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

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Rex Nettleford was the first postindependence observer of Jamaican society to directly highlight the complex persistence (and historical rootedness) of Jamaica's class, color, and cultural hierarchies in terms other than those elaborated either by a Marxist-oriented underdevelopment theory or by the Moyne Report after the late-1930s labor rebellions. The Moyne Report emphasized "faulty" family formation and child socialization as among the primary causes of societal disorganization, and this theme was reproduced in various ways and through various models by the early anthropological research on kinship and class in the anglophone Caribbean. In his 1970 *Mirror Mirror*, Nettleford took a different perspective, emphasizing instead the ways Afro-Jamaican cultural, socioeconomic, and political practices reflected both the institutionalized inequalities related to color *and* creative mechanisms for the elaboration of an alternative worldview.[1] Rastafari, in this text, appeared as an expression of black knowledge and politics, a nexus of cultural autonomy and self-determination in the face of persistent racial bias in the postcolonial era. The *livity* (Rastafari way of life), therefore, took its place alongside other iterations of Black Power that emerged in Jamaica during the second half of the 1960s and that indeed circulated throughout the Americas and beyond. For Nettleford, Rastafari could tell us something about the faulty logic of the "Out of Many" basis for citizenship

1 Rex M. Nettleford, *Mirror Mirror: Identity, Race, and Protest in Jamaica* (Kingston: W. Collins and Sangster, 1970). An edition with a new introduction was published in 1998.

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that characterized the 1962 moment of independence, and thus also about the excesses of the immediate postindependence security concerns as they related to black Jamaicans.

This argument is of course consistent with a more general approach to Rastafari after independence, and particularly after the 1970s, during which Rastafari became positioned in relation to a longer history of Afro-Jamaican rejection of both colonial and nationalist models of respectability and development. Tony Bogues, for example, has argued that by the late nineteenth century, Afro-Caribbean subjects had developed "a *prophetic redemptive tradition* within the black radical political tradition," one that reordered the "symbolic universe of colonial rule" in their struggle to produce themselves as persons within conditions of exploitation, and one that did not view the seizing of state power as the local solution to the global problems facing black people.[2] And Brian Meeks has positioned Rastafari, and in particular the 1960 events surrounding Claudius Henry, as "the ideological product of an alternative universe of resistance whose markers were the assertion of Africa, blackness, and revolution." This was a universe that denied "any notion of racial harmony as the norm in Jamaica," that understood Jamaica as "a place where black people are oppressed," and that conceptualized community in terms of pan-Africanism rather than through Jamaican nationalism.[3] The various iterations of Rastafari, here, become emblematic of a radical rejection of the status quo, a classic Romanticist critique not only of capitalist Enlightenment—which in the Caribbean ended up taking the shape of plantation slavery—but also of mainstream anticolonialism, with nationalism being envisioned instead as the racist continuity of an oppression that began with the forced removal from Africa, and therefore produced the longing for return, physically and spiritually.

While this has become the dominant take on Rastafari, I am wondering what would happen if we placed the livity in relation to a different set of concerns, if we didn't foreground black peoples' struggle for sovereignty, an approach that necessarily positions Rastafari as vanguardist in relation to liberal critiques of personhood, governance, and citizenship. What if we placed public and colonial discourses about Rastafari in relation to broader imperial transitions instead of predominantly nationalist ones? What might we glean about the Jamaican 1960s if we shifted our gaze just a little earlier, if we looked at the archives that we have within the context of a concern with security? It will be my contention here that by foregrounding views of the colonial state toward Rastafari during the 1950s—views that were by no means unitary, based on information that was not always clearly circulated—we can see how centrally the Cold War, and in particular US anticommunism stemming from the Cold War, shaped the experiences of and possibilities for sovereignty during the 1960s. Using early newspaper accounts and colonial records of the emergent movement, as well as later surveillance reports from the "migrated archives" in the United Kingdom, I will discuss a transition in the approach toward Rastafari on the part of the colonial government because of both local events (the "Henry Rebellion" of 1960) and conflicts elsewhere in the British Empire (the

2 Anthony Bogues, "Politics, Nation, and PostColony: Caribbean Inflections," *Small Axe*, no. 11 (March 2002): 20 (italics in original), 17.

3 Brian Meeks, *Narratives of Resistance: Jamaica, Trinidad, the Caribbean* (Mona: University of the West Indies Press, 2000). For additional early texts elaborating this position, see Robert A. Hill, "Leonard P. Howell and Millenarian Visions in Early Rastafari," *Jamaica Journal* 16, no. 1 (1983): 34, 46; and Barry Chevannes, "The Repairer of the Breach: Reverend Claudius Henry and Jamaican Society," in Frances Henry, ed., *Ethnicity in the Americas* (The Hague: Mouton, 1976).

Malaya "Emergency" of 1948–60 and nationalist violence in Cyprus throughout the 1950s). In this discussion, we will see that security concerns related to the effect of black radicalism on Jamaican nationalist consolidation were entangled with, and eventually enlisted in the service of, security concerns related to the effect of communism on imperial control.

I will show that the intensifying concern with anticommunism that began in the late 1940s and grew throughout the 1950s undergirded this transition and produced Rastafari no longer merely as a racialist nuisance to the local business elite but as a primary threat to the security of the Jamaican state as the result of purported or potential alliances with leftist political organizations, alliances that were nevertheless often rejected by Rastafari themselves. As a result of this emergent paranoid preoccupation on the part of the colonial state, one generated in part by post-1952 US foreign policy throughout the western hemisphere, neither nationalist organizers nor the progressive left in Jamaica were able to fully recognize the salience of the specificities of racial injustice to the majority of the population during the colonial period.[4] This is a problem that remains one of contemporary Jamaica's public secrets. By this I mean that we are still largely unable to discuss the ways race and color saturate the structural and affective configurations of political garrisons, for example, or how they discipline our judgments of various popular cultural practices and the hierarchies of value and personhood that attach to particular bodies.[5]

This story of the 1950s—one in which security (in relation to communists, Soviet sympathizers, and agitators for racial justice) emerges as the paramount problem of late colonialism—is one that we can tell now in part because of the public release of the "migrated archives" from the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) at the National Archives at Kew. These archives, which were released in the third tranche in September 2012, contain among other things monthly reports from the local security and intelligence committee for Jamaica for the period 1957–62, with a gap from November 1958 to September 1961.[6] But this story of the 1950s is also available to us at this juncture precisely because of the "failures" of both official nationalism and the more radical and leftist alternatives to nationalism that were imagined and, to a degree, implemented, after the 1960s moments of independence and Lewisian developmentalism. By using the word *failure* here, I do not mean to adhere to the tragic reading of our postcolonial present (though one surely could), but instead to redirect our attention away from the anticipatory, triumphalist, and teleological narratives that often

4 Indeed, Norman Manley's assignment of a mission to Africa following the publication of the 1960 report *The Ras Tafari Movement in Kingston, Jamaica* (authored by M. G. Smith, Roy Augier, and Rex M. Nettleford, for the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies) positioned the possibility for repatriation as one among many migration opportunities of which Jamaicans had long taken advantage rather than as a racial reparation or repatriation. Ken Post has offered the most sustained critique of the Left's insufficient analysis and understanding of the ways racial discrimination (and pride) affected political subjectivity among the peasantry and working classes in Jamaica. See Ken Post, *Arise Ye Starvelings: The Jamaican Labour Rebellion of 1938 and Its Aftermath* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978); and *Strike the Iron: A Colony at War, Jamaica 1939–1945*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1981).

5 Spatial constraints prevent a fuller analysis of these points here, but I explore them more deeply in the manuscript I am currently completing, "Politics in the Wake of the Plantation."

6 Unfortunately, these were crucial years, and I was eager to see if there was another way to gain access to them. But my Freedom of Information Act request resulted in confirmation that there was not: "We cannot identify any other LSIC [Local Standing Intelligence Committee] reports from Jamaica in the information that we hold" (letter from FCO, dated 27 May 2015). Colin Clarke, however, was able to obtain copies of some of these missing months, and he used them to support the information he was reporting in his own field journals during 1961; see Colin Clarke, *Race, Class, and the Politics of Decolonization: Jamaica Journals, 1961 and 1968* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

pervade discussions of constitutional decolonization.[7] While Nettleford's classic text perhaps began a critical reappraisal of the sociocultural legacies of plantation slavery that permeated the first decade of independence, standing alongside other scholars examining the root causes of underdevelopment and activists exploring the possibilities within Black Power, he would not have been able to fully apprehend the effects of the anticommunist paranoia that had developed within the United States and the United Kingdom. This is because Nettleford, like others, was captivated by the era of decolonization and the creation of infrastructures to support newly independent peoples during a moment when it seemed possible to chart one's own future through actions that were ultimately local in scope. My agenda in this essay, therefore, is not only to destabilize the 1960s as the decade against which we have come to evaluate both the promises and limits of Jamaican sovereignty, but also to elucidate the pervasiveness of overt and covert external intervention *as these very infrastructures were being built*. In this way, I encourage us to turn our eyes to the 1950s as the period during which the patterns that still haunt us—politically, economically, and socioculturally—first became fully established.

The First Moment: Howell, "Racial Feeling," and Ganja

On 23 January 1937, Vivian Durham, writing on behalf of the Kingston and St. Andrew Civic League (KSACL), petitioned Governor Sir Edward Denham, urging him to take action against the "blasphemous and indeed sacrilegious movement" of Rastafari. Durham's letter, which was also published in full in the *Gleaner*, argued that the movement threatened "to resurrect the causes which led up to the unfortunate Incident of 1865 by the abominable doctrine of SKIN FOR SKIN AND COLOUR FOR COLOUR being inculcated in the minds of the Ignorant and hot-headed masses of this Colony who for the most part can be easily driven to any extremes at the present time oweing [*sic*] to the evils of unemployment and privations." The letter continued by elucidating elements of the doctrine of Rastafari as Durham and the KSACL saw them, including the view of H.I.M. Haile Selassie as the returned Messiah, the "propagation of racial hatred and prejudice" as a result of the Italo-Ethiopian War, the condemnation of Christian practices, and "the wicked Idea that there is an unholy conspiracy between church and state and capitalists in the country which is responsible for their poor condition." This last point, Durham argued, was a teaching "as dangerous as that of Soviet Russia," and the view of the league was that this kind of ideology would harm the progress of the island and would produce mental illness among its followers, who, in the opinion of the KSACL, were generally ignorant and susceptible to duping at the hands of charlatans attempting to exploit their vulnerability.[8]

7 For a more extended discussion of the productive dimensions of "failure" (and therefore of why we must not see purported failure as an end point but rather as a lens through which we might become privy to other processes), see, for example, Yarimar Bonilla's exploration of the sociopolitical agitation among union activists in Guadeloupe, *Non-Sovereign Futures: French Caribbean Politics in the Wake of Disenchantment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). Incidentally, this 1950s story might also promote new insights into how federation (and its failure) were viewed, not only by the colonial government but also by the United States, since a few State Department documents express a distinct sense of trepidation about the results of the referendum, having preferred Manley's statesmanship to Alexander Bustamante's.

8 Vivian Durham, letter to Edward Denham, 23 January 1937, CSO 5073/34, Jamaica Archives 18/5/77/283, Pinnacle Papers (hereafter PP). Vivian Durham, "Petition Re. Ras Tafarian Cult Movement, Officers of the Kingston and St. Andrew Civic

Durham's letter reflects a growing concern among local business and clerical elites about the emergent "cult" of Rastafari. As early as 1933, Leonard Howell was preaching the new doctrine in St. Thomas, and members of the press and of the Constabulary Force were taking notice, asking "the authorities to bring the activities of those who preach Ras Tafari in Jamaica to an end."[9] Despite Howell's sedition trial in March 1934 and his sentence to a two-year term in the asylum; despite ongoing coverage in the media of the activities of Ras Tafari in St. Thomas, Portland, and Kingston; and despite the continuous detaining of followers of Rastafari on charges of disorderly conduct and ganja possession, the colonial government maintained a position of noninterference during the early years. In response to a May 1936 letter from Elder V. R. Cameron, pastor of the Church of God at Font Hill, Acting Colonial Secretary A. R. Singham wrote, "The Government is not prepared to interfere in the matter."[10] Cameron had complained to Governor Denham that "hard working and very law abiding" people in Cedar Valley, St. Thomas, were being pressured by the movement, echoing the concerns expressed in numerous newspaper reports throughout 1934 and 1935 regarding harassment, noise, children being removed from school, people abandoning their provision grounds to await the expected repatriation, and the cultivation of racial hatred.[11] Yet as far as the Colonial Office was concerned, extensive police action in St. Thomas had brought Rastafari activity "to a standstill in that parish," and therefore the "movement ha[d] lost very considerably in members and influence and at present need not be seriously regarded."[12] Moreover, letters like Cameron's and others within Kingston's corporate community were "merely the airing of imaginary grievances and fears by . . . high coloured folks," the inspector general wrote, and he felt certain that "the white population" had "nothing whatever to fear."[13]

After the KSACL letter was published in the *Gleaner*, Altamount Reid, Philip Walker, and R. N. White, officers of the Ethiopian King of Kings Salvation that was founded by Reid in Jones Town in 1936, penned a rebuttal on 4 February 1937.[14] Their letter was also written to Governor Denham, but in it they stated their desire for a public forum in the *Gleaner* as well (there is no indication it was ever published). The Salvation was particularly exercised by the KSACL petition's reference to the Morant Bay Rebellion, and they took the opportunity of their letter to remind Governor Denham of the political outcome of that event: "We hate to recall the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865, because as British citizens enjoying years of evolution we are looking forward to the time when the Governor, His Majesty's Representative, will be able to show more appropriate mannerism than that of Sir [Edward] John Eyre, who had to be recalled home." Reid, Walker, and White continued by refuting

League Send Protest to His Excellency the Governor, Incident of 1865," *Gleaner*, 26 January 1937, 31.

9 "It Is Not a Joke," in "Here and There in the News, by the Speaker," *Gleaner*, 27 December 1933, 13.

10 A. R. Singham, letter to V. R. Cameron, 30 June 1936, CSO 5073/34, PP.

11 In the *Gleaner*, see "Deluded Creatures," 9 July 1934, 12; "Alleged Members of Ras Tafari Cult Held by St. Thomas Police," 13 July 1934, 2; "A Meeting of the Kingston School Board," 7 September 1934, 8; "Matters of Interest Dealt with by Education Board," 29 April 1935, 8; "Current Items," 20 May 1935, 3; "Harm 'Ras Tafari' Advocates Are Doing in Eastern Parish," 23 May 1935, 1; "Ras Tafari Cults Excite Portlanders," 30 July 1935, 4; and "Danger Signals," 31 July 1935, 12.

12 "Sequel to Ras-Tafari Cult in Districts of St. Thomas Parish," *Gleaner*, 19 August 1935, 19; Acting Inspector General, letter to "Private Secretary," 18 July 1936, CSO 5073/34, PP.

13 Acting Inspector General, letter to "Private Secretary." For a more detailed discussion of the complaints against and surveillance of Leonard Howell, see Daive Dunkley, "The Suppression of Leonard Howell in Late Colonial Jamaica, 1932–1954," *New West Indian Guide* 87 (2013): 62–93.

14 Reid would go on to become involved in the riots of 1938, and by 1940 became Norman Manley's bodyguard; see Hélène Lee, *The First Rasta: Leonard Howell and the Rise of Rastafarianism* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 2003), 207.

the KSACL's determination that whatever racialism was being inculcated into the masses—"skin for skin" and "colour for colour"—was necessarily negative. "If this had been the case," they argued, "of the one million two hundred thousand people in Jamaica approximately the eight hundred thousand coloured, or darks or blacks, would be a menace to the minority white."[15] They continued by turning a line of biological argumentation commonly used to buttress racial segregation on its head and by appealing to the governor's duty to protect all citizens of empire:

> It is a self-evident proof that nature intended various species of things to associate, as to their kind. Hence for the sake of social instinct, the cow is always found with the cow, sheep with sheep, parrots with parrots, pigeons with pigeons, though they are all birds and beasts. Therefore the black or colored man as the white man, has no apology to make if he preaches ratial [*sic*] solidarity. What Englishman did not feel the onslaught of the Germans in the 1914 to 1918 War? What African whether at home or abroad would not feel the indignity of Italian atrocities in the recent Ethiopian conflict? It is utterly absurd to think that men must be made inmates of the Lunatic Asylum when they are taught to think in terms of themselves. Englishmen thought in terms of themselves hence the Great Empire. Japanese, Germans, Italians, Russians, Americans—all thought in terms of themselves. As British Citizens, we are hoping to have such legislation and laws enacted which will be compatible with our finer feelings as to prevent reprecussion [*sic*] within the state.[16]

While neither the governor nor the colonial secretary seem to have responded to Reid, Walker, and White, in a letter dated 11 March 1937, Colonial Secretary J. D. Lucie-Smith acknowledged receipt of Durham's January missive. He assured the KSACL that "the Government is considering the enactment of legislation to prohibit the practices of these curious cults."[17] No official action against Rastafari was taken at that time by the colonial government, but representatives of the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation, private citizens, and the Jamaica Constabulary Force began a campaign of rounding up Rastafari and charging them with disorderly conduct as well as demolishing their living spaces.[18] After the labor rebellions, both reports in the *Gleaner* regarding the activities of Rastafari and notices within the records of the Colonial Office became considerably less frequent, with a brief uptick of interest during the Moyne Commission's visit and their walk through the slums of western Kingston.[19]

By 1940, however, as Britain was attempting to get the United States to join the war effort against Nazi Germany, two new lines of attack against Howell in particular and Rastafari as a whole were pursued. The first was locally rooted, spurred by concerns from representatives of the Ministry of Health in St. Catherine whose attention was drawn to Howell's camp at Pinnacle in late

15 Ethiopian King of Kings Salvation, letter to Governor Edward Denham, 4 February 1937, CSO 5073/34, PP.
16 Ibid.
17 J. D. Lucie-Smith, letter to Vivian Durham, 11 March 1937, CSO 5073/34, PP.
18 "Ras Tafari Members Attacked by People in St. Thomas Parish," *Gleaner*, 11 January 1937, 13; "Ras Tafari Shack Village Demolished," *Gleaner*, 26 February 1937, 6; "Local Ras Tafarians and Second Effort to Settle on City Land," *Gleaner*, 13 April 1937, 17. Katrin Norris also wrote extensively about police brutality against Rastafari. "Every Rastafarian has become to a policeman as a red rag to a bull," she observes. "The police fear the dreadlocks and cannot distinguish between them and the peaceful, law-abiding Rastafarians, so tend to brutalise all recognizable cultists, or anyone wearing a beard." Katrin Norris, *Jamaica: The Search for an Identity* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 48.
19 For more on the visit of the Moyne Commission to Jamaica, see Colin A. Palmer, *Freedom's Children: The 1938 Labor Rebellion and the Birth of Modern Jamaica* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), esp. 93–117.

November 1940, when nineteen adherents were sent to the Spanish Town Hospital for treatment and were admitted to the poorhouse. Three days later, two medical officers made a surprise visit to Pinnacle to examine the housing and sanitary conditions within the community. They reported that the wattle-and-daub dwellings of the two-hundred-odd persons living in the area known as East Avenue were sufficient, that the four four-seater latrines were fly-free, that the water supply (taken from the Rio Cobre) was clean, that there was good drainage, that "light, ventilation and general sanitation [were] satisfactory," and that residents cultivated in the fields. "The discipline is excellent," they reported. "There were no complaints and all were willing to be examined and advised." This team, however, also noted that undernourishment prevailed and that "the need for food relief [was] urgent."[20] The "acute starvation" they noted was likely what prompted people to seek help at the hospital, and ultimately, eight of those nineteen who were admitted to the poorhouse died of malnutrition and complications related to it.[21]

This situation was publicized in the *Gleaner*,[22] and by January 1941 the commissioner of police had been in touch with the director of medical services regarding sanitary conditions at Pinnacle. The medical officer and the inspector of police subsequently visited the camp, reporting that the living conditions "of the inmates were unsatisfactory," that "when food was distributed, the stronger ones deprived the weaker," and that "they were all armed with sticks, obviously with the intention of scaring off visitors."[23] These observations, as well as the eight adherents' deaths, were used by the Parochial Board of St. Catherine to try to force the director of medical services to intervene by asking the government to charge Howell with criminal negligence. However, a solicitor sent to investigate the case responded, "No legal liability can be attached to the Ethiopian Salvation Society as far as your Board is concerned."[24] Malnutrition, it was argued, may have resulted "from ignorance and not neglect."[25]

The second line of attack against Rastafari, and in particular Howell, was rooted in the renewed attention to the group on the part of an "increasingly repressive" colonial state.[26] In April 1940, the new governor, Arthur Richards, wrote to Malcolm MacDonald, secretary of state for the colonies, outlining continued activity on the part of the Ethiopian Salvation Society and his attempts to stop their meetings. He specifically detailed one meeting at Port Morant, which, he wrote, was attended by approximately five hundred people. Howell, Richards recounted, "informed the crowd that the white man's time was ended and that soon black men would sit on the throne of England; further that Hitler was in charge of Europe and that all European powers would be overthrown in 1940, and that at the end of this war the white nation would be utterly exterminated." Richards was concerned about the "racial feeling" aroused during these meetings, and saw this as "prejudicial to the public

20 Report by F. W. Avis, Minister of Health, St. Catherine, 29 November 1940, CSO 5073/34, PP.
21 Report of the Clerk of the Parochial Board of St. Catherine, 22 March 1941, ibid.
22 "Plight of Ras Tafarians at Camp Pinnacle in Saint Catherine: Disease Said to Be Rampant among Poverty Stricken People," *Gleaner*, 22 December 1940, 1.
23 Report of Medical Officer and Inspector of Police, written by J. M. Hall, 16 January 1941, CSO 5073/34, PP.
24 Director of Medical Services, letter to Parochial Board, 28 March 1941, ibid.
25 Director of Medical Services, letter to Colonial Secretary, 15 April 1941, ibid.
26 Palmer, *Freedom's Children*, 241. Palmer argues that surveillance and repression of union activity (by the police) intensified after 1938 as part of a more general concern with wartime security.

safety."[27] As a result, when he learned that Howell was planning another meeting, and upon hearing that men were to arrive armed with sticks and cutlasses, he resolved to prohibit that and any subsequent meeting in accordance with the state of war emergency that had been issued on 24 August 1939 by Colonial Secretary A. G. Grantham.[28] It was ultimately the war, then, that generated a more sustained onslaught on Pinnacle, culminating in the 1941 raid on 14 July, during which 115 police were dispatched to capture Howell and round up his followers. During this raid, 70 people were arrested and 101 ganja plants were removed from a field close to Howell's residence. "[The raid] has undoubtedly had a good effect and was very popular with the surrounding inhabitants," the police commissioner reported, "and it would appear that a certain amount of terrorism which had been exercised by members of the Camp has been to a considerable extent broken."[29]

Postwar Placidity? The United States in the Caribbean

Outside of a four-part series on Ras Tafarianism published in *Public Opinion* in February and March 1943, there was limited reporting on Ras Tafari during or after the Second World War and up to the 1954 raid of Pinnacle that ultimately devastated the commune and dispersed its members to Kingston and other areas of Jamaica.[30] There has been speculation as to why, after the considerable public anxieties concerning the movement in the early days, there would be such a dearth of interest as the country moved toward constitutional reform and the establishment of full internal self-government. That Pinnacle, by that time, had developed an industrial-scale trade in ganja would make the seeming decline in public interest even more baffling.[31] Frank Jan Van Dijk has argued that while heightened suppression during the war may have been the primary cause of the reduced public activities of Rastafari, it is also possible that the rise of trade unions and political parties as well as the achievement of universal adult suffrage in 1944 may have diminished the movement's political role among lower-class Jamaicans. "Rastafari," he writes, "had temporarily succumbed to repression and the rise of party politics."[32] This proposition is especially important

27 Governor Arthur Richards, letter to Malcolm MacDonald, 9 April 1940, CSO 5073/34, PP.

28 The Defense Regulations Act that had been passed in England in 1938, and extended to the colonies in 1939, allowed for "the arrest and detention of individuals who allegedly engaged in acts prejudicial to public safety or the security of the realm" (Palmer, *Freedom's Children*, 231). It also provided the grounds for censorship of the press. Governor Richards, who was brought from Fiji to take over from the deceased Governor Denham, applied these regulations enthusiastically in Jamaica, even more stringently than the measures being taken within Britain itself and even as these were being decried by British citizens. In August 1939, for example, all street meetings were banned throughout downtown Kingston, and leaders of the nascent trade union movement were being harassed and infiltrated by members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force.

29 Report of Commissioner of Police to Acting Colonial Secretary, 17 July 1941, CSO 5073/34, PP. See also "Police Raid 'Pinnacle,' Ras Tafarian Den, Seize Seventy, but Miss Chief," *Gleaner*, 15 July 1941, 1, 14; there was also a full pictorial of the police raid published in the *Gleaner* on 16 July 1941.

30 R. A. Leevy, "Ras Tafarianism," *Public Opinion*; pt. 1, 13 February 1943, 3; pt. 2, 20 February 1943, 3; pt. 3, 27 February 1943, 3; and pt. 4, 13 March 1943, 3.

31 See Dunkley, "The Suppression of Leonard Howell," for an interesting take on the role of the 1948 amendment of the Dangerous Drugs Act in colonial attention to (and suppression of) Howell's activities, and for a somewhat different take on the period between the raids of Pinnacle in 1941 and 1954.

32 Frank Jan Van Dijk, "Sociological Means: Colonial Reactions to the Radicalization of Rastafari in Jamaica, 1956–1959," *New West Indian Guide* 69, nos. 1–2 (1995): 69. Ken Post has argued that Jamaican communists never succeeded in creating a worker-peasant alliance because they focused on the development of trade unions (and therefore to a large degree excluded peasants from their organizing techniques). "In so far as any of its members moved towards political protest,"

to consider if we understand Rastafari less as the purest and most powerfully resonant expression of a counter-hegemonic worldview and instead as one among a number of alternative visions for the future that circulated among working-class and lumpen Jamaicans, articulating an analysis of their social position and elaborating both the history behind it and a way out of it.[33]

However, what I want to argue here is that the period between 1945 and 1954 marks a critical shift in colonial government approaches to Rastafari because it also marks the beginning of Jamaica's entrance into two transnational commodity trades at the commercial level—ganja and bauxite. Not coincidentally, this is also a period that inaugurates a more intense economic involvement in Jamaica on the part of the United States, and therefore also a heightened foreign policy awareness as a result of the intensifying Cold War. Of course, we know that during World War II, the United States emerged from its Great Depression–era isolationism and developed anew its political stake in Caribbean futures by signing the September 1940 Destroyers for Bases agreement. Through this deal, fifty US destroyers were sent to Britain to assist them in the war effort in exchange for ninety-nine-year leases on a range of military bases in the western hemisphere, including Trinidad and Bermuda (with smaller bases in Guyana, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, and The Bahamas).[34] As Steven High has argued, these bases were represented by journalists as signs of US hypermodernity in contrast to "picturesque British colonial outposts," and they gave material substance to the 1904 Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.[35] They were also targets of anti-imperialist agitation, in part because of the introduction of Jim Crow–style racism but also because the United States refused to recognize collective bargaining rights and other forms of trade union activity. Within the context of intensifying leftist trade unionism in Jamaica after the war, as well as growing rumors that to forgive the war debt the United States would annex the colonies where bases were located, the bases came to symbolize "everything that was wrong with colonization."[36]

The militarism of the US bases was accompanied by the developmentalism of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (AACC), an advisory body that was established in March 1942 in order to coordinate and augment cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in relation to social welfare and economic growth. Through the AACC, an anxious United States sought to formally influence British colonial policy in the West Indies by, among other tactics, pressuring the British government to implement the Moyne Commission's recommendations, especially those having to do with increasing and making more efficient expenditures through the Colonial

Post writes, "it was indirectly, through the medium of Rastafarianism, and often then as migrants to urban centres" (*Strike the Iron*, 2:542).

33 The overlap and movement back and forth among these various visions would perhaps become most obvious during the late 1960s and the 1970s, when various left-leaning groups centered at the University of the West Indies, and especially the Workers Party of Jamaica, would combine forces with particular groups of Rastafari.

34 For historical analyses of the Bases for Destroyers arrangement and its effects, see Steven High, *Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940–1967* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Harvey Neptune, *Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); and Post, *Strike the Iron*, vol. 2.

35 High, *Base Colonies*, 11.

36 Ibid., 116. On the rumors of US political takeover of West Indian colonies, see Howard Johnson, "The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission and the Extension of American Influence in the British Caribbean, 1942–1945," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 22, no. 2 (1984): 180–203; Charlie Whitham, *Bitter Rehearsal: British and American Planning for a Post-war West Indies* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); and Cary Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940–1964* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994).

Welfare and Development fund and—more obliquely—those regarding constitutional transformation. Through these critiques of colonial administration, US representatives to the AACC hoped to alleviate unemployment and therefore prevent renewed outbursts of political unrest akin to the late-1930s labor riots, unrest that in their view might also encourage African Americans in the United States.[37] After 1943, when the Caribbean was no longer an active war theater, the AACC turned its attention to promoting industrialization, trade, and economic diversification, thereby laying "the foundations for the commercial penetration of the British Caribbean" by the United States.[38] And after 1947, with the articulation of the Truman Doctrine, anticommunism became the structuring principle through which this "penetration" occurred, and containment—through overt and covert means—became the central pillar of post-1945 American foreign policy.[39]

Here, bauxite is of especial interest. At the point of the discovery of commercial quantities in Jamaica in 1942 and 1943, the Aluminium Company of Canada (Alcan) had a monopoly on bauxite mining in Jamaica and elsewhere in the Caribbean. US-based Reynolds Metals, however, was eager to get in the game. In 1950, after some tussling with the Canadian and British governments, Reynolds began to purchase bauxite-rich land in Jamaica and to prepare for extraction and export, and in the immediately ensuing years Jamaica became the primary supplier of bauxite to the United States.[40] It was ultimately this interest in bauxite that also spurred US intervention into Jamaican trade unionism. In 1952, after the expulsion of the Left from the People's National Party (PNP), two representatives from US Steel began to collaborate with the newly established National Workers Union.[41] This collaboration was the result of the broader anticommunist offensive on the part of the US government throughout Latin America, and in Jamaica it would lay the groundwork for intensified agitation within the trade union movement and ultimately for the establishment in 1964 of the Trade Union Education Institute (TUEI) at the University of the West Indies, Mona. The TUEI was financed by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the CIA-supported, USAID-funded anticommunist "education" arm of AFL-CIO labor imperialism throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. That the AIFLD was also involved in building housing enclaves for workers supporting business unionism elsewhere in Latin America might raise questions regarding the processes of garrisonization in Kingston.[42] For now, however, I am merely concerned to point out

37 See Johnson, "Anglo-American Caribbean Commission," 182, 184.
38 Ibid., 192. See also Whitham, *Bitter Rehearsal*.
39 Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism*, 15.
40 See Norman Girvan, *Foreign Capital and Economic Underdevelopment in Jamaica* (Mona: Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1971); and Owen Jefferson, *The Post-war Economic Development of Jamaica* (Mona: Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1972).
41 I am currently conducting both archival and ethnographic research into the contours of this collaboration, but for earlier accounts, see Jeffrey Harrod, *Trade Union Foreign Policy: A Study of British and American Trade Union Activities in Jamaica* (New York: Doubleday, 1972); Trevor Munroe, *The Cold War and the Jamaican Left, 1950–55: Reopening the Files* (Kingston: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1992); and Hobart Spaulding, "US and Latin American Labor: The Dynamics of Imperialist Control," in June Nash, Juan Corradi, and Hobart Spaulding, eds., *Ideology and Social Change in Latin America* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1977), 55–91.
42 Harrod writes that concurrent with the establishment of the TUEI was to be the creation, in 1963, of a "Jamaican democratic Trade Union Alliance for Housing and Social Development," which was to build low-cost housing for trade unionists (*Trade Union Foreign Policy*, 288). I should point out here that the first US ambassador to independent Jamaica, William Doherty Sr., was the former director of the Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone International (PTTI), the union that financially sponsored the funds for Latin American trade unionists to travel to the United States for business unionism education and then provided the stipends for them to return to their own countries to organize over a period of nine months (he was also

how central anticommunism was to the transformation of US attention to Jamaica, both in terms of economic industries and in relation to the phenomenon of Rastafari.

We must remember, too, that the post-1945 period marked a time of intense urbanization and was the moment when the PNP began to establish its dominance not only among the middle classes in Kingston but also among the newly arrived lower classes concentrating in West Kingston. Among these migrants, and especially after the 1941 raid of Pinnacle, were Rastafari, who by the end of the decade had quietly established a rural-urban circuit of ganja that also spanned national borders by the early 1950s. As I mentioned earlier, there has been some speculation about why this trade would have been allowed to flourish until 1954, when Pinnacle was ultimately raided again. Hélène Lee suggests that there must have been some political linkage between Bustamante, then chief minister, and Howell that would have allowed for the trade, and the businessmen involved in it, to be protected.[43]

Others support this idea. Jahlani Niaah, for example, drawing from his extensive interviews with Mortimo Planno, refers to Pinnacle as having been "an important site for responding to the needs of those British troops on the front line [during the Second World War] who were sent ganja cultivated in Jamaica," and that "the development and subsequent problem of Pinnacle was really based on this reputation."[44] According to Planno, as Jamaica was approaching full internal self-government, it was determined that Pinnacle, and the economy it supported, had to be demolished. Winston Churchill's visit to Jamaica in 1953, in this view, was one diplomatic step toward this agenda, which was to "remove traces of Howell's linkages, alignments, economy, his national and international stature . . . [and] evidence of the level of facilitation that Howell was able to provide during the war."[45] This, then, was ultimately the project of the 1954 raid, during which hundreds of thousands of ganja plants, trees, roots, and seeds were removed from the compound; afterward, the *Gleaner* reported that it was "estimated that it will take the police nearly a month to destroy the ganja cultivations at Pinnacle."[46]

This narrative may not seem plausible, particularly when we remember that German U-boats were ubiquitous in the Caribbean Sea from about 1940 to 1943. However, given the extent of the official silences regarding these kinds of relationships and patterns, it is not impossible to imagine that this interpretation, among so many others, being "only historicized by members of the Rastafari movement" might contain some kernels of truth. What is also interesting about this interpretation is that it positions Howell, unwittingly, according to his son Monty, as a kind of "Jamaican don-type businessman, controlling the day-to-day, common working-class people, but connected to all of the power forces and the political movers and shakers at that time." And from this perspective, it

the former vice president of the AFL-CIO). His son, William Doherty Jr., was at the time the director of the AIFLD, but he had from the start of the organization been the director of social projects, which included the building of housing, financed by USAID.

43 See Lee, *The First Rasta*.

44 Jahlani Niaah, interview with the author, 11 March 2014, Kingston.

45 Ibid.

46 "Police Raid Pinnacle Again: 9 Thousand More Ganja Trees Destroyed," *Gleaner*, 25 May 1954, 1; "Police Burn More Ganja at Pinnacle," *Gleaner*, 28 May 1954, 1.

was his links to the centers of power in Jamaica, "those kinds of untidy political networks," that needed to be undone.[47]

Whatever the reason for the relative quiescence on the part of the colonial office toward Rastafari, and toward Howell in particular, a quiescence that extended from the end of the Second World War to the expulsion of the left from the PNP in 1952 (and the subsequent development of anticommunist hysteria), what is clear is that the emergent global hegemony of the Cold War framework of the United States was worked out in Jamaica either through the suppression or protection of new industries and the generation of new labor regimes. One trade—ganja—spearheaded by an unrepentantly anticolonial and antinationalist black man who advocated principles of economic self-determination, was shut down; another—bauxite—organized according to the logics of externally based transnational corporations, and working through the emergent common sense of business unionism and its disassociation from a more radical form of syndicalism, was allowed to flourish. It should not be surprising, then, that by the mid-1950s Rastafari resurfaces as a concern among the local elite in Jamaica and emerges as a new point of interest within the Colonial Office, though now more as a result of increasing Cold War anticommunist paranoia than as a potential racial threat to multiracial nationalism.[48]

The Second Moment: Communists, Communists Everywhere . . .

In response to a query by Governor Hugh Foot about whether there was any intelligence regarding Rastafari, several handwritten and typed notes appear on one of the Colonial Office folders toward the end of 1956.[49] Foot's query was prompted by a letter from Mr. Francis Moncrieff Kerr-Jarrett, custos of St. James, who was concerned about an uptick of Rastafari activity in Montego Bay. Kerr-Jarrett wanted the governor to procure a denial, from H.I.M. Haile Selassie, that he was the Rastafari Messiah, and to ask the editors of the *New Times and Ethiopia News*, the organ of the Ethiopia World Federation (EWF), to stop sending their paper to Jamaica. Governor Foot consulted with advisors within the Colonial Office before addressing Secretary of State (Cecil) Juxon Barton, who expressed surprise at the governor's ignorance. Barton wrote a note to an M. Phillips, Esq., explaining, "I think you will find an amount of material in the Jamaica Intelligence Reports on the Rastafaris."[50] Barton went on to discuss the position of H.I.M. Haile Selassie, noting that he "became something of an emblem of Africa to people of African descent in Jamaica." He also mentioned the Ethiopian World Federation and the news of the land grant, as well as the practice of smoking ganja. Both Barton and Phillips advised against banning the EWF publication on the grounds that such an action would cause more trouble than it was worth, with Phillips expressing the expectation

47 Jahlani Niaah, interview.
48 But see Clarke, *Race, Class*, for another interpretation of the local dimensions of racialist fear, both among middle-class and elite members of the general population and within the PNP government.
49 Marginalia on folder, CO 1031/1958, National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom (hereafter NA).
50 (Cecil) Juxon Barton, typewritten note to M. Phillips, ibid.

that "Miss Pankhurst [editor of the EWF organ] would relish an approach from the C.O. on such a matter and use it to her own ends."[51] Barton concluded his note by writing:

> I have been wondering of later [*sic*] whether there is not something below the surface in Jamaica, and you will recollect there have been mentions of Communism in the LSIC [Local Security and Intelligence Committee] reports which the Governor does not cover in his monthly reports. I do not suppose there is anything of Communism in these Rastafaris as yet, but surely the great wealth and abject poverty displayed in Jamaica are all that is needed for genuine trouble?—we have been taken unawares before in other places. Would it be acceptable to WID [West Indies Department] . . . to ask for the LSIC to write a paper on these Rastafaris, their origin, objects, etc., as is done in other Colonies?[52]

Governor Foot's response to Mr. Phillips noted his agreement that banning the paper would do more harm than good and indicated that he would "explain the position" to Kerr-Jarrett when he saw him again.[53] This perspective would be in line with Foot's generally measured approach to Jamaica's social and economic realities during his tenure as governor. Indeed, we should view his assessment of Rastafari as a relatively nuanced, and even sympathetic, one. The governor concludes his letter to Phillips as follows:

> The Rastafaris have long been a source of some concern and anxiety and those who like to make use of violence have previously attempted to engage the Rastafaris for their own evil purposes. I remember hearing, for instance, that the Rastafaris were brought into the violent strikes which took place at the end of 1950 and early in 1951 just before I came back to Jamaica. Now that we know the local Communist clique is trying to make use of them it is all the more important to watch developments carefully. But it would be a mistake to assume that all Rastafaris are criminals. . . . Many of them are good and regular workers who respond to fair treatment and sympathetic handling. On the other hand there are pockets of Rastafaris in the slums of Kingston and Montego Bay which seem to be centres of various forms of crime and vice. Certainly the Rastafaris provide an interesting example of reaction against the normal conventions and they also illustrate a commendable desire to escape from squalor and poverty by evolving some new pattern of communal life. There may well be some good in the Rastafari cult as well as the obvious bad.[54]

Here, Foot, though himself militantly anticommunist, eschews the unitary and paranoid views of Rastafari that circulated among some elites in Jamaica. In part, this may be the result of his great respect for scholarship and the arts. Perhaps he had read anthropologist George Eaton Simpson's pioneering essay published in 1955 in *Social and Economic Studies*, which generally presented a sympathetic and functionalist view of Rastafari.[55] Simpson, influenced by Herskovitsian retentionism, understood Rastafari as a "cult" that nonetheless satisfied broader ego needs in relation to the

51 M. Phillips, handwritten note, 13 October 1956, ibid.
52 (Cecil) Juxon Barton, typewritten note, 26 October 1956, ibid. Barton was colonial secretary in Fiji from 1936 to 1941, and chief secretary in Nyasaland from 1941 to 1945.
53 Hugh Foot, letter to M. Phillips, 19 November 1956, CO 1031/1958, NA.
54 Ibid. This correspondence is also detailed in Van Dijk, "Sociological Means."
55 George Eaton Simpson, "Political Cultism in West Kingston, Jamaica," *Social and Economic Studies* 4, no. 2 (1955): 133–49.

social, economic, and political situation in which practitioners found themselves. In this respect, he would have been influenced as well by the growing literature on messianic movements and "cargo cults" within anthropology.[56] At the time, movements like Rastafari were understood as responses to rapid modernization and colonialism, and were thought to emerge in relation to the contradictions people experienced due to intensified inequality within moments of crisis, during which charismatic leaders would necessarily have a greater appeal among followers. Today, we might understand so-called cargo cults and anticolonial guerrilla warfare as two sides of the same coin, though this was not widely articulated at the time. Nevertheless, while Simpson's early work sought mainly to outline the ideas and practices of Rastafari, he was clearly also interested in the extent to which we might see Rastafari as an example of how subordinate groups acculturated within a context of domination.[57]

However, although Foot was not initially exercised about Rastafari, his interlocutors in the Colonial Office were, especially after the events of 1959 and 1960 involving Reverend Claudius Henry (I will return to this below). As a result, the governor responded that he would "ask the Local Standing Intelligence Committee to see that a special eye is kept on Rastafari activities," and he commissioned the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) to develop a report on the movement. The committee Foot mentioned was part of a broader effort throughout the empire to centralize and coordinate information on security concerns. While there were security liaison officers in the Caribbean as early as 1951, an LSIC was not officially established in Jamaica until January 1953. LSICs were elaborations of an early 1948 request on the part of the Colonial Office to governors in Africa and the Far East, spurred by communist-inspired riots in Accra (1948) and communist guerrilla warfare in Malaya (1948–60), for "monthly political intelligence reports with specific reference to communism."[58] LSICs marked a general expansion of the MI5 within the United Kingdom after 1945, as a result of the Cold War and pressure from the United States, and LSIC reports were submitted directly to MI5 headquarters in London.[59] In Jamaica, their terms of reference, formally adopted in November 1957, were as follows:

> i. To advise the governor and Minister of Home Affairs on all intelligence affecting the security of Jamaica, including communism, threats to public order and stability, espionage, sabotage, and subversion;

56 The literature here is vast, but I am thinking especially of Ralph Linton, "Nativistic Movements," *American Anthropologist* 45 (1943): 230–40; and Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of "Cargo" Cults in Melanesia* (London: MacGibbon and Key, 1957).

57 See George Eaton Simpson, "The Ras Tafari Movement in Jamaica: A Study of Race and Class Conflict," *Social Forces* 34, no. 2 (1955): 167–71; and "Personal Reflections on Rastafari in West Kingston in the Early 1950s," in Nathaniel Samuel Murrell, William David Spencer, and Adrian Anthony McFarlane, eds., *Chanting Down Babylon: The Rastafari Reader* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 217–28. A more developed consideration of the influence of North American anthropologists on public perceptions of Rastafari is beyond the scope of this essay (though I discuss the scholarship on Rastafari at greater length elsewhere), but this would be a fascinating and critically important exercise. See Deborah A. Thomas, *Exceptional Violence: Embodied Citizenship in Transnational Jamaica* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), chap. 5.

58 Creech Jones, Circular Despatch to Governor John Huggins, 5 August 1948, CO 537/2795, NA.

59 See Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire* (New York: Overlook, 2013).

ii. To keep under review all matters of intelligence policy, including the development of efficiency of the intelligence organization in Jamaica;
iii. To define intelligence objectives, as and when considered necessary;
iv. To prepare such intelligence reports and appreciations as may be required by the Governor and Minister of Home Affairs;
v. To prepare a monthly report and appreciation to be forwarded to the Minister of Home Affairs and Secretary of State through the Governor;
vi. To keep under review, in light of the current security appreciations, protective security measures.[60]

The committee was headed by a security liaison officer (SLO), who was appointed by the British intelligence services and who would work with Police Special Branch, the Armed Forces, and representatives of the administration to generate monthly reports. These reports were to contain information about "typical points" of interest in territories "where no actual state of emergency exists," using headers such as "Communism"; "Extremist Nationalism"; "Labour and Agrarian Unrest"; "Racial, Religious, and Tribal Tension"; and "Frontier and Border Incidents."[61] In Jamaica, these reports generally had three headers—"Communism," "Political/Trade Union Activity," "Rastafari"—and at the end they would report emigration numbers for the month.[62]

It is interesting to note that not all governors seem to have been on board with this new organization of intelligence. Governor Foot, for instance, raised concerns within MI5 for not submitting the LSIC report at the same time as he sent his governor's monthly report, which included information on internal security concerns. A back and forth between himself and the Colonial Office reveals that when queried as to his practice of sending the LSIC report "late," Governor Foot responded that he felt the LSIC reports to be overanxious, that they would provoke the sense within the Colonial Office that there were communists everywhere in Jamaica, and that his own report was more nuanced and could give the more contextual information that was needed. The colonial secretary appeared to take Foot's side in this matter, in principle, writing that Foot's were among the best and most enjoyable monthly reports within the empire, and that he should not be antagonized. Nevertheless, Foot was asked to send the reports at the same time from that period on.[63]

In January 1957, though, it was still the Special Branch that was gathering monthly intelligence information, and the police were less sanguine about Rastafari than Governor Foot. On 5 January 1957, the JCF submitted its report on Rastafari, which outlined the main timeline of the movement, discussing Howell and Pinnacle in some detail. What is critical to our purposes here, however, is the report's mention of alliances, or potential alliances, between Rastafari and the leftist trade union and popular education movements:

60 Local Standing Intelligence Committee, November 1957, FCO 141/5418, NA.
61 Secretary of State, "Organisation of Intelligence," Colonial Office Despatch, 28 April 1956, CO 1035/43, NA.
62 Special Branch Monthly Report, 28 November 1957, FCO 141/5434, NA.
63 Correspondence between a Mr. Rogers in the Colonial Office; Governor Hugh Foot; I. Wallace; Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies; and Philip Rogers, Secretary of State; 16 July–11 September 1956, CO 1035/43 and FCO 141/5393, NA.

> Various Trade Unions have used individual Rastafarites as professional pickets and dues collectors, this particularly applies to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) under the leadership of the Hills. . . . During the past year, it has been known that the Communist inspired People's Educational Organisation (PEO) bookshop has imported books for circulation amongst the Rastafarites and overtures to the Rastafarites have been made by the Communist People's Freedom Movement (PFM), both in Kingston and St. James. It is difficult to assess the extent, if any, of PFM success, but it is known that Richard Hart, a PFM leader, defended a Rastafarite leader in Montego Bay and won the case, no doubt gathering considerable prestige.[64]

Kenneth Blackburne, who replaced Foot as governor in December 1957, followed up on the issue of potential alliances between Rastafari and leftist political activists, but this time as a result of a concern expressed to him by Norman Manley. "The Chief Minister suggested today that Special Branch should keep a careful eye on the activities of the communists (PFM) in relation to the Ras Tafarians," he wrote in a note to Alan Lennox-Boyd, secretary of state for the colonies. "He said that the PFM had moved their headquarters to the proximity of the Ras Tafarian area," the note continued. "He also said, after the riot in the Coronation market, the first person to telephone to him was Mr. Richard Hart."[65] A month later, Blackburne wrote the secretary again, now asking him to pass on whatever information he had about the movement.[66]

In his response, Lennox-Boyd included a summary of previous intelligence on Rastafari, and appended the copy of the January 1959 report of the Local Standing Intelligence Committee. He concluded his letter to Blackburne with the following:

> After the initial attempt by the People's Freedom Movement (PFM) in 1957 to infiltrate the ranks of the Rastafarites in St. James, Westmoreland and the Corporate Area—which met with little success—there has been little effort by the Movement to pursue its object. It is known that certain individual members of the Cult hold communist beliefs, but the Rastafarites as a group have shown no more interest in the PFM than in the other political parties. Since the inauguration, in December 1958, of the Progressive Independence Party (PIP) by H. C. Buchanan, one-time Chairman of the PFM, 2 members of the Cult have been admitted into its ranks with the object of using them to stir the interest of the cultists in the new political party.[67]

64 "The Rastafari Cult," Jamaica Constabulary Force report, 5 January 1957, CO 1031/2767, NA.

65 Kenneth Blackburne, letter to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 11 May 1959, FCO 141/5295, NA.

66 This concern on the part of Manley would apparently grow during the years Claudius Henry returned to Jamaica and began actively recruiting people to the faith. Robert A. Hill, who has recently constructed a more detailed picture of the Henry events of 1959 and 1960, has controversially argued that the 1960 report *The Ras Tafari Movement in Kingston, Jamaica* was actually an intelligence document posing as an academic study and that it was written entirely by anthropologist M. G. Smith, who had been tasked by then-Premier Manley to conduct surveillance research on the Rastafari communities in West Kingston. The goal of the report, for Hill, was pacification of the movement through the political co-optation of its members. Nettleford's own accounting of the story of the report, however, has Planno and others visiting him at the Extramural Department at UWI asking that a study be done "to let Jamaica understand what they're about." Nettleford claims that he sent the group of Rastafari to Sir Arthur Lewis, who then made arrangements to sponsor a six-week study of the movement, concentrating on downtown Kingston, conducted by Nettleford, Roy Augier, and M. G. Smith. The report was serialized in the *Gleaner* and sold out its initial printing of ten thousand copies in one day. David Scott, "'To Be Liberated from the Obscurity of Themselves': An Interview with Rex Nettleford," *Small Axe*, no. 47 (July 2015): 164, 167.

67 Alan Lennox-Boyd, letter to Kenneth Blackburne, 10 June 1959, Appendix 1, p. 2, CO 1031/2767, NA. Again, see Clarke, *Race, Class*, for further discussion of the shifting alliances between various groups of Rastafari and the different Marxist organizations operating at the time.

H. C. Buchanan, a trade union leader, former Garveyite, and Jamaica's first Marxist, was the person who inspired Richard Hart to become involved in Marxist processes of analysis and organizing in 1937, and as we will see, his own individual connections with Rastafari would generate suspicion among the Special Branch and the LSIC.[68] However, when asked about links between the Left and Rastafari in an interview with Trevor Munroe, Hart remembered that Buchanan knew Leonard Howell personally but that the two movements did not work together in the early days: "I don't recall really being close to Rastas before the '50s."[69] Though Hart sometimes gave public lectures about black history and black leadership within struggles for social change, race was not an organizing principle for the Left. As Munroe put it, "It is clear that there was no real analysis of Rastafarianism within the communist Left and no systematic effort at organizational relationship." This was true despite the fact that, as Munroe further points out, there was significant "overlap between Rastafarian and communist working people and unemployed, particularly in Western Kingston."[70] This is a question to which I will return below.

Aside from this purported penetration into Rastafari by the Jamaican Left, the Claudius Henry events of 1959 and 1960 attracted an intensified interest in the movement on the part of both the Colonial Office and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.[71] In large measure, this was the result of the discovery during the 1960 raid of Henry's compound in Red Hills of the letter addressed to Fidel Castro,[72] stating their intention to overthrow the government of Jamaica and turn it over to him as they repatriated to an African colony to spur a liberation movement there. The potential linkages with local communists alongside this communication with Castro raised enough questions about the movement to maintain the attention of the LSIC, which by January 1958 was reporting extensively on Henry's movements.[73] The governor's own internal security reports also began to focus on Henry during this period. In December 1960, Blackburne linked the "threat" of Rastafari to the intensifying inequalities within the colony. "The Premier and the Cabinet as a whole," he wrote, "appear to be fully appreciative of the dangers of the present situation."

> In particular, there is at last a general realization that the threat to internal security lies not solely in the Rastafarian movement, but rather in the fact that too many of the population have been 'left behind' in the great upsurge of development of the past few years. Many people—from the ranks of artisans upwards—are now enjoying standards of life which were beyond their wildest dreams a few years ago. Middle class housing estates, hire purchase and higher wages have all contributed to an air of prosperity among some people. But, despite all the publicity attendant on the opening of every new factory, despite figures showing the growth in the national

68 Richard Hart, *Rise and Organise: The Birth of the Workers and National Movements in Jamaica, 1936–39* (London: Karia, 1987).

69 Trevor Munroe, *Jamaican Politics: A Marxist Perspective in Transition* (Kingston: Heinemann, 1990), 130.

70 Munroe, *The Cold War and the Jamaican Left*, 46. The assertion of a link between Rastafari and Marxism was also made in *The Ras Tafari Community of Kingston, Jamaica*, 25–26.

71 Hill, "Leonard P. Howell and Millenarian Visions"; Meeks, *Narratives of Resistance*; Special Branch Reports, CO 1031/2767, CO 1031/2768, CO 1031/3994, and FCO 141/5434, NA.

72 According to followers who were with Henry at the time, this letter was written but never sent, and it was written not by Henry but by an undercover police informer.

73 The LSIC was also concerned with Prince Emmanuel Edwards's plan for a thirty-day convention, which, they write in their April 1958 report, "appeared to have served no useful purpose." Local Standing Intelligence Committee Report, submitted 28 April 1958, FCO 141/5434, NA.

> income, and despite a fantastic increase in the number of cars on the roads, a sizeable part of the population—particularly in Kingston—are still without jobs, without houses, and without prospects for the future. For many years this lower segment of the population has based its hopes on political promises at the times of election campaigns; but they now see the gap widening between themselves and the more fortunate members of the community, and they are beginning to lose hope. The sad fact is that the development of industry and the import of capital for housing and other development projects has not kept pace with the rapidly increasing population; and the number of unemployed increases rather than decreases. It is from the ranks of these underprivileged people that C. V. Henry gained such support for his "Back to Africa" movement; it is from these people that the Rastafarians are now gaining recruits; and it is from these people that some minor incident could easily provoke a serious riot in Kingston at any time.[74]

For Blackburne, Rastafari only indexed a broader problem, that of the increased wealth gaps created by economic development measures—through bauxite and tourism—put into place by Norman Manley's PNP.[75] This was a view widely shared among left-leaning Jamaicans, as became clear after the events at Coral Gardens in 1963, when a number of editorials in *Public Opinion* identified economic development as the solution to the millenarian "problem" of Rastafari.[76] As early as April 1960, however, the Colonial Office recognized that Rastafari posed a more fundamental problem, since their focus on repatriation made it more difficult to capture them with developmentalist promises. "They admit no future for themselves in Jamaica and vociferously wish to be sent to Africa," Blackburne wrote. "They have been unmoved by constitutional progress," he continued, "and are violently opposed to the present Government—or indeed to any established authority."[77] Here, Blackburne clearly identified the issue—he could not diffuse Rastafari by "sociological means," in other words, through social development programs, because they did not see themselves as having a stake in the development of the Jamaican nation since they themselves were focused on returning to Africa.[78] Instead, the government, in Blackburne's opinion, would have to convince Rastafari "that their faith in a return to Africa is misconceived and that their belief that they will be welcomed on their return by the Emperor Haile Selassie is without foundation."[79]

Blackburne's report for January 1961 continued with this concern. In that report, he turned his attention to the attempt by the PFM to organize in the sugar areas of Clarendon and Westmoreland, the sites of two large estates and factories owned by the West Indies Sugar Company. He noted that a governmental survey confirmed that workers there were experiencing significant hardships, in part as a result of increased mechanization, and that this problem should be added "to the hard core of Rastafarians and others in the area, who have always presented a security problem, as representing

74 "Extract from Governor of Jamaica's Intelligence Report for November–December 1960, Orig. on WIS 472/1025/01," CO 1031/3995, NA.
75 See Mimi Sheller's fascinating discussion about the links between these two industries in *Aluminum Dreams: The Making of Light Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014).
76 See a discussion of this in Thomas, *Exceptional Violence*, chap. 5.
77 Monthly Intelligence Report for April 1960, CO 1031/3995, NA.
78 See Van Dijk, "Sociological Means."
79 Kenneth Blackburne, letter to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 10 June 1959, CO 1031/2767, NA.

a focal point of disaffection."[80] Henry, of course, had many followers from Vere and other sugar areas in southern Clarendon; these were part of the "hard core" to which the governor referred.

After the April 1960 preemptive raid of Henry's compound in Red Hills, there was a long discussion in the LSIC report focused on the question of how he could have amassed the funds to develop the arsenal that was found during the raid, an arsenal that was "modern, purchased from the proceeds of a series of bank robberies which had been well organized by a black New York policeman":[81]

> There is a large question mark in all this—the source of funds to meet the cost of Henry's frequent journeys abroad and of the arms and uniforms with which usually poor people have been equipped. While it is not yet possible to pronounce finally on this it is fair to say that there is no evidence that any external source of these funds which there may be is communist-connected and, indeed, it is possible that this money represents the proceeds of the illicit sale of ganja. Such communist connection with these developments as has come to light has been limited to the fact that Richard Hart and a few other members of the local People's Freedom Movement, but not Ferdinand Smith himself, are known to have some association with Henry, that Henry is being defended at the preliminary enquiry into the charges against him by Peter Evans, a barrister of Irish descent once connected with the Communist Party who was required to leave Kenya some six or so years ago, and that rumour has it that D. N. Pritt will appear for the defence in a higher court.[82]

In May 1960 during a meeting of the PFM at which Janet Jagan was present, Hugh Buchanan explained the connection between Henry and the PFM. He said that Henry had come to him after seeing pamphlets regarding the Convention Independence Party, of which Buchanan was president, in order to see whether they would assist Henry's church. The LSIC reported that Buchanan said "he had guided HENRY on matters concerning the Church and on his advice HENRY collected £600 from his followers":

> Later, [Buchanan said] he severed connection with HENRY as he realized that the latter's plans would come to the ears of the Police and there would be trouble. He assured the meeting that at no time did the PFM have any dealings with HENRY or the AFRICA REFORM CHURCH as SMITH had always regarded the Rastafarians as fanatics. BUCHANAN said he had in fact joined hands with HENRY in order to get support for the CIP [Convention Independence Party]. (Buchanan's explanation of his connections with Henry agrees with Special Branch reports received at the time.)[83]

While the LSIC seemed certain of the PFM's disavowal of Claudius Henry, their July report indicated that Ferdinand Smith, then leader of the movement, stated during a meeting at his house that "the PFM would consider taking over the AFRICAN REFORM CHURCH if HENRY were imprisoned."[84] In

80 "Extract from Governor of Jamaica's Intelligence Report for January 1961," CO 1031/3995, NA.
81 Terry Lacey, *Violence and Politics in Jamaica, 1960–1970: Internal Security in a Developing Country* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), 83.
82 Report of the Local Standing Intelligence Committee, April 1960, CO 1031/3994, NA. D. N. Pritt was an English barrister who was ultimately expelled from the Labour Party because of his pro-Soviet stance.
83 Ibid., May 1960 (capitalization in original).
84 Ibid., July 1960 (capitalization in original).

May and June, there was additional communication back and forth about Henry's US connection, the individuals involved, and a more general concern regarding support from "terrorist" organizations in New York City. The head of the West India Regiment also weighed in, discussing a worry about the potential of continued operations on the party of Henry's followers and an anxiety that some of his men may have traveled to Cyprus, where Governor Foot had been relocated from Jamaica during a period of intense nationalist and communist struggle that culminated in independence from British rule in August 1960.[85] This communiqué reveals how generally paranoid the Colonial Office and Intelligence Services were about insurgent activity throughout the empire at that time.

After the June raids, carried out by a combined force of the police and army, Henry was arrested and subsequently convicted of treason and was sentenced to ten years in prison. In December, the West India Regiment (WIR)—having been revived in response to the push for West Indian Federation—received intelligence that over the Christmas holidays, Henry's followers would attempt to carry out armed attacks on the prison to allow their leader to escape. To thwart this possibility, police were ordered to start a number of raids among Rastafari settlements in order to disrupt their plans, and there was discussion about whether Henry should be moved to Up Park Camp in order to be placed under military guard.[86] Additionally, the head of the WIR wrote a letter to Colonel B. Wilson in the War Office, petitioning him for support with arms and other forms of weaponry. "One further point on which I should be most grateful if you could help," he wrote,

> Toward the latter part of the Cyprus emergency a splendid new gas was issued under the name "792," now known as "CS." I should very much like to have a supply out here. There is no doubt that this Rastafarian trouble is with us for some time, and if we should be called upon to raid another Camp in circumstances similar to the June episode, then rather than risk injuries to our chaps who would inevitably be invited to accept the first volley, I should like to be in a position first to neutralize the opposition with "792." Could you please look into this and let me know what are the possibilities and how soon we could get supplies. I should like 500 cartridges 1 1/2 inch Anti-Riot Irritant L2A2CS: we have sufficient pistols signal 1 1/2 inch from which they are fired.[87]

The response to this letter came via telegram, and stated simply, "First. Much regret unable send you 200 L2A2 CST (729) by air as no civilian company will carry and RAF unable to help. Second. 500 [tear gas] cartridges being despatched by quickest sea route."[88] These cartridges were likely the ones used against Rastafari during the Coral Gardens incident of April 1963.

What should be clear here is that at the height of the Cold War, disturbances in one area of empire prompted security and surveillance action in others. Moreover, once there was even a shadow of a link between communists and other anti-imperial groups, like Rastafari, these groups

85 Ibid.

86 Major St. J. C. Brooke-Johnson, MBE, Worcestershire Regiment (from the War Office), confidential letter to G. P. Lloyd, West Indian Department, Colonial Office, 15 December 1960, CO 1031/3995, NA.

87 "D. W. L.," to Colonel B. Wilson, 15 December 1960, WO 336/26. "D. W. L." would be Brigadier D. W. Lister, who was a Caribbean Area Army commander after a long stint in Aden.

88 "Rastafarian Movement. Your G2061 of 152220 Z December," telegram from "Troopers" to "General Jamaica," 21 December 1960, WO 336/26.

became a threat to the state, threats that needed to be "neutralized" socially and militarily. There is one additional piece to this puzzle, however, and that is the role of Rastafari in West Kingston as gangs were being formed. Barry Chevannes has told us that between 1955 and 1963, three major gangs had coalesced in West Kingston. The first was the Vikings, established near what is now Newport East, a community of fishermen and hustlers who worked the ships docking in the harbor. The Vikings, Chevannes reports, were influenced by the Rastafari movement *and* the socialist movement. The defeat of the latter in 1952 with the purging of the Left from the PNP, he argues, "left an ideological vacuum in semi-lumpen Viking community which was partially filled by the dreadlocks, who by 1960 could be identified as the leading trend throughout the Rastafari movement." The Vikings became a dominant force among urban youth not only through their winning football team (which was, not incidentally, comprised of all dreadlocks) but also because of their ability to secure valuable commodities—such as pistols—from the ships. The second gang was the Park or "Culbut" (Culvert) men, who met in a park in Denham Town at the top of Wellington Street. Park men, Chevannes writes, were known to be petty thieves, but were also involved in more dangerous crimes that involved weapons, and so they were "on good and friendly terms with the Vikings." The third gang was the Salt City group, who were "famous for their use of knives and cutlasses, and for riding around on their bicycles in large numbers."[89] Chevannes also mentions a group of youth, friendly with the Vikings, who followed Duke Reid and hung out on the corner of Regent and Charles Streets. This group's activities, he argues, were not based in crime, but the group was drawn into political affiliation when the PNP constituency headquarters moved to their corner and they "found themselves also the object of attacks."[90] They became known as the Spanglers.

Chevannes argues that these gangs coexisted relatively peacefully until 1963, when the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) through the minister of Parliament for West Kingston, Edward Seaga, who was also minister of Community Development and Welfare, began to organize youth toward social development goals through the Youth Development Agency (YDA).[91] Chevannes recounts that the Park gang formed a club, Wellington United, which became affiliated to the YDA, affording them access to sports gear and equipment but also subjecting them to intense pressure to affiliate with the JLP. It was not long before YDA affiliation became "regarded as tantamount to JLP affiliation," which generated physical boundaries and fissures between groups that had previously operated on friendly terms. "Inter-gang hostilities," Chevannes writes, "became at the same time inter-party hostilities,"[92] with the Salt City gang (now renamed Phoenix City) and other smaller groups based on youth clubs becoming allied to the JLP, while the Vikings and the Spanglers maintained a PNP affiliation; the Park gang was split and eventually was the target of violence by both sides. With the slum clearance project that began in 1963 and culminated in 1966, the communities of Back-o-Wall and Ackee Walk were completely wiped out, and the Vikings were dispersed from the area that

89 Barry Chevannes, "The Rastafari and the Urban Youth," in Carl Stone and Aggrey Brown, eds., *Perspectives on Jamaica in the Seventies* (Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1981), 393.
90 Ibid., 394.
91 Amanda Sives, *Elections, Violence, and the Democratic Process in Jamaica, 1944–2007* (Kingston: Ian Randle Press, 2010). Sives disputes Chevannes's claim that prior to 1963 intergang rivalry was unknown.
92 Chevannes, "Rastafari and the Urban Youth," 394, 395.

would become the new housing estate of Tivoli Gardens. As a result, the JLP developed its most notorious stronghold in the Kingston ghetto areas, thereby reversing the long-standing dominance, enjoyed since 1949, of the PNP.

The point I am making is that by the time the 1960s began, there was an established ground for linking security, Rastafari, the trade in ganja, and political partisanship, itself generated through an intensifying anticommunist paranoia throughout the 1950s on the part of the United Kingdom and the United States. As Jamaican nationalists were envisioning the constitutional changes that would lead to self-government, they were envisioning them within the parameters—violently maintained—that were established by the Cold War and growing US hegemony. These parameters also provided the ground on which territory in downtown Kingston would be linked to the provision of services, and thus the vectors of what would become intense political violence and penetration by the United States (politically and economically) were established by the beginning of the decade. Where Rex Nettleford and others would respond to the negative framing of Rastafari and black consciousness generally through the 1960 report and through texts such as *Mirror Mirror*, attempting to counter both elite and imperial anxiety, the issues of racial justice raised by Rastafari were never fully engaged. The problem of the 1960s, thus, is not merely what Nettleford identified as the sociocultural, economic, and political divisions between "the melody of Europe and the rhythm of Africa"—a principally local (nationalist) expression—but exists in an increasingly complex set of imperial alliances and breaks among a range of sometimes conflicting global actors that were developed throughout the 1950s and that become more clearly mobilized during the 1970s and 1980s. That we still feel the effects of these entanglements today should be obvious. How to dismantle them is less so.

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