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Homogenous Voting, Electoral Manipulation and the 'Garrison' Process in Post-Independence Jamaica

MARK FIGUEROA and AMANDA SIVES

Jamaican politics presents a number of distinctive features that sets it apart from other Commonwealth Caribbean countries. While elections have been held regularly since independence in 1962 and changes of government have occurred periodically, Jamaican politics has been plagued by gun violence and electoral manipulation. This article focuses on the role of the 'garrison' communities as a special feature of the Jamaican political system that helps to explain the development of violence, electoral fraud, corruption and Jamaica's connection with the international drug trade. It concentrates on one particular facet of these communities, namely the growth of homogenous voting. An examination of homogenous voting between 1962 and 1993 highlights the increasing impact of the 'garrison' process. While the 1997 election represents a break in the trend, we argue that it will take more than one election before it is possible to say that there is a decline in the influence of the 'garrison' process on Jamaica's polity.

The current sociopolitical conjuncture in Jamaica presents a number of distinctive features that, when taken together, set it apart from other Commonwealth Caribbean countries. On the surface Jamaica's politics presents the outwards appearance of a modified Westminster parliamentary system where elections are held regularly and changes of government are periodically achieved through the ballot. At the same time, despite efforts at electoral reform, a number of electoral contests in recent decades have been marred by widespread electoral manipulation and gun violence especially in inner city areas. Away from electoral contests Jamaica has exhibited a very

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high rate of violent crimes (especially homicides) and has come to play a significant role in the international drug trade first as an exporter of ganja (marijuana), then as a transhipper of cocaine, and perhaps most dramatically as an exporter of drug gangs that have operated with notoriety abroad especially in Britain ('yardies') and Canada and USA ('posses').

It is impossible to present in one article an in-depth discussion of all of these interrelated negative elements that have emerged within the Jamaican sociopolitical system. At the same time there is a distinctive feature of the system that provides a link between all of these symptoms of malaise. The nexus between electoral manipulation, corrupt politics, tainted elements in the security forces, crime, violence and the international drug trade has reached its *apogée* in a number of Jamaica's urban communities which have been labelled political 'garrisons'. Coming to terms with the 'garrisons' is essential to an understanding of Jamaica's national politics, its crime problem and its role within the international drug trade.

This article seeks to fill an important gap in the literature on the 'garrisons' as a central aspect of Jamaica's politics. The 'garrisons' did not emerge overnight. Therefore, the article tracks the development of the 'garrison' phenomenon in the post-independence period. No attempt is made to give a detailed socioeconomic picture of the contemporary situation within the 'garrisons', especially as a number of issues relating to them have recently been receiving some attention. The issue of political violence in Jamaica has been studied in some detail, as has the question of the role of the 'garrisons' as crimogenic communities.¹ This article therefore only deals with issues of crime and violence tangentially, narrowing the focus to concentrate on the issues relating to electoral manipulation and the impact of the 'garrison' phenomenon on the Jamaican political system. By contributing to an understanding of the nature of the 'garrisons' and their role in Jamaica's political culture it is hoped that a basis will be laid for more effective political and electoral reform.

During the 1997 election, electoral reform became a significant issue of public debate. For the first time since independence in 1962, both foreign and local observer teams formally monitored the electoral process. But despite the various electoral reforms (ongoing for most of the post-independence period), neither the Carter Center nor the local monitoring organisation, Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (Caffe), were able to state categorically whether the 1997 election had been 'free and fair'. In coming to terms with this reality the Carter Center has suggested that 'garrison communities' are 'a socio-economic and political phenomenon unique to Jamaica'.

While only further research can confirm or deny this assertion, what is clear is that the 'garrisons' have been associated with widespread electoral

manipulation in Jamaica. Electoral manipulation, in turn, has also been associated with the growing trend towards urban homogeneous voting manifest from 1962 to 1993. Homogenous voting, as defined by Figueroa,² is the process whereby one party receives all the votes in a box or all but ten or less votes. In the 1993 election, for the parish of Kingston (part of the capital of the same name), 48 per cent of the boxes returned no votes for the losing candidate(s). In one constituency the figure rose to 98 per cent of those boxes where voting took place. To understand how this level of electoral manipulation can be achieved it is important to explore the 'garrison phenomenon' and how it has impacted on Jamaica's political culture.

Current available research on the 'garrisons' originated in Jamaica. It is Jamaican political scientist and pollster Carl Stone who has been credited with introducing the term into the literature. A 'garrison', as the name suggests, is a veritable fortress where the dominant party and/or its local agents/supporters are able to exercise control over all significant political, economic and community related social activities. 'Garrisons' originally developed in the 1960s and 1970s from large scale government housing schemes where the units were allocated to political supporters of the governing party. Despite the prominent part it plays in Jamaican politics, the 'garrison' phenomenon has not received commensurate attention from political scientists. Prior to the 1993 elections 'garrison' communities have been treated, largely, as aberrations that are confined to inner city zones with limited potential to impact on national electoral outcomes and little potential for growth. This article presents an alternative perspective arguing that the 'garrison' process has had a wider impact on political culture and socioeconomic development in Jamaica.

The first section of the article gives a brief background of the Jamaican political system concentrating on the concept of the 'garrison'. Second, following an explanation of the method developed to analyse electoral statistics, there is a discussion of the electoral contests between 1962 and 1993 (this excludes the 1983 election which the opposition party did not contest). In this period there is an increasing trend towards homogeneous voting. Subsequently we discuss the extent to which the 1997 election might be seen as deviating from this trend.³ The final section of the article examines the wider impact of the 'garrison' process on the political system. Only one-half of Jamaica's 60 constituencies are considered in the detailed data analysis. These constituencies fall into the four parishes where the urban 'garrison' phenomenon is clearly manifest. Given that the subject discussed in this article involves illegal activity, much of the material presented here is based on confidential informal interviews which have been conducted over many years with persons involved in electoral manipulation.

THE JAMAICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Compared with the experience of many other newly independent countries, Jamaica has had a history of relative political stability. There have been five changes of government along with the transfer of power from the British since universal adult suffrage was granted in 1944. In this time there have been no major attempts to overturn the system. All of this has been achieved in a country where the distribution of income and wealth and the social distance between the classes is extreme and the potential for racial conflict between the African majority and the small but rich minorities is enormous. Perhaps it is this enviable record that has caused many external observers to fail to delve into the inner workings of the Jamaican electoral system. As a result the extent to which it deviates from the Westminster ideal on which it was based is often missed.⁴

Commentators such as Stone⁵ and Edie⁶ have attempted to capture the peculiarities of Jamaica's political system using the concept of 'clientelism'. Clientelism, as it is typically defined, focuses on the one-to-one relationship between patrons and clients in which material favours are exchanged for votes. The studies by Stone and Edie have highlighted the significance of clientelism to the Jamaican political system. However, while the clientelist framework, as it has been used, has been able to provide many useful insights, it has severe limitations. Political mobilisation in Jamaica is not carried out primarily on a one-to-one basis, but rather is very much a community process.

Other studies of clientelism have recognised that there is a process of communal clientelism in which communities barter their votes in exchange for material resources. Research by Rouquié has highlighted that this form of clientelism is prevalent in parts of India and Latin America and occurs when the votes of a whole community or village are given in return for the dispensation of community benefits. The patron is able to provide these benefits through his/her access to the largesse of the state.⁷ In Jamaica, communities have benefited through, for example, the construction of a housing scheme, a water supply connection or a paved road through an area and there is little doubt that the development of communal clientelism has been inextricably linked to the 'garrison' process. The ability to live in a government house without paying rent or mortgage or indeed without any registered title to the premises is not *only* an individual benefit, it is one gained by living in a particular community. The ability to use electricity or water and never pay a utility bill is also a community *as well as* an individual benefit.⁸ Indeed, within such a social setting, even the more particularistic benefits such as jobs or contracts take on a community character because one's ability to gain these benefits is directly related to being a member of a particular community, and participating in its activities.

DEFINING THE 'GARRISON'

A 'garrison' community can be defined as one in which any individual/group that seeks to oppose, raise opposition to or organise against the locally dominant party would be in physical danger, thus making continued residence in the area extremely difficult, if not impossible.⁹ Any significant social, political, economic or cultural development within the 'garrison' can only take place with the tacit approval of the leadership (national and/or local) of the dominant party. The 'garrison' is therefore, in its extreme form, a totalitarian social space in which the options of its residents are largely controlled. Indeed the most tightly controlled (or core) 'garrisons' exhibit an element of extraterritoriality; they are states within a state. The Jamaican state has no authority or power there, except in as far as its forces are able to invade in the form of police and military raids. In the core 'garrisons' disputes have been settled, matters tried, offenders sentenced and punished, all without reference to the institutions of the Jamaican state. For example, an incident between two Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) communities in 1995 was referred to by a local councillor as 'an internal dispute'.¹⁰

An alternative method of identifying 'garrison' communities is to focus on the electoral process. It can be defined as one in which the dominant party can, under normal circumstances, control the voting process.¹¹ This control can be exercised so as to completely exclude voting for the opposition. Alternatively, for tactical (that is, cosmetic) reasons control can be exercised more liberally to allow for the registration of a limited number of votes for the other party.¹² This is not to suggest that the socioeconomic and political features of a 'garrison' community can be summarised in terms of electoral outcomes. The aim here is for a diagnostic and not an essentialist definition of a 'garrison' community. That is, the focus is on the most easily measured symptom of the presence of a 'garrison' rather than what constitutes the essential characteristics of a 'garrison'.

THE 'GARRISON' PROCESS

Whatever definition we adopt, it is very important to use the concept of a 'garrison' in a dynamic way. Communities must not be simply seen as either 'garrisoned' or not. There exists a broad spectrum of community types. At one extreme there are communities in which people accept or are totally oblivious to the political choices of their neighbours in much the same way as they would accept or be oblivious to their neighbours' choice of a favourite meal. At the other extreme are communities where the slightest opposition to, or disrespect for, the political symbols of the dominant party

would be to risk being physically removed from the community, if not physically removed altogether.¹³ The overall evidence suggests an increasing role over time for the 'garrisons' (manifest for example in increased violence and electoral manipulation). At the same time it is also possible to identify where some communities have become less 'garrisoned' between two elections. This could be due to internal political dissension or external factors relating to demographic shifts and urban redevelopment.

Encompassed in the concept of the 'garrison' process are all those activities that are associated with the establishment, the strengthening and the extension of influence of 'garrisons' and their associated psychology. Thus the presence of the large scale 'garrisons' such as Jungle, Payne Land, Rema, Tivoli and other less known strongholds are not seen in isolation. They are linked to a political culture that extends well beyond the boundaries of communities that are under the tight control of politicians, their thugs and/or local enforcers.¹⁴ There are many 'garrison' communities but, to date, there are few constituencies where the vast majority of the territory has been 'garrisoned'. Therefore to focus on constituencies (as Stone originally tended to) is to miss the significance of the 'garrison' phenomenon *as a whole*. The presence of a relatively small 'garrison' within a constituency or the presence of a 'garrison' in a neighbouring constituency can fundamentally alter the course of an election in a constituency that is relatively 'garrison-free'.¹⁵ The ability of the 'garrisons' to do 'outreach work' greatly enhances their significance. A central concern of this article is therefore with the concept of a 'garrison' community and a 'garrison' process *rather than* 'garrison' constituencies.

Based on the 1993 election, and using homogeneous voting as a proxy, we can identify five of Jamaica's 60 constituencies that are almost completely dominated by the 'garrison' process. There are another six constituencies where the process is very significant and one other where it is also quite important (see Tables 1 and 2). In most cases the 'garrison' process involves both parties leading to very high rates of votes recorded. Each party has its 'garrison' areas; sometimes taken together they encompass nearly the entire constituency.¹⁶ Lying between the party 'garrisons' there are usually a number of contested areas. Alternatively the 'garrison' communities might constitute pockets of tight control surrounded by much broader zones that represent contested areas. The relevance of the concept of a 'garrison' process can be seen here in two ways. First, there is an effort over time to expand these pockets to the point where the whole constituency is transformed into a 'garrison' and second, the presence of a 'garrison' within a constituency fosters certain types of activities.

In terms of this article these activities are mainly seen within the context of vote manipulation and efforts to rig the results. The central role that

TABLE 1
1993 SELECTED PARISHES: CONSTITUENCIES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE OF BOXES IN WHICH
LOSING CANDIDATE(S) GETS ZERO, AND TEN OR LESS VOTES

Constituency	Recorded Voter 'Turn Out' (%)	Total Number Boxes	Boxes Losers Get 0 Votes (%)	Boxes Losers Get 0-10 Votes (%)	Rank by Loser 0 votes	Rank by Loser 0-10 votes
St. Andrew	88	87	90	92	1	2
St. Andrew Southern	97	165	70	81	2	4
Kingston Western	87	162	61	74	3	5
St. Andrew South Western	94	97	61	95	4	1
Kingston Central	89	149	56	91	5	3
St. Catherine	77	77	38	58	6	9
St. Andrew Western	70	118	32	63	7	8
St. Andrew East Central	78	119	21	56	8	10
St. Catherine Central	86	104	18	69	9	6
St. Andrew South Eastern	73	104	15	49	10	11
Kingston Eastern	75	101	15	66	11	7
Clarendon Central	78	89	9	38	12	12
12 Constituencies	83	1372	43	71		

Note: Includes all constituencies in the four parishes where the percentage of boxes in which losing candidates got ten votes or less exceeded 30 per cent.

Source: Calculated from the Report: Director of Elections, 1993.

TABLE 2
1993 SELECTED PARISHES: CONSTITUENCIES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE OF 'ADJUSTED' BOXES IN WHICH
LOSING CANDIDATE(S) GETS ZERO, AND TEN OR LESS VOTES

Constituency	No. of boxes no votes recorded **	'Adjusted' no. of boxes minus 0 votes boxes	Boxes losers get 0 votes 'adjusted' (%)	Boxes losers get 0-10 votes 'adjusted' (%)	Rank by loser 0 votes 'adjusted'	Rank by loser 0-10 votes 'adjusted'	Points increase loser 0 votes 'adjusted' (%)	Points increase loser 0-10 votes 'adjusted' (%)
St. Andrew St. Andrew Kingston St. Andrew Kingston	7 26 21 2 1	80 139 141 95 148	98 83 70 62 57	100 96 85 97 91	1 2 3 4 5	1 3 5 2 4	8 13 9 1 1	8 15 11 2 0
St. Catherine St. Andrew St. Andrew St. Catherine St. Andrew Kingston	4 3 0 0 0 0	73 115 119 104 104 101	40 33 21 18 15 15	62 64 56 69 49 66	6 7 8 9 10 11	9 8 10 6 11 7	2 1 0 0 0 0	4 1 0 0 0 0
Clarendon Central	2	87	9	39	12	12	0	1
12 Constituencies	66	1306	45	74		2		3

Notes: ** No votes are recorded for various reasons:

Tampering: ballot box stolen. All ballots rejected.

Intimidation/tampering/manipulation by biased officers: No votes recorded.

Out migration due to commercialisation of former residential area: No electors registered to vote.

'Adjusted' figures were calculated using the total number of boxes less those where no votes were recorded.

Source: Calculated from the Report: Director of Elections, 1993.

'garrisons' have with respect to the practice of electoral manipulation in Jamaica is related to two other aspects of the Jamaican political system. The first of these is turf politics, defined as the process by which political parties seek geographic or positional control over given areas as part of their electoral strategy. Second, there is bogus voting or electoral rigging.¹⁷ In this article, these related aspects are seen as part of a broad strategy whose ultimate aim is the creation of 'garrisons'.

In some discussions, 'garrisons' have been inexorably linked to the large scale state housing schemes from which they emerged. Based on this conception it has been argued that the 'garrison' phenomenon has a limited future, as the state no longer undertakes large scale housing projects. (Since the late 1970s the government's involvement in housing has been directed through a statutory corporation, the National Housing Trust. Its prime mandate is in provision of low cost financing and was designed in large part to limit direct political influence on housing development.) The results of the 1993 election suggest that this conclusion may be premature, as in that election there were many examples of 'garrison-type' voting outside of the large scale government supported housing schemes. 'Garrisons' have developed in other ways. First, via homogenisation, by pushing out the opposition from within and, second, through the invasion of a community from outside.¹⁸ Other cases have occurred where a politically homogeneous group (which itself may have been 'pushed out') has set up a squatter community – for example, 'Sufferer's Heights', White Marl in St Catherine.

There are a variety of ways in which the 'garrisons' can extend their reach. What each method has in common is the effort to create a community that is essentially homogeneous in its overt political behaviour, thereby ensuring partisan political control. This had its origin in the partisan allocation of government houses but it is now part of Jamaica's political culture and like all cultural phenomena it can continue to exist even after its original material impulse has ceased to drive it forward. It is possible that in the future the influence of the 'garrisons' will diminish but the absence of new housing schemes will not be enough to restrain their development.

TRACKING THE 'GARRISONS'

In previous work by Figueroa,¹⁹ overvoting, which occurs when the total vote recorded exceeds the number of electors registered to vote, was analysed as the most obvious electoral sign of the 'garrison' phenomenon in Jamaica up to that time. This was, however, a very restricted manifestation as it only showed up in a minority of the actual 'garrison' boxes. In addition, it became so embarrassing that it was severely limited after 1980 by the simple administrative device of restricting the number of ballots going to

TABLE 3
SELECTED ELECTORAL CONTESTS WITH APPARENTLY UNTAINTED HOMOGENEOUS VOTING

Election	Constituency	Candidates	Homogeneous Boxes		Total # of Boxes
			#	%	
1962	Clarendon North East	Duhaney (PNP) Sangster** (JLP)	30 (0)	25	122
1962	Clarendon South East	Bustamante* (JLP) Lambert (PNP) Lewis (PPP)	21 (0)	22	95
1967	Clarendon North Central	Peryer (PNP) Sangster ** (JLP)	29 (1)	36	81

Notes: Sum of votes for losing candidate(s) in box less than or equal to 10 or () equal to zero.

*Jamaica's first, and **second Prime Minister.

Source: Calculated from Report of the Chief Electoral Officer 1962, 1967.

each polling station.²⁰ This measure removed a very 'untidy' aspect of the electoral process from public view but it did nothing to change the underlying 'garrison' phenomenon. In the same article homogeneous voting was identified as a broader but less precise indicator of the 'garrison' phenomenon. It is this measure that we use below to demonstrate the growth and development of the 'garrison' phenomenon.

It must be noted that even where a polling station returns 100 per cent of the vote for a particular party this is not conclusive evidence that the 'garrison' phenomenon is present. In very small polling stations it is not inconceivable that homogeneous voting could result from a purely random variation even in a fairly mixed community. In inner city areas, commercial development often leaves behind only a small cluster of residences. For example, in 1993 in Kingston Western there were 36 polling stations where voting took place and less than 40 voters voted. This varied from one to 38 with 13 stations recording ten or less votes. The probability that ten or less voters vote for one party out of 40 voters drawn from a population, which is split 65:35, is approximately one in ten. While the probability that no voter of ten votes for a party in a population split 80:20 is also approximately one in ten.

There are also cases where we can accept that communities have produced untainted homogeneous voting on a larger scale. For example, despite the multi-class character of both major political parties in Jamaica there have been elements of class voting from time to time. The support given by sections of the middle class to the Norman Manley-led People's National Party (PNP) and the support of certain sections of the rural community for Alexander Bustamante's JLP did produce polling stations with homogeneous voting. Table 3 gives examples of electoral contests where there were very high levels of homogeneous voting. Without evidence to the contrary it is possible to accept that the results were achieved with little or no intimidation or fraud as these results conform to a period when locally based loyalties influenced voting and the personalities of the local candidates were of greater significance. Even today there are communities in the urban areas where, if a genuinely secret ballot were held, homogeneous voting might well manifest itself. The fact is that whether by fair means or foul there are communities where fierce political loyalties have developed. Association with the dominant party takes on the cultural manifestation of tribalism. These loyalties approximate those of the early years of Jamaica's politics discussed above. The presence of homogeneous voting *by itself* is not an indication of the 'garrison' phenomenon nor does it imply that coercion was present or that if it were not present similar results would not be produced. Thus the presence of homogeneous voting as an isolated phenomenon within a particular

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF BOXES WHERE LOSING CANDIDATE(S) GOT 0, OR 10 OR LESS VOTES IN
EIGHT JAMAICAN GENERAL ELECTIONS 1962-97: SELECTED PARISHES

	1962		1967		1972		1976		1980		1989		1993		1997	
Parishes	0	≤10	0	≤10	0	≤10	0	≤10	0	≤10	0	≤10	0	≤10	0	≤10
Kingston	0	1	0	9	2	31	3	17	8	28	24	49	48	78	22	72
St. Andrew	0	2	0	8	0	19	2	11	8	19	16	34	28	44	10	36
St. Catherine	0	11	0	15	0	19	0	7	0	12	1	11	6	24	1	9
Clarendon	0	16	0	16	0	11	0	7	0	12	0	6	2	16	0	8
Four Parishes	0	7	0	11	0	19	1	10	4	17	10	24	19	38	7	27

Source: Calculated from Report: Director of Elections/Chief Electoral Officer, various years.

community can be explained in many ways and only a detailed knowledge of the particular district would enable us to determine which is the correct explanation. The concentration of homogeneous voting in many polling stations side by side in growing numbers from one election to the next is a different matter.

Two definite trends can be identified from the data. The most significant of these is an element of homogeneous voting that is witnessed in recent elections and which starts as an isolated factor within a few polling stations in Kingston and St Andrew (the parishes containing Jamaica's capital). From here it grows from election to election until it has become central to the political process in four of the most urbanised parishes (see Table 4). Detailed knowledge of the socioeconomic character of the communities in which homogeneous voting is occurring combined with insights into the politics of these areas allows the conclusion that in the Jamaican context persistent homogeneous voting is a symptom of the 'garrison' phenomenon.

Over the years the locally based voting patterns that are a hangover from the early development of the political system have been increasingly eroded. Whereas in 1944 local issues and local candidates had significant and, at times, a dominant impact on voter choice, the development of a more nationally oriented political process has tended to produce a more unified countrywide voting pattern. In this context we would expect the old pockets of loyalty to political personalities (such as Norman Manley and Alexander Bustamante) to become less and less significant. Thus, with an approximate 50/50 split nationally between the parties we would expect homogeneous community voting to occur infrequently. That is, it would be fairly unusual if it were not for the 'garrison' phenomenon.

Two measures of homogeneous voting have been adopted in this article. The more narrow indicator is where the total vote for the losing candidate(s) is zero and the broader measure is where the total vote for the losing candidate(s) is ten votes or less.²¹ Our confidence in these measures is increased where the voter turnout in the particular boxes greatly exceeds the national average and that of boxes from surrounding communities. In 1993 there remained some examples of homogenous voting in areas that do not fit the profile of the urban 'garrison'. The most striking case was St Ann South Eastern a traditionally safe (rural) PNP seat. The turnout here was 58.7 per cent as against the national average of 66.8 per cent, suggesting that many JLP-inclined voters simply did not vote, as they did not wish to 'waste their vote'. High turnouts do occur in keenly contested elections but often with very little homogeneous voting and with little difference in the recorded turn out for homogenous and non-homogenous boxes. An example was (rural) Northern Trelawny, which had a 73.8 per cent turnout with less than ten per cent of the boxes homogenous.

There are, however, three main problems with the method adopted. It overestimates the number of 'garrison' boxes since it counts all homogeneous boxes as 'garrison' boxes including those where there was actually untainted homogeneous voting. It underestimates the number of homogenous votes, as there are a significant number of boxes where no votes are recorded. This is due to a range of reasons which may or may not indicate electoral manipulation – for example in very small inner city boxes the failure of one or two extended family groups to turn out would have caused a zero vote. Elsewhere, fear or intimidation may have been an issue even if there was not the outright prevention of voters from turning out, stealing of ballot boxes or a deliberate decision by partisan electoral officials to close the polls very early or not to open them at all. Tables 1 and 2 give some indication of the significance of this. If we were to eliminate the boxes where no voting took place we would have to revise upwards the percentage of homogeneous boxes by as much as 15 percentage points. Far more importantly, our method underestimates the extent to which the electoral process in Jamaica has been compromised, as the more sophisticated vote rigging operations cannot be discerned from electoral statistics. Well-organised political campaigns often give party workers a vote target to return in specific boxes that requires them not to exceed some specified majority beyond which suspicions might be raised.²² What is more, the power of the dominant party will not be fully reflected in the figures. The influence of a party in an area that it controls means it has a capacity to manipulate results, but may well choose, for a variety of reasons, such as the fact that it is under external scrutiny, not to do so. Despite the many caveats lodged against the methodology there is no doubt that it provides the best available device for the tracking of the 'garrisons' short of extensive field work that would still not be able to trace much of the process of 'garrison' development. Confidence in this methodology is strengthened by a concrete knowledge of the political geography of Jamaica and those community studies that are available.

TRENDS IN HOMOGENOUS VOTING

The main conclusion of the data analysis is that there are two trends in homogeneous voting since 1962. The first is associated with the strong loyalties, which were formed among different communities and social groups in the early period of development of Jamaica's party politics. The second newer trend is the one that can be associated with the 'garrison' phenomenon. The older form of homogeneous voting is represented in Table 3 and is discussed above. It can also be seen in the data for Clarendon for the elections from 1962 to 1976 (Table 4). Here we see a trend towards

TABLE 5
HOMOGENEOUS VOTING: 1997 AND 1993, 12 MOST 'GARRISONED'
CONSTITUENCIES (1993) PERCENTAGE BOXES LOSER(S) GOT 0,
OR TEN OR LESS VOTES

Constituencies	0 Votes			≤ 10 Votes		
	1993	1997	Decline	1993	1997	Decline
Top 5	66	32	52	86	84	2
Selected 10	47	20	58	73	65	11
Top 12	43	17	60	71	56	22
All 30	19	7	63	38	27	29

Source: Calculated from Report: Director of Elections 1997 and 1993.

a decline in homogeneous voting based on old loyalties as the country adopts more uniform voting patterns. The second trend is towards increasing homogeneous voting as the 'garrison' phenomenon spreads to engulf a larger number of the communities, principally where the urban poor reside.

The two trends in homogeneous voting exhibit different statistical evidence. The old trend was characterised by greater homogeneous voting in the rural areas measured on the broader indicator and practically no homogeneous voting measured on the narrow indicator. In 1962 homogeneous voting on the broad measure was highest in Clarendon at 16 per cent of the boxes, followed by St Catherine 11 per cent, St Andrew two per cent and Kingston one per cent for the four parishes considered. The trend here is from the most rural to the most urban of the four parishes. In 1962, there was only one box in which the losing candidate got no votes,²³ while broad homogeneous voting occurred in seven per cent of the boxes in the 30 constituencies considered. The losing party's vote was more likely to be close to ten than zero at this time.

In subsequent elections rural homogeneity tends to decline and urban homogeneity takes over. The trend is essentially unbroken except for 1976 when the level of homogeneous voting on the broad measure fell relative to 1972. This was not uniform over all the constituencies. There are a number of reasons that might explain the break in 1976. The first is that some of the broad homogeneous voting found in 1972 was based on the enormous swing especially among particular classes, to the PNP. The result was such a large victory that homogeneous voting was more likely to occur as many JLP inclined voters would have stayed away. This, along with the residual effects of the older trend, helps to explain the fact that the broad homogeneous voting is lower in 1976 than it is in 1972. The fact that the

1976 election took place under a state of emergency may have also been a restraining force on 'garrison-induced' homogeneous voting. The very large swing in favour of the JLP in 1980 also helps to explain the high level of broad homogeneous voting in that year relative to 1976 and 1989 for St Catherine and especially Clarendon (a traditionally JLP parish).

By 1993, on broad homogeneity, Kingston leads with 78 per cent of the boxes, followed by St Andrew 44 per cent, St Catherine 24 per cent and Clarendon 16 per cent. Contrary to the early period the losing parties' vote now tends to cluster closer to zero. For 1993, 48 per cent of the Kingston boxes produced no vote for the losing candidate(s). St Andrew followed with 28 per cent, St Catherine six per cent and Clarendon two per cent. These differences in homogeneous voting correlated with the number of constituencies of the total in each parish where 'garrison' voting appeared to have some significance. For the four parishes the ratios were as follows: Kingston 3:3, St Andrew 6:12, St Catherine 2:9 and Clarendon 1:6. For these four parishes 19 per cent of boxes returned no votes for the losing candidate(s) (this compares with 0.5 per cent for the rest of Jamaica). If we include those boxes where the losing candidate(s) got three votes or less the figure rises to 28 per cent and for ten votes or less the figure rises above 38 per cent. This latter percentage compares with a figure of just under 12 per cent for the rest of Jamaica. The comparable figures for the 12 most 'garrisoned' constituencies are 43 per cent, no votes for the losing candidate(s); 59 per cent, three or less votes for the losing candidate(s); and 71 per cent, ten votes or less for the losing candidate(s).

These figures provide a graphic indication of the extent to which the 'garrison' phenomenon has come to play a major role in Jamaica's political culture. Yet it is still an underestimation of the extent of the significance of the 'garrison' phenomenon even in its purely electoral manifestation because the manipulation of voting can be done in a variety of ways, many of which leave no statistical trace.²⁴ A good example of this occurring is when the dominant party workers occupy key roles in the polling station. The Director of Elections recalled that he had faced a situation when trained polling staff called in sick the day before the election or on election day and known party workers 'volunteered' to fill the vacancy.²⁵ Blatant intimidation of polling staff, stuffing of boxes and closure of the polling stations at 10am on election day are ways in which electoral fraud is perpetrated, leaving no statistical trace.

There are two contradictory developments with respect to the wider measure of homogeneous voting. These have been explained in terms of two trends: an older trend of declining rural homogeneity and a newer trend towards greater urban homogeneity. The broader measure of homogeneous voting, as a crude indicator of the extent of the 'garrison' problem for elections, is useful at least from 1980 onwards. What is perhaps of greater

interest is the narrower indicator as it shows an unambiguous growth of the hard-core 'garrison' tendency.

THE WIDER IMPACT OF 'GARRISONS'

The statistical data by itself demonstrate that the 'garrison' phenomenon is central to the electoral process. However, the impact of 'garrison' politics stretches much further invading the socioeconomic, political and cultural life of the country. There is only space in this article to briefly sketch some of the effects.

By the early 1950s Jamaica's two party political system was firmly established and the essential socioeconomic and political framework that was to guide the country through its first decade of independence was in place.²⁶ Within this structure, politics, based on two-party clientelistic mobilisation, played a central role. Violence became a feature of the political competition, first through the trade unions and later the political parties. Jamaica has the perhaps unusual history of a labour movement that emerged out of a spontaneous labour rebellion in 1938, the main result of which was a blanket trade union that was led by a conservative, charismatic, authoritarian moneylender, Alexander Bustamante, who later formed the JLP. Whereas he struggled to keep the personalised loyalty of the working poor, the nationalist leaders in the PNP, especially those influenced by socialist ideas, saw the workers as their natural constituency and struggled to dislodge his hold over the people. Initially this involved fights with sticks and stones on the streets of Kingston. The legacy of this period was to take on a more menacing tone in the 1960s, concentrated initially in the fight for control of the West Kingston constituency. The construction of Tivoli Gardens, the first major garrison community, by a JLP government in the late 1960s was to start a political process to which the PNP quickly responded. The sharpening of the political contests during this period saw the consolidation of the 'garrison' phenomenon as a central feature of the political process. With this came a new quality of political violence and an entirely new character to political conflict in many urban areas. The reverberations of these contests throughout the society have in many ways transformed the entire political system.

This is not to suggest that prior to the development of the 'garrisons' the entire system was a pristine model of gentlemanly Westminsterism. Indeed, prior to independence the clientelistic system was already well developed with its attendant political tribalism, asymmetric allocation of scarce benefits, corrupt use of state resources, influence peddling and electoral manipulation.²⁷ The significance of the 'garrisons' is that they gave the negative elements of the Jamaican political process an entirely new impetus.²⁸

A consideration of the basis on which the 'garrisons' were initially developed will assist an understanding of the role they have come to play. Both of Jamaica's political parties have a multi-class character. With the exception of the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, they have since the early 1950s tended to espouse a similar policy perspective. In this context the securing of a safe seat in the face of large electoral swings has been a difficult task even where large scale clientelistic mobilisation is employed. For example, before the building of the government housing scheme in Tivoli Gardens, no sitting member of parliament had ever been re-elected in the West Kingston constituency. With the establishment of Tivoli as a 'garrison' there has been no real possibility of defeating the incumbent member.

The bipolar homogenisation of political expression that comes with the development of 'garrisons' has had an important psychological impact on Jamaican politics. Jamaica, while relatively homogeneous (especially among the majority classes) with respect to its culture, religion, race and language, has come to take on many of the features of communal politics. Indeed it is the 'garrisons' that provide an important reservoir for the psychology of tribalism. When people live in circumstances where it is not possible to have a neighbour with a different political affiliation extremist attitudes predominate.²⁹ The 'garrisons' have therefore proved to be fertile environments in which to construct tribal identities. The existence of such fanatical support for political parties goes beyond clientelistic mobilisation and the hope for, or actual receipt of, scarce benefits. Membership in, or support for, a political party has come to be an essential aspect of the identity of many urban Jamaicans. Indeed, it has been noted that the party identities generally predate the national Jamaican identity.³⁰ This understanding of the psychological/cultural aspect of Jamaica's politics aids the explanation of why many Jamaicans have been willing to give so much to the parties, often with little to show in return.³¹

Within the 'garrisons' the value system promoted is one that accepts the right of the party supporters to undertake all manner of illegal acts, as long as they are seen to be contributing towards the ultimate goal of party victory. If the party wins, certain spoils of victory are expected to be distributed to its supporters.³² But win or lose, living in a 'garrison' often brings with it certain privileges (mentioned above) not enjoyed by other citizens.³³ The sharing in the spoils provides a basis for community support for the justification of hatred, murder and mayhem against the opposition. Thus a psychological and social basis is created for the terrorism that has been part and parcel of Jamaican politics. But the 'garrison' is more than a psychological fortress; it is an operational base and a haven for those who engage in illegal activities. From these bases it is possible to do the

'outreach work' involving intimidating the opposition and manipulating the electoral process. It is from the 'garrisons' that the paramilitary attacks are launched in the positional warfare associated with turf politics. In general these are carried out with impunity as, through politics (and in recent years through the drug trade), the perpetrators have a wide network of local and international contacts that protect them from prosecution.³⁴

The 'garrisons' also play a very important role within the parties themselves. In many cases it is from the 'garrisons' that the crowds for party meetings and conferences are most easily mobilised. The 'garrison' communities often also have the greatest ability to mobilise delegates for participation in party elections. Hence, the leaders from the 'garrison' constituencies have a particular status within the parties.³⁵ They are particularly valuable because their seats are essentially safe and they can mobilise large crowds to attend party functions. They are therefore given special recognition on these occasions and are also strong candidates for ministerial office. Not surprisingly, then, the 'garrison' tendencies are brought into the parties themselves, so that party members, including those seeking election or supporting candidates for party office, have been physically attacked at party conferences in full view of the national media. Parnell Charles, a key member of the JLP, received such treatment when running for re-election as deputy leader of the JLP in July 1992.³⁶ Similarly, the elections within parties can be manipulated using some of the same methods adopted for national elections. The degree to which internal elections had become suspect is shown by the fact that in recent contests where the JLP leader has sought to demonstrate the extent of loyalty to him in the party he has invited the Jamaican Electoral Office to supervise the elections.

The development of the 'garrisons' (and with them the more negative aspects of Jamaican politics) has led an increasing number of persons to shun political activity. In addition, knowledge of the terrorism associated with 'garrison' politics breeds a deep fear of the consequences of opposing politicians who are associated with armed enforcers. This goes beyond the normal fear of offending those in power where clientelistic relationships are well developed and career victimisation is a real possibility. This political atmosphere limits civic engagement. Many people are unwilling to participate in organisations and many organisations are unwilling to make critical statements from an independent non-partisan position.³⁷ In the context of strong clientelistic relations business persons are often inclined to involve themselves with the process either with the hope of receiving benefits or from fear of the consequences of opposing strong forces. For this and other reasons the 'garrison' process has also come to impact on the economy.

Security costs are high; some businesses are faced with demands for protection money. Kickbacks and bribes raise the cost of doing business and

there is pressure to employ workers and contractors based on political affiliation rather than competence. The infrastructural cost of political violence associated with the 'garrisons' has been enormous. Homes, shops, factories, schools and other community buildings have been abandoned³⁸ and lands that could be redeveloped close to the centre of Kingston lie in ruins. A significant part of the new suburban area Greater Portmore need not have been developed, with its heavy environmental and infrastructural costs, if good inner city locations had not been destroyed by political violence.

The complex network of corruption and illegality that has been woven around the 'garrisons' has come to undermine the integrity of many of the country's institutions and has had a significant impact on the value systems to which people increasingly adhere. When those who make and enforce the laws of a country are perceived to be intimately involved in illegal activities it tends to create a deep lack of confidence in the legitimacy of national institutions. The widespread acceptance of law breaking is a general consequence of the integration of the 'garrison' phenomenon into the political system. The large rewards that can accrue to those who participate in the systems of political corruption also undermine the values of workmanship. With the growth of the drug trade there is also the danger of the development of some form of 'narcodemocracy'³⁹ and any new third party or other political movement is under severe pressure to play along with the system if it is to survive.

It is these more fundamental consequences of the 'garrisons' that need to be taken into account in assessing their significance. When viewed in this broader light it is possible to see the extent to which the 'garrisons' are of great importance beyond their boundaries. They condition the politics of the country, they impact on intra as well as inter-party rivalry and, more importantly, they foster within the wider society attitudes and values that are likely to be very negative in terms of their impact on economic and societal development as a whole.

THE 1997 ELECTION

There was a decline on both indicators of homogeneous voting for the 1997 election as compared to 1993. The possible causes for this decline and the significance that should be attached to them requires a more extensive analysis than can be provided in the space available. What we seek to do is to pose the relevant questions and point to some possible explanations for what took place in 1997. There are two questions that need to be considered. Does this represent a permanent change towards a reduction in electoral manipulation and fraud and if so does this signal a decline in impact of the 'garrisons' on the sociopolitical situation in Jamaica?

Table 4 indicates the level of decline for the four parishes under consideration. That is, from 19 per cent to seven per cent of boxes on the narrow and from 38 per cent to 27 per cent of boxes on the broad indicator. The decline is much steeper with respect to the narrow measure. There is a 62 per cent decline on the narrow and a 29 per cent on the broad indicator when compared to 1993. Table 5 suggests a much smaller decline in the core 'garrison' areas and much less of a decline on the broad indicator than on the narrow one. If we ignore Clarendon Central the least 'garrisoned' of the constituencies and St Catherine Central (which faced a completely new political situation) we are left with a selected ten constituencies in which the decline on the broad measure from 73 to 65 per cent represents a mere 11 per cent. If we take the top five most 'garrisoned' constituencies the decline is just above two per cent. For the top five most 'garrisoned' constituencies the decline on the narrow measure is 52 per cent and for the selected ten it is 58 per cent.

There is no doubt that there was a considerable change in the experience of 'garrison' voting but it was a highly differentiated one. We will have to wait on the results of the 2002 election to assist us in understanding some of the more complex trends. But it is too early to suggest that the 'garrisons' have exhausted their potential for creating havoc within the Jamaican electoral system. In the 1997 elections 'garrison'-type voting was more confined to the core 'garrisons' and their outreach effect was more limited. In addition it appears that the context of the 1997 election encouraged those who control the process of 'garrison' voting to be more circumspect in terms of the absolute exclusion of votes for other parties from the boxes they control. Our tentative conclusion is that the conditions under which the 1997 elections were held limited the extent to which the core 'garrisons' were able to influence the electoral process while at the same time placing them under greater scrutiny. This led to a reduction in the manipulation of voting in many areas but it most likely also led to more sophisticated, less detectable fraud.⁴⁰ In many of the 'garrisons', the most blatant abuse is quite unnecessary to win the seat and in the context of the initiatives introduced in 1997, the option may have been to settle for a slightly less sweeping victory.

It is not possible to give a detailed discussion of the 1997 election. What we are able to do is examine some of the general factors, which differentiated the 1997 election from the 1993 election.⁴¹ There are several key issues that positively impacted on the conduct of the 1997 election. The 1993 election had a big impact on the national psyche. Blatant fraud, violence and partisan police behaviour were rife.⁴² It brought back memories of the 1980 elections and the violence associated with it. Many Jamaicans had thought they would never see another contest like 1980 and were

extremely distressed by the 1993 experience. This spurred the re-elected Prime Minister, P.J. Patterson, to publicly commit his government to reforming the electoral process. In light of allegations of partisan police action, a management team was established for the policing of the 1997 election. Police officers were specially trained in electoral law, efforts were made to provide better equipment and each member of the force wore a large bib with his or her ID number clearly marked to facilitate identification in the event of any wrong-doing. International and domestic observers formally monitored the election; this included a number of the problematic 'garrison' areas. The domestic observer groups placed volunteers in just under 1,000 of the nearly 7,000 polling stations, island-wide, while international observers put the world spotlight on the election. While the observers were not in a position to eradicate electoral abuse, they were in a position to record it.⁴³ Legislative reform was introduced, which among other things created a Constituted Authority to hear allegations of fraud. If evidence of fraud was found, the specific result could be declared null and void. This would be quickly followed by a re-election in a whole constituency or for specific polling stations.⁴⁴

Allied to the positive initiatives, there were more general factors which may well have impacted upon the declining electoral manipulation, principally because the political realities of 1997 differed from 1993. The legitimacy of the political system had been under increasing scrutiny in the media following the 1993 election. In 1995, a National Committee on Political Tribalism was established by the PNP government in response to public debates about the 'garrisons'. Allied to this there were several media investigations into the 'garrisons' following spates of violence.⁴⁵ Political problems beset the JLP. Most significantly, the heir apparent, Bruce Golding, resigned and went on to lead the newly established National Democratic Movement.⁴⁶ It was also clear to the leadership of the party that the JLP could not win the general election. Polls in December had put the JLP ten clear points behind the PNP, which had been consistently leading in the polls from the year before. Hence it would have made no political sense, in the context of sure defeat and with international observers present, not to rein in its supporters. Conversely, the PNP knew it would win the election and any abuse, which would definitely be reported internationally, would undermine the legitimacy of the government and potentially the economy (international observer reports were particularly important in this context given the reliance on international lending agencies).

The election took place in a period of heightened social engagement at a time when feelings of national unity were at their highest level since Jamaica gained independence in 1962. The World Cup, 'Road to France', campaign of the national football team had generated a level of unity across

race, class and political affiliation that was unprecedented in the post-independence period. It was just one month before the election that Jamaica had held Mexico to a nil-all draw at the national stadium, thereby securing its place in France. The Prime Minister immediately declared a national holiday, reflecting the mood of a very large section of the Jamaican population. There is no doubt that the 1997 elections took place within an unusual conjuncture. There were undoubtedly changes made that could have a permanent effect on how elections are conducted but there were many circumstances that were quite special. The result was an improved election relative to 1993, but it represented no improvement with respect to other recent contests that were also quite tainted.

The bigger question of the wider impact of the 'garrisons' remains to be answered. A break in the trend towards homogenous voting and the cruder forms of electoral manipulation even if they proved to be permanent should not be seen as a signal of the demise of the 'garrisons'. The rise of the drug 'don' to pre-eminence in many of the 'garrison' communities signals a continuing role for these communities that promises to ensure that high levels of violence remain a feature of the Jamaican scene. Thus, even if the electoral impact of the 'garrisons' were to decline significantly there is no doubt that they will continue to have a significant impact for the foreseeable future. The violence that emerged in the summer of 2001 in Western Kingston following the assassination of the leading 'dons' from one of the neighbouring 'garrisons' provides a strong reminder of this reality. A full discussion of the relationship between the 'dons', the 'garrisons' and the political process in Jamaica is beyond the scope of this article. What is clear is that the power of the 'dons' is in part rooted in the history of the development of the 'garrisons' that this article seeks to record. Whatever changes the 1997 elections may or may not signal there is no doubt that an understanding of the 'garrisons' will remain essential for an understanding of the Jamaican socioeconomic and political situation and its impact on a number of foreign communities where persons of Jamaican heritage are significant players.

CONCLUSION

Despite its significant achievements Jamaica's political culture has exhibited serious problems associated with political violence and electoral manipulation. These phenomena are not isolated manifestations or social pathologies alien to the mainstream of the socioeconomic and political system. Rather these negative elements are at the centre of Jamaica's political culture and they have impacted on every level of economic and social life.

The article has focused on the electoral aspect of the 'garrisons', highlighting through an examination of voting patterns since independence the growth of homogenous voting, particularly in the inner city areas. The results of the 1997 election signal a break in this electoral trend. We have pointed to several factors that may account for this, but until the 2002 election has been held it will be difficult to predict the long-term developments and impact of electoral manipulation on Jamaican society.

However, we can make some observations about the impact of the 'garrisons'. As we have stated in this article, 'garrisons' are more than areas where homogenous voting occurs. They are political strongholds which have spawned violence. Gangs, which were initially armed through politics, have developed their horizons (partly as a result of shrinking state largesse) and are now firmly embedded in the international narcotics trade. Money, guns and increasing levels of brutality and violence have resulted, impacting on communities in Kingston, London and New York, to name a few. Links between Kingston gangs and their counterparts in foreign countries have made the reach and influence of Jamaican gangs a truly transnational phenomenon. The impact in Kingston on every facet of social, political and economic life has been devastating. Politicians, who used to control gangs through scarce benefits, have declining influence, the police have an increasingly negative human rights reputation as they struggle to contain better armed gunmen, and the social and economic fabric of inner city communities continues to be fragmented by violence.

Whether the electoral manifestations of the 'garrison' develop or decline in 2002, what is clear is that the widespread impact of the garrison culture will continue to reverberate in Kingston and beyond. The issues at stake are not just electoral. They are cultural, social, political and economic. Attempting to solve the problems of the 'garrisons' requires a concerted domestic political and international effort. The huge financial resources that are currently being invested in electronic voting and in boosting the public image of Jamaica to attract tourists miss the vital point which is that the complex mix of cultural, social, political and economic corruption nestling in the society has to be rooted out in a comprehensive and far-reaching way. Otherwise, the 'garrison' culture will move centre-stage, dominating the society, further undermining the economy and completely corrupting what fragments of legitimacy the political system still retains.

NOTES

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1. A. Sives, 'Politics and Violence in Jamaica. An Analysis of Urban Violence in Kingston, 1944–1996' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bradford, 1998). See also M. Figueroa and A. Sives, 'The Growing Impact of Jamaican Garrison Politics: Does the 1997 Election Signal a Break in the Trend', Paper presented at the *International Conference on Crime in the Caribbean*, UWI Mona, Kingston, Jamaica, Feb. 2001. Other relevant papers presented at the above conference were O. Gray, 'Honorific Fundamentalism: The Theory and Practice of Badness-Honour in Jamaica', and C. Charles, 'Garrison Constituencies and Crime'.
2. M. Figueroa, 'An Assessment of Overvoting in Jamaica', *Social and Economic Studies*, 34/3 (1985), 71–106.
3. Figueroa and Sives, 'Growing Impact'.
4. This is as true of civil liberties liberty as well as academic literature see, for example, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993* (US State Department); C. Griffin, 'Democracy in the Commonwealth Caribbean', *Journal of Democracy*, 4/2 (1993), 84–94; and J. Harrigan, 'Jamaica: Mature Democracy but Questionable Accountability', in J. Healey and W. Tordoff (eds.), *Votes and Budgets: Comparative Studies in Accountable Governance in the South* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 63–108.
5. C. Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980).
6. C. Edie, *Democracy by Default: Dependency and Clientelism in Jamaica* (London: Lynne Reiner, and Kingston: Ian Randle, 1992).
7. A. Rouquié, 'Clientelist Control and Authoritarian Contexts', in G. Hermet, R. Rose and A. Rouquié (eds.), *Elections without Choice* (London: Macmillan, 1978), 19–35.
8. With respect to bill collection and other enforcement issues, 'garrison' communities are often referred to as 'no go zones'. Communities have existed, for long periods, where utilities have been reconnected by the citizens even though the meters have been completely removed and services disconnected by the authorities.
9. Within all 'garrison' communities there are local enforcers associated with the dominant party who form a lethal force that shows little tolerance for opposition.
10. *Jamaica Herald*, 28 Jan. 1994.
11. An example of an abnormal circumstance when it is impossible to determine the electoral outcome would be a situation where elements of the security forces hostile to the dominant party gather in sufficient numbers at the polling station and stay there long enough to discourage efforts at electoral rigging.
12. For a detail discussion of how elections are manipulated within the Jamaican 'garrisons', see M. Figueroa, 'Garrison Communities in Jamaica 1962–1993: Their Growth and Impact on Political Culture', Paper presented to conference entitled 'Democratization in Jamaica: Fifty Years of Adult Suffrage', 6–7 Dec. 1994, Faculty of Social Sciences UWI, Mona.
13. As one informant in a 'garrison' community responded when asked if an individual in the area could vote for the opposing party 'Might be we have to run him out of the area because we not going to stand for that. That means say he going to run against the whole community' (Confidential interview conducted by Sives, 1998).
14. This control was explicitly referred to by a PNP politician who, in a discussion about a non-partisan initiative in 'his' constituency stated: 'They [community residents] don't want no political man chair this meeting, it's JLP and PNP people together ... it is probably valid to them ... What is valid to me is that I want my man to be in charge regardless of what the programme is. They want their man who is apolitical. I want my man to be in charge' (Confidential interview conducted by Sives, 1998).
15. A good example can be found in the 1993 elections. Clarendon South Western is relatively

- 'garrison-free', but polling station number 14A borders on a 'garrison' community in Central Clarendon. The result was that in this one box the dominant party won 226 votes to none. There is no other comparable box in the constituency of Clarendon South Western.
16. Voting in St Andrew Western in 1993 presents a clear case. Votes were registered for more than one candidate in only 2 of the 87 boxes. A total of 3 votes were registered for the losing party in these boxes. The margin of victory was 11,774 to 6,193 with 104 votes spoilt. Ironically the winner of this contest was appointed Attorney General.
 17. It may be worthwhile to distinguish between the bogus voting that is carried out in rural and suburban areas and the kind of inner-city operations that are the focus of this article. Some of the same tactics used in the inner-city areas are used elsewhere but it would be wrong to connect them with the 'garrison' phenomenon in precisely the same way.
 18. B. Chevannes, 'The Formation of Garrison Communities', Paper presented to Grassroots Development and the State of the Nation: Symposium in Honour of Carl Stone, Faculty of Social Sciences, UWI, Mona, 16–17 Nov. 1992.
 19. Figueroa, 'An Assessment of Overvoting'.
 20. In 1983 an effort was made to limit the number of extra ballots; this was refined in 1989. Large polling stations receive no extra ballots but small ones receive a few extras to allow for spoilage. This is based on a view that whereas in a very small polling station a 100 per cent turn out is possible it is very unlikely that all registered voters would be ready, willing and able to vote in a large polling station given the likelihood of death, migration or apathy. Prior to this, overvoting of up to 120 per cent of the voters list was not uncommon and the two constituencies of South and South West St Andrew reported overvoting in nearly half the polling stations in 1980.
 21. Note if both parties received less than ten votes or, if 20 or less than 20 people were registered to vote in the box, it was not counted. There are obvious limitations to the use of an absolute number regardless of percentages. Despite this we do not believe that a more refined approach would alter the findings except at the level of fine detail. D. Douglas, 'The Growth and Electoral Impact of Garrison Communities, 1962–1993', *Caribbean Study Paper* (UWI, Mona, 1995), extended the analysis presented here by looking at a third intermediate measure of five votes. The trends she found were entirely consistent with those reported here.
 22. These statements are based on confidential interviews and personal knowledge of the Jamaican political process. Particular examples were provided where party workers were restrained when and where it was felt that rigging was unnecessary.
 23. The PNP got 22 of 30 votes on the list at the Polio Rehabilitation Centre situated in a suburban community in the constituency of East Rural St Andrew.
 24. Once the dominant party is able to get its agents appointed as the Presiding Officer and Poll Clerk they are able to manipulate the vote in a variety of ways, especially if the official agent of the opposing party is absent or can be intimidated. This is not uncommon, nor is open intimidation of neutral poll officials. These have few options when gun toting activists request extra ballots to be marked for their candidate or that particular individuals be allowed to vote in the name of persons on the voters list.
 25. Interview with the Director of Elections, conducted by Sives in July 1999.
 26. M. Figueroa, 'The Formation and Framework of Middle Strata National Leadership in Jamaica: The Crisis of the Seventies and Beyond', *Caribbean Studies*, 21/1–2 (1988), 45–66.
 27. The works of S. Wilmot, 'Race, Electoral Violence and Constitutional Reform in Jamaica, 1830–1854', *Journal of Caribbean History*, 17 (1982), 1–13; and Sives, 'Politics and Violence', show that political violence and patronage predate the political parties, and political independence respectively.
 28. See *National Committee Report on Political Tribalism* (Kingston, Jamaica, 1997), 11, which defines political tribalism as follows: 'It is political because the tribal grouping is not ethnic but based upon politics. In a tribe, members of the group and persons within the tribe confines must obsequiously obey and observe the rules and rituals of a tribe or suffer the consequences for disobedience and dissent, so in like manner political tribalism demands

- unswerving support for a particular party by persons within the tribal area or suffer the consequences'.
29. One reporter writing in the *Jamaica Herald* about a peaceful period between two communities stated: 'They are free, they said, to enjoy the company of friends living on different sides of the political divide, an act which they once said was punishable by death or banishment from their communities' (*Jamaica Herald*, 15 Nov. 1994). Also see A. Sives, 'Politics and Violence', who has undertaken analysis of two communities driven apart by political conflict. Her work highlights the depth of division and suspicion that exists between rival areas, even among people not intimately involved in violence.
 30. O. Grey, *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1960–1972* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991).
 31. A. Gunes-Ayata has written of the relationships which have developed between political parties and their supporters. He has convincingly argued that political parties 'serve as a basis for the formation of a new kind of identity, a sense of belonging to an imagined community, and a potential means of access to power centres ... How realistic these exclusionary mechanisms are, how much a client benefits from such relationships, or what the tangible outcomes for the client are do not necessarily matter'. A. Gunes-Ayata, 'Clientelism: Premodern, Modern and Post-Modern', in L. Roniger and A. Gunes-Ayata (eds.), *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society* (Colorado and London: Lynne Reiner, 1994), 19–28.
 32. For example, after the 1989 Election, when the PNP regained power after nine years, PNP supporters were alleged to have invaded houses in Tawes Pen, Spanish Town. They were armed with automatic weapons and told residents, who were JLP supporters, that they had come to reclaim their homes. The PNP supporters said JLP supporters had hounded them out of their homes when the JLP won the 1980 election. The PNP candidate for the area stated: 'The entire scheme is illegally occupied. The people want them out and they will have to get out' (*Daily Gleaner*, 14 March 1989).
 33. It should be noted that living in a 'garrison' could also come with a number of negative attributes. Above we have noted the element of control exercised over residents' lives. There is also violence, threats, police harassment, and demands for displays of party support, rundown infrastructure and often social stigma in the wider society.
 34. B. Headley, *The Jamaican Crime Scene* (Mandeville, Jamaica: Eureka Press, 1994); and A. Harriott, *Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: Problems of Reforming Ex-Colonial Constabularies* (Kingston, Jamaica: University of West Indies Press, 2000).
 35. During the 1970s, Michael Manley defended the actions of his then Minister of Housing, Anthony Spaulding, who had been associated with gunmen from his constituency. It was believed by one key PNP member that Manley had protected Spaulding because he was in control of an important Kingston garrison community (Sives, 'Politics and Violence').
 36. For details of this case see reports that followed in the Jamaican media in July 1992.
 37. The election monitoring organisation Caffé represents a recent exception.
 38. A.L. Eyre, 'The Effects of Political Violence on the Population and Urban Environment of Kingston, Jamaica', *Geographical Review*, 74/1 (1984), 24–37.
 39. C. Stone, 'Garrison Politics', *Daily Gleaner*, 23 Feb. 1992, 6.
 40. To indicate which of these factors was at work would require more detailed knowledge of the conditions existing on the ground in specific 'garrisoned' communities.
 41. This section of the paper will necessarily be brief. A fuller discussion can be found in Figueroa and Sives, 'Growing Impact'.
 42. See editions of the *Daily Gleaner* during the election campaign and immediately following it (March–April 1993).
 43. Both political parties were conscious of the spotlight. The leaders of both parties took out full-page adverts in the press the day before the election calling on supporters to show the world that Jamaica had an electoral system to be proud of.
 44. Elections were voided and held again in some polling stations in South St Catherine and all of West St Andrew, and then once more for some polling stations in the latter case.
 45. Most notably, the Breakfast Club radio programme broadcast their early morning show from

the communities of Denham Town, Rema and Tivoli Gardens in 1995. This programme has a wide middle-class audience and normally broadcast their show from the Pegasus Hotel in New Kingston.

46. Golding had held the 'garrison' seat of St Catherine Central, which in 1993 had 25 per cent and 67 per cent narrow and broad homogenous voting. He called for a new and different politics. He was defeated in 1997 by Olivia 'Babsy' Grange who had previously ran in the Kingston Central 'garrison' seat (56 and 91 per cent homogenous with a nearly 90 per cent turnout). For various reasons there was a decline in homogenous voting to zero and seven per cent respectively and the turn out fell from over 85 to less than 50 per cent.