Causes and effects in Dichotomous Comparative Judgments: an information-theoretical system with plausible mechanism

Jose Manuel Rivera Espejo

Tine van van Daal

Sven De De Maeyer

Steven Gillis

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Abstract

Dichotomous Comparative Judgment (DCJ) requires judges to compare pairs of stimuli to determine which one exhibits a higher degree of a specific trait. DCJ has proven effective and reliable across various fields Pollitt (2012b); Jones (2015); van Daal et al. (2019); Bartholomew et al. (2018); Lesterhuis (2018); Bartholomew and Williams (2020); Marshall et al. (2020); Boonen, Kloots, and Gillis (2020)]. However, despite the method’s widespread use, existing literature lacks a clear explanation of the complexities and assumptions underpinning the DCJ system, as well as the plausible mechanisms through which DCJ data are generated. This study addresses these issues by integrating DCJ into the framework of causal inference. Specifically, utilizing a structural approach to causal inference, the study develops a scientific model to clarify the causal assumptions and mechanisms inherent in the DCJ system. It then translates this model into a probabilistic statistical framework to estimate statistical relationships and infer causal connections within the system. This research builds upon Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment (1927) and provide a robust probabilistic foundation for the statistical analysis of DCJ data. The findings of this study offer valuable insights for researchers and analysts involved in education and assessment procedures who implement or design DCJ experiments.

# Introduction

In contemporary contexts, Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment (1927) primarily refers to the method of *dichotomous* comparative judgment (DCJ, Pollitt 2012a, 2012b). In DCJ, a judge assesses the relative manifestation of a *trait* within a pair of stimuli. This assessment results in a dichotomous value indicating which stimulus possesses a higher degree of the trait. After different judges perform multiple rounds of pairwise comparisons, an outcome vector is produced. This vector is modeled using the Bradley-Terry-Luce model (BTL, Bradley and Terry 1952; Luce 1959), which creates a score that corresponds with the trait of interest. This score is then used to rank the stimuli from lowest to highest or to evaluate the influence of certain variables on the stimuli’s positions in the ranking.

DCJ has proven effective in assessing competencies and traits predominantly within the educational realm, as demonstrated by Pollitt (2012b), Jones (2015), van Daal et al. (2019), Bartholomew et al. (2018), Lesterhuis (2018), Bartholomew and Williams (2020), and Marshall et al. (2020). However, its application transcends education, as exemplified by Boonen, Kloots, and Gillis (2020). The methodology has also evolved to include multiple, as opposed to pairwise comparisons (Luce 1959; Plackett 1975), and to accommodate comparisons with ordinal outcomes (Tutz 1986; Agresti 1992). Overall, research suggests that DCJ offers an alternative and efficient approach to measurement and evaluation, characterized by its reliability and validity (Lesterhuis 2018; van Daal 2020; Marshall et al. 2020). Nevertheless, despite the method’s widespread use, the literature does not offer a clear representation of the plausible mechanisms that generate DCJ data. Particularly, there is no depiction of the complexity and the underlying assumptions of the DCJ system, nor how different assessment factors can potentially influence the observed DCJ outcome.

According to Verhavert et al. (2019) and van Daal (2020), several assessment factors interact and influence the method’s outcome. These factors include the number and characteristics of the stimuli, their *proximity* in terms of the assessed trait, the number of comparison per stimulus, and the pairing algorithm used. Furthermore, since the method relies on judges’ assessments, the number and characteristics of judges, their *discrimination* abilities, and the number of comparisons per judge also play pivotal roles. Moreover, when the stimuli represent sub-units of higher-levels units, factors such as the number and characteristics of these units, along with their *proximity* in terms of the assessed trait, can significantly influence the outcome. For example, van Daal et al. (2019) assessed the academic writing skills of university students (units) using multiple argumentative essays (sub-units).

Although several studies have examined the individual impact of these factors on the method’s reliability (Bramley 2015; Pollitt 2012b; Bramley and Vitello 2019; Verhavert et al. 2019; Crompvoets, Béguin, and Sijtsma 2022; van Daal et al. 2017; Gijsen et al. 2021), none, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, have provided a transparent depiction of the DCJ system and the mechanisms generating the DCJ outcome. This study aims to fill this gap by representing DCJ within the causal inference framework. Specifically, using the structural approach to causal inference (Wright 1927; Pearl 2009; Pearl, Glymour, and Jewell 2016), the study aims to construct a scientific model. This model will elucidate the underlying assumptions of the DCJ system, providing plausible mechanisms for how the DCJ outcome is generated. Next, using a minimal set of assumptions, the study will translate the scientific model into a probabilistic statistical model. This model will produce statistical estimates to draw inferences about plausible causal relationships within the DCJ system.

Ultimately, this research builds upon Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment (1927) and provide a robust probabilistic foundation for the statistical analysis of DCJ data. Consequently, the findings of this study offer valuable insights for researchers and analysts involved in education and assessment procedures who implement or design DCJ experiments.

# Theoretical background

## The structural approach to causal inference

In statistics, *causal inference* refers to the process of identifying the causes of a phenomenon and estimating their effects using data (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister, and Zechmeister 2010; Neal 2020). Unlike classical statistical modeling, which focuses solely on summarizing data and inferring associations, causal inference provides a coherent mathematical notation for analyzing causes and counterfactuals (Pearl 2009).

According to Pearl and Mackenzie (2018), counterfactuals occupy the highest level of cognitive abstraction in the ladder of causation, followed by intervention and association, and form the foundation of causal inference. Counterfactuals represent scenarios *contrary to fact*, where alternative *potential* outcomes resulting from a cause are neither observed nor observable (Neal 2020; Counterfactual 2024). Nevertheless, despite their abstract nature, counterfactuals enable the development of a *theory of the world* that explains why specific causes have specific effects and what occurs in their absence (Pearl and Mackenzie 2018). They achieve this by translating causal statements into counterfactual statements, that is, statements about “what would have happened in the world under different circumstances.”

Several approaches to causal inference and counterfactuals exist, but two are particularly prominent: the potential outcomes approach, also known as the Neyman-Rubin causal model (Neyman 1923; Rubin 1974), and the structural approach (Wright 1927; Pearl 2009; Pearl, Glymour, and Jewell 2016). Both approaches employ rigorous mathematical notation to characterize causal inference, but they do so in different ways (Neal 2020). The potential outcomes approach relies on counterfactual notation, whereas the structural approach utilizes the do-operator and structural causal models (SCM, Pearl 2009; Pearl, Glymour, and Jewell 2016). Despite these differences, both notations can be expressed in terms of the other, and both approaches provide methods for using experimental and observational data to estimate causal effects (Pearl 2010).

However, the structural approach offers a key advantage over the potential outcomes approach: it enables the graphical representation of systems through directed acyclic graphs (DAG, Gross, Yellen, and Anderson 2018; Neal 2020). In this context, DAGs fulfill the role of a heuristic, effectively conveying the assumed causal structure of a system. They do not represent detailed statistical models but allow researchers to deduce which statistical models can provide valid causal inferences, assuming the causal structure depicted in the DAG is accurate (McElreath 2020).

## DAGs, SCMs, and the flow of association and causation

Graph theory is the branch of mathematics focused on the study of graphs. Graphs are mathematical structures used to model pairwise relations between objects (Gross, Yellen, and Anderson 2018). While graph theory covers a wide array of topics, the field of causal inference, particularly its structural approach, has incorporated some of its concepts to represent causes and counterfactuals formally and transparently. A causal graph, or Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), as its name suggest, is a directed graph without cycles. A *graph* is a collection of nodes connected by edges. In a *directed graph*, edges extend from a node to another node, with arrows indicating the direction of causal influence. In a directed *acyclic* graph, the direction of causal influences does not loop back on itself, ensuring that the graph contains no cycles McElreath (2020).

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| Figure 1: The flow of association and causation in graphs. Extracted from Neal (2020, 31) |

## But where does it all fit?

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| Figure 2: Identification-Estimation flowchart. Extracted from Neal (2020, 32) |

# Theoretical framework

## A scientific model for the DCJ

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| Figure 3: DCJ causal diagram, simplified description |

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| Figure 4: DCJ causal diagram, simplified mathematical description |

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| Figure 5: DCJ causal diagram, population mathematical description |

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| Figure 6: DCJ causal diagram, sample with comparisons mathematical description |

## Probabilitics assumptions of the scientific model

## From the scientific to statistical model

for identification purposes we can set , , and . A special case of this would be to assume that the data comes from the same population, in that case, ,

## Let’s talk about Thurstone

Thurstone’s comparative judgment Thurstone (1927) is based on the formula:

where defines the comparative judgment outcome, and are the modal discriminal processes, , with and being the dispersion of discriminal processes and , respectively, and the correlation between discriminal processes.

The theory identifies five cases:

* **Case 1:** only constant (not )
* **Case 2:** becomes with judges (replication, not duplication)
* **Case 3:** , then
* **Case 4:** , then
* **Case 5:** , then

Now using the DAG and statistical notation

The theory identifies five cases:

* **Case 1:** only constant
* **Case 2:** now judges are separated by using
* **Case 3:** (no nesting of texts on students), then
* **Case 4:** , then
* **Case 5:** , then

But now can we see other scenarios than just those 5 cases?

* consider different , depending on nesting structures
* we can now investigate
* we can assume , no need for results on the limit

# Discussion

## Findings

## Limitations and further research

# Conclusion

# Declarations

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# Appendix

## Additional definitions

## Why do we need to estimate judges’ abilities?

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