An Examination of Josip Broz Tito and Yugoslavia As an Application of Hobbesian Statecraft and Philosophy

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**Abstract:**

In this paper, I begin by examining the Hobbesian concept of man in relation to society as well as its application to the turbulent history of tribalism within Yugoslavia. I then attempt to relate this notion to Thomas Hobbes’ notion of the state and Commonwealth, which I show espouse a deeply centralized and monarchial style of governance. I then argue that Tito epitomized this model of rule, and then reason that Yugoslavia needed such a centralized rule to overcome ingrained ethnic nationalism. I next examine Tito’s success by describing the *bellum omnium contra omnes-*nature of post-Tito Yugoslavia. I conclude by offering a critique of both Hobbes’ and Tito’s ideas on power and government in a free society,while also considering the practical utility of tyrannical power.

**Introduction:**

Much of the Western literary tradition concerning man’s innate state was, in its infancy, dominated by religious discourse. Scholars, including St. Augustine of Hippo, among others, espoused a model of human existence that focused around the concept of Original Sin.1 In the lens of Christianity, man’s very existence was evil, simply because of Adam and Eve’s transgression. As both philosophy and concepts of society progressed in the Renaissance and Enlightenment era, however, these Western beliefs concerning human nature were increasingly challenged. One of the earliest scholars to formulate a dialogue was Thomas Hobbes whose seminal work, *Leviathan*, was published in 1651 and has been heralded as one of the great works on Western statecraft. In *Leviathan,* Hobbes utilizes a philosophical and scientific approach to the issue of the natural state of man. Hobbes first separates the concepts of man as a natural entity (i.e. beast) and man as a member of society.2 Hobbes, eschewing a more religious approach to the issue, concludes that man is driven by a myriad of ‘passions’ and, more pertinently, desires. Without order, Hobbes believed that man would fall into ‘a war of all against all,’ where each man, competing for common resources, would recognize every other man as an enemy. To prevent this, Hobbes believed that a Social Contract was necessary, where subjects would forgo some freedom in exchange for security. To enforce this, Hobbes believed that a strong, justice-seeking monarch who cared deeply for his or her subjects was paramount.

To Historians, the notion of an absolute monarch possessing sympathy for his subjects is nearly identical to the contentious idea of a ‘benevolent dictator.’ In contrast to the malevolent dictators deeply ingrained within the fabric of modern history, benevolent dictators rule with (mostly) altruistic intentions, although with the autonomy and complete sovereignty. In the time of Mao, Stalin, and Pol Pot, Josip Broz Tito (Tito) would emerge as such a dictator, and lead Yugoslavia, a region oft in conflict due to ethnonationalism, quite successfully on a path free from USSR and US influence. In this paper, I will consider only Hobbes non-religious statements and argue that the Hobbesian model of man provides a strong foundation upon which to model the tribalism and tribal warfare. I will apply this notion to the turbulent of Yugoslavia and contend that embedded in the Hobbesian man are contradictions. I will next contend that Tito embodied the perfect Hobbesian monarch due to man’s tendencies towards tribalism. I will then conclude that Tito provided a positive and necessary force of unification in Yugoslavia by embracing a strong pan-Yugoslavian nationalism in the style of Hobbes; furthermore, I will highlight nationalistic, tribal, and Hobbesian disaster that occurred in Yugoslavia following Tito’s death.

**The Hobbesian Man**

In order to examine the validity of Hobbes’ proposed political system, we must first consider Hobbes’ beliefs about man. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes begins his examination of man by espousing that “all fancies are motions within us” and that these fancies “immediately succeeded one another in the sense continue also together after sense.” 3 Hobbes believed that our desires were a result of innate senses that existed deep within us. These senses and desires built upon each other throughout our life in order to form a chain that produced even more lusts. These desires include the pursuit of greed and the evasion of death. Besides these innate wants, Hobbes argued that man was, as a natural creature, neither good nor bad.4 The conscious mind was blank, malleable, and impressionable. The temperament of man, however, was of a different ilk. Hobbes felt that man was prone to conflict: “if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies…. [and] endeavour to destroy or subdue one another.” 5

An extension of the innate desire to preserve the self, this realization of man’s temperament gave Hobbes the crucial information needed to formulate the notion of *bellum omnium contra omnes* (the war of all against all). According to Hobbes, war, when considered in a natural state removed from the morality that society imposes, is neither good nor evil: it simply exists.6 How can killing your fellow man be ‘evil’ if no codified system exists to declare the malevolence of such an act? Since the natural state has no laws, Hobbes described what he called ‘liberties,’ and, in the state of all-out war, Hobbes contended that: “in such a condition, every man has the right to every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man.” 7 In effect, man has access to whatever liberties he desired within the natural state. Furthermore, without any form of contracts, a man in this state also has complete sovereignty. Given this freedom, Hobbes believed that man would eventually default to warfare, over the realization that they share the same innate desires (defined above). To Hobbes, the war of all against all was the worst possible form of human existence, and thus, he argued that rational men would be willing to cede some personal autonomy in order to secure security and basic rights, so as avoid such an execrable state, where no rights and no law exists.8

Therefore, man found himself in a position to seek the benefit of society. Hobbes came to believe that: “all men agree… that peace is good.” 9 Because of this, Hobbes contended that man would erect society that could enforce peace and that this society would exist upon a set of contracts or covenants which would place strict boundaries upon the structure of society. Hobbes detailed the guarantees that such a contract should make based on what he describes as laws of nature. Hobbes outlines 15 such laws, but the first three are of special precedence. The first law of nature implores man to seek peace and defend him or herself when peace is threatened; the second law of nature states that actions and rights are congruent: if I can kill you then surely you can kill me.10 Thus, the first two rights naturally lead man to seek peace. The third law dictates that the only contracts (and compromises) of value are those that are acted upon.11 Given this natural progression towards society, I, therefore, believe that the Hobbesian man (Hobbes model of man) is rational in his decision making. Because of this, I would then like to argue that while the Hobbesian man may be a useful structure for examining man in his natural state, a more practical application of Hobbes’ framework concerning man exists on the ethnic and nationalities level as well as in the context of political tribes.

Hobbes believed that man was the fundamental base level of organization in society, and *Leviathan* reflects this notion given its focus on the actions of individuals, but man, as an entity of power, is weak. Although great leaders exist in the annals of history, the power these leaders wielded is derived not from their individual power, but rather their distinct ability to form a tribe conducive to the promotion and maintenance of their sovereignty.12 Thus, analyzing their success from the perspective of mobilization (and on the scale of political tribes) is more practical than analyzing the explicit individual. Hobbes posits that “the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the Commonwealth,” but in nearly all war-like conflicts, it is the leader who forms the stronger, more skilled tribe that often emerges victorious.13 If Hobbes believes that a crucial part of government is that the sovereign’s and citizen’s interest are aligned, then some form of tribalism (based on the notion of a shared identity, and thus a collective success) must be relevant. Although an individual generally leads this tribe (such as Tito or any other dictator), power is often derived from the notion that deviating from the tribe will result in the defecting individual encountering a lower quality of life, punishment, or death. The power of a man, then, is derived from his or her ability to create this tribe and ensure its success. A healthy tribe attracts more people (as a form of social proof), and the larger a tribe becomes, the more likely it is to succeed. Eventually, the strongest tribe, I argue, emerges as the foundation within society at large, for the goal of a tribe (situated in a Hobbesian environment of the shared desire for common resources) is to have complete sovereignty. Such sovereignty can only be guaranteed to a tribe when they legitimize and dictate the very basis of government.14 In *Leviathan*, however, Hobbes focuses on a quasi-free-for-fall-type battle that a lack of society would engender. Because of the above, however, I contend that, in a similar vein to the microstates that compose historical Yugoslavia, the covenants that form ‘society’ would simply occur on a smaller scale, thus engendering a battle among competing ‘societies’ or tribes, as opposed to individuals. Individuals gravitate towards others with commonalities, including heritage or general interests. Individuals do *not* interact with society on such a level, and thus, the first social interactions that most individuals have is not with society-at-large, but rather with a smaller tribe. As a result, the Social Contract that Hobbes discusses exists concurrently with those made at smaller levels of tribal organization. A man does not feel greatly indebted to his or her fellow member of society, but, regarding a tribe member, they certainly do. Thus, given this internal understanding, tribes become the effective base unit of social organization. These tribes, therefore, contend for the same reason resources (as Hobbes posits), and this behavior was seen exactly in the history of the Yugoslavian region.

**The Turbulent History of Yugoslavia**

The history of Yugoslavia can be traced to the South Slavs, a group of Slavic peoples who invaded and settled in what is now the Balkans around the fifth or sixth century AD.15 By the seventh century AD, the South Slavs had conquered a large portion of central and eastern Europe. As a result of their peculiar location, straddling the influence of the Germanic West and Byzantine East, the South Slavs became increasingly divided and dissimilar and by the 10th century, certain ethnic groups had already begun to emerge as distinct, solidified by the Great Schism of 1054 in which the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches officially separated.16 In conjunction with the stated ethnic differences, religion also became an axis of division: the Croats and Macedonians were under Byzantine rule, the Slovenians were under Germanic rule, Serbia had emerged as an independent state, though still affiliated with Byzantine Christianity, Bosnia had also emerged as an independent entity with strong Islamic influences, and the Croatians were under Frankish rule, leading to an affiliation with Catholicism.17 It was this religious schism that would drive tribal conflict within the region throughout the Middle Ages. According to historian Richard West, “both the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Croatian Catholic Church tried to impose their faith on the South Slavs in Bosnia and its adjoining dukedom of Hercegovina (from Herzog, the German for ‘duke’). As the popes crusaded against the Bogomils… [the Turks] were moving through Greece into the realm of the Serbs.” 18 It was not until an invasion from the Ottoman empire that the disparate states realized the need for unification. On St. Vitus’s Day, June 28th, 1389, an Ottoman army confronted an alliance of Serbs, Bosnians, Hungarians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians lead by Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović at Kosovo Polje, now known as the Battle of Kosovo.19 Although one of the rare instances of unification in Yugoslavian history, besides under Tito, the Ottomans emerged victorious after intense fighting and would impose their reign over the region for the next four centuries.20

Under the Ottoman rule, a strong Muslim contingency migrated to the Balkans, eventually centralizing around Bosnia and Herzegovina, where much of the population is still Muslim today. Ottoman rule also brought suppression of nationalism and tribalism as no state was allowed true sovereignty. By the18th and 19th centuries, however, the Ottoman empire began to collapse, and the Balkan states were once again divided. According to Richard West, by July of 1875, Bosnia and Hercegovina “flared in revolt.” 21 With increasingly worsening conditions under the Ottoman rule and amid a failed harvest from the previous year, the Bosnians decided to rebel. Sensing the potential discord that these actions could engender throughout the region, the Ottomans sent in troops to punish the Orthodox-Christian peasants, provoking a riot. The rebellion eventually spread, inciting fierce nationalism from the revolting Serbs. As a result, these events “plunged Europe into a state of crisis that recurred in 1887 and 1908.” 22 Eventually, Serbia emerged as an independent sovereignty which had absorbed Macedonia, while Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia were now part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.23

Following the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 by Bosnian nationalist Gavrilo Princip, the Balkans were thrown into chaos. By the time of World War I, the region effectively became dominated by the religious tribes described above: the Serbs and Macedonians espoused Orthodox Christianity, the Croats and Slovenians practiced Roman Catholicism, and the Bosnians were majority Muslim.24 As a result, the constituents of what would become Yugoslavia found themselves split both on a sovereign and religious axis during the war, though tensions remained low enough to allow for the eventual formation of a fully-independent Yugoslavian state, known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, encompassing Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenian.25

The state was initially led by King Alexander I of Yugoslavia, who ascended to power as the monarch of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (a precursor to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Initially seen as a unifier among the Yugoslavians, Alexander was nonetheless a contentious figure, who, in 1929, established a dictatorship to consolidate power after the assassination of Croatian politician Stjepan Radić by a Serbian nationalist. By 1931, Alexander reintroduced constitution, but his detachment from the common man lost him favor with much of the Yugoslavian population.26 Moreover, the Croats felt that Alexander’s royal dictatorship was an extension of Serbian dominance over Croatia. As tensions surrounding Croatian nationalism grew, Alexander began to jail opponents and the Zagreb Points, which were a litany of demands by Croatian nationalists, inspired the creation of similar documents throughout the Kingdom.27

By 1932 and 1933, the *Ustashe*, a radical terrorist group dedicated to Croatian independence, began to conduct systematic bombings and assassinations against government officials.28 Tensions reached their acme when Bulgarian separatist Vlado Chernozemski assassinated Alexander in 1934. Following this assassination, the constituents of the Balkans began to drift further apart, with Nazi Germany occupying much of the region and allowing Croatia to come under the control of the *Ustashe.*29 Ruthless, the *Ustashe* were accountable for over 500,000 murders and the inception of a brutal system of concentration camps designed to exterminate any non-Croats and convert the local populace to Catholicism.30 Concurrently, Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia were divided between Nazi Germany and the *Ustashe.* Again, tribal identities were suppressed under the dominion of foreign powers. This the world that Tito encountered as he rose to power.

**Pre-Tito Yugoslavia in the Context of the Hobbesian Man**

If Hobbes believed that man was pre-disposed to war, then it seems that Yugoslavia existed in such a state. Throughout the history of Yugoslavia and the South Slavs, there was no justice, no good or bad: a true blank slate, just as in Hobbes model of man. Moreover, when left to their own desires, the individual states sought to preserve their own interests, while viewing the other states as enemies, due to their shared desire for control of the region. Hobbes viewed man as driven, with a strong will: “beasts that have deliberation must necessarily also have will,” and each of the political tribes in Yugoslavia was also driven by a fervent will, a will to gain recognition.31 Hobbes characterized this lust as a desire natural to man: “Joy arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability is that exultation of the mind which is called glorying.” 32 Hobbes felt that, when taken to the extreme, glory transformed into what he called ‘vainglory.’ If glory is an individual’s desire to be recognized by others, then vainglory is an individual’s desire to *dominate* others.

Vainglory is a perfect characterization for the state of Yugoslavia (and the South Slavs) throughout history. Reaching for a sense of autonomy, each of the Slavic states yearned to be independent, but outside forces stymied this, and instead fostered a deep yearning for recognition within among the region. Much of this can be explained by the unique geographic location of the region (laying somewhere between the heart of Europe and outside Eastern influences). Given their inability to fully express their identities, the Slavic States slowly developed a deep sense of nationalism which flared at various flashpoints throughout. What began as glory transformed into a pernicious vainglory as member states sought to dominate the others and declare their ethnicities and religions as victorious. Once cultivated, this vainglory had no means to be allayed without a strong source of authority (e.g. a dictator). A war of all against all was the next step in a sequence of predicted Hobbesian behavior.

**Pre-Tito Yugoslavia As a Critique of the Hobbesian Man**

Crucial to the beliefs of the Hobbesian man is the desire for man to seek peace. I will now attempt to contend that this argument is not only contradicted in *Leviathan* but also that the history of Yugoslavia has also dispelled this notion when abstracted. Although Hobbes states that man seeks peace in establishing society and is thus willing to forgo the need for complete personal sovereignty and power, this assumption seems to be too lofty. Revolutions are commonplace throughout history, and, moreover, man seeks self-preservation.33, 34 Hobbes contended that this is the basic impetus for the creation of society: realizing that, as an individual, man is weak will drive him to form covenants to secure basic securities. However, Hobbes believed that this impetus is driven not for the love of others, but for the love of oneself. By this logic, the state is then a simple amalgamation of individuals desiring their own best interest. This does not seem conducive to the livelihood of a state where power is so concentrated since so few ambitious men can exercise power. In constructing the Social Contract, it is in the best interest of any single man to become the sovereign monarch to acquire unlimited power and use that power (in the style of Hobbes) to suppress others, enforcing ‘peace.’ Moreover, the notion of best interest extends naturally to the task of obtaining the best possible life, which, due to the desire for common resources, also begets inherent conflict within any society. Thus, in forming society and existing within its bounds, man’s natural state of conflict often reappears because of the guarantees of security within society.

While this argument is aimed at countering Hobbes’ belief in man, this same observation can be seen in Yugoslavia. When Gavrilo Princip assassinated Franz Ferdinand, a relatively non-violent figure, Hobbes’ notions of peace were also challenged. Ferdinand was far from a despotical evil tyrant, but he did exercise effectively unlimited power in Yugoslavia.35 Moreover, the region was relatively peaceful during his rule, a reasonable alternative to the war of all against all, and yet Princip still assassinated the monarch. This is because Princip desired the greatest Bosnia and, to the Young Bosnians (a tribe), this was a world where Austro-Hungary was weakened, and Bosnia was a strong, independent nation, free from the fetters of foreign rule. Thus, Princip was willing to sacrifice his life, as well as the life of Ferdinand, to obtain such a desire.36 Princip had little reason to believe that Ferdinand would undermine the success of Yugoslavia, especially given that Ferdinand was relatively sympathetic to the plight of that region, but Ferdinand not a *Bosnian* sovereign. This falls outside of the good behavior of man as defined in Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, and instead embodies the characteristics of glory. Hobbes defines glory in context of the individual and extending his or her own power, but Hobbes fails to offer such an analysis for tribes. Given that Princip was operating as a proxy for his tribe, Hobbes analysis of man, then, fails to consider the nature of tribes

Princip’s motives do not stand alone. When King Alexander I imposed his dictatorship (a la Hobbes), members of the Yugoslavian region responded with unrest and the eventual assassination of Alexander in order to secure their sovereignty.37 When the *Ustashe* were given the opportunity to lead Croatia, they used fear and murder in order to maintain their sovereignty. Therefore, political entities (and by extension, man) value sovereignty and personal freedom before all else, especially in society. Man values peace, but, at least in the Yugoslavian region, only when that peace is conducive to the maintenance and protection of one’s own power. Thus, man will fight for sovereignty to obtain eventual peace. This endless cycle may be perceived as the continued quest for vainglory, but the struggle is also one of typical tribal glory and survival. Thus, Hobbes’ beliefs reach a crucial issue: it is effectively impossible for man not to simultaneously seek peace and glory or self-preservation.

***Bellum Omnium Contra Omnes* and Pre-Tito Yugoslavia**

Although the state of *bellum omnium contra omnes* applied explicitly to man, the historical condition of the Yugoslavian region also provides keen insight into man’s natural tendencies. Central to Hobbes’ belief about the war of all against all is his presumption that this state could only exist outside the limits of a defined society. As a result, no action can be considered good and none bad. An action is merely an action as there is no sovereign power nor contract (within society) to evaluate the nature of any action. In effect, this is what we would call anarchy. Another integral component of *bellum omnium contra omnes* is the prior-discussed assumption that individual man seeks glory. It then seems logical that this notion can be abstracted to, and more practically analyzed in context of, the various ethnoreligious tribes that have existed in the Yugoslavian region.

Man, as an individual is weak, and thus man seeks tribes (and eventually society). Tribes serve as a natural intermediary between the macro-scale of the tribe and the micro-scale of the individual, and thus tribes should be viewed as society existing on a smaller scale. Tribes, however, have the underlying assumption of some shared identity. Be it political ideology or geographic location, the members in a tribe are much more likely to share a deep bond than any two members of a large-scale society. The Bosnians were joined by both their geographic location within the Balkans, but also their shared Islamic religion. The Croats were joined similarly by Catholicism, as were the Serbians and Orthodox religion. Moreover, each of the member Balkan states is joined by a common tribal descent.38 This has begotten deep loyalties that extend beyond the individual. Moreover, as the constant conflict within the Balkans has shown, these loyalties take precedence over peace. When a group desires its own sovereignty, it will act against other groups to do so, even at the expense of peace. In this way, the Yugoslavian states have existed in the removed social state that occurs as a result of the war of all against all. There is no justice, no right or wrong. Therefore, Hobbes theory concerning man is quite effective at describing the state of Yugoslavia.

**The Hobbesian Model of Government and Commonwealth Creation**

To Hobbes, government emerged as a result of contracts between people. Implicit within every society, according to Hobbes, is the Social Contract wherein citizens of society cede some rights in order to secure basic security. Contracts are crucial to Hobbes because they are the simplest instrument utilized to impose justice. The formation of contracts begets an explicit definition of what is deemed acceptable (good) and unacceptable (bad), and thus the reneging of a contract implies the existence of a power structure to recognize such a contract. To enforce a contract, according to Hobbes, implies the reneging party will face some punishment.39 This is an important cession of basic liberties and an embrace of vulnerability that Hobbes felt contracts beget. To enforce such contracts, especially those made concerning these natural laws, Hobbes felt that a single power entity, ideally a sovereign monarch or assembly, was to be entrusted with nearly autonomous power in order to uphold the contract between individuals. Hobbes fervently believed, however, that this sovereign needed to possess a deep amount of compassion and clemency for his fellow man.40 To support this conclusion, Hobbes contends that the interests of the monarch’s citizens will be aligned with the interests of the monarch themselves.41 This is why the subjects would be willing to cede rights to such a monarch.

When this cession is undertaken, and men enter into a binding covenant, Hobbes contended that man created what he calls a Commonwealth: “When men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others… [this] may be called a political Commonwealth, or Commonwealth by Institution.” 42 With contracts in place, Hobbes believed that the most suitable method of enforcing such agreements would be through a strong, central sovereign. The implementation of this sovereign was an issue Hobbes grabbled with extensively. Ultimately, Hobbes rejected the individual-focused nature of democracy, and instead espoused monarchy and a strong assembly.43 Concerning any form of non-monarchical government, Hobbes believed that individuals’ natural desire to hold office, be ambitious, and contribute to their best interests would be antithetical to the well-being of the state. Thus, Hobbes felt that a strong, borderline tyrannical government would best protect man’s natural rights (and enforce contracts).44 Hobbes also believed that the monarch was the moral and just foundation of society: “The sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the Commonwealth, which expiring, the members are governed by it no more than the carcass of a man by his departed, though immortal, soul.” 45As a result, the monarch’s actions superseded those of his or her subjects and were just. Furthermore, the sovereign is directly responsible for ensuring the “nutrition” of the commonwealth via: “the plenty and distribution of materials conducing to life.” 46 According to Hobbes, it was the sovereign’s onus to ensure “distributive justice” for all citizens.47 Hobbes also believed that because the best interests of the sovereign’s citizens would align with the sovereign’s own, the sovereign would be naturally inclined to act in such a benevolent manner, trumping interference from the monarch’s self-interests. 48

Given the health of a Commonwealth’s subjects, Hobbes was perfectly willing to entrust the monarch with unfettered power.49 In fact, Hobbes felt that the goal of the sovereign was to prevent man from falling into the war of all against all, contending that: “though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse.” 50 Hobbes felt that even a despotical tyrant was to be preferred to the horrid state of perpetual civil war that man would himself in when lacking a strong central authority figure. In fact, Hobbes contended that if the sovereign’s rights were taken away, “every man returneth into the condition and calamity of a war with every other man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life.” 51

A crucial aspect of the Hobbesian monarch is that he or she is benevolent, in the words of Hobbes: “the intention of the legislator is always supposed to be equity” and “be Judge both of the means to peace and defense.” 52 The sovereign should be knowledgeable and fair enough to guarantee its citizens equity as well as ensure peace, so as to avoid civil war. What Hobbes leaves unresolved, however, is the exact nexus between these ideas and the pursuit of the monarch’s own self-interest. The Hobbesian man is rational, and thus seeks to further his best interest, so what system prevents such an absolute monarch from imposing a despotical tyranny upon his or her citizens under the alibi of peace? Hobbes even recognized this fragile balance, claiming: “the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no other inconstancy than that of human nature.” 53 Hobbes did believe that, in times of deep justice, the populace could depose the monarch, but doing so was fundamentally immoral according to Hobbes.54 Thus, Hobbes text is rife with contradictions concerning the interests of a sovereign, but, regardless, I will now contend that this style of absolute tyrannical governing was necessary for the success of Tito in Yugoslavia, and the allaying of the tribalism issues that plagued Yugoslavia by first considering Yugoslavian monarchs and Tito.

**Pre-Tito Yugoslavia As a Critique of the Hobbesian Sovereign**

The Yugoslavian region had few monarchs that prioritized a pan-Yugoslavian state. With the exception of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović, who led a unified force against the Ottomans (but never attained true political power over the entire domain of Yugoslavia), it was not until Archduke Franz Ferdinand that the Yugoslavian region was fully unified under a single monarch. Ferdinand was a Hobbesian sovereign as he held complete power but was also benevolent. Regarding Yugoslavia, Ferdinand was a supporter of some ethnic minorities within his empire gaining recognition, if not greater overall autonomy.55 If Ferdinand was a leader in the model of Hobbes, then I believe that both men failed to ascertain the strength of tribes. Although I believe that Ferdinand was a Hobbesian monarch, he was *not* a Yugoslavian monarch. The Yugoslavs had been under the control of the Austro-Hungarians for some time, and, as was seen in World War II, felt that their identities had been suppressed. Regardless of the power of Ferdinand, members of the Yugoslavian states felt driven to put in place their own monarch, thus leading to Ferdinand’s assassination. The absolute power that Ferdinand possessed (a la Hobbes) was futile: his populace was simply too fervent and too tribal. Therefore, as was previously stated, the true power in society lies not in the power of the monarch, but rather in the power of the various tribes within that society. Within Yugoslavia, Ferdinand lacked a dominant tribe (unlike Tito). He was a foreign, controlling leader who ruled from afar, and certainly did not respect full Yugoslavian sovereignty (as evidenced by his eventual assassination). Moreover, Ferdinand was not willing to utilize the force necessary to impose his tribal identity upon Yugoslavia. In this regard, Ferdinand was simply too weak, most likely due to his lack of experience when dealing with internal conflict. In a similar vein, Hobbes’ theory on sovereign monarchs (in *Leviathan*) also fails to account for internal social strife. Hobbes makes a distinction between individuals and those in power, yet the true power within society lies in tribes, not individuals. Hobbes believed that people had little reason or right to overthrow a monarch, and Hobbes did not foresee the tribalism that so oft manifests itself in places of conflict. By failing to account for this crucial element of man within society, Hobbes’ theory is incomplete. In stark contrast to the failures of Ferdinand, Tito developed a strong base of support that centered around his embrace of the pan-Yugoslavian identity, and by doing so, Tito became the practical Hobbesian sovereign within Yugoslavia.

**Tito’s Rise to Power**

As was discussed above, the Yugoslavia that Tito initially encountered had a multitude of suppressed yet distinct identities. With the NDH (the government of the independent state of Croatia) imposing its Croat and Catholic views on the region and the Nazis running the de-facto governments of many Yugoslavian states, two major grassroots factions emerged: the royalist and Serbian nationalist Chetniks, led by Draža Mihailović and the communist Yugoslav Partisans, led by Tito.56 Initially, though ideological conflicted, the two movements worked in a fragile parallel against the Axis occupation. As Mihailović observed the might and cruelty of the Nazi machine, however, he warmed to the idea of collaboration, along with the Chetniks existing agreements with the *Ustashe* (signed in 1942). Given these agreements, the Serb-dominated group turned its focus to eliminating Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as its communist rivals, the Partisans.57

In comparison, Tito’s Partisans focused almost exclusively on Axis resistance, eventually winning the support of the Allies in 1943. Although the Partisans were badly defeated in various operations, including Case White, Tito’s military deft allowed the Partisans to persist. As Tito gained invaluable leadership and military experience, he also found himself playing an important piece in the combined Allied effort to defeat the Axis. After the Tehran Conference, at which the Allies recognized the Partisans as a legitimate resistance force, Tito gained direct support from both the Americans and British as well as Soviet Russia. With this added support, Tito led the Partisans to success in various operations against the Axis as well as the Chetniks, and he gained invaluable experience in dealing with more powerful foreign powers.58

By late 1943 and early 1944, the Chetniks lost both Allied support and large amounts of territory to the growing Partisan movement. By May of 1945, Tito led the Partisans to defeat both the Nazis and the Chetniks.59 The challenge of handling the dissolution of the rival faction proved to be one of Tito’s first major challenges as a Yugoslavian leader. Although the Partisans participated in the Bleiburg repatriations, in which thousands were unfairly convicted and murdered, Tito himself advocated for peaceful action against his former rivals, calling for surrender and peace.60 It was at this point that Tito began to act as the Pan-Yugoslavian monarch.

As the leader of the Yugoslavian Communist Party, Tito comfortably won election in November 1945 in order to lead the country, and, now viewed as a liberator of Yugoslavia, he enjoyed widespread support.61 Moreover, Tito’s platform centered around the empowerment of the common man via worker’s reform and heavy industrialization, inspired by Tito’s own encounters with Yugoslavia as a youth. Thus, Tito was able to form a strong tribe centered around both his Communist beliefs and his accomplishments as an advocate of the Yugoslavian identity. Following his election, Tito was sworn in as both the foreign minister and prime minister of the new Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.62 Moreover, Tito consolidated power by officially deposing King Peter II, creating the State Security Administration, and forming the Yugoslav’s People’s Army from his Partisans (making it the fourth largest army in Europe).63,64 He also stymied any resistance to his legitimacy by ensuring the destruction of competing tribes, including the Chetniks. In a controversial move, Tito put Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović on trial for treason and other crimes, and, after being found guilty, Mihailović was executed by firing squad in July of 1946. 65 Tito also embraced Leninist-Marxist ideologies by continually arresting and imprisoning political enemies.66 Until 1948, Tito also pledged a strong allegiance to the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the crucial period following the war, unlike Alexander I or Ferdinand, Tito focused on promoting the Yugoslav identity, while also ensuring that citizens understood, respected, and even feared his power. With strong support throughout Yugoslavia, Tito was primed to fortify his belief in the pan-Yugoslavian identity by finally achieving a truly sovereign state.

**Tito As the Ideal Hobbesian Monarch**

As outlined above, Hobbes’ felt that the ideal monarch not only provided for the health of his Commonwealth but also prevented man from descending into the perils of perpetual war. In both accounts, Tito decisively succeeded. Concerning the former, one of Tito’s first (and most important) decisions as a sovereign was to sever any ties to the USSR in 1948. Initially warm towards Stalin and the might of the Soviet Union, Tito became increasingly disillusioned with the oppressive regime promoted by the USSR.67 Throughout World War II, Stalin’s Red Army continually helped the Yugoslavian’s repel the Axis threat. To Tito, the Red Army was merely a small help to the cause; however, Stalin felt that the Red Army was the primary reason as to why Tito achieved his successes. Furthermore, Tito envisioned the unimportant role Yugoslavia would occupy as a meek Soviet satellite state, which would lack true sovereignty. In fact, Stalin felt that the Yugoslavian pride was not only dangerous for a satellite state but that it would hinder the state’s ability to submit to higher USSR order. In June of 1948, the USSR officially split from Yugoslavia, citing dangerous Yugoslavian nationalism.68

Tito’s decision would yield impressive results for Yugoslavia. Under Tito’s leadership, Yugoslavia quickly transformed into a market economy with a strong centralized leadership, lacking the planned economy so vital to the USSR.69 As a result, the quality of life within Yugoslavia rose rapidly. In fact, citizens of Yugoslavia even enjoyed a life comparable to most Western nations. By the early 1960s, observers noted that literacy rates were over 91 percent, life expectancy was 72 years, and medical care was accessible to all.70,71,72 Moreover, Yugoslavia maintained strong trade relations with both the West and East.73 To ensure the health of his populace, Tito allowed for the formation of worker’s self-management and encouraged industrial manufacturing. With these reforms in place, Yugoslavia’s industrial sector grew rapidly, with yearly GDP growth averaging an impressive 6.1% per year until 1980.74 With the implementation of worker’s self-management, Tito ensured that a majority of the profits obtained from this rapid growth went not to executives, but rather to the workers themselves, a form of Hobbesian distributive justice.75 Through the creation and promotion of worker’s councils, the average worker became increasingly empowered within Yugoslavia under Tito and facilitated a state-market separation that saw excellent returns.76

Also embodying the Hobbesian notion of distributive justice, Tito was keen to stimulate development in the historically underachieving portions of Yugoslavia such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. In Bosnia, Tito developed a strong military base as well as a variety of manufacturing plants, stemming from Bosnia’s abundance of natural resources.77 Tito also pushed for strong industrialization in Montenegro, while establishing various educational institutions including the University of Montenegro.78 Politically, Tito tied these states into the larger Yugoslavia by creating six fairly autonomous republics, in accordance with the distinct ethno-geographic tribes: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. By doing this, Tito successfully achieved the fragile balance between preserving an overall Yugoslavian identity and fostering the distinct smaller national identities. The smaller states had finally achieved a sense of power. These states were fairly autonomous, and although they were not full, sovereign republics, Tito’s division aligned ethnic and national interests to an unprecedented level in the history of Yugoslavia. This epitomizes the benevolent model of monarchy put forth by Hobbes as well as Hobbes’ belief that the success of the commonwealth depends on the equal distribution of resources. Unlike the Soviet Union or other communist dictatorships, the entirety of the Yugoslavian people was enjoying the benefits of centralized power: Tito was providing for the ‘nutrition’ of his entire population.

**Tito as a ‘Peaceful’ Monarch**

Where Tito was most successful in embracing the ideals of the Hobbesian monarch was in his ability to ‘enforce’ peace. Although Tito never fully resolved the deep tribalism in Yugoslavia, he allayed it to such a degree as to prevent it from stymying Yugoslavian progress. Tito’s first orders to ensure peace occurred in the aforementioned execution of Mihailović and throughout the late 1940s when Tito sought to expel any Cominformists, or pro-USSR communists who lingered in Yugoslavia.79 To facilitate this process, Tito implemented Goli Otok, a ruthless, fear-driven prison his political prisoners. Over 16,000 prisoners would be sent to Goli Otok.80,81 Tito also took a strong stance against democracy, especially regarding the treatment of his potential heir Milovan Đilas. Đilas was initially a strong supporter of Tito and his communist policies, but as Tito encouraged Đilas to write in the propaganda in the state-sponsored magazine *Borba*, Đilas became increasingly critical of a one-party state.82 In 1956, Tito sensed the potential consequences of Đilas’ widely-circulated criticism and had Đilas arrested. Đilas would remain in jail for much of the next decade.83Tito also created a state police force modeled after the KGB, which continually arrested and suppressed intellectuals and liberals.84 One such victim was Adem Demaqi, a Kosovo Albanian writer. Demaqi became a vocal critic of Tito’s authoritarian policies and would spend “28 years as a political prisoner, before he was released by the Croatian authorities when Yugoslavia started to crumble.” 85

Throughout Yugoslavian history, peace was most often disrupted through the uprising of the various nationalistic movements. The most notable of these uprisings was the Croatian Spring in 1971. Communist nationalists within Croatia had grown increasingly dissatisfied with Tito’s push for unitarization and demanded more economic and political reforms within Yugoslavia, including more political representation (i.e. sovereignty).86 The movement centered around Zagreb, and when leaders began to publicize the movement via writing, namely in a book entitled *Hrvatski Pravopis*, Tito immediately banned the book and ordered all copies to be destroyed.87 Tito viewed the entire movement as a pernicious form of Croatian ultra-nationalism, and dispatched a police force to brutally suppress the uprising.88 Ivan Zvonimir Cicak was one of the main leaders of the movement and led peaceful demonstrations in support of increased democracy within the region. For his actions, Cicak was “harshly punished” and “was imprisoned for three years, and spent nine months in solitary confinement,” ordered directly by Tito.89 In this regard, Tito was far from a truly benevolent dictator: he used fear and violence to silence any dissent, which I believe is a deep challenge to the natural rights outlined above. Tito realized, however, that allowing such contrarian movements to grow would only result in a broken Yugoslavia which lacked a unified identity (a crisis which would occur in the early 1990s).

Although violence and fear were Tito’s main instruments to enforce peace (quite paradoxically), in the Hobbesian lens, these actions warrant little examination. As Hobbes posited, even horrid tyrants were to be preferred to the war of all against all, a state that would have arguably been reached had a strong monarch not tied the disparate nations together. In addition, the sovereign’s actions could always, according to Hobbes, be justified. Tito came to this realization and envisioned that without a strong monarch, Yugoslavia would be torn apart like it had been so many times previously. Hobbes believed that the sovereign monarch had the power to take any necessary action: “when kings deny themselves some such necessary power, it is not always (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake.” 90 I do not believe that murder is ever a justifiable action, but without the fear-power dynamic that Tito cultivated, the ingrained nationalism that had been festering within Yugoslavia for hundreds of years would likely have come to its acme, as so occurred in the 1990s. Therefore, Tito’s actions fit quite suitably within the Hobbesian framework for a sovereign monarch, as he was willing to take whatever action he thought was necessary (including the murder of political rivals).

**Tito As a Critique of the Hobbesian Sovereign**

If Tito embodies the ideal Hobbesian monarch, then his actions should be interpreted as the practical application of Hobbes ideas. Following the discussion of Tito’s successes (and the benefits of a Hobbesian monarch) above, I will now examine the multitude of issues with Tito and his style of rule. As stated above, the purpose of a monarch (according to Hobbes) is to protect his or her citizens from the war of all against all, while also ensuring distributive justice and the protection of natural rights. To do this, Hobbes felt that the monarch, whose criterion to rule is never clearly defined, required absolute power.91 I believe that there are deeply antithetical ideas at play here. If Hobbes believes that man is acting in self-interest, then I find it difficult to believe that a monarch with absolute power would *always* act in the best interest of his citizens. Moreover, by placing the monarch outside the limits of civil law, Hobbes gives any potential monarch justification for any questionable action.92

If we integrate Hobbes’ ideas on man with this latter point, I find it easy to reach a monarch who acts solely on self-interest and utilizes their place outside of the law to justify murderous and immoral action. This was seen primarily by other dictators such as Stalin and Pol Pot. I believe that Hobbes would not consider these despotical men as models of the ideal monarch, given his explicit requirements that the monarch act with benevolence and justice in mind, which these monarchs clearly did not do. Where I believe Hobbes’ deeply errs, however, is in his omission of a clear definition of benevolence. I believe that without a clear description, we rapidly reach an impasse where the respect of the individual must be sacrificed in favor of public good. Although Tito, for the most part, did act with the best intentions of his citizens in mind (unlike the other dictators), he did so by embracing the consolidation of power a la Hobbes. Tito turned to fear and murder, in the vein of the very USSR he despised. It then appears that a real-world Hobbesian monarch, with absolute power, inevitably infringes upon the natural rights of some of his or her citizens, in conflict with the notion that such a monarch should *protect* his or her citizen’s natural rights (in the face of the war of all against all). To what degree this sacrifice of the individual is warranted in order to secure a superior utilitarian outcome is unanswered (since this notion does not fit into the Hobbes’ theory), which leaves a crucial piece of practical governing unanswered in *Leviathan*. Tito profoundly violated the Social Contract (and the first three laws of nature), but he did so at the expense of exercising absolute power and thus avoiding *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Because of Hobbes’ ardent belief that the fundamental goal of sovereign monarchs was to avoid such a dire state, I conclude that, in practice, Tito was a Hobbesian monarch, and that Hobbes’ theory falters on a practical scale. Had Tito not enforced his power, the nationalism so deeply embedded within Yugoslavia would have risen unchecked until an explosion of ‘vainglory’ resulted in the disintegration of a united Yugoslavia (the war of all against all).

Moreover, for this monarch to succeed, another requirement is that: “the sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is not subject to the civil laws.” 93 I find this to be quite an alarming statement, given that this principle is rife for hypocrisy and oppression. While Tito utilized this sentiment to quickly implement policy and effect change, he also used the basis of these ideas to transform actions that may have been immoral into those that were amoral, a simple justification for some of his more heinous undertakings. Being situated above the law (and thus, society), Tito (and any sovereign monarch) could undertake any action without fear of retribution because he was only the entity that existed in the natural state. Sovereign monarchs, then, can exploit their unique position as the only member of nature to philosophically and morally justify any action, quite the dangerous precedent if the populace’s and monarch’s interest are antithetical. This is furthered by Hobbes’ belief that to revolt was to commit an immoral action, a deeply concerning view; Hobbes even believed that good laws were only good if “[they are] for the benefit of the sovereign, though it be not necessary for the people.” 94 Hobbes believed that the sovereign’s subjects were truly subjects in the sense that they obeyed (and rarely questioned) the actions and laws of the sovereign.95 Hobbes posited: “[the sovereign] cannot be punished by them: he is judge of what is necessary for peace, and judge of doctrines: he is sole legislator, and supreme judge of controversies.” 96 For a subject to revolt was not only discouraged but actively immoral and wrong. Thus, given these ideas, the Hobbesian monarch has unlimited power as well as complete moral superiority, which can (and has been) used to justify monstrous actions.

Consequently, the essence of the Hobbesian monarch can be condensed to the simple belief about the benevolence of sovereigns and man in general. The issue I find with Hobbes, however, is his omission of the exact definition of benevolence. I believe that Tito interpreted benevolence in a utilitarian point of view: understanding that without his autocratic leadership, Yugoslavia would have descended into a nationalist-driven war, which did occur after his death. To prevent this war of nations against nations, Tito felt justified in using fear and coercion, but in doing so, Tito violated the implicit contract at the base of society: he deprived individuals of their natural rights. Thus, I contend that within the framework of a Hobbesian monarch, no man’s natural rights can be secured. Regardless of the benevolence of the dictator, situations will emerge in which the sovereign’s power is challenged and the sovereign’s most natural and most effective response is the deprivation of natural rights. If man seeks govern himself, force must be used to prevent the collapse of a union by coercing ideological deviants to succumb to the power and beliefs of the central government.

**Tito As a Necessary Monarch**

The final argument I would like to make in this paper is that Tito was a necessary monarch. Although I do not believe Tito was justified in murdering his citizens in the name of order, I do believe that Yugoslavia, given its turbulent and divisive history, needed an autocratic leader to suppress nationalistic tendencies and promote a shared pan-Yugoslavian identity. The justification for Tito’s necessity can be reduced to Hobbes’ arguments concerning the nature of man outside of society: a war of all against all. Had Tito not unified Yugoslavia, I envision that two equally probable (though not mutually exclusive) events would have occurred: Yugoslavia would have been absorbed into the USSR and would have withered as a satellite state, much in the vein of Latvia or Estonia, or Yugoslavia would have undergone various cycles of nationalism leading to conquest or dissolution. Although the former never occurred, the latter manifested itself in the 1990s.

Following the death of Tito in 1980, the Yugoslavia states began to slowly drift apart as various nationalistic factions within Slovenian and especially Croatia conflicted with factions within Serbia and Bosnia who favored Yugoslavian unity. Beginning in 1991, a series of battles for independence was fought, with Slovenia becoming the first nation to officially split from Yugoslavia after the Ten-Day War.97 Later in 1991, Croatia, too, declared its independence from Serbia, and began a 4-year long conflict that resulted in the death of over 20,000.98 During the Croatian War of Independence, Serbian forces, led by Slobodan Milošević, would undertake a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Croatians, under the pretense of national pride and retribution.99 In 1992, Bosnia also declared its independence from Bosnia Serbs and Croats, leading to the death of over 50,000 and culminating in Bosnian independence.100 Various other conflicts would occur in the region, eventually resulting in the formation of the modern states of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia (now North Macedonia), Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Overall, it is estimated that over 100,000 people died in Yugoslavia.101 This is the true manifestation of *bellum omnium contra omnes*, and this is the reality of Yugoslavia without a strong monarch in the style of Hobbes: pernicious tribalism superseding the shared identity in an attempt to move towards individual sovereignty. Hobbes, himself, also acknowledged the desire for man (and by extension, tribes) to govern himself. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes claims that men in colonies (specifically British colonies) wish to govern themselves.102 Just as in Yugoslavia, Hobbes believed that without a strong central authority to be a visible, known source of power, man’s internal yearning for sovereignty would be strong enough to supersede society whose power was spread. Thus, Tito’s actions to immediately consolidate and defend power were, again, in the image of an ideal Hobbesian monarch.

In the other scenario, under the control of the USSR, Yugoslavia would likely have been subject to strict economic planning and a policy of Russification, wherein Russian nationals would have settled in Yugoslavia, turning Yugoslavians into a minority within their own land.103 Moreover, USSR central economic planning undoubtedly would have resulted in lost economic potential for the region. Latvia, an analog to the constituent states of Yugoslavia in terms of natural resources and political positioning, experienced an absorption into the USSR. By the 1970s and 1980s, living standards continued to fall behind neighbor Finland and Soviet mismanagement lead to serious environmental damage and a conflicting focus on militarization rather than economic progress.104 Given Yugoslavia’s crucial positioning between European and Eastern spheres of influence, I foresee that a similar focus on militarization would have occurred, damaging the region.

Thus, a leader such as Tito who was autocratic, resisted embracing individualistic nationalism, and supported a strong pan-Yugoslavian identity that promoted Yugoslavian excellence was needed for Yugoslavia to become a successful independent nation. Without his autocratic style of governing, burgeoning nationalistic movements would not have been effectively suppressed, given that a weak government would lack the necessary power and force to do so. Tito was also careful to avoid stroking conflict within the region by refusing to legitimize any of the various nationalistic movements that did exist. Tito permitted groups such as the League of Communists of Croatia to persist, allowing citizens of the six republics to maintain their individual identities, but when these groups became too ambitious and too large of a potential threat to the stability of Yugoslavia, Tito utilized his autocratic force to subdue them. Tito, therefore, ensured a fragile balance between order and the maintenance of national pride in an effective manner. In addition, as opposed to merely supporting the disparate nationalistic movements scattered throughout Yugoslavia, Tito successfully fostered a sense of pan-Yugoslavian excellence by diverting passion away from nationalism. With suppressed individual nationalistic identities, citizens of Yugoslavia needed a body of pride to invest in, and Tito’s unified Yugoslavia was the ideal entity to do so. When one region struggled, so did other regions, and by linking the success of the state to the success of all the constituent states, Tito effectively used his sovereign power to create a better Yugoslavia.

**Conclusion**

Tito has remained a contentious figure in history: some scholars point to his murderous and oppressive regime, while others highlight his ability to unify a deeply divided geography and produce an economically successful state. Because of his contemporaries, including Stalin and Pol Pot, most Westerners, including myself, tend to have a more positive view of Tito. Combined with the success and respect that Yugoslavia garnered under Tito as a non-affiliated nation in a world dominated by two superpowers, I have personally reached the conclusion that Tito was an effective, yet deeply flawed, monarch who exhibited the best and worst tendencies of man.

In this paper, I have argued that Tito was a necessary monarch in the image of the ideal Hobbesian sovereign, which, itself, is a conflicted idea. I began by exploring the notion of the Hobbesian man, and how tribes are a crucial feature in the formation of any society, as opposed to Hobbes focus on the individual. I then applied these ideas to the history of the Yugoslavian region and showed that effective parallels to Hobbes’ theory exist. I next considered the creation of commonwealths by examining how contracts form the basis of society, but that Hobbes’ assumption that man seeks peace in society is conflicted with the concurrent assumption that man also seeks whatever is in his best interest. I then analyzed Hobbes’ presumption that commonwealths are best formed and maintained when an autocratic sovereign leads the commonwealth. Although I have argued that the Hobbesian monarch is effective due to their consolation of power and ability to suppress that which may be antithetical to the common good, I have also shown the dangerous consequences of entrusting man, who acts in self-interest, with such power. I finally applied these ideas to Tito and showed that, as the ideal Hobbesian monarch, he found success in suppressing nationalism via his absolute power but succumb to the faults of the Hobbesian monarch by utilizing oppression. I finally examined the tumultuous history of Yugoslavia to show that Tito was a needed figure of stability in a region that gravitated towards pernicious tribalism.

In discussing Tito and his relation to Hobbes, I have entered into the ongoing debate as to the historically ‘best’ system of governing. In conflict with traditional American ideas that emphasize individual freedom, I have argued that a dictatorship can yield positive results if implemented correctly, but I have also shown that Tito succeeded due to the particular nature of Yugoslavia. In an already free and successful society, I believe that such an absolute monarch would have not the incentive, in the style of Hobbes, to connect the success of the populace with his own personal success, but rather transform the ruler-people relationship by exploiting the success of the people. A constitution may be able to stymie a descent into corruption, but the Hobbesian monarch, given his status above (or removed from) his citizens is not truly bound to such a document. Consequently, for much of the modern developed world, I reject the governing style advocated by Hobbes and practiced by Tito in favor of a more democratic system. In inherently unstable regions marked by a visceral nationalism, however, I believe that a governing-system (sans the marked oppression of political enemies) in the style of Tito is effective.

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