LANGUAGE AND LOYALTY

Jonathan Pool
Department of Political Science
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, New York 11790, U.S.A.

Jonathan Pool   1
Research Committee on Sociolinguistics
Section on Language and National Identity

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1. Introduction

To what extent does community of language make people
belong to a nation or nationality? From one perspective,
this question is one of definition, rather than investigation,
since "nationality" is often defined as determined by the
sharing of one or more specific traits.[2] From another point
of view, however, the key to nationality is not a set of
objective criteria, but rather the existence of a collective
will or identity.[3] This view makes the role of language an
empirical question. We need to determine how language
affects which sets of individuals develop such a will or
identity with respect to each other.

Language is, of course, one of the objective character-
istics of man most often asserted to lie at the base of
nationality. And, for a variety of reasons, it appears
currently to be growing in importance compared with some
other cleavages.[4] What this paper will attempt to show is
that some available data on micro-level (individual) behavior
support and quantify these impressions gained mainly from
historical studies and contemporary events. On the one
hand, two recent opinion surveys conducted in a plural
society will be analyzed to show that language has emerged
as the predominant divisive demographic characteristic in
this country (Canada). In addition, results from an
experiment on coalition formation will be reported, indica-
ting that behavioral cohesion in small groups can be substan-
tially manipulated by simulating language differences.

The reason for combining both of these kinds of data into
one argument is precisely that they are different--in
complementary ways. The data from Canada will show how
people react to real-life linguistic differences, but their
reactions will be less than real-life ones. They will be
attitudes expressed in a survey, rather than observed
interpersonal behaviors. The experimental data, on the other
hand, are observations of actual behavior, but in situations
where language differences are only simulated. Further, the
Canadian data will help us describe the importance of language
in the configuration of ethnic characteristics in that
country, but will not permit a conclusion about the causal
order or mechanism linking changes in these characteristics.
The experimental data will contribute to the search for
universal generalizations that can clarify why and how
language should be expected to be influential in affecting
the behavior of individuals in small and large groups.

These can help explain the importance of language in Canada
(and elsewhere) more satisfactorily than we could by
reference to antecedent historical, macro-level events alone.

The proto-theory that guides the present work can be
expressed in the following form:

The diagram reflects the common assertion that language works
on national loyalties through two reinforcing paths: its role
as medium of communication, and its role as symbol of identity.[5]
But the diagram further asserts that all four (proto-)variables
vary positively with one another. Group identity, an expressed
sentiment of group membership, is distinguished from group
loyalty, which refers to a behavioral propensity to favor
members of one group over members of another. This paper will
focus mainly on the horizontal relationships in the above
diagram.[6]

2.   Language and Identity in Canada

Regarding the arrow linking language with identity, two
kinds of questions can be asked. On the one hand, one can
ask whether people see or treat language as the basis of
identity, and on the other, one can ask whether there is an
association between language repertoire and identity.

Contemporary Canada is an interesting case in which to
ask these questions. While scholars often cross-classify
polities as having old states or new states, and old nations
or new nations, Canada is one of the few countries that must
be classified as having an old state and no nation. More
accurately, the issue of nationality is, in Canada, still
unresolved. A large majority of Canadians believe that
Canada should become a single nation, but far fewer believe
that it already is that. And a significant minority of
French-speaking Quebeckers want to see Canada become two
states, reflecting the existence of two nations which they
and others believe already constitute Canada.

In this particular case, then, is language the basis of
identity? To begin answering this question, we shall find

useful some data collected for the now defunct, but
nonetheless important, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism.[7] Two of the most potentially useful projects
of this Commission were national sample surveys of the
Canadian population, one of adults (using interviews) and
the other of teenagers (using self-administered question-
naires), conducted in May, 1965.[8]

It is regrettable that these surveys have hardly been
analyzed in published form in the nine years since they were
conducted. In spite of some problems and defects character-
izing survey analysis in general and these surveys in
particular,[9] they are far too rich in interesting information
about an important range of problems to ignore.

It appears clear from the responses to the two Royal
Commission surveys that language was, in 1965, the most
definitive component of group identity in Canada.

In the first place, Canadians themselves <u>saw</u> language
as the principal politically important cleavage within
their state. When asked how various types of Canadians
would agree or disagree with each other on policy questions
if a series of votes were taken, youth survey respondents[10]
predicted more disagreement between English-speaking and
French-speaking Canadians than between any other pair of
types offered (East-West, Catholic-Protestant, native-
immigrant, rich-poor, and urban-rural). The percentages
predicting nearly total disagreement were 12% for English-
speaking versus French-speaking Canadians, 8% for rich versus
poor, and 4 or 5% for all other opposing groups. When given
twelve ways in which English Canadians and French Canadians
could be compared or contrasted, 92% of these same respondents
said that the two groups differed in language, but no more
than 57% said they differed in any other way mentioned.[11]

To judge from their other responses, this perception of
the predominance of language as a social cleavage was
correct. The group identities of the respondents themselves
were associated with a variety of other personal character-
istics, but never so strongly as with language. The most
useful questions about group identity appeared in the adult
survey. Here the respondents were asked:

> 2-30. To what ethnic group do you consider
> that you belong: English Canadian, French
> Canadian, or another ethnic group?

In addition they were asked:

2-67. Do you feel closer to English
Canadians or closer to French Canadians?

Our interest is with felt membership in groups.
Question 2-30 emphasizes ascriptive, rather than felt,
membership, especially because the question immediately
preceding it asks about the ethnic or cultural origins
of the respondents' ancestors. Question 2-67, on the other
hand, refers purely to a feeling of proximity, without
necessarily implying a feeling of belonging or identity.
One could consider oneself a member of group a but feel
closer to group b. We can cope with this problem by
dividing the adult respondents into four categories:

a. Those who are clearly self-defined English
Canadians, in that they answered "English
Canadian" to both questions;

b. Those who are clearly self-defined French
Canadians in the same way;

c. Those who are clearly neither of the two
above, in that they answered one or both of
these questions by naming another ethnic
group, disclaiming membership,[12] or claiming
to be equally close to the two groups, or who
answered "English Canadian" to one question
and "French Canadian" to the other; and

d. Those (i.e. all the rest) whom we cannot
classify because of missing answers.

In the following analysis, category d will be omitted from
consideration.

Given the previous-question bias just mentioned, and
given the meaning in ordinary usage of the phrase "ethnic
group", we have considerable reason to expect that the
personal characteristic by which we could most easily
predict a respondent's membership in category a, b, or c
would be ethnic origin, as determined by the question just
before 2-30. There are other possibilities, however.

Related to this characteristic of ancestry is family
name. In some groups, many would be unaware of their group
membership were it not for a distinctive surname. Consider,
for example, that over 9% of the Canadian adult respondents
were unable to say what ethnic or cultural group their
(paternal) ancestor had come from. Occasionally society or
government emphasizes name as a badge or criterion of

membership, as in the official use of "Spanish-surname" as an
ethnic classification in the United States and the complaint
of French Canadians that they still suffer economic discrimi-
nation even after they become fluent in English.

Historically, the conflict between Canada's "two races"
has been interpreted often in religious terms.[13] Language
was seen as instrumental, as "guardian of the faith" in the
French Canadian case.

The trend in recent years among French Canadian nation-
alists has been to stress increasingly the uniqueness, rights,
and need for autonomy of Quebec, at the expense of French
Canadians living elsewhere in Canada. This is reflected in
the preference for "Québecois" over"French Canadian" for
those living in Quebec. This suggests that ethnic politics
may be becoming territorialized, as in Belgium, and that
identity may be moving in the same direction.

Finally, there is language. The importance of language
is suggested by the fact that language policy was the focus,
during the 1960's, of those elements who wanted to redress
French Canadian grievances and save the confederation. This
focus could be seen in the name and in the terms of reference
of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Of these five personal characteristics--ethnic origin,
surname, religion, residence, and language--it is language
which best predicts identity, as defined above. Figure 1
shows what percentages of the adult respondents had English
Canadian and French Canadian identities, among those with and
without the traits that were hypothesized to predict identity.
In each case, respondents with a given trait were far more
likely to have the hypothesized identity than those without
the trait. The percentage difference, however, which I am
using as the measure of predictivity, is greater for the
language trait than for any of the others, on both the
English and the French sides. Fifty-six percent of those
speaking English as their principal home language identified
themselves as English Canadians, while less than 1% of
those not speaking mainly English at home did so: a
difference of 55 percentage points. In comparison, the
percentage differences were 52 between those with and
without British[14] ancestry, 42 between those with and without
French surnames, 51 between Protestants and non-Protestants,
and 30 between those living outside and inside Quebec. The
predominance of language as the predictive variable is
greater, both absolutely and relatively, for French-Canadian
identity. Of those speaking French as their main home
language, 78% expressed a clear French Canadian identity, as

opposed to just 2% of the rest. In comparison with this
difference of 76 percentage points, the differences were 65
between those with and those without French ancestry, 54
between those with and those without French surnames, 53
between Catholics and non-Catholics, and 42 between those
living inside and outside Quebec.[15]

The questions on identity were phrased in such a way
that the expression of a territorially, rather than
ethnically, based identity was not easy.[16] But some questions
were asked that permit us to explore the territorial aspect
of identity. Quebec is the only province of Canada where
there is a salient issue of provincial versus federal loyalty
and identity. There, and only there, people debate whether
Quebec is a province, or rather an "état" or a "nation", and,
if it is a province, whether it is a province "like the
others". What determines, then, whether a resident of
Quebec attaches his primary loyalty to Quebec or to Canada?

We can get semi-direct evidence on this subject from
the adult survey, which permits us to discover:

> a. What kinds of Quebec residents felt that
> they would never want to live outside Quebec;
>
> b. What kinds of Quebec residents had more
> interest in Quebec politics than in the
> politics of Canada as a whole; and
>
> c. What kinds of Quebec residents would like
> to see Quebec become a separate country.

The answers to these questions parallel those already
revealed. In each case, the pro-Quebec orientation was
displayed among Quebec residents more frequently by those
of French ancestry than by those of non-French ancestry,
more frequently by those with French family names than by
those with non-French family names, more frequently by
Catholics than by non-Catholics, and more frequently by
French speakers than by non-French speakers. Of all these
dichotomies, however, the linguistic one is again the most
predictive. The percentage difference between those speaking
French as their best language and all others in terms of our
three types of Quebeckism was 23 points, 15 points, and 10
points, respectively. The corresponding differences between
the other pairs were all less: some barely and others
considerably less.[17]

While language appears to predict these three types of
Quebeckism more successfully than other predictors used,

the intergroup percentage differences in Quebeckism, it
should be noted, are far lower than the differences in ethnic
identity.[18] This fact suggests that a variety of personal
identity attributes, both ascriptive and affective, may
occur in syndromes, while political opinions that are
closely related to such identity elements in apparent logic
are not so strongly associated in fact. In other words,
responses to "who are you" questions may fall into one
cluster, fairly separate from responses to "who do you want
to live with" questions. This hypothesis will not be
examined in this paper, but it conforms to two things we
already know about Quebec: the fact that there are French
Canadians who can and do feel quite comfortable whether as
extreme separatists or as extreme anti-separatists, and the
fact that those who display an anomolous combination of
elements within one of the hypothesized clusters, namely
the identity cluster (particularly English Catholics), have
typically led an uncomfortable and awkward existence.[19]

     The most notable finding so far has been the very strong
association between language and ethnic identity in Canada.
On the one hand, we have found that Canadians themselves
agree that disagreements are most severe between the two
language groups, and that the ethnic groups are more differ-
ent from each other in language than in any other way. And
on the other hand, it appears that those who differ linguis-
tically, more than those who differ in any other way, have a
very strong tendency to differ in the ethnic identities that
they claim for themselves. This finding is not represented
as supporting the hypothesis that language must inevitably
be the basis of nationality or ethnicity. On the contrary,
several other demographic characteristics have been seen to
be strongly associated with identity among these respondents,
sometimes lagging behind language only slightly. It is
reasonable to assume that different objective characteristics
are differentially important in determining identity in
different countries, and that the determining characteristics
can change over time in the same country. Indeed, historical
analysis suggests that just such a change has taken place
over the decades in Canada, from religion to language as the
characteristic perceived to be most important in distinguish-
ing the two major ethnic groups.[20] The above findings show
the extent to which this trend has gone.

3. Language Competence and Ethnic Identity

     If, then, Canada is a country where the most important
conflictual population groups are identified largely by
differences in language, it would be natural to expect
identity to vary not only with family tongue, but also with

competence in the language(s) of other groups. Specifically,
the percentage of the population identifying itself with a
given group should be a monotonically increasing function of
competence in that group's characteristic language, and the
percentage of the population shunning identification with any
group should, for the speakers of each language, be a
monotonically increasing function of bilingual competence.
What this hypothesis says is that a person's identity can be
predicted better if we know not only which language he
normally uses or which language he speaks best but also how
well he speaks the other relevant language(s).

There are several reasons for expecting this hypothesis
to be true. Other research has found persons with positive,
or "integrative", attitudes toward another language to learn
it better than those without such attitudes, given the same
learning conditions.[21] Those speaking a second language, on
the other hand, have thereby acquired one of the characteris-
tics of members of another identity group in a state where
group identity is largely language-based. Knowledge of a
second language permits communication with members of the
identity group of which it is characteristic, and communica-
tion provides an opportunity for feelings of community to
develop.[22]

To test the hypothesis we can array most of the adult
respondents (remembering that no suitable ethnic identity
questions were asked in the youth survey) on a scale of
English-French competence. On one end of this scale are
those speaking English as a principal home language but
having no competence in French. On the other end are those
with French as a principal home language but having no
competence in English. Arrayed between these two poles are
respondents speaking one of the languages as principal home
language and having progressively more competence in the other
language as one moves away from each monolingual pole. Thus,
in the middle of the scale are those speaking both English and
French as principal home languages.[23]

Figure 2 shows that the three parts of our hypothesis
are largely confirmed for the Canadian adult survey sample.
The percentage identifying themselves as English Canadians
rises from 0, among those speaking English less than natively,
to 61 among those speaking English with native competence and
not speaking French at all. The rate of French Canadian
identification rises more sharply, from 0 to 88%. And the
percentage rejecting both of these identifications is highest
(77%) among those with native competence in both English and
French, falling off on both sides of this midpoint.

The figure reveals somewhat more than the confirmation
of this hypothesis, however. First, there is a range of
competence in each language which appears to be an absolute
prerequisite for self-identified membership in the associated
ethnic group. Practically without exception, it turns out
that no-one was a French Canadian without at least a medium
competence in French, and no-one was an English Canadian
without full native competence in English. Thus the
percentages identifying themselves as English Canadians and
French Canadians are, strictly speaking, in this case
monotonically non-decreasing, rather than monotonically
increasing, functions of competence in the associated
language.

Secondly, while competence in English was more of a
necessary condition for English Canadian identity than was
competence in French for French Canadian identity, it was
French competence which was closer to being a sufficient
condition. Hence the tendency to reject a pure English or
French ethnic identity, while highest among co-ordinate
bilinguals, was, at any given level of bilingualism,
considerably stronger among those whose home language was
English than among those speaking French at home. The
difference is reduced a little (by 7 to 16 percentage
points) if we restrict our attention just to those with
British and those with French origins, respectively, but
it remains strong, indicating that "other" Canadians who
have assimilated to English are only in part responsible for
the English-French asymmetry.[24] Thus the tendency to reject
one of the two ethnic identities was monotonically associated
with bilingualism within each native-language group, as
predicted, but the association differs in strength for the
two groups.

These findings suggest two additional points. One is
that the English Canadians are far more likely to identify
themselves with Canada as a whole than are the French
Canadians. Of those speaking English as principal home
language, 18% answered question 2-30 by saying that they
were "Canadians" rather than members of any ethnic group,
while only 3% of those speaking French at home chose this
method of rejecting any parochial group membership. This
fact seems to conform to a general pattern: in the United
States it is whites, in the USSR Russians, and (one could
hypothesize) in every country the dominant group that will
most easily and frequently transcend its own boundaries as
limits of identity.

The other implication of Figure 2 is that linguistic
assimilation can be expected to take a big toll in terms of

ethnic identity. Almost all assimilation in Canada today is
towards English, and considerable numbers of persons with
French ancestry outside of Quebec speak English only or
English better than French. To make sure that our sample
contains specimens of what, to paraphrase Isaacs, we might
call "ex-French Canadians", we can examine the association
between ethnic identity and position on the language compe-
tence spectrum just for those of French ancestry. When we
do this, we find that 61 respondents of French ancestry had
English as a principal home language and spoke little or no
French. Of these 61, just <u>one</u> identified herself as French
Canadian. Except for minor fluctuations characteristic of
statistics based on small totals, the better the French and
the worse the English spoken by someone of French ancestry
the more likely he was to have a definite French Canadian
identity. On the other end of the continuum, of the 258
respondents who, in addition to their French origin, also
spoke French at home and knew no English at all, 227 (or
88%) identified as French Canadian. Likewise, of the 41
respondents having British ancestry but speaking French
rather than English at home, <u>none</u> identified himself as
English Canadian. (See Table 1.)

Thus the intergenerational loss of English may be
accompanied by the loss of English identity as often as, or
even more often than, the loss of the French language is
accompanied by the loss of French identity. But the latter
phenomenon is more important because the French language is
lost considerably more often. While there were 95 respondents
of French origin who did not speak fluent French, there were
only 21 respondents of British origin not speaking fluent
English. These constituted 7% of the French-origin group,
but only 1½% of the British-origin respondents.

Our finding that almost no-one without high competence
in French identifies himself as a French Canadian, even if
he is of French ancestry, suggests a significant and
paradoxical prediction. The French Canadians, who constitute
the most distinctive ethnic group of substantial size in
Canada and are believed to do so largely because they have
preserved their language, may become one of the <u>least</u>
distinctive groups, if and when they do <u>not</u> preserve their
language.[25]

4. Communication Barriers and Coalition Behavior

The results presented above show that, in the case of
Canada in 1965, there was a marked tendency for identification
with a given group to vary directly with one's ability to
communicate in its predominant language, and inversely with

one's ability to communicate in the predominant language of
the other main group. This suggests the more general
hypothesis that communicative competence differences of the
sort that exist in multilingual societies give rise to
parallel differences in membership and loyalty behavior among
its members. The survey data at hand cannot test this
hypothesis, however, because findings of association such as
those reported so far could equally be due to a converse
relationship: the tendency for feelings of belonging or
loyalty to cause people to learn to communicate with (inclu-
ding learning the language of) those they feel akin to.

But by experimentally varying communicative competence
in a situation where people are motivated to choose partners
for a coalition, one can counteract this problem. At the same
time one can observe loyalty behavior rather than just
identity expressions.

A number of studies have shown that interpersonal
attraction varies directly with geographical proximity,[26]
which might well have its effect mostly by virtue of the
communication advantages it provides. In addition, there is
some experimental evidence that groups with the greatest
internal communicative opportunity perform certain tasks
best.[27] If the formation of a coalition is a task that the
rules of a small-group experiment prohibit more than one
subgroup from accomplishing, then it might be hypothesized
that the subgroup with the greatest opportunity for intra-
subgroup communication should have the greatest probability
of forming the successful coalition.[28]

An experiment of this sort was conducted in July, 1973,
in Heidelberg, West Germany, at the Stiftung Rehabilitation.[29]
The experiment took the form of a computer-mediated game
called "Tod auf See" (Death at Sea), in which subjects
played the part of passengers in a sinking lifeboat. They
were instructed that if a bare majority could form a coalition
within a specified time, agreed on which bare minority should
be dumped overboard, then the boat would stay afloat and
those not dumped would survive and split a buried treasure
among themselves. Each survivor's share amounted to 5
German marks, which would be paid to each winner after the
game.

Each game proceeded through as many rounds as necessary
to reach an agreement or exhaust the time limit. On any
given round, each subject had 30 seconds to cast a vote
against those he wanted to dump.[30] The votes were then
tabulated and the outcome of the round revealed. Subjects
had been informed that they were playing the game against

each other, but individual subjects were identified only by
number, with subjects randomized across numbers and numbers
randomized across conditions. Since subjects sat at
separate, cubicled computer terminals, they were anonymous
to each other.

The experiment consisted of four playings of the game.
Except for the first game, subjects were allowed to transmit
messages to each other before every vote. Messages could take
the form of a binding promise of a side-payment in the event
of the survival of both sender and receiver, or a fixed-form
suggestion to vote against a particular set of passengers.
Each message could be sent to only one passenger; the number
of messages per round that a subject could send, and the set
of passengers to whom he was allowed to send messages, were
an experimentally manipulated condition. Each subject knew
only how many messages he could send per round, to whom, and
sometimes why. Other conditions, indirectly relevant to the
present study, were also manipulated, i.e. the time limit and
the amount of detail in the outcome feedback.

Game 1, it was noted above, permitted no communication,
and we shall ignore its results below. Game 2 imposed a
non-hierarchical, and Games 3 and 4 a hierarchical,
communication opportunity network. The two types of network
for the 7- and 6-person groups were:

|	
6 Players,	7 Players,
<u>Non-hierarchical</u>	<u>Non-hierarchical</u>

6 Players,
Hierarchical

7 Players,
Hierarchical

In these diagrams, each node represents a player, each
number indicates how many messages per round the player in
question was allowed to send, and each line segment
represents the presence of a reciprocal communication
opportunity between two players. As in the case of a
linguistically heterogeneous group, all communication barriers
were symmetrical: passenger i could send messages to
passenger j if and only if j could send messages to i. This
situation contrasts, of course, with asymmetrical barriers
such as are typical of mass media systems.

Five groups of seven subjects each, and one group of
six subjects, took part in the experiment. Subjects were
recruited from a pool of persons aged 15-21, mostly
Gymnasium students living in Mannheim.[31]

The results of this experiment strongly support the
hypothesis that the likelihood of a subgroup forming a
winning coalition varies directly with the density of the
communication network within the subgroup. Of the 18 games
played in which communication was allowed, 17 ended in the
formation of a successful coalition. If coalitions had been
formed by chance, then it would be statistically expected
that only 1.41 of the coalitions would have perfectly dense
communication networks, i.e. in which each coalition member
could send messages to any other coalition member. In fact,
however, four of the coalitions were of this type. There
was, then, a marked tendency for coalitions to form among
those with maximum mutual communicative competence.

This tendency is revealed in more detail by Figure 3. Here each possible coalition is rated horizontally by the statistical probability of a coalition with an at least equally dense communication network being formed by chance. For each density level, the number of coalitions actually formed at or above that level ("Observed") is seen to be considerably greater than would have been expected by chance ("Random"). Over the whole range the observed values are closer to the maximum possible values than would have occurred randomly, and sometimes even reach the maximum possible values.

In the coalition-seeking process, a total of 450 votes were cast by players who had been given restricted communicative competence.[32] Each such vote was inspected to determine how many of the passengers against whom the vote was cast were also passengers to whom the voting player was allowed to send messages. The votes were then tabulated according to how likely it would have been that a vote would name at most as many communicable passengers as it did, if the voter had chosen his voting targets at random from among the other players. The results of this tabulation are shown in Figure 4. The gap between the "Observed" and the "Random" curves represents the tendency to cast votes that name, as targets for dumping overboard, fewer of the passengers with whom the voter can communicate than would be expected by chance. As can be seen, players consistently avoided voting against others that they could communicate with.

The effect of communication opportunity appears basically unchanged in the presence of two conditions that would be expected to interact with it. It might be hypothesized that the tendency to choose coalition partners from communicables would be even stronger when an explicit identity component is added to the communication gap. This condition was met by assigning all semi-communicative players in odd-numbered groups to a "language explanation" condition, while their counterparts in even-numbered groups were left in the normal condition. In the language explanation condition, players were given additional information about those that they could and could not send messages to. Those with whom they could communicate were said to speak German, while the others were said to speak an "incomprehensible foreign language". This condition, contrary to expectations, did not lead to a greater gap between the two curves, as a comparison of Figures 4 and 5 shows.

Another condition that might have affected the importance of communication is the presence or absence of other sources of information about the intentions of the players.

If the only clue to the intentions of another player is the
communications which he sends, such communications would be
expected to exercise great influence over partner choice, and
resultant coalitions would be expected to follow communication
lines closely. But if direct communication with others is not
needed to discover how they plan to vote, decisions might be
less likely to favor communication partners. The former
situation was present in Game 3, and the latter situation in
Game 4, which were otherwise identical. In Game 3, the only
feedback about the outcome of a round was the information that
no agreement had been reached--or that agreement had been
reached and that the player in question had won or lost. In
Game 4, however, the feedback about results was total: all
players' votes for the round were reported in addition to the
fact that an agreement had or had not been reached. With
this opportunity to know the actual voting behavior of all
other players, subjects might be expected to form coalitions
across communication barriers more easily.

        In fact, however, the tendency to vote against
non-communicables was not appreciably different in Game 4
from Game 3, as can be seen by comparing Figures 6 and 7.
This finding is by no means definitive, since it may have
also been the case that subjects became more skilled in
using, and more sensitive to the importance of, their
communication opportunities over time. To test this, an
experiment will be needed in which total-feedback games are
not systematically different from low-feedback games in
temporal sequence or subject sophistication. Another
possible explanation for the absence of a difference is
that total feedback makes it more difficult for players to
use communication for deceit, since deceit can be detected
in the voting results. Since deceptive communications would
be likely to involve subsequent votes against the message
recipient, the keep-them-honest effect of feedback might lead
players to coalesce more rather than less often with those
they communicate with. Subsequent detailed analysis of the
voting results in these two games may reveal such an effect.

        Regardless of why the tendency to vote against non-
communicables remained stable from Game 3 to Game 4, it is
clear from the data that a substantial improvement in the
subjects' ability to form coalitions took place from game to
game. In Game 2, the first game with communication, the
members of all groups cast a total of 199 votes. They cast
152 votes in Game 3, and only 99 votes in Game 4. Likewise,
the number of rounds per game averaged 5.3, 4.3, and 2.8 in
Games 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Once again, additional
experimentation will be necessary to determine whether this
pattern of increasing coalition-forming efficiency can be

attributed to experience alone, or whether part of the
difference is accounted for by the denser, hierarchical
communication network in Games 3 and 4, and by the greater
feedback in Game 4.

5. Conclusion

Although further investigation is needed to discover
conditions of greater and lesser communication network impact,
it appears clear that players avoid voting against those they
can communicate with. What does this mean for language and
loyalty?

It means, first of all, that in a situation communica-
tionally analogous to a linguistically heterogeneous
collectivity competing for scarce resources, individuals
who were offered material incentives for forming coalitions
tended to do so with their communication partners, at the
expense of those they could not talk to. This tendency
may well coincide with a tendency to follow a rational, i.e.
gain-maximizing, strategy (suggesting that $\underline{a}$ vote against
$\underline{b}$, $\underline{c}$, . . . , and then voting that way oneself), although
rational deceptive strategies may also exist. Experiments
in decision-making, however, have typically found that even
in the simplest games, where the gain-maximizing strategy
soon becomes easily discoverable, it is usually not adopted
by subjects.[33] So it is not uninteresting that our subjects
behaved rationally (if they did), and that in doing so they
exercised "linguistic" discrimination. Death at Sea is not
unrepresentative of many outside-world situations if it
provides opportunities for people to gang up against those
they cannot communicate with. And if people in such situa-
tions respond to these opportunities, the consequences can
be important. Our data from Canada provided clear evidence
that language groups there are groups of distinct identity,
whose members perceive language as their principal uncommon
denominator. There are reasons to suspect that language
differences are, indeed, not just incidental and not just
perpetuated results, but also among the main causes, of
differences in group identity.

Our initial experimental findings seem to point to the
possibility of a communicational interpretation of language
conflict--in Canada or elsewhere. Rather than seeing
conflict among language groups as epiphenominal, transitory,
and pathological, this interpretation would be that it is
reasonable for the boundaries between language groups to
coincide with the boundaries between communication groups,
hence bargaining groups, hence consensus-building groups,
hence consensus groups, and hence ultimately loyalty groups.

Language need not be a surrogate for some other cleavage,
since there are interpersonal mechanisms that make language
groups likely to oppose each other. Thus, rather than
asking why language conflict has become more common, we
might ask what forces have so often kept language <u>from</u>
being one of the chief dividers of society. And if we
treat language group differences as a social illness, we
should still recognize them as a manifestation of <u>individual</u>
behavior that could easily be viewed as healthy behavior.

We have not, however, explored here what effects
language conflict has on society. The evil effects are
usually stressed, but the argument can be made[34] that such
conflict integrates plural societies rather than destroying
them. In addition, antagonistic behavior <u>across</u> groups may
be accompanied by altruistic behavior <u>within</u> groups, such as
in the cases of several subjects in the experiment who
helped reach a consensus by voting against themselves. Thus
our conclusion approaches "Who says language diversity says
language group conflict"--but it remains to be seen whether
this warrants alarm.

Appendix A: Medium as Message

The results reported above should be interpreted in
the light of the effects that both the surveys and the experi-
ment   by virtue of their respective designs, may have had
on responses or behavior.

The two Canadian surveys were a product, as well as a
register, of their times. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism had been directed[35] to find ways, parti-
cularly through measures promoting bilingualism, to "develop
the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partner-
ship" between the English Canadians and French Canadians.
To what degree the Groupe des Recherches Sociales, which
conducted the adult survey, and Canadian Facts, Limited,
and the National Opinion Research Center, the organizations
conducting the youth survey, were free to design the surveys
as they chose I do not know. The net result, however, is that
the responses to these surveys are less than perfect data for
the present study, largely because by the content and the
ordering of their questions they partly answered _for_ their
respondents the questions which we would like to ask the
respondents themselves. The chief identity terms that were
contained in the questionnaires are shown in Table 2.

A perusal of these two lists is an adequate reminder
of the terminological entanglements that threaten an empirical
investigation of identity and loyalty, especially in a country
like Canada where no consensus exists on either the question
of nationality or the terms in which to discuss it. In
addition to "nation" and "nationality", such terms as
"Québecois", "l'État de Québec", _and_ "race" were omitted. Further
one can find traces of Canadian nationalism in the youth
survey, which refers to "English-speaking" and "French-speaking
Canadians" and to "the government of Canada", as opposed to
the greater French-Canadian or provincial-rights orientation
of the adult survey, which emphasizes "ethnic groups" and
refers to "the federal government in Ottawa". But while one
can criticize the terminology employed in the Royal Commission
surveys, one can not easily offer a different one without
simply substituting new biases for old. Perhaps the above
terminologies are even less biasing than they might have been
because of their variation and occasional inconsistency.

It is clear, in any case, that the two surveys did indeed
define _for_ their respondents a situation in which "nationality"
was not an issue, and in which Canada was a "country" composed
of ten provinces and various "groups", "ethnic groups", or
people speaking different languages, as well as people with
other differentiating characteristics such as religion.
The most emphasized differentiation in the adult survey was

among "English Canadians", "French Canadians", and "other
Canadians"; and in the youth survey was between people
(or Canadians) speaking English and those speaking French.
The fact that a large number of questions in each survey
dealt with language knowledge, language experience, and language
attitudes means that respondents were certainly sensitized
to language as a salient phenomenon, so the attribution to
them of pre-existing sensitivity on the basis of these data
should be hesitant and tentative.

TABLE 1

LANGUAGE REPERTOIRE AND ETHNIC IDENTITY AMONG THOSE OF FRENCH AND BRITISH BACKGROUNDS

English Competence:	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	1	0
French Competence:	0	1	2	3	4	4	4	4	4

Respondents of French Patrilineal Origin

	English	17 40.5%	3 15.8%	4 11.8%	4 7.0%	2 3.3%	0	0	0	0
Ethnic Identity	French	1 2.4%	0	4 11.8%	10 17.5%	10 16.7%	276 65.9%	275 80.4%	156 86.7%	227 88.0%
	Neither or Mixed	24 57.1%	16 84.2%	26 76.5%	43 75.4%	48 80.0%	143 34.1%	67 19.6%	24 13.3%	31 12.0%

Respondents of British Patrilineal Origin

	English	603 69.5%	172 62.8%	143 57.0%	21 35.6%	2 12.5%	0	0	0	0
Ethnic Identity	French	0	1 0.4%	1 0.4%	1 1.7%	1 6.3%	13 65.0%	6 85.7%	7 100.0%	6 85.7%
	Neither or Mixed	265 30.5%	101 36.9%	107 42.6%	37 62.7%	13 81.3%	7 35.0%	1 14.3%	0	1 14.3%

Competence key: 0=none, 1=low, 2=medium, 3=high, 4=native.

TABLE 2

IDENTITY-RELATED TERMS IN THE TWO QUESTIONNAIRES

Adult Survey

English Version:	French Version:
Canada	le Canada
English Canadians	Canadiens anglais
French Canadians	Canadiens français
people from Canada	(des) gens du Canada
foreign	étranger
citizens of Canada	citoyens du Canada
one people	un seul peuple
society	société
the province of Quebec	la province de Québec
minority group	minorité
origin	origine
group	groupe
people	gens
province	province
Canadians of another group	Canadiens d'un autre groupe
English speaking	de langue anglaise
French speaking	de langue française
Frenchmen of France	les Français de France
Englishmen of England	les Anglais d'Angleterre
other Canadians	les (des) autres Canadiens
French Canadian	canadiens-français
country	pays
ethnic or cultural group	groupe ethnique ou culturel
ethnic group	groupe ethnique
language	langue
religion	religion
the federal government	le gouvernement fédéral
one country	un seul pays
the rest of Canadians	le reste des Canadiens
New Canadians	Nouveaux-Canadiens
the federal government in Ottawa	le gouvernement fédéral (à Ottawa)
the federal government of Ottawa	le gouvernement fédéral d'Ottawa

Youth Survey

English Version:	French Version:
Canada	le Canada
Canadians	des habitants du Canada
Canadian provinces	provinces du Canada
people from Eastern Canada	les gens de l'Est du Canada
people from Western Canada	les gens de l'Ouest du Canada

TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)

|	
Catholics	les Catholiques
Protestants	les Protestants
French-speaking Canadians	les Canadiens de langue française
English-speaking Canadians	les Canadiens de langue anglaise
people born in Canada	les gens nés au Canada
people born outside of Canada	les gens nés hors du Canada
country	pays
Americans	les Américains
the government of Canada	le gouvernement du Canada
the United States	Etats Unis
first language	première langue
the English	les Canadiens anglais
the French	les Canadiens français
groups of people	groupes de gens
English-speaking Canadians	les Canadiens anglais /sic7
French-speaking Canadians	les Canadiens français /sic7
French-Canadians	les Canadiens français
English-Canadians	les Canadiens anglais
country	--
-speaking (speak __)	parlent __ (de langue __)
Canadian __	du Canada
Quebec	le Québec
Canadians	les Canadiens
-speaking Canadian	Canadien de langue __
English-French	franco-anglais
religious group	groupe religieux
born in Canada	né au Canada
country from which __ originally came	pays d'origine

Percentage having English-Canadian (left pairs) and French-Canadian (right pairs) identity, among those with (outer) and without (inner) the indicated attributes

Figure 1.   Five Demographic Characteristics as Predictors of Identity

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
Percentage having
indicated ethnicity
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Mixed

or

Key:
0 None
1 Low
2 Medium
3 High
4 Native

English-
Canadian

French-
Canadian

Non - Ethnic

| 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | English competence |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | French competence |

Figure 2.   Language Repertoire and Ethnic Identity

Figure 3. Communication Opportunities among the Members of Winning Coalitions

Figure 4. Votes Cast against Non-communicables

Figure 5.   Votes Cast against Non-communicables in the Language Explanation Condition

## Figure 6. Votes Cast against Non-communicables in Game 3

Figure 7.   Votes Cast against Non-communicables in Game 4.

Footnotes

1. Earlier versions of portions of this paper were presented
at the City University of New York Comparative Politics
Colloquium and at the Discussion Group of the Columbia
University Program on Soviet Nationality Problems. Portions
of Section 3 appeared in my unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
"Language and Political Integration: Canada as a Test of
Some Hypotheses" (University of Chicago, 1971). I am
grateful for stimulating criticisms of earlier drafts of
portions of this paper from Dankwart Rustow, Kemal Karpat,
Rosemarie Rogers, Joshua A. Fishman, Thomas Spira, Walker
Connor, Edward Allworth, and others.

2. A brief review of the definitional aspect of nationality
may be found in Joshua A. Fishman, <u>Language and Nationalism</u>
(Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House Publishers, 1973), pp. 3-5,
and the footnotes thereto. See also Karl W. Deutsch,
<u>Nationalism and Social Communication</u>, 2nd edn. (Cambridge,
Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), ch. 1 and pp. 96-105.

3. E.g. Hans Kohn, <u>The Idea of Nationalism</u> (New York: Collier
Books, 1967, c. 1944), ch. 1; Rupert Emerson, <u>From Empire to
Nation</u> (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 95-104. Cf., on
ethnicity, Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-
Destroying?", <u>World Politics</u> 24: 319-55 (no. 3, April, 1972),
pp. 336-42.

4. See Deutsch, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 2, and other sources cited in
ch. 1 of Pool, <u>op. cit.</u>

5. E.g. Herbert C. Kelman, "Language as an Aid and B*arrier*
to Involvement in the National System", pp. *30-34*, in <u>Can
Language Be Planned?</u>, ed. Joan Rubin and Björn H. Jernudd
(Honolulu: East-West Center Books, 1971), pp. 21-51.

6. To the degree that policy preferences expressed to an inter-
viewer are manifestations of group loyalty, my paper on "Mass
Opinion on Language Policy: The Case of Canada", in <u>Language
Planning: Current Issues and Research</u>, ed. Joan Rubin and
Roger Shuy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1973),
pp. 55-66, of which a revision is forthcoming in <u>Advances in
Language Planning</u>, ed. Joshua A. Fishman (The Hague: Mouton),
has tested some hypotheses relating the upper-left and lower-
right corners of the diagram. And relationships between
language communality and communication have been explored
somewhat in ch. 3 of Pool, <u>op. cit.</u> (fn. 1).

7. Considered by some to have been a multi-million dollar
pork barrel for the social sciences, this commission used
the funds it received from the Canadian Federal Government
to sponsor a total of 146 research projects, including case

studies, surveys, and histories, above and beyond its own
extensive hearings. See the annotated list of studies in
Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967),
appendix V, pp. 201-12. Some of the products of this work
have been appearing under three serial titles: Reports,
Studies, and Documents, respectively, of the Royal Commission
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

8. These surveys were probably unique in combining the
following characteristics:
    a. They had large samples--4071 adults and 1365
       teenagers--thus permitting more than usually
       controlled analysis;
    b. They oversampled the regional minorities
       (English in Quebec and French elsewhere), thus
       making detailed within-group analysis possible; and
    c. They collected, in addition to common demographic
       and political information, responses to a wide
       variety of questions about language: language
       competences, language backgrounds, language
       experiences, language behaviors, and language
       attitudes, including opinions on language
       policies. In all, there are about 260 items
       of information in the adult survey, and 185 in
       the youth survey.

9. See Pool, op. cit. (fn. 6), and Appendix A of this paper.

10. The adult survey asked no such question.

11. This last finding is not trivial. Scholars frequently
ask whether language is not really a camouflage issue used
to mask more "real" differences, e.g. economic, between
groups that happen to differ in language. See Stanley
Rundle, Language as a Social and Political Factor in Europe
(London: Faber and Faber, Limited, 1946), pp. 53, 55-64;
Karl Heinz Pfeffer, "Sprachenfrage und soziale Unruhe in
Pakistan", La Monda Lingvo-Problemo 1: 129-39 (no. 3,
Sept., 1969). Furthermore, in many places in Canada French
Canadians, i.e. those of French origin, are far more likely
to be able to communicate with each other in English than
in French. See Stanley Lieberson, Language and Ethnic
Relations in Canada (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1970), p. 229.

12. In response to question 2-30, 13% of the respondents not
only refused to name any ethnic group but also volunteered
that they were "Canadians".

13. See, for example, A.R.N. Lower, "Two Ways of Life: The
Primary Antithesis of Canadian History", in Approaches to
Canadian History, ed. Ramsey Cook et al. (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 15-28.

14. English, Scottish, or Irish. Had the trait been defined
as just English ancestry, the difference would be lower still.
A serious defect in this trait is that it includes only male
ancestry, but this is dictated by the question asked.

15. If we refer to linguistic competence rather than lin-
guistic performance, in other words ask which language the
respondent knew best rather than which one he normally used
at home, the associations change somewhat but the percentage
differences remain the same. Had the percentages above been
based on weighted totals, to compensate for the stratified
sampling employed, no substantial change would have been
required in the above conclusions. The predictivity of
region is substantially greater with weighting, since
regional minority oversampling was employed. But language
remains clearly the most predictive. Weighting brings the
regional percentage differences up to 46 for English and 63
for French identity.

16. See Appendix A.

17. It would, of course, be possible to make finer distinc-
tions than the dichotomies of this analysis, and in doing
so to increase the differences both in ethnic identity
and in Quebeckism from one category to another of the various
predictors which we have been examining. Across-the-
board dichotomization is the device used here to permit
comparisons of predictiveness, since without such a device
there is no limit to the possible fineness of categoriza-
tion. It will become clear below that I have no intention
of ignoring such finer distinctions when the purpose of
analysis is other than predictiveness comparisons.

18. This statement may suffice here since it is not a
main point in the present argument. However, comparison
of arithmetical percentage differences is somewhat
arbitrary and therefore challengeable. Another measure
of differenee, for example, is the comparison of proportional
percentage differences. But even in this scheme a difference
between 12 percent Quebec seperatism among those speaking
French best and 2 percent Quebec separatism among all others
would not be considered a greater gap than that between the
81 percent French identity among those speaking French best
and the 4 percent French identity among all others. A
variation on proportional comparison, which weights

differences near 0 or 100% more than differences near 50%,
has been expounded in several papers by Henri Theil.

19. On this latter point see Everett C. Hughes, French
Canada in Transition (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1963, c.
1943), ch. 12.

20. See Edward N. Corbett, Quebec Confronts Canada
(Baltimore: The John's Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 291, and
Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicul-
turalism (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), vol. II, p. 47.

21. See W. E. Lambert et al., "A Study of the Roles of
Attitudes and Motivation in Second-Language Learning", in
Readings in the Sociology of Language, ed. Joshua A.
Fishman (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 473-91.

22. Cf. Kelman, loc. cit.

23. This continuum is based on questions asking for princi-
pal home language and asking about speaking ability in
English and French. The questions were worded, "Do you
speak _____ without any difficulty, with some difficulty,
with a great deal of difficulty or do you not speak it at
all?"; "Parlez-vous le _____ sans difficultés, avec
quelques difficultés, avec beaucoup de difficultés ou pas
du tout?" The assumption, in some cases doubtless incorrect,
was made that those speaking a given language as a principal
home language had higher competence in it than others who
merely claimed to speak it fluently (i.e. without any
difficulty). The former I have labeled as having "native"
competence, and the latter as having "high" competence.

24. The precise figures are in Table 1.

25. Cf. Lieberson, op. cit., p. 130. The converse point is
made by Michael Oliver, "Ethnicity in Canadian Politics:
French-English Relations", unpublished ms., p. 12. The
conclusions about intergenerational change are necessarily
weakened by the fact that the respondents were asked about
only patrilineal ancestry.

26. Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small
Group Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971),
p. 110.

27. George A. Heise and George A. Miller, "Problem Solving
by Small Groups Using Various Communication Nets", Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology 46: 327-35 (1951).

28. Small-group research on various communication networks
has focused on their effects on leadership, decision-making
style, attitudes toward the group, and problem-solving
efficiency, rather than interpersonal choice. See A. Paul
Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research (New York: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1962), ch. 10, and Shaw, op. cit., pp.
137-45. For a discussion of the limitations of game-type
small-group experiments as predictors of every-day behavior,
see Karl E. Weick, "Laboratory Experimentation with
Organizations", pp. 242-44, in Handbook of Organizations,
ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965),
pp. 194-260, and Colin Cherry, On Human Communication, 2nd
edn. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 28.

29. The experiment was programmed in APL-PLUS on the IBM 370/
155 of the Stiftung Rehabilitation. Subjects interacted with
the program and with each other via typewriter-style IBM
2740 Communications Terminals. (An American version has
been programmed in APL\1500 on the IBM 1800 of the State
University of New York at Stony Brook Computer-Assisted
Instruction Laboratory, where additional experiments are
being conducted.) I wish to express my deep thanks to Dr.
Werner Augsburger, for permission to use the facilities of
Stiftung Rehabilitation; to Wilfried Schreiber, Dietrich
Franz, Wolfgang E. Fendt, and numerous others at that
institution for assistance in text editing and program
improvement, both directly and by their participation as
pretest subjects; and to Günter Dhom and Jeannette Huber
of the University of Mannheim for assistance in editing the
first version of the German text. The organizational and
administrative assistance of Walter Wehrli was indispensable
for the realization of the experiment. I am grateful to
Prof. Martin Irle of the Sonderforschungsbereich 24,
University of Mannheim, for repeated help and advice, and
to Margit Oswald of the University of Mannheim for sharing
a subject pool with me. The development of the German version
of the program would not have been possible without a
visiting appointment as Gastdozent at the Institut für
Sozialwissenschaften, University of Mannheim, during the
fall of 1972. The experimental work was made possible by
a summer, 1973, fellowship from the Deutscher Akademischer
Austauschdienst-Council for European Studies Post-doctoral
Support Program.

30. A bare majority of subjects could form a coalition even
while one or more others neglected to vote at all. In this
way the experiment avoided making every member's co-operation
necessary. Experiments in which all group members are
essential have been criticized as unrealistic by Murray
Glanzer and Robert Glaser in "Techniques for the Study of

Group Structure and Behavior: Empirical Studies of the
Effects of Structure in Small Groups", p. 418, in Small
Groups: Studies in Social Interaction, ed. A. Paul Hare
et al. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 400-26.

31. The subject pool had previously been modified by the
exclusion of most members rated high on introversion or
extraversion.

32. I.e. players who were not allowed to send messages to
whichever other players they wanted.

33. E.g. Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Jr., et al., Coöperation
and Competition: Readings on Mixed-Motive Games (Belmont,
Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 59-60; Emir
H. Shuford, Jr., "Some Bayesian Learning Processes", pp.
149-50, in Human Judgments and Optimality, ed. Maynard W.
Shelly, II, and Glenn L. Bryan (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1964), pp. 127-52.

34. And has been. See Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Language
Conflict and National Development (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1971).

35. See Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism, vol. I, Appendix A, pp. 173-74.