### Contemporary Models and Underdevelopment

EC 390 - Development Economics

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So far we have seen that development is **possible but difficult to achieve**The theory models we have seen use very **strict assupmtions** 

- This is done to simplify the model and bring it down to a handful of variables that can change
- However the world is not simple

#### Newer theories relax some of these assumptions

- Perfect information
- Insignificance of externatilities
- Uniqueness/optimality of equilibria

These models attempt to incorporate more realistic observations of the developing world

A major theme is the inclusion of:

- **1. Binding Constraints**
- 2. Coordination of **Economic Agents**

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#### **1. Binding Constraints**

- The main thing holding you back from growth
- If this limitation was to be relaxed, we would see accelerated growth (or an increased amount in whatever target we have)
- 2. Coordination of Economic Agents

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#### 2. Coordination of Economic Agents

- A participant that chooses an action to maximize an objective
  - Firms, Workers, Consumers, Government Officials, etc.

## Coordination Failure

### **Important Terms**

#### **Complementarity:**

• An action taken by an agent, that increases the incentives for other agents to take similar actions

#### **Coordination Failure**

• A situation where the **inability** of agents to coordinate their **behavior** leads to an **outcome** that leaves everyone worse off than in an alternative situation that is also an **equilibrium** 

**Coordination Failure** is essentially where agents do not work optimally together to reach the **best possible** outcome

### Expectations

Let's quickly introduce the important economic concept of **Expectations** 

- Agents hold beliefs of what they think will happen
  - You expect that studying hard will improve your grades
  - You expect the empty restaurant will not be good
- These beliefs then shape your behavior
  - You study more
  - You go eat somewhere else

### Complementarities

Expectations are an important component of complementarities

**Complementarities** will often involve investments where returns depend on **other investments being made** 

- An important example is the presence of firms using special skills by agents and those agents acquiring those skills
- Later we will see a model that directly deals with worker skills complementing each other in production

### Coordination Between Agents

**Coordination** gets more difficult/unlikely as the number of agents increases

There can also be added limitations to coordinating behavior

- Agents may not be able to coordinate at all → Where-to-Meet Dilemma
- Even if agents can coordinate, it may be difficult to convince them to

### Price of Fish Example

#### **Reading on Site**

- Central Issue: Fishermen in India were not sure what the local prices were
  - A good catch might not fetch a lot of money if a fisher man chooses
     a saturated market
  - This led to surpluses and shortages
  - Coordination Failure

### Price of Fish Example

Central Issue: Fishermen in India were not sure what the local prices were

- The most basic supply and demand curves require full information for all agents
- Without information, volatility and uncertainty enter the market
- The fishermen have no information on the local prices, and they were not sure where to sell
- This leads to volatile prices in the market
- With cell phones, information became accesible
- Cell phones also allowed them to coordinate
- "Law of One Price" emerged

### Price of Fish Example

How did cellphones allow agents to overcome the coordination failure?

- They allowed fishermen to communicate with buyers and other sellers
- They could call a number of markets and find out where the price was highest
- Generally aware of where buyers had high Willingness to Pay
- Sellers were able to spread out across the different markets in an optimal way
- Eliminated inefficiencies like guessing




FIGURE IV
Prices and Mobile Phone Service in Kerala

100 110

120 130 140

Survey Week

150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220


# Multiple Equilibria

#### How Can There Be More Than One?

Basically, reflects a more (but not entirely) realistic possibility of outcomes

We will be matching **expectations** to **reality** 

- Recall that **expectations** are not necessarily reality but they do inform it
- Multiple Equilibria is the condition where more than one equilibria exists
- These equilibria may sometimes be ranked, in the sense that one is preferred to another
- The standard diagram takes an S-shape around a 45 degree line



### Multiple Equilibria

Components of the **S-Diagram** 

#### **Wavy Line** → **Private Decision Function**

 Tells us the best decision an individual can make given decisions of all other agents

#### **45 Degree Line**

• Shows all points where an individual's decision is exactly the same as

### Multiple Equilibria

### Stable vs Unstable Equilibria

#### Stable Equilibria


• An **equilibrium is stable** if it is the case that if we were to move away from it, then agents will eventually end back at that equilibrium

#### **Unstable Equilibria**

• An **equilibrium is unstable** if it is the case that if we were to move away from it, then agents will take actions that make it move further away from it

#### How can we tell if an equilibrium is stable/unstable?

- If the S-Curve is flatter than the 45-Degree line than it is stable
- If the S-Curve is steeper than the 45-Degree line than it is unstable



In this previous example,  $D_1$  and  $D_3$  are **stable** And  $D_2$  is **unstable** 

### Big Push

This model helps us understand something like perpetual poverty or the middle income trap

Take for example a nation with a low average investment

- ullet If nothing is done, investment will simply return to  $D_1$  and there will be less and less economic activity
  - Recall what our previous models infer about low investments → low output
- ullet If investment could be increased beyond the intermediate point  $D_2$ , then these models predict that investment would eventually end up at  $D_3$

### Examples of a Big Push

# Intestinal works are prevalent among children in the poorest of developing countries

- Worms lead to sickness
- Sickness means missed school or missed work
- Worms spread from children to children in several ways
- **Coordination Failure:** If no one treats their child (or if they are unable to), why should I treat mine?
- Studies have shown that deworming medicine leads to a large increase in school attendance in Kenya, even among untreated children

### Multiple Equilibria Problems

There are several other problems with multiple equilibria to consider

- 1. Firm Incumbency
- 2. Behaviour and Norms
- 3. Linkages

### Multiple Equilibria Problems

#### 1. Firm Incumbency

- Existing firms have an advantage over new firms
- This may be true even if they have relatively worse technology
- Take the entry of a modern firm, with better technology
- Even if the new firm has better tech, they run up against an economies of scale problem
- The local firm produces more output, so their per-unit cost is lower
- A new firm cannot just match production yet, even though they may produce output more efficiently
- Older firms can adjust and obtain the more efficient tech, but can they?
- If capital markets are poor, then they cannot invest properly and the economy is stuck with the inefficient production

#### 2. Behaviour and Newscure 03 | Contemporary Models and Underdevelopment

### Multiple Equilibria

#### 1. Firm Incumbency

#### 2. Behaviour and Norms

- Movement to a better equilibrium can be especially difficult when there are many agents to consider
- Some agents may have different and selfish incentives that make them act in corrupt ways
- Imagine how difficult it is to change someones mind from say corruption to a cooperative nature where working together benefits all

#### 3. Inequality

### Multiple Equilibria Problems

- 1. Firm Incumbency
- 2. Behaviour and Norms

#### 3. Linkages

- A traditional view has been that **some inequality** may enhance growth because **the savings of the rich are higher than those of the poor**
- But in reality the poor save more than we think, or at the very least they do when we consider savings as investments in things like health, children's education, and home improvements
- Even more importantly, in high inequality settings, the poor may not be able to get loans due to their lack of wealth
  - With lack of access to credit, they may not be able to get loans that finance productivity increasing investments (efficient capital, educational investment, etc.)

# O-Ring Theory

#### Introduction

This model leans in on complementarities in production in a strong way

 The notion is that modern production (comparative to tradiotional crafts production) requires many activities be done well together in order for any of them to amount to a high value

The name comes from the unfortunate 1986 **Challenger disaster** where one small and inexpensive part (the O-Ring) failed and caused the space shuttle to explode

# Key Feature - Complementarities Among Inputs

Start by thinking of the model as describing what goes on inside a firm, but we can extend this to an industry or sector of the economy

- Suppose that production is broken down into n tasks
- For simplicity, we say that these tasks are ordered by the required level of skill to complete them, q, where  $0 \le q \le 1$ 
  - The higher the skill, the higher the probability of it being "successfully completed"
- The production function is a simple one:
  - ullet Output is given by multiplying the q values of each n tasks togehter, and this is then multiplied by a term B that is just a production scalar

### O-Ring Production

$$BF(q_i,q_j)=q_iq_j$$

Let's make a simplifying assumption that B=1 so then we just have

$$F(q_i, q_j) = q_i q_j$$

Now let's introduce other assumptions

- Firms are risk-neutral
- Labor markets are competitive
- Workers supply labor inelastically

# HRV