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Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries

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Abstract. Given how central the immigration issue has been for the new radical right-wing parties in Western Europe, many have turned to immigration-related factors in trying to explain their emergence and electoral mobilisation. This research has convincingly shown that immigration scepticism (i.e., wanting to reduce immigration) is among the principal factors for predicting who will vote for a radical right-wing party. However, earlier studies have often uncritically equated immigration scepticism with xenophobia or even racism. By using data from the first round of the European Social Survey (2003) involving six West European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway), this article differentiates between immigration scepticism and xenophobic attitudes. The analyses strongly indicate that xenophobic attitudes are a far less significant factor than immigration scepticism for predicting who will vote for the new radical right. Moreover, this article analyses the extent to which anti-immigration frames employed by radical right-wing parties resonate with attitudes held by supporting voters, and to what extent they make a difference for people's decision to vote for the radical right. The analyses indicate that frames linking immigration to criminality and social unrest are particularly effective for mobilising voter support for the radical right. Finally, the article criticises earlier research that explained radical right-wing voting with reference to ethnic competition theory. In contrast to much of the earlier research that used macro-level measures and comparisons, this study uses (self-reported) individual-level data on the degree of ethnic heterogeneity of people's area of residence. Hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory receive less support than expected, which indicates that earlier research may have overestimated the significance of these factors.

Introduction

During the past two decades, the radical right has re-emerged as an electoral force in Western Europe, as well as in other stable democracies such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Since the early 1980s, parties such as the French *Front National*, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Danish People's Party have established themselves in their respective party systems, sometimes with vote shares exceeding 20 per cent. The new family of radical right-wing parties share a fundamental core of

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ethno-nationalist xenophobia (based on the so-called 'ethno-pluralist doctrine') and anti-political-establishment populism (Rydgren 2005; see also Minkenberg 2001). However, although this definition works well for almost all parties included in this study, as well as for a number of related parties (e.g., the Republikaner in Germany, the Lega Nord in Italy, the Swedeish Democrats), it suits the Norwegian Progress Party and the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn less well. Although these parties are mobilising against immigration and multiculturalism, ethno-nationalism is less of an issue and they are less dependent on the ethno-pluralist doctrine. It is thus questionable whether these two parties should be included in the family of the radical right. Yet, their political messages are largely based on the same anti-immigrant frames as those employed by the radical right-wing parties. Moreover, there are good reasons to treat them as 'functional equivalents' to the radical right-wing parties: earlier research indicates that they are electorally successful for approximately the same reasons and satisfy approximately the same political demand (Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005: 41). It is also common to include the Norwegian Progress Party and the List Pim Fortuyn in electoral studies of the radical right (e.g., Norris 2005). Hence, for simplicity's sake, I will call the parties included in this study – the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Belgian Vlaams Blok (recently renamed 'Vlaams Belang'), the Belgian *Front National*, the Danish People's Party, the Danish Progress Party, the French *Front National*, the French Mouvement National Républicain, the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn and the Norwegian Progress Party – 'new radical right-wing parties'. However, there will be reasons to look specifically at the question of whether the Dutch and the Norwegian cases differ from the other cases in any systematic way.

Given the centrality of the immigration issue for these parties, many observers have turned to immigration-related factors to explain their emergence and electoral mobilisation. This research has convincingly shown that immigration scepticism (i.e., wanting to reduce immigration) is one of the principal factors for predicting who will vote for a radical right-wing party, a finding that is also supported in this study. However, earlier studies have often uncritically equated such attitudes with xenophobia or even racism. Yet, there are no *a priori* reasons to expect that all immigration sceptics are also xenophobes or racists, and the extent to which they are is of course an empirical question. By using data from the first round of the European Social Survey (2003) involving six West European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway),[1] I will in the first section of this article differentiate between attitudes expressing immigration scepticism and xenophobic attitudes.[2] The analyses indicate that xenophobic attitudes are a far less significant factor than immigration scepticism for predicting who will vote for the new radical right.

Earlier research on the radical right's political programmes and discourses has identified four main themes, or frames, related to immigration (Betz & Johnson 2004; Rydgren 2003a; Zaslove 2004b). Radical right-wing parties have framed immigrants as problems because they are: a threat to the national identity; a major cause of criminality and social unrest; a cause of unemployment; and abusers of the welfare state. However, there have been no previous studies of how effective these frames have been in mobilising voter support. Data from the European Social Survey will permit me, in the second section of this article, to analyse the extent to which these frames resonate with attitudes held by voters who support the radical right, and the extent to which they make a difference for their decision to vote for the radical right. The analyses indicate that frames linking immigration to criminality and to social unrest are particularly effective discursive strategies to mobilise voter support for the radical right.

The third section of the article, finally, will discuss two alternative theories of why some voters (rather than others) become immigration sceptics and thus become more likely to support radical right-wing parties: ethnic competition theory and the contact hypothesis. Two principal hypotheses follow from these theories: that the radical right will be more successful in areas with many immigrants, and that voters with heterogeneous friendship networks are less likely to vote for the radical right. Earlier research, using macro-level measures and comparisons, has not been able to address the first hypothesis without falling into the ecological fallacy of inferring individual characteristics from macro-level characteristics. In this study, by contrast, I use data from the European Social Survey on people's self-reported degree of ethnic heterogeneity of their area of residence, as well as of their friendship networks. Both ethnic competition theory and ethnic contact theory receive less support than expected, which indicates that earlier research may have overestimated the significance of these factors. Hence, the aim of this study is not to present a full explanation of the rise of radical right-wing parties and why such parties have been successful in some countries but failed in others. The aim is more mundane: to examine critically some key factors that have been very popular in such explanations (see Rydgren 2007).[3]

Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists?

The ideology and discourse of the new radical right-wing parties are based on ethno-nationalism and opposition to immigration and the multicultural/multiethnic society. This fact has led some scholars to view immigration scepticism, xenophobia and/or racism as the main reasons – and sometimes the sole

reasons (e.g., Mitra 1988) – why these parties have emerged and established themselves in a number of Western European countries. To believe that anti-immigration attitudes are a very important factor for explaining the electoral mobilisation of radical right-wing parties makes some intuitive sense. Although the anti-immigration nexus is only a part of a wider web of issues (Mudde 1999), it is at the core of the radical right-wing parties' political programmes and dominates the images voters have of these parties.

Earlier research results were consistent with the hypothesis that anti-immigration attitudes are an important factor for predicting who will vote for radical right-wing populist parties (e.g., Lubbers & Scheepers 2000; Lubbers et al. 2002; Norris 2005). Even if not all voters who are sceptical of immigration vote for radical right-wing parties, most voters who do vote for those parties have such attitudes. As cross tabulation of data from the European Social Survey shows, when asked if they wanted to allow many immigrants to come to their country, some immigrants, only a few, or none at all, almost none of the voters who voted for the radical right wanted to allow many immigrants into their country (less then 2.5 per cent of the voters). On the other hand, 93 per cent of those who voted for the FPÖ wanted to accept only a few immigrants into Austria or none at all. This should be compared to 64 per cent of those who did not vote for the FPÖ. The corresponding figures are 76 per cent of radical right-wing voters (versus 41 per cent of other voters) in Belgium, 89 per cent (versus 44 per cent) in Denmark, 82 per cent (versus 44 per cent) in France, 70 per cent (versus 39 per cent) in Norway and 63 per cent (versus 39 per cent) in the Netherlands. Not surprisingly, logistic regression analysis (Table 1) shows that in all six countries voters who wanted to stop immigration, as well as those who wanted to allow only a few immigrants, were significantly more likely to vote for the radical right.[4] These associations are very robust and remain significant after controlling for socio-demographical variables in Model 3.[5]

Earlier research provides very little guidance about what kind of anti-immigration attitudes drive voters to support the radical right-wing parties. Does such support come primarily from immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racist voters? These categories overlap, but not symmetrically: racist voters are probably xenophobic and immigration sceptics as well, but xenophobic voters are not necessarily racists and immigration sceptics are neither necessarily xenophobes nor racists.

More specifically, xenophobia may be characterised as believing that it is 'natural' for people to live among others of 'their own kind', along with a corresponding hostility toward people of 'another' kind. However, this hostility need not be activated until 'strangers' come too close to the ingroup (in geographical or social space) and are believed to threaten the identity (consensual beliefs and practices, mores and traditional values) or the material

Table 1. Who votes for the radical right: immigration sceptics or xenophobes? Logistic regression analyses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Austria			
Allow no immigrants	6.18***	7.96***	4.19*
Allow few immigrants	4.28**	4.92***	3.07*
Immigrant as boss	0.99		1.02
Strongly opposed to immigrant as boss		0.71	
Immigrant as wife	1.13		1.10
Strongly opposed to immigrant as wife		2.62	
Low educated			–
Mid educated			1.06
Household's income			0.98
Age			0.99
Pseudo-R^2	0.062	0.052	0.048
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.016
Log likelihood	–246.53	–248.81	–170.52
N	1,133	1,133	805
Belgium			
Allow no immigrants	4.12***	4.38***	4.04***
Allow few immigrants	2.23***	2.40**	1.84
Immigrant as boss	1.02		0.98
Strongly opposed to immigrant as boss		1.21	
Immigrant as wife	1.12*		1.19**
Strongly opposed to immigrant as wife		1.98*	
Low educated			1.76
Mid educated			3.21**
Household's income			1.07
Age			0.98*
Pseudo-R^2	0.087	0.084	0.137
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–258.41	–259.18	–210.34
N	1,051	1,051	904
Denmark			
Allow no immigrants	12.52***	12.54***	12.23***
Allow few immigrants	5.97***	6.14***	6.20***
Immigrant as boss	1.14**		1.13**
Strongly opposed to immigrant as boss		2.10*	

Table 1. Continued.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Immigrant as wife	0.94		0.94
Strongly opposed to immigrant as wife		0.97	
Low educated			1.89
Mid educated			3.07**
Household's income			0.93
Age			0.99
Pseudo-R^2	0.125	0.122	0.165
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–293.46	–294.51	–252.36
N	1,153	1,153	1,047
France			
Allow no immigrants	4.49**	4.74**	3.09*
Allow few immigrants	4.14***	4.46***	3.76***
Immigrant as boss	1.05		1.04
Strongly opposed to immigrant as boss		1.48	
Immigrant as wife	1.07		1.06
Strongly opposed to immigrant as wife		1.57	
Low educated			3.08*
Mid educated			2.49*
Household's income			0.97
Age			0.98
Pseudo-R^2	0.098	0.097	0.118
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–180.46	–180.76	–168.00
N	763	763	703
Netherlands			
Allow no immigrants	2.81***	3.01***	2.79***
Allow few immigrants	2.25***	2.33***	2.17***
Immigrant as boss	1.05		1.05
Strongly opposed to immigrant as boss		1.21	
Immigrant as wife	1.05		1.07*
Strongly opposed to immigrant as wife		1.65**	
Low educated			1.04
Mid educated			1.36
Household's income			1.00
Age			0.99**

Table 1. Continued.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Pseudo-R^2	0.058	0.057	0.68
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–699.69	–701.02	–599.28
N	1,858	1,858	1,642
Norway			
Allow no immigrants	6.40***	7.11***	6.84***
Allow few immigrants	2.38***	2.59***	2.26***
Immigrant as boss	1.06		1.05
Strongly opposed to immigrant as boss		1.42	
Immigrant as wife	1.04		1.06*
Strongly opposed to immigrant as wife		1.22	
Low educated			–
Mid educated			2.70***
Household's income			0.98
Age			0.98***
Pseudo-R^2	0.098	0.094	0.131
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–608.23	–610.87	–567.16
N	1,546	1,546	1,500

Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level. ** Significant at the 0.01 level. *** Significant at the 0.001 level.

interests of the ingroup. Strangers at a distance will not meet the same hostility or be as feared. The ambiguous etymological meaning of xenophobia, fear of strangers or guests, is thus very apt: it is strangers as unwanted *guests* who are feared or met with hostility. Racism, on the other hand, is traditionally understood as an ideology that claims the fundamental inequality and hierarchical order of different biologically defined races. After the Second World War and the experience of German Nazism, this traditional racism has lost much of its power in Western Europe, even though it still exists. Instead, many argue that a new type of racism has emerged in the postwar era (Barker 1981; Miles 1989, 1993; Wieviorka 1998). This new form of racism, which Taguieff (1988) calls '*racisme différencialiste*' and Wieviorka (1998) calls '*racisme culturelle*', is not based on biology and hierarchies, but on culture and difference. This new racism does not argue that some races are superior or inferior, but rather stresses the insurmountable difference between culturally defined *ethnies* (Wieviorka 1998: 32). According to the new cultural racism, a merging of

different ethnic groups would lead to the abolition of the unique qualities that constitute the *ethnies*, which accordingly implies that different ethnic groups should be kept separated. As will be further discussed below, it is upon this idea that the ideology of the new radical right-wing parties is built.

It is a reasonable assumption that many immigration sceptic voters are also xenophobes, and that some of them are also racists. Cross tabulation of data from the European Social Survey show that 28 per cent of voters who want to stop immigration are also strongly against having an immigrant of another race or ethnic group as a boss, compared to 7 per cent of voters who want to allow a few immigrants, 2 per cent of those who want to allow some immigrants, and 1 per cent of those who want to allow many; and that 33 per cent of voters who want a stop to immigration (compared to 9 per cent of voters who want to allow a few immigrants, 4 per cent of those who want to allow some immigrants and 3 per cent of those who want to allow many) would strongly oppose a relative marrying an immigrant of another race or ethnic group.[6] Unfortunately in this context there are no good proxies for measuring racist attitudes. However, as is indicated by these figures, it should be emphasised that there are a number of additional reasons other than xenophobic or racist attitudes for people wanting to reduce immigration to a country. Logistic regression analysis (Table 1) also shows that being against immigration, or only wanting to accept a few immigrants to the country, are considerably more effective variables than xenophobic attitudes (operationalised as attitudes toward having an immigrant as a boss, or toward a relative being married to an immigrant) for predicting who will vote for the radical right-wing parties.[7] The first model includes the variables 'immigrant as boss' and 'immigrant as wife', which are ordinal variables ranging from 0 = 'do not mind at all having an immigrant as boss' (or seeing a relative marrying an immigrant) to 10 = 'do mind a lot'. We would expect to see positive associations – that is, that voters become more likely to vote for the radical right for every step they move up the scale. However, when controlling for immigration scepticism we only found a significant (positive) association for the variable 'immigrant as boss' in the case of Denmark; for the variable 'immigrant as wife' we only found a significant (positive) association in the case of Belgium. When controlling for socio-demographic variables in Model 3, we also found significant positive associations for the latter variable in the cases of Norway and the Netherlands.

Yet, there are good theoretical reasons for looking specifically at voters who have strong preferences for or against this or that, because strong preferences are more likely than weak ones to make a difference in voting decisions. In Model 2, therefore, I have included the variables 'strongly opposed to immigrant as boss' and 'strongly opposed to immigrant as wife', which were coded 1 for voters who scored 8 to 10 on the corresponding scales (whereas

other voters were coded 0). Here we found significant (positive) associations only in the case of Denmark, where voters who were strongly against the idea of having an immigrant as a boss were 2.1 times more likely to vote for the radical right compared to other voters, and in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, where voters strongly opposed to relatives marrying immigrants were, respectively, 1.9 and 1.7 times more likely than other voters to vote for the radical right.

These results indicate that explanations of the emergence of radical right-wing parties that focus on increased xenophobia among voters should be met with some caution. In these analyses we find relatively weak micro-level support for this assertion. So far, the results rather suggest that the new radical right is primarily supported by voters who are more unhappy than average about the prevailing immigration policy (i.e., who believe that the immigration rate is too high) and that xenophobic attitudes only play a secondary role. However, it is far too early to jump to conclusions; for one thing, we will first have to deal more specifically with how the various anti-immigration and anti-immigrant frames employed by the radical right-wing parties resonate among their voters.

Anti-immigrant frames

As has been indicated above, the new radical right gives priority to issues related to national identity. More specifically, the new radical right builds on the idea of ethno-pluralism, an idea that largely agrees with right-wing ideas going back to Herder (Berlin 1976; Holmes 2000), and that in modern times was elaborated by the French *Nouvelle Droite*. The notion of ethno-pluralism states that in order to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separated; mixing different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction (see Griffin 2000; Minkenberg 1997; Taguieff 1988). Yet, as was discussed above, contrary to traditional racism, the doctrine of ethno-pluralism is not hierarchical: different ethnicities are not necessary superior or inferior, only different and incompatible (Betz & Johnson 2004; Taguieff 1988). By employing an ethno-pluralist ideology, the radical right-wing parties claim the right of European national cultures to protect their cultural identities. According to the new radical right, there are several threats against their national identity, of which the alleged 'invasion' of immigrants is the most important. Immigrants from the Muslim countries are singled out as particularly threatening to European values, allegedly because they are the least compatible and the least inclined to assimilation (see, e.g., Zaslove 2004b). A further theme of this doctrine is that different cultures and ethnicities can

never co-exist peacefully. A peaceful society, according to the ethno-pluralists, requires an ethnically homogeneous population.

It has been suggested that popular xenophobia and ethnocentrism that resonate with the ethno-pluralist theme have grown more common and/or important as a result of 'a crisis of national identity among the postindustrial democracies brought about by the transformation into a multicultural society' (Knigge 1998: 271). As Koopmans et al. (2005: 5) have argued, for instance, many people experience a loss of identity as a result of globalisation, and because there 'is nothing beyond the nation-state that can serve as a new anchor for collective identities and can renew the sense of control', people turn to nationalism as a way to find such anchorage. We would therefore expect ethno-nationalist xenophobia to be particularly important for the electoral mobilisation of radical right-wing parties. We would also expect ethno-nationalist attitudes to be more important in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and France than in the Netherlands and Norway, whose radical right-wing parties have used the ethno-nationalist frame in a relatively less pronounced way.

Yet, the ethno-pluralist frame is not the only strategy the new radical right-wing parties have used to denounce immigration (and immigrants). These parties have framed immigrants as problems in four different ways: first, as already mentioned above, as a threat to ethno-national identity; second, as a major cause of criminality and other kinds of social insecurity; third, as a cause of unemployment; and fourth, as abusers of the generosity of the welfare states of Western democracies, which results in fewer state subsidies and the like for 'natives'. Only the first two of these frames can be treated as a manifestation of the ethno-pluralist doctrine (i.e., that different ethnicities should not 'mix' lest cultural specificities disappear and insecurity and crime increase), whereas the last two can be treated as part of a welfare chauvinist doctrine in which immigrants and 'natives' are depicted as competing for limited economic resources. In such a conflict situation, immigrants are portrayed as illegitimate competitors, pitted against 'natives' who are *entitled* to keep the entire cake for themselves. Hence, in this view immigration is seen as a zero-sum game in which one side always loses what the other side gains. In addressing welfare chauvinist frames, the new radical right-wing parties have used the idea of 'national preference': giving 'natives' priority in jobs, housing, health care and so on – a proposal that can be characterised as 'reversed affirmative action' (e.g., Zaslove 2004a; Rydgren 2003a, 2003b).

However, although these anti-immigration and anti-immigrant frames dominate the ideological programme and discourse of the new radical right-wing parties, we do not quite know from earlier research how effective the ethno-pluralist and welfare-chauvinist frames are in mobilising voters to the radical right. Do these frames resonate with the attitudes held by supporters,

and do they make a difference for people's decision whether or not to vote for the radical right? If not, we cannot really use them as explanations of the emergence of the new radical right as an electoral force. In order to deal with this important problem I have estimated a number of logistic regression models, which are displayed in Table 2.

The first two models test different attitudes related to the ethno-pluralist frame: a strong belief that society will be better if everyone shares customs and traditions; a strong belief that a country that wants to reduce tension should stop immigration; a strong disbelief that society will be better with a variety of different religions; and a related belief that a Christian background is an important qualification for immigration.[8] In addition, I have added a proxy for 'old' racism: the extent to which being white is seen as an important qualification for immigration. For the two last variables ('Christian immigrants' and 'white immigrants'), I have used ordinal variables for Model 1, ranging between 0 = 'extremely unimportant qualification' to 10 = 'extremely important qualification', and dummy variables for Model 2, in which voters scoring 8 or more on the corresponding scales have been coded 1 and other voters 0.

From the logistic regression analyses we see that the frame that links immigration and multiculturalism to tension seems particularly effective in attracting voters. For the variable 'stop immigration to reduce tension' we found a significant positive association for all six countries, and voters who strongly believe in the need to stop immigration in order to reduce tension in society were between 2.0 times more likely (in Norway) and 6.3 times more likely (in Belgium) to vote for the radical right, compared to voters who neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that immigration must be stopped in order to reduce tension.[9] These associations were shown to be robust: with the exception of the Netherlands, they remain significant after controlling for socio-demographic variables in Model 6. On the other hand, for the variable 'better if everyone shares customs', we found significant associations only in Belgium and the Netherlands, whereas we found (weak) significant positive associations for the variables measuring beliefs in the virtue of religious homogeneity only in the case of Denmark. Attitudes toward skin colour were significantly associated with a higher likelihood for voting for the radical right in Norway alone and, when controlling for a variety of additional variables in Model 5, in Austria.

In models 3 and 4, two additional variables related to the ethno-pluralist frame were tested: whether the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants; and whether immigration is making the country's crime problems worse or better. I also tested two variables related to the welfare chauvinist frame: whether immigrants take jobs away or create new jobs; and whether immigrants take more from the welfare system than they

Table 2. Anti-immigration frames and the likelihood of voting for the radical right, logistic regression analyses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Austria						
Better if everyone shares customs	1.50	1.50			1.23	1.07
Better with only one religion	0.60	0.59			0.52	0.60
Stop immigration to reduce tension	3.25**	3.20**			2.53*	3.89*
Only allow white immigrants	1.09					1.11
Whiteness as criterion: Strong		1.96			2.50*	
Only allow Christian immigrants	0.96					0.98
Christianity as criterion: Strong		0.82			0.72	
Immigrants take jobs			0.97			1.10
Immigrants take jobs: Strong				0.57	0.46	
Immigrants live on welfare			0.93			0.88
Immigrants live on welfare: Strong				2.21*	1.86	
Immigrants enrich culture			0.79***			0.81*
Immigrants undermine culture: Strong				1.97	1.76	
Immigrants make criminality worse			0.90			0.91
Immigrants make criminality worse: Strong				2.35**	1.58	
Low educated						–
Mid educated						1.13
Household's income						0.95
Age						0.98
Pseudo-R^2	0.070	0.070	0.095	0.068	0.098	0.144
Prob > Chi^2	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
Log likelihood	–233.34	–233.44	–236.95	–244.25	–211.29	–139.77
N	1,076	1,076	1,165	1,165	948	648

Belgium						
Better if everyone shares customs	7.35**	7.24**			12.38*	13.54*
Better with only one religion	1.60	1.63			1.64	1.03
Stop immigration to reduce tension	6.26***	6.32***			5.19***	5.55**
Only allow white immigrants	1.07					0.99
Whiteness as criterion: Strong		1.94			1.73	
Only allow Christian immigrants	0.95					1.02
Christianity as criterion: Strong		0.55			0.56	
Immigrants take jobs			0.98			1.14
Immigrants take jobs: Strong				1.04	0.70	
Immigrants live on welfare			1.15			1.11
Immigrants live on welfare: Strong				1.28	1.08	
Immigrants enrich culture			0.77***			0.80**
Immigrants undermine culture: Strong				1.71	1.20	
Immigrants make criminality worse			0.61***			0.66***
Immigrants make criminality worse: Strong				4.55***	2.83***	
Low educated						1.39
Mid educated						2.31
Household's income						1.05
Age						0.97**
Pseudo-R^2	0.158	0.161	0.149	0.090	0.194	0.272
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–242.01	–241.30	–239.32	–256.08	–221.04	–172.70
N	1,078	1,078	1,096	1,096	1,005	825

Table 2. Continued.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Denmark						
Better if everyone shares customs	1.87	1.77			1.25	0.74
Better with only one religion	2.43*	2.34			2.14	2.39
Stop immigration to reduce tension	2.87*	2.83*			2.71*	2.83*
Only allow white immigrants	0.98					0.99
Whiteness as criterion: Strong		1.08			1.03	
Only allow Christian immigrants	1.03					1.07
Christianity as criterion: Strong		1.49			1.76*	
Immigrants take jobs			0.89			0.83*
Immigrants take jobs: Strong				1.74	2.43*	
Immigrants live on welfare			1.05			1.15*
Immigrants live on welfare: Strong				1.15	0.85	
Immigrants enrich culture			0.78***			0.87*
Immigrants undermine culture: Strong				2.11*	1.21	
Immigrants make criminality worse			0.78**			0.87
Immigrants make criminality worse: Strong				3.29***	1.95*	
Low educated						4.19
Mid educated						2.55*
Household's income						0.90
Age						1.00
Pseudo-R^2	0.134	0.137	0.122	0.089	0.180	0.220
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–282.09	–281.12	–277.75	–287.95	–241.82	–210.02
N	1,099	1,099	1,099	1,099	993	917

France						
Better if everyone shares customs	1.45	1.43			1.17	0.79
Better with only one religion	2.83	2.85			2.25	2.16
Stop immigration to reduce tension	3.73**	3.75**			2.97*	2.86*
Only allow white immigrants	1.03					1.03
Whiteness as criterion: Strong		0.91			0.77	
Only allow Christian immigrants	0.96					0.96
Christianity as criterion: Strong		0.97			0.86	
Immigrants take jobs			0.78***			0.84*
Immigrants take jobs: Strong				1.89	1.48	
Immigrants live on welfare			1.00			0.97
Immigrants live on welfare: Strong				1.47	1.08	
Immigrants enrich culture			0.92			0.99
Immigrants undermine culture: Strong				1.46	1.09	
Immigrants make criminality worse			0.80*			0.88
Immigrants make criminality worse: Strong				2.92**	2.07	
Low educated						3.42*
Mid educated						2.28
Household's income						1.05
Age						0.98
Pseudo-R^2	0.167	0.166	0.133	0.103	0.190	0.224
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–165.15	–165.40	–173.20	–179.08	–156.87	–140.84
N	771	771	758	758	744	687

Table 2. Continued.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Netherlands						
Better if everyone shares customs	2.19**	2.15**			1.72*	1.45
Better with only one religion	1.77	1.74			1.68	1.31
Stop immigration to reduce tension	1.84*	1.89*			1.40	1.59
Only allow white immigrants	1.06					1.05
Whiteness as criterion: Strong		1.42			1.20	
Only allow Christian immigrants	0.92**					0.92*
Christianity as criterion: Strong		0.75			0.74	
Immigrants take jobs			0.98			1.03
Immigrants take jobs: Strong				1.05	0.85	
Immigrants live on welfare			0.98			0.99
Immigrants live on welfare: Strong				1.44*	1.26	
Immigrants enrich culture			0.83***			0.86***
Immigrants undermine culture: Strong				2.06**	1.40	
Immigrants make criminality worse			0.78***			0.86**
Immigrants make criminality worse: Strong				2.62***	1.88***	
Low educated						0.79
Mid educated						1.13
Household's income						0.96
Age						0.98**
Pseudo-R^2	0.096	0.092	0.080	0.063	0.118	0.136
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–670.20	–673.23	–648.06	–659.67	–613.40	–527.39
N	1,858	1,858	1,782	1,782	1,747	1,559

Norway						
Better if everyone shares customs	1.57	1.52			0.95	0.89
Better with only one religion	1.48	1.36			1.17	1.20
Stop immigration to reduce tension	2.04*	1.96*			1.80	2.11*
Only allow white immigrants	1.06					1.08*
Whiteness as criterion: Strong		1.80*			1.51	
Only allow Christian immigrants	0.96					0.96
Christianity as criterion: Strong		1.12			1.06	
Immigrants take jobs			0.94			1.01
Immigrants take jobs: Strong				1.06	0.99	
Immigrants live on welfare			0.94			0.97
Immigrants live on welfare: Strong				1.38	1.08	
Immigrants enrich culture			0.75***			0.82***
Immigrants undermine culture: Strong				3.31***	2.44**	
Immigrants make criminality worse			0.94			0.97
Immigrants make criminality worse: Strong				2.21***	1.70**	
Low educated						–
Mid educated						2.35***
Household's income						0.99
Age						0.99**
Pseudo-R^2	0.100	0.102	0.094	0.067	0.121	0.15
Prob > Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	–610.52	–609.65	–600.03	–617.58	–578.00	–542.23
N	1,543	1,543	1,524	1,524	1,509	1,464

Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level. ** Significant at the 0.01 level. *** Significant at the 0.001 level.

contribute.[10] In Model 3, I have used ordinal variables ranging from 0 = 'cultural life undermined' to 10 = 'cultural life enriched'; between 0 = 'crime problems made worse' to 10 = 'crime problems made better'; between 0 = 'take jobs away' to 10 = 'create new jobs'; and between 0 = 'take out more than they put in' to 10 = 'put in more than they take out'. Here we expect negative associations: voters become less likely to vote for the radical right for every step they move up the scales. For Model 4, I have used dummy variables coded 1 for voters scoring 0–2 on respective scale, whereas other voters were coded 0.

Here logistic regression analyses indicate that frames that relate immigration and criminality are particularly effective in mobilising electoral support for the radical right-wing parties. In all six countries, voters who strongly believed that immigration exacerbates the country's crime problem were significantly more likely to vote for the radical right. Models 3 and 4 also showed that attitudes related to the frame that blames immigration for the loss of national identity have been effective for the new radical right-wing parties in attracting voters. For the variable 'immigrants enrich culture', we found the expected significant associations in all countries except France. However, the hypothesis that welfare chauvinist frames are important discursive strategies used by the radical right to mobilise voters receives considerably less support; attitudes related to these frames are only significantly associated with a higher likelihood to vote for the radical right in France and, when controlling for socio-demographic variables in Model 6, in Denmark ('immigrants take jobs'), and in Austria and the Netherlands ('immigrants live on welfare').[11]

The ethnic competition hypothesis versus the contact hypothesis

In earlier research, we find two dominant theories that link immigration and attitudes toward immigration to the emergence of the new radical right as an electoral force. The first focuses on the alleged increase in popular xenophobia (as discussed above); the second is the so-called 'ethnic competition theory'. According to the ethnic competition thesis, voters turn to the new radical right because they want to reduce competition from immigrants over scarce resources such as in the labour market, housing, welfare benefits and even the marriage market (Fennema 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Kriesi 1999; see also Blalock 1957, 1967; Olzak 1992; Pettigrew 1957). Hence, ethnic competition makes voters sceptical of immigration, but does not necessarily make them more xenophobic in the strict sense. This idea received some support in the first two regression models specified above (Table 1), where anti-immigration attitudes – but only to a lesser extent, xenophobic attitudes – made voters significantly more likely to vote for radical right-wing parties. Yet, voters who

espouse attitudes related to welfare chauvinistic frames (such as 'immigrants take our jobs' and 'immigrants drain the welfare state of resources') were significantly more likely to vote for the new radical right-wing parties in only a few countries (Table 2).

However, two additional hypotheses follow from ethnic competition theory: that radical right-wing parties will be more successful in areas with many immigrants, where this kind of competition is more manifest; and that the radical right-wing parties will be supported primarily by voters who are more likely to be confronted by competition from immigrants – that is, by lower educated, unskilled, male voters who aspire to the same jobs and consumer goods as many immigrant groups in Western Europe (Fennema 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Kriesi 1999; see also Olzak 1992).

Let us start with the second hypothesis, which will not receive much attention in this study. Earlier empirical research clearly showed that workers and the 'old' middle classes are over-represented among the new radical right voters (Ivarsflaten 2005: 465; Lubbers et al. 2002: 364; Norris 2005: 139), as are male voters (Givens 2004). When it comes to education, however, empirical findings deviate somewhat from the expected. Although support for the new radical right-wing parties varies inversely with the level of education – lower educated voters are over-represented and highly educated voters are under-represented (Lubbers et al. 2002) – the relationship seems to be curvilinear. The new radical right receives its strongest support from the mid-school stratum (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Evans 2005). However, although earlier research largely supported the second hypothesis derived from ethnic competition theory, it should be emphasised that these voter groups may be motivated to vote for the radical right for a variety of other reasons than the desire to reduce ethnic competition.

Concerning the first hypothesis, Knigge (1998) and Lubbers et al. (2002) showed that the electoral results of new radical right-wing parties correlate positively with the number of immigrants in a country, and Swank and Betz (2003) and Van der Brug et al. (2005) have shown that the same holds true for the number of asylum seekers. However, Golder (2003) showed a positive relationship between the proportion of immigrants in a country and electoral turnout for the new radical right only in situations in which the unemployment rates exceeded 1.3 per cent, while the analyses of Norris (2005) failed to show a significant relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and electoral popularity of the new radical right-wing parties. Nor did possible interaction effects between such indicators of ethnic heterogeneity and unemployment prove significant.

However, although these results are largely consistent with the first hypothesis derived from ethnic competition theory, I would dispute that the theory as

such has been supported. The reason is that earlier studies have used the wrong level of analysis, the comparative national level (including measures of the number of immigrants or asylum seekers in a country). Yet although some ethnic competition is due to the national proportion of foreign-borns (i.e., competition over welfare benefits), most competition is more local in character. It is an ecological fallacy to conclude from country-level data that voters living in ethnically heterogeneous countries also live in ethnically heterogeneous local settings. Some of them probably do, but many others do not, and we do not know from these studies whether those who vote for the new radical right-wing parties belong to the former or the latter category. In order to test this hypothesis more thoroughly, more fine-grained analysis (and data) is needed. A first step in this direction was taken by Bon and Cheylan (1988), who in their study of Toulouse and Marseille showed that the vote for the French *Front National* was higher among voters living *close* to areas with a high concentration of non-European immigrants than for those living *within* these areas. This study will take matters one step further by using individual-level data on the ethnic heterogeneity of people's area of residence.

However, before accounting for these results, I find it necessary to discuss another popular theory: the contact hypothesis, which focuses on xenophobia rather than on ethnic competition. The contact hypothesis assumes that contact between members of different ethnic groups will reduce prejudice and xenophobia (Allport 1954). The reason for this assumption is that encounters increase firsthand information about ethnic outgroup members, which increases the likelihood that ethnic stereotypes and prejudice will be falsified. As a result, interethnic contact may lead to increased awareness that ethnic outgroups are as heterogeneous as the ethnic ingroup – that is, that *they* are not all the same (see Rydgren 2004). However, as Allport (1954) was already well aware, certain conditions must be fulfilled before increased contact between individuals from different ethnic groups leads to reduced prejudice and xenophobia, especially the *acquaintance potential* criterion: the contact should be of such frequency, duration and closeness that it has the potential to lead to meaningful relationships between the individuals concerned, and that contacts be symmetrical (i.e., interacting parties be of approximately equal status in the encounter situation) (see Allport 1954; Forbes 1997; Pettigrew 1998 for additional conditions).

We must thus distinguish between *casual contacts* and *true acquaintance* (Forbes 1997: 20). Casual contacts that cross ethnic boundaries are the kinds of contacts that cannot be avoided in ethnically heterogeneous areas, and that occur when people bump into each other over the course of everyday activity – as when people travel on the same bus or buy a pack of cigarettes in the drugstore. Such contacts will probably not provide relevant new information about ethnic outgroups; they do not promote increased interethnic familiarity

and are unlikely to reduce prejudice. On the contrary, casual contacts are likely to increase stereotypes and prejudices by providing highly biased information about the outgroup (Rydgren 2004; cf. Forbes 1997: 20). Ethnic integration, however, which here should be understood as the number of ethnically heterogeneous ties in a network (see Breiger 1974: 184), is likely to lower intergroup hostility. The reason for this assumption is that such network ties reduce the information asymmetry between ingroup and outgroup, which undermines the power of stereotypes and prejudice and increases bilateral trust (cf. Hechter et al. 1982: 424).

The hypothesis that voters with ethnically heterogeneous friendship networks are less likely to vote for a radical right-wing party follows from contact theory. In Table 3, logistic regression analyses (models 1 and 2) provide some support for ethnic competition theory – albeit considerably weaker than expected. Only in Denmark and the Netherlands were voters who resided in areas with many immigrants and other ethnic minorities significantly more likely to vote for a radical right party than voters who resided in ethnically homogeneous areas.[12] This was also the case in Belgium, but only after controlling for socio-demographic variables in Model 4. These results clearly qualify the results from the country-level studies reported above, and future research should more explicitly address why ethnic competition theory works better for the specific cases of Denmark and the Netherlands than for the other four countries. The hypothesis derived from contact theory also receives weaker support than expected: only in Belgium and Norway are voters who lack immigrant friends significantly more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party. Controlling for interaction effects (Model 3) does not change the results in any substantial way. Nor does controlling for socio-demographic variables in Model 4 (and possible interaction effects involving education; not shown in the table) change the results substantially. However, it should be emphasised that the data suffer from one important limitation in this case: they do not allow us to distinguish between European and non-European immigrants. We should thus be very cautious when evaluating the effect of the contact hypothesis: we may for good reasons assume that it is principally contacts with non-European immigrants that would matter. Yet, this analysis points out two important things: the fact that, in four out of six countries, voters lacking *both* European and non-European immigrant friends are not significantly more likely to vote for the radical right, compared to voters who have several European and/or non-European friends; and, in particular, the need to collect better data in the future. As of today, most cross-national surveys include rather poor relational data, which is unfortunate as it makes it considerably more difficult to analyse quantitatively questions related to ethnic relations in a theoretically tenable way.

Table 3. Ethnic competition theory, the contact hypothesis and the vote for the radical right, logistic regression analyses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Austria				
No immigrant friends		1.70	1.48	2.20
Live in heterogeneous area	1.21	1.35	0.87	1.81
Live in area with some minority	0.85	0.89	0.87	1.10
Heterogeneous area*No immigrant friends			2.03	
Low education				–
Mid education				1.41
Household's income				1.00
Age				1.00
Pseudo-R^2	0.002	0.011	0.013	0.023
Prob > Chi^2	0.592	0.225	0.239	0.319
Log likelihood	–268.05	–262.31	–261.77	–171.43
N	1,279	1,269	1,269	896
Belgium				
No immigrant friends		3.92**	3.95*	3.50*
Live in heterogeneous area	1.55	1.83	1.88	2.45*
Live in area with some minority	0.84	0.96	0.96	1.19
Heterogeneous area*No immigrant friends			0.96	
Low education				4.40**
Mid education				5.30***
Household's income				1.08
Age				0.99
Pseudo-R^2	0.003	0.022	0.022	0.070
Prob > Chi^2	0.381	0.012	0.025	0.000
Log likelihood	–296.27	–290.40	–290.40	–238.10
N	1,173	1,167	1,167	998
Denmark				
No immigrant friends		3.05	3.07	2.94
Live in heterogeneous area	1.78	2.07*	2.10	1.55
Live in area with some minority	0.66	0.74	0.74	0.76
Heterogeneous area*No immigrant friends			0.97	
Low education				2.68
Mid education				4.77***

Table 3. Continued.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Household's income				0.89*
Age				1.00
Pseudo-R^2	0.009	0.021	0.021	0.071
Prob > Chi2	0.043	0.005	0.010	0.000
Log likelihood	–347.68	–343.25	–343.25	–293.53
N	1,221	1,220	1,220	1,096
France				
No immigrant friends		1.13	1.20	0.66
Live in heterogeneous area	0.73	0.74	0.82	0.72
Live in area with some minority	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.85
Heterogeneous area*No immigrant friends			0.69	
Low education				5.49***
Mid education				3.66**
Household's income				0.96
Age				0.99
Pseudo-R^2	0.002	0.003	0.021	0.054
Prob > Chi^2	0.714	0.842	0.010	0.011
Log likelihood	–194.93	–194.49	–194.40	–175.28
N	766	765	765	700
Netherlands				
No immigrant friends		1.15	1.26	1.13
Live in heterogeneous area	2.22***	2.30***	3.00***	2.40***
Live in area with some minority	0.96	1.00	1.01	0.96
Heterogeneous area*No immigrant friends			0.60	
Low education				1.44
Mid education				1.74**
Household's income				0.99
Age				0.99**
Pseudo-R^2	0.009	0.011	0.012	0.027
Prob > Chi^2	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.000
Log likelihood	–742.95	–739.45	–738.77	–627.22
N	1,864	1,863	1,863	1,638
Norway				
No immigrant friends		1.84**	1.71*	1.80**

Table 3. Continued.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Live in heterogeneous area	1.25	1.39	0.88	1.23
Live in area with some minority	0.98	1.06	1.05	1.04
Heterogeneous area*No immigrant friends			2.47	
Low education				–
Mid education				3.57***
Household's income				0.96
Age				0.99*
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.010	0.012	0.054
Prob > Chi^2	0.706	0.009	0.007	0.000
Log likelihood	–677.56	–671.21	–669.89	–621.25
N	1,539	1,539	1,539	1,493

Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level. ** Significant at the 0.01 level. *** Significant at the 0.001 level.

Conclusions

The results of this study clearly question the tendency of much earlier research to equate immigration scepticism, xenophobia and racism. The fact that the radical right-wing parties pursue xenophobic political programmes and discourses does not automatically imply that xenophobic attitudes among the voters are a major reason why these parties get the support they do in elections. Contrary to expectations, xenophobic attitudes, operationalised as being strongly against having an immigrant as a boss and as being strongly opposed to the idea of a relative marrying an immigrant, were a far less significant factor than immigration scepticism for predicting who will vote for the radical right.

In a similar vein, earlier research has sometimes, quite problematically, inferred from the discourse of the radical right-wing parties (which is dominated by anti-immigration and anti-immigrant themes) that ethnonationalism (and more specifically the ethno-pluralist doctrine) and various welfare chauvinist frames have been important instruments for mobilising voter support. However, a minimum requirement for the truth of such assumptions is that the attitudes held by supporters resonate with these frames, and that such attitudes make a difference for people's decision to support the radical right. This article shows that this was clearly the case with frames that link immigration to criminality and to social tension, and also

with frames that link immigration to the loss of cultural distinction and national identity. The Dutch and the Norwegian cases do not differ from the other cases in any systematic way. Yet, in most countries we did not find significant associations, or only weak significant associations, for frames that link immigration to job losses and the welfare chauvinist frame that immigrants drain the welfare system of resources. Moreover, given the increasingly prominent place of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam frames in the rhetoric of radical right-wing parties, we might have expected to find significant positive associations between the variables 'better with only one religion' and 'only allow Christian immigrants' and the likelihood of voting for the radical right. However, in five out of six countries, we did not find such associations.

In order to answer the question why some voters rather than others become sceptical of immigration, and thus become more likely radical right-wing voters, earlier research has argued that voters who live in immigration-dense areas, and who want to reduce competition from immigrants over scarce resources such as jobs and housing, have stronger reasons for wanting to limit or stop immigration. However, most support for this hypothesis comes from national-level comparative studies – a research design that is not suited for testing this kind of hypothesis. This study shows that only in Denmark and the Netherlands were voters who live in immigration-dense areas significantly more likely to vote for the radical right, which clearly indicates that earlier research overestimated this factor. A more fine-grained comparative case study is warranted to determine why Denmark and the Netherlands are exceptional cases in this regard. Equally unexpected was the relatively weak support for the hypothesis that voters who lack immigrant friends would be more likely to support the radical right, although data limitations urge us to interpret these results with caution.

Notes

1. The reason why these countries were selected (and not, e.g., Germany, Sweden or the United Kingdom) is that they harbour radical right-wing parties whose electoral support is large enough to support meaningful quantitative analyses.
2. Data for the first round of the European Social Survey were collected in 2002 and 2003. The response rate varied among countries, and was: 60.4 per cent in Austria (2,257 completed interviews); 59.2 per cent in Belgium (1,899); 67.6 per cent in Denmark (1,506); 43.1 per cent in France (1,503); 67.9 per cent in the Netherlands (2,364); and 65 per cent in Norway (2,036). Hence, the results should be interpreted with some caution, especially those based on the French data. For more information about the European Social Survey, see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org
3. One important problem with much earlier research is that demand-side factors are inferred from supply-side factors (and sometimes also the other way around; something

that is not discussed in this article). This has largely been the case with xenophobia and with various anti-immigrant frames. However, from the fact that xenophobia has played a very important role in the rhetoric of these parties, we cannot conclude that xenophobic attitudes are an important reason for why some voters rather than others vote for the radical right.

4. For readers who are unfamiliar with logistic regressions, the tables should be read in the following way. Instead of displaying coefficients (b), as is common in OLS regressions, odds ratios (e^b) are used. The odds ratio shows how the odds of the 'event' are influenced by changes in the independent variables. E.g., an odds ratio of 2 means that the odds of the event are doubled by a one-unit increase in the independent variable. A value of 1 means that the change in the independent variable has no effect on the odds, and an odds ratio of 0.5 means that the odds of the event is halved as the independent variable increases by 1. Odds ratios greater than 1 thus signify positive relationships, odds ratios less than 1 negative relationship, and odds ratios equal to 1 no relationship at all. Log likelihood is a value for the overall fit of the model, whereas pseudo-R^2 provides a way to describe or compare the fit of different models for the same dependent variable (cf. Pampel 2000). Here and in the following models, the dependent variable will be 'voted for the radical right in the last national election'. For all countries, voters who voted for the radical right were coded 1 and other voters were coded 0.
5. The only exception is Belgium, where the variable 'allow few immigrants' failed to be significant in Model 3. Yet, the variable 'allow no immigrants' was still highly significantly related to a higher likelihood for voting for the radical right. 'Age' is a continuous variable measured in years. Concerning the variable 'education' people were asked about the highest level of education they had achieved, and the answers were originally coded into the following categories: 'Not completed primary education'; 'Primary or first stage of basic'; 'Lower secondary or second stage of basic'; 'Upper secondary'; 'Post-secondary, non-tertiary'; 'First stage of tertiary'; and 'Second stage of tertiary'. Because of the unclear distance in ranking between these categories, I chose to construct three dummy variables: 'Low educated', which included the first two categories; 'Mid educated', which included the next two categories; and 'High educated', which included the three last categories. 'High educated' was chosen as the reference category. 'Household's income', finally, is an interval-scale variable, where a low net income for the household receives a low value and a high net income a high value. For more information about the intervals, please see the 'fieldwork documents' at http://ess.nsd.uib.no. The reason for including 'household's income' rather than personal income was principally that the latter is more relevant for voting behaviour as it says more about the respondent's economic status.
6. It should be noted that these cross-tabulations involved the whole dataset, which gives an N = 39,166 in the first case and an N = 39,404 in the second.
7. The respondents were asked whether they wanted to allow many people of another race or ethnic group than the majority to come and live in the country: whether they wanted to allow some, a few, or none at all. The alternative 'allow some' was chosen as the reference category.
8. For the first variable, respondents were asked whether they agreed strongly with the statement, 'it is better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions', or agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed, or disagreed strongly. 'Neither agree

nor disagree' was chosen as the reference category. The same alternatives were given to the statements 'it is better for a country if there is a variety of religions' and 'if a country wants to reduce tension it should stop immigration'. 'Neither agree nor disagree' was chosen as the reference category here as well.

9. Cross-tabulation also show that 37 per cent of voters who voted for the FPÖ strongly agreed with the statement that if a country wants to reduce tension it should stop immigration, compared to 14.7 per cent of other Austrian voters. Corresponding figures for Belgium were 40.2 per cent for radical right voters, versus 10.9 per cent of other voters; 28.3 per cent versus 8.3 per cent in Denmark; 45.6 per cent versus 12.2 per cent in France; 19.1 per cent versus 7.6 per cent in the Netherlands; and 9.7 per cent versus 2.9 per cent in Norway. Almost none of the voters who strongly disagreed with this statement voted for a radical right-wing party.
10. I do not deal with the question of whether statements such as 'immigrants take more from the welfare system than they contribute' correspond with reality. What matters is the voters' subjective opinion. However, differences in attitudes between countries may partly, and probably substantially, be caused by differences in the actual situation in those countries.
11. As is shown in Table 2, some of the variables are significant in Model 3, but not in Model 4, and visa versa. In the latter case, this indicates that the group of voters who very strongly believed that immigration leads to these particular problems is more likely to vote for the radical right, but that this association is not linear.
12. Respondents were asked to 'describe the area were you currently live', and were to chose between 'almost nobody minority race/ethnic group', 'some minority race/ethnic group' and 'many minority race/ethnic group'. 'Almost nobody minority race/ethnic group' was chosen as the reference category. Respondents were also asked if they have any friends who have come from other countries to live in the country, and were given the alternatives 'yes, several', 'yes, a few' and 'no, none at all'. 'Yes, several' was chosen as the reference category. 'Friends' is a reasonably good measure of 'true acquaintance' contacts: if anything it implies an even closer, more positive, and more intimate relationship (which means that, from the vantage point of the contact hypothesis, there are even stronger reasons to assume that voters with many immigrant friends would be less likely to vote for the radical right). It should be noted that in these estimations I have excluded all respondents who stated that they belong to a minority ethnic group in the country.

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