

System Administration

Week 11, Segment 4: System Security IV
“Crypto” means Cryptography

**Department of Computer Science
Stevens Institute of Technology**


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<https://stevens.netmeister.org/615/>


Feeling insecure?

```
curl http://random-place-on-the-internet/some-file | sudo bash
```




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
Feeling insecure?

```
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```



Feeling insecure?

```
curl http://random-place-on-the-internet/some-file | sudo bash
```



Feeling insecure? Rub some crypto on it!


Cryptography can help mitigate some of the risks sometimes.

It may provide security in the areas of:

- Secrecy or Confidentiality
 - *Did/could anybody else see (parts of) the message?*
- Accuracy or Integrity
 - *Was the message (could it have been) modified before I received it?*
- Authenticity
 - *Is the party I'm talking to actually who I think it is / they claim they are?*

Confidentiality

curl https://random-place-on-the-internet/some-file | sudo bash



Threats to Confidentiality


- lack of authenticity
- key exchange
- lack of key rotation
- key disclosure / revocation

Never store secrets in code! Separate code and config, config and secrets.

Always use a key management system.

Integrity?

```
curl https://random-place-on-the-internet/some-file | sudo bash
```



Integrity?

```
curl https://random-place-on-the-internet/some-file >file  
curl https://random-place-on-the-internet/sha256 >file.sha256  
diff <(sha256sum <file) <(file.sha256) && cat file | sudo bash
```

Threats to Integrity

- lack of authenticity
 - Where did I get the checksum?
- lack of integrity
 - Was the checksum tampered to match the (tampered) data?
 - collisions in algorithm
- “verification” with compromised tools


Hashing - not just for integrity

- Integrity checking: fast, collision-resistant, unkeyed, unsalted data
- HMAC: Integrity + Authenticity, shared secret
- Password Hashing: slow, collision-resistant, salted data

- Never confuse *hashing* and *encryption*!
- Never *encrypt* your users' passwords to store them – always *hash* them.
- Always *salt* your hashes.
- Always use adaptive or *key-stretching* functions such as e.g.: argon2, bcrypt, PBKDF2, scrypt
- $\text{DK} = \text{KDF}(\text{key}, \text{salt}, \text{iterations})$, where *salt* and *iterations* are *public*.


Authenticity?

```
curl https://random-place-on-the-internet/some-file >file
```




Authenticity?

```
curl https://random-place-on-the-internet/some-file >file
```



Authenticity?


```
curl https://random-place-on-the-internet/some-file >file
```




Integrity + Authenticity

```
curl https://random-place-on-the-internet/some-file >file  
curl https://random-place-on-the-internet/signature > sig  
gpg --verify sig file && cat file | sudo bash
```


Authenticity?



Authenticity?



Authenticity



Threats to Authenticity

- lack of *integrity*
- reliance on fragile infrastructure
- unverified or overly broad trust model
- usability
- conflation with *authorization*

(Some) Classes of Vulnerabilities

- memory management:
 - use of uninitialized memory
 - buffer overflow / stack smashing
 - use-after-free / dangling pointer
- input validation:
 - code and command injections
 - format attacks
- race conditions
 - non-atomic TOCTOU
 - symlink attacks

<https://www.xkcd.com/327>



(Some) Classes of Vulnerabilities

- privilege escalation and confusion:
 - XSS, CSRF
 - setuid with untrusted environment
- social engineering
 - phishing
 - watering hole attacks
- brute-force attacks
 - namespace iteration
 - denial of service
- information disclosure
 - insufficient permissions
 - MitM
 - lack of encryption, authN, authZ

Cryptography

- Never write your own crypto or invent your own protocol.
- Authentication != Authorization
- Cryptography does not handle authorization.
- You usually need all three: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity.
- Cryptography cannot prevent against incorrect use – usability is hard!
- Cryptography often times cannot help you at all.

Know your threat model!