent support, prevalent communal values, and higher stress indicators among citizens. However, a debiasing nudge reversed this effect, enabling voters to reward (punish) incumbents with low (high) COVID-19 impact. Our findings underscore how biases in information processing undermine electoral accountability in polarized contexts and demonstrate the potential for nudges to restore it.

Working papers**A Theory of Criminal Bribe and Punishment under Elections**

(with Martín Castillo-Quintana)

Under review

Criminal organizations exert political influence through bribery, voter mobilization, and pre- and post-electoral violence. We present a model in which organized crime groups strategically choose between inducements (e.g., vote buying), punishments (e.g., violence against voters and/or candidates), or a combination of both to obtain political favors, either before or after elections. The model elucidates the mechanisms through which these choices impact voter turnout and electoral competitiveness—two critical aspects of democratic processes. We derive direct, testable empirical implications and discuss their relevance to existing and prospective research, offering insights for transparency-enhancing policies.

Confounding, spillovers, and interactions influence estimates of social distancing policy effects

(with Horacio Larreguy and Alberto Simpser)

Under review

Understanding the effectiveness of social distancing policies aimed at curbing the spread of COVID-19 and other infectious diseases is a pressing need that a growing number of studies seek to address. Using fine-grained mobility and epidemiological data, we show that widely used methods to estimate the effects of policies are highly sensitive to accounting for the facts that policies are often enacted simultaneously, that they can complement, or substitute for, each other, and that they can spill over as persons move across geographies. Accounting for confounding and spillovers can change conclusions about the direction and magnitude of the effects of social distancing policies, while failing to consider interactions may hamper the design of optimal public policy packages.

Democracy under Assault: Electoral Reform and Political Violence

This paper investigates when criminal organizations use violence to influence politicians. Using an asymmetric information model, I show that criminal groups resort to violence when other channels of influence, specifically bribes, become unavailable. I test the model's predictions in the context of an electoral reform in Mexico that increased politicians' cost of accepting bribes. I measure bribes using confidential administrative reports of suspicious financial transactions in retail banking and measure violence using an original dataset of attacks on politicians. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that in areas with drug trafficking organizations, the reform led to a 4-percentage point decrease (~650 fewer reports) in suspicious financial transactions and a 2-percentage point increase (~44 more attacks) in attacks on politicians. Consistent with the model, further evidence indicates that (1) criminal organizations resort to violence when they fail to reach agreements with politicians, and (2) the effects of the reform are driven by municipalities where politicians have tighter campaign spending limits and possess less information about the criminal groups. These findings have implications for our

understanding of local governance and call for attention to the design and implementation of transparency-enhancing electoral reforms.

Elite-driven Polarization on social media

(with Horacio Larreguy and Octavio Lujambio)

Social media has been identified as a relevant factor in the global rise in political polarization. Yet, the role of political elites in this process remains unclear. Using data on mobile coverage, Facebook connections, and electoral outcomes in Mexico from 2012 to 2021, we investigate the determinants of elite-driven polarization on social media. Our findings indicate that political actors who deepened a divisive discourse during this period gained electoral benefits from increased polarization. We distinguish between mechanisms of selective exposure (i.e., echo chambers) and diversification (i.e., contact), noting that electoral gains are concentrated where social media amplifies a single political voice. Conversely, exposure to an ideologically diverse network mitigates these effects. By clarifying the role of political elites and differentiating mechanisms of social media exposure, our study reconciles conflicting results in political polarization literature and offers insights into potential mitigation strategies.

Works in Progress Emotional Drivers of Misinformation

(with Susan Athey and Kristine Koutout)

Augmenting Human Survey Responses with Generative AI: An Application to Economic Research

(with Erik Brynjolfsson and David Nguyen)

Deliberating for Social Good: Generative AI in Policy Deliberation

Policy Dreamer: Diverse Public Policy Generation via Elicitation and Simulation of Human Preferences

(with Arjun Karanam, Udari Madhushani Sehwaig, Michael Elabd, Noah Goodman, and Sanmi Koyejo)

Awards Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Harvard University, 2020-21

Seminars & Conferences ASSA Annual Meeting, 2025*
Pacific Conference for Development Economics (PacDev) at Stanford University, 2024
Conference on the Economics of Crime and Justice at the University of Chicago, 2023
EGAP's Seminar Series on Democracy, Conflict, and Polarization, 2023
Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), 2023
Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) at the University of California, Berkeley, 2022
The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association and the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society (LACEA-LAMES) Annual Meeting, 2022
ITAM, Center for Economic Research, 2022
Northeastern Universities Development Consortium (NEUDC) at Yale University, 2022
Northeast Workshop in Empirical Political Science (NEWEPS) at Yale University, 2022
XIII Transatlantic Workshop on the Economics of Crime (TWEC) at Bocconi University, 2022
American Political Science Association (APSA), 2020, 2021, 2022

Service Referee for: *Journal of Political Economy*, *Journal of Development Economics*, *The Journal of Politics*, *Stanford Impact Labs*

Co-chair, Harvard University Mexican Association of Students, 2020-21

Co-chair, The Mexico Conference at Harvard University, 2020-21

Skills Computing: R, Python, STATA
Languages: English (fluent), Spanish (native), Mandarin (basic), French (basic)