

# Causes and effects in Dichotomous Comparative Judgments: an information-theoretical system of plausible mechanism

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## Abstract

Dichotomous Comparative Judgment (DCJ) requires judges to compare pairs of stimuli to determine which one exhibits a higher degree of a specific trait. DCJ has proven effective and reliable across various fields (Pollitt, 2012b; Jones, 2015; van Daal et al., 2019; Bartholomew et al., 2018; Lesterhuis, 2018; Bartholomew and Williams, 2020; Marshall et al., 2020; Boonen et al., 2020). However, despite the method's widespread use, existing literature lacks a clear explanation of the complexities and assumptions underpinning the DCJ system, as well as the plausible mechanisms through which DCJ data could be generated. This study addresses these issues by representing DCJ within the framework of causal inference. Specifically, utilizing the structural approach, the study develops a scientific model to clarify plausible causal assumptions and mechanisms inherent in the DCJ system. The study then translates this model into a probabilistic statistical model to estimate statistical relationships and infer causal effects within the system. This research provides a robust probabilistic foundation for the statistical analysis of DCJ data, building upon Thurstone's law of comparative judgment (1927). Its findings offer valuable insights for researchers and analysts designing and implementing DCJ experiments.

*Keywords:* causal inference, probability, Thurstone, comparative judgement, directed acyclic graph, structural causal models, statistical modeling

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## 1. Introduction

In contemporary contexts, Thurstone's law of comparative judgment (1927) primarily refers to the method of *dichotomous* comparative judgment (DCJ, Pollitt, 2012a,b). In DCJ, a judge assesses the relative manifestation of a *trait* within a pair of stimuli. This assessment results in a dichotomous value indicating which stimulus possesses a

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higher degree of the trait. After different judges perform multiple rounds of pairwise comparisons, an outcome vector is produced. This vector is modeled using the Bradley-Terry-Luce model (BTL, [Bradley and Terry, 1952](#); [Luce, 1959](#)), which creates a score that corresponds with the trait of interest. This score is then used to rank the stimuli from lowest to highest or to evaluate the influence of certain variables on the stimuli's positions in the ranking.

DCJ has proven effective in assessing competencies and traits predominantly within the educational realm, as demonstrated by [Pollitt \(2012b\)](#), [Jones \(2015\)](#), [van Daal et al. \(2019\)](#), [Bartholomew et al. \(2018\)](#), [Lesterhuis \(2018\)](#), [Bartholomew and Williams \(2020\)](#), and [Marshall et al. \(2020\)](#). However, its application transcends education, as exemplified by [Boonen et al. \(2020\)](#). The methodology has also evolved to include multiple, as opposed to pairwise comparisons ([Luce, 1959](#); [Plackett, 1975](#)), and to accommodate comparisons with ordinal outcomes ([Tutz, 1986](#); [Agresti, 1992](#)). Overall, research suggests that DCJ offers an alternative and efficient approach to measurement and evaluation, characterized by its reliability and validity ([Lesterhuis, 2018](#); [van Daal, 2020](#); [Marshall et al., 2020](#); [Bouwer et al., 2023](#)). Nevertheless, despite the method's widespread use, existing literature lacks a clear representation of the plausible mechanisms through which DCJ data could be generated. Particularly, there is no depiction of the complexity and the assumptions underpinning the DCJ system, nor how different assessment factors can potentially influence the observed DCJ outcome.

According to [Verhavert et al. \(2019\)](#) and [van Daal \(2020\)](#), several assessment factors interact and influence the method's outcome. These factors include the number and characteristics of the stimuli, their *proximity* in terms of the assessed trait, the number of comparison per stimulus, and the pairing algorithm used. Furthermore, since the method relies on judges' assessments, the number and characteristics of judges, their *discrimination* abilities, and the number of comparisons per judge also play pivotal roles. Moreover, when the stimuli represent sub-units of higher-levels units, factors such as the number and characteristics of these units, along with their *proximity* in terms of the assessed trait, can significantly influence the outcome. For instance, [van Daal et al. \(2019\)](#) assessed academic writing skills of university students (units) using multiple argumentative essays (sub-units).

Although several studies have examined the individual impact of these factors on the method's reliability ([Bramley, 2015](#); [Pollitt, 2012b](#); [Bramley and Vitello, 2019](#); [Verhavert et al., 2019](#); [Crompvoets et al., 2022](#); [van Daal et al., 2017](#); [Gijzen et al., 2021](#); [Bouwer et al., 2023](#)), none, to the best of the authors' knowledge, have provided a transparent depiction of the DCJ system and the mechanisms generating the DCJ outcome. This study aims to fill this gap by representing DCJ within the framework of causal inference. Specifically, utilizing the structural approach, the study develops a scientific model to clarify plausible causal assumptions and mechanisms inherent in the DCJ system. The study then translates the scientific model into a probabilistic statistical model. This model aims to produce statistical estimates to draw inferences about plausible causal relationships within the DCJ system.

Ultimately, this study provides a robust causal and probabilistic foundation for the statistical analysis of DCJ data, building upon Thurstone's law of comparative judgment ([1927](#)). Consequently, its findings offer valuable insights for researchers and analysts

designing and implementing DCJ experiments.

## 2. Theoretical framework

This section introduces fundamental concepts in causal inference, such as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), structural causal models (SCMs), and the flow of association and causation in graphs. The section is not a comprehensive description of causal inference methods. Readers interested in deeper exploration should consult introductory papers like [Pearl \(2010\)](#), [Rohrer \(2018\)](#), [Pearl \(2019\)](#), and [Cinelli et al. \(2020\)](#). They may also find introductory books such as [Pearl and Mackenzie \(2018\)](#), [Neal \(2020\)](#) and [McElreath \(2020\)](#) useful. For more advanced study, seminal intermediate papers like [Neyman \(1923\)](#), [Rubin \(1974\)](#), [Spirtes et al. \(1991\)](#), and [Sekhon \(2009\)](#), as well as books such as [Pearl \(2009\)](#), [Morgan and Winship \(2014\)](#) and [Hernán and Robins \(2020\)](#) are recommended.

### 2.1. The structural approach to causal inference

In statistics, *causal inference* refers to the process of identifying the causes of a phenomenon and estimating their effects using data ([Shaughnessy et al., 2010](#); [Neal, 2020](#)). Unlike classical statistical modeling, which focuses solely on summarizing data and inferring associations, causal inference provides a coherent mathematical notation for analyzing causes and counterfactuals ([Pearl, 2009](#)).

Counterfactuals represent scenarios *contrary to fact*, where alternative *potential* outcomes resulting from a cause are neither observed nor observable ([Neal, 2020](#); [Counterfactual, 2024](#)). According to [Pearl and Mackenzie \(2018\)](#), counterfactuals are the foundation of causal inference and occupy the highest level of cognitive abstraction in the ladder of causation, followed by intervention and association. Nevertheless, despite their abstract nature, counterfactuals enable the development of a *theory of the world* that explains why specific causes have specific effects and what occurs in their absence ([Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018](#)). They achieve this by translating causal statements into counterfactual statements, that is, statements about “what would have happened in the world under different circumstances.”

Several approaches to causal inference and counterfactuals exist, but two are particularly prominent: the potential outcomes approach, also known as the Neyman-Rubin causal model ([Neyman, 1923](#); [Rubin, 1974](#)), and the structural approach ([Pearl, 2009](#); [Pearl et al., 2016](#)). Both approaches employ rigorous mathematical notation to characterize causal inference, but they do so in different ways ([Neal, 2020](#)). The potential outcomes approach relies on counterfactual notation, whereas the structural approach employs the do-operator and structural causal models (SCM, [Pearl, 2009](#); [Pearl et al., 2016](#)). Despite these differences, both notations can be expressed in terms of the other, and both approaches provide methods for using experimental and observational data to estimate causal effects ([Pearl, 2010](#)).

Nevertheless, the structural approach offers an additional key advantage over the potential outcomes approach: it enables the graphical representation of any system through directed acyclic graphs (DAG, [Gross et al., 2018](#); [Neal, 2020](#)). DAGs serve as heuristics, effectively conveying the assumed causal structure of a system. A heuristic is a strategy

that simplifies information to make decisions more quickly, efficiently, and sometimes more accurately than complex methods (Chow, 2015). Consequently, DAGs do not represent detailed statistical models but allow researchers to deduce which statistical models can provide valid causal inferences, assuming the causal structure depicted in the DAG is accurate (McElreath, 2020).

## 2.2. DAGs and SCMs

Graph theory is a branch of mathematics focused on the study of graphs. Graphs are mathematical structures modeling pairwise relations between objects. They can represent physical relations, such as electrical circuits and roadways, and less tangible structures, such as ecosystems and sociological relations. Graphs have proven useful in various fields, including computer science, operations research, and the natural and social sciences (Gross et al., 2018).

In statistics, one application incorporating concepts from graph theory is causal inference. Specifically, the structural approach to causal inference uses directed acyclic graphs (DAG), and their associated structural causal models (SCM), to provide a graphical and formal representation of the causal structure of a system (Neal, 2020). In this context, a *graph* denotes a collection of nodes connected by edges, where nodes represent random variables. The term *directed* indicates the edges of the graph extend from one node to another, with arrows showing the direction of causal influence. Moreover, the term *acyclic* indicates the causal influences do not form a loop, meaning the influences do not cycle back on themselves (McElreath, 2020).

Regardless of complexity, DAGs can represent various causal structures using only five fundamental building blocks (Neal, 2020; McElreath, 2020). The left panels of Figure 1 illustrate these building blocks using the *standard* representation (Morgan and Winship, 2014). In these graphs, the variables of interest, or *endogenous* variables  $V = \{X, Z, Y\}$ , are depicted as solid black circles to signify that they are observed random variables. The arrows in the graphs reflect the expected direction of causal influences among these variables.

In contrast, the middle panels of Figure 1 present the building blocks using the *magnified* representation. These graphs incorporate *exogenous* variables  $E = \{e_X, e_Z, e_Y\}$ , depicted as open circles to signify their unobserved nature. Exogenous variables represent *errors* or *disturbances* arising from omitted factors that the investigator chooses not to model explicitly (Pearl, 2009, 27,68). Thus, they can be viewed as the ‘idiosyncratic’ causes of each variable. Although these variables are often omitted for simplicity, as illustrated in the left panels, including them in the graphs can be beneficial, as their presence can reveal potential issues related to conditioning and confounding (Cinelli et al., 2020), concepts explored in the next section.

A careful examination of the left and middle panels of Figure 1 reveals the assumption inherent in these building blocks. Figures 1a and 1b depict two unconnected nodes, representing a scenario where variables  $X$  and  $Y$  are not causally related. Figures 1d and 1e show two connected nodes, illustrating a scenario where a parent node  $X$  exerts a causal influence on a child node  $Y$ . Consequently,  $Y$  is considered a *descendant* of  $X$ . Figures 1g and 1h depict a *chain* (or *pipe*), where  $X$  influences  $Z$ , and  $Z$  influences  $Y$ . In




Figure 1: The five fundamental building blocks of DAGs with corresponding SCMs. **Note:** left panels show the standard representation of DAGs, middle panels show the magnified representation of DAGs, and the right panels show their corresponding SCMs.

this configuration,  $X$  is a parent node of  $Z$ , and  $Z$  is a parent node of  $Y$ . Furthermore, the DAG shows that  $X$  is an *ancestor* of  $Y$  and that  $Z$  completely *mediates* the relationship between these variables. Figures 1j and 1k illustrate a *fork*, where variables  $X$  and  $Y$  are both influenced by  $Z$ . In this scenario,  $Z$  is a parent node of  $X$  and  $Y$ . Finally, Figures 1m and 1n depict a *collider*, also known as *immorality*, where variables  $X$  and  $Y$  are concurrent causes of  $Z$ . In this configuration,  $X$  and  $Y$  are not causally related to each other but both influence  $Z$ .

Given the heuristic nature of DAGs, a motivating example can help illustrate the use of the five fundamental building blocks to construct a system's causal structure. This example can also help to clarify some additional conventions for drawing DAGs.

Consider a research problem where the causal effect of a variable  $T$  on an outcome  $Y$  needs to be investigated. Additionally, the problem suggests that a variable  $X$  potentially influences both  $T$  and  $Y$ . Such scenarios are not hard to imagine. For instance,  $T$  might represent different treatments that could affect the recovery from cancer  $Y$ , while  $X$  could denote the patient's age. Similarly, in the context of a DCJ study like the one described by Boonen et al. (2020),  $T$  could represent the duration of a child's cochlear implant use, which might influence the child's overall speech quality  $Y$ , with  $X$  indicating the child's hearing status. (not a bad example, but I prefer one using writing skills)

Figure 2 presents two graphs illustrating the plausible causal structure of the motivating example. Figure 2a shows the *simplified* graph, while Figure 2b depicts the *magnified* graph of the DAG. A detailed examination of both figures reveals the presence of at least four of the five fundamental building blocks. Figure 2a displays multiple descendants, evident in pairwise relations such as  $X \rightarrow T$ ,  $X \rightarrow Y$ , and  $T \rightarrow Y$ . It also illustrates a fork with  $X \rightarrow \{T, Y\}$ . Similarly, Figure 2b features multiple two-unconnected nodes, evident in the pairwise relations  $\{e_T \perp\!\!\!\perp e_X\}$ ,  $\{e_T \perp\!\!\!\perp e_Y\}$ , and  $\{e_X \perp\!\!\!\perp e_Y\}$ , as well as colliders such as  $\{X, e_T\} \rightarrow T$  and  $\{X, T, e_Y\} \rightarrow Y$ . The symbol  $\perp\!\!\!\perp$  denotes a concept known as *d-separation*, which roughly implies the independence of the variables. This concept is introduced in the next section.




Figure 2: DAGs for a plausible causal structure in a system.




Figure 3: The flow of association and causation in graphs. Extracted from Neal (2020, 31)




Figure 4: Identification-Estimation flowchart. Extracted from Neal (2020, 32)

2.3. The flow of association and causation in graphs

2.4. But where does it all fit?

### 3. Theory

3.1. A scientific model for the DCJ




Figure 5: DCJ causal diagram, simplified description




Figure 6: DCJ causal diagram, simplified mathematical description




Figure 7: DCJ causal diagram, population mathematical description






Figure 8: DCJ causal diagram, sample with comparisons mathematical description

3.2. Probabilities assumptions of the scientific model

3.3. From the scientific to statistical model

3.4. Let's talk about Thurstone

#### 4. Discussion

4.1. Findings

4.2. Limitations and further research

#### 5. Conclusion

## Declarations

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**Consent to participate:** Not applicable

**Consent for publication:** All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Availability of data and materials:** No data was utilized in this study.

**Code availability:** All the code utilized in this research is available in the digital document located at: [https://jriverspejo.github.io/paper2\\_manuscript/](https://jriverspejo.github.io/paper2_manuscript/).

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## **6. Appendix**

- 6.1. Why do we need to estimate judges' abilities?*
- 6.2. Latent variables as a mean of imputation*
- 6.3. Other comparative scenarios*

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