Reassessing Random Assignment on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Summer Research Proposal

Jeremy R. Johnson Jeremy.Johnson@psu.edu

Pennsylvania State University

April 26, 2015

Introduction

Due to an increasing interest in assessing causality, many recent articles have leveraged randomized panel and case assignment on the U.S. Court of Appeals to learn about judicial decision making and racial and gender characteristics of Court of Appeals judges (Kastellec, 2010; Glynn and Sen, 2015; Farhang, Kastellec and Wawro, 2014). The United States Courts of Appeals are broken into eleven geographic circuits plus the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit. These courts' primary responsibility is to hear appeals from the 94 U.S. District Courts. Traditionally these courts hear cases in panels of three judges. In normal practice, panels are randomly chosen then a series of cases are randomly assigned to these panels (Hooper, Miletich and Levy, 2011; A Journalist's Guide to the Federal Courts, 2011; Chilton and Levy, 2014; Songer, Kuersten and Haire, 2007). These assignments are made to all current circuit judges and available senior judges. There is variation from circuit to circuit on panel length and the number of cases that each panel hears before judges are assigned to a different panel as well as the number of judges on the circuit; however, the randomness is nominally standard across all circuit courts.

While this process is generally taken to be the normal procedure in the Federal Appellate courts, a substantial literature has challenged this as fact (Atkins and Zavoina, 1974; Brown and Lee, 2000; Chilton and Levy, 2014). Chilton and Levy (2014) performed Monte Carlo simulations and concluded that the observed partisan breakdown of panel assignments for a five year period could not have happened using random assignment. Atkins and Zavoina (1974) as well as Brown and Lee (2000) examine "panel packing" during the 1960's. In addition, Brown and Lee (2000) examines modern practices qualitatively to determine if such practices could still go on today, determining that the courts have enough rule making discretion to do so.

Chilton and Levy (2014) have shown that the panel assignment process is not entirely random. If it is not entirely random, what then can help us predict how panels are assigned? The most likely hypothesis for answering this question surrounds partisanship, both of the judges on the panel, as well as the chief judge, who exercises administrative control over the circuit. As an extension of that administrative control, what role does the Circuit Executive and Circuit Clerk play in assignments? By integrating existing data with a simulation-based approach to assess randomness, we are able to examine the influences of a host of judge- and court-level factors on the extent to which, relative to our expectation, judges are over- or under-represented on Court of Appeals panels. Moreover, we can do so while examining nearly a century's worth of assignments, allowing us to assess changes over time in patterns of nonrandom assignment.

Data

The data for this project will come from the Songer Court of Appeals Database for the case data (Songer, Kuersten and Haire, 2007). The data for the individual judge level variables will come from the Federal Judicial Center biographical database with supplemental information coming from the U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Attribute Database (*History of the Federal Judiciary*, N.d.; Gryski and Zuk, 2008). Measures of case salience are already coded into the Songer, Kuersten and Haire Dataset which reduces any additional coding, using the method developed by Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek (2003).

Analysis

The analysis of this data will proceed in two phases. The first phase will be to create a simulated dataset of panel assignment probabilities. This will consist of creating a set of available judges for each circuit/year. This can be compared to the caseload statistics available to establish a baseline. The Songer, Kuersten and Haire database is a stratified sample of all Court of Appeals cases from 1925-2002, which is approximately 20,000 case observations. The simulation will establish a baseline of panel and case assignment probability which will show how under or over represented a judge is on the panels. We will then apply a hierarchical generalized linear model with various judge level and circuit level effects.

Tasks to Be Performed / Timeline

The most important task will be to assemble the dataset and clean the data for analysis. Both the Songer, Kuersten and Haire and Federal Judiciary Biographical datasets are readily available, but will need to be cleaned and prepared. The next task will be to match the judge and circuit attributes to the cases in the Songer, Kuersten and Haire dataset. This will be completed by Jeremy over the course of June. All cases will be coded for all case, judge, and circuit level variables, which should also be completed by the end of June. Concurrently with gathering the data will be to build the simulated panel assignment dataset. This will also be completed by the end of or mid-July. The next step will be to build the model which will be done by Chris and Jeremy and should be completed by mid-July. The final task should be the completion of the manuscript, which will be completed by Chris and Jeremy and should be done during the first week of August. This article should be ready for submission by the beginning of August.

References

A Journalist's Guide to the Federal Courts. 2011. Technical report Administrative Office of the United States Courts Washington, D.C.: .

Atkins, Burton M. and William Zavoina. 1974. "Judicial Leadership on the Court of Appeals: A Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment in Race Relations Cases on the Fifth Circuit." *American Journal of Political Science* 18(4):701–711.

Brown, J Robert and Allison Herren Lee. 2000. "Neutral assignment of judges at the court of appeals." Texas Law Review 78(5):1037.

Chilton, Adam S. and Marin K. Levy. 2014. "Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeal.".

Farhang, Sean, Jonathan Kastellec and Greg Wawro. 2014. "The Politics of Opinion Assignment and Authorship on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Evidence from Sexual Harassment Cases." *Journal of Legal Studies* Forthcoming.

Glynn, Adam N and Maya Sen. 2015. "Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?" *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1):37–54.

Gryski, Gerald S and Gary Zuk. 2008. "A Multi-User Data Base on the Attributes of US Appeals Court Judges, 1801-2000." Retrieved online, June 20(08).

Hettinger, Virginia A, Stefanie A Lindquist and Wendy L Martinek. 2003. "Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing in the US Courts of Appeals*." Social Science Quarterly 84(4):792–810.

History of the Federal Judiciary. N.d. URL: http://www.fjc.gov

Hooper, Laural, Dean Miletich and Angelina Levy. 2011. Case management procedures in the Federal Courts of Appeals. Federal Judicial Center Washington, DC.

 $Kastellec, Jonathan\ P.\ 2010.\ ``Panel\ Composition\ and\ Voting\ on\ the\ US\ Courts\ of\ Appeals\ Over\ Time."\ Political\ Research\ Quarterly\ .$

Songer, Donald R, Ahslyn K Kuersten and Susan B Haire. 2007. "The United States Courts of Appeals Database.". URL: Available at: http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm